“ALLIANCE!”
MARXIST-LENINIST
SUMMER 2006
WHO
DOES HIZBULLAH REPRESENT IN CLASS TERMS?
Contents:
Introduction
The ‘Confessional’ Divides Are Class Divisions
Hizbullah and the Shi’ia
Origins of HIzbullah
Relations With Iran and Syria
Internal Conflicts Within Hizbullah on Foreign Alliances and Secular Politics
Hizbullah After the Assassination of Hariri and the 2005 Withdrawal of Syria
The
Social Welfare Policies of HIzbullah
Nature of the military Campaign of Hizbullah
The War with Israel from 1982 to 2006
Current Status vis-à-vis Iran and Syria
The Current State of War in Lebanon
Introduction
It is impossible to appraise the recent
war launched
by Israel without understanding the overall geopolitical strategy of
Israel.
“In 1982, the Hebrew journal Kivunim
-- the official organ of the World
Zionist
Organization -- published an article by former Israeli
Foreign
Ministry official Oded Yinon,
who observed that: "Iraq, rich in oil on
the
one hand and internally torn on the other, is guaranteed as a candidate
for
Israel’s targets. Its dissolution is even more important for us than
that of
Syria... In the short run it is Iraqi power which constitutes the
greatest
threat to Israel... Every kind of inter-Arab confrontation will assist
us in
the short run and will shorten the way to the more important aim of
breaking up
Iraq into denominations as in Syria and in Lebanon. In Iraq, a division
into
provinces along ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Ottoman times
is
possible. So, three (or more) states will exist around the three major
cities:
Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and Shi’ite areas in the south will separate
from the
Sunni and Kurdish north."
August 07, 2006:
“The Four-Frontal War: Covert Operations Escalate
in Middle East and the Horn of Africa
Civil
War Looms in Iraq”; ‘The Cutting Edge’; http://nafeez.blogspot.com/
To assist this fragmentation, the militant organizations fighting the Zionist allies of imperialism, are portrayed variously
as either sectarians of the Muslim religion (‘Shi’ite’ or ‘Sunni’) – or as the pawns of some power or other in
the Middle East. (note: Shi’ite is also rendered variously as Shia or Shi’ia).
To Marxist-Leninists, whether the Hizbullah are compradors to the Syrian state, or whether they are nationalist bourgeoisie
– is an important question. In the context of the Lebanese war now raging, it is not the most immediate question.
That remains the war of resistance to the Zionist imperialist war machine that has ravaged Palestine repeatedly,
Iraq recently, Lebanon twice in the last 20 years – and now looms over Iran. Nonetheless, we would be foolish not
to characterize the class forces of Hizbullah accurately.
Secretary
General Hasan Nasrallah of
the
Hizbullah, explicitly states that Hizbullah is part of the national
independence
movement in Lebanon:
“Now, our priority - as Lebanon, homeland, people, government
resistance, and
army - is to emerge from this battle victorious with our heads high. Being forces that
have zeal for
Lebanon, its dignity, and pride, I faithfully say that this is
Lebanon's true
battle of independence. If we win this battle, this means that we, the
Lebanese
people, will tell the whole world that we will be the decision-makers.
We will
even be able to tell the embassies that are interfering in our internal
affairs
not to interfere in our internal affairs. This is a battle of true
independence.”
Interview with Hizbullah
Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah; July 22, 2006 All-Jazeera interviews
Hizbullah chief; Interview by Al-Jazeera
Beirut Bureau Chief
Ghassan Bin-Jiddu
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article14152.htm
How much confidence can Marxist-Leninist have that Hizbullah is not a pawn of Iranian or Syrian interests?
Does Hizbullah follow a ’fundamentalist’ Islamic religious line –as opposed to a national liberationist line? Is Hizbullah an individual terrorist organization – or is it leading a national resistance movement?
The ‘Confessional’ Divides Are Class Divisions
The long history of fostering division in Lebanon, in its modern form, began when the French imperialists promoted the Maronite Christian sector of society. This resulted in the following currently acknowledged situation:
“Shiites have long been at the bottom of the country's economic ladder, with high unemployment and illiteracy rates. Lebanon's Christian and Sunni classes have dominated the country's political and business circles.”
’Fighting Force: Amid Ties to Iran, Hizbullah Builds Its Own Identity
Shiite Group's Leader Vows Defiance After Israeli Hit; A Gift for Propaganda 'Frighteningly Professional'
By Jay Solomon And Karby Leggett; Wall Street Journal July 21, 2006; Page A1
A British Marxist-Leninist, W.B.Bland, put this into class terms, in 1987, as follows:
“The main social classes in Lebanon are:
1) a comprador capitalist class, drawn mainly from the Christian
community,
closely linked with and dependent upon foreign - principally United
States --
imperialism;
2) a landlord class, drawn mainly from the Sunni Moslem community;
3) a national bourgeoisie, drawn mainly from the various Moslem
communities;
4) a peasantry, drawn mainly from the Moslem communities; and
5) a small working class numbering 100,000, drawn mainly from the
Moslem
communities and involved mainly in the oil-processing and textile
industries.
http://www.allianceml.com/BLAND/Lebanon_WBB.htm
Up till the Lebanese Civil War of 1982, the so-called National Pact left a guarantee of the comprador status of the state,
as analysed by Bland:
“The Constitution is one of "parliamentary
democracy". The Head of State is a President who is elected by a
single-chamber
elected National Assembly. However, this body is elected under laws
which give
the economically dominant Christian community a majority of seats -
based on
the ratio of Christians to Moslems in the population (6:5) as shown in
the
(last) Census of 1932. The domination of
the state by the Christian community - in practice by the predominantly
Christian comprador capitalist class - is reinforced by an unwritten
convention
agreed between representatives of the four religious communities in
1943. By
this convention it was agreed that the President should always be a
Christian,
the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem and the Speaker of the National
Assembly a
Shia Moslem.
The interests of the comprador capitalists
and
landlords are represented politically by the National Liberal Party (a vehicle
of the financial groups around the Chamoun family) -and the Phalangist Party (named after
Franco's fascist party and a vehicle of the financial groups around the
Gemayel
family). The most progressive of the
political
parties are - the Progressive
Socialist Party, founded in 1947 and
now led by Walid
Jumblatt (a Druze), and the revisionist Lebanese Communist Party, which
represent the interests of the national bourgeoisie.
The officers of the army are drawn
predominantly from
the politically and economically dominant Christian community, while
the rank
and file are divided into separate units on a religious basis. This
brought
about a break-up of the army in the civil war of 1975-6, when masses of
soldiers deserted to different private militias. From that time the
army, and
the central state apparatus, has been almost impotent. The elections
due in
April 1976 were postponed because of the civil war, and no elections
have been
able to be held since. Unable to collect taxes over most of the
country, the
state has become increasingly dependent upon foreign aid - principally
from
Britain, Saudi Arabia and the United States: in the first half of 1984
alone
Lebanon's balance of payments deficit stood at $700 million. Effective
political power is exercised locally by:
1)
the
foreign occupying forces of Syria in the north
and west;
2)
rival
para-military forces armed and financed by the
neighbouring states of Iraq, Israel and Syria;
3)
rival
para-military forces armed and financed by the
political parties of the Lebanese ruling classes - the Tigers of the
National
Liberal Party and the Lebanese Forces of the Phalangists; and
4)
a
para-military force of the Palestine Liberation
Organisation (the Palestine Liberation Army), armed and financed by
certain
Arab states (principally Syria,. Libya and Saudi Arabia) and (since
July 1972)
by the Soviet Union. The PLO contains factions financed and armed by,
and
subservient to, different states, a number of which are mere small
terrorist
organisations.”
Bland, Ibid.
Hizbullah and the Shi’ia (note: Name is variously rendered as Hezbollah, Hizbullah, and Hiz’bullah).
The term in Arabic means ‘Party of God’. The organization was definitely in origin, a Shi’ite militia, and it remains so.
Islam traces its main division into Sunni and Shi’ia wings, to events after Mohammed’s death. Mohammed Ibn Abdullah
(570-632 AD) was born a nobleman, and from his ‘revelations from the angel Gabriel’, he delivered the Muslim Holy Book
the ‘Koran’. Becoming known as Mahomet – ‘God’s Messenger’ - he created a religion suiting the nomadic warring desert
tribes. Welding in the result, a unity that enabled control of surrounding trade routes. Upon his death, there was no successor
(Kalifah, or Caliph). A consensus agreement on leadership established that the leaders of Mohammed’s tribe, the Quaraysh,
would be Caliphs. However, divisions erupted in 659 AD, when Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law – Ali – took the Caliphate.
Ali insisted that only direct family of Mohammed and his daughter Fatimah could be heirs to Mahomet. Ali was assassinated
in 661, by the rest of the community. Followers of Ali became known as the Shi’ia and the remaining Muslims were Sunni.
Sectarian divisions were frequent hereafter. (Further detail at: in Alliance Issue 51; article entitled: “The Syrian National
Revolution - The Role Of Khaled Bakdash” http://www.allianceml.com/AllianceIssues/SYRIAALLIANCE51.html)
The Shi’ii believe that the Twelfth Imam in Ali’s line, is in hiding. The high authorities of the Sih’ia clergy take a “stand-in’
to be the ‘Supreme Jurist’. This position (al-wali al-faqih) was taken by the Ayatollah Khomeini, after the removal of the
USA comprador Shah Pavlavi of Iran. Khomeini had studied at the seminary at Najaf, from where many of Hizbullah’s leaders
would emerge.
Origins of HIzbullah
The Hizbullah organization emerged after the 1982 Civil War of Lebanon.
It was formed from smaller militia of a Shi’ia background:
“Some organizations list the official formation of the group as early as 1982, whereas (others) maintain that Hizbullah
remained an amalgamation of various violent Shi’ia extremists until as late as 1985. Regardless of when the name
ame into official use, a number of Shi’ia groups were slowly assimilated into the organization, such as Islamic Jihad,
Organization of the Oppressed on Earth and the Revolutionary Justice Organization. These designations
are considered to be synonymous with Hizbullah by the US, Israel and Canada” .
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hizbullah
Another major antecedent group, was the ‘Movement of the Disinherited’ (harahat al-mahrumin) which was led by
Imam Musa al-Sadr, and which called for reform of the Lebanese system. He disappeared mysteriously –
likely instigated by Western agencies – on a trip to Libya in 1978.
Finally, a secular militant group known as Amal (afwaj-al-muqawamat-al-lubaniyya –Battalion of the
Lebanese Resistance) led by Nabih Berri, had developed within al-Sadr’s grouping.
Relations With Iran and Syria
Syria
The aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War, fomented by Israel, and the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982 itself,
left the state of Lebanon completely disrupted. Into this vacuum, both Syria and Iran entered, hoping to control
the state though proxies. Syria had been trying for some time to control sections of Lebanon – and rapidly
occupied when an invitation was arranged from Prime Minister Selim al-Hiss to station troops Lebanon to “maintain order”.
In the post Civil War cauldron of Lebanon, instability was worrying to the Arab regional states and to the USA imperialists.
They initiated “The Taif Agreement” of 1989 brokered by the Arab League.
“In 1982, Rafik Hariri … acted as an envoy of the Saudi royal family to the country. He laid the ground work, along
with Philip Habib, the US envoy to Lebanon at that time, that led to the 1989 Taif Accord which he organized and
hosted at his own expense. Taif put an end to the civil war and paved the way for himself to become prime minister
(of Lebanon).”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafik_Hariri
The Arab League is a body uniting the regional comprador states of the area. The Taif Agreement served at that time,
to assist the Israelis and imperialists to disarm Lebanese militia, that it itself had been unable to do by war and by
fomenting civil war. They turned to Syria, to perform the work of the imperialists, in now controlling the chaos in the
aftermath of Israeli-led war in Lebanon.
Under the Document of National Reconciliation (The Taif Agreement) the Arab League ensured that:
I) There was an increase in the ratio of Muslim to Christian seats in parliament – but it was only an update of the
‘National Pact’ – it did not change the essence of it;
II) Syria was accorded a ‘special interest’ in Lebanon and would assist the Lebanese government by ‘disarming
all the militia”.
III) Syria could retain troops inside Lebanon till an undefined future date to be negotiated.
(Harik JP; Ibid; p. 45).
Syria now assisted the Amal and Hizbullah to finally defeat the Lebanese Army led by Maronite General
Michel Aoun, former head of the 1988 government, who strongly resisted Syria’s new dominance
(Harik JP Ibid p. 45). He was then forced into exile.
But Syria became quickly unpopular with brutal tactics:
“Damascus and Assad expected to have a tight grip on Hizbullah .. this expectation was tested in 1987 when
Hizbullah partisans refused to remove a checkpoint form the road before their West Beirut barracks on
orders of Syrian troops.. The Syrian officer.. shot them”:
Harik JP; Ibid; p. 40.
Although at times, Syria is supported by Hizbullah, no significant section of Hizbullah can be seen today as a
comprador force for Syria (see below for post-Hariri assassination history).
Relationship to Iran
Most sources agree that the Khomeini Iranian government after taking power in 1979 by overthrowing the
Shah of Iran, gave significant early aid to the Hizbullah after 1982. An early envoy to the group was
Fazallah Mahallati, sent by Ayatollah Khomeini (Harik JP Ibid p. 53).
However the extent to which Iran and Hizbullah now share the same immediate goals are disputed:
“Hizbullah's strength was enhanced by the dispatching of one thousand to fifteen hundred members of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the financial backing of Iran. It became the main politico-military force
among the Shia community in Lebanon and the main arm of what became known later as the Islamic Resistance
in Lebanon. Hizbullah follows a Shiite Islamist ideology shared by the leader of the 1979 Islamic Revolution
in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, but it has abandoned its goal of establishing a fundamentalist Shiite state in
Lebanon. Many people in Hizbullah said many times that they have never had such a target”.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hizbullah
“From its start in the early 1980s, Hizbullah, a Shiite Muslim group, had a close association with the leaders
of Shiite-dominated Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution. Lebanon's Shiite community is estimated to be
around 40% of the nation's population. .. . Iran's financial aid and religious oversight in the 1980s
helped galvanize Lebanon's Shiites. U.S. intelligence officials based in Beirut during the period
say cadres from Iran's Revolutionary Guard encouraged women to wear the Islamic veil and inspired
social groups and charities in Lebanon's Shiite slums. Young Lebanese Shiite men went to Iran for military training.”
’Fighting Force: Amid Ties to Iran, Hizbullah Builds Its Own Identity - Shiite Group's
Leader Vows Defiance After Israeli Hit; A Gift for Propaganda 'Frighteningly Professional'
By Jay Solomon And Karby Leggett; Wall Street Journal July 21, 2006; Page A1
This strong reliance on Iranian weaponry persist to this day, and in this current war of national liberation against Israel:
“Even as Mr. Nasrallah has developed Hizbullah into an independent force, he has also deepened its ties
with Iran. U.S. and Israeli officials say a steady stream of Iranian military hardware flows to Hizbullah
through Syria -- including night-vision goggles, machine guns, explosives, rockets and missiles. These
officials say Iran has
believe can reach Tel Aviv from Lebanon. In all, Iran is estimated by some military analysts to provide Hizbullah
as much as $120 million a year for its activities. Hizbullah's annual budget is estimated to be at least $250 million,
experts on the group say. Revolutionary Guard agents continue to train Hizbullah fighters, both in southern
Lebanon and in Iran
Jay Solomon And Karby Leggett; Wall Street Journal Ibid.
So is this current reliance on weaponry, of itself, a determining key to the national aspirations of Hizbullah?
After all resistance fighters need arms, in order to resist. Hizbullah would hardly get arms from the EC or the USA.
Internal Conflicts Within Hizbullah on Foreign Alliances and Secular Politics
An early struggle took place within the leading circles of Hizbullah, over its orientation, which was dominated
by the poverty of the Shi’ite majority population. The question quickly became, how secular to be or in other
words, how narrowly Shi’ite and Islamicist to be.
This concretely took the form of whether to insist on a ‘Jihadist’ view of the struggle, excluding non-Shi’ite forces –
or to form alliances with non-Shi’ia forces?
The context within which this debate unfolded, was the failure of the post French mandate system of
the so-called ‘National Pact’. This Pact was noted both by Marxist-Leninists such as Bland (see above),
and by other observers, as serving Maronite comprador interests, and iniquitous:
“As time passed dissatisfaction with the .. political system increased.. the secular arrangement of 1943 had
.. ossified into a system that guaranteed Christian political domination regardless of that sect’s size in
comparison to that of the other confessional groups suspected of outstripping Maronite numbers over the
years. . . . By all measurements, peripheral regions such as the Baaka valley and the South where Shiites
are concentrated were severely deprived of even such basics as sewer networks and clean water
distribution.. As a result of rising discontent in the 1950s and 1960s, the issue of social justice became
another one of contention between … most Muslims and some Christians (who were pro-Arab).. and the
pro-Western position of the majority of Christians”;
Judith Palmer Harik; “Hizbullah – the Changing Face of Terrorism’; London 2004; p.17-18
“Muslims thought their best chance for development and influence lay with taking the religious component
out of the governing formula completely”:
Harik JP Ibid; p. 19
The Hizbullah ruling circles were split. The leadership of the Hizbullah was from the beginning heavily
influenced by graduates of the Najaf religious seminary – where they were taught by Sheikhs
Mohammed Baqer al-Sadr and Ruhallah Khomeini. The Consultative Council (Majlis al-shura) was
initially dominated by pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian forces led by the First Secretary General Sheikh Tufeil,
who was a follower of an ultra-orthodox faction in Iran led by Ali Akbar Mohtashemi (Harik Ibid p.55).
Following the death of Khomeini in 1989, Iran was itself toning down Islamic rhetoric under President
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani . Meanwhile the Iranian spiritual leadership was taken over by
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was as ‘purist’ as Khomeini had been, and became
Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
A debate erupted within Hizbullah, as to how ‘fundamentalist’ or how secular – Hizbullah should become.
Sheikh Tufeil sided with the pro-Iranian wing. They adopted a strict ‘Fundamentalist’ viewpoint.
They were a pro-Iranian comprador force (Harik Ibid p.56).
Sayyed Fadlallah was a key figure, being a ‘marjaa’ (“one of the few Shi’ite clerics in the world to
be elevated to the rank of Jurist” Harik Ibid p. 60). Fadlallah was willing to compromise with a
pro-national wing that recognized the need to develop secular united fronts with the Maronite
Christians and knew that a fundamentalist policy would not achieve a united free
Lebanon (Harik; Ibid, p. 56). He had always been an advocate of religious coexistence:
“Fadlallah believes that religious scholars should work through multiple institutions, and should not
affiliate with a single political party or be involved in affairs of worldly government. In these beliefs,
he is close to traditional Shi`ia jurisprudence, and distant from the concept of velayat-e faqih
(rule of the clerics) promulgated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran. “ Deeb L; “Hizballah: A Primer”; Lara Deeb’ July 31, 2006
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.html
He allied to the wing led by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and Sheikh Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed.
That argued for a ‘flexible’ approach that would win allies within the Christian and Druze communities.
It was this national bourgeois wing that took over Hizbullah, replacing the secretary general
by Shiekh Abbas al-Musawi.
Initially the division was papered over. But when Tufeil led a Bekka demonstration (‘The Revolt of
the Hungry’) on sectarian lines, he was cut off by Hizbullah (Harik Ibid p. 59).
Following these debates, the Hizbullah poured much of its time, energy and resources into developing
a welfare and social infrastructure. By the mid 1990’s a majority of the Lebanese irrespective of
their denomination were impressed by the Hizbullah resistance to Israel. Israel had annexed lands
in South Lebanon, and had been pumping a precious resource - water - out of Lebanon
(J.P. Harik Ibid p. 49). This non-sectarian support for Hizbullah was confirmed in pre-electoral
polls in 1992. The Hizbullah also began to strongly emphasise a different thrust to “jihad”:
“Among the most obvious were the public and social services offered to the umma
(the religious congretation) and the burgeoning networks of mosques and husseini yyas
(places of religious congregation). Furthermore as doing jihad is not just only the act of fighting but also
doing anything conducive to victory – for example providing financial support – Hizbullah's campaign
against the Israelis in South Lebanon provides a means of fulfilling sacred religious obligations”…
Fadlallah .. established a number of important charitable institutions like an Islamic orphanage and
a religious school.. a large modern medical facility; (Harik; Ibid; p. 60-61).
Currently, the leader of the organization is Nasrallah. He is a cleric who trained at Najaf, in Iraq:
“46-year-old Mr. Nasrallah, Hizbullah's secretary-general, took control of Hizbullah in 1992….
He studied for three years at a Shiite seminary in the Iraqi city of Najaf. ….He gained the respect
of many Hizbullah fighters by spending significant time at the Israeli front, these people say.
Mr. Nasrallah's own son was killed fighting against Israel, sealing Mr. Nasrallah's reputation as a
man willing to sacrifice for his cause. He was held in even higher esteem when, upon viewing the
bodies of the dead fighters, he didn't linger any longer over his own son's body than over the others.”
Jay Solomon And Karby Leggett; Wall Street Journal Ibid.
”Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah .. while he is
also a
religious scholar, and also studied at Najaf, he does not rank highly
enough to
be a marja` al-taqlid and instead is a religious follower of Khamenei.
Nasrallah became Hizbullah's Secretary-General in 1992, after Israel
assassinated his predecessor, Sayyid `Abbas al-Musawi, along with his
wife and
5 year-old son.”
Deeb L; Ibid http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.html
A key defining feature of Nasrallah’s
leadership was
electoral participation:
“It was under
his (i.e. Nasrallah) leadership that Hizballah committed itself to
working
within the state and began participating in elections, a decision that
alienated some of the more revolution-oriented clerics in the
leadership.”
Deeb L; Ibid http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.html
Hizbullah was immediately an electoral success:
”When the first post-war elections were held in Lebanon in 1992, many of the various militia groups (which
had often grown out of political parties) reverted to their political party status and participated. Hizballah
also chose to participate, declaring its intention to work within the existing Lebanese political system, while
keeping its weapons to continue its guerrilla campaign against the Israeli occupation in the south, as allowed
by the Ta'if accord. In that first election, the party won eight seats, giving them the largest single bloc in the
128-member parliament, and its allies won an additional four seats.”
Deeb L; Ibid http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.html
One reason for their success at the polls was their refusal to engage in corruption:
“Hizballah
developed a reputation -- even among those who disagree vehemently with
their
ideologies -- for being a "clean" and capable political party on both
the national and local levels. This reputation is especially
important in Lebanon, where government corruption is assumed,
clientelism is
the norm and political positions are often inherited”.
Deeb L; Ibid http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.html
”Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians and infrastructure -- including the destruction of power plants in Beirut in
1996, 1999 and 2000 - generally contributed to increases in national support for the Resistance. This was
especially true after Israel bombed a UN bunker where civilians had taken refuge in Qana on April 18, 1996,
killing 106 people. “
Deeb L; Ibid http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.html
Hizbullah After the Assassination of Hariri and the 2005 Withdrawal of Syria
We noted earlier that Rafik Hariri (1944-2005) was instrumental in brokering the Taif Agreement,
which then suited the plans of Israel and the USA. He was always a representative of the comprador
forces for US imperialism as the Prime Minister. When US imperialism and Israel switched form the policy
of stablising Lebanon (exemplified by the Taif Agreement) to one of disrupting it anew, they wished to
re-defined anew Syria’s role in Lebanon – Hariri complied:
“Hariri served as Prime Minister of Lebanon
from 1992 to
1998, then again from 2000 until late 2004. However, amid the political
crisis
brought on by the extension of President Emile
Lahoud's term, which was brought about by pressure from Syria,
Hariri
resigned as Prime Minister (he resigned in 1998 for about the same
reason),
saying: "I have... submitted the resignation of the government, and I
have
declared that I will not be a candidate to head the (next) government."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafik_Hariri
Elsewhere, Garbis Altinoglu has discussed the assassination of Hariri which served as an early signal of
Israel’s coming war (http://www.allianceml.com/PAPER/JULY2005/ReactionaryTerrorLebanon.htm).
This was made the pretext to remove Syria from the Lebanese political scene. This had been bruited for a year
– under the UN Resolution 1559. Under this clause, all militia in Lebanon were supposed to be disarmed, and
this meant the withdrawal of Syria:
“On September 2, 2004,
the UN Security Council adopted UN
Security Council Resolution 1559, coauthored by France
and the
United States. Echoing the Taif Agreement, the resolution "calls upon
all
remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon" and "for the
disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias."
Lebanon has requested that Israel withdraw from the disputed Shebaa Farms
and the hills of Kfar-Shouba
and return the Lebanese detainees in Israel as a
condition for fully implementing Resolution 1559 which includes
disbanding of
the military wing of Hizbullah. Critics of the resolution argue however
that an
attempt from the weak and confessionally divided Lebanese army to
disarm Hizbullah
would be very difficult and could restart the Lebanese civil war. Syria
was
also in violation of the resolution until recently because of their
military
presence in Lebanon.
On October 7, 2004 the UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan
reported to the Security Council
regarding the lack of compliance with Resolution 1559. Mr. Annan
concluded his
report by saying: "It is time, 14 years after the end of hostilities
and
four years after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, for all parties
concerned
to set aside the remaining vestiges of the past. The withdrawal of
foreign
forces and the disbandment and disarmament of militias would, with
finality,
end that sad chapter of Lebanese history."
The January 20, 2005 UN
Secretary-General's report on Lebanon stated that "The continually
asserted position of the Government of Lebanon that the Blue Line is
not valid
in the Shab'a farms area is not compatible with Security Council
resolutions.
The Council has recognized the Blue Line as valid for purposes of
confirming
Israel’s withdrawal pursuant to resolution 425 (1978). The UN Security
Council
has repeatedly requested that all parties respect the Blue Line in its
entirety." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UN_Security_Council_Resolution_1559
Lands occupied by Israel of Lebanon _ the Shebaa Farms and Kfar-Shouba – were ruled as irrelevant as they
were deemed as not belonging to Lebanon, but to Syria. This subterfuge enabled the UN to insist on disarming
both Syria and Hizbullah, leaving Israel in control of land it wished. That this was linked to water was not mentioned
in the UN resolution (Harik JP; Iid p. 139-40). Nor was the fact that it had first been mapped by Lebanese authorities,
a fact that Israeli scholars (Asher Kaufman) pointed out (Harik Ibid p. 142). Somehow Israel’s long standing violations
of UN Resolutions in the matter of Palestine or Lebanon did not impede its belligerent insistence on the position of
Resolution 1559. The anti-Syrian movement was euphemistically dubbed by the USA imperialist diplomats as ‘The Cedar Revolution”:
“The name "Cedar Revolution" is a term
that
was coined by the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs
Paula J.
Dobriansky in a news conference, and used to draw a comparison with the
Rose
Revolution of Georgia, the Orange Revolution of Ukraine, and the
"Purple
Revolution" (as described by George W. Bush) of Iraq.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cedar_Revolution
The assassination was followed by huge demonstrations – both pro and anti-Syrian presence in Lebanon:
“Hizbullah leader
Hassan Nasrallah called for a "massive popular gathering" on March 8
supporting Syria and accusing Israel and the United States of meddling
in
internal affairs. Nasrallah also criticized UN Resolution 1559 saying
"The
resistance will not give up its arms ... because Lebanon needs the
resistance
to defend it", and added "all the articles of U.N. resolution give
free services to the Israeli enemy who should have been made
accountable for
his crimes and now finds that he is being rewarded for his crimes and
achieves
all its demands." his Beirut rally called by Hizbollah dwarfed the
earlier
anti-Syrian events; CNN noted some news agencies estimated the
crowd at
200,000, the Associated Press news agency estimated that there
were more
than 500,000 pro-Syrian protestors, while the New York Times
and Los
Angeles Times simply estimated "hundreds of thousands". Al
Jazeera reported a figure of 1.5 million. The predominantly Shi'ite
protestors held pictures of Syrian President Bashar Assad and placards
reading,
in English, "No for the American Intervention". A couple of anti-Syrian
media sources noted that it was likely that many of Lebanon's
approximately
500,000 Syrian guest workers participated in the rally. In
addition
to demonstrating the extent of popular support for Syria in Lebanon,
the
demonstration reiterated Hizbullah's rejection of Resolution 1559,
whose call
for the disbanding of all Lebanese militias threatens the continued
existence
of its military wing, the force widely credited for the liberation of
south
Lebanon. Nasrallah also held demonstrations in Tripoli and Nabatiyé on
11 and
13 March.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cedar_Revolution
“On March 14, the one-month anniversary of
the
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, hundreds of
thousands of
confessionally diverse Lebanese, including significant numbers of
Christians,
Druze, Shiite and Sunni Muslims, rallied in central Beirut on Monday
chanting
"Freedom, Sovereignty, Independence" and carrying a huge Lebanese
flag. They flocked from throughout the country, many unable to even
enter the
city due to heavy traffic. The peaceful rally was considered to be "the
largest demonstration ever seen in Lebanon", with estimations of a
turnout
ranging from 800,000 to more than one million. . The
Lebanese protestors demanded an
international inquiry into Hariri's murder, the firing of Syrian-backed
security chiefs in the Lebanese government, and a total Syrian pullout
from
Lebanon... . . ” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cedar_Revolution
By April 26 2005, the Syrian troops and
agents had
crossed the border back to Syria.
Had this pro-Syrian stance of Hizbullah affected its’ standing with the masses, as gauged by electoral politics?
It does not appear so.
”After the Syrian withdrawal, it became
evident that
the party would play a larger role in the Lebanese government. Indeed,
in the
2005 elections, Hizballah increased their parliamentary seats to 14, in
a
voting bloc with other parties that took 35. Also in 2005, for the
first time,
the party chose to participate in the cabinet, and currently holds the
Ministry
of Energy. ……
The first item on Hizballah's 2005
electoral platform
pledged to "safeguard Lebanon's independence and protect it from the
Israeli menace by safeguarding the Resistance, Hizballah's military
wing and
its weapons, in order to achieve total liberation of Lebanese occupied
land." This stance places the party at odds with UN Security Council Resolution 1559,
which called for the "disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and
non-Lebanese militias" in September 2004, and with those political
forces
in Lebanon that seek
to implement the resolution. Prior to the July events, Nasrallah and
other
party leaders attended a series of "national dialogue" meetings aimed at
setting the terms for Hizballah's disarmament. The dialogue had not
come to any
conclusions by the beginning of the current violence, in part because
of
Hizballah's insistence that its arms were still needed to defend
Lebanon.”
Deeb L; Ibid http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.html
The
Social Welfare Policies of HIzbullah
No doubt the Hizbullah’s special welfare
role – often
exceeding that of the Lebanese state – plays a large part in its
popularity:
”But the party has a social platform as
well, and
views itself as representing not only Shi`i Lebanese, but also the poor
more
generally. The Amal militia formed by Sayyid Musa al-Sadr developed into a
political
party as well, and has been Hizballah's main political rival among
Shi`i
Lebanese, though they are now working in tandem. The longtime speaker
of
Parliament, Nabih
Berri, Amal's leader, is the intermediary between Hizballah
and
diplomats inquiring about ceasefire terms and a prisoner exchange.”
Deeb L; Ibid http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.html
”Hizballah . . . has a broad base of
support
throughout the south and the country - a base of support that is not
necessarily dependent on sect. . . Nor does one's socio-economic
status. . .
.the party's popularity is based in part on its dedication to the poor,
but
also on its political platforms and record in Lebanon, its Islamist
ideologies,
and its resistance to Israeli occupation and violations of Lebanese
sovereignty. Hizballah's ….. constituents are not only the poor, but
increasingly come from the middle classes”
Deeb L; Ibid http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.html
It also has an insistence on resisting
seatrain politics.
It consciously makes alliances with other denominations, even those who
have been
at times violent enemies of Hizbullah, such as Michel Aoun:
“The party (is) ..run on
multi-confessional district
slates rather than as individuals, and it allies (however temporarily)
with
politicians who do not back its program. In the 2005 parliamentary
contests,
the Sunni on Hizballah's slate in Sidon was Bahiyya al-Hariri, sister of the
assassinated ex-premier. Since the elections, the strongest ally of the
Shi`i
movement has been the former general, Michel Aoun. . . . A Shi`i Muslim
social welfare
network developed in the 1970s and 1980s, with key actors including
al-Sadr,
Fadlallah and Hizballah.
Today, Hizballah functions as an umbrella organization under which many
social
welfare institutions are run. Some of these institutions provide
monthly
support and supplemental nutritional, educational,
housing and health assistance for the poor; others focus on supporting
orphans;
still others are devoted to reconstruction of war-damaged areas. There
are also
Hizballah-affiliated schools, clinics and low-cost hospitals, including
a
school for children with Down's syndrome. These social welfare
institutions are
located around Lebanon and serve the local people regardless of sect,
though
they are concentrated in the mainly Shi`i Muslim areas of the country.
They are
run almost entirely through volunteer labor, mostly that of women, and
much of
their funding stems from individual donations, orphan sponsorships and
religious taxes…. called the khums, one
fifth of the income they do not need for their own family's upkeep. Half of this tithe is given to the care
of the marja` they recognize. Since 1995, when Khamenei appointed Nasrallah and another Hizballah leader as
his religious deputies in Lebanon, the khums revenues of Lebanese Shi`a who follow Khamenei
have gone directly into Hizballah's coffers. These Shi`a also give their zakat, the alms required of all Muslims
able to pay, to Hizballah's vast network of social welfare institutions. Much of this financial support comes from
Lebanese Shi`a living abroad."
Deeb L; Ibid http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.html
Nature of the military Campaign of Hizbullah
The charge that Hizbullah is a terrorist
organization
is laid by the Western imperialists.
Before the internal debate within
Hizbullah, there seems
little doubt that the organization did engage in “individual terror” –
such as
civilian hostage-taking – as well as a resistance and mass activity,
against
military targets such as the attack on the US Marine barracks and
imperialist
targets:
“In the United States, Hizballah is
generally
associated with the 1983 bombings of the US embassy, the Marine
barracks and
the French-led multinational force headquarters in Beirut. The second
bombing
led directly to the US military's departure from Lebanon. The movement
is also
cited by the State Department in connection with
the kidnappings of Westerners in Lebanon and the hostage crisis that
led to the
Iran-contra affair, the 1985 hijacking of a TWA flight and bombings of
the
Israeli embassy and cultural center in Buenos
Aires in the early 1990s. These associations are the stated reasons for
the
presence of Hizbullah's name on the State Department's list of
terrorist
organizations. In 2002, then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
famously described Hizbullah as the "A-Team of terrorists,"
possessing a "global reach," and suggested that "maybe al-Qaeda
is actually the B-Team." Hizbullah's involvement in these attacks
remains
a matter of contention, however. “
Deeb L; Ibid http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.html
It is true that Nasrullah denies individual hostage were taken by the Hizbullah itself:
“One person said there
is the issue of the hostages. I told him that Hizbullah did not take
any
hostages. Even the groups that took hostages in 1982 and 1983, they
took them
to exchange them for hundreds of Lebanese prisoners from the Israeli
prisons,
especially in Atlit. Some witnesses are still alive. Speaker Nabih
Birri was
one of the people who ran the negotiations and was aware of this issue.
So, if
hostages were taken, they were taken to exchange them for Lebanese, and
not for
Syrian or Iranian interests. I have nothing to do with the hostages
issues. So,
I tell everybody now: Give us one example before this war, which you
are
accusing us of, to implicate us and prove that we have done anything
against
the national interest.” Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah; July 22,
2006 All-Jazeera
interviews Hizbullah chief;
Interview by Al-Jazeera Beirut Bureau Chief Ghassan Bin-Jiddu
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article14152.htm
It is noteworthy that
even Hariri – in 2001 – publicly defended Hizbullah as a resistance
force:
“During a BBC interview in 2001, Hariri
was asked by
Tim Sebastian why he refused to hand over members of Hizbullah that
were
accused by America of being terrorists. He responded that Hizbullah
were the
ones protecting Lebanon against the Israeli occupation and called for
implementation of passed United Nations resolutions against Israel. He
was
further accused of making the American coalition in the War on
Terrorism
worthless and asked if he was ready for the consequences of his
refusal,
reminding him that George W Bush had said : "you are either with
us
or against us". He replied that he had hoped that there would be no
consequences, but would deal with them if they arrive. Hariri further
said that
he opposed the killing of all humans Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian or
Lebanese
and believed in dialogue as a solution. He further went on to say that
Syria
will have to stay in Lebanon for protection of Lebanon until they are
no longer
needed and Lebanon asks them to leave.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafik_Hariri
However, there is no question that after the debate, there was a shift in Hizbullah’s activities, towards dropping of
individual terrorism:
“Tufeili was replaced as secretary general of Hizbullah by the more flexible Sheikh Abbas ak-Musawi, former head
of Islamic Resistance. The Westerners who had been kidnapped in Lebanon began to be released in 1989. Closing
one chapter of Shiite Islam in Lebanon was a necessary prelude to the new turn Hezbolah was about to make”;
Harik JP Ibid p. 59.