ALLIANCE

ISSUE 29: AUGUST 1998
(1)THE STRUGGLE IN KOSOVA

Communist League UK, 1998

(2)THE LEGACY OF TITOITE REVISIONISM
-Choose between the legacy of Tito and the Legacy of Stalin", Alliance

(3)COMMUNIST PARTY ALBANIA ON MILLOSHI

Translation from "Feniksi"(The Phoenix) no.4; May 1998;
Central Organising Committee of the CPA Condemns Splitting Activity.


TABLE CONTENTS
:

Introduction.
The Struggle In Kosova, Bill Bland Communist League (UK)
Albania, Enver Hoxha And Joseph Stalin -Choose Between Legacy of Tito and the Legacy of Stalin
Hsyni Milloshi Continues His Fraudulent Positions; Statement of the Central Organising Committee of the Communist Party Albania on Splitting Activities in the Party; From "Feniski"; Number 4, May 1998.


INTRODUCTION:

         Recent events in the former People's Republic of Socialist Albania (PSRA) have already been discussed by Alliance in issues 26 and 21. But the Crisis in Kosova returns us, to the question of liberty and full human and national rights for the Kosovan Albanians.
         This issue is comprised of
three articles. The first was recently written by W.B.Bland for the English Communist League;
         Secondly
we reprint an article by Alliance on the relationships of Albania=s leader Enver Hoxha to Stalin;
         Finally
we reprint a very recent statement by the Central Organising Committee of the Communist Party Albania - translated by W.B.Bland. The reprinted article is a version of one read to the First Stalin Conference in Moscow of 1994, for Alliance. This was printed in Alliance number 10 - along with all other submitted articles to that Seminar.
         (NB. The Alliance issues 10 and 11 remain the only printed version that we are aware of
all the papers given at that forum - certainly in English).
         The
urgent need for clarity upon Albania is shown by several recent events within the movement that calls itself Marxist-Leninist.
         Taken together - these indicate profound confusion about, if not an assault upon the PSRA Socialist legacy.

         WE LIST THESE RECENT EVENTS FOR CLARITY:

1.
Verbal attacks upon the sovereignty of Kosova, were launched in May 1998, of the Pyongyang-Brussels axis [led by Ludo Martens (Parti du Travail de Belgique-PTB) and Nina Andreyeava (CPSU(B)], at Brussels. Non-participants, such as ourselves have been made aware of this, by verbal reports from several attenders at the meeting. We await the written version of the attack - if the Brussels PTB dares. We write elsewhere of the Pyongyang-Brussels axis - Please see Alliance 19.
         The Brussels axis has been obstructing a meaningful resolution of the theoretical differences over the past 30 years in the Marxist-Leninist movement.
         2.
The public distortion of the views of the deceased leader of the Party Of Labour of Albania - Enver Hoxha - by a "pretender" of the Communist Party Labour Albania. This pretender is
Hysni Milloshi. It cannot be an accident, that the pretender has been assiduously taken up by the Brussels-Pyongyang axis, and the PTB.
        In Issue 26 which was on Albania's recent Civil War, we urged that those claiming the heritage of Enver Hoxha - should put their programs forward. That is because we already did have some doubts given competing claims. We wrote the following :
"It should not be surprising, given the massive repression following the death of Hoxha and the revisionist take-over by Ramiz Alia, if there is some considerable confusion inside Albania. Perhaps it may even extend to genuine Marxist-Leninists. Suppression, with consequent secrecy makes open organizing communist practice difficult... Any such confusion is naturally greater for comrades outside Albania, who are straining to understand who exactly are the participants in the struggle. This struggle has now taken on the dimensions of a class based civil war."
Issue 26 Alliance.

         Standing outside Albania, at the sidelines, we do not suggest any other path than that of Hoxha and his heirs. We believe that the party leadership of the CPA knows its own conditions best of all. But, whilst hesitating, lest we give meaningless and fatuously easy-to-give advice from the side-lines, we do urge our Albanian comrades, on only one matter. That is to make clear their
Programme, as far as this is possible. This will surely have many positive effects inside Albania. For us and others outside Albania, it would lead to a better and wider sympathy of their heroic struggles - one that is tempered by an understanding of their positions. (See Alliance 26: Civil War In Albania).
         But having sounded that cautionary note, in a non-sectarian spirit, we published documents sent to us from other organisations in Europe, that claimed to originate with the CPA. Although these documents were clearly somewhat 'voluntarist' and appeared to give an overly optimistic picture of the current situation in Albania for the communist perspective. We were correct to publish these. But we were also correct to warn that currents inside the CPA were not clearly defined as of then. Since that time, the prominent denial by Milloshi, of profound distinctions between Mao and Hoxha, was printed and widely distributed by the Brussels Parti du Travail de Belgique (PTB). Of course Milloshi's profoundly anti-historical assertion suits the revisionist operation of Martens, who asserts that the differences between the various
"Marxist-Leninist" leaders are secondary to the current goal of "unity". That Milloshi's statement is anti-historical and incorrect, can be verified by reading Hoxha's printed words! The statement is a clear declaration that whatever else he is - Milloshi is not a Marxist-Leninist. Unfortunately certainly the Pyongyang-Brussels factions, and it is also possible - other international currents, accept Milloshi's self-proclaimed credentials as the "leader" of the revived Albanian Communists.
         The position of
Nexhjime Hoxha (widow of Enver Hoxha) is as yet unclear. Whether she is or is not affiliated to Milloshi, needs clarification since she attended the Brussels meeting with him. These issues will continue to be clarified with the organisational emergence of the leading current of the Communist Party Albania, whose paper appears under the name "Feniksi"[The Phoenix] This current emanates from those that we consider the true adherents of Hoxha; and takes Milloshi to task. This taking to task - forms the third article, and is printed last in a form translated by Comrade W.B.Bland of the Communist League (UK).
        3.
The third recent event, is the continued confusion of honest ex-revisionists - who have managed to finally shake off the worst of
Khruschevite revisionism. Unfortunately, many have as yet to fully liberate them from the legacy of Greater Slav chauvinism in supporting firstly Tito, and latterly Millosovic. This unfortunately includes some sections of North Star Compass (NSC). Readers of Alliance will know our vocal support of NSC - See Alliance 19. However, it should be noted that NSC only printed articles favouring Slobodan Miloshevic=s attack upon Bosnia and the peoples of Bosnia. We trust the NSC Collective have learnt by the bitterness over that decision, not to make a similar mistake, this time in regard to Kosova. But it is important to emphasise, that Alliance holds that the NSC mistake is an honest, subjective and in the end - a mistake born of confusion. This is totally at variance with the qualitatively different attacks launched by the Pyongyang-Brussels axis and Milloshi. But nonetheless, at some stage all pro-Marxist-Leninist forces, have to choose - AThe Legacy Of Tito Or Legacy Of Stalin?@ North Star will, someday, have to finally make that choice.
         We remind NSC that on one point Hoxha and Tito did actually agree. What was this point? That in Tito
=s Yugoslavia dinar billionaires formed a new ruling class! See the following matching quotes :
Said Hoxha:

A
Capitalism has been fully established in Yugoslavia, but this capitalism is cunningly disguised. Yugoslavia poses as a socialist state, but one of a special kind which the world has never seen before.@ E.Hoxha :@Yugoslav >Self-Administration= - A Capitalist Theory and Practice@; Tirana; 1978; p.3.
And Tito does not disagree,
saying this of the class differentiation inside former Yugoslavia:
A
Even among Communists there are extremely wealthy people whose wealth does not amount to merely to tens or hundreds or millions , but billions of old dinars. That much cannot be earned. This is exploitation of the results of other people=s work@. J.B.Tito: Speech of September 14th; 1972, In AKeesings= Contemporary Archives@, Volume 19, pp. 25, 794. (Cited from: AThe Question of The Albanians in Yugoslavia@ By W.B.Bland, The Albanian Society, 1981, UK).

         To all who deny, and justify the anti-Kosovan atrocities perpetrated by Great Serbian aggression, including the Brussels-Pyongyang axis; to all who deny Hoxha
=s distinction from revisionists like Tito and Mao Ze Dong, we must say:
WHICH WILL YOU CHOOSE: ATHE LEGACY OF TITO OR LEGACY OF STALIN?
@

ARTICLE ONE:
THE STRUGGLE IN KOSOVA; BY BILL BLAND (COMUNIST LEAGUE- UK)
INTRODUCTION

         The present crisis in Kosova - ['Kosovo' in the Serbian language] commenced in March 1998 when:
"Serbian police swept through ethnic Albanian villages in Kosova province" ('The Guardian', 2 March 1998; p. 12).

And left: "An estimated 75 people dead". ('The Guardian', 20 March 1998; p. 15);
In what 'The Times' called in its headline a: "Massacre by the 'ethnic cleansers"'. ('The Times', 4 March 1998; p. 1).

However, the roots of the crisis go back to at least the beginning of the century.

(1) THE PARTITION OF THE ALBANIAN NATION

         The Albanian people, who are descendants of the Ancient
Illyrians, form a nation whose language evolved from Illyrian.
         Following the defeat of the Turkish Ottoman Empire in the First Balkan War, a
conference of the Great Powers of the period - Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia - convened in London in December 1912 and took it upon themselves to draw the frontiers of the new states which came into being as a result of the war. However:
" The Great Powers largely ignored demographic realities".
('New Encyclopaedia Britannica', Volume 14; Chicago; 1997; p. 617).

        In particular, only about half the Albanian nation was placed in the newly created state of Albania, the rest - composed mainly of the region of Kosova - being placed within Serbia. The Great Powers

"Ceded the vast region of Kosovo to Serbia" ('New Encyclopaedia Britannica',Volume 14; Chicago; 1997; p. 617).

Thus, today 1.7 million ethnic Albanians live in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 0.4 million in the Republic of Macedonia. And out of a population of 2.0 million Kosovars:

"Around 1.7 million or 85% of the total." are ethnic Albanians." ('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 34; p. 35,785).

        After the First World War, in December 1918, the victorious Allied Powers created the 'Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes', renamed 'Yugoslavia' in October 1929, and installed on the throne Aleksander, Regent of Serbia, who formally became:
"King in August 1921" ('Europa World Year Book:1997', Volume 2; London; 1997; p. 3,661).

        In October 1934 Aleksander was assassinated in France, and his brother, Prince Paul, was made Regent until Alexander's son Peter should come of age.
        In March 1941, the increasingly pro-German regime of Prince Paul was overthrown in a coup, and a Government which supported the Allied Powers was installed, with King Peter as Head of State. In April, however, German and Italian forces invaded, quickly overrunning the country". ('Europa World Year Book : 1997', Volume 2; ibid.; p 3,661).

(2) KOSOVO UNDER THE MONARCHY:

Aleksander had:

"Assumed dictatorial powers in January 1929"; ('Europa World Year Book : 1997', Volume 2; ibid.; p. 3,661).

        and under the Serb-dominated monarchy, ethnic Albanians:

"Did not even enjoy the most basic national and democratic rights - the right to use the Albanian language in public business, the right of having schools in their mother-tongue,.. The right of publishing in their own language, and so on. Nothing was done for the schooling of the Albanian national minority. Moreover, even those schools, which had existed previously for teaching in the Albanian language, were closed. In 1939 there were only three public libraries with 6,000 books (all in the Serbo-Croat language)";
(Ali Hadri: 'The Albanian Population of Kosova between the Two World Wars', in: Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Albania: 'The Truth on Kosova'; Tirana; 1993; p. 131, 136).

        As a result of this policy:
"More than 90% of the Albanian population were illiterate," (Ali Hadri: ibid.; p. 131, 136).

        But even worse, the monarchist government adopted a programme of 'ethnic cleansing'. Disguised as 'agrarian reforms', a series of 'colonisation' laws took land from Albanian peasants in order:

"To settle these parts with 'sound nationalist elements"' (Ali Hadri: ibid.; p. 128); from Serbia or Montenegro.

        A semi-official report submitted in March 1937 by
VASO CHUBRILOVICH, who later became a Minister in Titoite Yugoslavia, to the Serbian Club of Culture, concluded that:

"The only effective method for solving this problem (the alleged 'problem' of Kosova -- Ed.) is the mass deportation of the Albanians. When the state wants to intervene in favour of its own people in the struggle for land, it can be successful only if it acts brutally". (Vaso Chubrilovich: 'The Expulsion of the Arnauts', in: Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Albania: op. cit.; p. 184).

(3) KOSOVA IN THE RANKOVICH PERIOD

        The official position of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia during the Second World War was expressed in a resolution of the 1st Conference of the National Liberation Council for Kosova and Metohija held at Bujan in Decemberi January 1944:

"Under the leadership of the Provisional Committee of the CPY for Kosova."
(Enver Hoxha: 'The Titoites; Historical Notes' (hereafter listed as 'Enver Hoxha (1982)'; Tirana; 1982; p. 117).

This resolution pledged as follows:

"Kosova and the Dukajin Plateau is a province inhabited for the most part by an Albanian population which today, as always, wishes to be united with Albania. . . . The only way for the Albanian people of Kosova and the Dukagim Plateau to be united with Albania is to fight together with the other peoples of Yugoslavia in the war against the bloodthirsty Nazi occupiers and those in their pay, because this is the only way to win the freedom.. to decide their own future through the right of self-determination up to secession."
'Resolution of 1st Conference of National Liberation Council for Kosova and Metohija', in: Enver Hoxha (1982): ibid.; p. 117).

        On the basis of this resolution, Albanian partisans assisted those of Yugoslavia in the armed struggle to liberate Yugoslav territory from German occupation.
        However, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were in fact,
NOT MARXIST-LENINISTS, BUT REVISIONISTS. And the grouping which became dominant in the immediate post-war period was one REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF SERBIAN CAPITAL HEADED BY ALEKSANDER RANKOVICH.
In June 1948,

"The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform was announced";
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 7; p. 9,381).
because of: "Deviations from Marxism-Leninism, of pursuing a policy of 'nationalism' and Trotskyism".('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 7; p. 9,381).

        It was in accordance with this revisionist policy that, after the liberation of Yugoslavia, the leadership of the CPY reneged on the pledge of the Bujan Conference, and brought about the arbitrary:
"Inclusion of Kosova, the Dukagjin Plateau and other Albanian regions within the 'new federal Yugoslavia." (Enver Hoxha (1982): op. cit.; p. 120).

        and proceeded to continue the policies of the Yugoslav monarchy towards the ethnic Albanian population of Kosova. As the Marxist-Leninist leader of post-war Albania, Enver Hoxha, told Stalin in April 1949:

"The Tito clique is following the sane line and the same methods in Kosova and Macedonia as those used by their counterparts - King Aleksander and others in the past...The Belgrade clique . . . is using large-scale terror there, with mass deportations, arrests and forced labour, . . as well as expropriation."
(Enver Hoxha: 'With Stalin: Memoirs'; Tirana; 1979; p. 108).

        In November 1952:

"The CPY was renamed 'the League of Communists of Yugoslavia' (LCY)... A new Constitution was adopted in January 1953, with Tito becoming President of the Republic, a post which he held until his death in 1980".
('Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volune 2; op. cit.; p. 3,161).

(4) KOSOVA IN THE KARDELJ PERIOD

        In June 1966, a:

"Crisis inside the League of Communists was reported to have been brought to a head by the accidental discovery.. of a hidden microphone in President Tito's private apartments." ('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,567).

        Rankovich:

"As State Secretary for Internal Affairs from 1945-53 and President of the Committee for Internal Affairs from 1953-63 had been primarily responsible for the organisation of the security police (generally known as the UDBA)."
('Keesing' s Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,567).

        So, in July 1966, Rankovich was expelled from the Executive Committee and Central Committee of the LCY, and:
"Subsequently resigned as Vice-President." ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,567).

        The investigation of the Yugoslav security services into this period:

"Revealed that particularly grave irregularities had occurred in two autonomous provinces of the Serbian Republic, Kosova.. and Vojvodina.. Allegations of persecution of the Albanian community in Kosmet (Kosova and Metohija -- Ed.) had been put forward by the Albanian Government in 1958".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,805).

        After the dismissal of Rankovich, a revisionist grouping
REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF NON-SERB CAPITAL became dominant. Its leading ideologist was
EDVARD KARDELJ
and its interests and ideas were expressed in the Constitution adopted in 1974. This Constitution handed down a significant degree of power to:

"The six republics AND autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosova). The confederal character of the constitution was further evidenced by the parity of all federal units.. The 1974 constitution did take the devolution of power and the empowerment of federal units to unparalleled heights".
(David A. Dyker & Ivan Vejvoda (Eds.): 'Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth'; London; 1996; p. 15).

        Two years after the ousting of Rankovich, in 1968,
LARGE-SCALE DEMONSTRATIONS TOOK PLACE IN KOSOVA demanding greater democracy, and these were seized upon by the Kardelj clique to force acceptance of:

"Some of the demands placed by demonstrators. They approved the use of the (Albanian - Ed.) national flag and establishment of a university'.
(Anon.: 'Republic of Kosova'; n.d.; n.p.; p. 29).
The University of Prishtina, providing higher education in the Albanian language, was established in 1970. ('World List of Universities and Other Higher Institutions of Education," New York; 1997; p. 1,124).

        The new dominant clique:

"Did not approve the status of a republic (for Kosova -- Ed.)" (Anon: op. cit.; p. 29).

But the constitutional changes which were adopted under the Kardelj regime:

"To a certain degree, limited Serbian competence over Kosova". (Anon: ibid.; p. 29).

        The adoption of the new constitution:

"Was followed by the formation of .. supreme courts, territorial defence, Albanians were engaged in police forces and army forces and many of them were even given General's ranks". (Anon.: ibid.; p. 29).

        It seemed that:

"Kosova was . . . in a new phase in its struggle to realise its long dreamt dream - the 'Republic of Kosova"'. (Anon.: ibid; p. 30).

(5) THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

        But the multinational state of Yugoslavia, under the basically capitalist regime of the Kardelj period, was inherently unstable.
        As long ago as 1978 the Albanian Marxist-Leninist Enver Hoxha wrote:

"The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, from the very beginning, was not built on the bases and teachings of Marxism-Leninism. With each passing day it was becoming clearer that a socialist society of the Leninist type was not being built in Yugoslavia, but that capitalism was developing instead. How does the problem of nations and nationalities in Yugoslavia stand? The Yugoslav Federation inherited deep-rooted conflicts in this field.
Tito and the renegade Yugoslav clique around him did not develop a Marxist-Leninist national policy. . . . On the contrary.. this policy served to fuel the hatred and feuds among the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia".
(Enver Hoxha: 'Yugoslav Self-Administration' - A Capitalist Theory and Practice', in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Tirana; 1985; p, 272, 274, 313-14).

        By the beginning of the 1990s, it was clear that the rise of national antagonisms between the constituent nations of this federal state had
MADE THEIR RETENTION WITHIN A SINGLE STATE NO LONGER POSSIBLE.
        Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence in June 1991, Bosnia-Hercovina in April 1992, and Macedonia in November 1992. In April 1992, a new
'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' was proclaimed, now composed only of Serbia and Macedonia.
(6) KOSOVA IN THE MILOSHEVICH PERIOD

         As, in the late 1980s, the old Yugoslav Federation approached disintegration, the Serbian capitalist class plotted to replace it with a new federation which they would dominate.
SLOBODAN MILOSHEVICH:

"Became president of the Serbian League of Communists in 1984. . . . As a hardline party leader in the pre-perestroika mould",
(Melanie Perry: 'Chamber's Biographical Dictionary'; Edinburgh; 1997; p.1,286).

        He was:

"An unrepentant champion of a 'Greater Serbia', (Melanie Perry: ibid.; p. 1,286).

        WHICH WOULD INCORPORATE WITHIN ITS FRONTIERS ALL THOSE PARTS OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA WITH A SUBSTANTIAL SERB POPULATION.

        This did not mean that Miloshevich had the slightest sympathy for the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosova. On the contrary,
HE HAD USED DEMAGOGIC ANTI-ALBANIAN RACISM AS A STEPPING STONE TO POWER. Miloshevich
"(himself of Kosovar origin) . . had undertaken a hard-line and on occasions an openly nationalist campaign for the extension of Serbia's rights over its provinces (i.e., over Kosova and Vojyodina)".
(Melanie Perry: ibid.; p. 34).

        In June 1987:

"Thousands of Serbs and Hontenegrins travelled from Kosova to Belgrade, where they staged a protest march". (
'Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volume 2; op. cit.; p. 3.661).

        and by these means, the grouping around Miloshevich was successful:

"In ousting Serbian leaders who did not share his views on this issue' "
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 34;p. 36,375).

        In October 1987, the Federal State Presidency imposed
EMERGENCY MEASURES on Kosova,

"Including the despatch to the province of special federal police units and the effective suspension of the authority of the provincial police and judiciary".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 34; p. 36,795).

        And:

"The expulsion from the party of Mr. Fadili Hoxha, an influential (ethnic Albanian) Kosovar politician who had been a member of the federal collective state Presidency between 1974 and 1984".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 34; p. 36,795).

        In particular, during 1988 and 1989:

"Proposals to amend the Serbian Constitution to reduce the level of autonomy of the two regions (Kosova and Voivodina -- Ed.), were supported by regular demonstrations by Serbs".
('Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volume 2; op. cit.; p. 3,661).

        The ethnic Albanians of Kosova replied with counter-demonstrations, and in November 1988,

"An indefinite ban on all mass gatherings in Kosova was imposed".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 34; p. 36,622).

        In February 1989,

"The LCY central committee dismissed several members from its own ranks, including Azem Vlasi, the popular ethnic Albanian former LC leader in . . . Kosova".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,470).

        In response, ethnic Albanian miners

"Began a protest strike in the Kosova town of Trepca". ('Keesing 's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,470).

        When, under this pressure, the president of the Kosova LCY, Rahman Morina, announced his resignation:

"The announcement prompted the Trepca miners to call off their strike. . The apparent capitulation of the Kosova IC leadership to the strikers prompted an immediate backlash by Serbs both in Kosova and in Serbia proper. On Feb. 28 an estimated 700,000 Serbian demonstrators massed outside the Federal Assembly building to protest against the Kosovar Albanians' 'chauvinism and separatism"; ('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,470).
"Rioting continued.. when Vlasi was arrested in early March. Some 25 people were reported to have been killed during clashes with the police'.
('Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volume 2; op. cit.; p. 3,662).

        In March 1989, the Kosova Provincial Assembly:

"Endorsed changes to the Serbian Constitution which gave the Serbian central authorities control over the internal affairs of Kosova and Voivodina. . . . This reduction in autonomy gave rise to a wave of rioting". ('Keesing 's Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,514).

        and later in the same month the:

"Ban on public protests in Kosova was reinforced to include restrictions on the movement of people into the proyince from other parts of Yugoslavia, and on the reporting and photographing of public protests and troop movements,"
('Keesing' s Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,514).

        In April 1989:

"It was reported . . that the Yugoslav authorities were offering financial incentives to Serbs wanting to settle in Kosova".
('Keesing' s Record of World Events', Volume 35; p. 37,156).

        In May 1989, Miloshevich:

"was elected President of the Serbian State Presidency
('Europa World Year Book: 1997'. Volume 2; op. cit.; p. 3,662),

        and this position became the centre of his power base for the next few years. In January 1990:

"Violence erupted once again in . . . . Kosova. . . . Tens of thousands of Albanians in at least 12 Kosovar towns were involved in daily clashes with riot police which by the end of the month reportedly had left at least 27 people dead. A crowd of more than 10,000 ethnic Albanians gathered outside the provincial LC headquarters in the capital Prishtina. . . . After several hours, the crowd had swelled to around 40,000 people. Riot police used water-cannon and tear gas against those who ignored warnings to disperse."
('Keesing s Record of World Events', Volume 36; p. 37,173).

        In April 1990, Serbian President Slobodan Miloshevich:

"Declared that Serbia's own internal affairs secretariat had now taken over from the federal authorities in administering public security in the province (Kosova - Ed.)". ('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 36; p. 37,382).

        In May 1990:

"The Serbian leadership announced new proposals for constitutional amendments that would remove Kosova 's autonomy entirely".
('Europa World Year Book: 1996; Volume 2; op. cit.; p. 3,662).

        In June 1990, the 180-member Kosova Assembly was

"Summarily closed by the Serbian authorities";
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 36; p. 37,621).

        while the Serbian Assembly was:

"Empowered to take over the affairs of the Kosova Assembly and of other official bodies".,
('Keesing’s Record of World Events', Volume 36; p. 37,621).

        In July 1990, the Serbian League of Communists of Serba voted to form:

"A new political party to be known as the Serbian Socialist Party. Slobodan Miloshevich, the Serbian President and a former leader of the Serbian communists, was elected president of the new party",
('Keesing 's Record of World Events', Volume 36; p. 37,622).

        Also in July 1990:

"The Serbian Assembly voted .. To dissolve the Kosova Assembly permanently (and thereby dismiss the government), and to terminate the contracts of all Kosova parliamentary officials, transferring the Kosova bodies' responsibilities permanently to the Serbian parliament. The head of Kosova's radio and television services and the director-general of the influential Kosova newspaper 'Rilindja' (Renaissance - Ed.) were replaced. In the following days, .. thousands of workers responded to calls by ethnic Albanian leaders for a one-hour daily strike".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 36; p. 37,621).

        And in the same month,

"In a referendum conducted throughout Serbia, a majority of Serbs voted in favour of proposals for a new constitution for the republic... However, the Albanian majority in Kosova province protested that the proposed constitution would effectively strip Kosova of the special autonomous status conferred on it . . in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution.. Only 25% of the Kosova electorate turned out to vote, most of them being Serbs";
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 36; p. 37,621).

(7) SERBIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST CROATIA

        The Yugoslav federal army had long been controlled by Serbia, and its officers were predominantly Serbs:

"The majority of officers (in the Yugoslav Federal Army - Ed.) are Serbs".
(Economist Intelligence Unit: 'Country Report: Yugoslavia', No, 1, 1991; p.5).

        Furthermore, Serbia was

"A major arms producer before the ending of the cold war."
('The Observer'' 18 April 1993; p. 18).

        and this large arms industry made Serbia well-equipped for aggressive war:

"The Serbs are endowed with an embarasssing wealth of heavy weapons and endless supplies of ammunition".
('The Guardian', 16 April 1993; p. 12).

        THE YUGOSLAV FEDERAL ARMY WAS THUS A READY-MADE INSTRUMENT TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT THE 'GREATER SERBIA' DESIRED BY THE SERB CAPITALIST CLASS.

        In mid-1991, therefore,
SERB 'IRREGULARS', ARMED, SUPPLIED AND SUPPORTED BY THE YUGOSLAV FEDERAL ARMY, INVADED CROATIA.
As a result:
"By early September (1991 - Ed.) . . Croatia had lost almost one-third of its territory to Serbian nationalist forces, with whom the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA) was now openly identified".
('Keesing 's Record of World Events', Volume 37; p. 38,420).

        In December 1990, the Serbian occupation forces proclaimed the:

"Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina' within Croatia, comprising municipalities in Croatia with a 'majority Serb population
('Keesing 's Record of World Events', Volume 37; p. 38,163).

        and in April 1992, Krajina:

"Declared itself part of Serbia".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 37; p.38,275).

(8) SERBIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST BOSNIA

        Shortly after the proclamation of Bosnia's independence, the Serbs permitted the UN to arrange a CEASE-FIRE WITH CROATIA. In other words:

"As soon as the Serbs had had their territorial fill of Croatia, they used the United Nations to arrange a cease-fire. This enabled them to re-deploy in Bosnia".
('The Guardian', 22 December 1992; p. 125).

        Then:

"Serb troops, backed by the Yugoslav army, stormed into eastern Bosnia, capturing a string of . . . towns" ('The Guardian', 8 February 1992; p. 15).

        The Serbian aims were:

"To take over as much of the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina as possible by military action and terror. It was launched in the summer of 1990 and is closely linked to Slobodan Miloshevich's Socialist Party of Serbia.... Their strategy has been to help local militia gain control of a maximum amount of this territory, to proceed with ‘ethnic cleansing’; this territory, and then to call in the UN and other international forces to separate the two sides, and finally for the 'ethnically cleansed' populations to vote to join the new Yugoslavia".
(Economist Intelligence Unit: 'Country Report: Yugoslav Republics', No. 2, 1992; p. 10, 12).

        In other words, the policy was aimed at
THE MURDER OR EXPULSION OF NON-SERBS FROM 'GREATER SERBIA':

"General Radko MIadich, the former Yugoslav army officer, Greater Serbian nationalist and Bosnian Serb military chief . . is . . . one of the architects of the Serbian programme of 'ethnic cleansing', first on Croatia in 1991 and now on a much larger scale in his native Bosnia. The Miloshevich camp in Belgrade armed, organised and supplied the Bosnian Serbs. Over the next four months Gen Mladich's forces went on a rampage of killing, raping, looting and expelling Bosnia's Muslims from their homes".
('The Guardian', 14 April 1993; p. 8).
'The Observer' calls this 'ethnic cleansing' by its proper name -Serbian fascism".
('The Observer', 18 April 1993; p. 23).
        By mid-1992. Serbian forces had occupied 70% of Bosnia:

"The Serbs . . have overrun 70% of Bosnia in nine months of war".
('The Guardian’ 16 January 1993; p. 11).

         And in September 1992:
"The parliament of the self-proclaimed 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina' . . . declared itself in favour of union with the ('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 38; p. 39,103).

(9) THE 'REPUBLIC OF KOSOVA'

        Rejecting the new constitutional proposals, in July 1990, a group of 110 delegates to the Kosova Assembly
DECLARED KOSOVA TO HAVE REPUBLICAN STATUS WITHIN THE YUGOSLAV FEDERATION:

"A group of 114 ethnic Albanian delegates to the Kosova Assembly issued a statement . . in which they declared that Kosova was now independent of Serbia, and that it was instead a full constituent republic within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 36; p. 37,621).

        In September 1990. Serbia's new Constitution entered into force. It:

"Abolished almost completely the attributes of statehood which the . . . Yugoslav federal Constitution had granted to the provinces of Kosova and Vojvodina within the Serbian republic. The new constitution proclaimed the 'Republic of Serbia', dropping the adjective 'socialist’''.
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 36; p. 37,725).

        In response:

"A general strike brought Kosova virtually to a standstill".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 36; p. 37,725).
It was:
"Called to protest against the mass dismissals of ethnic Albanian officials".
('Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volume 2; op. cit.; p. 3,662).
In the same month:
"The Kosova Provincial Assembly . . . was re-formed unilaterally by 111 of its . . . deputies at a secret session . . . in the village of Kacanik. . . Serbia immediately declared the proclamation illegal . . and the Prishtina public prosecutor's office announced that criminal charges would be brought against those Assembly deputies involved".
        Also in September 1990, Serbia's repression of the Kosovar Albanians was:

"Condemned by the minority leader in the United States, Senator Robert Dole, following his visit to Prishtina at the head of a delegation of US Republican congressmen";
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 36; p. 36,726).

        In September 1991, 6,000 Albanian teachers were:

"Threatened with dismissal for refusal to comply with the Serbian curriculum. . . . The Serbian authorities were also preventing 350.000 Albanian pupils and students from re-entering school because they had followed an Albanian curriculum". ('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 37; p. 38,420-42l).

        In October 1991, the Kosova Assembly (illegally, according to the Serbian authorities):

"Organised a referendum . . . on sovereignty for the . province of Kosova, and proceeded . . . to elect a provisional coalition government headed by Bujar Bukoshi. .The referendum was reported as recording an 87.01% turnout and 99.87% approval for sovereignty for Kosova".
('Keesing 's Record of World Events', Volume 37; p. 38,513).

        In May 1992:

"Elections were held in Kosova . . to a 130-member provincial assembly. The 'Democratic Alliance of Kosova' (DAK) secured most seats in the elections (which were declared illegal by the Serbian authorities) and their leader, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, was elected 'President' of the self-proclaimed 'Republic of Kosova'. However, Serbian security forces prevented the assembly from holding its inaugural session"
('Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volume 2; op. cit.; p. 3,663).

        In June 1992, Serbian troops:

"Surrounded the building and arrested several deputies".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 38; p. 38,970).

        In July 1992, the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosich:

"Nominated Serbian-born US businessman Milan Panich as Federal Prime Minister";
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 38; p. 39,013).

        In August 1992, Prime Minister Panich:

"Revoked the state of emergency in Kosova, which had been in effect since the unrest of 1989-90".
('Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volume 2; op. cit.; p. 3,663).

        He emphasised, however:

"That he was not yet proposing any withdrawal of federal troops from the province
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 38; p. 39,037).

        In October 1992, Federal Prime Minister Panich:

"Visited the Kosova capital Prishtina . . . for talks with Ibrahim Rugova . . . on the rights of ethnic Albanians. Panich's visit followed two days of clashes in Prishtina . . . between police and unarmed Albanians demanding the right to education in the Albanian language and the reopening of Albanian schools".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 38; p. 39,150).

        Also in October 1992:

"In what appeared to be an attempt by his power, Serbian police led by Nihail Kertes, one of Miloshevichs aides, seized and retained control of the FRY Belgrade".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 38; p. 39,150).

        In May-June 1993.

"a group of more than 20 writers and journalists staged a hunger strike.. in protest against censorship and against restrictions on Albanian language publishing".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 39; p. 39,518).

In August 1993:

"Tension rose... in Kosova, with numerous reports of beatings, house searches and arrests, including searches of party offices."
('Keesing’s Record of World Events', Volume 39; p. 39,606).

        In the same month, the UN Security Council:

"called on the Yugoslav government to reconsider its decision not to allow the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to continue its monitoring work in Kosova";
('Keesing’s Record of World Events', Volume 39; p. 39,606).

        In September 1993, the Yugoslav government:

"Ordered the closing of the 58 secondary schools and 21 of the 350 elementary schools in the Albanian language".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 39; p. 39,646).

        In November 1993, at the inaugural conference of the Serbian (SSJ), paramilitary commander Zeliko Raznjatovich ('Arkan'):

"Threatened that if he secured a seat in Kosova, Albanian nationalists would be expelled".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 39; p. 39,745).

        In elections to the Serbian legislature in December 1993:

"Less than nine-tenths of the 1,000,00 strong Kosova electorate was reported to have voted".
('Keesing’s Record of World Events', Volume 39; p. 39,785).

        In February 1994, Ibrahim Rugova:

"Met US President Bill Clinton ..during a visit to the USA".
('Keesing’s Record of World Events', Volume 40; p. 39,872).

        In the same month, the Serbian authorities in Kosova announced

"The immediate closure of the 'Academy of Sciences and Arts of Kosova'. The Academy had continued to function despite its official abolition in 1992".
('Keesing s Record of World Events', Volume 40; p. 39,872).

        In December 1994,

"In the largest wave of arrests since 1990 in the . . province of Kosova, Serbian police detained 170 ethnic Albanian former policemen".
('Keesing’s Record of World Events', Volume 40; p. 40,327).

(10) INSTABILITY IN SERBIA PROPER

        In early June 1996:

"Several new appointments to the Serbian Government were carried out. All the new ministers appointed were members of the increasingly influential 'Yugoslav United left'(YUL),led by Miriana Markovich, the wife of President Miloshevich".
('Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volume 2; op. cit.; p. 3,664).

        Municipal elections in Serbia in November 1996 were contested by an anti-Miloshevich coalition
'Zajedno' (Together) and:

"Provisional results . . . indicated that 'Zajedno' had gained control over 14 principal towns, including Belgrade. . . . However, most of the opposition victories were annulled by (SPS-dominated) municipal courts and electoral commissions. Mass demonstrations in protest at the Government 's refusal to recognise the results of the municipal elections were subsequently staged by students and other 'Zajedno' supporters in Belgrade".
('Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volume 2; op. cit.; p. 3,664).

        The demonstrations quickly became general:

"protests against the regime of Serbian President Miloshevich. The demonstrations were the largest witnessed since . . . March 1991".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 42; p. 41,414).

        and by December 1996 developed:

"Into violent clashes between protestors and members of the security forces in Belgrade. It was reported that two people had been killed and a further 58 injured".
('Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volume 2; op. cit.; p. 3,665).

        Subsequently:

"The Ministry of Internal Affairs..ordered a ban on demonstrations, which the security forces attempted to enforce; nevertheless, anti-government rallies continued".
('Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volume 2; op. cit.; p. 3,665).

        At the end of December 1996:

"A delegation from 'the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe' (OSCE)' issued a report upholding the results of municipal elections that had been invalidated". ('Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volume 2; op. cit.; p. 3,665).

        In late December 1996:

"Reports in the Western press suggested that Miloshevich was becoming increasingly isolated".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 42; p. 41,415).

        In January 1997, for example:

"The Serbian Orthodox Church (which had hitherto supported Milosevich) issued a statement urging him to acknowledge the results of the municipal elections";
('Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volume 2; op. cit.; p. 3,665).

        Throughout January 1997:

"mass protests against the regime of Serbian President Slobodan Miloshevich continued. Students continued to hold daily rallies in Belgrade (the capital) throughout January, despite an Interior Ministry ban on marches".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 42; p. 41,454).

        In mid-February 1997:

"The Serbian Parliament passed legislation.. which recognised victories by the opposition coalition 'Zajedno' in municipal elections held in November
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 43; p. 41,503).

        Thereupon:

"the leaders of 'Zajedno' announced an end to the daily anti-government demonstrations". Students, however, continued to demonstrate throughout February in support of their demands for political reform... Teachers also began strike action in February in support of their demand for increased pay";
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 43; p. 41,504).

        In March 1997, the 'Agence-France Presse' news agency reported

"That the Serbian authorities were taking steps to drive the privately-owned TV station 'BK Television' off the air. 'BK Television' had been one of the few domestic media outlets which had provided extensive coverage of the anti-Miloshevich protests which had engulfed Serbia from November 1996 to February 1997".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 43; p. 41,555).

        In April 1997:

"the Serbian government bowed to widespread pressure and dropped a controversial section of a proposed new media law which would have permitted private radio and television stations to broadcast to only 25% of Yugoslavia's total population".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 43; p. 41,606).

        In early April 1997, informal talks on Kosova were held in New York:

"The talks, between Serb and ethnic Albanian officials, ended without any significant agreement".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 43; p. 41,606).

        In June 1997, Miloshevich made an:

"Attempt to move his power-base from the Serbian presidency to the presidency of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). .The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS).. officially nominated Miloshevich (the party's president) for the federal presidency".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 43; p. 41,705).

        The impetus for the move:

"Lay in the fact that he was barred by the Serbian constitution from running for a third term as Serbian President when his current term ended in December 1997."
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 43; p. 41,748).

        In July 1997:

"Miloshevich formally resigned as President of Serbia",
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 43; p. 41,748).

And:

"Was elected unopposed to the post of President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia";
('Keesing's Record of World Events',Volume 43; p. 41,748).
"In September/October 1997, elections in Serbia resulted in the election to the post of President of Serbia of: "Milan Milutinovich", ('Keesing's Record of World Events", Volume 43; p. 41,978). ....
"The outgoing Foreign Minister. The 'Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe' OSCE) which monitored the election, issued a report in late December which claimed that the contest had been 'fundamentally flawed'.
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 43; p. 41,978).

        In Kosova, ethnic Albanian electors:

"Largely boycotted the polls". ('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 43; p. 41,978).

        In October 1997:

"A large demonstration was held . . . By students in Prishtina",
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 43; p. 41,978).

        In the capital of Kosova:

"The students, who had been boycotting Prishtina University for some six years, had organised the demonstration to press the Serbian authorities to implement the 1996 agreement which had provided for the restoration of Albanian-language education at all levels in Kosova. The demonstration was broken up violently by police".
('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 43; p. 41,875).

CONCLUSION

(1)
THE ATTEMPT OF THE SERBIAN RACISTS TO DEPRIVE THE ETHNIC ALBANIAN PEOPLE OF KOSOVA EVEN OF THE LIMITED FREEDOMS THEY EXPERIENCED IN THE KARDELJ PERIOD IS FUTILE AND DOOMED TO FAILURE.
(2)
ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ATTEMPT OF RUGOVA AND MOST OF THE IMPERIALIST POWERS TO RESTORE TO THE KOSOVARS MERELY THE LIMITED AND OBVIOUSLY FRAGILE AUTONOMY THEY EXPERIENCED IN THAT PERIOD DOES NOT GO FAR ENOUGH TO SATISFY THE ASPRATIONS OF THE GREAT MAJORITY OF KOSOVARS.
(3)
FURTHERMORE, THE STRATEGY OF TRYING TO ACHIEVE EVEN THIS THROUGH MILITARY INTERVENTION FROM OUTSIDE, AS A GIFT FROM 'PHILANTHROPIC' POWERS, IS A DANGEROUS ILLUSION. THE IMPERIALIST POWERS ARE INTERESTED IN KOSOVA ONLY AS THEY ARE INTERESTED IN BRITAIN - AS A SOURCE OF PROFIT!
(4)
THERE CAN BE NO VALID REASON FOR TRYING TO REDRAW, AT THE END OF THE 20th CENTURY, THE PURELY ARTIFICIAL AND DIVISIVE FRONTIERS WHICH THE GREAT POWERS WERE ABLE ARBITRARILY TO DRAW AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CENTURY.
(5)
THINKING PEOPLE IN KOSOVA HAVE IN RECENT YEARS LEARNED THAT IT IS NOT ENOUGH - EXCEPT IN THE RAREST OF CIRCUMSTANCES - MERELY TO DEMAND LIBERTY.
LIBERTY HAS TO BE FOUGHT FOR WITH FORCE OF ARMS AND THOSE KOSOVARS WHO HAVE LEARNED THIS LESSON FROM EXPERIENCE HAVE GIVEN IT TANGIBLE FORM IN THE KOSOVA LIBERATION ARMY, WHICH MUST RECEIVE THE SUPPORT OF ALL PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.


ALBANIA, ENVER HOXHA AND JOSEPH STALIN -

Choose Between the Legacy of Tito and the Legacy of Stalin

Alliance Article First Presented At First Moscow Stalin Seminar, 1994.
INTRODUCTION

        Marxist-Leninists view the attitude towards
J.V.Stalin as a touch stone, that helps to distinguish those who only call themselves a Marxist-Leninist from those who are truly a Marxist-Leninists. These Marxist-Leninists consider that socialism in the Soviet Union was established and successfully functioned until shortly after Stalin=s death. This view allows us to sort out from the welter of groups - those that are truly Marxist-Leninist from those that are not. It stands to reason that Stalin=s international allies - within the Communist movement - were Marxists-Leninists, and conversely where Stalin had enemies within the Communist movement - these were either hidden or overt revisionists pretending to be Marxist-Leninists.
        This article shows that Hoxha and Stalin had a relationship quite unlike that of Tito and Stalin. The natural outcome of this was that the paths of Albania and of Yugoslavia would diverge - Albania towards socialism while Yugolsavia became a stooge of the American imperialists assisting in disruption of the international communist movement. It is absolutely imperative now to revise this history, since confusion in the ranks of those who have recently liberated themselves from the worst of the grip of Krushevite revisionism, still have not been able to throw off some of the legacy of that period.
        One of the legacies remains the chauvinist tendency to white-wash Serbian massacres under the mistaken belief somehow that Milosevic
Awas and is@ a Communist. Underlying this is a chauvinist Pan-Slavism. This has manfested interntionally in reactions to events in former Yugoslavia.
        First, the chauvinist and barbaric attacks against Bosnia was misinterpreted as
>socialist@ defense against Islamic fundamentalism. Now Kosovan self-determination is being mis-interpreted as ASerbian self-defence@. We regret that international organizations and individuals of stature take this position, including the Pyongyang-Brussels axis, and North Star Compass, as discussed above.
        We ask these organisations and individuals to consider the meaning of the alliance between Stalin and Hoxha, and the antagonism between Tito and Stalin. Alliance has previously discussed the formation of the Cominform and the explusion of the Tito-ites from international commnism.

        The Party Of Labour of Albania

, and its' Albanian communists were heavily influenced by the Soviet state from 1917 onwards. On this, Albanian national-social liberation was like in many other European countries. That is to say that the anti-fascist war of national liberation itself, in many European countries was boosted by the Soviet example. The Albanian Party history says :

"Led by the CP headed by J.V.Stalin the Soviet people rose in a body to wage their Great Patriotic War in defence of the freedom and independence of their Socialist homeland. This just war opened a new stage in the Second World War strengthened the liberation, anti-fascist character of the struggle of peoples against the fascist bloc, and laid the foundations for the unification of all the anti-fascist forces of the world into a single front.. the treacherous assault on the Soviet people and the outbreak of the great Patriotic War had deep repercussions in Albania. the broad masses of Albanian patriots were indignant at the Hitlerite aggression.. Only the Soviet Union had defended the rights of Albania and had raised its voices against the injustices perpetrated against her.. "
Our struggle", Enver Hoxha said, "Did not begin after the entry of the Soviet Union into the war, but after the entry of the Soviet Union into the War, our people felt that the blood that they shed would be not be in vain.";
(History of The PLA. p. 81-2).

        Furthermore, at the formation Meeting of Communist Groups uniting into the CPA, the task of linking the Albanian National Liberation with the Great Anti-Fascist World War was identified. As the PLA History puts it, the most :

"Decisive external factor of the historic victory of the Albanian people was the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union and its great victory Over fascism.. Under the leadership of J.V.Stalin, the Soviet Union bore the brunt of the Second World War and played the principal role in the destruction of fascism."
(PLA, Ibid, p.241).

        But, it is in the period following the victory of the national liberation struggle, that the differences between Albania, and the other countries that had fought a war of national liberation against fascist invasion become clear. Under the leadership of Enver Hoxha, the Party Of Labour of Albania did not retard the national liberation revolution, but immediately launched into the socialist stage of struggle. In this they remained close to the teachings, aid and advise given by the CPSU led by Stalin. Alliance previously discussed how both the Yugoslavian revisionists under Tito, and the Bulgarian revisionists under Dimitrov - halted the revolution after the national liberation and did not launch the second stage. Alliance has previously shown how Stalin urged both the Yugoslavs and the Bulgarians to proceed on to socialism, and how Tito violently rejected Marxist-Leninism and vituperated Stalin (See Alliance 12: "On Georgii Dimitrov"; and Alliance 18: Events in Former Yugoslavia".)
        There is a marked contrast in the behaviour of the Albanian party leader Hoxha. A direct evidence of the closeness of the CPSU and the PLA is the personal testimony of the leader of the PLA, Enver Hoxha, relating to his five personal meetings with Stalin. Hoxha claimed in his memoirs of the meetings with Stalin that :

"We Albanian communists have successfully applied the teachings of Stalin in the first place in order to have a strong steel like Party, always loyal to Marxism-Leninism, stern against the class enemies."
Enver Hoxha, p.39, Tirana 1979).

        These Memoirs are redolent of a very warm and personal relationship between Hoxha and Stalin. We will describe briefly some specific key questions, that show a fundamental agreement between Stalin and Hoxha. We will discuss in turn, the matters of:

Firstly,
the failed revolution in Greece,
Secondly
the aid of the CPSU to the Albanian state, and
finally
Albania=s relationship to Yugoslavia and the Titoite attempt to swallow Albania.
(A). UPON THE IMPERIALIST ATTACKS UPON ALBANIA - THE ROLE OF GREECE.

The Great Powers had always interfered in Albania, setting up their version of her borders. In the secret
Treaty of London of April 26th, 1915 - Britain, France, Italy, and tsarist Russia had divided Albania into 3 parts; two of which were to be directly under Italian control and one under Greek control. (From British Foreign Office Records, Kew, FO371/3148/6163/199287. Cited W.B.Bland and I.Price "A Tangled Web- A History of Anglo-American Relations With Albanai (1912-1955); ISBN: 327.410496 5; London 1986; p.6).
But after the war, the correct policy of mass class mobilisation led by the CPA made it far more difficult to manipulate Albania. Therefore, immediately after the Second World War, after crushing the Greek revolution, the British and American imperialists used the Greeks as pawns by which to try to disrupt Albania. The Greeks revived the specious claim to the part of the South of Albania that they called the
ANorthern Epirus@. As an British Foreign Office memorandum urged :
A
The State Department.. are inclined to consider that there might be justification for limited action by the Greek army just inside Albanian territory.. There is much to be said.. for hinting unofficially to the Greek military authorities that a minor incursion of this nature should be winked at.@ (Cited by Bland and Price Ibid, p.235-236. Kew Documents: FO371/78444/10390/R7696).
Hoxha pointed out to Stalin, that the British and the USA imperialists were anxious to continue swallowing Albania, just as before the war. In addition the Greek and Italian and Yugoslavs had designs upon Albania. The advice of Stalin was to steadily proceed with the fundamental matter - the building of socialism. Stalin sagely advised :

A
As for the screams of the external enemies about partitioning Albania, they are just to intimidate you because I do not think there is any danger in this direction at present.. In the first place Albania is a free and independent country, the people have seized independence and they know how to defend their independence. Second the external enemies have themselves contradictions with one another over Albania. None of them wants Albania to belong only to the other. If Greece wants to have Albania for itself, this would not be advantageous to Italy or Yugoslavia, which would raise obstacles.. On the other hand the independence of Albania has been recognised and confirmed by the delegation of the big three - The Soviet Union, Britain and the USA. This declaration may be violated, but it is not easy to do. Hence come what may, Albania has its independence protected.@ (Hoxha : AWith Stalin@, Ibid, p.116-117).
Unfortunately across the border from Albania, in Greece, serious errors had been made by the Greek Communist Party. These firstly, compromised the Greek socialist revolution. But secondly, this then made Greece a conduit of imperialist pressure on Albania. In 1947, at his Second meeting with Stalin Hoxha was blunt. Hoxha pointed to the incorrect handling of the partisan war in Greece; and the immediate post-war problems of the inexperienced and poorly led
Greek Communist Party (KKE) and its broader mass based Greek Democratic Party (GDA):
A
We think that the leadership of the KKE made grave mistakes.. among others that the Greek Democratic Party (GDA) stood aloof from the people.. made great mistakes in regard to the expansion of the party in the countryside and the town during the war.. and during the war against internal reaction and Anglo-American intervention.@ (AWith Stalin@, Ibid, P.109-110).
Many of these mistakes in the KKE, the Hoxha leadership had already fought against within the CPA Central Committee. These mistakes were being urged by Trotskyites, and by hidden Titoite agents. In essence, these mistakes embodied a lack of reliance upon the masses, and opportunism:

A
In the countryside.. the extension of the party was limited, and its organization weak and lax, with the organisation of the party frequently confounded with the EAM (the National Liberation Front-Ed). There was opportunism both in the organization and in the political line of the national liberation councils at the village level, there was duality of power and coexistence with the Zervist reactionary organizations etc. in the liberated areas and elsewhere. We told the Greek comrades that their putting the Command of the National Liberation Army under the orders of Mediterranean Command (the British and the American Command-editor), their talks and agreements of an opportunist and capitulationist character with Zervas and the reactionary Greek government in exile, the predominance of peasant elements and of the old career offers in the leadership of the Greek National Liberation Army, and so on, were grave errors which would lead the heroic struggle of the Greek people to defeat. The Varkiza agreement was the logical conclusion to all these wrong actions and views - it bought about the capitulation to British and local reaction..
Even after the capitulationist
Varzika Agreement and the period of >legality= of the KKE, the leadership of the KKE did not go deeply enough into its former mistakes in order to correct them in a radical manner.. it did not have sound links with the broad masses of the people.. it did not appreciate the new situation after the defeat of fascism, underrated the internal enemy and Anglo-American reaction and was unable to foresee the great danger that would threaten it from these forces of reaction.. It had great hopes in >legal= activity and parliamentarism. As a result the party was disarmed before the enemy, lost its sound ties with the people, the people=s revolution in Greece went through a grave crisis, and the people were given the impression that the revolution would triumph on the parliamentary road and through elections.. they failed to prepare themselves for a protracted difficult war, under-rated the partisan war and described the partisan forces they succeeded in regrouping, as a regular army. They pinned all their hopes of victory on this >regular army=, in this way neglecting the main factor-the people, and the Marxist-Leninist principle that Athe army and the people are one." ("With Stalin,pp.110-114).
Hoxha above has identified at least three fundamental erros of strategy of the Greek Counist Party. Stalin recognised from Hoxha
=s critique, the strained relationship between the CPA and the KKE. Following this, Stalin arranged for a meeting between the leaders of the KKE - Nicos Zachariades and Mitsos Partsalides; and Enver Hoxha to discuss the allegations of Hoxha. Hoxha=s views were openly ventilated in the Kremlin, on the occasion of Hoxha=s Fourth meeting with Stalin.
In More detail, Hoxha's criticisms of the Greek Communist Party were :

i) That the KKE Had Ceded Control of the battle against the Fascists to the British and American Mediterranean command :

As Hoxha stated above, a joint command was accepted in the Mediterranean by the Greek Communist Party. Hoxha explains that this should have been rejected- while still participating in an alliance aimed at the fascists. This in fact was the policy followed by Hoxha
=s partisans in Albania. Hoxha contrasts the Greek Communist Party approach as follows :
A
Our party supported the Soviet-British-American Alliance, because through to the end it considered this an anti-fascist coalition to crush the German Nazis. But at the same time we never created the illusion that the Anglo-American imperialists would be the loyal friends and allies of the Albanian people.. we made a radical distinction between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Americans from the beginning.. Our Party, our Army and the General Staff of our army not only never submitted to the dictate of the British and the Allied Mediterranean Head quarters, but even when we allowed them to give us advice, we took it with very great caution..our two peoples (ie. Albanian and Greek) developed even closer fraternal relations during the war.. But we have criticised the comrades of the leadership of the KKE because the EAM and they themselves committed a major political mistake of principle in subordinating the National Liberation War of the Greek people to the Anglo-American strategy and placing it virtually under the leadership of the British and the Mediterranean HQ. We addressed our criticism to Comrade Zachariades personally. The person mainly to blame for this situation was Siantos.. Zachariades was imprisoned.. When we pointed out this matter to Comrade Zachariades later, he did not give me a clear answer, and leaned more to the view that mistakes had not been made.@ (With Stalin, p.166).
ii) Hoxha's Second Criticism Concerned the defeatist Tactics of the KKE - The Capitulation at Varkiza.

Hoxha above ahd critcised a capitualition at Varkiza. In the background, the Right wing forces in Greece had formed
a National Republican Greek League (EDES), led by General Nicholas Plastiras and by General Napoleon Zervas. In a meeting of May 1944, in Lebanon, the EAM, ELAS and KKE all agreed to place all their military forces under a AGovernment of National Unity@ to be led by the bourgeois leader George Papandreou. Papandreou then demanded the disbanding of all military forces bar those of the Greek Government. When ELAS refused, civil war broke out led by the British Lieutenant -Colonel Ronald Scobie, who was authorised to do so by Winston Churchill. On January 3rd, 1945, Papandreou was replaced as Prime Minister by General Nicholas Plastiras. After this a Apeace conference@ on February 12th, was held at Varkiza where the ELAS agreed to disband in return for an amnesty, and handed in its arms. The remnants of the ELAS then re-grouped as the Greek Democratic Army, and civil war broke out again. Hoxha characterised the handing of arms as an Aact of betrayal":
A
Our opposition to the leadership of the KKE with Cmde Zachariades at the head is based in the first place on Varkiza, where the KKE and the EAM signed the agreement which nothing more than a capitulation a surrender of their arms. The CPA described this act as a betrayal committed against the KKE and the fraternal Greek people.@ (With Stalin, Ibid, p.170-171).
This agreement was to have major significance, and devastated the forces of the Greek Communists.

iii) Hoxha's Third Criticism Was Upon The KKE understanding of guerilla war.

The PLA had the distinction of being the guerrilla leaders of the only country that liberated itself completely by itself without foreign troops at all. This practical experience of the CPA meant that they were able to fully assess the KKE leadership
=s limited understanding of People=s War. The PLA assessment was sharp and telling :
A
After the capitulation at Varkiza, the Greek national Liberation War was resumed.. we have had contradictions with Zachariades, Bardzotas, and Ionnides over the character of the war the Greek Democratic Army (GDA) should have waged against.. Greek reaction.. On the basis of the our National Liberation War, we think that the Greek Democratic War should not have been transformed into a frontal war, but should have retained the character is a partisan war, fought with small and large units. In this way the General Van Fleet (of the USA) superior forces would not have been able to liquidate the GDA.. Zachariades= views on strategy were in opposition to ours. The comrades of the leadership of the KKE.. described the.. partisan forces.. as a >regular= and >modern= army.. they also claimed that they had equipped it with the strategy and tactics of the frontal war of a regular army. On the other hand, in their military operations the Greek the comrades followed the tactics of passive defence which is the mother of defeat.. the KKE proceeded from the incorrect principle that partisan warfare has not a final objective, that is, does not lead to seizure of power." (AWith Stalin@ p.174, Ibid).
Hoxha goes on to point out that the GDA was very demoralised, and with the continual waiting instead of seizing an offensive, became more so. Even following the success of
the Battle of Gramos in 1948, the victory was not built upon to Acapture cities,@ and to Aseize power@. Hoxha links these military considerations with an even more significant point- that the leading role of the party was discarded by the KKE:
A
We think that at the battles of Gramos and Vitsi, the comrades of the Greek leadership did not keep in mind the Marxist-Leninist principles of people=s war.. We have told the Greek comrades in a comradely manner that the leading role of the party in the Greek partisan army must be ensured more firmly; the political commissar of the company, battalion, brigade and division should be the true representative of the party, and as such should have the same right to command, just the same as the commander. But we have noticed and have often pointed out to the Greek comrades that they have not taken a correct view of the leading role of the party in the army.. Failure to understand the leading role of the party in the army was one of the main reason which led to defeat in the GDA.. In the Greek National Liberation Army (ELAS) the joint command of the commander and the commissar existed but this was poorly implemented in practice. The pressure of erroneous bourgeois views of career officers who could not tolerate trusted people of the party in command alongside them, brought about that.. the role of the commissar was overshadowed and relegated to second place. This is a consequence of the views of the leaders of the KKE on the >regular army=.@ (Ibid, p.183, 187-190).
Stalin after hearing Zachariades, supported Hoxha's analysis :

A
As regards Varkiza, the Albanians are right.. Varkiza was a major mistake. You should not have signed it and should not have laid down your arms, because it has inflicted great harm on the Greek people=s war.. as regards the assessment of the strategy and tactics followed in the Greek Democratic War, although it was a heroic war, again I think the Albanian comrades are right. You ought to have waged a partisan war.@ (Ibid, p. 196-197).
Conclusion:

This discussion on Greece shows several things:

Firstly
,
that the standard Trotskyite argument that AStalin was responsible for the debacle in Greece" is incorrect. Here Hoxha testifies that he and the CPA, advised the KKE to adopt a correct Marxist-Leninist line, one by which the CPA itself had secured victory. It was the KKE itself that refused to launch correct strategy.
Secondly
,
the relations between Stalin and Hoxha were frank, open and principled. The open party discussion between the CPA and the KKE was instigated by Stalin, in the best spirit of proletarian internationalism ie. To have open and sharp debate, in order to heal dangerous rifts, to develop Marxist-Leninist policy, and to prevent repetition of mistakes. At the end of this potentially bitter debate, Stalin said:
@
Wait a moment, comrades! Embrace each other, Comrade Hoxha and Comrade Zachariades!" (AWith Stalin@,p.200).
Thirdly
that the overall assessment of Albania by Stalin (See beginning of this section) was in the long run correct. By building socialism the CPA avoided the capitalist encirclement for many years - until the death of Hoxha in fact.
B) THE PRACTICAL SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION TO ALBANIA IN BUILDING SOCIALISM.

In all of Hoxha
=s meetings with Stalin, there was considerable talk of how the Soviet Union could help the fledgling socialist state of Albania. It was clear that Soviet leader was prepared to give the Albanian state, considerable help - in both political and practical terms. For example, the very name of the Party of Labour of Albania was suggested by Stalin. The overwhelming mass of the people were from the peasantry, and Stalin understood the implications of this:
A
The overwhelming majority of our people,@ (Hoxha) told Cmde Stalin.. AIs comprised of poor peasants and next come the middle peasants. We have a working class small in numbers then we have a quite a large number of craftsmen and townspeople engaged in petty commerce, and a minority of intellectuals. All of these masses responded to the call of our Communist Party, were mobilised in the war.. and are now linked with the party and the people's power.. While assessing the policy of the Party.. towards the masses in general and the peasantry in particular as correct, Cmde Stalin gave us some valuable comradely advice about our work in future.. He expressed the opinion that since the biggest percentage of its members were peasants, our CP should call itself "The Party Of Labour of Albania". (AWith Stalin@, Ibid, p.62).
This suggestion was later adopted by the CPA. Stalin
=s attitude, showed how well he understood the problems of a peasant based society, and the practical experience in the Soviet Union of creating the alliance of worker and peasant :
A
Cmde Stalin asked us in detail about the situation of the middle and poor peasants in our country. Hoxha told Cmde Stalin, about the policy of the CPA, and the great all-round work it had done.. in order to find support among the peasantry and win it over to its side.. Hoxha said AWe acted in that way, proceeding not only from the Marxist-Leninist principle that the peasantry is the closest and most natural ally of the proletariat in the revolution, but also from that fact that the peasantry in Albania constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population and through the centuries had been characterised by great patriotic and revolutionary traditions.. Cmde Stalin replied: AIn general the peasants are afraid of communism at first because they imagine that the communists will take the land and everything they have. The enemies talk a great deal to the peasants in this direction with the aim of detaching them from that alliance with the working class and turning them away form the policy of the party and the road of socialism. Therefore the careful and far sighted work of the CP is very important, as you also said, to ensure that the peasantry links itself indissolubly with the party and the working class.@.. AStalin advised: AYou must set up the Machine and Tractor Stations and strengthen them, so that they work the land well, both for the state and the cooperatives and for the individual peasants. The tractor drivers must always be in the service of the peasantry, must know all about agriculture the crops, and the soils, and must apply all this knowledge in practice to ensure that production increases without fail." (AWith Stalin@, Ibid, p.59-62;75-76.).
Of course there was much more advice. But also there was much critical practical aid. This consisted of everything from maize and cotton seeds(p.153), rails (p.103), army materials (p.103); and most importantly to specialists and educational help to build up industry and self-reliance of the people:

A
We shall help you with specialists in order to speed up the process of development of the Albanian economy and culture. As for oil think we=ll send you Azerbajani specialists, because they are masters of their profession. For its part, Albania should send the sons and daughters of workers and peasants to the Soviet Union to learn and develop so that they can help the advancement of their Homeland@.. We shall assist both with literature and with specialists in order to help increase the number of higher institutes which are the basis for the creation of the university@. (AWith Stalin@; Ibid; p.77-8; 105).
The generosity of Stalin is to be contrasted to the attitudes of such as the later to be revealed revisionist
Mikoyan :
A
Stalin said: Comrades, we are a big country, but you know that we have not eliminated all the grave consequences of the war. However we shall help you today and in the future, perhaps not all that much, but with those possibilities we have. We understand that you have to set up the sectors of socialist industry, and in this direction we agree to fulfil all the requests you have presented to us, as well as those for agriculture.@ Then smiling he said : ABut will the Albanians themselves work?@ I (ie Hoxha) understood why he asked me this. It was the result of the evil-intended information of the Armenian huckster Mikoyan, who .. not only spoke in a language quite unlike Stalin, but also used harsh terms in his criticisms of our realization of plans in our country, alleging that our people did not work etc. His intention was to reduce the rate and amount of aid.@ (AWith Stalin@, Ibid, p.103-4).
To Conclude:
< Clearly, Stalin fully supported both Hoxha and the Socialist state of Albania.
C) UPON THE REVISIONIST TITO LED COMMUNIST PARTY YUGOSLAVIA (CPY). Yugoslavia versus Albania; Stalin supports Albania.

After the open exposure of the Trotskyites, revisionism went underground. Following the further exposure of the revisionists in the Soviet Union such as
Zinoviev, Bukharin, Radek etc; international revisionism was cautious. The next open attempt to subvert the Marxist Leninist world movement was taken by the CPY under Tito. It was the exposure of the Tito by Stalin that ultimately helped the Albanians to maintain their independence. For, from the earliest days of the Albanian War of Liberation, until Stalin exposed the CPY, Albania and the CPA were constantly under pressure to cede its independence in various ways to the Yugoslavs and the CPY.
i) Relations During the War between the CPY and the CPA.

In summer 1941, the CPA established links with the CPY. The background relations, between Yugoslavia and Albania was
Aembittered@:
A
This whole grievous legacy built up over decades had been created by no fault of the peoples and the Albanian people in particular have never been to blame for it. The blame for this rests on the anti-Albanian policy of the monarchs of Serbia and princes of Montenegro who wanted to gobble up Albania.. The monarchs of Italy, Austro-Hungary, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria rushed to grab whatever they could from AThe periphery of the (crumbling-ed) Ottoman Empire.@.. In particular the Serbian and Montengrin hordes assailed the Albanian territories.. occupied the outermost region of Kosova.. expelling about 3000,000 Albanians.. In 1912 the Albanians won the great victory - the independence of Albania... (But-ed) then Albania was cut in half-Kosova and other Albanian regions were violently annexed to Yugoslavia.. the anti-Albanian policy of.. great-Serb reaction was intensified.. Yugoslavia once again sanctioned its de jure its Arights@, to the occupied Albanian territories.. and tried new ways of .. gobbling up the whole of Albania. It was precisely the Serbian monarchs who came to the aid of King Zog who had fled from Albania in June 1924.. Zog carried out the counter-revolution in December 1924. In return Zog initially gave the Serbs other pieces of Albanian territory, such as Vermsoh and Shen-Naum.@ (AThe Titoites@, Enver Hoxha, Tirana, 1982. p.4-9).
To seek unity and links with the CPY, with these bitter centuries, was not easy. But the CPY was fighting against fascism itself, and the CPA felt it important to establish links.
But, the CPY over the next years was to consistently attempt to foster another agenda-the long term swallowing of Albania. The CPY falsely claimed
Athey had set up the CPA.@
But actually the CPA had already begun forming itself before the first approach of the CPA to the CPY in July 1942. The various groups had met on 8th-14th November, 1941. A CPY contact only arrived in Albania on December 1942.
Blazo Jovanocic, came with a letter from Tito, saying :
A
It contains instruction and advice which are very important for you.. Do you agree with them or not!?@ (Titoites, Ibid, p..27).
This hectoring tone and anxiety to
Atake over@ the struggle was to mark the next years of interaction. The contents of that letter were later claimed by Tito to Ahave saved the CPA@. But in fact the CPA had already dealt with all the problems that Tito purported to address. Among many later Aadvisers@ from the CPY were Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo; and Dusan Mugosa. Apart from denigrating the Astereotype of the October Revolution@ (Titoites p.47. This attitude was vigorously rejected by Hoxha); they also attempted different subversions. They accused the CPA of sectarianism over collaboration with the nationalists, yet simultaneously accused the CPA of Asoftness@ to the Balli :
AYour stand towards the Balli Kombetar is incorrect, it is wrong.. Your softness and tolerance towards the Balli Kombetar from the first moments when it appeared on the scene, it took you by surprise and subsequently you have not known what stand to take. Instead of declaring war on it, you offered the negotiating table." (Titoites Ibid, p.64).
These charges Hoxha could easily reject, pointing to the successes of the United National Liberation Front. (See above, and further p.64-68
ATitoites@). The CPY Aadviser@ Colonel Velimir Stojnic, in 1944, charged the CPA and Hoxha as Aopportunists@, for even having talks with the Balli Kombetar at Mukje in August 1943. Again Hoxha pointed out the correct tactics of the CPA. Hoxha tried to end this sabotage by saying:
A
Your interference in our affairs is out of place and your tone is unacceptable." (Ibid,p.137).
The Yugoslavs however, continued to promote the provocative sectarians of CPA members such as
Liri Gega and Mehmet Shehu. They pursued sectarian acts; such as the arbitrary shootings of Ballists in violation of Party instructions to Adispassionately judge crimes@. (ATitoites@, p.126-30). The Yugoslavs also began their policy of ultimately subordinating things Albanian to the CPY. Early in their interaction the Yugoslavs, promoted :
A
A big staff, a staff above the staffs, as you might say a universal organisation. this staff will be an inter-Balkan staff, or let us call it a Balkan staff for short.@ (Titoites, Ibid, p. 53; See also p. 57-61).
Hoxha saw that this was ridiculous in a time of fascist occupation and war. The other sister parties involved (Greece and Bulgaria) also rejected this absurdity. But this was only a temporary retreat for the CPY.
Despite all these provocations, the CPA concerned itself only with liberation from fascism - the essential prelude to the socialist revolution. Even where Kosova (Albanian territory annexed by Yugoslavia, overwhelmingly peopled with ethnic Albanians) was concerned, the CPA applied a Marxist-Leninist policy. Despite the demagogic appeals of the Balli Kombetar to the Kosovan people, that they would Aliberate Kosova from Yugoslavia@, the CPA :
A
Issued calls to the people :@Only unrelenting war against the fascists and their collaborators will lead to the solution of our national problems, an integral part of which is the putting right of historical injustices. For this our Communist party is fighting and the CPY likewise is leading the peoples of its country on the same course.@ (p.78, Titoites).
As Kosova was now occupied by the Fascists (Balli demagogues even claimed that this "represented a liberation" from the Serbs) this was a principled stand of the CPA. Of course, either one of the CPA or the CPY could have led the Kosovan struggle. In fact:

A
The CPY demanded that the population of Kosova and the other Albanian regions of Yugoslavia should be mobilized in the fight under its leadership and immediately after the war, this population should decide its own future on the basis of the Leninist principle of the right of self-determination. This demand we considered reasonable and fair.. We agreed to make a concession.. so that this question could not be used even as a Apretext@ by others.. this was not the time to explain the peculiarity of Kosova etc.. the main thing was to arouse the peoples in the general war against the fascist occupation. later, when the communist parties were in power, then yes, then everything would be decided justly and would be settled finally, according to the will of the peoples themselves." (ATitoites@, p.79-84).
But the CPY reneged on its promises for a self-determination.
During the war nonetheless, the CPA unsparingly showed the Kosova people, that struggle they must - against the fascists. This line persisted, despite serious and false Yugoslav charges of "Great Albanian chauvinism" (See Titoites p.97-116).
But the CPY was continually exposing itself as having aggrandizing motives
. The Ist Conference of the National Liberation Council for Kosova and Metohia, was held in Bujan December 31st, 1943 to January 2nd 1944.
This Conference under the leadership of the CPY for Kosova and a local unit of the CPA (Shkodra and Tropoja, whose partisan units operated in the adjacent highlands of Gjakova) proclaimed the :

A
Albanian people of the Kosova and the Dukagjin Plateau, will have the possibility to decide their own future through the right of self-determination up to secession." (Ibid).
But the CC of the CPY headed by Tito, erased this from the written resolutions; but this fact was kept secret from the CPA. (Titoites Ibid p.121). Further unprincipled acts of the CPY followed. After the CPA had lit the torch in Kosova, Albanian partisans of the CPA helped actively in battle to achieve the liberation of Kosova. Now, Tito ordered the CPA and Kosova partisans, to pursue the Nazis into the North. This allowed the Titoites to enter Kosova un-hindered. But the population rose against this. The Titoites for a while backed down, but then under another pretext asked the Albanian partisans to go towards Greece, and then they were not allowed to re-enter Kosovan territory despite the wishes of the population:

A
Enter Kosova, without meeting the resistance of the Albanian insurgent forces, Kosova was liberated by the forces of the CPA army and the Kosova forces. Tito eliminated the national liberation councils that had been set up and launched unrestrained mass terror against the Albanians. These unprecedented reprisals of the Titoites quite rightly caused a great popular revolt which put the ANew Yugoslavia@ in doubt. In this extremely difficult position the patriotic people of Kosova demanded the return of the Albanian patriots.. Tito.. was obliged to agree to this demand, and the partisans returned.. after this Tito planned new manoeuvres.. it was necessary for him that our forces should finally withdraw from Kosova and return to Albania..But how? The direct withdrawal of our forces from Kosova .. would create unpleasant and grave scenes for the Titoites. The people of Kosova might rise in revolt again.. Tito staged the Aneed to pursue reactionary bands towards the South, towards Greece.@, and for this he sought the aid of those forces of ours. We .. ordered our divisions to act. After they reached the Southern most borders of Macedonia our forces were told there Awas no further need@ for them to stay in Yugoslavia. The border was crossed in the zone of Korca and Prespa, far from the eyes of the people of Kosova. Tito and Rankovic were left free to operate as they did, with their barbarous methods against the martyred Kosova." ( p.212-4; Ibid).
Meanwhile, the Yugoslavs had actively recruited agents, such as CPA CC member Koci Xoxe, later to be exposed as a dupe of the CPY. All of this activity was directed against Enver Hoxha who had constantly exposed the Yugoslav emissaries and obstructed them. Even during the war, the Yugoslavs attempted a coup, by using these secret agents in the CPA Polit Bureau. The thrust was that Hohxa had been sectarian in the line of the CPA. But this was occurring just as the Liberation of Berat and the South of Albania was being achieved by the correct policies of the CPA and Hoxha.
On the eve of liberation of the entire country, the
2nd Plenum of the CC of the CPA was held in Berat, on November 23rd. This marked the naked attempts by the previously concealed Yugoslav revisionists to disrupt the Albanian party. Prior to the Plenum, the Yugoslavs had captured a hidden majority on the CC of the PLA. These hidden agents were led by Koci Xoxe, and also included Nako Spiru and Sejfulla Maleshova.
The immediate object was to "Open the Front" to include the Balli, who were by now exposed. The Second objective was to remove Hoxha.

An initial victory at the Plenum was scored by the hidden agents, who labelled Hohxa as :

A
The synthesis of all the mistakes observed in the political and organisational line.@ ; and the line of the party as falling from Asectarianism into opportunism@. (p.187-91;Titoites).
The PCY delegate manipulating the agents, Stojnic, gave away the future agenda. He addressed the conference to say :

A
You cannot go ahead without Yugoslavia and in particular, without the Yugoslavia such as has now been created in the Balkans and in Europe..The perspective of Yugoslavia is the perspective of the Balkans and of Europe.. you speak very little about us, therefore in the future you should speak more about Yugoslavia and Tito." (Titioites Ibid p.214-5).
Another future agenda - alliance with the Western Great powers was also made clear.
Stojnic said in the debate before the CPA Plenum:
A
The great Allies which plays a decisive role in this war should all be looked on in the same way, by the new state..@ AHow@, asked Hoxha. ABy putting the Soviet Union on the same footing with the other two?@ AFrom the State viewpoint yes,@ Stojnic explained. AThe policy of a true state makes no differentiation. In an unofficial way for example through party channels the Soviet Union can be considered as the main and most natural ally, but not through state channels, America and Britain are always allies, and their present policy is positive and in our own interests." (Titoites, Ibid, p. 220).
Hoxha firmly refuted this sabotage in his speeches. Although the Berat Conference was a major set back; in one goal, the CPY failed. They did not eliminate Hoxha from the leadership, as the respect of the Plenum was so high for him. Hohxa was still able to push the correct line, which was to maintain the independence of the Front, and to now face the fact :

A
That the question of state power is the central question for the party..we must strengthen the councils and purge them of alien elements." Titioites Ibid; p.218).
Despite these treasonous acts by a supposed fraternal party, after the liberation of Tirana on the close of the Berat Conference, the Albanian army pursed the Hitlerite forces into Yugoslavia and helped to liberate Montengro, Sandjak, and Bosnia (
PLA History, Ibid, p.231).
ii) Tito Obstructs the Albanian path to socialist independence.

The attitude of Stalin towards helping Albania to build itself up, and develop its socialist industry has been described above. This attitude was in marked contrast to the behaviour of the Tito Regime. The post war relationship between Tito and Albania was one of obstructing its development. This facilitated Tito's plan to swallow Albania. Hoxha cites the Yugoslav,
V.Dedijer:
"
As early as the beginning of 1945, one of Tito's closest collaborators, Mosa Pijade demanded that the new chancellery of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Belgrade should have not 6, but 7 cabinets. According to the Titoites, the 7th Cabinet was for the AYugoslav Republic of Albania." (Rijeka 1981) Titoites, p.231).
Tito and
Kardelj and other Yugoslavs; expressed to their hidden agents in the CC of the CPA (Mehmet Shehu, Kristo Themelko Koci Xoxe, Sejfulla Maleshova) the Titoite revisionist views:
A
On the Astages of revolution@, the Yugoslavs thought that since the stage of the bourgeois democratic revolution has still not been completed, we should delay the transition to the second stage of the proletarian revolution@, that Athe road of transition from the former to the latter stage is the road of reforms@; that the Anational liberation councils are organs of the bourgeois democratic revolution@; and that Aone of the distinctions between the October Revolution and the Yugoslav Revolution is that in the Yugoslav Revolution the bourgeois is a member, a participant in the front@; that ATito has enriched Marxism with the tactics of the national liberation war." (p.240; Ibid).
The strategy of which Berat was one part, was becoming clear. The Berat Conference upbraided the CPA for Sectarianism in the Democratic Front. Now, the "innovative" views of Tito about the "stages of revolution", justified the agents of Tito in obstructing the second stage of revolution in Albania. The line give out was :"Comrades Tito, Kardelj and Djilas.. advice us not to skip the stages." (See p.245-7). Now the CPY even pressured the CPA to accept the ex-King Zog's treaties concluded with the imperialists.
Hoxha refused to allow the temporary defeat at Berat to dissuade him of the correct Marxist-Leninist line. The ambition of the 3 main hidden agents, each vying for power, helped the Marxist-Leninists. These agents were Xoxe, Maleshova and Spiru. In the Spring of 1946, Hoxha launched his counter attack in the Polit Bureau of the PCA on the errors of the Berat 2nd Plenum. Although the CPY tried to prevent it, Hoxha pushed to hold openly (as opposed to secretly, as the CPY urged) the 5th Plenum for the 1st Congress of the CPA. Just at this juncture, Tito urgently requested Hoxha to come to Belgrade in July 1946.

Hohxa asked for tangible assistance in credits for the development of agriculture and industry; and a mutual aid treaty.
Tito in return developed the idea of the "Balkan Federation". This had first been suggested by Georgii Dimitrov, the Bulgarian Communist who played a central role in the Comintern. As Tito took this idea, it was a vehicle by which, to use Hoxha's words:
A
He aimed to and struggled to annex the whole of the Balkan including Albania into Yugoslavia." ( Ibid; p.287).
A treaty of friendship and Mutual Aid, as well as an Economic Convention was indeed signed between Albania and Yugoslavia. Though Hohxa obstructed talk of the Balkan Federation, this pressure continued. Stalin effectively stopped this manoeuvre. As Hoxha said :

A
Xoxe, Kristo, and Themelko exerted considerable pressure on me to seek to enter the ABalkan Federation@. which in their head meant that we should unite with Yugoslavia. I did not encourage the. One day about the beginning of 1948, they came to me and said :@The Balkan Federation is being formed between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria!@. We wrote to the CPY.. we never received any reply. Stalin who had divined Tito's expansionist plans drew Dimitrov=s attention to them and at the beginning of 1948 the latter declared publicly that he had been wrong in his views about the Federation of Yugoslavia with Bulgaria." (Ibid, p. 287-8).
The reality of Tito's Aid, soon became clear :

A
In the first year after Liberation we had trade relations only with Yugoslavia.. the trade was virtually one-way and in our disfavour. We gave more than we received, We gave good products and received rubbish. We expropriated the big merchants of their property and sold the fabric to the Yugoslavs at prices which they set, while the razor blades and minor things of this type which they sold us cost us the earth. We imported grain from them because we were short of it, some leather and iron plough shares and these they sold to us at their internal prices which were very high. We sold them olives, cheese, olive-oil.. when we did not have enough of them for ourselves." (Titoites, p.302).
Of course the Albanians wished to transform their state
:
A
We had to lead the country consistently forward on the road to the construction of socialism in all fields and in the concrete instance, in the sector of the economy too. We knew that the fundamental factor for the socialist transformation of the country was the internal factor; we knew that the external auxiliary factor would be the Soviet Union of Stalin, in the first place, but specifically in the conditions when we had still not established the necessary direct link with the Soviet State, we turned with open hearts to our neighbouring friends the CPY." (Titoites, p.302).
But the CPY had different ideas, revolving around a sort of semi-colonial basis for Albania in relation to Yugoslavia:

A
The CPY said:@This is not the time for transformations of a socialist character@.. Our Afriends@ greatly hindered and misdirected us also on the question of the Land Reform.. We were advised that we should not Afall out@ with the former landowners, they told us to take a bit of their land (someone even Aadvised@ to pay for it with money) and to leave them a good part of the land which in fact represented areas ten or 20 times larger than those of the Apoor@.. As for industry.. we were advised : ALater, we shall see what can be done with the mines and the oil, but for the time being record what you have, supply us with raw materials and we shall supply you with ample finished products@.. AAgriculture - that is what you should go in for as the backward agrarian country you are!" ( Titioites; Ibid; p. 304-5).
The credits arranged were via Joint Stock Companies.
These agreements were signed on November 27th, 1947. Increasingly the Yugoslavs violated the agreement by:
i) The open distortion of the customs union with Yugoslavia, to open the borders to the benefit of Yugoslavia. This allowed Albanian goods to be taken intoYugoslavia for useless Yugoslav dinars.
ii) Operating the joint companies without input of funds from the Yugoslavs;
iii) Setting all prices unilaterally; and by not setting up factories in Albania;
iv) By on the other hand complaining that the Albanians were not fulfilling their obligation; despite the fact that these were dependent upon Yugoslav equipment never sent.
v) By demanding parity of prices between the 2 countries, which was difficult for Albania (Titoites; Ibid; p. 323-339).
Finally when it became clear to the Yugoslavs that the Albanians had tried to obtain advice and aid from the Soviets, the Yugoslavs said that :
AA new line is emerging in Albania.@ (Titoites; Ibid; p. 333). The Yugoslavs had tried repeatedly to Akeep the road to Stalin closed to us as long as they could if possible.@ (Titoites; Ibid; p. 344). After Hoxha=s contacts with Stalin,Yugoslavia tried preventing USSR equipment coming to Albania:
A
Albania is like a clock, it cannot work with all kinds of tools, Some may be better, others may be worse, but whatever they are they must be of one brand! Not some Yugoslav and some of another production. Since a Yugoslav foundation has been laid in your country, everything that will be built upon it must be Yugoslav alone." (Titoites; Ibid; p. 349-350).
Finally an "Ultimatum" was put by Yugoslavia to Albania in November 1947:

A
The CC of the CPY insisted that the relations of Yugoslavia with Albania ought to be characterised every day by the idea that our union should be sounder and our friendship should move in the direction of the fraternization and collaboration of our peoples, including Bulgaria to. Because of its backwardness the Albanian economy is not capable of developing independently. The criterion of this aid is that you should not take everything ready and rely on us in parasitic way! You will advance yourselves more strongly with us, and our CC thinks that the Yugoslav aid will be greater when we bring about an economic union between our countries!" (Ibid; p.360).
The hidden Yugoslav agents within the CC of the CPA tried to get this line accepted. But Hoxha tried to fight them off. But the mounting pressure continued. At the 8th Plenum of the CPA, the party was under the pressure forced to take the line that a new pro-Yugoslav line was to be taken. The Plenum was also being pushed towards discarding Hoxha. This all culminated in accepting the leading role of the Front, thereby discarding the leading role of the Party; as the Yugoslavs had wanted (Titoites; p.459).
But Hoxha persisted in his struggle. Hastily the Yugoslavs pressed on with their mission to swallow Albania. Hoxha demanded these requests to be made in writing. The reason for the Yugoslav haste to conclude agreement to have a unitary state between Albania and Yugoslavia became obvious soon. Obviously the Yugoslavs were aware that the CPSU(B) led by Stalin, were about to expose Yugoslav revisionism. The Yugoslavs wished to commit Albania to unification in one state, before this occurred.
But the CC of the CPSU(B) now exposed Yugoslav revisionism openly, on March 27th, 1948. There can be no doubt that this intervention of Stalin and the CPSU(B), had enormous significance in helping safeguard Albanian socialism (Titoites; Ibid; p. 484-498). Relations were subsequently cool between Yugoslavia and Albania; and conversely warm between the USSR and Albania.
iii) Following the Open Letter of the CPSU(B) to the CPY.

It soon became clear that Stalin had been aware for sometime about the improper conduct of the Yugoslavs towards the fledgling state of Albania.

Firstly
,
Stalin had defended the Albanians refusal to Tito to deploy Yugoslav troops in Albania;
Secondly
,
Stalin openly criticised and prevented Dimitrov's proposal for the Balkan Federation - a mask for Titoite aggrandizement;
Thirdly
,
as applied to the Balkans, Stalin acknowledged the right of the Kosovan peoples' to self determination [See pp.533-537 "Titioites"]. Indeed for strategic reasons, as well as reasons of principle, Stalin applied this to the Yugoslav Federation itself also :
A
I think that as Marxist-Leninists in the future too we must attack the anti-Marxist views and actions of Tito and the Yugoslav leadership, but I stress that in no way should we ever interfere in their internal affairs. That would not be Marxist. The Yugoslav communists and the Yugoslav people must attend to that matter; it is up to them to solve their problems of the present and the future of their country. It is in this context also that I see the problem of Kosova and the Albanian population living in other parts of Yugoslavia. We must not leave any way for the Titoite enemy to accuse us later of allegedly waging our fight to break up the Yugoslav Federation. This is a delicate moment and needs very careful handling, because by saying ASee, they want to break up Yugoslavia,@ Tito not only gathers reaction around him, but also tries to win the patriotic elements over to his side.@ (With Stalin; Ibid; pp.142-43).
Now it became easier to expose the Titoite agents in Albania. The 9th to the 11th Plenums of the CC of the CPA dealt openly with the history and repercussions of the Titoite penetration of the party. The way was clear for the continuation of the road to consolidate socialism. Stalin's aid continued as discussed above. But even now Stalin warned about the Yugoslav danger:

A
In the present situation, you should guard against any danger from Yugoslavia, The Titoites have their agents in your country, indeed they will smuggle in others. They want to attack you, but cannot, because they fear the consequences. You should not be afraid, but must set to work to strengthen the economy, to train the cadres, to strengthen the party, and to train the army and must always be vigilant. With a strong Party, economy and army, you need fear nobody." (AWith Stalin@, Ibid, p.205).
Stalin's forewarning was correct. As Khrushchev came to power, dismantling socialism in the USSR, the Titoites renewed their assaults on socialism world wide, but especially upon Albania.

CONCLUSIONS

Stalin and Hoxha had no essential differences. Their philosophy was the same - Marxism-Leninism. The philosophies of Stalin and Tito were however, diametrically different. This made the differences between Tito and Stalin those that encompass the differences between capitalism and socialism. The legacy of capitalist politics in the Yugoslav Federation was anti-democratic and promoted Greater Serb chauvinism.

ARTICLE 3

HYSNI MILLOSHI CONTINUES HIS FRAUDULENT POSITIONS

THE CENTRAL ORGANISING COMMITTEE OF THE CPA (Communist Party of Albania) CONDEMNS SPLITTING ACTIVITY AND WORKS TO STRENGTHEN UNITY IN TEE RANKS OF THE PARTY.

(Translated From ‘Feniksi’ (The Phoenix), NO 4, May 1998 by W.B.Bland

The Central Organising Committee of the CPA, at its regular meeting on 3 May 1998, discussed the tasks which confront the Party in the broadening of its ranks and the extension of its activity in the conditions created after the annulment of the illegal neo-fascist decision of 16 July 1992.
In this context, the participants in the meeting unanimously condemned the splitting and sabotaging activity of Hysni Milloshi and decided to explain its position publicly,
1. Comrade Hysni Milloshi was appointed to the Preliminary Commission for the Creation of the CPA in September 1991 and in the same month, at an unconstitutional meeting of some members of this Commission, was appointed Chairman of the Preliminary Commission. With the transformation of the Commission into the Central Organising Committee (November 1991), he remained Chairman of this committee and not Chairman of the Party as he has claimed.
2. During the period up to the illegal banning of the CPA he was frequently criticised by members of the Central Organising Committee systematic and for deliberate violations of the organisational norms and principles of collegiality, for breaches of decisions taken collectively, for the public expression of mistaken political and ideological views,and for expenditures outside the financial control of the Party.

While the greatest tolerance was shown, in the belief that some at least of these actions and positions arose from lack of experience, Hysni Milloshi responded consistently with arrogance, conceit and extreme voluntarism.

3. In December 1992, exploiting the difficult conditions of illegality, Hysni Milloshi, together with a minority of the members of the Central Organising Committee, in breach of communist principle, organised a secret meeting which he called an "Extraordinary Conference of the CPA". At this meeting, in the most arbitrary manner conceiveable and using methods of intrigue and deceit, the Central Organising Committee was disregarded and decisions were taken as though it did not exist. By this action, Hysni Milloshi excluded himself from this Committee, thus discharging himself from further duties as its Chairman.

This meeting,called an 'Extraordinary Conference', using on a wide scale the most banal and absurd fraud, slander and insults, expelled' some of the members of the Central Organising Committee, although none of them took part or wished to have links with the group created by Hysni Milloshi.

The so-called 'Conference', in fact, sowed the seeds of a split in the CPA, inaugurated a fractional group which broke away from the CPA as it was officially known on 9 November and merely fed the careerist megalomania and ambition of Hysni Milloshi, who was elected Chairman of the new party which was invented.

4. Faced with this unexpected and despicable behind-the-scenes activity, members of the Central Organising Committee and the three deputy chairman of this Committee reacted immediately and did everthing in their power to correct this fractional step with its dangerous consequences for the unity of the CPA and its very existence. However, Hysni Milloshi, either at his own wishes or on advice from outside the Party, refused to return. Precisely for this reason, a letter was sent to all organisations and committees of the Party with the aim of clarifying the situation, correcting errors made, and assisting the communists to re-establish the unity so severely and treacherously damaged.
5. With the aim of re-establishing the unity destroyed by the obstinacy and shamelessness of Hysni Milloshi, the majority of the members of the Central Organising Committee decided that the activity of this legal forum should be continued, without interrupting for a moment efforts to resolve the differences, to unify all communists in a single Marxist-Leninist Party, and to convoke a Congress of the CPA at which a Programme, Constitution and political line of the Party could be approved and a legitimate leadership elected. In all the many initiatives which the Central Organising Committee has undertaken without the participation of Hysni Milloshi and some of his supporters, it has had the approval of the overwhelming majority of communists in the four corners of the country.
6. In the conditions created after the elections of 29 June 1997, efforts for reunification have continued through discussions. Up to the end of April of this year, the Central Organising Committee has undertaken more than twenty initatives with the aim of re-restablishing Party unity. Towards these initiatives, Hysni Milloshi has maintained a dishonest, fraudulent stance. On not a few occasions he has welcomed them, has agreed to discussions and to deadlines for a reply. But each time he has cheated and given proof of his determination to travel further along the road of splitting and sabotage of the communist movement in Albania, while putting forward the bourgeois-imperialist view that the existence of 'several communist parties' is acceptable. It would seem that he is obsessed with the position of 'Chairman', the undeserved title he has adopted which has brought him not few benefits at a time when genuine communists were suffering in the prison cells of Berisha's dictatorship.
7. After the failure of all attempts at reunification, the Central Organising Committee decided unanimously to cease further attempts at discussions with Hysni Milloshi,to call on communists, organisations and committees of the PCA to distance themselves from his splitting and sabotaging activity, not to fall into bourgeois-imperialist trap of 'several communist parties', and to be vigilant.
8. The participants in the meeting of the Central Organising Committee expressed their determination to take without wavering the road taken up to now to build the CPA, to broaden its activities and increase the influence of communists in the social and political life of the country.
        In the framework of this task and this perspective, work will be done to clarify further the views and positions of Hysni Milloshi, analysing in detail, with facts, documents and serious arguments the mistakes and faults in his practical activity and in the ideological and political positions which he has held and holds.
        The communists, organisations and committees of the CPA, as in the evaluation of every phenomenon, must begin from the difficult situation through which Albania is passing, must hold on high the flag of the nation and the people, and make the Communist Party, as the people want, a vanguard force in the struggle for national sovereignty and independence, for people’s democracy and social equality.

CENTRAL ORGANISING COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA.
Tirana, 3 May, 1998.

 

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