ALLIANCE 51: PAN-ARABIC
- OR PAN-ISLAMIC "SOCIALISM"
APPENDIX 3: 1929 Comintern Resolution On Palestine
and Arabistan; From Editor Jane Degras: Documents of the
Communist International 1919-1943"; Volume 3; London 1971
EXTRACTS FROM A RESOLUTION OF THE ECCI POLITICAL
SECRETARIAT ON THE INSURRECTION MOVEMENT IN ARABISTAN
16 October 1929 Inprekorr, x, 11, P. 258, 3 1 January 1930
ALLIANCE EDITORS NOTE:
In smaller type: The precis of the preceding minutes/materials
– as prepared by J.Degras
[The fighting between Arabs and Jews which broke out at the Wailing
Wall in Jerusalem on 23 August 1929 provoked a good deal of discussion
in the communist press on the nature of the forces involved. The Zionist
movement had from the outset been condemned by the Comintern as an agency
and tool of British imperialism; it was a counter-revolutionary movement
of the Jewish big bourgeoisie run by the financial magnates of Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. An article in the Communist
International shortly after the outbreak asserted that: 'The Zionist immigrants
. . . turned the country into a suitable strategic base for British imperialism,
and ... were to serve as lightning-conductors towards which, in case of
need, British agents could direct the revolt of the Arab masses against
the occupation regime.' At
p. 77
any sign of revolutionary nationalism British agents provoked massacres
and pogroms, thus temporarily paralysing the revolutionary movement. The
fighting that broke out in August 'was undoubtedly organized by British
agents, provoked by the Zionist-fascist bourgeoisie, and arranged by the
Arab-Mohammedan reaction'; but the movement got out of hand and became
a genuine Arab nationalist revolt. The British purpose was to strengthen
their position against the penetration of American capital and to frustrate
Arab-Jewish mass solidarity. The Arab masses no longer trusted their bourgeois
leaders who, corrupted by the money channelled through Zionism, were conciliatory
towards imperialism, but their own movement had been captured by Pan-Islamic
reaction.
The official Comintern attitude was disputed by
some Jewish members of the Palestinian CP, who denied the existence of
an Arab revolutionary movement; the workers' movement was almost entirely
Jewish. In an article in Novy Vostok Arbuziam [Averbakh] asserted that
the fellaheen and the Beduin masses were waging an active political struggle
against British imperialism; they did not, however, submit easily to class
political discipline and might therefore become the tools of imperialist
agents. 'The basic question of the revolutionary movement in the Arab East
is to use the immense revolutionary energy of the Beduin tribes for the
revolutionary class struggle against imperialism, against the native bourgeoisie
and feudalists, and to link it with the movement of the impoverished fellaheen
and proletariat.' The Jewish Socialist Party (Poale Zion), including its
left wing, had become a national-chauvinist organization defending the
plantation owners and colonizers, and the trade unions sacrificed the workers'
interests on the altar of Zionism.
An article by a certain Nadab published four years
later in Revoliutsionny Vostok, which argued that, since Zionism was counter-revolutionary,
anti-imperialism in Palestine must be directed against the Jewish national
minority as being overwhelmingly Zionist, stated that those members of
the Palestine CP who insisted that the 1929 events were a pogrom, and not
a rebellion, had been expelled.
The League Against Imperialism interpreted the fighting
as an anti-imperialist struggle to which the imperialists had given a religious
character; the Zionists and social-democrats had prevented a united front
of Arab and Jewish workers. The imperialists welcomed the event as a pretext
for annexing Palestine to the British Empire. An article in Inprekorr said
the Arab Executive now regarded the Zionist leaders not as enemies but
as rivals for British favour. An accompanying article (signed J.B.) said
the 'street fight' which began on 23 August was 'the signal for a general
Arab rising'. The British Government 'dropped a little oil whenever the
fire threatened to go out' in an attempt to destroy the Arab-Jewish rapprochement
of recent years. The communist party was too weak to 'gain influence on
the mass movement which grew from hour to hour and was influenced by blind
religious fanaticism'. The Haifa committee of the communist party, claiming
that what had happened was a pogrom pure and simple, suppressed the central
committee statement which interpreted the events as the work of imperialist
stooges, deflecting the anti-imperialist revolt into pogroms. In a letter
to the Palestine central committee, the Eastern
P. 78
secretariat of the ECCI spoke of the dangers of opportunism in the
party, and of the conciliatory attitude to Poale Zion.
In October 1930 the ECCI again suggested that preparations
should be made for the formation of an Arab Communist Federation, to include
the parties of Syria, Palestine, and Egypt. At the seventh congress of
the Palestine Communist Party in December 1930 the Arab and Jewish delegates
were equal in number-previously the Arabs had been in a minority; the two
chief dangers facing the party were said to be Jewish Zionist chauvinism
and Arab bourgeois nationalism; the central committee elected by the congress
had an Arab majority. An article in Inprekorr on the congress said prospects
were improving because the Jewish workers were turning against their own
bourgeoisie while the Arab bourgeoisie were turning away from the nationalist
movement. The Pan-Islamic congress held in Jerusalem in the summer of 1931
was described as an attempt to consolidate reaction and mislead the masses;
its reactionary character was shown by the resolution it adopted protesting
against the oppression of Moslems in the USSR. Early in 1932 a draft programme
for the Egyptian CP was published. This described Egypt as a British cotton
plantation worked by slave labour, with the monarchy and landowners acting
as slavedrivers. All Egyptian parties were subservient to Britain, the
Wafd representing bourgeois-landlord-counter-revolutionary-national-reformism'.
An article in Inprekorr in May 1932 noted that 'as a result of the temporary
weakness of the labour movement in Egypt, police provocateurs and
petty-bourgeois adventurers succeeded in disorganizing the activity of
the Egyptian CP, detaching it from the workers, and alienating it from
the revolutionary mass struggle'. The seventh congress Materials said that
for a time 'an unprincipled group' in the Egyptian CP, behind whom the
police was hidden, had condemned communist organizations to complete inactivity.
At the congress itself a delegate said that because of internal feuds and
intrigues, the party had at one time been expelled from the Comintern;
in 1931 the ECCI had appointed a new leadership.
Referring to the events of 1929, the Materials noted
that there had been strong opposition to the ECCI's instructions to Arabize
the Palestinian CP; these opportunists had been removed and the position
was corrected at the seventh congress of the Palestinian Communist Party,
but the party was only now (1935) beginning to bolshevize itself, a process
inseparable from Arabization.
A footnote to the present resolution states: 'The
resolution is necessarily published in abridged form. In particular, it
omits those passages concerning the attitude of the Palestine Communist
Party to national-revolutionary trends.'
At the meeting of the LAI Executive in Cologne in
January 1929 Heckert (representing the RILU) and Melnichansky (representing
the Soviet trade unions) attacked A. J. Cook, a member of the Executive,
who protested against outside interference in the League, and against the
label of 'traitor' attached to union leaders, and said he was not inclined
to support a League that was to become a new red international. Cook shortly
afterwards resigned from the League. At the JAI congress in Frankfurt in
July 1929 there were 260 delegates, 84 of them representing the colonies,
although many did not come directly from
p. 79
the colonies themselves. Munzenberg reported that the bourgeois nationalists
who had been present at the Brussels congress, such as the KMT, had sold
out to imperialism, and were not represented at Frankfurt; there were fewer
intellectuals, but more representatives of workers' and peasants' organizations.
An article on the congress in the Communist International in November said
that in all the colonial countries the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie
had moved to the right. The ILP and the Indian National Congress had played
a treacherous part; Poale Zion was an agent of British imperialism. The
left-wing social reformists (such as Maxton and Fimmen) had joined forces
with the national reformists (such as Hatta and Gupta) and should have
been more thoroughly exposed at the congress. (Maxton was later expelled
from the British section of the LAI.) Neither the Indian nor the Indonesian
revolutionary movement was represented, and hence there had been serious
opportunist errors at the congress, which had failed to expose the left
social-democrats, who were 'the worst enemies of the colonial peoples,
the most dangerous enemies of the colonial revolution'. The congress resolution
had not said a word about the 'treachery and perfidy' of the Indian National
Congress. 'The time has come to raise the question of purging the League
of elements which are obviously treacherous.']
The uprising of the Arab masses in Palestine and
the events in Arabistan as a whole have by and large fully confirmed the
correctness of the analysis made by the sixth C1 congress and the tenth
plenum of the sharpening of the struggle between imperialism and the working
masses of the colonial countries, of the new surge of the national liberation
movement in colonial and semi-colonial countries, of the appraisal of the
English 'Labour' Government and the transformation of the Second International
into a social-fascist, openly social-imperialist International.
The national disunity of the Arabs, the fragmented
character of Arabistan, broken up into a number of small countries, the
division of Arabistan among the various important countries, the complete
absence of political rights for the indigenous population, forcible Zionist
colonization, and the use of greater pressure by English and French imperialism
on the Arab countries-these are one group of causes of the insurrectionary
movement.
A second group of causes of the events in Palestine
are the robbery of the Arab fellaheens' land for the benefit of Zionist
colonization (often with the help of Arab large landowners), and of the
Arab large landowners and foreign capitalists . . . the greater exploitation
of the peasants by higher rents and taxes and by the moneylenders, the
relatively rapid growth of a commodity and money economy . . . and the
comparatively rapid development of class differentiation among the Beduin
tribes.
The maturing of the revolutionary crisis was accelerated
by the growth of unemployment ... the harvest failure of 1928, the ferment
in the Arab countries, the dissolution of the Syrian parliament, the Iraq
government
p. 80
crisis ... the demonstrations and strikes of workers in Palestine and
Syria, the new Anglo-Egyptian treaty ... the approaching offensive by spiritually
bankrupt Zionism, which has discarded its socialist mask and appears openly
as an agency of capitalism (as shown in the decision of the Zurich Zionist
congress in July 1929).
THE CHARACTER OF THE MOVEMENT
These are the characteristic features of the movement:
1. The Palestine uprising is occurring at a time of revolutionary ferment
in the most important industrial centres of India, of crisis in the Chinese
counter-revolution, and of a rising wave in the revolutionary labour movement
of the West; it represents the beginning of a rising wave in the revolutionary
liberation movement of the Arab countries.
2. The movement extends over the whole of Arabia and has a profoundly
national character. It spread extremely quickly to the other Arab countries.
3. The movement is changing rapidly and moving on to a higher level.
If, in the first days, the clergy and the feudalists, united in the Mejlis
Islam, managed to direct it into the channel of an Arab-Jewish national
feud, after that the masses turned spontaneously against the Mufti, against
the Mejlis Islam, and against the representatives of the Arab Executive,
condemning their treachery and their surrender to imperialism ... the movement
is changing rapidly from a Zionist-Arab conflict into a national peasant
movement, in which the nationalist urban pettybourgeoisie are also taking
part. The fellaheen and particularly the Beduin are the most active participants
in the insurrection movement.
4. The working class has remained in part passive; in any case it has
not acted independently, much less tried to assume hegemony of the movement.
A section of the Jewish and Arab workers fell under the influence of 'their'
bourgeoisie and took part in the national-religious conflict under the
hegemony and leadership of 'their' bourgeoisie. Nevertheless there were
individual cases of heroic manifestations of proletarian class solidarity
by Arab and Jewish workers. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the insurrectionary
movement was a response to an Anglo-Zionist provocation, to which Arab
reactionaries (feudalists and priesthood) tried to answer with a pogrom,
notwithstanding the fact that in its initial stage it came under reactionary
leadership, it was still a national liberation movement, an anti-imperialist
all-Arab movement, and in the main, by its social composition, a peasant
movement.
5. The movement took place at a time when MacDonald's 'Labour' Government
was in power in England. The 'Labour' Government, with the full support
of the Independent Labour Party, came out openly in the role of executioner
of the colonial revolution.
p. 81
6. The movement revealed the growing depth of the contradictions between
English and French imperialism in the struggle for influence in the Middle
East.
THE CHARACTER AND DRIVING FORCES OF THE REVOLUTION IN ARABISTAN
The general Comintern position in regard to the character and driving
forces of the revolution in Palestine and in Arabistan as a whole has stood
the test of the revolutionary mass movement and has been confirmed by experience.
The main socio-economic content of the revolution is the overthrow of imperialism,
the national unification of all Arab countries, the agrarian revolution,
and the solution of the national question. It is this which determines
the character of the revolution as a bourgeois-democratic revolution in
the Leninist sense of the word. The main driving forces of the revolution
are the working class and the peasantry. The bourgeois-democratic revolution
can be conducted to its conclusion only in revolutionary struggle against
the bourgeoisie. Without doubt this bourgeois-democratic revolution will
turn into a socialist revolution. But the thesis advanced by some, about
the proletarian character of the revolution in the conditions prevailing
in Palestine, is [not] only completely out of accordance with the historical
reality, and not only reflects the Trotskyist ideology of permanent revolution,
but would signify, in the concrete conditions in Palestine, primarily the
dictatorship of a small company of Jewish workers over the large masses
of the Arab population.
THE ROLE OF THE DIFFERENT CLASSES IN THE MOVEMENT
The Zionist colonizing bourgeoisie and their lackeys played the part
of outright agents of English imperialism . .'. . The 'left' wing of Zionism,
Poale Zion, merged with the Jewish fascists and sided with English imperialism
and the Zionist bourgeoisie.
The Arab large landowners, the feudal lords, and
the higher ranks of the priesthood, united in the Mejlis Islam, capitulated
long ago to English imperialism, and played a treacherous, provocative,
counterrevolutionary role.
The All-Arab National Congress, which in the last
few years has revealed with a clarity that leaves nothing to be desired
its national-reformist character ... did not play an independent part in
the movement; rather its right wing joined the reactionary camp of the
feudals and priests.
The fellaheen and particularly the Beduin were the
basic driving forces of the movement. But the peasant movement did not
coincide in time with an organized and independent class action by the
proletariat in the towns. The peasant movement was unorganized and fragmentary.
p. 82
The Arab insurrectionary Movement clearly revealed both some positive
features and the weaknesses of the Palestine CP.
1. The uprising took the party by surprise; this was because it is
composed in the main of Jewish elements; it has no contact with the Arab
masses as a whole, and in particular lacks any kind of contact with the
peasantry.
The uprising has shown in practice how right the ECCI was in its repeated
instructions about the need to Arabize the party. The deficiencies and
errors of the Palestine CP, revealed in the course of the uprising, are
a result of the party's failure to steer a bold and determined course towards
the Arabization of the party from top to bottom. In the past the party
has applied its forces and means incorrectly, and concentrated its work
primarily on the Jewish workers, instead of concentrating its maximum forces
and means on work among the Arab worker and peasant masses.
The Arabization of the leadership was interpreted
as the mechanical inclusion of a few Arab comrades on the central committee.
The party did not succeed in creating solid party organizations among Arab
workers and in the local Arab trade union organizations. There was a spirit
of pessimism and scepticism as to the possibility of successful work among
the
fellaheen and Beduin, which in some cases led to passive sectarianism,
to an underestimation of the revolutionary possibilities in Arabistan,
to an exaggeration of the influence of the reactionary bourgeoisie on the
Arab masses....
2. Particularly in the first days of the movement, when it was almost
exclusively influenced by events in Jerusalem and some other cities, the
party failed to notice that the religious national conflict was turning
into a general national anti-imperialist peasant action. Consequently the
party failed to include in its slogans the questions of the seizure of
the land, the formation of revolutionary fellaheen and Beduin committees,
the agrarian revolution, and the national unification of all Arab countries,
and to conduct agitation around the slogan of an all-Arab workers' and
peasants' government, failures which can be explained by the right-opportunist
vacillations in the party about this question in the past. The party failed
to advance the slogan of forming Arab-Jewish workers' detachments, of arming
the workers, of joint demonstrations of Arab and Jewish workers, of a joint
general strike.... The exposure of the English 'Labour' Government's assumption
of the role of executioner, revolutionary criticism of the Arab and Jewish
political parties and organizations, particularly the adherents of Poale
Zion and of their attitude during the uprising, was not concrete enough.
At the same time it must be emphasized that the
Palestine CP showed
p. 83
itself to be a firmly welded organization of devoted revolutionaries,
anxious to fulfil their revolutionary duty in an honourable fashion. In
respect to its theoretical level, its devotion to communism, the CP of
Palestine certainly stands high. .
THE TASKS OF THE PARTY
The CPP, as well as the CI sections in other Arab countries, must learn
the lessons to be drawn from the uprising.
1. The most urgent task of the party is to steer an energetic and bold
course towards Arabization of the party from top to bottom. At the same
time it must make every effort to establish Arab or joint Arab-Jewish trade
unions, and to capture and extend those already in existence....
2. The party must at all costs eradicate the scepticism and passivity
on the peasant question which prevail in its ranks.... It must draw up
an agrarian programme which pays heed to the partial demands of the fellaheen
and Beduin.
3. The party must continue its work among the Jewish workers organized
in the Zionist-reformist trade unions, as well as among the unorganized
workers. The exposure of Zionism, and particularly of its left wing, as
an agency of imperialism, remains as before one of the chief tasks, the
concrete lessons of the movement being used to demonstrate this.
4. The party must expose the Mejlis Islam ... as a direct agent of
English imperialism. No less ruthlessly must it expose the national reformism
embodied in the All-Arab Congress...
5. The campaign for an active boycott of the commission appointed to
investigate the events, and the organization of the boycott . . . must
with the help of other CI sections be placed in the centre of the party's
attention....
8. The lessons of the rising clearly show the need for the closest
contact between the communist parties of the various countries of Arabistan
and of Egypt. The most appropriate form will be the formation of a federation
of communist parties of the Arab countries. The condition for such a federation
is the Arabization of the CPS of Palestine and Syria, the consolidation
of the CPS of Palestine, Syria, Egypt, etc. Steps to accelerate the Arabization
of the Syrian CP must be taken at once, to ensure that the communists in
Syria, after overcoming liquidationism and opportunism, finally become
independent communist parties.
9. These tasks can be accomplished only on condition that a bold and
energetic struggle is waged against the right deviation in the party, which
is bound to become stronger under the pressure of white terror and the
impact of the temporary defeat of the uprising. The right deviation in
the CP of Palestine is expressed in an underestimation of revolutionary
p.84.
possibilities, open or concealed resistance to Arabization of the party,
pessimism and passivity in regard to work among the Arab masses, fatalism
and passivity on the peasant question, failure to understand the role of
Jewish comrades as subsidiary forces, but not as leaders of the Arab movement,
exaggeration of the influence of the reactionary bourgeoisie, large landlords,
and priesthood on the Arab masses, a conciliatory attitude to opportunist
errors, failure to understand the need for courageous and vigorous self-criticism
of the mistakes committed by the party, a tendency to emigrate without
the permission of the CC, that is, to desert, resistance to the slogan
of a workers' and peasants' government. The appraisal of the rising as
a 'pogrom' and concealed resistance to Arabization are manifestations of
Zionist and imperialist influence on the communists. The eradication of
these attitudes is essential for the further development of the party....
The insurrection movement in Arabistan found a strong
international echo. The parties of the Second International and a number
of petty-bourgeois pacifists sided with English imperialism and counter-revolutionary
Zionism. The 'left' social-democrats, above all Maxton, exposed themselves
as agents of imperialism. Communists and national revolutionary organizations
sided with the Arab uprising.
At the same time it must be noted that in the early
stages of the uprising there was vacillation and confusion in some countries
(the Jewish section of the CP of the USA) as well as in some communist
newspapers (even in the Soviet Union) about the character of the movement.
These were rapidly overcome in the C1 sections.