ALLIANCE:
Number 36
JULY 2000
STALIN AND THE COMINTERN
(Paper Sent to Alliance July
2000 ; by Comrade N. S.)
FOREWORD:
Many Marxist-Leninists have long been aware of the position
of the Communist League (UK) and that of Alliance (North America) (ML)
- that the Comintern was hijacked by revisionists by 1928 onwards. Accordingly
the CL and Alliance have long advocated an original approach to the history
of the Comintern, and the lessons this history teaches militants the world
over. Comrades in many fraternal organisations - who work with us - have
at first found these positions difficult to grasp. This is not surprising,
as it has become a dogma in the Marxist-Leninist world that to reject Trotskyism
is to embrace the Comintern. But we have previously shown that to adopt
this mechanical position leads to the incorrect view, that Stalin was in
agreement with the Comintern's disastrous policies, towards fascism - for
isntance. In the past our combined work has been spread over several rather
detailed documents. Therefore we were pleased to recieve the specific article
here by Comrade NS. Comrade NS has brought together and amplified with
new documentation, the analysis showing the variance of Stalin's views
with those of the Comintern.
The October Socialist Revolution in 1917, the establishment of two opposing
systems, socialism and capitalism, together with the growing internationalization
of proletarian struggles, highlighted once more the necessity for effective
forms of mutual solidarity and co-ordination between the revolutionary
vanguards operating in different countries.
Hence, the setting up of the Third, Communist International, or Comintern,
in Moscow in 1919 - a new proletarian international , free from the opportunist
stands prevailing in the Second International, a new international that,
according to Lenin:
"Has began to implement the dictatorship of the proletariat."
V.I. Lenin, "The Third International and Its Place in
History
(15-4-19)", in Collected Works, vol. 29, Moscow, 1965,
p. 307. (Emphasis in the original).
Its recognition and the struggle to secure it were basic conditions for
membership. It was on Lenin's initiative that the Communist International
initially elaborated its revolutionary strategy and tactics as well as
its political and organizational principles, which soon became widespread
beyond Europe.
By acquiring vital significance for all the communist
parties, it could also exercise considerable social and political influence
in the international arena. As socialism was being consolidated in the
Soviet Union, the Comintern remained in existence until its dissolution
in 1943.
Seven congresses were held (the last taking place in 1935), and its highest
organ between congresses was the Executive Committee (ECCI) which convened
thirteen plenary sessions from 1922 to 1933. For some time, a relevant
and leading role in Comintern affairs was also played by Stalin,
elected in 1922 as secretary general of the RCP(B), later CPSU(B). His
active involvement began at the Fifth Comintern Congress in 1924, when
he was elected to the Executive Committee and its Presidium. But a striking
feature of Stalin's relationship with the Comintern lies in the fact that,
after a few years of intensive participation and engagement (his "Works"
are filled with speeches on Comintern and international affairs during
1924-25-26-27), Stalin ceased to participate in it from the late twenties
onwards. He remained absent during its congresses in 1928 and 1935, and
his official "Works" contain no
contribution to Comintern affairs after 1928.
Retrospectively - and also in the light of the fierce class struggle carried
out in the USSR both openly and behind the scenes - there is ample evidence
to prove that, from the late twenties until the early forties, Stalin and
the Marxist-Leninists had been removed from active leadership in the Comintern
by a dominating coalition of concealed revisionists who would later reveal
themselves as outright opponents of socialism. This revisionist majority,
with Stalin set aside, was therefore able to distort Marxism-Leninism -
firstly, during the early thirties, along pseudo-left, sectarian lines,
which were later revised along the path of right opportunism. This situation,
of course, contrasts with the stereotyped picture of Stalin as a bloody
tyrant, unchallenged and dominat over his own country and the Comintern.
Even bourgeois historians have now began to dispute the notion that by
the mid-thirties Stalin had imposed a totally monolithic control over the
international communist movement.
It is an historic fact that - prior to the establishment of Soviet revisionism
at the 20th Congress of the CPSU(B) in 1956 - some revisionist, criminally
wrong lines were implemented both within the Comintern and in the Soviet
Union. As Marxist-Leninists, it is certainly vital to recognise the incorrectness
of these policies and their failure. This is not for academic purposes.
It is vital for communists, in order to draw the necessary lessons and
incorporate them in today's revolutionary struggle for socialism.
Just to highlight Stalin's initial difficulties in the Comintern (Lenin
had withdrawn from active political life from December 1922), let us consider
the composition of the Russian delegation to the Executive Committee, elected
at the Fifth Congress in 1924. With the sole exception of Stalin, the other
members - including Zinoviev, Bukharin, Trotsky
- were all anti-socialist elements, whose factional activities emerged
at a later stage and some of them were then convicted of treason.
The members of the Russian delegation to the ECCI elected
by the Fifth Comintern Congress in 1924, were: Zinoviev (also the Comintern's
president), Bukharin, Stalin, Kamenev, Rykov; candidates: Sokolnikov, Trotsky,
Lozovsky, Piatnitsky. It was only in December 1926, that Zinoviev ceased
to be the Comintern's president, this office being replaced by a political
Secretariat.
Having gained influential positions from which they could sabotage socialism,
these revisionists could not - at first - openly oppose it. They would
have agreed with the last Soviet revisionist leader, Mikhail Gorbachev,
who has candidly admitted:
"My ambition was to liquidate communism, the dictatorship
over all the people. . . . I knew that I could only do this if I was the
leading functionary."
(Mikhail Gorbachev: In interview
with Turkish radio; quoted in NorthStar Compass, organ of the Organising
Committee for Friendship and Solidarity with Soviet People. Reproduced
in Lalkar, March/April, 2000; p.19.)
Their presence in the Comintern during the twenties, however, did not at
first prevent the successful elaboration of Marxist-Leninist policies,
mainly with regard to united front tactics and the defence of socialism
in the Soviet Union.
As a matter of fact, the proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union was
strengthened, despite the Trotskyist opposition had made damaging attempts
to deny the possibility of socialism being built in a single country. According
to Trotsky's infamous theory of the permanent revolution, only
the victory of the revolution on a world scale would
save proletarian rule
in the Soviet Union from "degeneration and decay". In
Trotsky's view the construction of
socialism in one country would give up the prospects
of the international revolution and neglect proletarian internationalism.
The most prominent role in defeating these perversions of Lenin's theory
on the subject was played by Stalin himself who, together with the other
delegations attending the Executive Committee Plenum in November/December
1926, recognised the fundamental necessity of the closest possible alliance
and solidarity between the USSR, the international revolutionary process
and the various liberation struggles. In no way did Stalin abandon the
cause of the revolution outside the USSR in upholding the principle that
socialism could be built in one country. Indeed, the victory of the October
Revolution represented, in Stalin's words, "the beginning of and the precondition
for the world revolution.":
"There can be no doubt that the
universal theory of a simultaneous victory of the revolution in the principal
countries of Europe, the theory that the victory of socialism in one country
is impossible, has proved to be an artificial and untenable theory. . .
. the victory of the revolution in one country, in the present case Russia,
is not only the product of the uneven development and progressive decay
of imperialism; it is at the same time the beginning of and the pre-condition
for the world revolution. . . . the unfolding of the world revolution will
be the more rapid and thorough, the more effective the assistance rendered
by the first socialist country to the workers and labouring masses of all
other countries. . . . not only does the October Revolution need support
from the revolution in other countries, but the revolution in those countries
needs the support of the October Revolution in order to accelerate and
advance the cause of overthrowing world imperialism."
Josef V. Stalin, "The October Revolution
and the Tactics of the Russian Communists"; (17-12-24), in Works,
Vol. 6, Moscow, 1947, pp. 414-5, 418, 420.
Accordingly, the Comintern characterised the Soviet Union as "the most
important fortress of the world revolution." (See
the Theses of the Seventh ECCI Plenum on the International Situation and
the Tasks of the Communist International (13-12-26), in Jane Degras, Ed.,
The Communist International: 1919-1943: Documents, vol. 2, London, 1971,
p. 323).
Also, during the twenties both Lenin and Stalin elaborated and supported
the so-called united front tactics in order to achieve the amplest
revolutionary unity of action by the workers. These policies were adopted
by the ECCI:
"The ECCI is of the opinion that
the slogan of the third world congress of the Communist International "To
the Masses", and the interests of the communist movement generally, require
the communist parties and the Communist International as a whole to support
the slogan of the united front of the workers and to take the initiative
in this matter. The tactics of each communist party must of course be worked
out concretely in relation to the conditions in each country."
Extracts from the Directives on
the United Front of the Workers and on the Attitude to Workers Belonging
to the Second, Two-and-a-half, and Amsterdam Internationals, and to Those
Who Support Anarcho-Syndacalist Organizations, Adopted by the ECCI (18-12-21),
in Jane Degras, Ed., The Communist International:1919-1943: Documents,
vol. 1, London, 1971, p. 311.
The Communist parties were meant to draw together the most diverse sections
of the working class around specific goals and on practical issues, such
as "questions concerning wages, hours, housing conditions, insurance, taxation,
unemployment, high cost of living, and so forth."
:
"The Social-Democrats must be pilloried
not on the basis of planetary questions, but on the basis of day-to-day
struggle of the working class for improving its material and political
conditions; in this, questions concerning wages, hours, housing conditions,
insurance, taxation, unemployment, high cost of living, and so forth, must
play a most important if not the decisive role. To hit the Social-Democrats
day after day on the basis of these questions, exposing their treachery
- such is the task."
Josef V. Stalin,The Prospects of
the Communist party of Germany and the Question of Bolshevisation (3-2-25),
in Works, vol. 7, Moscow, 1947, p. 37.
During the course of this united struggle, the proletariat was being educated
in a revolutionary
spirit in preparation for its main task - the overthrow
of the bourgeois order and the establishment of the dictatorship of the
proletariat. Emphasis was laid on building united fronts from below, by
appealing to
all workers - whether communist, anarchist, social-democrat,
Christian or non-party - over the heads of their leaders. For the very
purpose of achieving such a comprehensive unity, at this stage the Comintern
was in favour of entering into agreements with social-democratic, reformist
parties as well as with reactionary mass trade unions. Following Lenin's
and Stalin's indications, these agreements could be reached only on condition
that the communist parties retained total political independence at all
times, without contemplating any type of "fusion" or "merging" with social-democracy
or any "fraternisation of party leaders."
"The principal conditions which
are equally categorical for communist parties in all countries are, in
the view of the ECCI . . . the absolute independence of every communist
party which enters into an agreement with the parties of the Second and
the Two-and-a-half Internationals, its complete freedom to put forward
its own views and to criticize the opponents of communism. While accepting
a basis for action, communists must retain the unconditional right and
the possibility of expressing their opinion of the policy of all working
class organizations without exception, not only before and after action
has been taken but also, if necessary, during its course."
Extracts from the Directives on
the United Front of the Workers and on the Attitude to Workers Belonging
to the Second, Two-and-a-half, and Amsterdam Internationals, and to Those
Who Support Anarcho-Syndacalist Organizations, Adopted by the ECCI (18-12-21),
in Jane Degras, Ed., The Communist International:1919-1943: Documents,
vol. 1, London, 1971, p. 313. Emphasis in the original.
"The united front is not and should
not be merely a fraternization of party leaders. The united front will
not be created by agreements with those 'socialists' who until recently
were members of bourgeois governments. The united front means the association
of all workers, whether communist, anarchist, social-democrat, independent
or non-party or even Christian workers, against the bourgeoisie. With the
leaders, if they want it so, without the leaders if they remain indifferently
aside, and in defiance of the leaders and against the leaders if they sabotage
the workers' united front. . . . In every factory, in every mine, in every
district, in every town, the communist workers should arm together with
the socialist and non-party workers for the common fight against the bourgeoisie."
Extracts from the ECCI Statement
on the Results of the Berlin Conference (April 1922), in Jane Degras, Ed.,
The Communist International:1919-1943: Documents, vol. 1, London, 1971,
p. 341-2.
"The attempts of the Second International
to represent the united front as the organizational fusion of all 'workers'
parties' must of course be decisively rebutted. . . . The most important
thing in the united front tactic is and remains the agitational and organizational
rallying of the working masses. Its true realization can come only 'from
below', from the depths of the working masses themselves. Communists however
must not refuse in certain circumstances to negotiate with the leaders
of the hostile workers' parties, but the masses must be kept fully and
constantly informed of the course of these negotiations. Nor must the communist
parties' freedom to agitate be circumscribed in any way during these negotiations
with the leaders. It is obvious that the united front tactic is to be applied
in different ways in different countries, according to the actual conditions
prevailing there. . . ."
Extracts from the Theses on Tactics
Adopted by the Fourth Comintern Congress (5-12-22), in Jane Degras, Ed.,
The Communist International:1919-1943: Documents, vol. 1, 1971, p. 24-6.
"1. The tactics of the united front
from below are necessary always and everywhere . . .
2. Unity from below and at the
same time negotiations with [social-democratic, Ed.] leaders. This method
must frequently be employed in countries where social-democracy is still
a significant force. . . . It is understood that in such cases the communist
parties maintain their complete and absolute independence, and retain their
communist character at every stage of the negotiations and in all circumstances.
. . .
3. United front only from above.
This method is categorically rejected by the Communist International. The
tactics of the united front from below are the most important, that is,
a united front under communist party leadership covering communist, social-democratic,
and non-party workers in factory, factory council, trade union, and extending
to an entire industrial centre or area or industry. . ."
Extracts from the Theses on Tactics
Adopted by the Fifth Comintern Congress (July 1924), in Jane Degras, Ed.,
The Communist International:1919-1943: Documents, vol. 2, London, 1971,
p. 151-2.
Emphasis in the original.
"Of course there can be no question
of merging the communist parties with the social-democratic parties. This
would be open treachery to the cause of the proletarian revolution, it
would be the abandonment of the leading role in history which the proletariat
is called on to play. Recognition of the necessity for the existence of
an independent communist party is part of the ABC of Marxism-Leninism."
Extracts from the Theses on the
Current Questions of the International Communist Movement passed by the
Sixth ECCI Plenum (March 1926), in Jane Degras, Ed., The Communist International:1919-1943:
Documents, vol. 2, London, 1971, p. 252.
Accordingly, "the united front tactics . . . are tactics of revolution,
not evolution . . . are not a democratic coalition, an alliance with social-democracy.
They are only a method of revolutionary agitation and mobilisation:
"The united front tactics . . .
are tactics of revolution, not evolution . . . are not a democratic coalition,
an alliance with social-democracy. They are only a method of revolutionary
agitation and mobilization. We reject all other interpretations as opportunist.
We must keep firmly in mind that unted front tactics have a meaning for
the CI only if they promote the object of winning the bulk of the proletariat
from the revolutionary struggle for power."
Extracts from an ECCI Statement
on the Events in Germany in October 1923 (19-1-24), in Jane Degras, Ed.,
The Communist International:1919-1943: Documents, vol. 2, London, 1971,
p. 72.
Likewise, Stalin characterised them "as a means for the revolutionary mobilisation
and organisation of the masses." [Josef V. Stalin,
Concerning the International Situation (20-9-24), in
Works, vol.6, Moscow, 1947, pp.
305].
And in order: "to link the daily interests of the proletariat with the
fundamental interests of the proletarian revolution," the communist parties
must - always according to Stalin - "combine an uncompromising revolutionary
spirit (not to be confused with revolutionary adventurism!) with the maximum
of flexibility and manoeuvring ability (not to be confused with opportunism!)."
"In its work the Party must be
able to combine an uncompromising revolutionary spirit (not to be confused
with revolutionary adventurism!) with the maximum of flexibility and manoeuvring
ability (not to be confused with opportunism!); without this, the Party
will be unable to master all the forms of struggle and organisation, will
be unable to link the daily interests of the proletariat with the fundamental
interests of the proletarian revolution."
Josef V. Stalin,The Prospects of
the Communist party of Germany and the Question of Bolshevisation (3-2-25),
in Works, vol. 7, Moscow, 1947, p. 39.
"It should not be forgotten that
Rights and "ultra-Lefts" are actually twins, that consequently both take
an opportunist stand, the difference between them being that whereas the
Rights do not always conceal their opportunism, the Lefts invariably camouflage
their opportunism with "revolutionary" phrases."
Josef V. Stalin,The Fight against
Right and "Ultra-Left" Deviations (22-1-26), in Works, vol. 8, Moscow,
1948, p. 9.
This correct tactical line prevailed at the 1924 Comintern Congress which,
according to Stalin, ""merely sealed the victory of the revolutionary wing
in the principal sections of the Comintern."
[Josef V. Stalin, Concerning the
International Situation (20-9-24), in Works, vol.6, Moscow, 1947, pp. 306.]
Initially, in fact, the Communist international had rejected the
sectarian "theory of the offensive", that is, those "leftist stupidities"
- as Lenin called them - forcing the communist parties into adventurist,
premature, unprepared and hopeless insurrections. At the Second Comintern
Congress (1920) Lenin himself sharply criticised anarcho-syndacalist and
"left" sectarian trends pursued by a number of communist organisations,
just as he fought against opportunist, centrist parties which were attempting
to penetrate the Comintern. Some other revisionist
formulations had also emerged in connection with the so-called "workers'
government (or workers' and peasants' government)," fostering the illusion
of a parliamentary road to socialism through an alliance with social-democracy.
On Stalin's initiative, these formulations were corrected in favour of
mobilising workers for the revolutionary smashing of the capitalist state.
The original revisionist formulation of a
"workers' government" was
the following:
"The overriding tasks of the workers'
government must be to arm the proletariat, to disarm bourgeois, counter-revolutionary
organizations, to introduce the control of production, to transfer the
main burden of taxation to the rich, and to break the resistence of the
counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. . . . In certain circumstances communists
must declare themselves ready to form a workers' government with non-communist
workers' parties and workers' organizations. But they can do so only if
there are guarantees that the workers' government will really conduct a
struggle against the bourgeoisie in the sense mentioned above."
Extracts from the Theses on Tactics
Adopted by the Fourth Comintern Congress (5-12-22), in Jane Degras, Ed.,
The Communist International:1919-1943: Documents, vol. 1, London, 1971,
p. 424-6.
This formulation was later corrected as follows:
"Opportunists elements in the Comintern
tried to distort this slogan [of a workers' government, Ed.] too by interpreting
it as a 'government within the bourgeois-democratic framework' and as a
political alliance with social-democracy. The fifth world congress emphatically
rejects this interpretation. For the Comintern the slogan of a workers'
and peasants' government is the slogan of the proletarian dictatorship
translated into popular language, into the language of revolution. . .
. For communists the slogan of a workers' and peasants' government never
means the tactics of parliamentary agreements and coalitions with social-democracy."
Extracts from the Theses on Tactics
Adopted by the Fifth Comintern Congress (July 1924), in Jane Degras, Ed.,
The Communist International:1919-1943: Documents, vol. 2, London, 1971,
p. 151-2.
[Emphasis in the original.]
In 1926 Stalin categorically rejected the
parliamentary road to socialism:
"Can such a radical transformation
of the old bourgeois order [the proletarian revolution, Ed.] be achieved
without a violent revolution, without the dictatorship of the proletariat?
Obviously not."
Josef V. Stalin,Concerning Questions
of Leninism (25-1-26), in Works, vol. 8, Moscow, 1948, p. 25].
The difficult economic restoration of the Soviet Union and its entering
into the stage of socialist industrialisation and collectivisation in agriculture
were accompanied by the emergence of an anti-socialist opposition around
prominent figures such as Trotsky, Zinoviev
(who was also the Comintern president), Kamenev,
Sokolnikov, who were all Executive Committee members
in the Comintern. They were joined in the Executive Committee by two other
influential members, Bukharin and Rykov,
who would later put forward a right opportunist platform in a common offensive
with the Trotskyist opposition against the CPSU(B). Of course, this factional
fighting sharpened the ideological and political struggle which was also
being carried out both within the Comintern and within various communist
parties.
In June 1926, for example, Stalin regarded the Zinoviev group as more dangerous
than Trotsky's because of the former's control of the Comintern in his
capacity as president. (Stalin's letter, n. 21 (25-6-26)
in Lih, Naumov, Klevniuk (Ed.), Stalin's Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936,
1995, p.115). Also in connection with the British General Strike
in 1926 significant political and ideological divergences emerged within
the Comintern, specifically, between correct united front policies supported
by Stalin, on the one hand, and ultra-left proposals,
emanating from Zinoviev, in favour of setting up Red "paper" Unions, on
the other. In solidarity with the miners, a general strike was proclaimed
in Britain on 3 May 1926 involving several millions of workers, before
being called off a week later by the General Council of the Trade Unions.
The miners, however, continued the struggle which was ultimately defeated
in November because of the extreme repressive measures imposed by the then
conservative government. Both the Comintern and the Communist Party of
Britain, in line with Stalin, indicated the necessity to win over the workers
within - not outside - the reformist trade unions, establish international
solidarity under the slogan "the miners' cause is our cause", attack at
the same time the reactionary trade unions bureaucrats, combine economic
with political demands, convert the capitalist offensive into the revolutionary
offensive of the working class:
"The Task of the Communist parties
is, while continuing the organisation of the united working-class front,
to bend all their efforts to convert the attacks of the capitalists into
a counter-attack of the working class, into a revolutionary offensive of
the working class, into a struggle of the working class for the establishment
of the dictatorship of the proletariat and for the abolition of capitalism."
[Josef V. Stalin,The British Strike and the Events in Poland (8-6-26),
in Works, vol. 8, Moscow, 1948, p. 177.]
The failure of
the General Strike in 1926 did not imply the failure of united front tactics.
It rather proved that capitalist stabilisation had not ended yet: according
to Stalin, it was "a continuing
stabilisation, temporary, not enduring, but stabilisation
nonetheless." [Stalin's
letter, n. 16, in Lih, Naumov, Klevniuk, (Ed.), Stalin's Letters to Molotov,
1925-1936, 1995, p. 108]. From such an overall assessment, therefore,
it was "time and unremitting energic work" that were needed in Britain
in order to accelerate the revolutionary process.
"Was the policy of the British
Communist Party correct during the general strike in Britain? Yes, it was.
Why, then, did it not win the following of the millions of workers on strike?
Because those masses were not yet convinced of the correctness of the Communist
Part's policy. And it is not possible to convince the masses of the correctness
of the Party's policy in a short time. Still less is it possible with the
help of "revolutionary" gestures. It requires time and unremitting energetic
work in exposing the reactionary leaders, in politically educating the
backward masses of the working class, in promoting new cadres from the
working class to leading posts. From this it is easy to understand why
the power of the reactionary leaders of the working class cannot be destryed
at once, why this requires time and unremitting work in educating the vast
masses of the working class. . . .
The exposure of reactionary leaders
and the political education of the masses must be done by you yourselves,
the Communists, and by other political Left-wing leaders, through unremitting
work for the political enlightement of the masses. Only in that way can
the work of revolutionising the broad masses of the workers be accelerated."
Josef V.Stalin,The Anglo-Russian
Committee (7-8-26), in Works, vol. 8, Moscow, 1948, p. 212-3.
The situation in the East required a slightly different approach. In the
colonial and dependent countries it was the slogan of a united anti-imperialist
front that was put forward by the Communist International in accordance
with the Leninist policy, whereby national liberation movements are part
and parcel of the proletarian revolution. This programme supported the
anti-imperialist national revolutionary movements in every possible way,
thus turning the communist parties into their vanguards. Provided they
maintained complete independence of action, it was for the communist parties
"permissible and necessary" to enter into temporary agreements with the
national bourgeoisie while consistently
striving towards a stable alliance with the peasant and
semi-proletarian masses.
"The question of Lenin's line on
the leadership of colonial revolutions. Lenin took as his starting-point
the difference between imperialist countries and oppressed countries, between
communist policy in imperialist countries and communist policy in colonial
countries. Taking this difference as his starting-point, he said, already
during the war, that the idea of defending the fatherland, which is unacceptable
and counter-revolutionary for communism in imperialist countries, is quite
acceptable and legitimate in oppressed countries that are waging a war
of liberation against imperialism. That is why Lenin conceded the
possibility, at a certain stage and for a certain period, of a bloc and
even of an alliance with the national bourgeoisie in colonial countries,
if this bourgeoisie is waging war against imperialism, and if it is not
hindering the Communists from training the workers and poor peasants in
the spirit of communism."
Josef V. Stalin,The Fifteen Congress
of the C.P.S.U. (B.): Political Report of the Central Committee (3-12-27),
in Works, vol. 10, Moscow, 1949, p. 353.
Emphasis in the original.
Once the working class, in alliance with the peasantry, has gained the
leadership and has begun to transform the national democratic revolution
into a socialist revolution, the Marxist-Leninist strategy was - according
to both the Comintern and Stalin during the twenties - to bring about the
final victory of socialism by overthrowing the national bourgeoisie and
establishing the dictatorship of the working class.
As Stalin noted in 1925, in some colonial-type countries the native bourgeoisie
"is splitting up in two parts, a revolutionary part (the national bourgeoisie
- Ed.) . . . and a compromising part (the comprador bourgeoisie - Ed.),
of which the first is continuing the revolutionary struggle, whereas the
second is entering a bloc with imperialism." [Josef V. Stalin,The Political
tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East: Speech Delivered at
a Meeting of Students of the Communist University of the Toilers of the
East (18-5-25), in Works, vol. 7, Moscow, 1948, p. 147].
The Sixth Congress of the Communist International,
in September 1928, agreed that the native bourgeoisie in colonial-type
counties maintained a differentiated attitude towards imperialism:
"One part, more especially the
commercial bourgeoisie, directly serves the interests of imperial capital
(the so-called comprador bourgeoisie). In general, they maintain, more
or less consistently, an anti-national, imperialist point of view, directed
against the whole nationalist movement, as do the feudal allies of imperialism
and the more highly paid native officials. The other parts of the native
bourgeoisie, especially those representing the interests of native industry,
support the national movement."
Extracts from the Theses on the
Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semicolonial Countries Adopted by
the Sixth Comintern Congress (1-9-28), in J. Degras (Ed.), The Communist
International: 1919-1943: Documents, Vol. 2, London, 1971, p. 538.
"During the first national-democratic
stage, the Marxist-Leninist party aims at allying itself with the national
bourgeoisie, to the extent that this class remains genuinely revolutionary.
Subsequently, "The proletariat pushes aside the national bourgeoisie, consolidates
its hegemony and assumes the lead of the vast masses of the working people
in town and country, in order to overcome the resistance of the national
bourgeoisie, secure the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution,
and then gradually convert it into a socialist revolution."
Josef V. Stalin,Questions of the
Chinese Revolution (April 1927), in Works, vol. 9, Moscow, 1948, p. 225.
"The bourgeois-democratic revolution,
consistently pursued, will be transformed into the proletarian revolution
in those colonies and semi-colonies where the proletariat acts as a leader
and exercises hegemony over the movement . . . In these (colonial-type
- Ed.) countries the main task is to organise the workers and peasants
independently in the Communist Party of the proletariat . . . and emancipate
them from the influence of the national bourgeoisie." Programme of the
Communist International Adopted at its Sixth Congress (1-9-28), in J. Degras
(Ed.), The Communist International: 1919-1943: Documents, Vol. 2, London,
1971, pp. 507,522.
Hence, the requirement of two stages for the revolution in the East. With
specific regard to China's liberation against Anglo-Japanese-American imperialism
during the twenties, the united anti-imperialist front policies aimed to:
- consolidate the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist forces
within the communist ranks;
- secure the working class' alliance with the peasantry;
- bring the Communist Party into the national revolutionary
movement, which was represented by the Kuomintang, thus striving to attain
the hegemonic role of the proletariat in the revolution.
The Chinese proletariat quickly rose to a position from which it could
challenge the bourgeoisie, particularly in May 1925, in the Hongkong-Canton
strike of 1925-26, in the Shangai uprising of 1927. But these events were
also accompanied by a considerable degree of fragmentation, sectarianism,
revolutionary impatience on the part of the Chinese Communist Party, which
failed to successfully mobilise the peasantry and infiltrate
the army during its alliance period with the Kuomintang.
Ultimately, by 1927, the Kuomintamg betrayed the cause of the national
anti-imperialist revolution, turning against the Communist Party which
was driven underground, first by Chiang Kai-shek and
then by the so-called left Kuomintang government located in Wuhan. Both
the Comintern and Stalin displayed strong support for the Chinese revolution
during this time. Recently declassified documents reveal how Stalin attributed
its failure to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, which he
characterised as "not a genuine Communist Party," failing to fulfil the
Comintern's directives, having not "a clue (literally, not a clue) about
[the] hegemony" of the proletariat.
(Stalin's letter, n. 36 in Lih,
Naumov, Klevniuk, (Ed.), Stalin's Letters to Molotov, 1925-1936, 1995,
p. 141).
In most developed capitalist countries during the late twenties intense
class antagonism was giving rise to what Stalin assessed as "the preconditions
for a new revolutionary upsurge of the working-class movement":
"The Comintern holds that the present
capitalist stabilisation is a temporary, insecure, shaky and decaying stabilisation
which will become more and more shaken as the capitalist crisis develops.
. . . Deep within the capitalist countries the pre-conditions for a new
revolutionary upsurge of the working-class movement are ripening."
Josef V. Stalin,The Right Danger
in the German Communist Party (19-12-28), in Works, vol. 11, Moscow, 1949,
p. 308,312.
It was during this time that pseudo-left sectarian distortions of united
front policies began to emerge after the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928
through the so-called class-against-class tactics. The members
of the Political Secretariat who were elected at the Sixth Comintern
Congress in 1928 were: Barbe, Bell,
Bukharin, Kuusinen, Molotov, Piatnitsky, Remmele, Serra, Tsiu Vito, Smeral,
Humbert-Droz; and the candidates were: Manuilsky, Lozovsky, Khitarov.
This new sectarian line, dominating the Comintern during the early thirties,
was based on the assumption of an equation between social-democracy and
fascism. Hence the theory of "social-fascism", strongly
opposed by Stalin who, avoiding a straight identification between the two,
characterised them as "twins", with social-democracy being "objectively
the moderate wing of fascism.":
"Fascism is the bourgeoisie's fighting
organisation that relies on the active support of Social-Democracy. Social-Democracy
is objectively the moderate wing of fascism. There is no ground for assuming
that the fighting organisation of the bourgeoisie can achieve decisive
successes in battles, or in governing the country, without the active support
of Social-Democracy. . . . These organisations do not negate, but supplement
each other. They are not antipodes, they are twins. Fascism . . . is intended
for combating the proletarian revolution."
Josef V. Stalin, Concerning the
International Situation (20-9-24), in Works, vol.6, Moscow, 1947, pp. 294-5.
"In the capitalist countries, where
the proletariat is not yet in power, Social-Democracy is either an opposition
party in relation to capitalist rule, or a semi-government party in alliance
with the liberal bourgeoisie against the most reactionary forces of capitalism
and also against the revolutionary working-class movement, or else an out-and-out
government party directly and openly defending capitalism and bourgeois
"democracy" against the revolutionary proletarian movement. It becomes
out-and-out counter-revolutionary, and its counter-revolutionary activities
are directed against the proletarian regime, only when the latter has become
a reality."
Josef V. Stalin, Interview with
Foreign Workers' Delegations (5-11-27), in Works, vol. 10, Moscow, 1949,
p. 215.
Contrary to Stalin's view, the Comintern now presented the social-democratic
parties as "the main enemy" of the working class, against whom the main
blow should be directed. And by regarding the left wing of social-democracy
(that which supported united front tactics) "more dangerous" than its right
wing (that which opposed united front tactics), united fronts became permissible
- under the "class against-class" policies - only from below, that is,
with the rank-and-file members of the social-democratic parties:
"The [sixth, Ed.] congress . .
. fully approves the tactics laid down by the ninth ECCI plenum. . . .
These tactics, while changing the form of the united front, do not change
its essential content. To sharpen the struggle against social-democracy
shifts the emphasis decisively to the united front from below."
Extracts from the Theses of the
Sixth Comintern Congress on the International Situation and the Tasks of
the Communist International (29-8-28), in Jane Degras, Ed., The Communist
International:1919-1943: Documents, vol. 2, London, 1971, p. 461.
"In this situation of growing imperialist
contradictions and sharpening of the class struggle, fascism becomes more
and more the dominant method of bourgeois rule. In countries where there
are strong social-democratic parties, fascism assumes the particular form
of social-fascism . . . International social-democracy . . . is the chief
support of capitalism . . . the plenum of the ECCI instructs all sections
of the CI to pay special attention to an energetic struggle against the
"left" wing of social-democracy which retards the process of the disintegration
of social-democracy by creating the illusion that it - the "left' wing
- represent an opposition to the policy of the leading social-democratic
bodies, whereas as a matter of fact, it whole-heartedly supports the policy
of social-fascism."
Extracts from the Theses of the
Tenth ECCI Plenum on the International Situation and the Tasks of the communist
international (1-7-29), in Jane Degras, Ed., The Communist International:1919-1943:
Documents, vol. 3, London,1971, pp. 44, 47.
"It does not matter with which fraction
of the bourgeoisie - with the 'left', the moderates, or the right - the
socialists unite in a bloc against the proletariat. what matters is that
these are only different stages of the development of social-democracy
into fascism. . . Take note, proletarians, that international social-democracy
prefers a united front with fascism to defend and save capitalism to a
united front with the working class to overthrow fascism by the proletarian
revolution."
Extracts from an ECCI May Day Manifesto
(April 1933), in Jane Degras, Ed., The Communist International:1919-1943:
Documents, vol. 3, London, 1971, p. 267.
Consequently, under Comintern instructions, a number of communist parties
during this period put forward slogans such as that
of a "Red United Front" (i.e., a front limited to conscious revolutionaries
alone) and that of "revolutionary trade union opposition" (i.e., withdrawing
communist activity from the reformist trade unions
in order to form new, tiny, impotent "revolutionary"
splinter unions).With the aim of spreading communist
influence among trade unions, the red International of Labour Unions (RILU),
or Profintern, had been established in 1921 at the Third Comintern Congress.
RILU held five congresses between 1921 and 1930, but fell increasingly
into decline in the thirties before announcing its demise in 1937. Disagreeing
with this line, Stalin regarded "trade union unity" as "the surest means
of winning over the vast working class masses."
". . . the tasks of the Communist
parties: . . . is . to promote the fight for trade-union unity and to carry
it to a successful conclusion, bearing in mind that this is the surest
means of winning over the vast working-class masses; for it is impossible
to win over the vast proletarian masses unless the trade unions are won
over; and it is impossible to win over the trade unions unless work is
conducted in them and unless the confidence of the masses of the workers
is won in the trade unions month by month and year by year. Failing this,
it is out of the question even to think of achieving the dictatorship of
the proletariat."
Josef V.Stalin,The International
Situation and the Tasks of the Communist Parties (22-3-25), in Works, vol.
7, Moscow, 1947, p. 57.
". . . the main task of the Communist
Parties in the West at the present time is to develop and bring to a successful
conclusion the campaign for trade-union unity, to see that all Communists
without exception join the trade unions, to work in them systematically
and patiently for uniting the working class against capital, and in this
way to enable the communist Parties to have the backing of the trade unions."
Josef V. Stalin,The Results of
the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) (9-5-25), in Works,
vol. 7, Moscow, 1947, p. 106-7.
"The Party cannot develop further,
especially in the conditions existing in the West, the Party cannot grow
stronger, if it does not have a very imporrtant bulwark in the shape of
the trade unions and their leaders. Only a party that knows how to maintain
extensive connections with the trade unions and their leaders, and which
knows how to establish genuine proletarian contact with them - only such
a party can win over the majority of the working class in the West. You
know yourselves that without winning over the majority of the working class,
it is impossible to count on victory."
Josef V. Stalin,Speech Delivered
in the French Commission of the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. (6-3-26),
in Works, vol. 8, Moscow, 1948, p. 112.
Indeed, this unity represented the indispensable precondition for disintegrating
the influence of social-democracy in the trade unions, exposing its leaders
and ultimately achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat. For such
purposes - provided that communists retained their independence - Stalin
indicated that "temporary agreements with mass reactionary trade unions
[were] not only permissible but sometimes positively essential."
"Is it permissible at all for Communists
to work in reactionary trade unions? . . .Is it at all permissible to conclude
temporary agreements with reactionary trade unions, agreements on trade
union matters, or on political matters?
It is not only permissible, but
sometimes it is positively essential to do so. . . . Care must be taken,
however, that such agreements do not restrict, do not limit the freedom
of Communists to conduct revolutionary agitation and propaganda, that such
agreements help to disintegrate the ranks of the reformists and to revolutionise
the masses of the workers who still follow the reactionary leaders. On
these conditions, temporary agreements with mass reactionary trade unions
are not only permissible but sometimes positively essential."
Josef V. Stalin,The International
Situation and the Defence of the U.S.S.R. (1-8-27), in Works, vol. 10,
Moscow, 1949, p. 40-1.
In certain historical conditions, however,
Stalin does not seem to rule out the necessity of creating parallel revolutionary
trade unions:
"From the fact that we must work
within the reformist trade unions - provided only that they are mass organisations
- it does not at all follow that we must confine our mass work to work
within the reformist trade unions. . . . Can it be affirmed that the struggle
of the working class, led by the Communist party, can avoid breaking to
some extent the existing reformist framework of the trade unions? Obviously,
this cannot be affirmed without landing into opportunism. Therefore, a
situation is quite conceivable in which it may be necessary to create parallel
mass associations of the working class, against the will of the trade union
bosses who have sold themselves to the capitalists."
Josef V. Stalin,The Right Danger
in the German Communist Party (19-12-28), in Works, vol. 11, Moscow, 1949,
p. 314-5.
Emphasis in the original.
Due to its sectarian policies, the Comintern could not successfully challenge
the attacks of capitalism and the growing threat of fascism and war. In
the revolutionary situation of the early thirties, as masses of workers
were deserting the social-democratic parties, Stalin could not agree with
pseudo-left "revolutionary" agitation, but regarded the appropriate consolidation
of communist activities as an essential precondition for the revolution.
Accordingly, the communist parties had to "be capable of appraising the
situation and making proper use of it" in order to "definitely fortify
themselves on this road . . . and successfully prepare the proletariat
for the coming class battles. Only if they do that can we count on a further
increase in the influence and prestige of the Communist International":
"The desertion of the masses of
the workers from the Social-Democrats, however, signifies a turn on their
part towards communism. That is what is actually taking place. . . . It
is the guarantee that our fraternal Communist Parties will become big mass
parties of the working class. All that is necessary is that the Communists
should be capable of appraising the situation and making proper use of
it. . . . The Communist Parties . . . must definitely fortify themselves
on this road; for only if they do that can they count on winning over the
majority of the working class and successfully prepare the proletariat
for the coming class battles. Only if they do that can we count on a further
increase in the influence and prestige of the Communist International."
Josef V. Stalin,Political Report
of the Central Committee of the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)
(27-6-30), in Works, vol. 12, Moscow, 1949, p. 260-1.
The victory of the revolution never comes of itself - Stalin also indicated
- "only a strong proletarian revolutionary party can prepare for and win
victory."
"The victory of the revolution
never comes of itself. It must be prepared for and won. And only a strong
proletarian revolutionary party can prepare for and win victory. Moments
occur when the situation is revolutionary, when the rule of the bourgeoisie
is shaken to its very foundations, and yet the victory of the revolution
does not come, because there is no revolutionary party of the proletariat
with sufficient strength and prestige to lead the masses and to take power.
It would be unwise to believe that such "cases" cannot occur."
Josef V. Stalin,Report to the Seventeenth
Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)
(26-1-34), in Works, vol. 13, Moscow, 1949, p. 304-5.
By denying a qualitative difference between bourgeois democracy and fascism,
the Comintern also rejected the concept that the working class had an interest
in defending bourgeois democracy against the threat of fascism. For the
sake of striking the main offensive against social-democracy, for example,
the German communists rejected proposals for joint actions and demonstrations
with social democratic parties against the Nazis. For some time after the
1933 Nazi coup in Germany the Comintern insisted that its "class-against-class"
tactics - tactics which had paved the way to that coup - had been correct.
The Executive Committee even maintained that the Nazi coup had been "accelerating
the rate of Germany's advance towards the proletarian revolution."
[Resolution of the ECCI Presidium on the Situation
in Germany (1-4-33), in Jane Degras, Ed., The Communist International:1919-1943:
Documents, vol. 3, 1971, p. 262].
Hence, an effective resistance to the Nazi advent to power was in deeds
sabotaged by dividing the German working class and avoiding the formation
of a broad anti-fascist united front which, in the conditions pertaining
to Germany at that time, would have been an integral component of the revolutionary
struggle for socialism. The basic strategy of the West European imperialists
now become one of appeasement of German imperialism, that is, encouraging
in deeds Nazi Germany to expand eastwards towards the Soviet Union, while
criticising this expansion in words. This became known as the "appeasement
policy" pursued by the West European imperialists - particularly those
of Britain and France. In order to meet the new demands of imperialism,
the revisionists who dominated the Communist International obligingly revised
their policies by criticising and rejecting the "left" sectarianism of
the early thirties and by preparing the ground for a right opportunist
deviation. This new platform - supporting the establishment of people's
fronts, or popular fronts, in the struggle against fascism - was adopted
at the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935 under the new leadership of Georgi
Dimitrov.
As it has been highlighted by the Communist League in Britain for some
time, Dimitrov's election to the leading post of the Communist International
had been punctuated by some very odd features. At a time when more than
2,000 communists were slaughtered during the so-called national revolution
in Germany and thousands more were imprisoned in Nazi concentration camps,
Dimitrov was put on a public trial by a Nazi court, allowed to question
Nazi leaders and make them look foolish, and after a campaign of
predominantly western inspiration, he was acquitted and permitted to fly
to a hero's welcome in Moscow before being appointed at the head of the
Comintern. After the war, his revisionist credentials became apparent when
he supported Browder, openly embraced
the thesis of the peaceful transition to socialism without revolution,
and joined with Tito by putting forward
- in a clear anti-Soviet move - proposals for a "Balkan Federation."
It must be also pointed out that the Comintern reorientation - the
switch from "left" to right - became possible at a time when the Marxist-Leninist
elements around Stalin remained a minority within its leadership. The new
Political Secretariat elected by the Congress in 1935, for instance, included
a strong majority of hidden revisionists.
Members of the Political Secretariat elected by the Seventh Comintern Congress
were: Dimitrov (also General Secretary), Togliatti, Manuilsky, Pieck, Kuusinen,
Marty, Gottwald; candidates: Moskvin, Florin, Wang Ming.
Revisionism continued to develop underground, in the sense that these elements
could not openly call for the restoration of the capitalist society yet,
but had to conceal the revisionist character of their policies behind the
theoretical defence of Marxism-Leninism or behind the provision - as Dimitrov
did - that a socialist revolution would still be necessary. Most importantly,
the fact that the new popular front policies were never endorsed by Stalin
provides strong circumstantial evidence of his personal opposition to them.
This opposition became almost evident at the 18th Congress of the CPSU(B)
in
1939, when Stalin, in his long report, made no reference
whatsoever to the Comintern policies. Besides, no attention at all to the
people's fronts was paid by the official Short Course History of the CPSU(B),
published in 1939.
In the meantime, "the cult of the personality" around Stalin was also built
within the Communist International - this cult being fostered by "wreckers",
as Stalin called them, for the purpose of discrediting him at a later date.
Against his opposition, therefore, the Executive Committee addressed Stalin
as "infinitely beloved leader, . . . dear to the hearts of millions of
working people . . . the brain and the will to victory," [ECCI
to Stalin (1937), in Jane Degras, Ed., The Communist International: 1919-1943:
Documents, vol. 3, London, 1971, p. 460]:
"sagacious teacher, supremely
beloved friend . . . dauntless revolutionary, great theoritician, leader
of the socialist revolution, splendid example for the proletarian revolutionaries
of all countries. . . . "
Extracts from a Message of Greetings
from the ECCI to Stalin on his 60th Birthday (1939), in Jane Degras, Ed.,
The Communist International:1919-1943: Documents, vol. 3, 1971, p. 460-1.
It was not a coincidence that in 1935, as soon as the Seventh Comintern
Congress was over, steps were taken to decentralise the organisation by
giving individual parties a significant degree of autonomy in managing
their affairs. There would be no more congresses, no more Executive
Committee plenary sessions, which had been very frequent
in the past and in 1941 the management of its work was placed in the hands
of a triumvirate of three leading revisionists - Dimitrov,
Manuilsky and Togliatti. This decentralisation was indeed contrary
to Lenin's and Stalin's insistence that proletarian internationalism could
only be effective provided that the Comintern retained a highly centralised
apparatus. "The comintern is a militant organisation of the proletariat
. . . - Stalin had indicated in 1925 - and cannot refrain from intervening
in the affairs of individual parties, supporting the revolutionary elements.
. . . To deduce . . . that the Comintern must be denied the right of leadership,
and hence of intervention, means working on behalf of the enemies of communism."
:
"As regards the rights of the Comintern
and its intervention in the affairs of the national parties, I emphatically
disagree with those comrades who spoke in favour of curtailing those rights.
They want the Comintern to be transformed into an organisation situated
beyond the stars, gazing dispassionately at what is going on in the individual
parties and patiently recording events. no, comrades, the Comintern cannot
become an organisation beyond the stars. The comintern is a militant organisation
of the proletariat, it is linked with the working class movement by all
the roots of its existence and cannot refrain from intervening in the affairs
of individual parties, supporting the revolutionary elements and combating
their opponents. Of course, the parties possess internal autonomy, the
party congresses must be unfettered, and the Central Committees must be
elected by the congresses. But to deduce from this that the Comintern
must be denied the right of leadership, and hence of intervention, means
working on behalf of the enemies of communism."
Josef V. Stalin,The Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia (27-3-25), in Works, vol. 7, Moscow, 1947, p. 67.
Dimitrov retained the following definition
of fascism, formulated at the Thirteen ECCI Plenum in 1933:
"Fascism is the open, terrorist
dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist
elements of finance capital. Fascism tries to secure a mass basis for monopolist
capital among the petty bourgeoisie, appealing to the peasantry, artisans,
office employees and civil servants who have been thrown out of their normal
course of life, and particularly to the declassed elements in the big cities,
also trying to penetrate into the working class. . . . . The possibility
of averting it [the fascist dictatorship, Ed.] depends upon the forces
of the fighting proletariat, which are paralysed by the corrupting [disintegrating]
influence of social-democracy more than anything else."
Extracts from the Theses of the
Thirteenth ECCI Plenum on Fascism, the War Danger, and the Tasks of the
Communist Parties (December 1933), in Jane Degras, Ed., The Communist International:1919-1943:
Documents, vol. 3, London, 1971, pp. 296-7.
The new political reorientation was officially formulated by Dimitrov in
1935. First of all, he put forward the correct thesis that, in order to
defeat the growing threat of fascism, communist parties should strive to
build broad people's fronts, or popular fronts, to include social-democratic
and other bourgeois democratic parties on the basis of short or long term
agreements. This united front, established - from above - between the communist
party and the social democratic parties (which are representatives of the
bourgeoisie), was supposed to represent the first step towards political
unification of these parties. That is to say, a fusion into a single political
party of the working class in order to avoid any dichotomy in its leadership
- and on condition that both the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism
and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat were
recognised:
"Holding that the interests of
the class struggle of the proletariat and the success of the proletarian
revolution make it imperative that a single mass political party of the
working class exist in each country, the Congress sets the communist parties
the task of taking the initiative in bringing about this unity, relying
on the growing desire of the workers to unite the social-democratic parties
or individual orgainzations with the communist parties. At the same time
it must be explained to the workers without fail that such unity is possible
only on certain conditions; on condition of complete independence from
the bourgeoisie and the complete severance of the bloc between social-democracy
and the bourgeoisie, on the condition that unity of action be first brought
about, that the necessity of the revolutionary overthrow of the rule of
the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the dictatorshiop of the proletariat
in the form of the Soviets be recognized, that support of one's own
bourgeoisie in imperialist war be rejected."
Extracts from the resolution of
the Seventh Comintern Congress on Fascism, Working-Class Unity, and the
Tasks of the Comintern (20-8-35), in Jane Degras, Ed., The ommunist
International:1919-1943: Documents, vol. 3, London, 1971, p. 368-9.
Dimitrov's thesis of the fusion between the
communist party and the social democratic parties was put into practice
in 1948, as communist parties in various people's democracies, in Rumania,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, would unite and amalgamate with
the respective social democratic parties of their countries. The following
line was put forward with regard to trade union unity:
"The communists are decidedly for
the re-establishment of trade union unity in each country and on an international
scale . . . In countries where small Red trade unions exist, efforts must
be made to secure their admission into the big reformist trade unions,
with demands put forward for the right to defend their views and the reinstatement
of expelled members. In countries where big red and reformist trade unions
exist side by side, efforts must be made to secure their amalgamation on
an equal footing."
Extracts from the resolution of
the Seventh Comintern Congress on Fascism, Working-Class Unity, and the
Tasks of the Comintern (20-8-35), in Jane Degras, Ed., The Communist International:1919-1943:
Documents, vol. 3, London, 1971, p. 365-6.
Dimitrov demanded:
"the formation of a wide, popular
anti-fascist front on the basis of the proletarian united front." Such
a popular front government, inclusive of the representatives of the bourgeoisie,
"should carry out definite and fundamental revolutionary demands . . .
For instance, control of production, control of the banks, disbanding of
the police and its replacement by an armed workers' militia, etc."
G. Dimitrov, The United Front:The
Struggle against Fascism and War, S.Francisco, 1975, pp. 39, 75.
But how on earth would sections of the capitalist class - no matter how
democratic and anti-fascist they may be - willingly accept their own demise?
By upholding that an elected popular front government can make revolutionary
inroads into the political and economic power of the capitalist class,
Dimitrov demands the impossible. Thus, the way is paved towards the peaceful,
parliamentary transition to socialism, with the goal of the socialist revolution
remaining only in theory. It follows therefore that a popular front government
can exist in a country where the capitalist class holds political power,
only provided that the participating communist party surrenders to opportunism
by servicing the interests of the capitalist class, and not those of the
workers. This was exemplified by the experience of the French and Spanish
popular fronts during the thirties.
The popular front government in France (1936-38) certainly brought about
initial improvements in the conditions of the working people. But it also
led France behind the appeasement policy of British imperialism when Daladier,
representing the French popular government, joined with Chamberlain, Hitler
and Mussolini in signing the 1938 Munich agreement which effectively handed
over Czechoslovakia to the Nazis. It was also the French popular government
which - besides being unprepared to liberalise its colonial policies in
North Africa and Indochina - initiated the policy of "non-intervention"
in Spain, a policy supported by the Soviet revisionists, which permitted
the fascist powers to pour arms and soldiers into Spain in support of the
fascist rebels led by Franco.
It was Stalin personally who, in opposition to the whole revisionist policy
of "non-intervention", ordered the supply of Soviet arms to the Spanish
Republican government. But during the course of the Spanish civil war (1936-39)
the Communist Party of Spain rejected the revolutionary path in favour
of preserving "parliamentary democracy" under instructions from the
Comintern, which sent a delegation to Spain, headed by Togliatti and Tito,
to run the party for the duration of the war. "Let the
example of the People's Front in Spain and France strengthen the will to
unity among the workers all over the world," stated the 1937 May Day Manifesto
of the Executive Committee. [Extracts
from the May Day Manifesto of the ECCI (April 1937), in Jane Degras, Ed.,
The Communist International:1919-1943: Documents, vol. 3, London, 1971,
p. 408].
Following the failure of the popular fronts in France and Spain, Dimitrov
disavowed the very same line that he had been previously put forward. In
1939 he called for "a united front from below" through "a most resolute
struggle against the social-democratic, 'democratic' and 'radical' flunkeys
of imperialism":
"The tactics of the united people's
front presupposed joint action by the communist parties and the social-democratic
and petty-bourgeois 'democratic' and 'radical' parties against reaction
and war. . . . In the preceding period the communists strove to secure
the establishment of a united popular front by agreement with the social-democratic
and other petty-bourgeois 'democratic' and 'radical' parties in the person
of their leading bodies on the basis of a common platform of struggle
against fascism and war. But to the extent that the principal leaders of
these parties have crossed over wholly and completely into the camp of
the imperialists, while certain of them, such as the French radicals, are
directly in charge of the conduct of the war, there can be no question
of such agreements. Now the mustering of the working class, of the peasantry,
of the urban working folk and of the progressive intelligentsia can and
must be brought about apart from and against the leadership of these parties,
on the basis of the struggle against the imperialist war and reaction in
a united front from below.
Such a united fighting front of
the masses cannot be brought about without a most resolute struggle against
the social-democratic, 'democratic', and 'radical' flunkeys of imperialism,
for the elimination of the influence of these agents of the bourgeoisie
in the working-class movement and for their isolation from the masses of
the working people."
Extracts from an Article by Domitrov
on "The Tasks of the working Class in the War"; (November 1939), in Jane
Degras, Ed., The Communist International:1919-1943: Documents, vol. 3,
London, 1971, pp. 455,457.
This sudden "revolutionary" revival on the part of Dimitrov, however, could
not prevent the dissolution of the Communist International in 1943, without
convening a congress and as a result of the alleged
"growth and political maturity" reached by its communist parties.
[Resolution of the ECCI Presidium Recomending the Dissolution of the Communist
International (15-5-43), in Jane Degras, Ed., The Communist International:1919-1943:
Documents, vol. 3, London, 1971, pp. 476-9].
And yet within a short time from its dissolution most
of the communist parties embraced revisionism of one sort or another and
found themselves in a state of mutual ideological conflict. By declaring
that its dissolution had been "proper and timely",
[Stalin's interview in Jane Degras, Ed., The
Communist International:1919-1943: Documents, vol. 3, London, 1971, p.
476].
Stalin must have reached the conclusion that, under its revisionist leadership,
the Comintern had ceased to be of any use as an organ of the socialist
revolution. That Stalin and the Marxists-Leninists did not agree that a
real international was no longer necessary is shown by the fact that in
1947, on Stalin's personal initiative, a new Marxist-Leninist international,
on a restricted basis, was set up in the shape of the Communist Information
Bureau, or Cominform, under a new leadership which excluded
Dimitrov and Manuilsky. It is significant that the first acts of the Cominform
were to express strong criticism of the revisionist lines of such communist
parties as those of France, Italy, Japan and, later, Yugoslavia.
Such, in summary, is Stalin's relationship with the Third Communist International.
After a period of militant involvement, Stalin was prevented from active
leadership, and excluded from effective influence, since the late twenties.
He cannot therefore be held accountable for the prevailing revisionist
distortions related to sectarian ultra-left tactics and then unprincipled
united fronts. Stalin's political "isolation" was equally reflected within
the CPSU(B) after the war. Having confined him to "harmless" activities
such as writing on linguistics and economics, concealed revisionists orchestrated
his death before being able to betray the working class and fully restore
capitalism in the Soviet Union.
Breaking a long established tradition, at the 19th Party Congress in 1952
the CC report was presented to the congress not by its general secretary,
Stalin, but by Georgi Malenkov. Not
the slightest trace of proletarian internationalism appears in Malenkov's
report. But in contrast, it was Stalin that, in a short speech to the Congress,
highly praised the communist parties of the various countries and the newly
created people's democracies by characterising them as the new "'shock
brigades' of the world-wide revolutionary and workers'
movement." [Stalin, Speech to the Nineteenth Congress
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (14-10-52) in Franklin B. (Ed.),
The Essential Stalin: Major Theoretical Writings 1905-52, London, 1973,
p. 509].
This was also Stalin's last public address, a revolutionary call from an
outstanding leader who consistently fought for socialism
and communism, and against revisionism, throughout his life and in the
most difficult circumstances.
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