Marxist-Leninist (North America)
Mar. 1994 No. 112; Communist League
TOOL OF IMPERIALISM
THE NEED FOR A CHANGE IN REVISIONIST POLICY (1933-34)
AFTER THE SUCCESSFUL NAZI COUP OF JANUARY 1933, THE
NEEDS OF THE IMPERIALIST POWERS OF WESTERN EUROPE CHANGED TO A CERTAIN
The basic need now became in deeds to encourage
the German imperialists to expand eastwards towards the Soviet Union, and
eventually make war on that state, while criticising this expansion in
words. This was the basic aim of the so-called 'appeasement policy'
pursued by the West European imperialists -- particularly those of
Britain and France.
The revisionists in the leadership of the Communist
International, in order to serve imperialism, had to change Comintern policy,
had to reverse its pseudo-left policies of 1930-34, and to prepare the
ground for a right opportunist deviation from correct Marxist-Leninist
united front tactics which would objectively assist appeasement.
Such a radical change of policy could obviously be
more easily effected by a new leader, a leader not associated with
the previous pseudo-left deviation and able to criticise this and dissociate
himself from it.
This new leader was the Bulgarian communist Georgi
Dimitrov*. [See the end for biographical details on all "starred
*" names –Editor Alliance]
THE REICHSTAG FIRE (1933)
On 27 February 1933 -- a few days before elections were
due -- a fire severely damaged the building of the German Parliament in
Berlin -- the Reichstag:
"Smoke and flames were seen from the windows of the Reichstag, in the
heart of Berlin . . . at about 9.15 p.m. The fire brigade was there by
9.25. The main hall was already a roaring cauldron. . . .
Adolf Hitler*, Hermann Goering* and Joseph Goebbels*
were quick to arrive at the scene and attributed the fire to 'arson by
A Dutch half-wit named Marinus Van der Lubbe* was arrested when police
found him in the burning ruins".
(John Gunther: 'Inside Europe'; London; 1936; p. 58, 59).
"The Reichstag building was set on fire in 20 places".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives;', Volume 1; p. 690).
"Chancellor Hitler, Dr. Paul Joseph Goebbels, Minister without Portfolio,
and Hermann Goering, Minister of the Interior and Speaker of the Reichstag,
quickly arrived on the scene and attributed the outrage to the Communists".
('New York Times', 17 September 1933, Section 9; p. 3).
". . . orders were issued for the arrest of all Communist members of
the Reichstag. The entire Socialist press throughout Prussia was immediately
On the day following the fire, 28 February 1933, Hitler
exploited the situation by prevailing upon the aged President Hindenburg*
('New York Times', 17 September 1933, Section 9; p. 3).
"to sign a decree ‘For the Protection of the People and the State’
suspending seven sections of the constitution which guaranteed individual
and personal liberties."
As 'Times' correspondent Douglas Reed* wrote:
(William L.Shirer: ‘The Rise & Fall of the Third Reich’; London;
"When Germany awoke, a man's home was no longer his castle. He could
be seized by private individuals, could claim no protection from the police,
could be indefinitely detained without preferment of charges; his property
could be seized, his verbal and written communications overheard and perused,
and his newspapers might no longer freely express their opinions".
and by election day, 5 March 1933,
(Douglas Reed: 'The Burning of the Reichstag'; London; 1934; p. 20).
"practically all of the leaders of the Communist Party, including .
. . Ernst Thaelmann*, the Party's chief in Germany, were under arrest,
either in prison or concentration camps)".
According to the Nazi 'Prussian Press Service' on 28
('New York Times', 17 September 1933, Section 9; p. 3).
". . . Van der Lubbe . . . had on him a Dutch passport, which . . .
stated that he was a member of the Dutch Communist Party".
On 9 March three emigre Bulgarian Communists were arrested
in Berlin in connection with the arson -- Georgi Dimitrov (who had been
working in Berlin as head of the West European Bureau of the Communist
International), Blagir Popov* (a student) and Vasil Tanev* (a shoemaker).
A fourth arrest was that of Ernst Torgler*, leader of the Communist fraction
in the Reichstag.
('Preussische Pressedienst' (Prussian Press Service), 28 February 1933,
in: World Committee for the Victims of German Fascism: 'The Brown Book
of the Hitler Terror and the Burning of the Reichstag'; London; 1933; p.
"The first statements about the Dutchman, issued by Goering, were false.
It was said that he had a membership card of the Communist Party on his
person….. several photographs of himself, and a passport. Obliging fellow!
He did posses the passport, but not the other documents, as the trial subsequently
(John Gunther: op cit.; p.59).
"Van der Lubbe . . . appeared to be in a state of utter apathy to the
point of imbecility throughout the trial".
The International Committee for Aid to Victims of Nazi
Fascists, headed by Albert Einstein*, organised an international commission
of jurists to investigate the Reichstag Fire. It met in London under the
chairmanship of Dennis Pritt*. Its report, published before the Reichstag
Fire Trial began, concluded:
(Denis N. Pritt: 'Autobiography', Part 1: 'From Right to Left'; London;
1965; p. 73).
"That Van der Lubbe was not a member of the Communist Party.
Indeed, the Commission concluded that the real arsonists
were most likely to have been the leaders of the Nazi Party, who wished
to find a pretext for the repression of rival parties -- in particular
the Communist Party. It found:
That no connection whatever could be traced between the Communist Party
and the burning of the Reichstag.
That the accused Torgler, Dimitrov, Popov and Tanev ought to be regarded
not merely as innocent of the crime charged, but also as not having been
concerned with or connected in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly,
with the arson of the Reichstag".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 1; p. 956).
"That the examination of all the possible means of ingress and egress
to or from the Reichstag made it highly probable that the incendiaries
made use of the subterranean passage leading from the Reichstag to the
house of the President of the Reichstag (Goering -- Ed.).
The Commission's findings were abundantly confirmed
in 1946 at the Nuremberg Tribunal. Hans Gisevius*, an official in the Prussian
Ministry of the Interior at the time, gave evidence:
That the happening of such a fire at the period in question was of
great advantage to the National Socialist Party.
That for those reasons and others, grave grounds existed for suspecting
that the Reichstag was set on fire by, or on behalf of, leading personalities
of the National Socialist Party".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 1; p. 956).
"Hitler in a general way had expressed a wish for a large-scale propaganda
campaign. Goebbels undertook to prepare the necessary proposals and it
was Goebbels who first thought of setting the Reichstag on fire. Goebbels
discussed this with the leader of the Berlin SA Brigade, Karl Ernst*, and
he suggested in detail how it should be done.
And General Franz Halder*, who had been Hitler's Chief
of the General Staff in 1939-42, testified in an affidavit:
A certain chemical . . . was chosen. After spraying, it ignites after
a certain time -- hours of minutes. In order to get inside the Reichstag,
one had to go through the corridor leading from the palace of the Reichstag
President (Goering -- Ed.) to the Reichstag itself. Ten reliable SA men
were provided, and then Goering was informed of all details of the plan".
('Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Tribunal',
Volume 12; Nuremberg; 1947; p. 252).
"On the occasion of a luncheon on the Fuehrer's birthday in 1942, people
around the Fuehrer turned the conversation to the Reichstag building and
its artistic value. I heard with my own ears how Goering broke into the
conversation and stated: 'The only one who really knows the Reichstag is
I, for I set fire to it'. And saying this, he slapped his thigh".
The trial of the five defendants in the Reichstag Fire
case opened in Leipzig on 21 September 1933 and, after some sessions in
Berlin, ended there on 23 December.
('Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Tribunal',
Volume 9; Nuremberg; 1947; p. 435).
During the proceedings irrefutable evidence was produced
that Dimitrov had not been in Berlin on 27 and 28 February (the day of,
and the day following, the fire):
"The public prosecutor himself . . . admitted that Dimitrov was in
Munich on the 27th and 28th".
It was clear that Van der Lubbe had been a dupe:
(Stella Blagoeva: 'Georgi Dimitrov: A Biographical Sketch'; Sofia;
1961; p. 131).
"Van der Lubbe, a typical enough unfortunate by-product of modern civilisation,
was not only weak-minded; he had a deep grievance against society and authority,
which his feeble mind sought to remedy by pryomania. He was a genuine arsonist.
A homeless vagrant, wandering in the Berlin slums, he set several fires,
and in his thick manner boasted about them. And Nazis heard him. So much
Yet at his trial Van der Lubbe repeatedly and proudly
insisted that he had been solely responsible for the arson:
(John Gunther: op. cit.; p. 64).
"Van der Lubbe, it seems clear, was a dupe of the Nazis. He was encouraged
to try to set the Reichstag on fire. But the main job was to be done --
without his knowledge, of course -- by the storm troopers".
It was established at the subsequent trial at Leipzig that the Dutch
half-wit did not possess the means to set so vast a building on fire so
(William L. Shirer: op. cit.; p. 242).
"Twice Dr. Wilhelm Buenger, the presiding judge, asked: 'Did you burn
the Reichstag alone, or not?', and twice Van der Lubbe answered 'Yes"'.
Of the five defendants, only Van der Lubbe was found
guilty, sentenced to death and, on 10 January 1934, beheaded.
('New York Times', 11 October 1933; p. 16).
"He was proud of his fire; he resented it deeply when anyone was put
forward to share the credit. With impenetrable obstinacy, he insisted that
he had no confederates, and set the fire alone -- and really believed it'.
(John Gunther: op. cit.; p., 64).
"On December 23 the Leipzig court acquitted the three Bulgarian defendants
for lack of evidence".
There can be no doubt that the defendants in the Reichstag
trial, other than the mentally defective Van der Lubbe, were innocent of
any complicity in the Reichstag fire, and that the real culprits were
the leaders of the Nazi Party.
(Note to: Georgi Dimitrov: 'Selected Works' (hereafter listed as 'Georgi
Dimitrov (1967)', Volume 2; Sofia; 1967; p. 750).
Nevertheless, there remain some very odd features
about the affair which require explanation.
Firstly, why was Dimitrov given, in comparison
with other political prisoners of the Nazis, relatively favourable treatment?
For example, during his interview on his arrival in Moscow in February
1934, Dimitrov was asked:
"The bourgeois press published a photograph showing you . . . in a
cell of the Secret State Police. A large cigar is seen in your hand. Do
you know how this picture was taken and do you recognise it?
Secondly, why was it decided to put the three
Bulgarian Communists on public trial and allow Dimitrov to question Goering
and Goebbels, in a way that made them look foolish, at a time when most
known Communists were being herded into concentration camps without any
trial at all?
Dimitrov: Of course we know this photograph. . . . An American
correspondent . . . said that he wanted to take a picture. At first we
hesitated, but then made the mistake of giving him our consent".
(Georgi Dimitrov: Interview with Representatives of the Soviet and
Foreign Press (27 February 1934), in: Georgi Dimitrov (1967): op. cit.,
Volume 1; p. 528-29).
"Their subsequent trial before the Supreme Court at Leipzig turned
into something of a fiasco for the Nazis, and especially for Goering, whom
Dimitrov, acting as his own lawyer, easily provoked into making a fool
of himself in a series of stinging cross-examinations. . . .The trial.
. . . cast a great deal of suspicion on Goering and the Nazis".
Thirdly, why did the Nazi prosecutors, not noted
for their concern for legal niceties such as innocence or guilt, ask the
Court to acquit the three Bulgarian Communists because of 'insufficient
(William L. Shirer: op. cit.; p. 242-43).
"Georgi Dimitrov . . . must be acquitted, the prosecution held, together
with the two remaining defendants, Blagir Popov and Vasil Tanev, . . .
because the proof against them is insufficient". ('New York Times';, 15
December 1933; p. 19).
Fourthly, why did a Nazi court, not noted for
justice towards Communists, find all the Communist defendants not guilty?
The official reply to this question by the Bulgarian
revisionists is 'international pressure':
"Under the pressure of this struggle, which developed into an international
campaign of unprecedented proportions, on the 23rd December 1933 the fascist
court was forced to acquit Dimitrov".
Yet on most other questions international pressure was
singularly unsuccessful in modifying Nazi policies.
(National Council of the Fatherland Front: 'Georgi Dimitrov: A Short
Biographical Note'; London; 1949; p. 22).
Fifthly, why did capitalist newspapers in
many countries -- newspapers usually not noted for objectivity towards
Communists or for their critical attitude towards Nazism -- support the
campaign in favour of Dimitrov's innocence? For example,
"The suggestion that the German Communists had any official connection
with the affair is just nonsense?"
Sixthly, why were the three Bulgarian defendants
assisted by the Nazis, in February 1934, to fly to a heroes' welcome in
Moscow, while the German defendant Torgler, who was also acquitted, disappeared
into a concentration camp?
('News Chronicle', 1 March 1933; p. 1).
"The assumption of Communist guilt . . . did not find universal credence
in Germany, and met with almost universal scepticism abroad".
(Douglas Reed: op. cit.; p. 13).
"We were . . . sent by plane from Berlin directly to Moscow".
Seventhly, why, in the years that followed the
Reichstag Trial, did international revisionism continue to extol Dimitrov
as a 'heroic Marxist-Leninist' while denouncing as 'criminals' genuine
Marxist-Leninists like Stalin?
(Georgi Dimitrov: Interview with Representatives of the Soviet and
Foreign Press (27 February 1934), in: Georgi Dimitrov (1967: op. cit.,
Volume 1; p. 523).
"On February 27 1934 Dimitrov, Popov and Tanev arrived at Moscow aerodrome
. . . from Berlin".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 1; p. 1,142).
"The German Communist leader (Torgler -- Ed.) was immediately taken
into 'protective custody"'.
(William L. Shirer: op. cit.; p. 242).
For example, a conference was held in Sofia in June
1972, in honour of Dimitrov at which revisionists from all over the world
paid fulsome tribute to him. The leading Soviet revisionist Boris Ponomarev*
" . . . Dimitrov's personal efforts to rally the international communist
movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Georgi Dimitrov was irreconcilable
towards any deviations from the revolutionary basis of scientific communism".
And the Yugoslav revisionist leader 'Tito'* sent a message
(Boris Ponomarev: 'Georgi Dimitrov's Ideological Heritage and Contemporaneity',
in: 'Georgi Dimitrov and the Unification of the Revolutionary and Democratic
Forces for Peace, Democracy and Socialism'; Sofia; 1974; p. 47).
"Georgi Dimitrov was one of those revolutionaries who constructively
applied and developed Marxism-Leninism in accordance with the special needs
of each country".
Marxism-Leninism teaches us that everything makes sense.
(Josip Broz ('Tito'): "His Thoughts and Ideas are still Alive Today
and are of Topical Importance', in: ibid.; p. 126-27).
THE SEVEN ODD FEATURES OF THE REICHSTAG FIRE CASE MAKE COMPLETE
SENSE IF DIMITROV'S TRIAL AND ACQUITTAL WERE STAGED AS PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL
IMPERIALIST CONSPIRACY TO FACILITATE HIS ELECTION TO THE LEADING POST IN
THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, A POST IN WHICH HE COULD SERVE THE INTERESTS
OF EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM.
Of course, the working class needs heroic figures, and
it would be unforgivable to slander a genuinely heroic Marxist-Leninist.
But, the above interpretation of the facts is
confirmed by a number of witnesses:
For example, the former leading German Communist
Ruth Fischer* asserts that she was assured of its truth by Wilhelm Pieck*
and Communist Reichstag deputy Maria Reese:
"Independently, both told me the same story, that before Dimitrov stood
up in the courtroom to make his courageous peroration, he knew of the secret
arrangement . . . that he would leave it a free man".
And the American historian Stephe Koch* confirms:
(Ruth Fischer: 'Stalin and German Communism: A Study in the Origins
of the State Party '; London; 1948; p. 309).
"The trial was a charade within a charade. . . .
The suitability of Dimitrov for the post of imperialism's
nominee for the post of Secretary-General of the Communist International
in these circumstances is supported by the fact that in 1929 -- as Babette
Gross, the widow of the German revisionist Willi Muenzenberg* relates --
he had been:
In 1989, I interviewed Muenzenberg's* 92-year-old widow, Babette Gross,
in Munich. She confirmed Ruth Fischer's information about a deal. . . .
In 1992, Peter Semerdjiev, a former member of the Bulgarian Party's Central
Committee, who had been very close to Dimitrov, told me that during the
40s and 50s the secret conspiracy was known to him and a few top leaders".
(Stephen Koch: 'The Dimitrov Conspiracy', in: 'New York Times', 22
January 1994; p. 21).
". . . removed from the Party leadership (of the Bulgarian Communist
Party -- Ed.) for 'conciliatory, rightist tendencies"'.
According to Lenin, the transition from a capitalist
to a socialist society can be accomplished only by means of a violent
revolution on the part of the working class:
(Babette Gross: 'Willi Muenzenberg: A Political Biography'; East Lansing
(USA); 1974; p. 251).
INDEED, THE FACTS SHOW INCONTROVERTIBLY THAT DIMITROV WAS ONE OF
THE PIONEERS OF MODERN REVISIONISM.
THE TRANSITION TO 'PEACEFUL PARLIAMENTARY TRANSITION'
Lenin's Fundamental Principle
"The substitution of the proletarian state for the bourgeois state
is impossible without a violent revolution".
Stalin unequivocally endorsed Lenin's view:
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The State and Revolution: The Marxist Doctrine
of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution' (August
1917), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 7; London; 1946; p. 21).
"Can . . . a radical transformation of the old bourgeois order be achieved
without a violent revolution, without the dictatorship of the proletariat?
This conception was incorporated in Lenin's theses on
bourgeois democracy adopted by the lst Congress of the Communist International
in March 1919:
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Concerning Questions of Leninism' (January 1926),
in: 'Works', Volume 8; Moscow; 1954; p. 25).
"History teaches us that no oppressed class ever did, or could, achieve
power without . . . the conquest of political power and forcible suppression
of the resistance always offered by the exploiters. . . .
Further, Lenin dismissed as a 'reactionary, petty-bourgeois
dream' the concept that there could be a form of state intermediate
between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and that of the proletariat:
The main report at the 7th World Congress of the Comintern
was given by Georgi Dimitrov -- on 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks
of the Communist International'. At a casual reading, this report appears
to follow Marxist-Leninist principles on the question of the transition
to socialism. Dimitrov dismisses as an 'illusion' the revisionist
concept of 'peaceful, parliamentary transition to socialism', and condemns
as 'Right opportunism' the revisionist concept that there
could be some intermediate type of state between the dictatorship of the
bourgeoisie and that of the proletariat:
The capitalists and exploiters have to be overthrown and their resistance
(Vladimir I. Lenin: Theses and Report on Bourgeois Democracy and the
Dictatorship of the Proletariat, lst. Congress of Communist International
(March 1919), in: 'Collected Works', Volume 28; Moscow; 1974; p. 458, 461).
"The Right opportunists . . . tried to establish a special 'democratic
intermediate stage' lying between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and
the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the purpose of instilling into
the workers the illusion of a peaceful parliamentary passage from one dictatorship
to the other".
and he insists that a united front government is not
a Soviet government (i.e., a government of the dictatorship of the proletariat)
so that the establishment of such a government does not eliminate the
need for a socialist revolution to establish Soviet power:
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International', 7th World Congress of CI, (August 1935j, in: 'The United
Front: The Struggle against Fascism and War' (hereafter listed as 'Georgi
M. Dimitrov (1938)', London; 1938; p. 75).
"We indicate the possibility of forming an anti-fascist united front
government. . . .
And yet, in spite of these correct Marxist-Leninist
formulations, Dimitrov opens the door slightly to the revisionist concept
of 'peaceful, parliamentary transition to socialism' when he avers that
an elected united front government can make revolutionary inroads into
the political and economic power of the capitalist class:
This government is not in a position to overthrow the class rule of
the exploiters. . Consequently, it is necessary to prepare for socialist
revolution. Soviet power and only Soviet power can bring salvation".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938): ibid.; p. 76).
"We demand an entirely different policy from any united front government.
We demand that it should carry out definite and fundamental revolutionary
demands required by the situation. For instance, control of production,
control of the banks, disbanding of the police and its replacement by an
armed workers' militia, etc.".
But if a united front government is not a government
of the dictatorship of the proletariat and yet is in a position to make
'revolutionary inroads' into the political and economic power of the capitalist
class, it must be some kind of intermediate government between the dictatorship
of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat which Dimitrov
has earlier dismissed as a 'Right opportunist illusion'!
(Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938: ibid.; p. 75).
The 'Decentralisation' of the Communist International (September
On Lenin's insistence, the Communist International was
a highly centralised international organisation:
"All decisions of the Communist International's congresses and of its
Executive Committee are binding on all affiliated parties. . . . The Communist
International must be far more centralised than the Second International
In fact, even when revisionists dominated it, the centralised
Communist International was a significant barrier to the adoption of clearly
revisionist ideas, since individual parties could raise objections to these
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The Terms of Admission into the Communist International'
(July 1920), in: 'Collected Works', Volume 31; Moscow; 1974; p. 211).
Consequently, in September 1935, as soon as the 7th
World Congress of the Communist International was over, the revisionist
leadership of the CI initiated steps to decentralise the organisation,
giving the individual parties 'day-to-day management' of their affairs:
At a meeting of the Secretariat of the ECCI in September
1936, Dimitrov reversed his 1935 position that there could be no such thing
as an 'intermediate state' between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie
and that of the proletariat. He now declared that the Popular Front governments
elected in Spain in February 1936 and in France in June 1936 were precisely
such 'intermediate states':
"Challenging the old guidelines to the effect that a state was always
either a capitalist or a socialist state, Dimitrov said that there was
now coming into being a democratic state in which 'the popular front is
of decisive importance".
Dimitrov defined this imaginary 'intermediate state'
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU: op. cit.; p. 417).
"a special form of the democratic dictatorship of the working class
But Lenin used the term 'democratic dictatorship of
the proletariat and the peasantry' to mean, not an elected progressive
government, but one which came into being by revolution, specifically
in the first stage of the revolutionary process in Russia. Significantly,
he usually termed it 'the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship
of the proletariat and the peasantry':
(CPSU: Central Party Archives, Institute of Marxism-Leninism: 495/18/1135/8,
in: Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU: op. cit.; p. 417).
"A successful revolution . . . cannot be anything but the democratic
dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry".
In an article in October 1936, Palmiro Togliatti* coined
the term 'new democracy' to describe the Popular Front government
which had been elected in Spain in February:
(Vladimir I. Lenin: Report on the Question of the Participation of
the Social-Democrats in a Provisional Revolutionary Government, 3rd Congress
of RSDLP (April 1905), in: 'Collected Works', Volume 8; Moscow; 1962; p.
"Victorious revolution democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'Victorious Revolution' (May/June 1905), in: 'Collected
Works', Volume 8; Moscow; 1962; p. 450).
"A decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism is the revolutionary-democratic
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry'."
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic
Revolution' (June/July 1905), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; London; 1946;
"The democratic republic which is being established in Spain is a new
type of democratic republic . . . . a new democracy".
The term 'new democracy' was taken over by the Chinese
revisionist leader Mao Tse-tung* and applied to a type of state created
after the first stage of the revolutionary process in a colonial-type country
and described as 'the joint dictatorship of several classes including the
On the day of the German attack on the Soviet Union,
22 June 1941, the revisionist leaders of the Communist International reorganised
the ECCI so as to place management of the ECCI's work in the hands of a
triumvirate of three leading revisionists -- Georgi Dimitrov, Dmitry Manuilsky
and Palmiro Togliatti:
On 15 May 1943 the Presidium of the Executive Committee
of the Communist International submitted a proposal to the Communist Parties
for the dissolution of the Communist International.
(Palmiro Togliatti: 'Specific Features of the Spanish Revolution',
in: 'International Press Correspondence', Volume 16, No. 48 (24 October
1936); p. 1,295).
The decision to dissolve the Communist International
was taken by the Presidium of the ECCI on 8 June 1943:
"The proposal of the ECCI Presidium was supported by 31 sections. Not
a single communist party objected to it. . . .
The aim of the Communist International was defined in
its Statutes as
After perusal of the texts of the communist parties' decisions, on
June 8, 1943 . . . a decision was taken to abolish, as from June 10, 1943,
the Communist International".
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU: op. cit.; p. 514).
". . . to fight by all available means, including armed struggle, for
the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie and for the creation of
an international Soviet republic".
Clearly, therefore, the motive for the dissolution of
the CI was not because its aims had been achieved.
(Communist International: Statutes, in: Jane Degras (Ed.): 'The Communist
International: 1919-1943: Documents' (hereafter listed as 'Jane Degras
(Ed.) (1971)', Volume 1; London; 1971; p. 163).
The reasons given for the proposal were, firstly
that, because of the increased complexity of the international situation,
" . . the organisational form of uniting the workers chosen by the
first congress of the Communist International . . . has . . . become a
drag on the further strengthening of the national working-class parties".
and, secondly, that the Communist International
had become superfluous as a result of:
(ECCI Presidium: Resolution recommending the Dissolution of the Communist
International (May 1943), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): ibid., Volume 3;
". . . the growth and political maturity of the communist parties and
their leading cadres in the separate countries".
Neither of these reasons has any validity.
(ECCI Presidium: ibid.; p. 479).
Firstly, the CI had based itself on
the principle of taking national differences fully into account. The Programme
of the CI emphasised:
"The unequal development of capitalism, accentuated in the epoch of
imperialism, has given rise to a great variety of types of capitalism,
different degrees of maturity in different countries, and to a great variety
of conditions of the revolutionary process peculiar to each. It follows
with historical inevitability that the proletariat will seize power in
a variety of ways and with varying degrees of rapidity. . . . It follows
further from this that the construction of socialism will assume different
forms in different countries".
and the 7th Congress in July/August 1935 instructed
(Programme of the Communist International, (September 1928), in: Jane
Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 2; p. 505).
" . . to proceed, in deciding any question, from the concrete situation
and specific conditions obtaining in each particular country".
Secondly, the lack of political maturity on the
part of the great majority of Communist Parties is shown incontrovertibly
by the fact that within a short time of the dissolution most had openly
embraced revisionism of one hue or another and were in a state of mutual
(7th Congress CI: Resolution on the Report of the ECCI (August 1935,
in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p. 354).
The decision to dissolve the Communist International
was not one that undermined the security of the socialist state. Therefore,
the Marxist-Leninist minority in the leadership of the Communist International
and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not resist the move to
the point of resigning from these bodies, but accepted the majority decision
as binding on them. Indeed, they could hardly make a stand for the maintenance
of an organisation that was dominated by revisionists.
Answering a question on the subject from Reuter's
Moscow correspondent, Harold King*, Stalin said:
"The dissolution of the Communist International is proper and timely".
It was significant, however, that Stalin did not give
as his reason for favouring dissolution either of the reasons given by
the Communist International itself. On the contrary, he gave as the reason
for his support that:
(Josef V. Stalin: 'The Dissolution of the Communist International -Answer
to Reuter's Correspondent, May 28, 1943', in: 'War Speeches, Orders of
the Day, and Answers to Press Correspondents during the Great Patriotic
War: July 3rd, 1941-June 22nd, 1945'; London; 1956; p. 66).
" . . . it facilitates the work of patriots of all countries for unifying
freedom-loving peoples into a single international camp for the fight against
the menace of world domination by Hitlerism". (Josef V. Stalin: ibid.;
In other words, Stalin was implying -- without breaching
the discipline of the CI and the CPSU -- that the CI, under its revisionist
leadership, had ceased to be of any use as an organ of socialist revolution
so that in these circumstances its dissolution would usefully contribute
to united -military action with the imperialist powers.
The Marxist-Leninist minority on the Communist International
took the view that, instead of trying to save the old degenerate Comintern
under its revisionist leadership, they would rather seek to form a new
international organisation, under new anti-revisionist Marxist-Leninist
leadership. As we shall see, this new body came into being in 1947
as the 'Communist Information Bureau' (Cominform).
The question arises:
What was so urgent about the proposal to dissolve
the CI that it could not be submitted to a Congress of the CI?
The great victory of Stalingrad had already taken
place, the Soviet armies had already embarked on their great counter-offensive
against the German forces, and Allied forces had already landed in North
Africa. The critical phase of the war for the Soviet Union had passed,
and victory was clearly approaching.
But if the revisionists had waited till the end of
the war to put forward their proposal, this would have had to have been
debated at a Congress -where some Communist Parties might
have questioned it. But in 1943 the revisionists could claim that:
Freed of the 'restraints' of the Comintern, some Communist
Parties lapsed almost immediately into open revisionism.
The Formulation of Earl Browder (1944-45)
In 1944, the leader of the Communist Party of
the United States of America, Earl Browder*, initiated the adoption by
the Party of a totally revisionist programme. He presented the agreement
between the Soviet Union and the Western imperialist powers at Teheran
as an indication that interclass antagonisms had been eliminated, and that
American capitalism could be peacefully transformed into socialism by class
collaboration through the institutions of "American democracy". Browder
further put forward the view that:
" . . . the two-party system provides adequate channels for the basic
so that the existence of the Communist Party had become
an obstacle to national unity!
(Earl Browder, in: Philip J. Jaffe: 'The Rise and Fall of Earl Browder',
in: 'Survey', Volume 18, No, 2 (Spring 1972); p. 50).
Under Browder's leadership, the 10th Convention of
the CPUSA in May 1944 dissolved the Party and reconstituted it as the 'Communist
Political Association', the aim of which was to carry on 'political education'
to make the public understand that the peaceful transition to 'socialism',
through the nationalisation of monopolistic enterprises, was socially desirable.
The CPA's constitution states:
"The Communist Political Association is a non-party organisation of
Americans which . . . carries forward the tradition of Washington, Jefferson,
Paine, Jackson and Lincoln. . . .
William Foster*, who was opposed to Browder's Teheran
theses (though not to the liquidation of the Communist Party), wrote to
Dimitrov asking for his support in opposing Browder, but Dimitrov wrote
back supporting Browder:
It looks to the family of free nations, led by the great coalition
of democratic capitalist and socialist states, to inaugurate an era of
world peace, expanding production and economic well-being".
(Communist Political Association: Constitution, in: Philip J. Jaffe:
ibid.; p. 51).
"Dimitrov transmitted a message to Foster, through Browder, strongly
urging him to withdraw his opposition. Dimitrov's reply was a severe blow
to Foster, who did not attack Browder's Teheran theses again for more than
Foster was, in fact,
(Philip J. Jaffe: ibid,; p. 47-48).
". . . so cowed by the almost unanimous opposition of his critics and
by Dimitrov's reply that he asked for the honour of nominating Earl Browder
as President of the new Communist Political Association. And he himself
was elected as one of the Vice-Presidents".
In the April 1945 issue of 'Cahiers du Communisme' (Notebooks
of Communism), the theoretical journal of the French Communist Party there
appeared, under the title 'On the Dissolution of the Communist Party of
the USA', an article attributed to the leading French communist Jacques
Duclos* and highly critical of Browderism. The main points of his criticism
(Phlip J. Jaffe: ibid.; p. 51).
"Earl Browder declared, in effect, that at Teheran capitalism and socialism
had begun to find the means of peaceful . . . collaboration in the framework
of one and the same world. . . . Earl Browder drew political conclusions
. . . that the,principal problems of internal politics of the US must in
future be solved exclusively by means of reforms, for the expectation of
unlimited inner conflict threatens also the perspective of international
unity held forth at Teheran". (Jacques Duclos: 'On the Dissolution of the
Communist Party of the USA', in: Philip J. Jaffe: ibid.; p. 53).
Thus, charged the article, Browder had distorted the
meaning of the Teheran declaration:
" . . . into a political platform for class peace in the United States".
The article dismissed Browder's claim that nationalisation
of monopolies was equivalent to socialism:
(Jacques Duclos: ibid., p. 53).
"Nationalisation of monopolies actually in no sense constitutes a socialist
achievement. . . . It is not simply a matter of reforms of a democratic
character, achievement of socialism being impossible to imagine without
a preliminary conquest of power".
Finally, the article strongly criticised the dissolution
of the Communist Party:
(Jacques Duclos: ibid.; p. 54).
"Earl Browder proposed to name the new organisation 'Communist Political
Association' which, in the traditional American two-party system, will
not intervene as a 'party', that is, it will not propose candidates in
the elections . . . but will work to assemble a broad progressive and democratic
movement within all parties".
Although the article bore Duclos's signature, it was
in fact written in Moscow, almost certainly under the guidance of Andrey
(Jacques Duclos: ibid.; p. 53).
"It is . . . clearly evident that the so-called 'Duclos article'; could
not have been written in France, but was written in Moscow, probably under
the guidance of Andrey Zhdanov". (Philip A. Jaffe: op. cit; p. 59).
Following the circulation of the 'Duclos Letter', at
a Special Emergency Convention of the CPA on 26-28 July 045, a resolution
was adopted to reconstitute the CPUSA, headed by a temporary Secretariat.
In February 1946 Browder was expelled from the reconstituted party and
in July 1946 Eugene Dennis* was elected General Secretary.
The Formulation of Harry Pollitt (1945)
In May 1945, before the appearance of the 'Duclos' letter,
the revisionist leader of the Communist Party of Great Britain, Harry Pollitt*
rushed to jump on the Browder bandwagon and embrace state capitalism:
"State capitalism can mean that the sectional interests of the capitalists
are to some extent subordinated to the needs of the whole (which include
. . . the workers). . . .
Following publication of the 'Duclos' letter, the pamphlet
The conditions created by the great political changes arising out of
this war are now objectively more favourable for the peaceful transition
to socialism than they have ever been. . . .
There is, up to a point, a common interest between all the progressive
sections of the nation, labour and capitalist alike".
(Harry Pollitt: 'Answers to Questions' (May 1945); London; 1945; p.
30, 39, 44).
The Formulation of Georgi Dimitrov (1946)
In March 1946, a year after he had supported Browderism,
Dimitrov openly embraced the revisionist thesis that socialism could be
attained peacefully, without revolution:
"In certain conditions socialism may be attained without an uprising.
These conditions now exist".
The editor of Dimitrov's 'Selected Works', Spass Roussinov,
explains the change of line by 'changed conditions':
In 1947 the Soviet government was alarmed at proposals
from Tito and Dimitrov for the formation of a 'Balkan Federation' -- proposals
which they saw as an anti-Soviet move:
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Young Workers' League must be a School of
Socialism', (March 1946), in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1967): op. cit., Volume2'
; Sofia; 1967; p. 195).
"It is probable that the Yugoslav-Bulgarian negotiations on a projected
federation first gave the signal to the Russian camp. That two such important
parties could commit so grave an ideological crime warned the leaders in
the Kremlin that something was radically amiss with the new regimes".
Speaking in Sofia in November 1947 before the signing
of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian 'Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual
Aid', Tito said:
( -- : 'The Evolution of the Cominform: 1947-50', in: 'The World Today',
Volume 6, No. 5 (May 1950); p. 218-19).
"We shall establish cooperation so general and so close that that the
question of federation will be a mere formality".
And during his visit to Bucharest in January 1948 for
the signing of the Bulgarian-Romanian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance,
Dimitrov, now Prime Minister of Bulgaria,
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 6; p. 8,975).
" . . . spoke of the possibility of an eventual federation of the Eastern
European nations allied to Russia. . . .
Eleven days later, on 28 January, a 'Pravda' editorial
He declared that the first step would be a Customs Union between these
countries, adding that 'when the time is ripe . . . the peoples of the
popular democracies . . . will decide whether it (the Customs Union) shall
be a federation of States. M. Dimitrov listed as members of the projected
federation 'Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and even Greece. . . . and declared that it would 'if possible' establish
trade relations with America, Britain and France".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 6; p. 9,118).
". . . came out in strong opposition to the proposals for an East European
federation as set forth by M. Dimitrov, saying inter alia. 'These
countries do not need a problematical and artificial federation or Customs
Union. What they do need is the consolidation and protection of their independence
and sovereignty, through the mobilisation and organisation of domestic
popular democratic forces, as has been correctly stated in the declaration
of the Cominform"'. ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 6; p. 9,118).
In his report to the 2nd Congress of the Bulgarian Fatherland
Front in February 1948, Dimitrov said:
"These notes in 'Pravda' are well-grounded and are a timely, valuable
and useful warning against possible inexpedient exaggerations harmful to
the People's Democracies".
In July 1948, after the expulsion of the Communist Party
of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian
Communist Party hastily dissociated itself from Titoism. It
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: Report to the 2nd Congress of the Fatherland Front
(February 1948), in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1967), Volume 2; p. 511-12).
". . . unanimously declared that the leadership of our Party has never
doubted the leading role played by the Russian Communist Party and the
Soviet Union in the democratic camp. They recognised that they had not
shown sufficient vigilance towards the Yugoslav Communist Party".
In these circumstances, at the trial of Traicho Kostov*
and others in Sofia in December 1949, the character of the Balkan Federation
proposals were correctly characterised as treasonable, but Dimitrov was
not included among the defendants and the blame for the abortive Balkan
Federation scheme was placed on Tito and Kostov's group:
('The Evolution of the Cominform: 1947-50', in: 'The World Today',
Volume 6, No. 5 (May 1950); p. 223-24).
"The federation thought up by the Titoists and Traicho Kostov's group
had as its aim fully to destroy the national independence of the People's
Republic of Bulgaria, making her a simple appendage of Yugoslavia. . .
and the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir
Poptomov*, was at pains to deny the Yugoslav government's assertions that
Dimitrov had been a Titoist:
Five years later, in 1951, the revisionist leadership
Of the Communist Party of Great Britain officially followed Dimitrov's
In February 1956 the 'peaceful, parliamentary road to
socialism' was endorsed on behalf of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union by its First Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev*:
For the Titoists and for Traicho Kostovts group, . . . the federation
was envisaged as a true assault upon our friendship and collaboration with
the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, an assault upon the socialist
development of our country. The economic and political submission of Bulgaria
and her enslavement by Anglo-American imperialists was being aimed at".
(Vladimir Dimchev, Prosecutor: Speech at: 'The Trial of Traicho Kostov
and His Groupt; Sofia; 1949; p. 512-13).
"In a number of capitalist countries . . . the working class . . .
is in a position to capture a stable majority in parliament, and transform
the latter from an organ of bourgeois democracy into a genuine instrument
of the people's will. In such an event, this institution . . . may become
an organ of genuine democracy -- democracy for the working people".
Despite its verbal criticism of modern revisionism,
the Declaration of the Meeting of the Communist and Workers' Parties of
Socialist Countries, held in Moscow in November 1957, gave international
endorsement to this revisionist formulation:
(Nikita S. Khrushchev: Report of the Central Committee to the 20th
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (February 1956); London;
1956;1 p. 30).
"Today . . . the working class can defeat the reactionary, antipopular
forces, secure a firm majority in parliament, transform parliament from
an instrument serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument
serving the working people, launch a nonparliamentary mass struggle, smash
the resistance of the reactionary forces and create the necessary conditions
for the peaceful realisation of the revolution".
(Declaration of the Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist
Countries (16 November 1957), in: John Gittings: 'Survey of the Sino-Soviet
Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent Polemics: 1963-1967';
London; 1968; p. 318).
THE REICHSTAG FIRE TRIAL OF 1933 WAS STAGED BY THE NAZIS IN CONJUNCTION
WITH OTHER WEST EUROPEAN IMPERIALISTS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CREDENTIALS FOR
GEORGI DIMITROV, A CONCEALED REVISIONIST WITH A HISTORY OF RIGHT-REVISIONISM,
TO TAKE OVER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COMINTERN AND DIVERT IT ALONG THE PATH
OF RIGHT OPPORTUNIST APPEASEMENT OF NAZI GERMANY IN ORDER TO SERVE THE
NEEDS OF WEST EUROPREAN IMPERIALISTS IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
WHICH FOLLOWED THE NAZI COUP OF 1933.
'COMpass' is published by: THE COMMUNIST LEAGUE; The aim of the
Communist League is to establish in Britain a Marxist-Leninist Party of
the working class free of all revisionist trends.
BROWDER, Earl R. American revisionist politician (1891-1973); General
Secretary, Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (1927-28); General Secretary,
CPUSA (1930-45); expelled from CP (1946).
followed by Bibliography
DENNIS, Eugene (American revisionist politician (1904-61); General
Secretary CPUSA (1946-59); President, CPUSA (1959-61).
DIMITROV, Georgi M., Bulgarian revisionist politician (1882-1949);
Head, West European Section, CI (1929-33); defendant in Reichstag Fire
Trial (193334); to Moscow (1934); Secretary-General, CI (1935-43); to Bulgaria
(1945); Premier (1945-49).
DUCLOS, Jacques , French revisionist politician (1896-1975); Secretary,
FCP (1931-64); Vice-President, National Assembly (1936-40); Senator (1959-79).
EINSTEIN, Albert, German-born physicist (1879-1955); published theories
of relativity (1905, 1916); Director, Kaiser Wilhelm Physical Institute,
Berlin (1914-33); Nobel Prize for Physics (1922); to USA (1933); Member,
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University (1933-45).US citizen
(1940); Professor of Physics, Princeton University (1940-55).
ERNST, Karl, German fascist para-military leader (1904-34); leader,
SA, Berlin and Brandenburg (1931-34); murdered by fascists in 'Blood Purge'
FISCHER, Ruth, German revisionist politician (1895-1961); leader,
CPG (1924-25); expelled CPG (1926); to France (1933); member, International
Secretariat, (Trotskyist) Communist League (1935-36); to USA (1941)
FOSTER, William Z., American revisionist politician (1881-1961);
Member, Presidium, ECCI (1931-43); National Chairman, CPUSA (1932-57);
President, CPUSA (1957-61).
GISEVIUS, Hans B., German fascist diplomat (1904-74); Vice-Consul,
Zurich (1940-44); prosecution witness, War Crimes Trial (1946).
GOEBBELS, Joseph P., German fascist politician (1897-1945); Minister
for Propaganda (1933-45); committed suicide (1945).
GOERING, Hermann W., German fascist politician (1893-1946); President,
Reichstag (1932-45); Prussian Premier, Minister of Interior & Air Minister
(1933-45); commander-in-chief, Luftwaffe (1935-45); field marshal (1938);
Reichmarshal (1940); defendant, War Crimes Trial (1946); committed suicide
HALDER, Franz, German military officer (1884-1972); Chief of General
HINDENBURG, Paul von, German military officer and politician (1847-1934);
general (1903); field marshal (1914); Chief of General Staff (1916-19);
retired from army (1919); President (1925-34).
HITLER, Adolf, German fascist politician (1889-1945); Chancellor
(1933-34); Fuehrer (1934-45); committed suicide (1945).
KHRUSHCHEV, Nikita S., Soviet revisionist politician (1894-1971);
Member, Politburo, CPSU (1939-64); lst. Secretary, CP Ukraine (1944-49);
1st. Secretary, CPSU (1953-64); USSR Premier (1958-64).
KING, Harold, German-born British journalist (1898-1990); assistant
general manager, Reuters, Paris (1958-67); retired (1967).
KOCH, Stephen (pron. Coke), American writer and teacher (1941- Instructor
in Fiction Writing, Columbia University, NY (1977- ).
KOSTOV, Traicho, Bulgarian revisionist politician (1897-1949); SecretaryGeneral,
BCP (1944-45); Deputy-Premier (1946); arrested, found guilty of treason
and executed (1949).
LUBBE, Marinus van der, Dutch anarchist (1910-34); scapegoat in Reichstag
Fire (1933); convicted of high treason and guillotined (1934),
MAO Tse-tung, Chinese revisionist politician (1893-1976); Chairman,
Chinese Soviet Republic, Kiangsi (1931-34); Chairman, CCP (1935-76); President
(1949-59); initiated reactionary 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution'
MUENZENBERG, Willi, German revisionist publisher and editor (1899-1940);
head, Young Communist International (1919-21); founded 'Workers' International
Relief' (1921); founded 'League against Imperialism' (1927); to France
(1933); became anti-Communist and expelled from CPG (1937); murdered in
POLLITT, Harry, British revisionist politician (1890-1960); Secretary,
'Hands off Russia' Movement (1919); Secretary, 'National Minority Movement'
(1924-291; General Secretary, CPGB (1929-39, 1941-56); Chairman, CPG (1956-60).
PONOMAREV, Boris N., Soviet revisionist politician (1905- ); Head,
Government Information Bureau (1946-49); Deputy-Director, Marx-Engels-Lenin
Institute ~043-44); Secretary, CC, CPSU (1961-86); retired (1986).
POPOV, Blagaev. Bulgarian revisionist politician (1902-); defendant
in Reichstag Fire Trial (1933); to Moscow (1935); made public self-criticism
(1936); arrested, found guilty of treason (1937); imprisoned (1937-54);
to Bulgaria, where employed in Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1954-67).
POPTOMOV, Vladimir, Bulgarian revisionist politician (1890-1952);
Minister of Foreign Affairs (1949-50); Deputy-Premier (1950-52).
PRITT, Denis N.,,British lawyer and author (1887-1972); called to
bar (1909) QC (1927); MP (1935-50); Chairman, Reichstag Fire Trial Inquiry
Commission (1933); member, Labour Party Executive (1936-37); retire from
practice (1960); Professor of Law, University of Ghana (1965-66).
REED, Douglas, British journalist (1895-1976); reporter, 'Times'
Assistant Correspondent, Berlin, 'Times' (1929-35); Chief Central
European Correspondent, 'Times', (135-38); Special Chronicle' (1938-39);
free-lance writer (1939-73).
TANEV, Vasil, Bulgarian revisionist politician (1897-1941); defendant
Reichstag Fire Trial (1933); to Moscow (1934); made public self –criticisms
THAELMANN, (pron. TAYL'man), Ernst, German Marxist-Leninist politician
(18661944); Chairman, CPG (025-33); arrested by Nazis (1933); murdered
by Nazis in concentration camp 0944).
('TITO'), Broz, Josip, Yugoslav revisionist politician (1892-1980);
Organising Secretary, YCP (1936-37); Secretary-General, YPC (1937-48);
Marshal (1943); Secretary-General, League of Communists of Yugoslavia (1948-80);
Premier & Minister of Defence (1945-53); President (1953-80); Chairman,
TOGLIATTI, Palmiro, Italian revisionist politician (1893-1954); member,
Presidium, ECCI (1924-43);secretary-general ICP (1927-64); to Italy (1944);
Deputy Premier (1945-47).
TORGLER, Ernst , German revisionist politician (1893-1963); deputy,
Reichstag (1924-33); arrested (1933); defendant, Reichstag Fire Trial (1934);
imprisoned (1934-35); released (1935); expelled, CPG (1935); joined Social-democratic
ZHDANOV, Andrey A., Soviet Marxist-Leninist politician (1896-1948);
Secretary, CPSU, Leningrad (034-44); member, Politburo, CPSU (1935-48j;
lieutenant-general (1943); murdered by revisionists (1948).
Blagoeva, Stella: 'Georgi Dimitrov: A Biographical Sketch'; Sofia; 1961.
Communist Party of Great Britain: 'The British Road to Socialism';
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Volumes 1, 2 and 3; London; 1971.
Dimitrov, Georgi M.: 'Selected Works', Volumes 1 and 2; Sofia; 1967.
---: 'The United Front: The Struggle against Fascism and War';
Fischer, Ruth: 'Stalin and German Communism: A Study in the Origins
of the State Party'; London; 1948.
Gittings, John: 'Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary
and Extracts from the Recent Polemics: 1963-67'; London; 1968.
Gross, Babette: 'Willi Muenzenberg: A Political Biography'; East
Lansing (USA); 1974.
Gunther. John: 'Inside Europe'; London; 1936.
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Koch, Stephen: 'The Dimitrov Conspiracy', in: New York Times; 23
Khrushchev, Nikita S.: Report of the Central Committee to the 20th
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union'; London; 1956.
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the Hitler Terror and the Burning of the Reichstag'; London; 1933.
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and Democratic Forces for Peace, Democracy and Socialism'; Sofia; 1974.
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'International Press Correspondence'.
'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'.
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