Number 30, Oct 1998
MARX, LENIN & STALIN ON
On Birobidzhan; on the Zionists
sabotage of an anti-Nazi Front;
On the Setting up of Israel;
On Revisionist Gromyko's participation
On the Yalta & Potsdam conferences
& the Atomic Bomb
THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET
JEWISH HOMELAND - BIROBIDZHAN
Jewry prior to the revolution had been intensely persecuted. The Russian
census of 1897 had enumerated 5,215,800 Jews - of whom nearly 2 million
emigrated between the years 1881 and 1914.
(Zvi Gitelman: p. 1; Introduction
to Robert Weinberg: "Stalin’s Forgotten Zion-Birobidzhan & the Making
of A Soviet Jewish Homeland, An Illustrated History 1928-1996." Berkeley
that stayed were left in the "Pale of Settlement". The
majority were peasants and earned their living from agriculture. But since
they were banned from owning any land, they were condemned always to be
at the poorest status of peasantry. By the beginning of the First World
War, about 50,000 Jews (3% of the total Jewish population of the Russian
Empire) were tilling agricultural land. Most Jews were engaged in commerce,
manufacturing and services - mainly in a petit bourgeois capacity. (Weinberg
Ibid, p. 18.)
the worst racism and pogroms, the Jewish leaders were split as to how to
deal with this. One section argued they should readily embrace the limited
reforms offered by some of the Tsars - and assimilate completely. At the
extreme were those advocating conversion to Christianity. Another "moderate"
section however wanted to modernise the Jewish traditions and including
a dropping of the Yiddish language for Hebrew. These were known as the
(enlighteners) and their movement as the
reacting to the pogroms of Tsar Alexander III (1881-94) and Nicholas II
(1894-1917) argued for a completely separate Jewish state. This tradition,
led by such as the physician Leon
known as shivat
To Zion). In the midst of this was the Jewish Bund whose positions have
been already discussed above.
1917 Bolshevik revolution, the situation of the Jewish people was considered
as part of the overall question of the minorities within the Soviet Union.
Within a year the Bolsheviks had organised Jewish
Sections within the Communist party (Evreiskie seketsii or Evsektsii or
commissariat for Jewish Affairs was set up known as
It was placed within the Commissariat of Nationalities,
headed by Stalin. The language question was resolved in favour of Yiddish
this being the language of the Jewish masses and not Hebrew.
There is no
doubt that the correct Soviet policy of restricting the medium of the religious
Hebrew language and encouraging Yiddish was at least in part responsible
for the rapid assimilation of the USSR Jews:
campaign against the Hebrew language. In their eyes, Hebrew is the reactionary
language of the Jewish bourgeoisie, whatever its content, and has to be
eliminated in favour of Yiddish, the language of the Jewish proletariat.
Hebrew schools and printing are closed. At the end of the 1920's, Hebrew
becomes the only language which is officially outlawed in the Soviet Union.
Jewish religious education is now impossible. The only permitted expressions
of Soviet-Jewish life are secular Yiddish education, literature, press
and theatre... The newly established Yiddish schools are very popular at
first. But as only few secondary school and no university courses are in
Yiddish, their numbers decline. At the end of the 1930's, they have completely
disappeared. With the almost complete elimination of organized Jewish religious
and communal life, the Yevsektsii have become redundant and are dissolved
in 1930. "
WWW site "Beyond the Pale";
A History of Soviet Jews;
The same source makes the point that many of the Yevsektsii were later
persecuted as "nationalists":
"During the Stalinist
purges of the late 1930's, most of its members are accused of having had
"nationalist tendencies", and are deported or killed."
the point has been repeatedly proven in the pages of
the purges of the 1930's were not under the control of Stalin, but the
hidden revisionists such as Yezhov.
They were aimed at the alienation and or physical
elimination of the best Bolsheviks from the party. A policy of
("Implanting Bolshevism in the non-Russian
masses") was launched. Stalin’s view at the Commissariat of Nationalities
was to stimulate cultural diversity, if it was "National in form and socialist
in content". (Cited Weinberg p.15)
"Beyond The Pale"; Ibid.
As Gitelman puts it, the promotion
of the Yiddish culture was - and remains - a unique experiment:
"This would be done by having
party and government institutions operate in their language and educating
their children with a Bolshevik content but a national form, as Stalin
put it. For Jews this meant the creation of networks of Yiddish schools,
newspapers, journals, and theatres. Two academic institutions operating
in Yiddish were set up in Kiev and Minsk. Courts, trade unions and even
party cells were encouraged to operate in Yiddish. This was the only time
in history that a state invested heavily in Yiddish institutions and the
promotion of Yiddish culture."
According to Gitelman, largely speaking, the Jews rejected this effort
to build a Jewish state. But this view is countered by Weinberg - who has
become the most visible historian of the Birobidzhan:
"The notion of a Jewish homeland
appealed to many Soviet Jews, and the Birobidzhan project was intended
to undercut the Zionist focus on Palestine."
Gitelman Ibid; p. 6-7.
Weinberg Ibid, p.13.
corroborates the view that a general interest was definitely present. In
any case, if Gitelman’s view is accepted, Gitelman explains the lack of
interest as being due to the power of the assimilation offered by the new
Soviet state. For Gitelman, the main reason was an embrace of Russian language
and the opportunities given by the revolution:
"Traditional Jews saw it as
an attempt to replace authentic grassroots Judaism with an ersatz product
imposed Afrom above".. Those uninterested n traditional forms of Jewishness
saw no reason to remain loyal to Yiddish culture when the broader horizons
of Russian culture beckoned to them. Jews rushed to take advantage of the
educational and vocational opportunities the revolution had given to them.
Clearly Russian was much more useful than Yiddish."
the views of Lenin and Stalin - that once the Jews were allowed to play
a part in society in free democratic manner - links to the past would be
eroded. Gitelman draws an explicit parallel to the dying of Yiddish as
a language in America.. where English was the key to assimilation. Gitelman’s
states that on this basis:
Gitelman Ibid; p. 6-7.
"The idea of a territory in
which Yiddish would be the dominant language as Birobidzhan, had limited
appeal to Soviet Jews in the 1920's."
But as Weinberg
argues, nonetheless there were still many Soviet Jews who retained the
belief in a separate entity. In May 1934 that the Jewish Autonomous region
was set up. It was located as Map 2 shows, in remote and poorly populated
area of the Soviet Far East. In this setting it would not displace indigenous
peoples. Of course this was in contrast to the creation of the future Israel
which displaced the Palestinians in a brutal manner. To this end the plan
was evolved to settle 100,000 Jews in agricultural colonies.
Gitelman, Ibid, p.7.
In Hard Copy form only:
MAP 2: From page 15 Weinberg
the early 1920's the number of poor Jewish unemployed in the USSR was high.
Around Belarus, in the city of Gomel it was about 70%. (Cited Weinberg
Ibid; p. 16).
In addition, many of the petit
bourgeoisie of the Jewish population had to be brought into the socialist
economy. Since the petit bourgeois nature of their work had in the majority
of Jews, been continually eroded by the socialist policies of collectivisation
in both manufacturing and agriculture, a question arose of the
of Jewish life. Weinberg comments:
"Given the devastated condition
of Soviet industry in the 1920's government officials focused on agricultural
resettlement as a strategy. Despite the long-term objectives of presiding
over an industrialised society, the Kremlin in the 1920's could not pursue
a concerted policy of industrialisation that could absorb significant numbers
of economically marginal Jews. The publication of two issues of the journal
Evreiskii krest’ianin (The Jewish Peasant) in 1925 and 1926 underscores
this official interest in Jewish land settlement."
In the 1920's
therefore two organisations were set up, OZET
(Society for the Settlement of Jewish Toilers on the Land) and KOMZET
(Committee for the Settlement of Jewish Toilers on the Land). OZET was
controlled by KOMZET members, who examined
conditions for settlement in Ukraine, Belarus, and the Crimea. After 1928,
attention focused on the formation of a Jewish
Autonomous Region (J.A.R).
Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 19.
the Shetls (Shetls were the villages or ghettoes where large numbers of
Jews were concentrated) were moved to the area. By 1930, some 47,000 Jewish
families were working in agriculture in the Soviet Union.
1928 decision to make the Biro-Bidzhanskii district a JAR - took in a region
the size of Belgium. It had been annexed in 1858 by Russia. The Biro and
the Bidzhan were tributaries of the river Amur. The population consisted
then of "several hundred" indigenous Siberians and some settlers - Russians,
Cossacks, Koreans and Ukrainians over the late 19th-early 20th century.
There was some early resistance from 1924, until the decision was finally
taken in 1928, to have the Biro-Bidzhanskii district as the site of the
JAR. This resistance, from some activists in KOMZET, argued that it was
too far from the current pockets of Jewish populations. Many Jews argued
that Birobidzhan was preferable to Palestine, since it was within an area
they already had roots - an argument put by I.Sudarskii in 1930 in the
book "Birobdizhan And Palestine". (Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 22).
the Ukraine Belarus and Crimea were becoming crowded and the Far East resources
had not been sufficiently tapped. This meant that the Soviet Government
made conditions attractive for Jews to move there:
"Many in the Kremlin were interested
in creating a Jewish national territory within the borders of the Soviet
Union... Soviet policy in the 1920's aimed at normalizing the status of
non-territorial minorities by establishing official enclaves."
sanction for the project was given by President
Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 21-22.
"It is completely natural that
the Jewish population.. Strives to find its place in the Soviet Union..
The Jewish people faces the great task of preserving its own nationality,
and to this end a page part of the Jewish population must be transformed
into an economically stable, agriculturally compact group, which should
number at least hundreds of thousands. Only under such conditions can the
Jewish masses hope for the further existence of their nationality."
In March 1928
a decree was published reserving the district for the settlement of Jews
who would work the land:
Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 22
"The decree banned agricultural
settlement by non-Jews and states that if Jewish settlement were successful,
"a Jewish national administrative - territorial entity" might be set up.
This idea was realised in 1934, when the district was designated as the
Jewish Autonomous Region, (JAR)
with Birobidzhan as its capital city."
were provided to move impoverished Jews to the JAR. Even those who had
been declared as Anon-labourers" were allowed to have electoral rights
in the JAR if they engaged in productive work. (Cited Weinberg Ibid; p.
24). But no doubt, conditions were hard, and were not helped by a serious
flood in 1928 and 1932, and Soviet reporters criticised the lack of preparations
for the settlers. So there was a yearly drop-out rate of about 50% in the
first few years. By 1931, the territory was however decreed to become an
autonomous administrative entity, and accordingly a broadening of the original
agricultural focus allowed more scope for settlers to stay if they were
not farmers. By 1939, only 23% (4,404 of 17,695) lived in the countryside
of the JAR. (Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 32.)
Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 23.
But the JAR grew as more Jews came . By World War II it’s capital Birobidzhan,
had a population numbered at 30,000, and the JAR was an important source
of cement, tin, bricks, paper products, and clothing. (Cited Weinberg Ibid;
A number of non-Jews went also
despite the original intention. In fact gentiles outnumbered Jews. By 1939
Jews were 18,000 of the 109,000 residents of the JAR. Seman
leading Jewish activist proclaimed:
"We do not set ourselves the
goal of establishing quickly a Jewish majority in the JAR; we are confident
that this will come about as a natural consequence of migration.. Our first
task is the expansion of and strengthening of socialist construction in
the JAR. Therefore we shall welcome assistance from abroad and non-Jewish
cadres as the most important and vital form of help".
It is not surprising
that foreign Jewish support was sought, including foreign emigration. Over
one thousand foreign Jews moved to the JAR by the mid-1930's. From 1935,
each foreign Jew who wanted to move to the JAR, had to pay KOMZET two hundred
dollars. The wholly bourgeois American Jewish
Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) (Later often known simply as the Joint)
and the Jewish Colonization Committee
Cited Weinberg Ibid; p. 43.
"Enthusiastic about the idea
of Soviet Jews working the land. In 1928 there were nearly 220,000 Jewish
farmers. By the mid 1930's the JDC had depended $13.8 million on other
agricultural work and an additional $10.3 million on other assistance."
Gitelman cites one of the American
leaders of the JDC, James
approvingly in an international report:
"Anti-Semitism in Russia is
a crime. The ghetto dwellers of Russia have been transformed into hardy
workers on farms and in factories. For us in the United States, there is
no Jewish problem in Russia".
By 1930 the drive
towards creating a socialist state, had both unified many of the former
minorities into a common struggle, and had created a higher purpose. "Accordingly
the Evsektii were abolished in 1930." (Gitelman Ibid; p. 8). But still
the JAR continued to attract world wide Jewish attention. Although certainly,
simultaneously many Zionists bitterly attacked it. However many cites throughout
the world organised committees of support that continued to donate both
monies and equipment and people. Prominent Jews the world over defended
the JAR. Lion
Feuchtwangler, the prominent Jewish writer,
"The Jewish Republic of Birobidzhan
is a reality".
In the context of the Soviet state,
hidden revisionists aiming to disrupt socialism sought ways of alienating
the world wide Jewish support. The secret security apparatus was controlled
by hidden revisionists such as Ezhov.
At this juncture correct tactics to the minorites was subverted. Thus at
this juncture, an anti-Jewish attack did take place. For example the leading
Jewish official Iosif
the former head of the Institute of Jewish Proletarian Culture in Kiev
- was arrested and charged with:
"Attempting to establish the
JAR as the center of Jewish culture in the Soviet Union." Weinberg Ibid;
But, since this
was precisely what had been intended for the JAR, such charges themselves
can be seen as provocative
Further anti-Soviet acts
the charges, both OZET and KOMZET were disbanded; and Semen Dimanshei was
executed. (Weinberg Ibid; p. 68).
virtually all the Yiddish schools in the JAR were closed barring only two.
But the institutional and legal foundations of the region were un-changed.
Nonetheless by 1939, the Jews accounted for only 16 % of the population(17,695
of about 109,000 inhabitants. Weinberg Ibid; p. 69.
war, while there was a temporary set-back for the hidden revisionists,
there was a resurgence
of Jewish immigration in the JAR. In 1948
Mikhail Kalinin continued his public support for the JAR:
"He stated in 1948 that he considered
the region a "Jewish national state" that will Aregenerate Soviet Jews
through creative toil".
following the war there was a revived Government sponsored support. Again
only Jewish immigration was allowed into the JAR. In 1946 a synagogue was
approved by the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults. In early 1946
Cited Weinberg Ibid, p. 72.
"Council of Ministers announced
a plan to stimulate the development of the region....... focused on the
building of industrial enterprise and the construction of new houses.....
the government also offered free transportation a and loans and other incentives
to those settlers who chose to till the land."
Again the international community
of Jews rallied to the JAR. Between 1945 and 1948 some 6 million rubles
worth of food and supplies were sent to the JAR from the USA alone. Albert
Einstein was one of the prominent supporters.
Cited Weinberg Ibid, p. 72.
The conventional wisdom is
"In 1948, Stalin launched a
murderous campaign to destroy all Jewish intellectual and cultural activity
throughout the Soviet Union. His ruthless attacks on "rootless cosmopolitanism"
and Abourgeois nationalists" culminated in early 1953 with the infamous
"Doctor’s Plot". .. A rumour circulated that the JAR barracks to house
the deported Jews were reportedly built, but Stalin’s death in 1953 prevented
the implementation of this sinister plan."
As even Gitelman
points out the ultimate
failure of Birobidzhan left
the reactionary alternative of a so-called "Homeland", of Israel-Palestine
, as was then being heavily promoted by the
- with no competition from a socialist alternative:
Cited Weinberg Ibid, p. 82.
"Even if the Project (Birobidzhan)
was not designed to fail, the fate of Soviet Jewry raise serious questions
about the viability of secular Jewishness outside a Jewish state..... The
attempt to create a Jewish Autonomous Region in the Soviet Far East remains
largely forgotten.. And Birobidzhan’s chief competitors, the Zionists have
Gitelman Ibid, p. 9.
It is no accident that a veneer
of "socialism" was adopted in the fledgling state of Israel.
Not only did it serve to better
harness the energies of immigrant Jews into the new state.
But it served to confuse those Jews
who had been previously drawn to the example of the JAR of Birobidzhan.
The JAR itself was conciously sabotaged
as a potential homeland for Jewish workers.
THE UNDERLYING OBJECTIVE
LOGIC FOR THE ZIONIST CALLS FOR " ANTI-ASSIMILATION" - WAS AN AID TO NAZI
The desire to be free of oppressions from pogroms is naturally understandable.
But could that desire lead to an alliance with forces of fascism that would
promote the worst pogrom known to us to date?
It is most "politically incorrect"
to say that it did.
Lenni Brenner clearly
illustrated this indeed occurred. He has described this well in the book:
"Zionism in the Age of Dictators".
The natural consequence of a
Zionist 'separatist’ mentality was described by Mussolini
as only being correctly understood by one
of the founders of Israel - a fellow "fascist" -
"The highest.. accolade was
from Mussolini who, in 1935, told David Prato, later to become chief
rabbi of Rome, that: For Zionism to succeed you need to have a Jewish state,
with a Jewish flag and a Jewish language. The person who really understands
that is your fascist, Jabotinsky."
As shown by Brenner, the Zionists across Europe were in fact, at best ambivalent
to fascist regimes, and informed many of the key Zionist colonists of Palestine
including the notorious Stern Gang. Brenner’s contentions inflame Zionists.
But the objective reality was that Zionist Jews turned their views and
thoughts towards, what was for them a "Zion", but which was in reality
the Arabic Palestine. Zionists had agreed that their current place of residence
was only a temporary historical stopping over.
Bar-Zohar, "Ben-Gurion-The Armed
Prophet", p. 46.
Cited by Brenner, Lenni in Chapter
10:"Zionist- revisionism and Italian Fascism; in: "Zionism
in the Age of Dictators"; 1983, Kent; ISBN (GB) 0-7099- 0628-5;
Web site of International Secretariat
of the War & Holocaust Tales Ancient Amateurs’ Association; (WHOTAAAN)
will now follow Brenner, and cite Brenner at great length, to illustrate
the objective logic of "Zionist separatism" versus "Assimilation" during
the Second World War, up to 1945.
the First Phase
the Zionist forces obstructed the anti-Nazi
and later on, they denied that the extermination
of the Jews was occurring.
in yet another phase, the highest echelons of the Zionists indicated that
they were prepared to "sacrifice" a substantial part of European
Jewry, as the Allies post-war would now accept the need for a seperate
Zionist sympathies were not primarily given
to the only potential forces - communism and
socialism - that could stop fascism. This
especially applied to German Jews:
When Hitler appeared to be gaining
ground in Germany, Jewish organisations led by their youth, did belatedly
try to counter the worst fascist atrocities:
"Religious Jewry turned to
its traditional defence organisation, the Centralverein, the Central Association
of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith; now, for the first time, the department
store owners, who had become a prime target for the attentions of the Nazi
brown-shirts, began to contribute to the CV’s efforts...younger members
of the CV pushed aside the old leadership and were able to get the CV ..
to subsidise the SDP’s anti-Nazi propaganda. After the DDP’s betrayal,
the SDP picked up approximately 60 per cent of the Jewish vote. Only 8
per cent went Communist."
"German Jewry was deeply loyal
to the Weimar Republic which had put an end to the discriminations of the
Wilhelmine era. Germany’s Jews, (0.9 per cent of the population) were generally
prosperous: 60 per cent were businessmen or professionals; the rest artisans
clerks, students, with only insubstantial numbers of industrial workers.
Most were for liberal capitalism with 64 per cent voting for the Deutsche
Demokratische Partei (DDP). About 28 per cent
voted for the moderate Sozialdemokratische
Partei Deutschlands (SPD). Only
4 per cent voted for the Kommunistische Partei
Deutschlands (KPD), and the rest were scattered
Lenni Brenner:" Zionism in the
Age of Dictators"; Chapter 3; "German Zionism & The collapse of the
Weimar Republic"; p. 27; or http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad3.html
On web; Ibid 1996;
Brenner Chapter 3; op Cit;
it has been pointed out by the Marxist-Leninists of the Communist
League, that the effective resistance
to the Nazis was sabotaged by the criminal sectarianism foisted upon the
KPD by the revisionists of the KPD and the revisionist leaders of the Communist
International led by Dimitrov. (Compass Issue 1996.)
points out that if both the SDP & the KPD did not organise effectively
against fascism - neither did the German Zionists:
"If the SDP and the KPD must
bear their full measure of guilt for Hitler's triumph, so too must the
Zionistische Vereinigung fur Deutschland (the Zionist
Federation of Germany-ZVfD).
Although conventional wisdom has always assumed that the Zionists, with
their dire view of anti-Semitism, warned the Jews of the Nazi menace, this
is in fact not true..... a diligent search of the pages of the Jeudische
Rundschau, the weekly organ of the ZVfD, will not reveal.. prophecies (foretelling
Hitler’s accession to power-Ed). When a Jew was killed several hundred
Jewish stores looted in a November 1923 hunger riot in Berlin, Kurt
Blumenfeld, the Secretary (later President) of the ZVfD, consciously
played down the incident:
'There would be a very cheap
and effective kind of reaction, and we ... decisively reject it. One could
incite deep anxiety among German Jewry. One could use the excitement to
enlist the vacillating. One could represent Palestine and Zionism as a
refuge for the homeless. We do not wish to do that. We do not wish to carry
off by demagoguery those who have stood apart from Jewish life out of indifference.
But we wish to make clear to them through [our] sincere conviction where
the basic error of Jewish galuth [exile] existence lies. We wish to awaken
their national self(awareness. We wish ... through patient and earnest
educational; work [to] prepare them to participate in the upbuilding of
From Brenner Ibid; Chapter
3; p. 29; also citing Stephen Poppel, Zionism in Germany' 1897-1933, p.119.
cites Stephen Poppel, author of "Zionism in Germany 1897-1933", to the
effect that until 1931 "Far from warning and defending the Jews, prominent
Zionists opposed anti-Nazi activity." The logic of the Zionists in Germany
was to agree with the Nazis that Jew and Gentile could not in fact co-exist:
"It had been the German Zionists
who had most fully elaborated the ideology of the World
Zionist Organization (WZO) before 1914
and in the 1920s they developed the argument to its logical conclusion:
Judaism in the Diaspora was hopeless. There was no possible defence against
anti-Semitism and there was no purpose in trying to develop Jewish cultural
and community institutions in Germany. The ZVfD turned away from the society
in which they lived. There were only two Zionist tasks: instilling nationalist
consciousness in as many Jews as would listen and training youths for occupations
useful in the economic development of Palestine. Anything else was useless
rigorous extent to which this type of logic was taken is instructive when
assessing the claims of present day Zionists proclaiming the Anecessity"
of the state of Israel in its current form. Thus In 1925 the
"total abstentionist" Jacob Klatzkin,
a co-editor of the "Encyclopedia Judaica"
"If we do not admit the rightfulness
of antisemitism, we deny the rightfulness of our own nationalism. If our
people is deserving and willing to live its own national life, then it
is an alien body thrust into the nations among whom it lives, an alien
body that insists on its own distinctive identity, reducing the domain
of their life. It is right, therefore, that they should fight against us
for their national integrity. Instead of establishing societies for defence
against the anti-Semites, who want to reduce our rights, we should establish
societies for defence against our friends who desire to defend our rights."
After the June
1930 elections in Saxony, where Nazis obtained 14.4 per cent of the vote:
"The Berlin Jewish community
put pressure on the ZVfD to join a Reichstag Election Committee in conjunction
with the CV and other assimilationists. But the ZVfD’s adherence was strictly
nominal; the assimilationists complained that the Zionists put barely any
time or money into it, and it dissolved immediately after the election...
Siegfried Moses, later Blumenfeld’s successor as head of the federation,
demonstrated the Zionists, indifference to the construction of a strenuous
"We have always believed the
defence against anti-Semitism to be a task which concerns all Jews and
have clearly stated the methods of which we approve and those which we
consider irrelevant or ineffective. But it is true that the defence against
anti-Semitism is not our main task, it does not concern us to the same
extent and is not of the same importance for us as is the work for Palestine
and, in a somewhat different sense, the work of the Jewish communities."
"Reactions Jewish Press to
Nazi Challenge", Leo Baeck Inst. Yr Bk, V (1960), p. 312; In Brenner; ibid;
It is not the
case that all Jews were so blind to the dangers. Obviously the position
of the Zionists was directly contrary to that section of the Jewish population
that had accepted and welcomed assimilation:
Jacob Agus, The Meaning of Jewish
History, vol. II, p. 425; cited Brenner; p. 30.
"The ZVfD leaders could never
effectively unite with the assimilationists on defence work. They were
total abstentionists politically, and they were volkists they did not believe
in the CV's fundamental premise that the Jews were Germans. Their concern
was that the Jews should emphasise their Jewishness. They reasoned that
if Jews started to consider themselves a separate national minority, and
stopped interfering in AAryan" affairs, it would be possible to get the
anti-Semites to tolerate them on a basis of a dignified’ coexistence. The
assimilationists would have none of this; to them the Zionist position
was just an echo of the Nazi line. There is no doubt that the assimilationists
But in the
face of the KPD sectarianism the best of the Jewish assimilationists had
no effective United Front to go to. Moreover, to their own youth, the Zionist
leadership preached fervent anti-communism, describing it in 1932 as
"red assimilation" (See
Donald Niewyk, The Jews in Weimar Germany, p. 30).
Brenner Chapter 3; op Cit Web
the Jewish bourgeoisie, such as Georg Kareski, a banker, disagreed
with the Zionists. In 1919 he founded the "Juedische Volkspartei".
But in 1930, he unsuccessfully stood for the Reichstag on a Catholic Centre
platform. He then set up the "Organisation of Jewish Centre Party Voters".
Even the left wing of the Jewish population was dominated by the idea of
"On the Zionist left the German
branch of the Poale Zion backed the incompetent leadership of the
SDP. Before 1914 the SDP refused to associate with Zionism, which it saw
as separating the Jews from other workers, and only those elements on the
far right of the SDP that supported German imperialism in Africa patronised
the Labour Zionists, whom they saw as fellow socialist colonisers. The
Socialist International only established friendly relations with Poale
Zion during and after the First World War, when the left-wing anti-colonialist
forces joined the Communist International. The Labour Zionists joined the
SDP with one central purpose: to gain support for Zionism."
after Hitler’s accession to power, the Jewish leaders did not organise
effectively. The Zionists position has been explained. However the assimilationists
also were tragically short sighted. They wished to not create waves to
draw attention to them. This is perhaps understandable. However the attitude
of actively identifying with the Nazi concept of "Volk" was also adopted
by sections of Zionism:
Brenner Chapter 3; p. 33;
op Cit; Or at:
"Gustav Krojanker, editor
at the Judischer Verlag, the oldest Zionist publishing house in Europe,
also saw the two movements’ common roots in volkist irrationalism, and
drew the conclusion that Zionists should look positively at the nationalist
aspects of Nazism. A benign approach toward their fellow volkists, he naively
reasoned, would perhaps bring forth an equivalent benevolence toward Zionism
on the part of the Nazis."
As far as Krojanker and many other Zionists were concerned, democracy’s
day was over. Harry Sacher, a Briton, one of the leaders of the
WZO in the period, explained Krojanker's theories in a review of Krojanker’s
book, "Zum Problem Ausutschen Nationalismus":
Brenner Ibid; p. 35-36; citing
Herbert Strauss, Jewish Reactions to the Rise of Anti-Semitism in Germany,
"For Zionists, Liberalism is
the enemy; it is also the enemy for Nazism; ergo, Zionism should have much
sympathy and understanding for Nazism, of which anti-Semitism is probably
a fleeting accident."
Jewry was not only confused about the nature of fascism, but often its
leaders took mis-guided steps to dissuade even any moderately active anti-Nazi
organisation, such as goods boycotts:
Harry Sacher, review of Gustav
Krojanker, Zum Problem des Neuen Deutschen Nationalismus, Jewish Review
(London, September 1932), p. 104; Cited By Brenner Ibid; p. 36.
"Certainly those Jewish groups
like the JWV, the Anti-Nazi League and the AJC were ineffectual,
but there were those in the Jewish community in America and Britain who
specifically opposed the very notion of a boycott. The American Jewish
Committee, the B’rnai B’rith (Sons of the Covenant) fraternal order
and the Board of Deputies of British Jews refused to back the boycott.
They feared that if the Jewish workers, and others as well, took it into
their heads to fight Hitler, perhaps they would stay in motion and come
after their own rich closer to home. These worthies confined themselves
to charity efforts for German Jewry and its refugees and prayed that Hitlerism
would not spread. The Agudas Yisrael (Union of Israel), the political arm
of the most extreme wing of traditional Orthodoxy, opposed the boycott
on religious grounds as well as their social conservativism. They claimed
that ever since the ancient Jewish kingdom was destroyed by the Romans,
the Talmud had forbidden Jews to revolt against Gentile authority in the
Diaspora; they interpreted the boycott as rebellion and therefore forbidden.
However, of all of the active Jewish opponents of the boycott idea, the
most important was the World Zionist Organisation (WZO). It not only bought
German wares; it sold them, and even sought out new customers for Hitler
and his industrialist backers. The WZO saw Hitler's victory in much the
same way as its German affiliate, the ZVfD: not primarily as a defeat for
all Jewry, but as positive proof of the bankruptcy of assimilationism and
liberalism. Their own hour was at hand. Zionists began to sound like tent-revivalists:
Hitler was history's flail to drive the stiff-necked Jews back to their
own kind and their own land. "
It is true that some were far more
aware, such as the American rabbi, Abraham Jacobson, who:
Lenni Brenner: "Zionism in the
Age of Dictators"; Chapter 6"The Jewish Anti-Nazi Boycott and the Zionist-Nazi
Trade agreement"; Op Cit p. 58;
or at: Web site for index, as
"Protested against this insane
idea, which was still quite widespread even as late as 1936: "How many
times have we heard the impious wish uttered in despair over the apathy
of American Jews to Zionism, that a Hitler descend upon them? Then they
would realize the need for Palestine!"
most of the leaders were drawn to the prospect
of using Nazism as a vehicle for the creation of a Zionist homeland - kicking
out the resident Palestinians.
Lenni Brenner: "Zionism in the
Age of Dictators"; Chapter 6"The Jewish Anti-Nazi Boycott and the Zionist-Nazi
Trade agreement"; p. 60; Op Cit; or at: Web site.
desire, was the vehicle by which the WZO
itself destroyed even the weak boycott of
Nazi German goods. They supported and then took over the 1933 independent
proposal of a Sam Cohen:
"The owner of Ha Note’a Ltd,
a Tel Aviv citrus export firm. Even under Chancellor Bruning the German
government had put a flight tax on capital leaving the country and Cohen
had proposed that Zionist emigres be allowed to avoid the tax by purchasing
goods in Germany which would later be turned back into cash after sale
in Palestine. Bruning had no interest in the idea, but in 1933 Cohen, on
his own, presented the plan again. The Nazis were already worried about
the effect even the spontaneous and lamentably organised boycott was having
on their balance of trade, and Heinrich Wolff, the German Consul
in Jerusalem, quickly grasped just how useful Cohen's proposition could
be. He wrote to his ministry:
"In this way it might be possible
to wage a successful campaign against the Jewish boycott of Germany. It
might be possible to make a breach in the wall.’
The Jews, he argued, would be put
in a quandary. Further boycott would be seen as imposing problems on emigrants
seeking to find new homes for themselves in Palestine or elsewhere. Because
of his location, Wolff was one of the first Germans to perceive the growing
importance of Palestine in the Jewish equation, and in June he wrote again
'Whereas in April and May the
Yishuv was waiting boycott instructions from the United States, it now
seems that the situation has been transformed. It is Palestine which now
gives the instructions... It is important to break the boycott first and
foremost in Palestine, and the effect will inevitably be felt on the main
front, in the United States.’
Brenner Chapter 6; p. 61; Op
or at Web Site.
contracts were soon signed that were then taken over by the WZO. Moreover
the WZO now used this lever to transfer monies out of Germany ear-marked
for buying land in then Palestine:
"In early May 1933 the Nazis
signed an agreement with Cohen for one million Reichmarks ($400,000) of
Jewish wealth to be shipped to Palestine in the form of farm machinery.
At this point the WZO intervened. The Depression had badly affected donations
and in March 1933 they had desperately cabled to their followers in America
pleading that if funds were not forthcoming immediately’ they were heading
for imminent financial collapse. Now Menachem Ussischkin, head of the Jewish
National Fund, got Cohen to arrange for the release of frozen JNF monies
in Germany via Ha Note’a. The
bait for the Nazis was that the cash was needed to buy land for the Jews
whom Hitler would be pushing out. Cohen also assured Heinrich Wolff that
he would operate: Behind the scenes, at a forthcoming Jewish conference
in London to weaken or defeat any boycott resolution’. Dr Fritz Reichert,
the Gestapo’s agent in Palestine, later wrote to his headquarters reminding
them of the affair:
'The London Boycott Conference
was torpedoed from Tel Aviv because the head of the Transfer in Palestine,
in close contact with the consulate in Jerusalem, sent cables to London.
Our main function here is to prevent, from Palestine, the unification of
world Jewry on a basis hostile to Germany... It is advisable to damage
the political and economic strength of Jewry by sowing dissension in its
Brenner Chapter 6; p.62; Op
or at Web Site.
But the WZO had
even grander aims than Sam Cohen. They saw an opportunity to draw enough
money and immigrants into Palestine to drown by weight of numbers the indigenous
and inconvenient Palestinian Arabs. The calculations involved the tacit
approval of the British. This was a plan woven by a self-proclaimed "Socialist-Zionist",
describes the secret calculation as "cold":
"Sam Cohen was soon superseded..
by Labour Zionist, Chaim Arlosoroff, the Political Secretary of the
Jewish Agency, the WZO’s Palestine centre. ..In 1932 he had concluded
that they had failed to attract enough immigrants to overcome the Arabs’
numbers and they were not drawing enough Jewish capital. Hitler in power
would mean war within ten years... Now.. he had the way for Zionism to
solve its difficulties: with Britain's agreement, they could get both the
immigrants and the capital needed through extending Cohen’s project. In
an article in the Rundschau .. he coldly explained that this could only
be done in complete co-operation with Berlin:
related the events of a meeting on 27 March
1943 between President Roosevelt, Anthony
others on the question of saving Bulgarian and other Jews. Eden said:
'Naturally, Germany cannot expose
herself to the risk of upsetting her currency and exchange balance in order
to meet the Jews, but a way out can be found to adjust these different
interests... It would be worth while, leaving all sentimentalities out
of the question, to reach such an agreement with Germany.
The self-styled "Socialist-Zionist"
then proposed the ultimate alliance, a deal between the Zionists, the Nazis,
the Fascists and the British Empire, to organise the evacuation of Jewry
'It could also be possible to
establish a company, with the participation of the German State and other
European, primarily British and Italian interests, which would slowly liquidate
the particular properties by issuing letters of credit... [and creating...
a guarantee fund."
Brenner Chapter 6; p. 62-63;
or at Web Site;
"We should move very cautiously
about offering to take all Jews out of a country like Bulgaria. If we do
that, then the Jews of the world will be wanting us to make similar offers
in Poland and Germany. Hitler might take us up on any such offer and there
simply are not enough ships and means of transportation in the world to
points out that according to Churchill,
the Arabs were no better than a backward people who eat nothing but camel
dung’. (Lenni Brenner: Chapter 24:"The Wartime Failure to Rescue";
p. 228; or at web: http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad24.html
Lenni Brenner: Chapter 24:"The
Wartime Failure to Rescue"; p. 228; Ibid; or at
As far as
the British were concerned they could control the Arabs better than they
might be able to control the Zionists. They temporarily therefore favoured
the Arabs. Most sections of the Zionists therefore saw merit in "currying
favour" with the British. They tried to consider the benefits of the war
"Their first thought was how
to turn the war to their advantage in Palestine. Yoav Gelber of the Yad
Vashem Institute (Israel’s Holocaust Institute-ed) gives a good account
of this view among the Labour Zionists in September 1939:
'The majority of the leaders
tended to Palestine and its problems as the touchstone of their attitude
towards the war. They were inclined to leave the front-line fighting as
such, if unconnected to Palestine, to the Jews of the Diaspora.'"
Lenni Brenner: Chapter 24:"The
Wartime Failure to Rescue"; p.229; ?Ibid; or at web:
fact there was very little attention to the plight of the European Jews
from the Jewish Agency Executive. Zionist leaders in the USA were also
not only unhelpful, but argued not
to assist even
with food packages as this relieved pressure
on the Nazis:
"Furthermore, the American
Zionist leadership campaigned against those Jews who were trying to aid
the stricken. Aryeh Tartakower, who was in charge of aid work for
the World Jewish Congress in America in 1940, has told some of the story:..:
'We received a call from the
American Government, from the State Department and they brought to our
attention that sending parcels to the Jews in Poland was not in the interests
of the Allies... The first one to tell us to stop immediately was Dr
Stephen Wise... He said: 'We must stop for the good of England."
Lenni Brenner: Chapter 24:"The
Wartime Failure to Rescue"; p. 229; Ibid;
The Zionist-Nazi Pact And Trade
In 1933, a Zionist-Nazi
Pact was announced.
This is a
little known -yet extraordinary event. It's lack of reporting must be compared
to the constant malignment of the USSR for the so-called
USSR-German pact was essential for the survival of the USSR against imperialist
machinations' and the USSR had tried repetitively before hand, to get a
united front against German fascism. The Western imperialists had refused
and had sabotaged even their own weak-kneed commitments to protecting the
sovereignity of several countries, that German Nazism blithely ignored
with no repercussions to itself. In fact the clear and obvious strategy
of the Western imperialists was to drive Germany against the USSR by so-called
"appeasement". (See articles by Communist League & Alliance elsewhere).
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact "spiked the guns of the imperialists", buying vital
time to move the industry East of the Urals and continue fevered preperation
for inevitable war.
Zionist-Nazi Pact was quite different - it was simply another instance
of how far Zionists were prepared to go to create a Zionist homeland in
allowed the Zionists to ship 3 million Reichmarks worth of Jewish wealth,
in the form of German export goods, to Palestine.
leaders of the WZO tried to prevent any serious discussion of this manouevre
"The Zionist-Nazi pact was announced
by the Nazis in time for the 18th Zionist Congress in August in Prague.
Hitler’s shadow completely dominated the Prague Congress. The WZO’s leaders
knew that the Nazis were interested in a deal and they determined to avoid
offending Germany by limiting discussion of the situation there to the
barest minimum. The regime as such was not condemned... No plan was proposed
to put pressure on the world body, nor was any specific action called for."
news, of the "Zionist-Nazi Pact", effectively discouraged adoption of an
anti-Nazi Boycott. To further facilitate and absolutely ensure this rejection
further, the case for the Boycott was actually presented by the fascist
Zionist Vladamir Jabotinsky, whose brown shirted troops, had thoroughly
alienated the Congress:
"The Zionist-Nazi pact became
public the day before a boycott resolution was to be debated, and it may
be speculated that the Nazis did this so as to discourage endorsement of
the boycott. The leader of the right-wing .. Vladimir Jabotinsky, presented
the boycott case.. Jabotinsky’s support for the boycott, and his opposition
to the pact, was dismissed as the raging of a terrorist opponent of the
democratically elected moderate leadership. His resolution was defeated
by a vote of 240 to 48."L.Brenner; WWW; Ibid; Chapter 6: "The Jewish Anti-Nazi
Boycott"; ibid; p.63; or at http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html
However when the Nazis publicised the pact, the floor of the Congress was
furious. The leaders of the WZO lied about their role:
"When the Nazis announced that
they had signed an agreement with the Zionists allowing German Jews to
ship three million Reichmarks’ worth of Jewish wealth to Palestine in the
form of German export goods.. pandemonium broke loose. The leadership..
tried to protect themselves by outright lying; the Labour leader, Berl
Locker, brazenly proclaimed: the executive of the World Zionist Organisation
had nothing to do with the negotiations which led to an agreement with
the German government’. No one believed this crude fabrication."
L.Brenner; WWW; Ibid; Chapter
6: "The Jewish Anti-Nazi Boycott"; p. 64;
L.Brenner; WWW; Ibid; Chapter
6: "The Jewish Anti-Nazi Boycott"; p.63; ibid;
or via web: See index page at:
or at http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html
The Zionist leaders
pretended the blame lay solely with a bank. But since
it was their bank,
this shallow pretence was clearly seen through:
"The Political Committee"..
leaders did not dare take official responsibility for the
Ha’avara’ or Transfer Agreement,
and pretended that it only bound Germany and
the formal signatory, the Anglo-Palestine Bank. But, since the bank was
their own bank, they only succeeded in making themselves look ridiculous..
The debate over the Zionist-Nazi pact continued angrily until 1935."
The financial trading associated with the Zionist-Nazi Pact was considerable,
and laid at least some of the basis for the colonisation of the Arab owned
Palestine. It did operate under Nazi rules, and it did have a top limit
of cash transfer. This meant that the richest fractions of the Jews transferred
monies (somehow) elsewhere. But the proportion sent purely for a Zionist
Palestine was critical at that time:
L.Brenner; WWW; Ibid; Chapter
6: p. 64; "The Jewish Anti-Nazi Boycott"; http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html
grew to become a substantial banking and trading house with 137 specialists
in its Jerusalem office .. in essence the agreement was always the same:
German Jews could put money into a bank inside Germany, which was then
used to buy exports which were sold outside Germany, usually but not exclusively
in Palestine. When the emigres finally arrived in Palestine, they would
receive payment for the goods that they had previously purchased after
they had finally been sold. ...its attraction to German Jews remained the
same: it was the least painful way of shipping Jewish wealth out of Germany.
However, the Nazis determined the rules, and they naturally got worse with
time; by 1938 the average user was losing at least 30 per cent and even
50 per cent of his money. Nevertheless, this was still three times, and
eventually five times, better than the losses endured by Jews whose money
went to any other destination. The top limit through the Ha’avara scheme
was 50,000 marks ($20,000 or ) per emigrant, which made the Ha’avara unattractive
to the richest Jews. Therefore only $40,419,000 went to Palestine via Ha’avara,
whereas $650 million went to the United States, $60 million to the United
Kingdom and other substantial sums elsewhere. Yet if, in terms of German
Jewry’s wealth, Ha’avara was by no means decisive, it was crucial to Zionism.
Some 60 per cent of all capital invested in Palestine between August 1933
and September 1939 was channelled through the agreement with the Nazis."
The rank and file of the Jewish
workers in many countries abhorred and organised against the Pact:
"The great majority of Jews
opposed the Ha’avara. It had no defenders outside the WZO, and trading
with the Nazis was not popular with many inside its own ranks. Protests
started pouring in while the Prague Congress was still in session. The
pact was extremely unpopular in Poland, where the Jews feared that if there
was no resistance to the anti-Semitism next door, their own Jew-haters
would start demanding that the Polish government imitate the Germans. In
America and Britain, each with a more or less democratic tradition, many
Zionists, including some of the leading names in the movement, opposed
it (like-ed) the prominent Cleveland rabbi, Abba Hille Silver."
the unconcern of the leaders of the WZO with the anti-Nazi attitudes of
many Jews continued even up to the 1935 Lucerne Congress. The leaders’
attitudes remained that Nazism assisted the formation of Israel:
"But by far the best example
of the leadership’s unwillingness to resist the Nazis was Weizmann’s
"The only dignified and really
effective reply to all that is being inflicted upon the Jews of Germany
is the edifice erected by our great and beautiful work in the Land of Israel...
Something is being created that will transform the woe we all suffer into
songs and legends for our grand-children.".... . . ..
(This cynicism was roundly condemned
by Jews in Britain and in the USA -Editor Alliance].......
L.Brenner; Ibid; Chapter 6:
"The Jewish Anti-Nazi Boycott"; ibid; p. 66;
or at: http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html
"Press criticism was immediate.
London’s 'World Jewry', then the best Zionist magazine in the English
language, excoriated their own World Congress:
'Dr Weizmann went as far as
to state that the only dignified reply the Jews could give was a renewed
effort for the upbuilding of Palestine. How terrifying the proclamation
of the Congress President must have sounded in the ears of Herren Hitler,
Streicher and Goebbels!"
In America the opposition to the
Ha’avara was particularly intense in the garment industry trade unions,
with their hundreds of thousands of Jewish workers. Most of the Jewish
labour leaders had always looked upon Zionism with contempt. Many of them
were from Russia and knew about the fateful Herzl-Plevhe meeting
and how their old enemy Zubatov had backed the Poale Zionists
against the Bund. As far as they were concerned the Ha’avara
was just Zionism up to its old tricks, and in December 1935 Baruch Charney
Vladeck, the Chairman of the Jewish Labor Committee, and himself an
ex-Bundist from Poland, debated Berl Locker, the organisational head of
the Palestinian Poale Zion, before an overflow crowd in New York. Locker
was compelled to take a defensive position, insisting that the agreement
was purely in the interest of the German Jews."
Brenner Ibid Chapter 6;
p. 71; 72; 73.
or at http://abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad.html
But some wanted
further manifestations of the 'apartheid" mentality of Herzl:
"If the majority of Jews did
oppose the Ha’avara as treason, there was one at least who was willing
to go on record as complaining that Weizmann and his friends were not going
far enough. Gustav Krojanker.. one of the leaders of the Hitachdut Olei
Germania (the German Immigrants Association in Palestine) in 1936 the association
published.. "The Transfer: A Vital Question of the Zionist Movement". To
him Zionism was stark calculation, nothing more, and he was more than willing
to draw the logical conclusions already inherent in the Zionist-Nazi pact.
He claimed to see Nazism and the opportunities it opened up for Zionism
in the authentic Herzlian manner: ... he perceived two political factors
--an organisation of the Jewish people on the one side, and the countries
concerned on the other. They were to be partners in a pact."
Brenner Ibid Chapter 6;
The WZO extended the agreements that busted the boycott to other countries
"In March 1936, Siegfried
Moses's negotiations had finally created the
International Trade and Investment Agency
in London to organise sales of German products directly in Britain itself.
The Nazis had to content themselves with the satisfaction of the further
demoralisation of the boycott forces, as fear of Jewish and general British
hostility to boycott--scabbing made it impossible for INTRIA to go so far
as to allow British currency to come directly into German hands. Instead,
the goods were bought in Germany for marks and their value was credited
to Jewish capitalists needing the Pounds sterling 1,000 entry fee required
of over-quota immigrants into Palestine. Zionist-Nazi trade relations continued
to develop in other spheres as well. In 1937 200,000 crates of the 'Golden
Oranges' were shipped to Germany, and 1/2 million more to the Low Countries
under the swastika flag.[(50)] Even after Kristallnacht --11 November
1938.. the manager of Ha’avara Ltd, Werner Felchenfeld, continued
to offer reduced rates to would-be users of Nazi boats."
Brenner Ibid Chapter 6;
The consequences of this episode were to assist the Nazis. As Eduard Benes
said to a later "remorseful" Nahum Goldmann at:
"At a dramatic meeting he had
with the Czech Foreign Minister, Eduard Benes, in 1935... had warned:
'Don’t you understand', he
shouted, 'that by reacting with nothing but half-hearted gestures, by failing
to arouse world public opinion and take vigorous action against the Germans,
the Jews are endangering their future and their human rights all over the
Brenner Ibid Chapter 6;
Molotov Warns Jews of the Killing
Squads But the Zionists Do Not.
the fervid anti-Stalin accusations of Arkady
the charge that the USSR was silent about the fate of the Jews behind the
Vaksberg has to assert this, given the shocking attempts of Western leaders
and leading Western Jewish individuals to silence the real news.
when it was that:
"The Western Jewish establishment
and the Allies discover that Hitler was systematically killing Jews? Reports
of slaughter in the Ukraine started reaching the Western press in October
It should be remembered that the USSR was then fighting for its’ very life.
Yet the Molotov Announcement explicitly
analysed the work of the Einsatzgruppen
(the Nazi killing squads, especially instructed
to kill Jews) in January 1942:
"The Soviets issued a detailed
report, the Molotov Announcement’ which analysed the workings of the Einsatzgruppen.
The memorandum was dismissed by the WZO in Palestine as Bolshevik propaganda."
It is instructive to follow in
historical time, what happens next, and the various delays introduced at
the highest levels of the self-appointed leaders of the international Jewish
It emerges that it was not until November (ie
let us be clear: Our
simple calculation is From January to November is 8
of the whole months of January & February - How many died in those
months?) - that an alarm was publicly given to the Jewish populations of
those area by organisations such as the World
Jewish Congress (WJC). These facts are
verified as Brenner makes clear in his text, by independent Jewish sources:
"In February 1942
the representative of the Joint Distribution
Committee in Hungary, held a press conference on his return to the USA
and relayed information from Hungarian officers about the massacre of 250,000
Jews in the Ukraine. In May 1942 the Bund sent a radio message to London
that 700,000 Jews had already been exterminated in Poland, and on 2 July
the BBC broadcast the essence of the report in Europe. The Polish government
in-exile used the Bund alarm in its own English-language press propaganda.
Yet on 7 July 1942, Yitzhak Gruenbaum, then leading the Jewish Agency’s
Vaad Hazalah (Rescue Committee), refused to believe similar accounts of
massacres in Lithuania, because the numbers of the estimated dead were
larger than the pre-war Jewish population in the country. On 15 August
Richard Lichtheim in Switzerland sent a report to Jerusalem, which was
based on German sources, about the scope and methods of extermination.
He received a reply, dated 28 September:
'Frankly I am not inclined
to accept everything in it literally... Just as one has to
learn by experience to accept incredible tales as indisputable facts, so
one has to learn by experience to distinguish
between reality --however harsh it may be-- and imagination
which has become distorted by justifiable fear."
Gruenbaum and his Rescue Committee
acknowledged that terrible things were going on, but he kept minimising
them as 'only’ pogroms. On 8 August Gerhart Riegner of the Geneva office
of the WJC obtained detailed accounts of the gassing programme from reliable
German sources, and he forwarded these to the WJC's London and New York
offices via British and American diplomats. The WJC in London received
the material, but Washington withheld the message from Rabbi Wise. On 28
August the British section of the WJC sent Wise another copy, and he called
the State Department and discovered that they had kept back the information.
They then asked him not to release the news to the public pending verification;
he agreed and said nothing until 24 November --88 days later-- when the
State Department finally confirmed the report. Only then did Wise make
a public announcement of a Nazi plan to exterminate all the Jews in their
grasp. On 2 December he wrote a letter to Dear Boss’, Franklin Roosevelt,
asking for an emergency meeting and informing him that:
'I have had cables and underground
advices for some months, telling of these things. I succeed, together with
the heads of other Jewish organisations, in keeping them out of the press."
Lenni Brenner: Chapter 24:"The
Wartime Failure to Rescue"; p.230-231. or at
The same delays
were engineered by the Jewish
Agency in Palestine that declared publicly
that the Nazis were exterminating Jews, ONLY
in November. Yet as Brenner shows, as early
as April leaders of the Agency had known this to be the case:
"On 17 April 1942, even before
the Bund broadcast, Moshe Shertok wrote General
Claude Auchinleck, the
commander of the Eighth Arm in North Africa. He was concerned with what
might happen to Palestine's Jews, if the Afrika Korps broke through Egypt:
'The destruction of the Jewish
race is fundamental tenet of the Nazi doctrine. The authoritative reports
recently published show that that policy is being carried out with a ruthlessness
which defies description... An even swifter destruction, it must be feared
would overtake the Jews of Palestine".
Lenni Brenner: Chapter 24; p.
232 :"The Wartime Failure to Rescue"; http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad24.html
Even after this the Jewish state in former Palestine remained the objective
for these Zionists, and both the numbers killed and the effects of the
Nazi killings were toned down:
"Dov Joseph, the acting director
of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, cautioned them against: APublishing
data exaggerating the number of Jewish victims, for if we announce that
millions of Jews have been slaughtered by the Nazis, we will justifiably
be asked where the millions of Jews are, for whom we claim that we shall
need to provide a home in Eretz Israel after the war ends."
Yoav Gelber tells us of the
immediate effect of Dov Josephs’ intervention:
‘Vociferous protests were therefore
toned down and instead, ways of responding more
'constructively, were sought."
Lenni Brenner: p.232; Chapter
24:"The Wartime Failure to Rescue"; http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad24.html
What sort of logic would
impel these types of behaviour?
These were not
"wicked"people, and they knew very well, what leaving the Jews of Europe
to Hitler meant. The abiding logic appears to have been that the higher
goal - that of
Zion in Palestine - meant hard present sacrifices.
Indeed one Zionist leader put explicit words on the lines of
"buying with blood" the right to Zionists
reply to pleas sent to him by a Jewish volunteer agent for Aguda, in Slovakia.
The story is told by the youth who later became famous for demanding of
the Allies that they bomb Auschwitz; and who was later to be known as
Rabbi Michael Dov-Ber Weissmandel.
1942 he twice contacted the Nazi agent for Eichmann - Dieter Wisliceny,
"How much money would be needed
for all the European Jews to be saved?.. in early 1943 word came... For
$2 million they could have all the Jews in Western Europe and the Balkans.
Weissmandel sent a courier to Switzerland to try to get the money from
the Jewish charities. Saly Mayer, a Zionist industrialist and the Joint
Distribution Committee representative in Zurich, refused.... The courier
who brought Mayer's reply had another.. from Nathan Schwalb, the HeChalutz
(The Pioneer Centre, in charge of training youth for the kibbutz movement
in Palestine- ed) representative in Switzerland. Weissmandel described
on the part of empowered and rich Western
Jewry had its’ reaction on both the left and the fascist right.
'There was another letter in
the envelope (saying).. 'We are writing to the group that they must constantly
have before them that in the end the Allies will win. After their victory
they will divide the world again between the nations... now, at the war’s
end, we must do everything so that Eretz Yisroel will become the state
of Israel, and important steps have already been taken in this direction....
all the Allied nations are spilling much of their blood, and if we do not
sacrifice any blood, by what right shall we merit coming before the bargaining
table when the nations and lands at the war’s end? Therefore it is silly,
even impudent, on our part to ask these nations who are spilling their
blood to permit their money into enemy countries in order to protect our
blood --for only with blood shall we get the land. But in respect to you,
my friends, atem taylu (escape to refuge-ed), and for this purpose I am
sending you money".
On the left,
sections of both the Trotskyite wing, and
the Marxist-Leninists - raised their voices and tried to propagate information
on the Jewish extermination.
On the Jewish
fascist right - the Irgun
launched rallies in the West aiming to raise
the public awareness of the need for action in the European theatre and
also they promoted armed struggle inside Palestine against the British.
the British - in this they were objectively with the aims of the
Zionists and would ultimately they would win them over. They were known
to be positively orientated towards fascism.
verdict is impossible to correct:
"Zionism had come full turn:
instead of Zionism being the hope of the Jews, their blood was to be the
political salvation of Zionism."
Lenni Brenner: p. 238; Chapter
24:"The Wartime Failure to Rescue"; http://www.abbc.com/aaargh/engl/zad/zad24.html
ESTABLISHING THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE
OF JEWS IN PALESTINE
Brenner notes the increasing
numbers of Jewish immigrants into Palestine were of necessity, "illegal"
immigrants since the British had theoretically placed embargoes on the
number of Jews entering Palestine, in order to placate the Arab Palestinian
inhabitants. Nonetheless the numbers of "illegals" were high:
"It is not known exactly how
many illegal immigrants were smuggled into Palestine before and during
the Second World War. Yehuda Bauer estimates that approximately 15,000
illegal immigrants entered in the years 1936-9.. He breaks down this number
to 5,300 brought in by Revisionist ships, 5,000 by the Labour Zionists
and 5,200 by private vessels...The British listed 20,180 as having arrived
prior to the end of the war. William Perl, the prime organiser of the Revisionist
effort, doubles that figure to more than 40,000.. Yehuda Slutzky gives
52,000 as having reached Palestine during the war, but this number includes
both legals and illegals."
points out that the Zionists claim credit for "saving European Jewry from
Hitler", by aiding them to Palestine.
But he also points out that
firstly they were bringing in specific, young "warriors" for a forthcoming
war with the British and with the Arab possessors of the land:
"At the time neither the revisionists
nor the WZO saw themselves as rescuing Jews per se; they were bringing
in specially selected settlers to Palestine. The Revisionists returned
to illegal immigration during the Arab revolt. The immigrants were mostly
Betarim brought in as reinforcements for the Irgun, which was engaged in
a terrorist campaign against the Arabs... All had been given weapon-training
earlier at their camp at the Revisionist estate at Kottingbrunn.. for..
the final battle against the British occupiers."
As Brenner says
the claims of an "unselfish rescue of all Jews irrespective of belief",
was "simply untrue":
"The 1947 statement of Otto
Seidmann, the former leader of the Viennese Betar, who wrote that:
"We had to save the lives of
Jews - be they Communists or capitalists, members of Hashomer Hatzair or
was simply untrue. Betarim were
always preferred over any other Zionists, right Zionists over left Zionists,
and any kind of Zionist over a non-Zionist."
Ibid; p. 222; or at:
When the WZO
also again began to sponsor illegal immigration, they held to the same
selection criteria for young future warriors. It is true they were more
circumspect than the Ultra-Zionists, but this was as they banked on future
"The revisionists were more
daring in organising the illegal immigration, because they did not care
what London thought. They had come to understand that they would have to
fight Britain, if they were ever to realise their Zionist state; the WZO,
however, still expected to get a Jewish state with the approval of the
British at another Versailles Conference after the Second World War. They
argued that Britain would only reward them if they accommodated to her
plans during the war, and London most definitely did not want more refugees
During this period, the British intention to divide and rule in the Middle
East - between the Arab land owners and the minority Zionist settlers is
graphically shown by Brenner, who cites the first military Governor of
Jerusalam, Sir Ronald Storrs,
from his memoirs as saying:
"The Zionist’s enterprise was
one that blessed him that gave as well as him that took, by forming for
England 'a little loyal Jewish Ulster"in a sea of potentially hostile Arabism".(Ronald
Storrs, Orientations, p. 405; cited Brenner). This was the spirit of the
Peel Commission’s proposal in July 1937 that Palestine be divided into
three parts. All of it would stay under British overlordship; Britain would
directly retain a strip from Jerusalem to Jaffa, and would hold Haifa for
ten years, after which it would be seconded to a Zionist statelet of two
pieces with a combined area the size of the English county of Norfolk.
The tiny Zionist entity would contain an enormous Arab minority, some of
whom the Commission contemplated moving to the Arab state which would get
the rest of the country."
The Goals of
the Zionists had been achieved by the end of the Second World War, even
though they had not wanted them to be attained in such horrific
circumstances. Nonetheless, some real and
new objective circumstances had been created by the end of the war. As
cited by Strizhov, former US Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles
Brenner Ibid; p. 95 Chapter
8; or at:
"When the Second World War broke
out, the chances for the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in the
Holy Land seemed indeed to have vanished. Yet, the forces that the war
had brought into being had a determining effect in arousing world public
opinion to the imperative need of finding a solution for the Palestinian
From the first days of the war, David
Ben-Gurion, one of
the Zionist leaders had noted:
Iurii Strizhov:" The Soviet
Position on the Establishment of the State of Israel"; In "Jews & Jewish
Life in Russia & The Soviet Union"; Editor: Yaacov Ro’i; London; 1995;
"The question that absorbed
us was Palestine’s future after the war. I was certain that we had to exert
ourselves to set up a Jewish State."
The new objective circumstances
can be summarised as:
Iurii Strizhov:" The Soviet
Position on the Establishment of the State of Israel"; In AJews & Jewish
Life in Russia & The Soviet Union"; Editor: Yaacov Ro’i; London; 1995;
1. A substantial Jewish immigrant
population in Palestine had taken place- many of them had been trained
It is in this context that the
relevance of the proposals put forward by the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee
- for an international Jewish Refuge - a socialist homeland - in the Crimea
become of relevance.
2. A world spotlight had been
trained on the inhumanity of anti-Semitism.
3. A new re-division of the
world’s territories was taking place following the war.
This was the
only possible, other "solution", (to the establishment of a Zionist state
of Israel) for the displaced remnants of European Jewry.
For the imperialists and for the Zionists, this would unacceptably strengthen
the state of the USSR.
It would require the joint efforts of the hidden revisionists within the
Soviet Union and the combined imperialist forces within the newly formed
United Nations to both:
a) destroy any plans for the
Socialist Jewish Autonomous Republic in the Crimea, and;
"LEGALISING" THE FORMATION OF THE
STATE OF ISRAEL BY THE UNITED NATIONS PARTITION & THE USSR RECOGNITION
b) to establish a pro-imperialist
semi-fascist state of Israel, in hitherto Arab Palestine.
At the early stages of the Comintern, the views of Lenin were still unchallenged
by the later revisionist opposition, who would finally succeed in hi-jacking
the Comintern, only by 1928.
Even when Stalin took over the
leadership of the CPSU(B), until 1925 his views were not easily ignored.
Matters within the Comintern, were however dominated by the
succeeding revisionist factions -
first of Zinoviev, and then those of Bukharin, and then by that of Dimitrov-Kuussinen-Manuilsky.
At the early stages then, policies
were in general correctly Marxist-Leninist. For instance, article (11f),
was passed at the Second
Congress of Comintern (still
attended by Lenin), that condemned the attempts of foreign imperialism
to establish the divisive "Jewish" state of Israel; in Arab Palestine.
"(11 f) It is essential constantly
to expose and to explain to the widest masses of the working people everywhere,
and particularly in the backward countries, the deception practiced by
the imperialist Powers with the help of the privileged classes in the oppressed
countries in creating ostensibly politically independent States which are
in reality completely dependent on them economically, financially, and
militarily. A glaring example of the deception practiced on the working
classes of an oppressed nation by the combined efforts of Entente imperialism
and the bourgeoisie of that same nations is offered by the Zionists’ venture
(And by Zionism as a whole, which under the pretense of creating a Jewish
state in Palestine in fact surrenders the Arab working people of Palestine,
where the Jewish workers form only a small minority to exploitation by
England). In present international circumstances there is no salvation
for dependent and weak nations except as an alliance of Soviet republics."
It must be asked
then, why Andrey
A. Gromyko, the UN representative of the USSR,
and the Soviet ambassador to the USA, voted
at the United Nations, to recognise the formation of the state of Israel
in 1947? While the European Communist Parties were being ideologically
re-educated by the Cominform, in the weakened state of the USSR it turned
out that Andrei Gromyko was appointed to the United Nations. Gromyko’s
later overt revisionism was clear. But at that time, he was not revealed
as a revisionist.
Theses 2nd Comintern Congress:
AThe National & Colonial Question A; Ed J.Degras; Vol 1; p.144.
Palestine Communist Party
had been agitating very publicly that there
should be no division of the territory of Palestine between Jewish immigrants
and the local indigenous Palestinians Arab population. However at the very
first session of the UN in San Francisco,
Gromyko voted for the division of Palestine
and the establishment of the state of Israel.
This policy went against the long history
of Marxist-Leninists, who had argued that Jews should be assimilated in
the country they lived, and should join the class struggle there.
The result was a temporary
victory for the revisionist faction inside the leading echelons of the
CPSU(B), led by Khrushchev.
one of the most well known historians of the Zionist movement puts it,
Gromyko was very much in the vanguard of the push for an independent Israel.
Even propelling the hesitant President
Truman and the USA into his wake:
"President Truman and his advisers
were firmly resolved not to give any lead to the United Nations but to
wait for the emergence of a consensus. Much to the surprise of the Zionists
the Soviet attitude was much more positive. This first became evident when
the Jewish Agency asked to be permitted (as a matter of simple justice’)
to appear at the UN on behalf of the Jewish people since the Arabs were
already represented there. They had the immediate support of the Soviet
delegation, and on May 15 Gromyko spoke not without sympathy about the
aspirations towards Palestine of a considerable part of the Jewish people,
of the calamities and sufferings they had undergone throughout the last
war, (which defy description’) and the grave conditions in which the masses
of the Jewish population found themselves after the war. He mentioned partition
as one of several possible solutions. This unexpected support continued
throughout 1947 and led later that year to the Soviet decision to vote
for partition. Traditionally the Soviet attitude to Zionism had been extremely
hostile, and since Moscow reverted to is earlier position not long after
the state of Israel came into being once can only conclude that the short-lived
rapprochement came exactly at the right moment for the Zionists. Without
it they would not have stood a chance... On 15 may 1947 the General Assembly
approved the establishment of a committee of eleven to investigate the
Palestine question to make proposals for a settlement...The UNSCOP committee
(United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) majority came out in favour
of partition.. And were published on 31 August 1947. Both the majority
and the minority reports were drafted by the same man - Dr Ralphe Bunche....
a hesitating President Truman gave his assent to the partition scheme on
9 October 1947... The vote was taken on 29 November and the motion carried
by 33 to 13.... The state of Israel came into being at a meeting of the
National Council at 4 pm on Friday 14 May 1948.. The first country to recognise
the new state was the USA.. Within the next few days the Soviet Union,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala Uruguay and other countries followed".
It is clear that Gromyko was also
fighting a propaganda war for an independent state of Israel based in Palestine,
inside the USSR. Clearly even members of the
Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee (see
below) such as Solomon
(or Shlomo) Mikhoels were
influenced by this, as related by Teller:
Laquer W; AA History of Zionism";
New York; 1976; p. 578; 582; 586.
"In a small and select group
the conversation turned to Gromyko’s speech on the Palestine question.
Actor-director Shlomo Mikhoels alluded to a passage in one of the Yiddish
classics by Mendel Mocher Sefarim in which a Jew ask a Russian peasant
to point him the way to the Land of Israel. "Gromyko", said Mikhoels in
exaltation, "is that good Gentile who shows us the way to the Land of Israel".
In order to be clear, we show this process below, citing both the primary
and the secondary source.
Teller, Judd T: "The Kremlin,
The Jews and the Middle East"; p.106; New York; 1957;
What seems to have happened is
apparent from recent detailed memorandums that reveal that the USSR first
did take a principled Marxist-Leninist line which was then subverted.
refugee problem after the war, obviously consisted of a huge Jewish
population. The USSR government was already aware of proposals that this
should be remedied by the formation of a state inside Germany:
"20 February 1945, the Third
European Division of the USSR People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
(NKID) sent a memorandum (from the Jewish Committee - dated 11.11.1944
- ed) to Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. G. Dekanozov.
It informed him that the Soviet Embassy in Italy had forwarded two letters
to the NKJD, one addressed to I. V. Stalin, the other to V. M. Molotov,
from the Rome-based Jewish Committee of the International Union of Emigrants
and Refugees. Enclosed with the letters was a proposal for creating an
independent Jewish state on German territory and a map of Germany where
the prospective state was delineated."
will be discussed later, proposals were also made by the progressive Soviet
Jews for the resolution of the problem in the Crimean republic of the
USSR. However by now, the Zionists had already made Palestine their
Strizhov I;:" The Soviet Position
on the Establishment of the State of Israel"; Op Cit; p.303
the objective reality of a larger settler population - whether illegally
arrived or not - inside Palestine was to be confronted by the remaining
Marxist-Leninists within the CPSU(B), by the correct insistence
that the mandate of Britain over Palestine should be lifted; and possibly
replaced by a Mandate responsible to the entire UN.
It was rightly
pointed out, by the CPSU(B) Marxist-Leninists, that the British had "failed"
to peacefully resolve the situation.
This was articulated on 27 July 1945 in a memo signed by
his post as, Chairman of the "Committee on Preparing Peace Treaties
and the Postwar Order". Although Litvinov was at best a vacillating
Marxist-Leninist, and at worst a concious enemy of the USSR state [as several
sources can attest to] - nonetheless the key memo itself had been set up
by the diplomats within the USSR People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
"Sent a memorandum entitled
'The Palestine Question'"
to Stalin, Molotov and the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Its conclusion
1. No matter how hard the British
may try to prove that their present policy in Palestine conforms to the
it is obvious that they have failed to live up to the mandate entrusted
to them. This was admitted in the.. statements by high-ranking British
statesmen. This is sufficient justification for taking the Palestine mandate
away from the British.
2.The Palestine question cannot
be duly settled without impinging upon the wishes and rights of Jews or
Arabs, or perhaps both. The British government is in equal measure subject
to the influence of the Arab states and world Jewry. Hence its difficulties
in choosing the correct means to settle the Palestine problem.
3. The US government is subject
to the same influences. While British Palestine policy is necessarily affected
mainly by orientation towards Arab interests, the American government is
subject in the first place to the influence of the powerful US Jewry. It
should be recalled that at the latest presidential elections both the Democratic
and the Republican parties felt compelled to issue declarations on their
attitude to Palestine, demanding unrestricted immigration of Jews and unrestricted
rights for Jews to their own land. At the same time, the US government
would hardly choose to quarrel with the Arabs, in view of the fact that
the oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia in which they have a stake will run
through hundreds of kilometres of Arab territory. That would put the US
government in as difficult a position regarding Palestine as the British
4. The USSR, free from either
Arab or Jewish influence, would be in a better position to tackle the Palestine
issue. This at least entitles it to request a temporary trusteeship over
Palestine until a more radical solution is found.
5. The British attach to Palestine,
which guards the approaches to the Suez Canal and has an outlet for Iraqi
oil on its territory, too much importance for us to expect them to consent
even to a temporary transfer of Palestine to the hands of another state,
particularly, the USSR.
6. In the event that the Soviet
request is rejected the following solution suggests itself: transfer of
Palestine to the collective trusteeship of three states - the USSR, USA
and Britain. These three powers will be able to take the requisite decisions
collectively, paying less tribute to the opinion of the Arab or the Jewish
population than either the American or British government acting on its
own would feel obliged to do.
7.The provisions of collective
trusteeship shall be bound neither by the Balfour Declaration nor by any
promises Britain has earlier given as the mandatary power, so that the
new collective administration could tackle the Palestine problem in all
fairness, in accordance with the interests of the entire population and
the new imperatives of political realities and general security."
Strizhov I;:" The Soviet Position
on the Establishment of the State of Israel"; Op Cit; p.304-305;
Citing 5.Arkhiv vneshnei politiki MID SSSR (AVP),fond
(f.) . 07,opis' (op.) 12a, papka (pk.) 42, delo
(d.) 6, pp. 36-8
This generally correct line,
given the new circumstances, continued to hold until May 1946.
By then the
British and the USA imperialists had continued the general policy of
divide and rule. They
had established the Anglo-American Committee,
which had alienated both Jews and Arabs:
"In December 1945 an Anglo-American
Committee was set up to investigate the situation in Palestine. It was
entrusted with a wide range of tasks connected with the Palestine problem
as a whole. The Committee’s report was made public in April 1946 and was
met with an outburst of violent recriminations throughout the Arab states
and with bitter disappointment on the part of the Jews".
The previous line of the USSR was brought up to date, in order to acknowledge
that the Anglo-American Committee had attempted to continue the British
imperialist mandate "jointly".
Strizhov I;:" The Soviet Position
on the Establishment of the State of Israel"; Op Cit; p.305
In the circumstances, the
correct Marxist-Leninist line was taken - to use the UN to "reveal the
aspirations" of the imperialists to "prevent the interference of other
countries" in settling the issue.
It was correctly stated (and consistent with previous Marxist-Leninist
views) that anti-racism and anti-Semitism was a reflection of larger forces
and could not be dealt with simply by creating a state - that anyway could
not "house" every one subject to racism.
it correctly noted that in the current situation unless the issue
was brought up, the British and USA would succeed in enforcing their will
- "our silence on the Palestine issue" .
approach however was to allow the Arabs to raise the question at the UN.
This was put in an up-dated memo to Dekanozov,
"A memorandum entitled 'The
Palestine Question', based on the results of the Litvinov Committee,
was compiled by the Middle East Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry
and on 15 May 1946 was sent to Dekanozov. It read: 'Attempts by Britain
and the US jointly to continue the British mandate outside the framework
of the UN reveal their aspiration to prevent the interference of other
countries in the settlement of the Palestine question until Palestine is
fully under the control of the US and Britain. Our silence on the Palestine
issue might be interpreted by the US, Britain, Arabs and Jews as the Soviet
Union’s partial approval of the proposals put forth by the committee. Bearing
this in mind and in view of the fact that official and unofficial representatives
of both Arab states and Jewish organizations are running to the Soviet
Union in order to have the Palestine problem settled it would be expedient
to set forth the Soviet point of view on the Palestine problem in two or
three articles to be published in the press. Later our diplomatic representatives
may refer to these articles in private conversations if they are approached
by Arab or Jewish representatives in connection with the Palestine question."
After this preamble, the most likely Marxist-Leninist position advisable,
was crystallised as being to reject the Anglo-American Committee’s position
as "incompetent" and to insist upon abrogation of the British mandate in
Strizhov I;; Op Cit; p.305 citing:
AVP, f. 06, op. 08, pk. 42, d. 694, pp. 2-4
"Presumably, our position on
the Palestine question should be as follows:
The best elements
of the Jewish immigrants into the Palestine lands, were the left wing
Poalei-Tsion (led by L.Levite and M.Erem)
and the Hashomer-Hatsair Workers Party (led by Y.Barzilai), had
participated in the Palestine-USSR
Friendship League. They were already in
contact with the Soviet Ambassador to Poland
1.The Anglo-American committee
set up to study the Palestine question without the participation of the
UN was not competent to discuss. ..and tackle the Palestine problem without
the participation of the parties directly concerned.
2.The Jewish question in Europe
cannot be solved through Jewish immigration to Palestine, inasmuch as only
complete eradication of racism and the democratization of European countries
can create normal conditions for the existence of the Jewish masses.
3.The British mandate in Palestine
should be abrogated since it is impeding a radical solution of the Palestine
question and jeopardizing security in the Middle East. All foreign troops
should be withdrawn from Palestine.
4. Palestine should be placed
under the trusteeship of the UN which within a certain period of time will
lay the groundwork for a sovereign and democratic Palestine. We must not
submit the Palestine question for consideration by the UN. It should be
raised by the Arab UN members themselves. We should only voice our opinion
and uphold it. It would be expedient to postpone the publication of articles
on the Palestine question until the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers
has completed its deliberations."
Strizhov I; Op Cit; p.305 citing:
AVP, f. 06, op. 08, pk. 42, d. 694, pp. 2-4
As he wrote to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
the Hasomer-Hatsair were in agreement with the principle of a federation
of an Arab-Jewish state with two national chambers. This differed from
the Poalei-Tsion. (Strizhov I; Op Cit; p.306).
The US Under-Secretary
of State Sumner Welles
now showed the USA policy response, which
was to accept the challenge of ensuring an imperialist led take-over of
the United Nations.
the British were persuaded to agree publicly to their failure:
"In mid-February 1947 the British
government officially admitted that since it was unable to find a solution
to the Palestine problem, it was going to ask the United Nations to recommend
Strizhov Op Cit; p.307; citing
Sumner Welles, We Need Not Fail (Boston:1948), p.41.
Even as late as 5 March 1947,
the Middle East Department of The USSR Foreign Ministry were pursuing a
correct Marxist-Leninist line.
memo entitled "The Palestine Problem" (October 1946-February 1947), which
based itself upon the previously cited points 2 and 3 of the May memo.
But more public
stands were shortly to be needed by the Soviet hidden revisionist representatives
to the UN. By 6 March the UN Soviet delegate Boris
Shtein had noted that although until then,
the UN had "refrained from formulating its stand on the Palestine question",
the fact that the discussion was now tabled would force a public stand
by the USSR.
This was an ideal opportunity
for the Soviets take the principled Marxist-Leninist line:
to demand the withdrawal of
British troops, the full independence for Palestine, and a full democratic
But since Arab-Jewish "contradictions"
would still exist, the resolution could only be exercised via a United
Nations "collective trusteeship" - specifically thereby rejecting a British
At least this would ensure the
possibility of real Soviet brakes upon the Zionist settlers and their wars
against the Arabs for land.
This line was indeed put,
or outlined, in the following internal memo to Vyshinsky:
"Up until now the USSR has refrained
from formulating its stand on the Palestine question. However, the upcoming
discussion of the issue by the UN impels us to formulate our position.
First of all, the USSR must come out resolutely for the abrogation of Britain’s
Palestine mandate. Britain has not coped with its responsibilities as the
mandatary power. Throughout the duration of the mandate... Britain has
not succeeded in establishing order in the country and preventing almost
un-intermittent bloodshed. Substituting British trusteeship for the mandate
is also out of the question. The change of signboard will not change anything.
What could be considered is collective trusteeship over Palestine by the
UN as an organization or by several nations (in effect, permanent Security
Council members). However, this possibility is excluded by the fact that
the population of the country, both Arabs and Jews, are mature enough for
independence. Neither Arabs nor Jews would agree to any trusteeship whatsoever
and want complete independence. The Soviet Union cannot but support the
demand for full independence for Palestine.. The withdrawal of British
troops from the country should be the first and obligatory precondition
for the independence of Palestine. Still, granting independence to Palestine
would not take the edge off Arab-Jewish contradictions in the country.
The Soviet Union cannot see any way of settling them other than by democratic
means. Thus, alongside independence, Palestine should obtain a democratic
statute ensuring full and genuine equality (civil, political and national)
for the population of Palestine as a whole. The statute is to be worked
out by the UN Organization, which is subsequently to become a guarantor
of its implementation. The fact that Britain has relegated the Palestine
question to the United Nations for discussion, enables the USSR for the
first time not only to voice its views on the issue but also to take an
active part in Palestine’s fate."
speech of 17 May 1947, made to the UN, he correctly pointed out, in
accordance with the general USSR line, that:
Strizhov I; Op Cit; Citing p.308;
AVP, f. 07, op. 12, pk. 42, d. 6, pp. 140-1.
"The mandate administration
established in Palestine in 1922 has not proved itself."
He even went on to note, that no single West European state had protected
the "elementary rights" of the Jewish people, and that "vast numbers" were
homeless and without subsistence. Again this was consistent with the line
Strizhov I; OP Cit; p.308.
then he radically departed from the
previously agreed line - of setting up a democratic Palestine with "full
and genuine equality for all the population of Palestine as a whole".
Instead Gromyko proposed a
Partition of Palestine, seemingly as a fall-back position, if a democratic
Palestine was not agreeable.
this unacceptable and revisionist line was designed to open the door on
an imperialist settlement of the Palestine question :
"Gromyko pointed out that neither
past history’ nor the conditions now obtaining in Palestine’ justified
a one-sided settlement of the Palestine question’ that ignored the legitimate
rights’ of both the Arab and Jewish populations. The Soviet delegation
had come to the conclusion that the legitimate interests of both the Jewish
and the Arab peoples of Palestine could be safeguarded only if an integral
Arab Jewish democratic state’ were established. If this variant proved
unattainable’ due to the deterioration of Arab-Jewish relations, then it
would be necessary to consider the second variant, which had gained currency
in Palestine: the partition of Palestine into two independent sovereign
states - one Jewish and one Arab."
It is not surprising,
that some Zionist observers were surprised by this line from someone
claiming to be the representative of the USSR, as the line was quite in
"contradiction to the explicitly anti-Zionist attitude":
Strizhov I;:Op Cit; p.309; 1zvestiia,
16 May 1947.
"Gromyko’s speech, an Israeli
diplomat commented many years later, 'was in complete contradiction to
the explicitly anti-Zionist attitude which both communist ideologists and
practical politicians had expressed repeatedly and consistently over several
decades.. therefore came as a great surprise".
On the 15 May
1947, UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee
On Palestine) was
established and it reported to the General Assembly on 13 October 1947.
Speaking in support of partition, the Soviet representative Tsarapkin:
Strizhov I;:Op Cit; p.309; Avigdor
Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem" (London, 1970), pp. 19-20.
"Pointed out that the Jews’
desire to create their own state was understandable, and it would be unjust
to deny the Jewish people the right to realize these aspirations. The creation
of a Jewish State has become a ripe and urgent issue’.Having supported
in principle the recommendations submitted by a majority in the special
committee’ for the partition of Palestine, he declared: If this session
of the General Assembly decides to establish a Jewish and an Arab state,
it would be a big stride forward in the settlement of the Palestine question
as a whole."
The final proposals were put to
the General Assembly after having been agreed to by the ad hoc committee
including the Soviet Ukrainian and Belorussian
Strizhov I;:" ASoviet Position";
Op Cit; p. 309-310; Pravda, 16th October 1947.
"On 25 November 1947 the ad
hoc committee adopted the proposal for the partition of Palestine into
two states, one Arab and one Jewish. The Soviet, Ukrainian and Belorussian
delegates all voted for the proposal. The Partition Plan was considered
and put to the vote at the General Assembly plenary sessions held between
26-29 November 1947. The session’s proceedings were marked by heated debate."
When on 26 November
1947, Gromyko addressed the plenary session, he defended Partition on the
grounds that it met the demands of the Jewish people, and he insisted that
the Soviet delegation had been insistent and quite un-ambiguous upon this
Strizhov I; "Soviet Position";
Ibid; p. 310.
"The resolution of the question
of Palestine on the basis of its partition into two independent states
will have great historic significance inasmuch as it meets the legitimate
demands of the Jewish people...In the opinion of the Soviet delegation,
the plan for the settlement in Palestine submitted by the committee and
stipulating that the Security Council is to be entrusted with its practical
implementation, fully coincides with the interests of maintaining and strengthening
international peace and the promotion of inter-state cooperation. Therefore
the Soviet delegation supports the recommendation for the partition of
Palestine. Unlike some other delegations, the Soviet delegation has from
the very outset taken a clear-cut and unambiguous stand upon this question
and is consistently upholding it. It will not engage in manoeuvring or
manipulations with votes as is regrettably the case at the Assembly, in
particular in connection with the debates on the Palestine issue."
On 29 November 1947 the General
Assembly adopted Resolution 181(11) on the partition of Palestine into
two states. This decision, endorsed the establishment of the State of Israel.
Strizhov I; Ibid; p. 310; vnethnaiapohuha
Soretskogo Sniuza (Moscow, 1948), pp. 244-2, 244-5.
Resolution 181(11) established in January 1948, a special UN commission
to "supervise" preparations for the creation of the Arab and the Jewish
this objectively supported the long term imperialist plans for the Middle
East, a certain myopia on the part of the imperialists prevented their
seeing immediately that they should be pleased.
"The work of the commission
generated acrimonious debate and differences in the UN Security Council
which was to ensure the implementation of the resolution. At the Security
Council meeting on 19 March 1948 the United States representative Warren
Austin submitted a proposal for convening the 2nd Special Session of the
General Assembly 'to establish UN trustee-ship over Palestine', claiming
that 'it is allegedly impossible to carry out the Palestine partition program..
.by peaceful means'. In reply, Soviet representative Gromyko declared that
the US stand had nothing in common with the General Assembly resolution
and that the Soviet Union could not agree with that position."
Strizhov I; "Soviet Position";
Ibid; p.310; Pravda, 21 March 1948.
Because of the
impasse, it was sponsored that the UN establish a
This had been the original Soviet intention
as shown by the above memos put to the Foreign Ministry.
therefore, it encountered opposition from the British who obstructed its’
work. On the floor of the UN, the US supported the British and argued that
it was not possible to perform the task of partition peacefully. But the
USA in turn was heatedly opposed by Gromyko who insisted that there should
be no such problem:
Gromyko expressly argued against these plans, and in effect, Gromyko
ensured that partition would occur with very likely, a quick
Israeli take-over of the whole of Palestine:
"On 30 March 1948 when two
US resolutions providing for an immediate truce between the Arabs and the
Jews and the convocation of a special General Assembly session to reconsider
the earlier decision on partition were submitted to the Security Council,
Gromyko criticized the US trusteeship plan, characterizing the partition
of Palestine as a just solution and insisting that US allegations about
the impossibility of effecting the partition by peaceful means were groundless.
He said the Palestine Commission should continue its work in order to carry
out the partition 'so long as the General Assembly decisions remained in
force'. " Strizhov I; "Soviet Position"; Ibid;
p.310-311; Pravda, 1 April 1948.
Now that in effect the damage had been done, the Soviet delegation promptly
abstained from the decision to convene a special General Assembly. But
at the General Assembly hearing on 20 April 1948, Gromyko again severely
attacked the USA and Britain for refusing to accept partition:
"They are out to torpedo the
partition decision and impose on the United Nations their decision on Palestine’s
future, prompted by the self-seeking interests of the US ruling circles..have
put forward new.. proposals to establish trusteeship over Palestine."
The rejection of the previously
"acceptable" UN trusteeship line, was now masked in high flown language
as expressed by Tsarapkin:
It is true that the certain perceptive USA diplomats probably correctly
and honestly, viewed the Partition as "un-workable".
memorandum of September 22 was entitled "Certain
Considerations Against Advocacy by the USA of the Majority Plan" and argued
against Partition as follows:
Strizhov I; "Soviet Position";
Ibid; p. 311; Izvestiia, 23 April 1948.
"In summary, Henderson’s main
points were that support of the majority plan would undermine US relations
withe the Arab and Moslem worlds; that the USA would be expected to make
a major contribution to the implementation of the Plan; that any plan for
partitioning Palestine was unworkable; that adoption of the plan would
not dispose of the Palestine problem; and finally that the proposals in
the plan Awere not based on any principle of an international character....
but in definite contravention of... the Charter of the UN as well as the
principles on which American Concepts of government are based."
But the real reason of the higher
politicians of the USA, was to enable the maximum possible land grabbing
by the Zionists.
Wilson E.M. "Decision On Palestine-How
the US Came to Recognise Israel"; Stanford;1979; p.117
the filibustering at the UN was going on, the Jewish settlers were feverishly
grabbing land and terrorising the Palestinians. This reality was referred
to, but in a veiled manner by Gromyko who in effect - again simply justified
the on-going practical "partition" as a "reality":
"At the 1st Committee Session
on 4 May 1948, Gromyko called on the General Assembly to admit that partition
was in fact being implemented. This, he said, was clear from a statement
made by a representative of the UN Secretariat, from reports of the Jewish
Agency and publications in the US and elsewhere. 'While the General Assembly
is engaged in discussions, the Jewish state will become a reality despite
the efforts of some UN members to create all kinds of obstacles', he asserted."
the discussions were ended by the practical establishment of the state
It was claimed by Pravda that
the USA had "suffered a fiasco":
"On 14 May 1948 the Special
Session of the UN General Assembly ended, for on that day the establishment
of the State of Israel was proclaimed in Tel Aviv. Pravda commented: ADevelopments
at the Special Session of the General Assembly showed that the US, on whose
initiative it had been convened, suffered a fiasco. The initial plans of
the US were frustrated. The US delegation did not even dare to put its
proposal for establishing a trusteeship regime over the whole of Palestine
to the vote. The General Assembly also rejected the British proposal for
a provisional regime for Palestine. This proposal, amounting to trusteeship
but presented in a disguised form, was criticized by the delegation of
the USSR and some other countries. In the course of the debate on the Palestine
issue, the USSR pursued a consistent policy, upholding the decision on
the partition of Palestine and exposing all scheming with respect to Palestine."
After the fait accompli, when "On 16 May 1948
Moshe Shertok (later Sharett),
Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government
of Israel, sent a cable to Molotov", asking for
official recognition it was granted:
"In a telegram to Shertok of
17 May 1948 Molotov replied:
Soon after, within a month later, on 26 June 1948, the appointments were
announced of P.1.
Ershov, as "USSR Envoy Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary in the State of Israel"; and of Mrs. Golda
Meyerson "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of the State of Israel in the USSR". (Strizhov I;:" ASoviet
Position"; Ibid; p. 313). On 7 September 1948 Golda Meyerson, was received
by Molotov in Moscow:
'This is to inform you that
the Government of the USSR has decided to extend official recognition to
the State of Israel and its Provisional Government. The Soviet Government
believes that the creation by the Jewish people of its sovereign state
will serve the cause of strengthening peace and security in Palestine and
the Middle East and expresses confidence that friendly relations between
the USSR and the State of Israel will develop successfully."
Strizhov I;:" 'Soviet Position";
Ibid; p. 313; Pravda, 18 May 1948.
"After presenting her credentials,
she said that her government had instructed her to take the first opportunity
to express to Molotov the gratitude of the people and Government of the
State of Israel for the help rendered by the Soviet Union in the United
Nations..... The Soviet Government, Molotov replied, regarded this as its
duty, all the more so in that it was fully in keeping with Soviet USSR
policy vis-a-vis other peoples'... Molotov pointed out that the State of
Israel was off to a good start and that there was a basis for the creation
of a viable state."
As only one of the outstanding issues (leaving aside the whole matter of
the Arab peoples’ response to this "legalised theft" of their lands) was
that of continued Jewish immigration, and from where this would come? Would
there be immigration from the USSR?
Strizhov I; "Soviet Position";
Ibid; p.314; AVP, f. 06, op. 10, pk. 46, d. 623, p.1.
It was asserted
by the diplomatic heads of the USSR that this would be from the "capitalist
countries" if at all, and not from the Soviet countries. This was the previous
Marxist-Leninist line of the Soviet Foreign Ministry until it was subverted
There are as
far as we know, no documents that show an approval of Gromyko’s step in
the partition of Palestine - a step that allowed the formation of a singular
state of Israel - by Stalin or the other minority Marxist-Leninists
of the Central Committee.
"On 15 September 1948, while
on a protocol visit to I. N. Bakulirt, head of the Middle East Department
of the USSR Foreign Ministry, Meyerson declared:
'The State of Israel will become
viable when its population increases several-fold".
Bakulin, like Deputy Foreign
Ministers V. A. Zorin and F. T. Guseev to whom Meyerson also paid her respects
on 15 and 17 September, respectively, made it clear that this immigration
would have to come solely from the capitalist countries and that Israel
could not even cope with all the repressed and persecuted Jews from these
Strizhov I; "Soviet Position";
Ibid; p.314;AVP, f 06, op. 10, pk. 46, d. 624, p.1.
This apparent volte-face by the USSR leaders of the international communist
movement, totally alienated the Palestinian communists who were left very
weakened. It has certainly assisted the alienation of the best of the Arab
militants from the Marxist-Leninist movement. In Gromyko’s own English
version of his memoirs, there is no discussion of this episode. (Gromyko
"Memoirs"; New York; 1989. )
Nor is there any discussion of this episode in the official "History of
Soviet Foreign Policy" edited by Gromyko himself, with another revisionist
(Gromyko A.A. & Ponomorev B.N. Ed:"Soviet
Foreign Policy; 1945-1980"; Vol II; Moscow; 1980). Nonetheless, Gromyko
does point out that a key member of the Soviet delegation to the UN was
another arch-revisionist - Dmitri Manuilsky:
"At San Francisco and later
at the first four sessions of the General Assembly and a number of other
international meetings up to 19563 the Soviet Ukrainian delegation was
invariably headed by Dmitri Zakharyevich Manuilsky, for whom I had the
is today raised that: "Stalin sabotaged the Palestinian struggle".
Gromyko "Memoirs" Ibid; p. 128.
explanations to supposedly "explain Stalin’s support of the formation of
Israel" are offered by non Marxist-Leninist sources.
Standard Non Marxist-Leninist
Explanations For "Stalin’s Support of Israel";
1. "Stalin wanted to alienate
the Arab Nations from the British"
Sudoplatov, amongst others, suggests it was deliberate ploy to undermine
"Clearly the intention was to
strengthen the Soviet stand in the Middle East and to undermine the British
influence among Arab states who objected to the Jewish state, by showing
their inability to stop the Jews."
It is also alleged
by Sudoplatov that Stalin said to Vetrov, who was Molotovs’ assistant &
later an Ambassador to Denmark:
Sudoplatov; op cit; p.292-293.
"Let’s agree to the establishment
of Israel. This will be a pain in the ass for the Arab states & will
make them turn their backs on the British. In the long run it will totally
undermine British influence in Egypt, Syria, Turkey and Iraq".
explanation, in an alleged quotation from Stalin (rather like the older
school of historians who state that in 1066 on a certain date and hour,
William had a vision after eating grapes and said that he dreamed of his
dynasty etc...) is buttressed by a "conversation with a confidential source",
who yet....... remains nameless.
Albert Axell, "Stalin’s War
Throughout the Eyes of His Commanders"; New York; 1997; p.296.
2. "Stalin wanted to justify
pre-emptively an attack upon Soviet Jewry":
He "Wanted to neutralize the
rumors about his changed course on the nationality policy... He felt that
he had a psychological and political alibi for future events (arrests exiles,
We reject these "explanations" as
self-evidently superficial, and again rather strained. But then what does
explain these events?
A MARXIST-LENINIST ARGUMENT
TO UNDERSTAND WHAT HAPPENED
We argue instead, that the
only logical answer is two-fold:
(1) Firstly, the USSR,
was not under Stalin’s full un-impeded control. Even following the victory
of the Great People’s Anti-Fascist War, revisionist influence within the
CPSU and in the leading echelons of the so called People’s Democracies
undermined Marxist-Leninist policies; Stalin and the Marxist-Leninists,
were in a minority in the Central Committee of the CPSU(B).
Secondly, that post
Second World War, Stalin and the USSR were in a position of a temporary
objective weakness with respect to the foreign imperialism of the USA.
Although epitomised by the "Atomic Gap", closing that gap still left the
USSR in an objectively weaker position than the USA.
PREMISE 1: Stalin And Marxists-Leninists
Were In A Minority
lines of evidence make clear that revisionists had gone underground in
order to continue subverting the Soviet Union, and outnumbered the honest
Marxist-Leninists. Even astute observers of the USSR like President
Harry S. Truman of the USA, who was a
deadly foe of Communism, observed that:
"Stalin was a prisoner of the
issues of Alliance have discussed the general analysis underpinning this
premise. In order to erect a facade behind which the revisionists could
operate, a cult of Stalin was built. As time goes by, more evidence supporting
this view emerges. We cite a participant in the Second World War:
Resis A: ’Stalin, the Politburo
& Onset of the Cold War. 1945-1946", no.701, Carl Beck papers, Pittsburgh
1988; p.9. Citing D.Yergin: the Shattered Peace."; Boston; 1977.;
"Konoplyanko, ex-KGB officer:
is true that the victory of the USSR in the Second World War gave the Marxist-Leninists
strength. This victory was gained, in spite of the enormous sabotage performed
from within the party and the army, both penetrated by traitors to the
Soviet Union. This is confirmed by interviews with several of Stalin’s
generals. For instance with General
"Author: General what puzzles
me is why would Stalin undercut himself, I mean weaken the army with the
pre-war purges? (Von Rauch says that of 6,000 of Stalin’s highest ranking
officers who were arrested on charge of treason, 1500 were executed."
"I would put the blame for Stalin’s
cult not so much on Stalin himself, but mostly on his environment - the
cult was launched from the top not from the bottom.. His toadies and bootlickers
competed in currying favour with him by praising him to the skies."
Shavrov: "The T-34 tank was
delivered to the army in 1939.. The weak points (were identified).. In
two months time after the tanks was sent back to the factory, the whole
research team on the T-34 was arrested.. Who gave the order? We don’t think
it was Stalin. Nobody knows for certain who was responsible. Was it treason?
Of course Hitler was interested in this.. I know another case.. The Lake
Khasan Battle against the Japanese army in 1938. When the Japanese struck
were about 200 miles away... That night and for a few more days, our regimental
commanders, divisional commandeers, and senior commanders were arrested.
At the very moment of the Japanese attack!.. Who did it? This question
is still un-answered."
A.Axell Ibid; p.20.
has a similar view of the degree of sabotage:
"In 1990, General Igor Sergeyev,
who was Deputy Commander-in-chief of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces disclosed
that 35,000 commanders’ were expelled from the Party and arrested in 1937-8.
Between 1932 and 1939, the army’s numerical strength actually decreased.
He said that experienced soldiers were replaced with hastily trained men’".
Similar is the testimony of the
Czech President Eduard Benes:
"The Czech President Eduard
Benes in his post war memoirs said that he learned in 1937 of the existence
of the anti-Stalin clique in the Red Army which had close contacts with
the Nazi officers.. Czech officials are said to have been shocked to learn
that their country’s’s military secrets hitherto known only to the Russians
through their mutual aid alliance, were also know to the German high Command.
The secrets they claimed were given to Berlin by
Marshall Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Some
corroboration came from G.E.R. Gedye, the Prague correspondent of the New
York Times, who cabled on 18 June that Atwo of the highest officials in
Prague" say that the they have 'definite knowledge that secret connection
between the German General Staff and certain high Russian generals have
existed since Rapallo."
response to this sabotage, within the Marxist-Leninist movement, both internally
and externally of the USSR, was to weld together a small group of solidly
Marxist-Leninist elements around him; to continue to pursue a correct line
both outside and within the USSR.
the approach led to the creation of the Cominform,
to pursue the task of ensuring Marxist-Leninist leadership in the Peoples’
Democracies. This occurred after a certain consolidation had taken place.
within the USSR, this policy led to among
other things, the creation of a Foreign Policy bureau to deal with the
post Second World War manipulations of imperialism. Stalin took the Politburo
function of foreign relations into his own hands, and he placed key tasks
in the safekeeping of a few chosen comrades, a "sextet"
of proven Marxist-Leninists upon whom Stalin could place trust:
"In the conduct of his postwar
foreign policies Stalin had no use for the ordinary type of foreign ministry..
he reserved all important decisions to himself.. For a number of years
the Politburo was practically eliminated; to Akeep some members away from
participation in the decision," a Asextet" was appointed to deal with international
as well as a number of other issues. Among the members of the small committee,
in addition to Stalin were Vyacheslev Molotov, Lavrenti Beria, Georgi Malenkov,
and until his death in 1948, Andrei Zhdanov."
Stalin attempted to place strategically important branches of the foreign
department directly under his own control:
Dallin D.J. "Soviet Foreign
Policy After Stalin"; Philadelphia 1961; p.3.
"No less important than the
sextets’ and septets’ was the large Foreign Department of the CC of the
CPSU, the existence of which was not publicly acknowledged.. It was divided
into sections by countries. The ties between these sections and the corresponding
offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were often very close. While
the official Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not always headed by a member
of the supreme Politburo-Presidium (For example neither Maxim Litvinov
or Andrei Vyshinsky was a member of the Politburo), the foreign department
of the CC was the organ of the "general" or "first" secretary.. This left
the ultimate power.. In the hand of the party’s leader."
Even then the
revisionists were too numerous to be kept entirely out of influential positions.
For example, Nikolai Voznosensky - who was a revisionist already
under suspicion but only later unmasked by Stalin, was added to the small
"sextet" group. It is extremely doubtful that this was "on Stalin’s suggestion"
as suggested by Dallin. As detailed elsewhere, Stalin had already realised
the nature of Voznosensky’s revisionism. (See For instance Issues Number
12 and 14 of Alliance.)
Dallin D.J. "Soviet Foreign
Policy After Stalin"; Philadelphia 1961; p.3.
But in fact
it was only later, in 1949 in fact to effect Voznosensky’s arrest and execution.
But wherever possible, Stalin ensured that the more steadfast and resolute
Marxist-Leninists took the leading and responsible roles. Zhdanov was in
the highest and most trusted category:
"In the early 1940's the Foreign
department of the CC was headed by Georgi Malenkov. Malenkov was succeeded
by Andrei Zhdanov, whose role was enhanced when the leadership of the dissolved
Comintern was incorporated into one of the departments of the CC.".. In
1944-45 under Zhdanov’s direction the Foreign Section of the CC carried
out the remarkable operation of dispatching to the respective countries
the leaders of the future governments of the satellites selected among
emigres in the Soviet Union. The foreign Ministry acquired growing importance
in the postwar era as the channel for relations with the communist parties
of the satellites."
Resis; Ibid; p. 4.
to ensure Marxist-Leninist control, Stalin removed
Ivan Maisky and Maxim Litvinov
from diplomatic functions in London and Washington.
But since all posts could not possibly be filled without recourse to skills
that the revisionists undoubtedly still retained, they were given a post
in heading two commissions - respectively the commission for state reparations
and the commission for postwar peace treaties. (Vladislav Zubok & Pleshakov,
Constantine "Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War-From Stalin to Khrushchev";
Cambridge Mass; 1996; p.28).
The two key
ambassador posts in the USA and England were filled initially by Molotov.
Litvinov in particular was suspected of secret contacts with the Western
ruling classes. This was confirmed when he met with the CBS correspondent
Richard C. Hottelet, and warned him to alert the West that "they
had to beware of Soviet ambitions for territory", saying:
"The outmoded concept of security
in terms of territory - the more you’ve got the safer you are".. No Western
concessions would satisfy the Soviet leadership."
It was fully
intended by Litvinov, that President Truman would be informed of
this conversation, and "in secret" he was so informed. However Soviet Security
was also aware of what had transpired. Within a month Litvinov was relieved
of his position. One year later Litvinov told Alexander Werth a
Western journalist in Moscow:
"That Russia could have cashed
in on the goodwill that it had accumulated during the war, but that Stalin
& Molotov did not believe that goodwill provided a lasting basis for
policy; they had therefore grabbed all they could while the going was good."
D.Holloway; Op Cit; p.167
In Summary, even
though the Bolshevik party, was penetrated by revisionists, Stalin tried
to ensure a personal control of the Ministry of Foreign affairs. However,
given the paucity of Marxist-Leninists in the leading echelons of the CPSU,
revisionists like Gromyko and Manuilsky, and Vosnoskensky were able to
slip into key positions like that at the UN.
Zubok & Pleshakov, Ibid
"If the West acceded to Soviet demands..
It would lead to the West being faced, after a more or less short time,
with the next series of demands."
D.Holloway; Op Cit; p.167
PREMISE 2: The Objectively Weak
Post-war Soviet Union
How can it be legitimately argued that the Soviet state was objectively
weak - even if only temporarily - over 1945-1948? After all the Soviet
Union had just in effect, been the decisive factor in liberating the world
from German and Japanese fascism. The heroic self-sacrifice of the USSR
and its peoples in the war had gained many admirers in the working classes
of the world. However, the Soviet people had been through an enormously
costly war, moreover one on its own land, and a new frightening technology
of the atomic bomb had been used.
(i) Human and Material Losses
of the USSR in the Second World War
the USA nor even the British had suffered the degree of destruction of
either the industry, or the human resources that the USSR had. Professor
John Erikson estimated in 1994, that the German invasion had led to 49
million solider and civilian deaths in Russia, far more than the previous
conservative estimate of 20-25 million. In addition there was a drastic
decline in Russian’ birth rate. (Cited by Axell A, Ibid; p. 177). The material
damage was huge also :
"In July 1944 the Emergency
State Commission headed by Niklai Svernik put a preliminary figure of damage
at 375 billion rubles, not including damages to a large portion of Ukraine,
Byelorussia, the Baltic countries, and the Finnish Karelia. The Maisky
Commission (Ivan Maisky was head of the Reparations Commission of the Soviet
Union-ed) assessed the overall damage Amust be no less than 700-800 billion
rubles... surpassing the national wealth of Germany or England.."
Stalin pointed out to US Senator Claude
Pepper on September 15th 1945, that (Cited
Resis p. 3 Ibid. From:FRUS 1945, Vol V 881-893; dated Sep 15th 1945) :
Zubok & Pleshakov; Ibid;
It is apparent
that a certain degree of war weariness was bound to affect decision making.
This affected the manner in which re-building the Soviet Union was approached.
"Our people are tired, they
couldn’t be induced to make war on anybody anymore".
(ii) The Post-Hiroshima Reality
As early as March 1942, the highest
echelons of Soviet government were aware of the activities in the West
towards the bomb. The secret British Maud
July 1941 had concluded that:
"It will be possible to make
an effective uranium bomb which, containing some 25 il of active material,
would be equivalent as regards destructive effect to 1,800 tons of T.N.T.;
and would also release a large quantity of radioactive substances which
would make places near to where the bomb exploded dangerous to human life
for a long period". D.Holloway:"Stalin and
the Bomb"; New Haven, 1994; p.79
of this were obtained by Anatolii
Gorskii (codename Vadim) the NKVD London
resident, and John Cairncross and Klaus
Fuchs and transmitted to Beria. (D.Holloway:"Stalin
and the Bomb"; New Haven, 1994; p82). Beria sent a memorandum to Stalin
and the State Defence Committee urging evaluation of this information.
(D.Holloway:"Stalin and the Bomb"; New Haven, 1994; p.84). Although
a USSR nuclear programme was undertaken soon, the reality was that the
decision itself was taken during the siege of Stalingrad. Consequently
initial progress was understandably slow.
The scientific advances made under the Manhattan Project in the
USA were also well known to the USSR. As the war proceeded, the imminent
defeat of the Germans raised the question of joint Allied intervention
against Japan. At Yalta,
the meeting took place between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, at which
plans for the post war period were drawn up. In the section entitled "Agreement
Regarding Japan", it was made clear that
after Germany’s surrender ("in two or three months time"), the USSR would
enter into war against Japan on condition that the USSR regained its rights
in the border zones with Japan, and was granted the Kurile Islands. In
full these conditions were that:
"1. The status quo in Outer
Mongolia (the Mongolian People’s Republic) shall
It was explicitly
noted that reference to Outer Mongolia would require the "concurrence of
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek."
But this was to be pursued by the USA President Roosevelt, and these claims
of the USSR were to Abe unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated."
But then, by the next meeting of the Allied leaders, at the Potsdam
Conference of July 1945, the USA had successfully
exploded a test device at Alamogordo on July 16th. In the interim Roosevelt
2. The former rights of Russia
violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored,
a) The southern part of Sakhalin
as well as the islands adjacent to it shall
be returned to the Soviet Union;
(b) The commercial port of Dairen
shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent
interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease
of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored;
(c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad
and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall
be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company,
it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union
shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kurile Islands shall
be handed over to the Soviet Union."
(February 11, 1945. "A Decade
of American Foreign Policy : Basic Documents, 1941-49; Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC: 1950. WWW: World War II Page WW II
Conferences Page; Avalon Home Page: William C. Fray & Lisa A. Spar.).
Zhukov relates how Stalin and Molotov
discussed the seemingly "casual" probing statement of the new USA President-
Harry Truman, to Stalin that the USA had a "new weapon of unusual destructive
Stalin and Molotov understood the implications of Truman’s remark.
"They’re raising the price,"
Stalin gave a laugh, "Let them.
We’ll have to.. speed up our work".
Holloway D; Ibid; p. 117.
The USA exploded the first
nuclear devices used in warfare - at Hiroshima on August 6th 1945 and Nagasaki
on August 9th 1945. At this stage, the USSR programme was still incomplete.
So the USA
possession of the atomic bomb was a potent threat, as both the American
and the Soviet state leaders understood. As
Yuli Khariton, a
scientist who became one of the Soviet creators of the bomb said (Zubok
& Pleshakov; Ibid; p.43):
"The Soviet Government interpreted
Hiroshima as atomic blackmail against USSR, as a threat to unleash a new
even more terrible and devastating war."
This assessment accords with that of the British Ambassador to the USSR,
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr who wrote to then
Foreign Secretary Eden:
"The victory over Germany had
made the Soviet leaders confident that national security was at last within
"Then plumb came the Atomic
bomb.. At a blow the balance which had seemed set and steady was rudely
shaken. Russia was baulked by the West when everything seemed to be within
her grasp. The three hundred divisions were shorn of much of their value."
Cited in D.Holloway:"Stalin
and the Bomb"; New Haven, 1994; p.154.
This atomic possession, grounded a new threatening approach of the USA.
This was manifested when Truman demanded the "right" of safe entry to any
world port they "needed for security". This threat, was specified in
Truman’s Navy Day Address
when he announced the so called 12 Principles
of operating for the USA state:
"On Navy Day October 27 1945,
President Harry S.Truman set forth his views ... Although the US was demobilizing
rapidly.. It would still retain the largest Navy. in the world, and one
of the largest air forces. It would retain the atomic bomb .. The US needed
this vast peacetime force not for territorial aggrandizement, because:
Outside the right to establish necessary bases for our own protection,
we look for nothing which belongs to any other power.’ A large military
force was also needed to uphold the peace & the twelve fundamentals
of US foreign policy.. Emphatically he said: "We shall refuse to recognise
any government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power."
bombing called into question the diplomatic gains won first at Yalta
and Potsdam by the USSR. The Japanese
had been on the verge of surrendering, and had posed by the time of Hiroshima
no significant military threat. Moreover the entry of the Soviets into
the Far Eastern theater of war, had been previously agreed at Yalta, between
if the USSR entered the theater, the USA was worried that concessions would
have to be made to it. Hiroshima was therefore both a pre-emptive strike
against the USSR presence in the Japanese-Pacific arena, and a threat for
the future post-war realpolitik’.
the Soviets entered the Far Eastern war there as they had promised, and
as they had been asked to by the USA previously. From August 9th at 00.10
am the Red Army attacked the Japanese in Manchuria. Thus the USA had not
fully achieved their goal of preventing the USSR entry into the Far eastern
(See Holloway; Ibid p. 128.).
comments, the Navy Day speech of Truman (see above) was an assertive
"Plainly coupled implicit threat
with explicit friendliness".
For the Soviet
Government, Molotov replied 10 days later in a speech to commemorate the
28th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. He stated that the imperialists
were "exploiting the atomic bomb in international affairs", and predicted
the USSR would have atomic energy also.(Resis Ibid, p. 6).
(Resis Ibid, p. 5).
out the continuing attempt to isolate the USSR in a renewed anti-Soviet
warned in a speech in Tashkent, that:
"Our country still finds itself
in capitalistic encirclement."
warned of the need to return to the task of "overtaking and surpassing
the economically most developed countries of Europe and the USA," in per-capita
industrial production in the near future. This required a strategic decision
regarding heavy or light industry. There was a division in the ranks of
even the Marxist-Leninists on this question. Malenkov and Voroshilov
explicitly pumped for heavy industry. Voroshilov in a speech in 1946, arguing
that anyone who called for a priority to light industry was a latter-day
"servitor of fascism". (Resis Ibid, p. 11). Yet
Zhdanov, only the previous day on Feb 6th had called for light industry
priority. He said:
Cited Resis Ibid, From Pravda,
p. 10, Feb 8, 1946.
"Because the people who over
the course of many years of war bore sacrifices and privations, legitimately
demanded that material and every-day living conditions should speedily
improve. All this is no trifle. The task of improving every-day living
conditions and material well-being of the masses, improving the production
of consumers’ goods, is a cause which must be defended, fought for, and
invested with the same Bolshevist enthusiasm with which we moved in solving
war tasks. The people will only thank us for this."
Clearly this difference of viewpoint, reflected a genuine debate
about the merits of the case, in which legitimate differences were being
pointed out in a key speech in February 9th 1946, preceding the elections
to the USSR Supreme Soviet, that although there had been an alliance of
"freedom loving states", including the USSR, UK, USA, the process of uneven
capitalist developments had continued unabated. Inevitably there would
be another war, although this would be some time off - some 15-20 years.
This could allow "special attention" to be "focused to expand the production
of consumer goods." (Resis Ibid, p. 16, Pravda February 10th, 1946).
also predicted that the next world war would be a war started between the
imperialists in order to re-divide the world.
That the rulers
of the USA were indeed in a bellicose and belligerent mood, is shown by
the manner in which Stalin’s speech was interpreted. The USA Charge
d’affaires, George Kennan in Moscow was
requested to analyze Stalin’s speech. Kennan wrote the infamous
in which he insisted that the USSR was preparing to go to war for expansion.
But this interpretation did not fit with either the speech of Stalin, or
the message being sent out consistently by the Soviets, as noted by later
independent historians such as Albert Resis.
of Moscow included the British Charge d’affaires in Moscow,
Frank Roberts. He
cabled to both London and Washington, that Moscow really did want peace
at this juncture. (Resis Ibid, p. 19. ). And Stalin’s actions fully corroborated
Resis points out the "conciliatory
deeds" of Stalin made in order to convey peaceful intent:
"In September 1945, despite
Soviet claims on Bear Island and Spitzbergen, Moscow had announced the
withdrawal of the Soviet Command from Norway without any quid pro quo and
before the Western Allies withdrew their troops. This action was followed
on April 6th 1946, when Moscow announced the withdrawal of the Soviet Command
from the Danish Island of Bornholm, leaving no Soviet troops in Scandinavia.
On the same day Moscow stated that it would complete evacuation of Soviet
troops from China by the end of April. Moscow also announced (or was compelled
to announce) that it would complete evacuation of all troops from Iran
within one-month and a half. On May 22, 1946, Moscow announced that Soviet
troops had been completely withdrawn from Manchuria, and on May 24 that
the evacuation of Soviet troops from Iran had been completed. At the Paris
Peace Conference the Soviet Union abandoned its request for a trusteeship
over Tripolitania in favour of its passing to Italian trusteeship under
United nations control."
The Breaking of the Atomic Monopoly
signals from the USSR assuring the imperialists of the USSR peaceful intentions
were in vain. The USSR was again being isolated. Therefore, on August 20th,
ten days after the bombing of Nagasaki, the State Defence Committee correctly
decreed that a special committee would:
"direct all work on the utilization
of the intra-atomic energy of uranium".
previously noted, the Special
Committee on the Atomic Bomb was headed by Lavrenti Beria.
It was set up by a special decree with extraordinary
powers, and reported directly to Stalin himself. This special body was
only dissolved by the Khrushchev revisionist controlled Politburo meeting
after Stalin’s death, in fact the same one that arrested Beria. Yet it
was this same Special Committee, that had succeeded in developing the bomb
for the USSR and closing the USA military superiority:
"Focusing all the country’s
forces on the solution of this complex problem called above all for the
establishment of a new state management body endowed with appropriate power.
Such a body, which was entrusted with practically unlimited authority,
was the Special Committee, headed by L. P. Beria (a member of State Defense
Committee and Vice Chairman of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars)
and was founded by the USSR State Defense Committee’s Resolution No. GOKO-9887
of 20 August 1945. The Committee was founded under the State Defense Committee,
but after the State Defense Committee was abolished in September 1945,
the Special Committee functioned as a body of USSR Council of People’s
Commissars (and after March 1946 as a body of the USSR Council of Ministers).
In reality, the Special Committee was an independent state control body
directly subordinate to Soviet leader J.V.Stalin. It functioned for almost
eight years until it was abolished in accordance with a CC CPSU Presidium
Resolution of 26 June 1953 at the same tumultuous meeting at which Beria
was arrested. Thus, the Special Committee’s activities covered a most important,
formative period of the Soviet atomic project, that is, the establishment
and growth of the USSR atomic-energy industry, the development and testing
of the first Soviet atomic bomb (in 1949) and early improved atomic bomb
designs, and the development and virtual completion of the first Soviet
hydrogen bomb (RDS-6), which was first tested in August 1953."
Cold War International History
Project; WWW: "Research Notes: the Russian Nuclear Project..the A-bomb
Effort, 1946" by G. A. Goncharov, N. I. Komov, A. S. Stepanov
But again it
was not possible to exclude fully the evident and known revisionists, such
the head of Gosplan,
let alone political waverers like Malenkov.
(Holloway D; Ibid; p. 134). Gosplan had apparently already expressed
disapproval of the Plan, at an earlier stage of the Soviet plans. (Holloway,
reference 78 note to p.86) . The industrial managers on the committee were
Vannikov, Zaveniagin and Pervukhin. Two scientists on the committee
were Khurchatov and Peter Kaptisa. In addition the NKVD representative
was General V.A.Mekhnev.
Beria reported to Stalin weekly on the progress.
The mandate of the Committee of necessity had to be broad, and encompassed
special dispensations for all matters related to the production of uranium:
Holloway D; Ibid; p. 129.
"Considering and resolving all
the most basic issues which arose in the course of the early Soviet atomic
project, the Special Committee was empowered to supervise all work on the
use of atomic energy of uranium:- the development of scientific research
in this sphere;- the broad use of geological surveys and the establishment
of a resource base for the USSR to obtain uranium...;- the organization
of industry to process uranium and to produce special equipment and materials
connected with the use of atomic energy; and the construction of atomic
energy facilities, and the development and production of an atomic bomb"
USSR atomic bomb followed the design of the USA bombs, and they were termed
the RDS systems. By August 1949, RDS-1 was successfully exploded:
"RDS-1 meant the analog of
the first U.S. plutonium-239 implosion type atomic bomb tested on 16 July
1945 in New Mexico (and of the U.S. atomic bomb exploded over Nagasaki
on 9 August 1945). This bomb was successfully tested in the USSR on 29
August 1949. RDS-2 signified the analog of the uranium-235 gun type bomb
exploded over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. This bomb passed a design verification
in the USSR, but was not tested. Later the abbreviation RDS-2 was used
to denote the improved plutonium-239 implosion type atomic bomb tested
in 1951. During the period through 1954 the USSR verified and tested three
more types of improved atomic bombs: RDS-3, RDS-4, and RDS-5."
of the USSR catch-up of the technological gap, surprised the USA imperialists.
The speed was no doubt, owed in part to successful Soviet espionage. However,
even authors hostile to Marxism-Leninism recognise the achievements of
Soviet science, and industry which had to overcome the appalling devastation
of Nazi invasion:
"The short duration and arrangement
of the parallel works became possible thanks to... intelligence materials
about the designs of the U.S. atomic bombs Fat Man and Little Boy, prototypes
of RDS-1 and RDS-2, Soviet atomic bombs, which the leaders of the USSR
atomic project decided in 1946 should be copied as closely as possible
from the American designs. It should be emphasized that the availability
of the intelligence materials could not substitute for independent experimental,
theoretical, and design verification of the Soviet atomic bombs which were
being prepared for testing. Owing to the extraordinary responsibility of
the leaders of and participants in the Soviet atomic project, RDS-1 was
tested only after thorough confirmation of the available information and
a full cycle of experimental, theoretical, and design studies whose level
corresponded to the maximum capabilities of that time." http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b8-9a38.htm
December 25th 1946 the first Soviet nuclear reactor started a controlled
chain reaction, the imminent likelihood of a tangible USSR atomic weapon
had become clear. This began to tilt the balance of power back into the
hands of the USSR.
was at this juncture that the Szalarsa
Poremba, First Cominform meeting was
held in September 1947.
exposed the French and Italian parties for revisionist tendencies, and
laid the planks for exposing Titoite revisionism (See Alliance 18). Previous
leaders of the ECCI such as Dimitrov, were deliberately excluded by Stalin.
There is only one rational explanation - that Stalin had become convinced
of their inability and sabotage, during the life of the previous Third
"As early as June 1946, Stalin
had spoken with Dimitrov and Tito about the need of establishing an Information
Bureau.. Rather than simply reviving the Comintern, on which Stalin heaped
a torrent of insults and abuse which caused Dimitrov to become alternately
pale and flushed with repressed anger"
The Continuing USSR Weakness
Following the Acquisition of the Bomb
Eugenio Reale :"Founding of
the Cominform", In M. M.Drachkovitch & Branko Lazitch (Eds):
"The Comintern.."; Stanford (USA); 1966; p. 257-60.
As we saw, the temporary military and political weakness of the USSR in
being able to counter the atomic intimidation of the USA, had partially
ended with the successful completion in August 1949, of the USSR atomic
bomb. But even then the sharpest imperialist observers of the USSR noted
military weaknesses. On just the atomic front the USA had already stockpiled
over a hundred atomic bombs by the time the USSR was successful in building
and exploding one. In fact, the Western imperialists remained confident
that the German Nazi invasion had left the USSR significantly weakened.
As the USA ambassador to the USSR, Admiral Alan G. Kirk, commented
at a meeting of U.S. ambassadors at Rome, March 22-24, 1950:
"There were certain weaknesses
in the Soviet Union which should be considered. The two basic shortages
in terms of raw materials were those of rubber and petroleum. It was generally
believed that there were no more large unexploited oil reserves available
to the Russians. The other important weakness was that of the transportation
system which in all respects, rail, highway, and water, was not highly
developed in a modern sense."
This was certainly
not an isolated view, despite the public shrill fear-mongering of the USSR,
that the Western Imperialists actively fanned.
Colonel Robert B. Landry,
Air Aide to President Truman in 1948, reported
the weakness of the Russian mobilisation capability when directed at the
FRUS 1950-, Volume III, p. 823.
"I was told at the G-2 [intelligence]
briefing that the Russians have dismantled hundreds of miles of railroads
in Germany and sent the rails and ties back to Russia. There remains, at
present time, so I was told, only a single track railroad running Eastward
out of the Berlin area and upon which the Russians must largely depend
for their logistical support. This same railroad line changes from a standard
gauge, going Eastward, to a Russian wide gauge in Poland, which further
complicates the problem of moving supplies and equipment forward".
As a recent commentator has pointed out, the highest levels of the US officialdom
knew very clearly how affected the USSR had been by the war:
Cited Frank Kofsky: "The War
Scare of 1948", London; 1993, 1995. pp. 293-94.
"In a memorandum to Secretary
of State Dean Acheson dated April 5, 1950, Willard L. Thorp, Assistant
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, offered his view of the Soviet
Union’s economic condition vis-a-vis the United States’s. Thorp wrote this
memorandum in response to a draft of NSC-68, the "State-Defense Staff Study,"
which high-level State Department officials like Thorp received on March
30, 1950. They were instructed to provide written comments on it prior
to the delivery of the final version of NSC-68 to President Truman set
for April 7, 1950. Thorp’s comments concerned the overall economic conditions
of the two countries and the amount each country devoted to military spending
in relation to its total expenditures. Disagreeing with the draft’s thesis
that Athe USSR is steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall
economic strength and that of the United States," Thorp stated:
That Stalin tried hard to remain
at peace with the Western imperialists was even accepted by A High Priest
of The Cold War Warrior Western Academics, John Lewis Gaddis:
"I do not feel that this position
is demonstrated, but rather the reverse.. that the gap is actually widening
in our favour."
He pointed out that the United States’s
economy increased twofold over the Soviet Union's economy in 1949. Steel
production in the U.S. outpaced steel production in the Soviet Union by
two million tons, and stockpiling of goods and production of oil far exceeded
Soviet amounts. Furthermore,
"if one compares the total economic
capacity [of the two countries]," Thorp writes, "the gap is so tremendous
that a slight and slow narrowing [on the part of the Soviets] would have
little meaning." As for Soviet military investment, Thorp opines: "I suspect
a larger portion of Soviet investment went into housing".
FRUS: 1950, Volume I, pp. 218-20.
Cited In an Internet exchange
dated October 1997, Upon a Controversy between Lloyd Gardner & John
Gaddis; See MA Thesis of Curt Cardwell.
"What is often forgotten about
Stalin is that he wanted, in his way, to remain 'friends' with the Americans
and the British: his objective was to ensure the security of his regime
and the state he governed, not to bring about the long-awaited international
proletarian revolution; he hoped to do this by means short of war, and
preferably with Western cooperation."
Cold War historians, already cited above, have agreed with Gaddis’ view,
such as V. Mastny; and Zubok and Pleshakov.
John Lewis Gaddis: "Intelligence,
Espionage and Cold War Origins", DH, Spring 1989, 209.
It is now
necessary to detail the changing roles and leadership of the Soviet Security
apparatus, in order to then correctly interpret the events of the so called
Zionist Plot and the Doctors Plot. This forms the next section
of this article.
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4 OF THIS ARTICLE
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of Contents ALLIANCE Number 30