All the quotations from Marx=s articles below, are drawn from the Marx-Engels Internet Archive and can be found at the following web site for the full index of works by Marx on one particular  Internet Archive:;
or more directly at:
(Please note that all emphases below in the quotes are from the Alliance editors. Original Marx citation is in blue and Alliance commentary is in black.)

    Marx=s article contains more than simply an analysis not only of the attitude that revolutionaries should take to the Jewish Question. Because the Jewish Question is a complex mixture of political, civil and religious victimisation, Marx has to deal with the relation of religion to society. Marx also deals with Bauer=s misconceptions surrounding the Democratic Rights Of Man - as adopted by the French Revolution and the USA War of Independence.

Marx first summarises the position of Bruno Bauer.

    Bauer starts out saying that no one in Germany, has the type of freedom that Jews want, ie ACivic political emancipation@. He argues that it is therefore Aegoist-ic@ to want a Aspecial emancipation@ separate from other humans. He argues that emancipation cannot come from those who are themselves Anot free@:

"Bruno Bauer: The German Jews desire emancipation. What kind of emancipation do they desire? Civic, political emancipation. Bruno Bauer replies to them: No one in Germany is politically emancipated. We ourselves are not free. How are we to free you? You Jews are Aegoists@ if you demand a special emancipation for yourselves as Jews. As Germans, you ought to work for the political emancipation of Germany, and as human beings, for the emancipation of mankind, and you should feel the particular kind of your oppression and your shame not as an exception to the rule, but on the contrary as a confirmation of the rule.     For Bauer the roots of the AJewish Question@ lie in a Areligious opposition@. This opposition can only be resolved by rendering the opposition Aimpossible@. Christianity and Judaism are simply different stages Ain the development of the human mind@. But there is only one way to render opposition Aimpossible@ - by Aabolishing religion@. The Jew must follow Bauer=s dictum of Aself-emancipation@, the Jew must renounce religion: "How, then, does Bauer solve the Jewish question?..
"We must emancipate ourselves before we can emancipate others".
The most rigid form of the opposition between the Jew and the Christian is the Areligious@ opposition. How is an opposition resolved? By making it impossible. How is religious opposition made impossible? By "abolishing religion". As soon as Jew and Christian recognize that their respective religions are no more than "different stages in the development of the human mind", different snake skins cast off by "history", and that man is the snake who sloughed them, the relation of Jew and Christian is no longer religious but is only a critical, "scientific", and human relation. AScience@, then, constitutes their unity. But, contradictions in science are resolved by science itself."
    For Bauer this renunciation and self-emancipation is necessary for Christians as well as Jews. It has a Auniversal significance@. The question embraces more than the individual, being also a Aquestion of the relation of religion to the state@: AThe AGerman Jew@, in particular, is confronted by the general absence of political emancipation and the strongly marked Christian character of the state. In Bauer's conception, however, the Jewish question has a universal significance, independent of specifically German conditions. It is the question of the relation of religion to the state, of the contradiction between Areligious constraint and political emancipation@. Emancipation from religion is laid down as a condition, both to the Jew who wants to be emancipated politically, and to the state which is to effect emancipation and is itself to be emancipated.@     In any case argues, Bauer, even if the State itself took the actions demanded by Jews, the State=s formal actions will not achieve the desired results. Bauer cites the French State as an example. Here the formal declaration of equality for all was not matched in practice. He then stresses that the responsibility for emancipation lies with the victim, the Jew - who should renounce religion and the Sabbath allowing him/her to attend the Chamber of Deputies and vote down the Aprivileged religion@. With the ending of a Aprivileged religion@ (ie Christianity) the freedom of worship as an individual act will follow. Marx concludes: ABauer, therefore, demands, on the one hand, that the Jew should renounce Judaism, and that mankind in general should renounce religion, in order to achieve Acivic@ emancipation. On the other hand, he quite consistently regards the Apolitical@ abolition of religion as the abolition of religion as such. The state which presupposes religion is not yet a true, real state.@     Marx now begins his demolition of Bauer. In essence, Marx shows that Bauer:     Marx outlines the limitations and the questions left unanswered by the mechanistic Bauer. Especially asks Marx, What is the nature of the emancipation being demanded that Bauer has not addressed?     Bauer excuses the bigots who opposed Jewish emancipation, seeing them as only committing only one error- they assume a Christian state to be Athe only true one@, and they do not criticise it as they do Judaism. For Marx the relevant criticism is the state itself, and the relationship of political emancipation to human emancipation: "We find that his error lies in the fact that he subjects to criticism Aonly@ the AChristian state@, not the "state as such", that he does not investigate Athe relation of political emancipation to human emancipation@ and, therefore, puts forward conditions which can be explained only by uncritical confusion of political emancipation with general human emancipation.@     Thus Marx turns Bauer=s question to the Jews around. Marx defends in effect the Aright@ of a private choice to religion and Judaism in particular. This right is not dependent upon, nor subordinate to a superior political emancipation: AIf Bauer asks the Jews: Have you, from your standpoint, the right to want Apolitical emancipation@? We ask the converse question: Does the standpoint of Apolitical@ emancipation give the right to demand from the Jew the abolition of Judaism and from man the abolition of religion?@     Marx also points out that Afreedoms@ necessitate understanding concrete realities. There are particular aspects that the Jewish question takes in different societies. Thus in Germany, a state not yet undergone the bourgeois revolution, a theological State is encountered by the Jew: AIn Germany, where there is no political state, no state as such, the Jewish question is a purely Atheological@ one. The Jew finds himself in Areligious@ opposition to the state, which recognizes Christianity as its basis. This state is a theologian Aex professo@. Criticism here is criticism of theology, a double-edged criticism -- criticism of Christian theology and of Jewish theology. Hence, we continue to operate in the sphere of theology, however much we may operate Acritically@ within it.@     Whereas since France is a constitutional state with differing effects on Jews, there it was a question of a Aincompleteness of political emancipation@: AIn France, a Aconstitutional@ state, the Jewish question is a question of constitutionalism, the question of the Aincompleteness of political emancipation@. Since the Asemblance@ of a state religion is retained here, although in a meaningless and self-contradictory formula, that of a Areligion of the majority@, the relation of the Jew to the state retains the Asemblance@ of a religious, theological opposition.     Only one state, the USA, has an apparently fully secular relationship with its peoples, allowing religious freedoms. Although Marx made it clear that he obviously understood that hypocrisies abounded, saying that although the USA Constitution was clear on the freedom of worship, ANorth America is pre-eminently the country of religiosity@. Nonetheless: AOnly in the North American states -- at least, in some of them -- does the Jewish question lose its Atheological@ significance and become a really Asecular@ question. Only where the political state exists in its completely developed form can the relation of the Jew, and of the religious man in general, to the political state, and therefore the relation of religion to the state, show itself in its specific character, in its purity. The criticism of this relation ceases to be theological criticism as soon as the state ceases to adopt a theological attitude toward religion, as soon as it behaves towards religion as a state -- i.e., Apolitically@. Criticism, then, becomes criticism of the political state. At this point, where the question ceases to be theological, Bauer's criticism ceases to be critical.@     In any case, the fundamental question is the relation of political emancipation to religion. Marx argues that if religious motivations still remain, despite Apolitical emancipation@ in countries like the USA, it is because of an incomplete secular freedom, a Adefect@ of a Asecular narrowness@. Religion itself is not the Acause@ of the defect. Religion can only be overcome not by overcoming Areligious narrowness@ but by Agetting rid of secular restrictions@- Not by Aabolishing religion@ as Bauer proclaims: AThe question is: What is the relation of complete political emancipation to religion? If we find that even in the country of complete political emancipation, religion not only exists, but displays a fresh and vigorous vitality, that is proof that the existence of religion is not in contradiction to the perfection of the state. Since, however, the existence of religion is the existence of defect, the source of this defect can only be sought in the nature of the state itself. We no longer regard religion as the Acause@, but only as the manifestation of secular narrowness. Therefore, we explain the religious limitations of the free citizen by their secular limitations. We do not assert that they must overcome their religious narrowness in order to get rid of their secular restrictions, we assert that they will overcome their religious narrowness once they get rid of their secular restrictions. We do not turn secular questions into theological ones... The question of the relation of political emancipation to religion becomes for us the question of the relation of political emancipation to human emancipation. We criticize the religious weakness of the political state by criticizing the political state in its secular form, apart from its weaknesses as regards religion.@     Marx agrees with Bauer, that for both Jews and Christians, full liberty means shedding religious superstitions. But for a fuller human liberation, the first and immediate need is for separation of state and religion, for the Aemancipation@ of the state from any Aparticular@secular elements and from Astate religion@. This is a Apolitical emancipation@ & not a Areligious emancipation@ which requires Ahuman emancipation@: AThe contradiction between the state and a particular religion, for instance Judaism, is given by us a human form as the contradiction between the state and Aparticular@ secular elements; the contradiction between the state and religion in general as the contradiction between the state and its presuppositions in general. The political emancipation of the Jew, the Christian, and, in general, of religious man, is the emancipation of the Astate@ from Judaism, from Christianity, from religion in general... the state as a state emancipates itself from religion by emancipating itself from the state religion -- that is to say, by the state as a state not professing any religion, but, on the contrary, asserting itself as a state. The Apolitical@ emancipation from religion is not a religious emancipation that has been carried through to completion and is free from contradiction, because political emancipation is not a form of Ahuman@ emancipation which has been carried through to completion and is free from contradiction.@     It is irrelevant if even the majority of the people remain religious. For religious sentiments remain, until the people undergo a more profound freedom. The problem is the Alimits@ of a Apolitical emancipation@ by itself: AThe limits of political emancipation are evident at once from the fact that the state can free itself from a restriction without man being really free from this restriction, that the state can be a Afree state@ without man being a Afree man@.     Marx means by this, the need for a further and profound liberation of the human. To drive his point home, Marx draws an analogy to private property relations. As the USA state had abolished requirements of property for the right to vote, he argues that it had effectively Aabolished@ private property. But Marx says this is ridiculous since clearly, private property not only exists in the USA, but that it forms the presupposed basis for the state: ANevertheless, the political annulment of private property not only fails to abolish private property but even presupposes it. The state abolishes, in its own way, distinctions of birth, social rank, education, occupation, when it declares that birth, social rank, education, occupation, are non-political distinctions, when it proclaims, without regard to these distinction, that every member of the nation is an Aequal@ participant in national sovereignty, when it treats all elements of the real life of the nation from the standpoint of the state. Nevertheless, the state allows private property, education, occupation, to Aact@ in Atheir@ way - Ai.e.@, as private property, as education, as occupation, and to exert the influence of their Aspecial@ nature. Far from abolishing these real distinctions, the state only exists on the presupposition of their existence; it feels itself to be a political state and asserts its universality only in opposition to these elements of its being.@     Consistent with this type of hypocrisy of the tenets of the bourgeois Constitution, religious conflicts will exist in politically bourgeois states. But these are no different in kind from contradictions even the bourgeoisie find themselves in with respect to their status as supposed free Acitizens@. Marx locates Jew=s problems in civil society, in the same conflicts of the Acitizen@ whose political powers are merely a Asophistry@ and not a real one: AMan, as the adherent of a particular religion, finds himself in conflict with his citizenship and with other men as members of the community. This conflict reduces itself to the Asecular@ division between the Apolitical@ state and Acivil@ society. For man as a bourgeois [ here, meaning, member of civil society, private life], Alife in the state@ is Aonly a semblance or a temporary exception to the essential and the rule@. Of course, the bourgeois, like the Jew, remains only sophistically in the sphere of political life, just as the citoyen only sophistically remains a Jew or a bourgeois. But, this sophistry is not personal. It is the sophistry of the political state itself. The difference between the merchant and the citizen, between the day-labourer and the citizen, between the landowner and the citizen, between the merchant and the citizen, between the Aliving individual@ and the Acitizen@. The contradiction in which the religious man finds himself with the political man is the same contradiction in which the bourgeois finds himself with the citoyen, and the member of civil society with his political lion=s skin.@     For Marx, Bauer ignores the Jew=s secular problems, confining himself to the purely religious conflicts: AThis secular conflict, to which the Jewish question ultimately reduces itself, the relation between the political state and its preconditions, whether these are material elements, such as private property, etc., or spiritual elements, such as culture or religion, the conflict between the general interest and private interest, the schism between the political state and civil society -- these secular antitheses Bauer allows to persist, whereas he conducts a polemic against their religious expression.@     As explained, Marx distinguishes political emancipation from the full human emancipation that tackles the religious sentiment. It is not surprising then, that Marx says that political emancipation of itself, often leaves religion intact. A thorough liberation, including from religion, requires special periods when new political states arise out of civil society, where a Apermanent@ non-stop revolution does not baulk at hurdles: AOf course, in periods when the political state as such is born violently out of civil society, when political liberation is the form in which men strive to achieve their liberation, the state can and must go as far as the abolition of religion, the destruction of religion. But, it can do so only in the same way that it proceeds to the abolition of private property, to the maximum, to confiscation, to progressive taxation, just as it goes as far as the abolition of life, the guillotine. At times of special self-confidence, political life seeks to suppress its prerequisite, civil society and the elements composing this society, and to constitute itself as the real species-life of man, devoid of contradictions. But, it can achieve this only by coming into Aviolent@ contradiction with its own conditions of life, only by declaring the revolution to be permanent, and, therefore, the political drama necessarily ends with the re-establishment of religion, private property, and all elements of civil society, just as war ends with peace.@     So Marx differentiates between the more limited liberation in political emancipation of the >secular= state of bourgeois society (that which in words denies religious persecution and property rights, but in fact endorses them) and a fuller human liberation. Where does all this leave the Jew? Bauer had denied the Jew civil rights till renunciation of Judaism. Marx denies that. But he adds, for full liberation, the Jew must strive for a Ahuman liberation@ from religion itself - as well as striving for political emancipation. The latter can be achieved without renouncing Judaism, but Ahuman liberation@ requires leaving religion. The Jew however, in confronting the AChristian@ state, in demanding Acivic rights@ is acting politically: ATherefore, we do not say to the Jews, as Bauer does: You cannot be emancipated politically without emancipating yourselves radically from Judaism. On the contrary, we tell them: Because you can be emancipated politically without renouncing Judaism completely and incontrovertibly, political emancipation itself is not Ahuman@ emancipation. If you Jews want to be emancipated politically, without emancipating yourselves humanly, the half-hearted approach and contradiction is not in you alone, it is inherent in the Anature@ and Acategory@ of political emancipation. If you find yourself within the confines of this category, you share in a general confinement. Just as the state evangelizes when, although it is a state, it adopts a Christian attitude towards the Jews, so the Jew acts politically when, although a Jew, he demands civic rights.@     Bauer had a somewhat mystical idea of how Democratic Rights were obtained. According to Bauer, the Arights of Man were not a gift of nature@ but were obtained by struggle against historical tradition: ABut, if a man, although a Jew, can be emancipated politically and receive civic rights, can he lay claim to the so-called Arights of man@ and receive them? Bauer denies it. [Says Bauer]: AThe question is whether the Jew as such, that is, the Jew who himself admits that he is compelled by his true nature to live permanently in separation from other men, is capable of receiving the universal rights of man and of conceding them to others. For the Christian world, the idea of the rights of man was only discovered in the last century. It is not innate in men; on the contrary, it is gained only in a struggle against the historical traditions in which hitherto man was brought up. Thus the rights of man are not a gift of nature, not a legacy from past history, but the reward of the struggle against the accident of birth and against the privileges which up to now have been handed down by history from generation to generation. These rights are the result of culture, and only one who has earned and deserved them can possess them.@
ACan the Jew really take possession of them? As long as he is a Jew, the restricted nature which makes him a Jew is bound to triumph over the human nature which should link him as a man with other men, and will separate him from non-Jews. He declares by this separation that the particular nature which makes him a Jew is his true, highest nature, before which human nature has to give way. Similarly, the Christian as a Christian cannot grant the rights of man.@
    In countering this naive mystic view, Marx shows that Bauer had not even understood the notion of the Auniversal rights of man@. For Bauer, man has to sacrifice the Aprivilege of faith@ to obtain universal rights of man. But Marx points out that these rights were never seen, by either the French and the USA framers of the Declaration of Rights, as being contingent upon abolition of religion: ALet us examine, for a moment, the so-called rights of man -- to be precise, the rights of man in their authentic form, in the form which they have among those who Adiscovered@ them, the North Americans and the French. These rights of man are, in part, political rights, rights which can only be exercised in community with others. Their content is Aparticipation@ in the community, and specifically in the political community, in the life of the state. They come within the category of political freedom, the category of Acivic rights@, which, as we have seen, in no way presuppose the incontrovertible and positive abolition of religion -- nor, therefore, of Judaism.@     Marx now examines the possible differences between the Arights of man@ and the Arights of the citizen@: AThere remains to be examined the other part of the rights of man -- the Arights of man@, insofar as these differ from the Arights of the citizen. Included among them is freedom of conscience, the right to practice any religion one chooses. The privilege of faith is expressly recognized either as a right of man or as the consequence of a right of man, that of liberty. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1791, Article 10: AThe freedom of every man to practice the religion of which he is an adherent.@     Marx quotes the Declaration, showing that the Right of freedom of conscience is drawn from ANature@: AAll men have received from nature the imprescriptible right to worship the Almighty according to the dictates of their conscience, and no one can be legally compelled to follow, establish, or support against his will any religion or religious ministry. No human authority can, in any circumstances, intervene in a matter of conscience or control the forces of the soul.@     Marx now distinguishes between Aman@ and Acitizen@. Man - as in Arights of man@ - is the person who makes up Acivil society@. Man, separated atomically from other men. He goes on to quote directly from the Amost radical Constitution@ that of 1793, that was used to define liberty, what is it that Aconstitutes liberty@? AThe rights of man, are, as such, distinct from.. the rights of the citizen. Who is man as distinct from citizen? None other than the member of civil society. Why is the member of civil society called Aman@; why are his rights called the rights of man? How is this fact to be explained? From the relationship between the political state and civil society, from the nature of political emancipation...
...Above all, we note the fact that the so-called rights of man.. as distinct from the rights of citizens, are nothing but the rights of a member of civil society -- Ai.e.@, the rights of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community. Let us hear what the most radical Constitution, the Constitution of 1793, has to say: Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Article 2. AThese rights, etc., (the natural and imprescriptible rights) are: equality, liberty, security, property.@ What constitutes liberty?
"Article 6. ALiberty is the power which man has to do everything that does not harm the rights of others@, or, according to the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1791: ALiberty consists in being able to do everything which does not harm others.@
Liberty, therefore, is the right to do everything that harms no one else. The limits within which anyone can act Awithout harming@ someone else are defined by law, just as the boundary between two fields is determined by a boundary post. It is a question of the liberty of man as an isolated monad, withdrawn into himself. A
    Marx returns to contrast Bauer=s position with that of the 1793 Constitution. Bauer=s position in demanding of the Jew to renounce Judaism before granting human rights- ALiberty@ in the words of the Declaration of Rights Of Man - is that unless the Jew does renounce Judaism he will remain Aseparate from non-Jews@: AWhy is the Jew, according to Bauer, incapable of acquiring the rights of man? @As long as he is a Jew, the restricted nature which makes him a Jew is bound to triumph over the human nature which should link him as a man with other men, and will separate him from non-Jews.@     And Marx replies to him saying that the very notion of liberty under the bourgeois Declaration of Rights is of a Aseparation of man from man@, on an isolated individual. This is easily illustrated with respect to another aspect of the Declaration of Rights of Man, that concerning private property: ABut, the right of man to liberty is based not on the association of man with man, but on the separation of man from man. It is the right of this separation, the right of the Arestricted@ individual, withdrawn into himself. The practical application of man=s right to liberty is man=s right to private property. What constitutes man=s right to private property?
Article 16. (Constitution of 1793):
AThe right of property is that which every citizen has of enjoying and of disposing at his discretion of his goods and income, of the fruits of his labor and industry.@
The right of man to private property is, therefore, the right to enjoy one=s property and to dispose of it at one=s discretion (a son gre), without regard to other men, independently of society, the right of self-interest. This individual liberty and its application form the basis of civil society. It makes every man see in other men not the realization of his own freedom, but the barrier to it. But, above all, it proclaims the right of man Aof enjoying and of disposing at his discretion of his goods and income, of the fruits of his labor and industry.@
    Of the other rights of Man: AThere remains the other rights of man: equality and security.@ Marx goes on to show that these also consist of a guarantee of individual rights as a Aself-sufficient nomad: AEquality, used here in its non-political sense, is nothing but the equality of the liberty described above -- namely: each man is to the same extent regarded as such a self-sufficient monad. The Constitution of 1795 defines the concept of this equality, in.. Article 3 (Constitution of 1795):
AEquality consists in the law being the same for all, whether it protects or punishes.@
And Security? Article 8 (Constitution of 1793):
ASecurity consists in the protection afforded by society to each of its members for the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property.@
Security is the highest social concept of civil society, the concept of Apolice@, expressing the fact that the whole of society exists only in order to guarantee to each of its members the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property. It is in this sense that Hegel calls civil society Athe state of need and reason@.
Marx concludes that egoism is enshrined in the Democratic Rights of Man:     As the Democratic Rights of Man signalled the victory of the bourgeois production over feudal production, Marx finds it consistent that an Aegoistic man@ should result: AFeudal society was resolved into its basic element -- man, but man as he really formed its basis -- egoistic man. This Aman@, the member of civil society, is thus the basis, the precondition, of the Apolitical@ state. He is recognized as such by this state in the rights of man.@     Again Marx stresses the incompleteness of the emancipation achieved under bourgeois rule, that there is freedom of religious opinion, but not freedom from religion: AHence, man was not freed from religion, he received religious freedom. He was not freed from property, he received freedom to own property. He was not freed from the egoism of business, he received freedom to engage in business. Man as a member of civil society, unpolitical man, inevitably appears, however, as the Anatural@ man. The Arights of man@ appears as Anatural rights@, because conscious activity is concentrated on the Apolitical@ act. A     Full emancipation has still to come, when the Aabstract citizen@ is Are-absorbed@ into the individual man, - that is when recognises and exerts his conscious Asocial powers@ : AAll@ emancipation is a Areduction@ of the human world and relationships to Aman himself@. Political emancipation is the reduction of man, on the one hand, to a member of civil society, to an egoistic, independent individual, and, on the other hand, to a citizen, a juridical person. Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a species-being in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognized and organized his "own powers" as -social@ powers, and, consequently, no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of Apolitical@ power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished.@     For Bauer, the Christian is closer to freedom than the Jew, since the Christian only needs to give up religion. But the Jew not only has to give up religion but also has to give up struggle to Aperfecting his religion@. Marx realises that Bauer has simply re-dressed in civic clothes, the old religious conflict between Judaism and Christianity. Marx condemns the Atransformation@ of Jewish emancipation into a Apurely religious question: AFor Bauer: AThe Christian has to surmount only one stage, namely, that of his religion, in order to give up religion altogether@, and therefore become free. AThe Jew, on the other hand, has to break not only with his Jewish nature, but also with the development towards perfecting his religion, a development which has remained alien to him.@ Thus, Bauer here transforms the question of Jewish emancipation into a purely religious question. The theological problem as to whether the Jew or the Christian has the better prospect of salvation is repeated here in the enlightened form: which of them is more capable of Aemancipation@. No longer is the question asked: Is it Judaism or Christianity that makes a man free? On the contrary, the question is now: Which makes man freer, the negation of Judaism or the negation of Christianity?@     Bauer uses a complex theological argument to portray the Jews need to overcome not only Judaism itself, but also Judaism=s link with Christianity. Jews must not only come to terms with Judaism, but also with Christianity by carrying out the ACritique of the Evangelical History of the Synoptics@ and the ALife of Jesus@, etc.@ Since Bauer conceives of Judaism as a Acrude religious criticism of Christianity, and of Judaism Amerely@ of religious significance, he transforms the emancipation of the Jews, also into a philosophical-theological act. Finally Bauer notes & excuses that Christians find Jews Aoffensive@. In contrast to this religious hocus-pocus, Marx emphasises the secular realities. This means an unsentimental analysis of the position of the Jew in society: AWe are trying to break with the theological formulation of the question. For us, the question of the Jew=s capacity for emancipation becomes the question: What particular Asocial@ element has to be overcome in order to abolish Judaism? For the present-day Jew=s capacity for emancipation is the relation of Judaism to the emancipation of the modern world. This relation necessarily results from the special position of Judaism in the contemporary enslaved world. Let us consider the actual, worldly Jew -- not the Sabbath Jew, as Bauer does, but the everyday Jew. Let us not look for the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let us look for the secret of his religion in the real Jew.@     So saying Marx locates the Jewish reality in money trading, in Asacher@ - or Ahuckstering@: AWhat is the secular basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest. What is the worldly religion of the Jew? Huckstering. What is his worldly God? Money. Very well then! Emancipation from huckstering and money, consequently from practical, real Judaism, would be the self-emancipation of our time.@     This being so, only a societal change of society to Aabolish those preconditions of huckstering@ - can make the AJew impossible@: AAn organization of society which would abolish the preconditions for huckstering, and therefore the possibility of huckstering, would make the Jew impossible. His religious consciousness would be dissipated like a thin haze in the real, vital air of society. On the other hand, if the Jew recognizes that this Apractical@ nature of his is futile and works to abolish it, he extricates himself from his previous development and works for Ahuman emancipation@ as such and turns against the supreme practical expression of human self-estrangement. We recognize in Judaism, therefore, a general anti-social element of the Apresent time@, an element which through historical development -- to which in this harmful respect the Jews have zealously contributed -- has been brought to its present high level, at which it must necessarily begin to disintegrate. In the final analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of mankind from Judaism.@     Bauer argues that the Jews have financial power, and goes so far as to state that it is fiction to say that the Jew is deprived of political rights, given the Jew has so much money power: AAccording to Bauer, it is Aa fictitious state of affairs when in theory the Jew is deprived of political rights, whereas in practice he has immense power and exerts his political influence Aen gros@, although it is curtailed Aen detail@.@     Marx replies that money power is not always consonant with political power: AThe contradiction that exists between the practical political power of the Jew and his political rights is the contradiction between politics and the power of money in general. Although theoretically the former is superior to the latter, in actual fact politics has become the serf of financial power.@     The peculiar power of the Jews arises from the need for money free of restraints: AJudaism has held its own Aalongside@ Christianity, not only as religious criticism of Christianity.. but equally because the practical Jewish spirit, Judaism, has maintained itself and even attained its highest development in Christian society. The Jew, who exists as a distinct member of civil society, is only a particular manifestation of the Judaism of civil society... The Jew is perpetually created by civil society from its own entrails. What, in itself, was the basis of the Jewish religion? Practical need, egoism. ... Practical need, egoism, is the principle of civil society, and as such appears in pure form as soon as civil society has fully given birth to the political state. The god of practical need and self-interest is money. Money is the jealous god of Israel, in face of which no other god may exist. Money degrades all the gods of man -- and turns them into commodities. Money is the universal self-established Avalue@ of all things. It has, therefore, robbed the whole world -- both the world of men and nature -- of its specific value. Money is the estranged essence of man's work and man's existence, and this alien essence dominates him, and he worships it. The god of the Jews has become secularized and has become the god of the world. The bill of exchange is the real god of the Jew. His god is only an illusory bill of exchange. The view of nature attained under the domination of private property and money is a real contempt for, and practical debasement of, nature; in the Jewish religion, nature exists, it is true, but it exists only in imagination.@     Indeed Judaism reaches its peak in Christian society, since its social function of money loaning is unique, and very much needed by Christians: AJudaism reaches its highest point with the perfection of civil society, but it is only in the AChristian@ world that civil society attains perfection. Only under the dominance of Christianity, which makes Aall@ national, natural, moral, and theoretical conditions Aextrinsic@ to man, could civil society separate itself completely from the life of the state, sever all the species-ties of man, put egoism and selfish need in the place of these species-ties, and dissolve the human world into a world of atomistic individuals who are inimically opposed to one another.@

AChristianity sprang from Judaism. It has merged again in Judaism. From the outset, the Christian was the theorizing Jew, the Jew is, therefore, the practical Christian, and the practical Christian has become a Jew again. Christianity had only in semblance overcome real Judaism. It was too noble-minded, too spiritualistic to eliminate the crudity of practical need in any other way than by elevation to the skies. Christianity is the sublime thought of Judaism, Judaism is the common practical application of Christianity, but this application could only become general after Christianity as a developed religion had completed Atheoretically@ the estrangement of man from himself and from nature. Only then could Judaism achieve universal dominance and make alienated man and alienated nature into Aalienable@, vendible objects subjected to the slavery of egoistic need and to trading. Selling [verausserung] is the practical aspect of alienation [Entausserung]. Just as man, as long as he is in the grip of religion, is able to objectify his essential nature only by turning it into something Aalien@, something fantastic, so under the domination of egoistic need he can be active practically, and produce objects in practice, only by putting his products, and his activity, under the domination of an alien being, and bestowing the significance of an alien entity -- money -- on them. In its perfected practice, Christian egoism of heavenly bliss is necessarily transformed into the corporal egoism of the Jew, heavenly need is turned into world need, subjectivism into self-interest. We explain the tenacity of the Jew not by his religion, but, on the contrary, by the human basis of his religion -- practical need, egoism.@

    Is there a Jewish Anation@? Marx thinks this is a Achimera@: "The chimerical nationality of the Jew is the nationality of the merchant, of the man of money in general. The groundless law of the Jew is only a religious caricature of groundless morality and right in general, of the purely formal rites with which the world of self-interest surrounds itself. Here, too, man's supreme relation is the legal one, his relation to laws that are valid for him not because they are laws of his own will and nature, but because they are the dominant laws and because departure from them is avenged.@  Again the Asocial emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism@ ie the emancipation of society from money and mercantile bonds of trading: AOnce society has succeeded in abolishing the empirical essence of Judaism -- huckstering and its preconditions -- the Jew will have become impossible, because his consciousness no longer has an object, because the subjective basis of Judaism, practical need, has been humanized, and because the conflict between man's individual-sensuous existence and his species-existence has been abolished. The Asocial@ emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism.@

All quoted sections in the Appendix are from the Marx-Engels Internet Archive located at the web site : ""; all at <>
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