This Material was FIRST PUBLISHED by:
COMPASS - Journal of The
COMMUNIST LEAGUE (UK)
No. 88a, August 1990.
Then was re-printed by ALLIANCE MARXIST-LENINIST
as a part of:
ALLIANCE ISSUE
Number 2; "The Gulf War - The USA Imperialists Bid To Recapture World Supremacy";
April 1992; First placed on web October 2001.
Continuation of Alliance Issue Number 2 (For Table of Contents and
First Part got : Alliance 2)
THE INVASION OF KUWAITCOMPASS
(Journal of the Communist League) No. 88a, August 1990.
In May 1990 Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil from an oilfield on the
Iraqi-Kuwait border, for which he demanded compensation of $2.4 billion.
('Sunday Times', 5 August 1990; p. 9).
Then, in July, Saddam accused Kuwait and other Gulf
States of deliberately depressing the price of oil and of breaking OPEC
quota agreements at a cost to Iraq of $14 billion.
('Sunday Times', ibid.; p. 9).
Kuwait rejected the charges.
ON 2 AUGUST 1990 (at 2 a.m. local time) IRAQI TROOPS EQUIPPED WITH
TANKS AND HEAVY ARTILLERY INVADED KUWAIT.
The Iraqi force of 100,000 dwarfed the Kuwaiti army
of 20,000 AND OCCUPIED THE COUNTRY WITHIN A FEW HOURS.
Kuwait has an area of 18,000 square miles and a population
of 1.7 million, 60% of whom are non-Kuwaitis. The currency is the Kuwaiti
dinar.
A British protectorate from 1899, its boundaries
were arbitarily drawn by the British imperialists in 1922. In June 1961,
however, Britain recognised the country's independence. Six days later
Iraq claimed the territory of Kuwait on the dubious grounds that it had
once a part of the same province of the Ottoman Empire as Iraq. Thousands
of British troops were sent at once to prevent any annexation of Kuwait
by Iraq. In August the British troops were replaced by an Arab League force,
and the withdrawal of the British troops was completed by October.
In September 1963 Iraq received a (Pounds Sterling
PS) PS30 million loan from Kuwait, and in October recognised Kuwait's independence:
"Kuwait . . purchased Iraqi recognition".
('Guardian', 3 August 1990; p. 2).
The ruler of Kuwait was the Emir, Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad
al-Jabir al-Sabah, who succeeded to the throne in December 1971.
In August 1976 the Emir dissolved the National Assembly,
suspended four articles of the Constitution and imposed restrictions on
the press. The National Assembly was not allowed to meet again until March
1981.
In July 1986 the Emir again dissolved the National
Assembly and imposed restrictions on the press, announcing that henceforth
he would rule by decree. In August he dissolved the local councils.
Kuwait's wealth originally came from its oil, but
the revenue from this has been invested, mainly abroad, and Kuwait now
possesses
"an investmnent portfolio of about PS54 billion",
('Guardian', 3 August 1990; p. 3).
held mainly in Britain, Spain and the USA. As a result:
"Kuwait is now thought to receive about half its income from investments.
This, in fact, was a key reason why the Kuwaitis were happy not merely
to accept, but to contrive, the low oil prices which exasperated President
Saddam Hussein. What Kuwait lost in petroleum revenues it gained in share
earnings".
('Guardian', 4 August 1990; p. 6).
A few crumbs from these immense earnings have been passed
to the ordinary people:
"The oil riches are divided among the people to varying degrees. Certainly,
the rulers have the palaces and the Cadillacs, the pomp and the worldly
pleasures, but the people have lives of affluence undreamt of by their
fathers.
Kuwait itself, with the highest per capita income in the world, tile
absence of any form of tax, and such perks as free health care (including
overseas consultation) and education up to foreign university level, was
a prime example of how the system operated".
('The Independent on Sunday', 5 August 1990; p. 17).
Despite this very limited sharing of wealth, the Arab
peoples have little sympathy for the fate of the ruling Sabah dynasty in
Kuwait:
"While the rulers may feel deeply about the fate of the Sabah familv,
the people do not".
('The Independent on Sunday', 5 August 1990; p. 17).
On 3 August Iraq announced that it would start to withdraw
its forces from Kuwait on 5 August, a promise which was greeted with scepticism
abroad.
In fact, a puppet 'Provisional Free Government
of Kuwait' was installed in Kuwait by the Iraqi occupiers, Kitwaiti
sources claiming that
"all nine members of the 'provisional government' were Iraqis".
('The Independent on Sunday', 5 August 1990; p. 1).
A 'popular army' was also set up comprised, according
to Kuwaiti sources, of
"Iraqi citizens".
('Guardian', 6 August 1990; p.3).
"The popular army will be made up of Iraqi soldiers without their shoulder
flashes".
('The Independent on Sunday', 5 August 1990; p. 17).
At the 'request' of this puppet government, on 8 August
IRAQ FORMALLY ANNEXED KUWAIT.
On 2 August the United States, Britain and France froze
Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, and the Soviet Union suspended arms deliveries
to Iraq.
('Financial Times', 3 August 1990; p. 1).
On 3 August the UN Security Council condemned the
Iraqi invasion, and the Soviet Union and the United States issued a joint
denunciation.
On 6 August the UN Security Council called on all
member states to impose an economic blockade upon Iraq and occupied Kuwait,
except for:
"medical or humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances,
foodstuffs". ('Guardian', 7 August 1990; p. 3).
On 9 August the UN Security Council unanimously declared
Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void.
('Guardian', 10 August 1990; p. 1).
The Counter-measures of US Imperialism
The Gulf regimes are extremely valuable sources of oil,
and therefore have always been regarded as of strategic importance to United
States imperialism. Since the Middle East regimes ceased to be dependent
upon British imperialism (an era which dates from the overthrow of the
Iraqi monarchy in 1958), the US imperialists have pursued a double
strategy in relation to the regimes in and near to the Gulf
area:
In the southern Gulf area,
where populations are relatively small and politically backward, a strategy
of backing up the corrupt autocratic sheikhdoms;
In the northern Gulf
area, where populations are relatively larger and more politically advanced,
a strategy of seeking to accentuate the contradictions between the states,
of backing one state against its rivals (e.g., over the whole post-Second
World War period, backing Israel against the Arab states; in the Gulf War
against Iran, backing Iraq against Iran).
The US intervention in the Iraq-Kuwait affair was, thus,
not a consequence, as President George Bush claimed, of 'principled
US opposition to aggression'. One has only to recall the recent aggressions
by the USA in Grenada, Nicaragua, Panama, and Libya -- to say nothing of
the connivance of the USA at Israeli aggression over forty years -- to
realise that this claim is blatant hypocrisy.
The real cause of the US opposition to the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait was that:
IT BREACHED THE US BALANCING
POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE POLICY OF PREVENTING ONE STATE FROM BECOMING
THE DOMINANT POWER IN THE REGION.
However, US military experts concluded that A MILITARY
OPERATION TO RETAKE KUWAIT WOULD BE IMPRACTICABLE:
"It is not conceivable for the US to launch a conventional ground war
to retake Kuwait". ('Guardian', 4 August 1990; p. 6).
"A counter-invasion of Kuwait is considered out of the question".
('Financial Times', 4-5 August 1990; p. 2).
The US hope, therefore, was that the sanctions approved
by the UN Security Council could be pressed to the point where they brought
about:
"An internal crisis in Iraq which will end with Saddam's removal from
power. The United States is striving to create a situation in which Saddam
Hussein cannot win, and in which, therefore, the relatively rational elements
in the Iraqi party and army will be under increasing pressure to depose
him".
('Guardian', 9 August 1990; p. 17).
To be effective, however, the cutting off of Iraq from
its oil markets required not merely a naval blockade of the Persian Gulf
to prevent the passage of tankers carrying Iraqi oil, but the closure of
the two pipelines carrying 90% of Iraqi oil:
1) through Turkey to the Turkish port of Dortyoi;
2) through Saudi Arabia to the Saudi port of Jeddah.
On 6 August the pipeline through Turkey was shut down
by the Iraqi government:
"due to marketing difficulties";
Financial Times', 7 August 1990; p. 2).
and the United States placed intense pressure upon Saudi
Arabia to shut down the other pipeline passing through its territory.
The Position of Saudi Arabia
Embracing 70% of the Arabian Peninsula with an area
of 849,000 square miles (larger than Belgium, Denmark, France, both Germanies,
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain combined),
Saudi Arabia has a population of 15.4 million. The world's largest exporter
of crude oil with the world's largest oil reserves, its oil production
97% of which comes from the state-owned 'Arabian American Oil Co.' (Aramco)
in 1980 was 251 million tonnes from 14 oilfields. Its currency is the
rial. The capital is Riyadh, with a population of 1.5 million.
Ruled dictatorially by the old and sick King
Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz, who came to the throne in May 1982. Saudi
Arabia has no legal political parties and elections are unknown. Its domestic
government is dominated by the royal family:
"5,000 princes fill virtually evey key position",
('Guardian', 10 August 1990; p. 2),
a royal family which is notorious for its:
"Corruption in business matters. Any foreigner who does business in
Saudi Arabia must have as a partner a native, preferably a member of the
royal family, who will do nothing but sign his name to papers and routinely
insist on a large percentage of any contract as a kickback". ('Sunday Times',
5 August 1990; p. 12).
Whereas the Iraqi armed forces have a strength of over
1 million, the Saudi armed forces, largely equipped by the USA and Britain,
have a strength of only 72,000, and the government has relied for its security
on US protection, to maintain which it has pursued a policy of subservience
to US imperialism:
"Saudi foreign policy consists largely of support for Washington in
the Middle East".
('Sunday Times', 5 August 1990; p. 12).
On its own Saudi Arabia would have been unable to resist
an Iraqi blitzkrieg, since
"the roads are excellent and ideal for tanks".
('Sunday Times', 5 August 1990; p. 1).
On 5 August Iraq pledged that it would not invade Saudi
Arabia only provided there was no interference in the pipeline through
Saudi Arabia, and in these circumstances Saudi Arabia felt unable to accede
to US pressure to shut down the pipeline:
In these circumstances, on 7 August, with the agreement
of the Saudi government, the US government ordered the immediate despatch
of 4,000 paratroopers to Saudi Arabia. Toosmall for serious defensive --
' much less offensive -- action, this symbolic force was intended to deter
Iraq from attacking Saudi Arabia -- and, it was hoped, to encourage that
country to block the pipeline through its territory. These US troops were
the advance guard of a force intended to reach 50,000:
"The US deployments are expected eventually to number 50,000 troops".
('Guardian', 10 August 1990; p. 1).
and to be a multinational force. It was, however:
"a multinational force in name only".
(,'Financial Times', 9 August 1990; p. 2).
At the time of writing only the closest allies of the
United States have sent ground forces to participate in the US-sponsored
intervention force, and these contingents have been purely of a token character.
Apart from Saudi Arabia, the Arab states have maintained
an extremely lukewarm attitude towards the US-sponsored intervention and
have refused to participate in it:
"Although the Arab League on 3 August condemned Iraq for its invasion
of Kuwait, 7 of the 31 members abstained (Djibouti, Iraq. Jordan, Mauritania,
the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Sudan and Yemen)."
('Financial Times', 4-5 August 1990; p. 2).
"Iraq can perhaps find some comfort in the refusal of any Arab country
to follow Saudi Arabia's lead in joining the 'multinational force'. Observers
atttributed the reluctance to the considerable popularity which President
Saddam has undoubtedly earned among wide segments of Arab public opinion,
deeply hostile to the idea of Arab governments collaborating with the US".
('Guardian', 10 August 1990; p. 1).
noting that the US interventionist is:
". . a foreigner who, through his long-standing support for Israel,
is apt to be seen as the very embodiment of great power arrogance and oppression".
('Guardian', 10 August 1990; p. 2).
The former British Ambassador to Iraq, Sir John Moberly,
writes:
"The relative indifference to the long-drawn-out agony of the Occupied
Territories is contrasted with the rush of international activity and armed
forces movements where the territory of an oil-rich sheikhdom is concerned".
('Evening Standard', 10 August 1990; p. 3).
and there was general agreement that the US intervention
had increased the prestige of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein among the Arab
peoples:
"Since the US forces began pouring into Saudi Arabia, Arab public opinion
is moving in President Saddam's favour. . . .
Arab popular anger at the alliance between the US and the Gulf rich
seemed to be widespread and growing. It was most visible in two countries,
Jordan and Yemen". ('Guardian', 11 August 1990; p. 1).
It was in this situation that on 10 August a summit
meeting of Arab League was held in Cairo at the invitation of Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak. The meeting, attended by an Iraqi
delegation, was described by King Husein of Jordan as:
"The last chance to avert a slide towards war".
('Times', 9 August 1990; p. 3).
In fact, the aim of the pro-US Arab States was to use
the Summit to bring about THE DESPATCH OF AN ARAB FORCE TO BACK UP,
WHILE REMAINING SEPARATE FROM, THE US INTERVENTION FORCE.
Thus:
"Twelve of the twenty Arab League members voted to send a force to
protect Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and to demand an Iraqi withdrawal
from Kuwait. They also endorsed United Nations sanctions against Iraq.
. . .
Baghdad immediately denounced the Arab League plan as 'implementing
the American will'.
('Guardian', 11 August 1990; p. 1).
Iraq, Libya and the PLO voted against the resolution,
while the other states abstainied or were absent.
IRAQ IS A CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIP (although its
capitalism is not monopoly capitalism, not imperialism) AND ITS INVASION
OF KUWAIT WAS UNJUST.
But should military confrontation occur between Iraq
and the US-dominated fores of intervention -- which may well occur -- this
would not mean that the US forces were waging a just war.
The UN resolution on the invasion approved only economic
sanctions, not military action, against Iraq. But even if, under American
pressure, the Security Council were to authorise mititary action, this
would not make such a war just, any more than the endorsement. of the Korean
War by the Security Council, in the absence of the Soviet Union, made that
war just.
It is impossible for imperialist powers to wage a
just war of liberation. Indeed, President Bush has defined one of the US
aims as:
"The restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government",
('Independent' , 9 August 1990; 1). 1).
that is, not the liberation of the Kuwaiti people from
their reactionary, corrupt, dictatorial rulers but the RE-ESTABLISHMENT
OF THEIR RULE.
Today the principal enemy of the peoples of the world
is imperialism, and the justice or injustice of any war depends on whether
that war tends to weaken or strengthen world imperialism.
Marxism-Leninism determines the justice or injustice
of any war, not on the basis of who fired tile first shot,
but on whether the war effort of each belligerent tends to
WEAKEN OR STRENGTHEN WORLD IMPERIALISM.
ANY WAR BETWEEN A NON-IMPERIALIST STATE AND AN
IMPERhLIST STATE IS A JUST WAR ON THE PART OF THE NON-IMPERIALIST STATE
(because its war effort tends to weaken world imperialism);
AND AN UNJUST WAR ON THE PART OF THE IMPERIALIST
STATE (because its war effort tends to strengthen world imperialism).
Thus, despite the original unjust Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait:
A WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN IRAQ AND THE US-DOMINATED FORCES
OF INTERVENTION WOULD BE A JUST WAR ON THE
PART OF IRAQ -- A WAR WHICH SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE THROUGHOUT
THE WORLD -- AND AN UNJUST WAR ON THE PART
OF THE FORCES OF INTERVENTION -- A WAR WHICH SHOULD BE OPPOSED BY PROGRESSIVE
PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, WHO SHOULD URGE THE PEOPLES OF THE STATES
RANGED ON THIS SIDE OF THE CONFLICT TO TURN THEIR WEAPONS AGAINST THEIR
OWN RULERS.
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