ALLIANCE
33: June 1999:
DEMARCATION: KOSOVA
PART 5:
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE KLA - WHO IS THE KLA? WHO FUNDS THEM? WHERE ARE
THEY GOING?
An "authoritative" voice says this of the KLA:
"It is fact if you follow the publicity photographs
and TV that the absolute majority of Kosovars that are being organised,
armed, transported and supplied with all modern weapons of destruction
are not the Kosovar Albanians who were born/live in Kosovar, Yugoslavia,
but Albanians who ran from Socialist Albania and are the sons and grandsons
of the anti-Communists who lived in lives in Germany, Switzerland and other
countries. They speak German and are only used as cannon fodder by the
US-NATO masters to do their dirty work!"
Editor p.7 NSC; Volume 7; # 10. May 1999.
Another view of the KLA is encapsulated
in this following statement:
"The Albanians have been radicalized, and their
new voice is the KLA. Rugova, the old pacifist, is more a symbol of outmoded
moderation than a leader. By ignoring the plight of the Kosovar Albanians
for nearly a decade, the West lost much of its credibility before NATO
began bombing. Many Albanians feel let down by the world and their own
meek leaders. What is most striking, then, about the KLA insurrection is
not that it occurred but that it took so long to occur. "
"Kosovo's Next Masters"; By Chris Hedges; Foreign
Affairs May/June 1999 (volume 78, number 3).
Who is right? Well, the Editor of Northstar Compass is always very "authoritative"
when pronouncing upon the Balkans. In this we find a similarity with the
many "pronouncements" of the "Marxist-Leninist List" upon the question
of Kosova, and upon the matter of the KLA
(Ushtria Çlirimtare ë Kosovës
(Kosovo Liberation Army - UÇK or KLA).
But we fear that this "authority" is
not always enough. At least from time to time - some corroboration is required.
Every single substantive statement in the Editor’s Northstar Compass quote
is factually wrong. Perhaps more than simple following of "publicity, photographs
and TV" is needed Comrade Editor? Some facts and some interpretation of
facts are needed.
The two most widely heard allegations
about the KLA among the "Marxist-Leninists" were and remain that:
-
The KLA is a "creature of the imperialists" and the
Americans;
-
The KLA is a gang of criminals and drug runners;
"Marxist-Leninists" should clearly
understand what it is they say. We ask the purveyors of these charges,
to consider:
"What does bourgeois propaganda say about ANY
national revolutionary movement? Or
indeed ANY
revolutionary movement? "
We will deal with these charges
that emanate from those who call themselves "Marxist-Leninists", in the
context of the history of the KLA. Sources on the KLA are still sparse,
so we utilize rather longer passages of quotations than we normally use.
1) Upon The Origins Of The
Kosova Liberation Army- A Response to Repression
When the peacefully voiced legitimate aspirations
of a people are repeatedly, and brutally denied, those people will turn
too more determined and violent means to effect their aspirations. Which
Marxist-Leninist does not know that? Alliance
in Issue Number 21 had already pointed
out that:
1) That the "Greater Serbia"
aim of Slobodan Milosevic was first resisted by the people of Kosova in
a constitutional and peaceful manner:
" Serbia embarked .. on a military and police
crackdown on .. the people of Kosova... in late March 1989 .... Milosevic
had launched.. martial law .. the 'Constitution of tanks', Albanians were
killed in broad daylight by the 'Yugoslav' forces in late March 1989. ..
The voice of the people of Kosova was not heeded by a speedily rising Nazi..
nomenclature in Serbia, embodied in Slobodan Milosevic." A l b a N e w
s - Thu, 28 Mar 1996; Alliance 21:
2) That the repression had failed
to prevent the democratic election of Rugova as President of Kosova:
"On 27 and 28 March 1989..thousands of Albanians
protested .. The death toll was high. Yet .. democratic movement launched
the Albanians on a path of no return toward complete independence from
the Serbs or a new Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. .. Dr. Ibrahim Rugova,
the Democratic League of Kosova .. The Independence Declaration
(2 July 1990), proclaimed a republican status for Kosova ..a constitution
(7 September 1990), a popular referendum on Kosova as an independent and
sovereign state conducted in late September 1991, were a prelude to the
first multiparty parliamentary and presidential elections in the Republic
of Kosova held on 24 May 1992. Through direct vote the people elected their
representatives to the Parliament and chose Dr. Ibrahim Rugova President
of the Republic of Kosova with a sweeping majority of votes."
A l b a N e w s - Thu, 28 Mar 1996). Alliance
21.
3) We also pointed out that,
an organisation called the Kosova Liberation Army had arisen in the wake
of the Slobodan Milosevic repressions and the defeated aspirations of Rugova:
"But throughout 1996 from January, a further
grim repression has set in the Province, really the nation, of Kosova.
An organization calling itself the Liberation
Army of Kosova (Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves -UCK)
arose, while escalating violence from
the Yugoslav remnant states erupted. The increasing attention paid to the
atrocities against Kosovan Albanians, by both the USA and the EEC, shows
the importance of the Kosovan and Albanian keys to the current situation
in the Balkans." Alliance 21.
This is the view also of other informed,
albeit bourgeois, commentators. We will use primarily four respected sources.
Firstly:
"Jane’s Defence Weekly" comments
in a lengthy "Background" to Kosovo:
"The 1981 movement, demanding a fully-fledged
Kosovo Republic, was brutally crushed by the Federal Yugoslav Army and
police, which continued to run the province under various martial-law provisions.
..In 1989, by intimidating and manipulating the provincial assembly, Milosevic
managed to abolish Kosovo's autonomous status. .. he then used the thin
pretext of a miners' strike to arrest and imprison
Azem Vllasi,
the foremost ethnic Albanian moderate
politician, and a number of others. .. The Serbian authorities then dismissed
tens of thousands of Albanians from their jobs, taking particular care
to almost completely purge the police. Ethnic Albanians, who make up almost
90 per cent of the province's 2.1 million inhabitants, responded by declaring
Kosovo a full republic within Yugoslavia and naming
Ibrahim Rugova,
a poet, its president. As the fate
of the former Yugoslavia was becoming obvious, a clandestine Albanian referendum
was held in September 1991 declaring the ``Republic of Kosovo'' fully independent.
Underground parliamentary elections were held in May 1992. Although the
parliament never met in session, Bujar
Bukoshi was
declared prime minister, a duty he has been performing from exile in Germany."
Recent Background to Current Crisis in Kosovo: Jane's Information
Group Limited 1999; http://www.janes.com/defence/features/kosovo/background.html
Secondly: Tim
Judah writing an article entitled
"Inside the KLA" for the New
York Review of Books, characterizes
Rugova as a "restraint" upon his people:
"Ever since 1990, the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo
had abstained from violence in favor of passive resistance. In this they
had been led by Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the main ethnic Albanian
political party, the Democratic
League of Kosovo, the LDK. As the
old Yugoslavia dissolved into war, Rugova restrained his people. To start
an insurrection, he said, would only bring disaster. "We would have no
chance of successfully resisting the army," he cautioned in 1992. "In fact
the Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian population and
wipe it out. We believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than
to be massacred." Rugova thought that since there were so few Serbs left
in Kosovo, independence was inevitable. Besides, the "international community"
would soon see the justice of the Kosovars' cause and reward them. But
the international community, in particular the Western nations, did no
such thing. After the Dayton agreement the European Union countries recognized
the borders of what remained of Yugoslavia-that is to say Serbia and Montenegro-thus
seeming to lock Kosovo into Serbia forever." Tim Judah, New York Times;
Review of Books; "Inside the KLA"; June 10th 1999; pp19-23.
Or at: <http://www.nybooks.com/nyrev/WWWarchdisplay.cgi?19990610019F
Rugova was explicitly
"pacifist",
objectively the Rugova wing
was a comprador
wing of the Kosovar bourgeoisie, comprador
to the Belgrade colonists:
"As head of the Democratic League of Kosovo
(Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves - LDK), Ibrahim Rugova repeatedly declared
the determination of Kosovo Albanians to achieve independence by peaceful
means. This included passive resistance, the creation of parallel ``Republic
of Kosovo'' institutions and faith in the support of the international
community. Busy with fighting in Bosnia and plagued by growing opposition
and a total disintegration of their domestic economy, rulers in Belgrade
apparently tolerated the parallel Albanian society as it seemed to content
itself with running its own affairs peacefully under the full control of
Rugova and the LDK."
"Recent Background to Current Crisis in Kosovo:
Jane's Information Group Limited 1999; http://www.janes.com/defence/features/kosovo/background.html
Thirdly: Chris
Hedges (The
same individual that North Star was very pleased to fully reprint earlier-see
Alliance 33 part 4) writing in "Foreign
Affairs," describes
Rugova’s vision as "Gandhi"-like. No doubt this was the peaceful path that
both North Star Compass and Harpal Brar recommends, as we discussed in
part 2 of this article. We characterized Brar's view, as the option of:
"Let us close the door and let them sort it out themselves, and meanwhile
we throw away the key"! How does Hedges use the adjective "Gandhi-like"?
"Croatia and Serbia, whose political ideology
is often overtly racist, unleashed a war in the early 1990s largely against
unarmed civilians to try to form ethnically "pure" enclaves and states.
Militias stormed through minority communities in drunken frenzies, looting,
burning, raping, and murdering. They set up detention centers, carried
out mass executions, and ignored tepid international protests. But after
Milosevic revoked Kosovo's autonomy in 1989, Rugova insisted on a very
different road to independence, a Gandhi-like plan to withdraw from all
state institutions and create a parallel government. His was to be a peaceful
revolution and an example of civility and tolerance that would earn the
backing of the Western democracies."
"Kosovo's Next Masters"; Chris Hedges; Foreign
Affairs May/June 1999 (volume 78, number 3).
Serb led violence escalated:
"Belgrade, blind to the looming rebellion, blithely
continued to rule Kosovo like a colonial backwater. On several occasions,
I saw two or three beefy Serb police officers, who I suspect are often
recruited by the pound, walloping young ethnic Albanians with their clubs
in the center of Pristina. I once watched a cop shove a young boy of about
ten, who held a small wooden tray of individual cigarettes for sale, onto
the sidewalk. The cop laughed as the frightened child scrambled to rescue
the cigarettes from the mud puddles. Many of the Serb police were sent
to Kosovo as a demotion or a punishment for misbehavior. One of their favorite
pastimes was to set up roadblocks and collect money from a long line of
cars for invented traffic violations. Drivers that did not have money or
did not pay had their documents seized. All this, however, paled in comparison
with the brutal treatment in Serb jails. People were beaten, tortured (usually
while chained to radiators), and held incommunicado for days and weeks.
Some simply vanished."
"Kosovo's Next Masters"; By Chris Hedges; Foreign
Affairs May/June 1999 (volume 78, number 3).
Fourthly:
Christophe Chiclet writing
for Le Monde Diplomatique says:
"Passive resistance to Belgrade repression had
achieved little. For 10 years Ibrahim Rugova (elected president although
not recognized by Belgrade) had insisted that a guerrilla war in Kosovo
would fail."
C.Chiclet: "Rise of the Kosovar Freedom Fighters";
Le Monde Diplomatique; May 1999.
What was the
inevitable response of ordinary Kosovars?
Those
willing to fight back, would adopt the usual tactics of those oppressed:
Guerilla
Warfare.
This
was especially so when Kosovars saw Bosnian rights being trampled, and
when Dayton showed that the USA imperialists were further placating and
favouring the Bosnian Serbs - including criminals such as Karadzic:
"We all feel a deep, deep sense of betrayal,"
the KLA man told me, echoing a sentiment that seemed to speak for most
ethnic Albanians. "We mounted a peaceful, civilized protest to fight the
totalitarian rule of Milosevic. We did not go down the road of nationalist
hatred, always respecting Serbian churches and monasteries. The result
is that we were ignored." The Dayton peace negotiations, which dealt with
Bosnia but not Kosovo, "taught us a painful truth, [that] those that want
freedom must fight for it. This is our sad duty…. Its death notice came
after the 1995 Dayton agreement was swiftly followed by the European Union's
recognition of Yugoslavia -- even though the EU had earlier demanded that
Yugoslavia first resolve the Kosovo issue. Kosovar Albanians, with understandable
rage, did not grasp why the Bosnian Serbs, responsible for some of the
worst acts of genocide since World War II, were handed nearly half of Bosnia
at Dayton. The recognition of Radovan Karadzic's gangster statelet, Republika
Srpska, was the final insult. It shattered all hopes for peaceful change
in Kosovo."
"Kosovo's Next Masters"; By Chris Hedges; Foreign
Affairs May/June 1999 (volume 78, number 3).
2) The Rise of Various Militant
Kosovar Groupings – Factions of the Future KLA.
It
is only in this light: i.e. a response to ineffectual "pacifist" leadership
– that Marxist-Leninists can see the development of the KLA. The first
embryos of the KLA was embodied in a series of revolutionary organizations
influenced by Marxism-Leninism, which ultimately would amalgamate into
the Levizja Popullore e Kosoves
(LPK), or the Popular Movement for Kosovo.
One precursor faction was known as the
LRSHJ,
and according to one Chiclet was "Maoist";
this itself spilt and one splinter was the LKCK:
"In 1982 militant Maoist supporters of Enver
Hoxha's dictatorship in Albania founded a movement to fight for an Albanian
republic in "Yugoslavia (the
LRSHJ).
A year later a breakaway Kosovo liberation
movement (LKCK)
carried the struggle into Serbia. Between
October 1982 and March 1984 they killed three Yugoslavs in Brussels, then
shifted their operations to Kosovo. Between October 1982 and March 1984
they carried out nine attacks in Pristina. The Yugoslav authorities responded
brutally: 12,000 Kosovars accused of belonging to these underground groups
were arrested between 1982 and 1989."
Chiclet Ibid;
Nonetheless,
the various streams ended up in the LPK, by 1993:
"In 1985 the LRSHJ became the hard-line anti-Yugoslav
Movement for the People's Republic changing its name again in 1993 to the
Kosovo People’s Movement (LPK)
after Rugova and his Democratic League
of Kosovo declared the province a republic."
Chiclet; Ibid.
Some accounts omit the earlier
splinters, placing the start of the LPK itself at 1982. There is little
doubt that elements of the earlier organizations ended up in the LPK by
1993:
"One of the driving forces behind the formation
of the KLA was a tiny political party formed in 1982 called the LPK.. it
had a secret cell structure, each cell kept apart from the others.. During
the 1980s it claimed to be a radical leftist organization which took its
inspiration from the Stalinist Albania of Enver Hoxha. Now in exile in
London, the Kosovar journalist Daut Dauti sums up these so-called Enverists
succinctly:
"The Marxist-Leninists of the LPK were for an
armed uprising in the 1980s. They had no idea what Enverism was-they just
wanted to get rid of the Serbs." Many of them went to jail in Kosovo for
political agitation and, as they came out, many of them then went abroad.
Bardhyl Mahmuti, one of the founders of the LPK and then the KLA,
told me: "It was not a question of ideology. [It was] rather Leninist theory
on clandestine organizations."
Judah T: "Inside the KLA"; Ibid; p. 20.
Judah
adds that their Marxism, was a guise adopted to obtain monies from the
then People’s Socialist Republic
of Albania (PSRA). But there
is no evidence that we are aware of, to substantiate this. Hoxha is on
record as making it perfectly clear that the PSRA would not intervene in
the legitimate national aspirations of the Kosovars. Even Judah does not
ground his own jibe in any concrete facts. Nonetheless, Judah is correct
to say that the Marxist underpinning of the organization was probably superficial.
Hedges
locates a large ideological range that is contained within the KLA.
Hedges as well as Judah (See
above), alleges that Hoxha "bankrolled"
the LPK. No doubt, Hedges is correct
in identifying an attraction for the more politically aware and radicalized
students of Prishtina University in Kosova, to the People’s Socialist Republic
of Albania:
"The KLA splits down a bizarre ideological divide,
with hints of fascism on one side and whiffs of communism on the other.
…The second KLA faction, comprising most of the KLA leaders in exile, are
old Stalinists who were once bankrolled by the xenophobic
Enver Hoxha,
the dictator of Albania who died in 1985. This group led a militant separatist
movement that was really about integration with Hoxha's Albania. Most of
these leaders were students at Pristina University after 1974, when Belgrade
granted the province autonomy. Freed from Yugoslav oversight, the university
imported thousands of textbooks from Albania, all carefully edited by Hoxha's
Stalinist regime, along with at least a dozen militant Albanian professors.
Along with its degree programs, Pristina University began to quietly school
young Kosovar leaders in the art of revolution. Not only did a huge percentage
of the KLA leadership come out of the university, but so, ominously, did
the ethnic Albanian leadership in neighboring Macedonia.
"Kosovo's Next Masters"; By Chris Hedges; Foreign
Affairs May/June 1999 (volume 78, number 3).
It
is also true that Jane’s Defence Weekly claims the existence of specialized
training camps inside the former PSAR. Alliance is prepared for the moment,
pending better data, to accept this claim of Jane’s Defence Weekly. Although
it does seem strange to us that neither
Tito’s regime nor his heirs including
Milosevic - exposed the existence of these camps at the time.
If we do accept the claim
of Jane’s Defence weekly, it would seem the best reference, to rebut the
slanders of those such as Northstar Compass, that the KLA are simple pawns
of imperialism. Moreover, it would appears that these camps were shut down
by USA imperialism:
"Several specialised training camps had existed
in Albania since the post-war rule of Albanian Communist Party leader Enver
Hoxha (who died in 1985), and at least two (in Fushe Kruje and Bajram Curri)
are believed to have remained well into the time of the Berisha regime;
these were reportedly closed down in 1993 under US pressure. Although the
present Nano government has officially acknowledged Kosovo to be a part
of Serbia and stated its commitment to a peaceful solution, it is possible
that unconfirmed reports of a training camp in Lhibrazd may be true. Even
so, that would appear to be more a result of anarchy than official support
by the Albanian Government, and in military terms the significance of such
a camp would be negligible."
Jane’s Defence Weekly; Ibid;
In any case, Marxists-Leninists are correct, to characterize
these above discussed factions, as a militant and
revolutionary wing of the national democratic
revolution. It will become quite
apparent as we discuss other factions of what became the KLA, that there
are wings of the national democratic forces that are not revolutionary
per se.
In
addition another faction was the
National Movement for the Liberation of
Kosovo (Levizje Nacional-Clirimtare e Kosoves) (LNCK). We
have been unable to find an ideological underpinning for this faction,
we are simply aware that it was:
"a known Albanian emigrant organisation that
had been operating out of Switzerland since 1981."
Jane’s Defence Weekly.
Marxist-Leninists are aware that the national liberation movements are
split into the compromising section and the revolutionary sections. We
have identified the revolutionary sections. Which were the compromising
sections? Chiclet claims that the KLA also was:
"Encouraged by groups in Washington, Berlin
and Zagreb".
Chiclet
Ibid;
The clearest pro-comprador
force to be set up was one encouraged
by the USA and known as FARK.
This was an armed militia, which emerged
from Rugova’s camp:
"In the late summer of 1998 a rival militia
emerged. The United States wanted a more docile fighting force and so,
under Rugova's leadership, the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK)
was created with Saudi money and Turkish
logistic support. The KLA responded with violence: on 18 September 1998
it murdered Ahmet Krasniqi… who had been assigned to set up the new army,
in the center of Tirana."
Chiclet Ibid.
"An attempt by the 'prime minister' of the self-proclaimed
Kosovo government, Bujar
Bukoshi, to
raise a parallel fighting force under his command
- the Armed Force of the Republic of Kosovo
(Forcave Armatosure ë Republikes ë Kosoves -FARK) -
ended in failure following the disbandment
of the only FARK brigade and the flight to Albania of its commander,
Colonel Tahir Zema. "
Jane's Defence Weekly; Ibid.
At this stage, there were other
militant Kosovar Albanian groups, and early on, a faction developed out
of Rugova’s LDK. But this quickly moved away from "Gandhism":
"The KLA had built close ties or melded with
much of Rugova's League of Democratic Kosovo (LDK). It was no coincidence
that once the rebellion erupted a year ago, local LDK leaders immediately
picked up weapons and became commanders of village units. By the time of
the uprising, Rugova had lost control of his own party."
"Kosovo's Next Masters"; By Chris Hedges; Foreign
Affairs May/June 1999 (volume 78, number 3).
Naturally
the comprador faction has not hesitated to attempt to smear the more determined
independence fighters. It is no surprise that they use the same terminology
as have many of the "authoritative" "Marxist-Leninist" – terminology that
Judah identifies as emanating from Serb propaganda:
"Bukoshi and his supporters have been muttering
that a future KLA-dominated government would be a "Cuba in Europe." Rather
bizarrely they have also picked up the vintage Serbian propaganda line
that the KLA are in fact little more than glorified drug dealers. It is
true that Kosovars are prominent in the Zurich heroin trade and control
some drug-trafficking routes, and it is also true that these gangsters
certainly make hefty contributions to KLA funds. The KLA has also used
the Mafia connections of these gangs to buy arms. However, to make the
leap to saying that the KLA leaders are drug traffickers themselves is
about as convincing as claiming that the US government, too, is a drug
trafficker because, at times, the CIA has worked with various drug barons."
Judah; Ibid; In New York Times Review Books.
The participants of all these
ventures were then folded into what became the KLA. So clearly, there are
now a large number of factions within the present KLA that reflects all
this previous history.
__________________________________________________________________
A SUMMARY OF KLA ANTECEDENTS:
National Revolutionary Wings
1982:
LRSHJ; A Maoist organisation fighting for
a Greater Albania. 1983:
(LKCK) Kosovo
liberation movement
1985: LRSHJ
becomes the LRPK:
Movement for the People’s Republic of Kosova.
1992-3: KLA
first being heard of.
1993:
LRSHJ becomes the LPK,
or the Popular Movement for Kosovo Levizja Popullore e Kosoves).
Comprador Wings
LDK
Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosoves);
and FARK
Led by Ibrahim Rugova and Bujar
Bukoshi ________________________________________________________________
Although
highly motivated, the activities of the LPK group, were located at first
mainly in the Western based émigré communists:
"Although the movement was not all that active
in Kosovo itself, it became influential among the Diaspora in Switzerland,
Germany and Belgium."
Chiclet; Ibid;
Effectively they were unable to
do very much at this stage. Even so, the Yugoslav secret services considered
them serious enough to assassinate leading cadre:
"On January 17, 1982, three Kosovar activists
were assassinated in Germany, presumably by the Yugoslav secret services.
They were the brothers Jusuf and Bardhosh Gervalla and the journalist Kadri
Zeka. ... Still, until 1995, there was little they could do about it all.
Living mostly in exile, LPK members agitated with little success among
the exile and Gastarbeiter communities of up to 500,000 Kosovars who lived
in Germany, Switzerland, and elsewhere."
Judah T; Ibid; p.20.
As Hedges says, some sections
of the national liberation movement are more right wing. But Hedges raises
the canard of the "Skanderberg
division" raised
by the German Nazis out of traitorous elements in the Second World War:
"The KLA splits down a bizarre ideological divide,
with hints of fascism on one side and whiffs of communism on the other.
The former faction is led by the sons and grandsons of rightist Albanian
fighters -- either the heirs of those who fought in the World War II fascist
militias and the Skanderbeg volunteer SS division raised by the Nazis,
or the descendants of the rightist Albanian kacak rebels who rose up against
the Serbs 80 years ago. Although never much of a fighting force, the Skanderbeg
division took part in the shameful roundup and deportation of the province's
few hundred Jews during the Holocaust. The division's remnants fought Tito's
Partisans at the end of the war, leaving thousands of ethnic Albanians
dead. The decision by KLA commanders to dress their police in black fatigues
and order their fighters to salute with a clenched fist to the forehead
has led many to worry about these fascist antecedents. Following such criticism,
the salute has been changed to the traditional open-palm salute common
in the U.S. Army."
Hedges; Ibid.
But
the "black fatigue" is worn by other progressive fighters, and the "clenched
fist salute" is not unknown amongst progressives either. Hedges himself
notes that the Skanderberg Division was "never much of a fighting force".
We have previously dealt with this question. Both the "authoritative" editor
of Northstar Compass and the highly "knowledgeable" and insistent Alexander
Moumbaris of Editions Democrite – like to dwell on this question. The goodly
(to Serb fascism) Moumbaris said this:
"Said Editions Democrite: There is some confusion
concerning the Albanians of Kosovo. Among the Albanians in Kosovo, many
are Albanians from Albania, who either arrived recently or were elements
opposed to communist Albania including survivors of two Albanian SS divisions
that the Yugoslav government settled there after the war. It is difficult
to determine the exact number of Albanians of Yugoslav nationality."
Alliance
in issue 32 responded as below:
"UPON THE SS LINEAGE OF KOSOVARS: We suggest
that this is an attempt to defame the Albanian majority of Kosova and somehow
"devalue" their claims. We must ask for proof of this allegation. We would
also refer readers to some independent evidence, rather than bar-room gossip
- to Noel Malcolm :
"One large scale recruitment effort (by the
Germans) .. created the 'Skanderbeg' volunteer SS division. This sprang
from discussions between the German authorities & Bedri Peja who offered
to raise a large military force to fight against the communists; at one
point he claimed he could gather up to 150,000 men. But the recruitment
drive, carried out in early 1944, was a disappointment: in the period up
to the beginning of the German withdrawal only 6,491 men joined the division.
According to the commanding officers' report the main obstacle had been
the "invisible resistance of the beys and agas which resulted in inactivity
on the part of the prefects and majors who were controlled by the beys,
and in a whispering campaign against recruitment."
(Malcolm; ?Kosova-A
Short History?; London; 1998;
p.309)." Full reply to "Editions Democrite" to be found at:.
http://www22.brinkster.com/harikumar/AllianceIssues/ALL32-KOSOVAANTI-ED.html
In
any case we have already in Alliance 33 (this issue part 4) pointed out
that there were fascist Quislings in all nationalities during the Second
World War. Neither the Serbs, the Kosovars or for that matter the Croats
had any monopoly on human goodness. Nor for that matter do they now. What
of it? What bearing does this have on the legitimacy of a National War
of Liberation?? Let us return to the main aim in this section - the history
of the KLA.
The name of
the KLA itself was first heard between 1991-1993. It
had drawn members from elements of all the factions discussed above:
"The KLA itself was formed from a nucleus of
LPK members in late 1992 and early 1993, but it was so small that it did
not take its first armed action, an ambush of a group of Serbian policemen,
until 1995. Still, significantly, the men it did have on the ground in
Kosovo included a new generation of LPK members who were in their twenties
and had grown up remembering the demonstrations and widespread resentment
that accompanied the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy by Milosevic in 1989.
Among them was Hashim
Thaci, then twenty years old.";
Judah T; Ibid; p.20.
The youth of the KLA was an important
consideration. High unemployment of the youth whether in the Diaspora or
in Kosova itself, high oppression, led to a situation that Hedges compares
to the Palestinian "Intifada".
But as the KLA became more
visible, Chiclet points out that it fell into a "trap" – that of suiting
and ‘justifying" the exterminist plans of the Milosevic led Serbian fascists.
"Supporters of a "popular" war, however, believed
that Serbian persecution was bound to strengthen the KLA's position among
the Kosovars and internationally. What they failed to realize was that
Slobodan Milosevic's government was waiting for just such provocation to
push forward with its ethnic cleansing programme and spilt Kosovo. The
KLA, clinging to old-style Marxist-Leninism and a mixture of Greater Albanian
nationalism and clannishness, chose the worst possible option. Since 1987
Milosevic has used Kosovo to strengthen his position. On 1 March 1989 a
state of emergency was declared in Kosovo and on 23 March the Serbian constitution
was amended to restrict the region's autonomy. On 2 November the Yugoslav
security service killed two LRPK cadres in Pristina. The LRPK then carried
the struggle abroad. In 1990 a bomb exploded at the Zurich home of Xhavit
Haliti, a senior officer in the
Sigurim (the Albanian secret service) who was responsible for keeping an
eye on pro-Hoxha Kosovars in Switzerland and Germany. He was made a leader
of the KLA on 13 August 1993 and was one of the Albanian delegates to the
Rambouillet conference in 1999."
Chiclet; Ibid.
3) As The Struggle Rises – The KLA
Becomes More Overt
As the tempo of Serb oppression
inside Kosova rose, more overt actions by presence of Kosovar militants
was likely. Initially, fear of the Serb fascist repression had kept the
lid on Kosovan actions:
"The apparent might of the Yugoslav Army (JNA)
and Serb paramilitary units, which kept pounding the cities in Croatia
and later Bosnia with heavy artillery, had a deterring effect in Kosovo."
Recent Background to Current Crisis in Kosovo:
Jane's Information Group Limited 1999; http://www.janes.com/defence/features/kosovo/background.html
In addition the KLA was still
small:
"The KLA itself was formed from a nucleus of
LPK members in late 1992 and early 1993, but it was so small that it did
not take its first armed action, an ambush of a group of Serbian policemen,
until 1995. Still, significantly, the men it did have on the ground in
Kosovo included a new generation of LPK members who were in their twenties
and had grown up remembering the demonstrations and widespread resentment
that accompanied the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy by Milosevic in 1989.
Among them was Hashim Thaci,
then twenty years old."; Judah T; Ibid;
p.20.
The level of armed retaliation
against Serb fascism was initially low, but then became more frequent,
and targeted the Serbian police. A simple Serb Police phrase covered it
all:
"Terrorist attacks" -
We could almost substitute
such phrases favoured by Northstar Compass and the Marxist-Leninist List:
"The number of armed incidents ..was surprisingly
low in the period 1992-95 and .. limited to short exchanges of fire or
harassment using firearms. Although official Serbian data records 136 attacks
on the police in the first 18 months after the declaration of the ``Republic
of Kosovo'', the only major action was an attack on a vehicle of
the Serbian Interior Ministry (Ministarstvo
unutrasnjih poslova - MUP) near
Glogovac on 22 May 1993 in which two policemen were killed and five wounded.
… On 22 April 1996 four almost simultaneous attacks took place within less
than two hours of each other and in widely separated locations. .. Serbian
police blamed ``separatist terrorists'': a usual cover-all phrase.. attacks
on the police continued throughout the summer and autumn of 1996. "
Recent Background to Current Crisis in Kosovo:
Jane's Information Group Limited 1999; http://www.janes.com/defence/features/kosovo/background.html
That there was indeed now, an
actual named organization that coordinated these attacks, became slowly
clear. Of the several possible contenders, the LCNCK, the LPK, and the
KLA - The Milosevic fascists tracked them down, and claimed to have eradicated
them by early 1997. But, the name of the KLA became steadily more well
known:
"The existence of a ``Kosovo liberation movement''
was at first just a rumour, but continued attacks and a similar modus operandi
made it clear that an organisation existed. The initial confusion was caused
by rumours claiming that the attacks were carried out by the armed wing
of the LNCK,
…. Rumours also suggested that the attacks could be the work of the
LPK,
which was formed in 1982 by the unification
of several smaller Albanian Marxist-Leninist factions. Attacks continued
at a steady rate, targeting not only the MUP but also ethnic Albanians
who pledged their loyalty to the Serbian administration. In early 1997,
Albanian language media started receiving faxes in which an organisation
calling itself Ushtria Clirimtare
e Kosoves (Kosovo Liberation Army - KLA)
admitted responsibility for the attacks.
After a series of ambushes and executions of ``loyal Albanians'', Serb
authorities arrested 60 Albanians in late January 1997. Although President
Milosevic claimed that ``terrorism in Kosovo had been cut in its roots'',
reality proved him wrong; after a brief lull the attacks resumed in the
late summer of that year. "
Recent Background to Current Crisis in Kosovo:
Jane's Information Group Limited 1999; http://www.janes.com/defence/features/kosovo/background.html
"Towards the end of 1992 it was announced a mysterious
"Kosovo Liberation Army" had been set up - so mysterious that Rugova denied
its existence for five years, ..For the next three years the organisation
- structured around LPK members and with a dual leadership based in Pristina
and Switzerland - consolidated its position. The clandestine army was chiefly
known for its assassination attempts until the bomb attacks on 11 February
1996 on five Serbian refugee camps in Krajina for which it claimed responsibility.
Two months later eight Serbian policemen were killed in Decani and Pec."
Chiclet Ibid;
"The first KLA armed attack took place in May
1993 in Glogovac, killing two Serb police officers and wounding five more.
But the rebel group -- its membership largely drawn from a few clans in
Kosovo and radicals in the Albanian diaspora -- was founded eight years
ago. Most of its leadership has spent years in prison for separatist activity,
many having been jailed earlier by Tito's communist government. Like all
revolutionaries who have spent years underground or in jail, the KLA leaders
are wary of the outside world and given to secrecy."
"Kosovo's Next Masters"; By Chris Hedges; Foreign
Affairs May/June 1999 (volume 78, number 3).
But it was not until September
1997 that the KLA gained "real credibility", by mounting coordinated actions
over the space of 150 kilometers, taking out police targets. They made
a public appearance at a holiday called "Flag Day":
"The most spectacular series of attacks which
gave the KLA real credibility took place within four hours of each other
on the night of 10-11 September 1997. No less than 10 co-ordinated attacks
in locations up to 150 km apart, mostly targeting police barracks and vehicles,
proved that there was a well-organised force. .. anti-tank weapons were
used for the first time to penetrate the wall of a building in a night
attack in the village of Babaloc near Decani on 16 October. However, the
event that was to make the KLA a household name was the first public appearance
of one of its members on 28 November: a date observed by Albanians in Kosovo,
as well as their kin in Albania, as Flag Day – a holiday of great patriotic
significance".
Recent Background to Current Crisis in Kosovo:
Jane's Information Group Limited 1999; http://www.janes.com/defence/features/kosovo/background.html
By late February 1998, the Serbian police decided
that it was time to end the problem, and in the Drenica
region they felt they could do this
easily. This area had become a "hot-spot" :
"In February 1998 a revolt started in Drenica.
The KLA then launched its first major offensive. In five months it liberated
at least 30% of the territory, but it banned all political parties in the
liberated villages and attacked the Serb, Gypsy and goran (Islamised
Macedonian) minorities. Determined to take the political lead, it denounced
Rugova, his LDK and the Kosovar parliament. On 13 June 1998 it appointed
its spokesman, Ahmet Krasniqi,
on 13 August its political committee."
Chiclet Ibid;
But the Serbs had only one real
weapon – a brutal terror and ‘scorched earth’ policy. The resulting terror
came up against unexpected heroism from a single family – the Jasharis.
They were a peasant farmer family clan,
who had links with the KLA. Their farmhouse was surrounded by a massive
army force, and they were eliminated after a fierce resistance:
"The Serbs opted for .. 'scorched earth' - hitting
any suspected 'terrorist resistance' with all means available. Such indiscriminate
force met with fierce opposition from the Jashari family compound in Prekaz,
and it took more than 48 hours to end all resistance there. .. to silence
less than 10 armed males the forces of the Serbian Interior Ministry (MUP)
killed more than 40 civilians, including women and children. .. pictures
from Drenica of destruction and grief served as an unexpected impetus for
KLA recruitment."
Recent Background to Current Crisis in Kosovo:
Jane's Information Group Limited 1999; http://www.janes.com/defence/features/kosovo/background.html
The heroic resistance of the Jashari
family, against overwhelming odds, inspired the Diaspora Kosovars who responded
with a patriotic pride:
"Thousands of young Albanians left their jobs,
both in Kosovo and all across Western Europe .. to join the force fighting
for the independence of their homeland: Kosovo. So rapid and unexpected
was the inflow of recruits that the KLA initially was unable to cope. Many
made their way into Drenica, which, despite the bitter defeats of February
and March, was seen as the center of the resistance."
Recent Background to Current Crisis in Kosovo:
Jane's Information Group Limited 1999; http://www.janes.com/defence/features/kosovo/background.html
It was now that the KLA began to weld itself more
into a semblance of an army.
4) The KLA Organizes Itself:
The "authoritative" Lucas of the Northstar Compass cannot understand how
the KLA managed to organize itself,
unless
it was with aid from the CIA; or from
drug running. Undoubtedly from what we can glean, Lucas is
right
that there are
some elements
of the KLA who are involved in the drug trade:
"The Pristina militants went underground to
escape Yugoslav justice: between 1981 and 1983, 1,000 underground fighters
received heavy prison sentences. Some fled abroad, joined up with Marxist-Leninist
cells that had links with the Kosovar "Mafias" in Western Europe. According
to Interpol figures, Kosovars account for 14% of arrests for trafficking
and control most of the heroin traffic in Switzerland, Austria, Germany,
Hungary, Norway, the Czech Republic, Poland and Belgium."
Chiclet Ibid; Citing El Pais.
But there are
more important links that Lucas neglects. Perhaps
he has forgotten the effect of living in a closely-knit community; or the
overall rebellious spirit that oppression brings about. This seems odd
- given the number of raffles, plaques-on-walls-for-money, auctions, and
fundraisers that Northstar itself organizes. Nonetheless, the correspondent
of Jane's Defence Weekly sympathizes with him, saying:
"It is still not easy to understand how it was
possible to bring together, organise and arm the 30,000 fighters that the
KLA mustered between the spring and summer of 1998."
Recent Background to Current Crisis in Kosovo:
Jane's Information Group Limited 1999; http://www.janes.com/defence/features/kosovo/background.html
But
do not fret Michael, because the correspondent of Jane’s Defence Weekly
does have an explanation, one that "dialecticians" may have forgotten in
their haste to apply ready-made-tailored-solutions-to-fit-their-biases.
This invokes the legendary
"clans" of the Kosovars, and their sense of solidarity. Those who have
experienced the hospitality of the Albanians in previous times can testify
to this. This solidarity,
appealed to both farmers, students
and intelligentsia:
"A key factor in explaining the unexpectedly
rapid growth of the KLA, however, is the nature of Albanian society.
Closely knit, with strong family, clan and regional affiances, Albanians
have always been regarded as impenetrable to outsiders and loyal to their
own sense of unity. This helped them to rally behind ..the KLA (that) appeared
in public on 28 November 1997. The fact that the Jasharis
were just ordinary farmers and not
professional soldiers reinforced the belief that an armed uprising had
a chance. The would-be fighters approached the former political prisoners
in their respective regions with offers to fight. Most Albanian political
prisoners were former students arrested in the 1980s for their participation
in the movement demanding a Republic of Kosovo within Federal Yugoslavia.
.. Other leaders included the younger generation of students (dismissed
from the universities when Kosovo autonomy was forcibly abolished in the
early 1990s), teachers, doctors, members of influential families and known
local rogues. Army officers and police inspectors who were purged in the
early 1990s were the only ones with any military knowledge. As soon as
rumour spread that there was a core of resistance in a particular area,
potential recruits were directed there by word of mouth."
Recent Background to Current Crisis in Kosovo:
Jane's Information Group Limited 1999; http://www.janes.com/defence/features/kosovo/background.html
Whether the Jasharis were only
farmers is disputed by Hedges, who identifies them as principal leaders
of the KLA movement inside Kosova. However he points out that they bore
resemblance to the older Clan chieftains – although some condescending
and almost racist whiffs come across in his view of the Balkans here. And
he concurs with "Janes’ Defence Weekly", in the view that the ‘scorched
earth’ policy of the Serbian fascists of Milosevic was a major element
in igniting rebellion. Hedges points out the Serbs were given a
"green light" for their actions by......
None Other Than....U.S. Special Envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard.
It is most interesting that this USA
representative, fully agrees with the view of many "Marxist-Leninists"
who easily label the KLA simply as "terrorist":
"Until the uprising in Kosovo last spring, the
KLA had only a couple hundred members. The most prominent inside Kosovo
was Adem Jashari, a gruff, taciturn peasant who, with his brother Hamza,
had been on the run from Serb authorities for months. They were among the
handful of militants who founded the KLA in 1991 before it mushroomed into
a popular army, much like the Islamist resistance in Algeria. In the early
days, they came closest to running the organization, and many of their
lieutenants and relatives -- at least the ones that have survived -- now
run the KLA. ….In another era the Jashari clan, which oversaw a large black-market
smuggling network, would have faded away into local folklore. The Balkans
are filled with small-time renegades who combine criminal activity with
thin, separatist ideologies. Instead, by leveling Prekaz with 20 mm antiaircraft
cannons and killing more than 50 people, including many old people, women,
and children, the Serbs made the Jasharis into martyrs.
U.S. Special Envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbard
gave what many have interpreted as
a green light to Belgrade to go after the rebel bands by announcing in
Pristina on February 23, 1998, that the KLA "is without any question a
terrorist group." He went on to add that the United States "condemns very
strongly terrorist activities in Kosovo." Within two weeks Serb forces
had turned Prekaz into a smoldering ruin, killed close to a hundred people,
and ignited the uprising."
"Kosovo's Next Masters"; By Chris Hedges; Foreign
Affairs May/June 1999 (volume 78, number 3).
Jane's Defence Weekly also further
discredits the view of some "Marxist-Leninists" that the KLA was raised
by the USA as a puppy:
"Currently by any definition the KLA is a terrorist
organisation, even if for political reasons everybody but the Serbs is
cautiously avoiding the use of the term. .. The KLA does not appear on
the official US State Department list of foreign terrorist organisations,
and threat of its inclusion on the list is currently the only US sway over
radical Albanians. After two explosions on Macedonian territory at the
turn of the year, for which the KLA claimed responsibility, a clear warning
was issued by Robert Gelbard,
the top US envoy for former Yugoslavia."
Jane’s Defence Weekly; Ibid.
In
order to win the peoples, it became a conscious policy of the KLA to win
over leading clans and chieftains. Thus the term "simple" farmers of for
the Jashari family, is not at all inconsistent with their also being "clan
chieftains":
"Kosovo operates on a system of local chieftains,
whom the KLA set about recruiting in 1996. With their support the organisation
established local bases to provide it with men and supplies. In 1997 it
set up rapid action units of several hundred men. In one year it carried
out 14 attacks in Kosovo and one in Macedonia. Through its clan links it
operated an efficient intelligence system and systematically assassinated
"traitors", especially those working for the Serbian intelligence service.
It was at this stage that the KLA began to come out in the open. Three
hooded KLA militants were at Skenderaj cemetery on 28 November 1997 to
pay their respects to a comrade killed in action."
Chiclet Ibid;
This
process of radicalisation of the Kosovars, is actually (surely!) a Marxist
textbook case of what happens in situations where there is
no other
recourse than to take up arms?
Well, so much for "enthusiasm" of the KLA. But,
how did they KLA live, how did they purchase arms, how did they sustain
a fight? According to Lucas and many others it was drug running. As we
ahve said this was one source. But Lucas ignores the many other strands
of support for the KLA.
The KLA primarily
relied on the good will of émigrés, and by a tax placed upon
them;
They were aided by the sense of solidarity discussed above;
They also had an advantage
in that guns were part of the background culture;
Moreover the Serb neighbors
would sell them up to date weaponry;
and the disintegration of the next door Albanian
state provided a ready source of arms:
"The self-proclaimed government of the 'Republic
of Kosovo' collected a 3 per cent income tax on all exiles working in Germany,
Switzerland and Austria, but much more important for the financing of the
KLA were the funds sent by family members who worked abroad. Before the
beginning of mass resistance they simply served to sustain the large families
and clans, but once a decision was taken to fight, those funds were further
augmented by additional donations and re-directed towards the procurement
of arms. An important role in the collection of funds was played by a Swiss-based
fund, 'Homeland
Calls' (Vendlindhja Therrët), which
organised large-scale collections, first across Europe and later in the
USA, where the Albanian community in the New York area alone numbers over
200,000. Arms were procured from all sources, but the single most important
early channel was from the Serbs themselves. Worried that the break-up
of former Yugoslavia might prompt an early uprising of Kosovo Albanians,
the Serbian government distributed an estimated 75,000 rifles to Kosovo
Serbs. Albanians, traditionally people with a gun-culture, kept as many
weapons as they could and kept buying Kalashnikovs from their Serb neighbours.
The Serbs were quite happy to sell, relying on the might of the Yugoslav
Army (Vojska Jugoslavije - VJ) to protect them. An important channel was
Albania, where the disintegration of the central government in the spring
of 1997 and subsequent looting of military depots put more than half a
million small arms on the market. The price for a Kalashnikov in northern
Albania was as low as $100; in Kosovo it was double. Supplies started flowing
across the mountains, first in small groups, but then convoys quickly grew
to up to 200 mountain ponies and a thousand men.
The gun-culture of the Albanians, the need for
concealment and the lack of trained officers created a propensity for individual
weapons. At first the only weapons apart from the usual rifles were
shoulder-launched anti-tank weapons, usually of the early generations,
and limited numbers of small-calibre mortars. To the surprise of many,
land-mines were barely used, not even for perimeter defence, but this also
reflects the Albanians' heroic system of values, where the only worthy
way to fight was deemed as being with a gun."
Recent Background to Current Crisis in Kosovo:
Jane's Information Group Limited 1999;
http://www.janes.com/defence/features/kosovo/background.html
"The KLA became bolder after the riots in Albania
in March-April 1997. The rioters looted more than a million weapons from
army and police armouries. Most of them were sold off cheap and found their
way to Kosovo. They were badly made and did not last long when fighting
broke out in spring 1998. The organisation needs money to buy more weapons.
The KLA exploits its links with the Kosovar 'Mafia" in Switzerland and
Germany, deriving most of its income from drug trafficking and fraud in
Western Europe In December 1997, for instance, the Paris police broke up
an LPK cell with links in Germany and Italy that specialized in false invoices
and accommodation bills. "
Chiclet Ibid;
Jane’s Defence Weekly, identifies
three main sources of arms and money:
The Diaspora, the drug courier service,
and the break-up of Albania.
But Jane’s Defence Weekly
makes it clear that the Albanians were couriers only, and not "running
the drug service"; and the other factor was the clan and national solidarity
of the Diaspora:
"The bulk of the financing of the KLA seems
to originate from two sources:
drug-related operations and Kosovo Albanian settlers
in the West. The former Yugoslavia has always been on the main European
drug-transit route. With the break-up of Yugoslavia the route has been
somewhat modified; west Europe-bound narcotics now enter Macedonia and
Albania and are then distributed towards Western Europe through Kosovo,
Montenegro, Bosnia and Croatia. Extremely high levels of corruption in
former Yugoslavia facilitate drugs trade, and routes across the borders
had been well established by trade blockade runners in 1992-95. Albanians
are highly regarded as couriers due to their reliability and secrecy, but
they do not appear to be running the drugs trade themselves. "
"The second source of financing is also significant.
There are over 500,000 Kosovo Albanians in the West, mostly in the German-speaking
countries of Europe and in the US. The largest community is in Switzerland
- 180,000-strong. The Luzern-based LPK, led by Ibrahim Kelmendi, was the
first organisation to claim direct connection with the KLA and openly collect
funds. .. there seems to be a willingness on the part of Kosovo Albanians
to contribute to the cause, but proper funding arrangements have not yet
been established. Émigrés in Germany have approached the
circles close to the ``Kosovan Prime Minister'', Bujar Bukoshi, with offers
for funding, but it is not yet clear in what way that funding has been
organised. On the other side of the Atlantic, ethnic Albanians have proved
more skeptical, demanding concrete proof of KLA connections before donating
money. All this is limited to Kosovo Albanians - their kin from Albania
having suffered significant losses in the spring collapse of that country
- who have proved incapable or unwilling to aid the ``Kosovo cause''. Apparently
very little money has been collected in the US."
Jane's Defence Weekly.
"Until the spring chaos in Albania, Kosovo Albanians
could only count on a limited number of weapons. The reserves of the Kosovo
Territorial Defence had been taken away after riots in 1981 and supplies
were limited. However, the wide availability of weapons after the conflict
started in former Yugoslavia brought a steady trickle to Kosovo, most being
sold by the Serbs themselves. Following the February/March 1997 looting
of Albanian Army barracks and depots, weapons became even more readily
available. The current price for a Kalashnikov is barely US$300, and the
most conservative estimates of Albanians' stocks now start at 25,000 hidden
AK assault rifles. Also available are anti-tank weapons, rifle and hand
grenades and even small-caliber mortars and anti-aircraft guns."
Jane’s Defence Weekly; Ibid.
Marxist-Leninists do not shirk from the facts, and
do NOT only choose facts that support their bias. A recent meeting of the
Communist Party Germany (ML)
and the Communist League (UK) expressed
their reservations on some elements that either are within the KLA or are
using the KLA. This does not detract from the correctness of the national
liberation struggle whatsoever. As the communiqué of the meeting,
[to be found on the home page of the National Committee for The Marxist-Leninist
Party (UK)] puts it:
"that, while condemning alike the military intervention
of the NATO powers in Yugoslavia and the genocidal atrocities committed
by the Serb socialfascists, full support must be given to the heroic fighters
of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) in their correct struggle for the
national liberation of the Kosovar people; however, the CPGer / ML express
reservations on role of some mafia-type elements which they believe to
be operating within the KLA".
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Pantheon/5666/page7.html
What other sources of funding
did the KLA find? There was some bourgeois State support, especially from
Germany:
"Germany, which has a large Kosovar community,
responded as it did in 1989-90 when it backed the first Croatian militia'.
By 1996 the BND intelligence service was building up its offices in Tirana
and Rome to select and train prospective KLA cadres. Special forces in
Berlin provided the training and supplied arms, transmission equipment
and uniforms from ex-East German Stasi stocks."
Chiclet; Ibid; Le Monde Diplomatique;
But even Chiclet agrees that the
fundamental springs of
KLA support were the Diaspora and the tax on the Kosovar peoples:
"The KLA's statements in l995 and 1996 were
clear. All Kosovar men between the ages of 18 and 50 in exile and living
abroad can be mobilized. Heads of families and anyone earning a living
are allowed to stay behind to finance the struggle; the others have to
join the Resistance. In a month and a half, 20,000 volunteers have arrived
from the West. In addition each of the 220,000 Albanians in Switzerland
must contribute 2,000 marks a month. Around 200 volunteers have been sent
from France, and those with jobs are contributing 50% of their eager wages."
Chiclet; Ibid.
The membership of the KLA are
basically peasants:
"It would be
a mistake, though, to think of the KLA as a group made up only of men whose
main purpose in life has been the liberation of their homeland. While these
people have provided the leadership, many of its field commanders are local
men, sometimes peasants, whose families have a historic tradition of uprisings
against the Serbs. Coincidentally, some of them have dubious gangster connections
too, rather like the first men to take up arms to defend Sarajevo in 1992.
The footsoldiers of the KLA are generally ordinary men who have armed themselves
to defend their villages and their families."
Judah; Ibid; New York Times Book Review.
As well as all this, the intense
oppression was coupled with a
high youth unemployment.
The number of youth was made higher
by the policies in Western Europe of deporting refugees-émigrés.
A high birth rate added to the youth of the population. All these triggers
all led to a Balkan, young people’s "Intifada":
"Money, especially the three percent levy on
all earnings abroad, was diverted to the KLA's Homeland Calling fund. Albanian
newspapers outside the province, such as the Zurich-based Voice of Kosovo,
started to print communiqués from the rebel group and run ads calling
for donations.
The young men who had sent home remittances from
menial jobs in Europe to support their families began to be deported under
a series of agreements signed between Belgrade and countries such as Germany,
Switzerland, and Sweden. Burdened by close to a million refugees from Bosnia,
these governments were unwilling to see the numbers swelled by a new influx
from the Balkans. The fighting in Kosovo has ended the repatriations. A
huge number of disenchanted and angry youth who saw no benefits from Rugova's
rule and who, unlike their parents, did not speak Serbo-Croatian, began
giving up on multi-ethnicity. The unemployment rate among ethnic Albanians
is 70 percent, and this pressure, coupled with the highest birthrate in
Europe (23.1 births per 1,000), has created a deep recruiting pool for
the KLA. Seventy percent of the population is now under 30. Kosovo has
undergone a generational shift much like that in the Israeli-occupied West
Bank and Gaza Strip at the start of the iIntifadah in 1987."
"Kosovo's Next Masters"; By Chris Hedges; Foreign
Affairs May/June 1999 (volume 78, number 3).
But the welding of a National
Liberation army requires more than enthusiasm, money, and youth. Military
train and strategy are learnt from practice, if it is not learn before
hand in a more theoretical and structured, disciplined way. The KLA would
come to understand this, only by a bitter lesson.
The existence of deeply divided
factions
exacerbated the overall problem. Hedges
comments the KLA has no unifying politics
except
that of national liberation.
This is confirmed by a quote
from a prominent KLA spokesman
Jakup Krasniqi:
"The two KLA factions ..are split bitterly between
radical left and radical right, they are now arguing over whether to carry
the fighting to the pockets of ethnic Albanians who live in western Macedonia
and neighboring Montenegro. The only thing they agree on is the need to
liberate Kosovo from Serbian rule. All else, menacingly, will be decided
later. It is not said how. Given these deep divisions, it is no accident
that the KLA has failed to create a political organization or even a vague
platform. "I do not think we have an ideology," Jakup Krasniqi, the KLA's
mercurial spokesman, told the Albanian-language daily Koha Ditore on July
12, 1998. "And in fact we do not have time for such things even if we were
interested in them, because we have our main job to do, which is the task
of liberation."
"Kosovo's Next Masters"; By Chris Hedges; Foreign
Affairs May/June 1999 (volume 78, number 3).
5) KLA Problems in Military Strategy
The first organisational steps of the KLA were
to attempt to organise a military structure. It based itself first on Kosovars
who had been trained in the Yugoslav army and then deserted. Some support
was offered by the Albanian President
Sali Berisha. :
"Initially the KLA fighters were led by ethnic
Albanian officers in the Yugoslav army and police who had deserted in 1991-92
to join the new Croat and Slovenian armies. In l997 the KLA set up training
camps in the Mirdita mountains of northern Albania. It was discreetly supported
by the new Albanian services (SHIK) and later President Sali Berisha. After
resigning in spring 1997 Berisha offered Tropoja stronghold to the Kosovar
fighters. The underground army also established bases in Western Macedonia,
the home of most of the country's Albanian minority. Arms, food and medicines
were hidden in the villages around Gostivar, Debar and Velesta and at Pogradec
on the Albanian-Macedonian border."
Alliance in previous articles,
has pointed out that Berisha
was the first choice of the USA imperialists
to take over the state of Albania after the sabotage and destruction of
the socialist state. However Alliance also pointed out that Berisha was
losing favour with the USA and was deliberately toppled in the
Pyramid Scheme (http://www22.brinkster.com/harikumar/Albania/ALLIANCE26_albanianpyramids.html).
After its’ early successes described above, the KLA became over-confident.
They over-reached themselves,
and ignored fundamental tenets of guerilla warfare. They relied on road
blockage and eschewed the "mobile" lighting flash, the disappearing and
sudden striking –hallmarks of successful guerilla forces. It was still
very much an infant army. They were still learning. Nonetheless, they survived
– partly because the Serbian forces made in their turn, an error. The Serbs
persisted in a slash-and-burn strategy, which created over 100,000 refugees.
This refugee mass, provided the final pretext for the intervention of foreign
imperialism (See section 6 this article):
"As the KLA grew .. The MUP simply stopped patrolling
..Growing overconfident, the KLA proclaimed 'free territories' and blocked
the main roads. ..denying safe communications .. the KLA still had little
central co-ordination and no unified command structure. Each operational
area cared only about itself, attracting funds and weapons through its
own channels and recruiting local villagers. There was no training... Food
was provided mainly by requisitioning supplies available. ..In July 1998
there were only three field hospitals. The total number of fighters had
reached 30,000 by mid-June, but a large number of those were just locals
carrying guns in their own villages. The government finally acted .. early
summer, when the KLA attempted to take .. Orahovac, .. The KLA failed to
properly plan and execute the attack ... By mid-summer the MUP was .. firstly
removing all roadblocks by force and freeing up communications. .. its
main allies were incompetent – often competing - KLA commanders, who did
not use their mobility to their benefit but defended roadblocks, canyons
and mountain passes with no attempt at surprise or flanking actions. ..
The KLA was thus broken into isolated pockets of resistance. What, in turn,
saved the KLA from ultimate military defeat was the incompetence of the
Serbian security forces: in destroying not just the fighters, but whole
villages as potential KLA bases, they sent the entire population fleeing
in the woods and hills. When the number of displaced civilians passed 100,000,
the international community had to react, and in the face of the threat
of NATO airstrikes Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic reached a deal with
US envoy Richard Holbrooke that ended the offensive, allowing refugees
to return."
Recent Background to Current Crisis in Kosovo:
Jane's Information Group Limited 1999; http://www.janes.com/defence/features/kosovo/background.html
The KLA had to reorganize.
"The KLA used the winter .. establishing a competent
central command structure centered around the General
Staff (Shtabi i Përgjithshëm
- ShP) and dividing Kosovo into operational zones... The principle of subordination
was reinforced and applied almost fully. Several local commanders who were
reluctant to accept central command quietly slipped away. Among those was
former commander .. Hajdin
Abazi (nom
de guerre Lum Haxhiu), .. who returned to civilian life in Germany."
Recent Background to Current Crisis in Kosovo:
Jane's Information Group Limited 1999; http://www.janes.com/defence/features/kosovo/background.html
The ShP, and its Operations Directorate (Oz) was
slow to organise in a full command structure:
"All of the KLA's military and political matters
are run by the ShP, which consists of 16 known members although there may
be up to 20 of them. Each member has a specific responsibility, but their
relations are not always harmonious. The ShP established at least eight
directorates (drejtoria) and several services (sherbimi), some of which
are subordinated to the Directorates while others are under direct ShP
command."
Janes Defence Weekly.
The question was related to that
of a potential loss of local control. In Spite of this attempts to set
up a military training were facilitated by establishing an "Academy":
"It is quite a peculiar feature of the ShP that
its Operations Directorate
(OZ) is
still feeble, and it is not even known who heads it. This reflects the
relative weakness of the ShP in imposing efficient military control over
influential OZ
commanders. While accepting ShP guidance,
the OZ commanders still remain largely independent in the conduct of operations
and even maintain their own parallel and independent financing and logistics.
It appears that one of the main short-term goals of the ShP is to impose
tighter control on OZ commanders. So far most resistance to centralisation
seems to come from the commanders of OZs No 5, 'Drini', and No 2, 'Remi'.
.. A system of military education was established,
however, where the central
Military Academy (Akademia ë Ardhshme Ushtarake) trains
higher officers (from just below OZ commanders to battalion commander level),
while at least three of the OZs have their own Military Training Schools,
which train officers down to squad leader level. Courses, which take an
average four to six weeks, are conducted mostly by former Yugoslav Army
officers ..At least 600 officers have completed various courses so far;
the Military Academy is currently into its 4th class."
Jane’s Defence Weekly;
The Civil affairs of the KLA are vested in the
Public Order and Civil Administration Directorate
(Drejtoria për Marrëdhënie Publike dhe Administrim Civil)
, formed in late 1998. It was headed
by the first KLA spokesman,
Jakup Krasniqi. But
training of recruits remains a problem:
"Training presents a major problem: up until
1990 basic rifle training and infantry drill were provided by the JNA.
Since that year, however, Albanian conscripts have not been required to
serve in the JNA. Large basic training camps cannot be established - either
in Kosovo or in Western Europe - forcing the KLA to limit its size for
the time being.."
Jane’s Defence Weekly; Ibid;
In spite of all this, there is
little doubt that under the more determined sections of the KLA, a genuine
national liberation will be achieved.
6) Rambouillet – The USA Splits
The Factions of the KLA -Creates a New Comprador Wing.
Although the courageous "Marxist-Leninists" of the ilk of Northstar Compass
and Harpal Brar claim that the USA basically was 100% behind the KLA, the
reality is much more opaque. In fact the USA was still uncertain as to
how to deal with the situation in which it had a vested interest. It was
only after
the cease-fire of 13 October that the
USA began "talking to the KLA leaders" - leaders they had previosulsy dubbed
as "Terrorists":
"On 13 October.. the US envoy, Richard Holbrooke,
persuaded Milosevic to accept a ceasefire. As the Yugoslav forces withdrew
from Kosovo, the KLA escalated its operations, reoccupying former Serbian
positions. In December 1998 the fighting resumed. The KLA was not short
of weapons. Container passed through the Adriatic and arrived at the Albanian
port of Durres. Arms also came from Macedonia disguised as humanitarian
aid. At that point US diplomats began talking to the KLA leaders, but the
attacks continued. The Kosovar delegation was already divided when it arrived
at Rambouillet on 6 February, and the KLA soon gained the upper hand. At
the end of the talks the KLA intelligence chief, Hashim Thaci, announced
that a new Kosovan government was being established to replace that set
up by Rugova in 1992 and appointed himself Prime Minister. Meanwhile the
KLA leadership was expanding. The 'political committee' had grown from
six to eight members. On 24 February Suleyman Silema, nephew of a prominent
chief of the general staff, which had two heads operational planning, Rexhep
Silemi and Bislim Zyrapi, five zone leaders specialist divisions."
Chiclet; Ibid;
The KLA Leaders at the start of
Rambouillet, included those in the Diaspora:
"The leadership still appears to rely, at least
for its public face, on the radicals in the diaspora, including Jashar
Salihu, the
head of the Homeland Calling fund, and Pleurat
Sejdiu, the
KLA's London representative."
Hedges; Ibid.
But more important were those
whose primary work was carried out, in the dangerous conditions of Kosova
itself. And among these Hashim Thaci was and remains most important:
"But the group's chief appears to be the university-educated
Hashim Thaci, the head of the political directorate, whose nom de guerre
is "Snake." Like many in the leadership, he was a student activist in Pristina
before leaving to study in Albania and raise money in Europe for the independence
movement. "
Hedges; Ibid;
He was then an "unknown":
"Many, including most Kosovo Albanians.. had
never heard of him, Thaci emerged from the hills to lead the Kosovo Albanian
delegation to Rambouillet. He had become the leader of the KLA's loose-knit
organization by being one of the most zealous members of the minuscule
group that founded it. Indeed, he was so dedicated that he began military
training in 1992, before the KLA was founded. His link to the older exiles
like Mahmuti, in Switzerland, was money. They collected it and funneled
it to Thaci and his colleagues in Kosovo. The connections between the émigrés
and the members of the new generation became more solid when the young
men made periodic visits abroad. Thaci, for example, spent some time in
1994 in Zurich, studying politics and international relations."
Judah; Ibid;
Someone
more well known, and who had been tested over a longer time was Adem
Demaci, who had been repeatedly and
prolongedly imprisoned by the Serbs for his Marxist-Leninist based espousal
of national status for Kosova. Demaci was the closest of the KLA leaders,
to Marxism-Leninism – as we can determine to date.
"Adem Demaci,
who was sometimes called the Mandela
of Kosovo because of his twenty-eight years as a political prisoner, and
who was then the KLA's "political representative" in Pristina";
Judah Ibid.
When the USA and the EEC imperialists
engineered the Rambouillet farce, they already knew that they could not
deal with such an experienced and determined fighter as Demaci. The imperialists
set out then to break the ranks of the KLA, and they in essence ensured
Demaci’s exclusion from the talks. This was wise on their parts, since
Demaci was steadfastly refusing to rescind the demand for independence
and at the very least another referendum:
"At Rambouillet .. The crux of the deal being
offered was that while the Serbs had to accept a NATO military force, the
Albanians would have to give up on their demand that there be a referendum
on independence after three years. The diplomats told Thaci that there
could be no credible pressure on the Serbs if his delegation did not sign.
Thaci was torn, not knowing what to do. Demaci…. was constantly on the
phone yelling at Thaci that he must not sign the deal. He told him that
the KLA commanders in the field would never accept anything short of independence
after three years. One diplomat who was there says that Thaci, uncertain
what to do, "was almost in tears."
Judah; Ibid.
It can be justly said that Thaci was pressured into
taking an opportunist line. Demaci held firm to the wisdom of not trusting
the imperialists self-proclaimed sense of justice. Whether Thaci has learnt
from his opportunist error, and has returned to a principled national liberation
perspective must yet be seen.
We
will remind readers that four parties affiliated to International
Struggle Marxist Leninist (ISML); issued
a joint statement on the war of aggression in the Balkans; namely Alliance
(North America); The Lenin Committee (Italy); Marxist-Leninist
Communist Party (Turkey); Communist League (UK).
In that statement we condemned
USA aggression; BUT we supported the war of national liberation of the
KLA. However, in light of slanders made against us, we remind all, that
we also resolutely warned that the KLA would make a make an opportunistic
mistake, if it supported NATO. We wrote this in our resolution, also found
on the web site below:
"We must however point out to the Kosovar working
class and peasantry, that supporting the US and NATO led imperialist bombing
war in the North of the former Yugoslavia - once more ties their fate to
that of the imperialists. The imperialist Treaty of London divided Albania
into two, and "gave" Kosova to the Serbs. Relinquishing now their freedom
struggle to imperialist USA and NATO - would lead the Kosovar people into
yet another, and equally tragic blind alley. Therefore we criticise the
calls of the Kosovar Liberation Army in calling for support of the NATO
strikes - both before and since the start of air-strikes - as a grave mis-understanding
of how to achieve real nationhood and meaningful independence. For the
Kosovar people - such calls to NATO leadership, can only retard their main
and final goal - socialism. If for the Serbian peoples it is necessary
to repudiate their bourgeois leader's suppression of Kosova independence
- the corollary for the Kosovar working peoples is to understand that national
liberation of oppressed peoples involves a struggle against imperialism,
as well as a struggle against the immediate oppressors."
http://www22.brinkster.com/harikumar/ISML/ISMLOnNATO99.htm
The current situation in the KLA leadership is that
of at least three main contenders for power. These are:
Hashim Thaci
who allied himself to the USA imperialists;
Hxahvit Haliti
who is closely linked to the Government
in Albania; And Sylejman
Selimi, 'Sultan': a
protégé of Demaci who may now represent the most progressive
sections of the KLA that are likely to move most determinedly to a national
status for Kosova:
"Contrary to what would be expected, most influence
and power lies within the Political
Directorate (Drejtoria Politike), led
by the rising political star and head of the Kosovo negotiating delegation
to France Hashim Thaçi.
Many consider his most serious long-term opponent
to be Hxavit Haliti,
whose several years of political imprisonment
are marred by allegations of collaboration with Serbian authorities. Haliti
has very close links with the current government in Tirana and is trying
to put all the financing of the KLA under his control. Although Sylejman
Selimi, 'Sultan', has been named
commander-in-chief, the extent of his real influence is not clear. It appears
that his surprise nomination during the first round of negotiations in
Rambouillet was an attempt by hard-line Kosovo politician Adem
Demaçi to explore rifts
among ShP members and prevent the acceptance of the Kosovo Interim Agreement.
Losing the battle against the Kosovo accord, Demaçi had to exit
the political scene, but the ShP decided not to cause internal divisions
by replacing Selimi by a more influential and militarily competent member."
Jane’s Defence Weekly; IBid.
In addition there is the continuing
presence and reality of the clear-cut comprador agencies set up by Rugova
and Bukoshi. It is clear that the USA has now taken up the cudgels on behalf
of Rugova (See part 6). But at the moment of writing some water still needs
to flow. The state of the present divide between the wings of the KLA and
its openly comprador rivals is depicted below:
"Likewise, Albanian politicians are squabbling
among themselves. As the Rambouillet meeting drew to a close the Albanian
delegation agreed among themselves to set up a provisional government.
The ministers were to be chosen by Hashim Thaci and they included members
of Rugova's LDK. But the LDK leaders refused to accept their appointments.
.. a fierce power struggle has broken out among the Albanian leaders. All
sides are working on the assumption that Kosovo will sooner or later be
liberated and thus it is essential to be in the best position now so as
to be able to take power when the time comes. On the one side are the leaders
of the KLA and on the other the leaders of the LDK, and more specifically
Bujar Bukoshi, the man Rugova appointed as his prime minister in exile
after he declared Kosovo's "independence" in 1991. Despite the breakdown
in the relations between the two, Bukoshi has remained premier, continuing
to perform his main job, which has been to raise money from Kosovars abroad.
No one knows how much money he and his government-in-exile have, but the
KLA regularly denounces him as a traitor for refusing to hand it over to
them."
Judah Ibid;
We remind the reader that Stalin
supported the Kuomintang, and steadily upheld the most determined and revolutionary
section of it - as weaker successive layers capitulated to imperialism.
(See: http://www22.brinkster.com/harikumar/China/NotesColonNatQues&China.htm)
At the time of writing
it is still not clear as to how the situation will end, nor which section
of the KLA will become predominant. Nonetheless it is quite clear that
the inevitability of Kosovar independence is becoming clearer:
"Despite all Serbian efforts to treat it as
a terrorist group, the KLA is now the strongest player on the Kosovo Albanian
political scene and fully aware of its current status and responsibilities.
All signs indicate that, should the Serbian authorities accept the Kosovo
Interim Agreement, the political arm of the KLA would transform into the
Kosovo Liberation Party (Partia Çlirimtare ë Kosovës -
PÇK). The requisite political wisdom and resources to take on a
civilian role without surrendering its position to the previous civilian
structures of the Kosovo Albanians are already in evidence."
http://www.janes.com/defence/features/kosovo/kla.html
Those who tried to ignore them
can do so no longer:
"The KLA fighters are the province's new power
brokers. Whatever political leadership emerges in Kosovo will come from
the rebel ranks, and it will be militant, nationalist, uncompromising,
and deeply suspicious of all outsiders. U.S. intelligence agencies, preoccupied
with tracking militant Islamist groups and Iranian agents in Bosnia, were
caught off guard by the Kosovo rebel force's emergence, strength, and popularity.
Indeed, some diplomats argued as late as last year about whether the shadowy
group really existed -- even as small armed bands roamed Drenica in central
Kosovo.
"Kosovo's Next Masters"; By Chris Hedges; Foreign
Affairs May/June 1999 (volume 78, number 3).
The lessons for the KLA are also
also clear: If independence for Kosova is to be achieved – do not trust
the USA:
"The West's blundering peace initiative has
reminded the KLA not to rely too much on NATO. The alliance was palpably
reluctant to move against the Serbs, although they have flagrantly violated
the agreement made last October to cease hostilities in Kosovo. Ignoring
the October pact, NATO bombed to get Belgrade to sign on to the Rambouillet
deal -- a shift not lost on the Kosovar Albanians. Milosevic, for his part,
has driven NATO crazy since the Kosovo crisis began. Chris Hill, the current
U.S. Kosovo mediator, has carried out fruitless shuttle diplomacy since
last spring; on his latest trip to Belgrade, Milosevic did not even meet
with him. Put bluntly, the Serb leaders stiffed the United States. The
KLA is correctly distrustful of Western intentions and resolve. That distrust
led to the decision by the KLA not to sign the Rambouillet agreement in
the first round of talks last February -- which, in turn, let the alliance
off the moral hook. Kosovar intransigence gave the West the excuse it was
looking for not to implement the October agreement and deepened the already
wide rifts within the alliance."
Hedges; Ibid.
Chiclet offers this view of the
future of the KLA:
"In the early days the KLA was under the thumb
of its pro-Hoxha backers. Now the Ordeals suffered by Kosovo's, ethnic
Albanian population have won it support. Fighting experience militarized
it. In deciding to back the KLA, the USA is dealing with a much more structured
leadership. A new KLA is probably about to emerge."
Chiclet Ibid.
But
to Conclude
this section, we will close for Northstar
Compass with a citation from a favorite bourgeois author of theirs, Chris
Hedges:
"Settling in for a long fight, the KLA probably
has 30,000 automatic weapons, made available at bargain prices after Albanian
military arsenals were looted in the chaos after the spring 1997 economic
meltdown. The rebels have made a concerted effort to acquire German antitank
weapons, heavy machine guns, sniper rifles, and rocket-propelled grenades.
Most important, by launching the current rebellion, taking on the Serbs,
and drawing international attention to the conflict, the rebel group has
done more in a year to further the cause of independence for Kosovo than
Rugova was able to do over the preceding decade…. In the end, it will come
to this: Led by the KLA, Kosovo will separate from Serbia, whether by negotiations
or by violence. "
"Kosovo's Next Masters"; By Chris Hedges; Foreign
Affairs May/June 1999 (volume 78, number 3.
This Section completed
August 1999.
FOR REFERENCED TEXTS BY WEB
LINK:
ISML STATEMENT UPON NATO AND
KOSOVA APRIL 1999; http://www22.brinkster.com/harikumar/ISML/ISMLOnNATO99.htm
NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A MARXIST
LENINIST PARTY (UK) & ALLIANCE MARXIST-LENINIST (NORTH AMERICA): STATEMENT:
BETRAYAL OF THE KOSOVARS JUNE 1999: http://www22.brinkster.com/harikumar/Albania/alliance-ncmlp-kosovars.htm
ARTICLE FROM JANE'S DEFENCE
WEEKLY: AS AN APPENDIX TO ALLIANCE 33:
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Atrium/1091/33-appone.html
For Next Section: "WHAT WERE
THE REAL AIMS OF THE IMPERIALIST NATO-LED WAR AGAINST SERBIA?" GO
TO: http://www22.brinkster.com/harikumar/Albania/All33-pt6.htm
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