“ALLIANCE!”
MARXIST-LENINIST
WINTER 2006
________________________________________________________________
”MY LIFE WITH ENVER”;
Memoirs
Volume I By Nexhmije
Hoxha
Nobody but Enver Hoxha deserves the expression:
“Glory goes to the ones not asking for it”
Chapters 18-19
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
COPYRIGHT:
of the original work belongs to the author;
All
Photographs from: 'Enver Hoxha 1908-1985':; Tirana; 1986;
containing photos of the Archives PPSH and of Albania Telegraphic Agency
Publishers Preface –
Alliance _______________________________________________________________________________________ Chapter 18: THE THREE MAIN PERSONAGES OF THE BERAT BACKSTAGE In addition to the serious
problems and great troubles that the country and the people were facing during
the difficult period of the Post- liberation years, 1945-46-47, Enver also had
to face the intrigues and dangerous actions of the very same people who had
been on the backstage in Berat. I have pointed out that the above mentioned individuals did not have a
common platform, neither in the political-economical aspect, nor in an affinity
for the cultural or social aspects. In these notes, I want to dwell more on
these 3 or 4 backstage actors, who, at that time, for evil reasons, were set
against Enver in an unprincipled and unscrupulous way. Koci Xoxe, this
individual, who was the organizational secretary and Minister of Internal
Affairs, brought much evil to the country and left a black stain on it and
therefore, I do not want to waste many words on him. He was appointed as the
Organizational Secretary at the Country’s First Conference. Since he was a hard
worker, and had been in the Korça Communist Group and at the foundation of the
ACP, the Provisional Central Committee picked him. He did not demonstrate
organizational skills in the Korca district where he operated, so he progressed
no further than the role of a deputy chief. He was ambitious and
megalomaniacal, and thus, he found it more convenient to climb the steps
through being tied to the foreigners’ bridles, which were bigger and stronger
than he. They needed him at that particular time and in the future to help them
fulfill their evil objectives. It is a well-known fact that
Koci Xoxe was a worker, a tinsmith, who flattered himself about his activity in
the labor movement in Korca, but who had an almost mediocre level of culture.
Boasting about his ‘proletarian’ background and pretending that he was a real
internationalist communist, he spoke scornfully about our national heroes,
starting with Skanderbeg, whom he
regarded a mere ‘feudal prince’, for Naim Frasheri,
who was nothing more that a ‘bektashi’, having written about religious wars
(Qerbela). Koci Xoxe could not grasp the Party policy about the Front along with
the patriots and nationalists. Not only
did he disbelieve the intellectuals, but also I dare say, he hated them, not
excluding, even the ones in the Party leadership, such as Enver, Nako Spiru, Sejfulla Maleshova and some
others in the Central Committee. His only backer in the Party Bureau was the
other uncouth worker, the cobbler Pandi Kristo,
who was even more mediocre than Koci Xoxe and appeared quite ridiculous in his
haughty shows and poses only for the reason that he had attained such a
position. It is surprising to see how the Yugoslav theoretician Eduard Cardell (or Kardelj - Editor) who was respected
in the western world (of course after his falling out with the Soviet Union),
estimated the mediocre Koci Xoxe. Citing Dedier (or Ddedijer, Vladimir
- editor). In early 1947, when Cardel was welcomed by Stalin,
he asked Cardel about Enver Hoxha and
Cardel replied that, Enver Hoxha is kind, honest, petty-bourgeois intellectual,
he is popular (since the war), but he lacks Marxist-Leninist education. Cardel also added,….Koci Xoxe
is better. I do not believe that in
1947, E.Cardeli had personally met Koci Xoxe, but he was aware that he was
entirely available for the Yugoslavs and that he had agreed to their plan to
annex Albania into the Yugoslav Federation. Sejfulla Maleshova
had nothing to do with Koci Xoxe. He took part on the Berat backstage not to
satisfy the Yugoslavs. His goal was to take advantage of the atmosphere against
Enver, in order to accomplish his ambition to be the head of the party and of
the new socialist state. Sejfulla might have had many vices, but he was a
patriot, and was culturally open-minded. In various aspects, he was the antithesis of Koci Xoxe and, in the boisterous
meetings of the Political Bureau, he was among the main ones who opposed the
proposals that Xoxe put forward concerning the relations with Yugoslavia, in
the political, economic and military aspects. On the other hand, Sejfulla
Maleshova opposed other members of the Political Bureau regarding various
issues, such as those about the depth of the agrarian reform and on the
Marshall Plan. He also opposed the proposal for a more flexible policy towards
the pressures carried out by the Great Western Powers and by the USA: by the nationalist
elements in the Front, as well as by the land owners and important merchants
and capitalists that Albania had at that time. Quite simply, his views were entirely democratic-bourgeois ones,
contrary to the Party line. Heated debates were held with him at the meetings
of the Political Bureau and in the Plenums of the Central Committee of the
Party. Even though he had been living in the Soviet Union for some years,
where, as we had heard, he had been a professor of Marxism-Leninism, Sejfulla
never spoke a good or bad word about the Soviet Union. Later on, his attitude
towards the economic policy in our country and our foreign policy regarding the
relations with the West, showed that that he had remained a liberal-democrat,
under the influence of his remarkable old friend, Faik
Konica, whom he called ‘the small’. He was appointed to the highest
institutions of the ACP, of the Anti-fascist National-liberation Front and of the
institutions of the new state that were being set up, such as in the Councils,
Committees and in the Democratic Government. However, his thoughts and actions
were incorrect, and opposed the decisions of these institutions. Precisely, at important milestones, Sejfulla would propose ideas that
were entirely to the contrary of the held positions of others. Thus,
immediately after Mukje, when Ali Kelcyra,
on behalf of the Albanian Rescue Committee,
invited the ACP to resume negotiations, Sejfulla Maleshova insisted on saying
‘Why don’t we accept?’. Maleshova disregarded the fact that the setting up of this committee was
dismissed by the Central Committee of ACP
and Leadership of the Anti-fascist
National-liberation Front, rembembering the treason committed by the
Dr.Ymer Dishnica and Mustafa Gjinishi against the National-liberation
War and the blood that partisans had shed. Moreover, Sejfulla remembered that
the “Comintern”, or “Moscow” had told him that ‘you can cooperate with
Zog…’ This happened particularly when King Zog was trying to set up a government in exile in London.
We at that time were on the eve of the Congress of
Permet, at which Zog was banned from returning to Albania without a
popular decision about the former regime. When the Nazi terror reached its peak in Tirana in January-February
1944, some independent intellectuals in the Leadership of the Anti-fascist
National-liberation Front of Tirana became afraid. They stepped aside to form
their own party, and Sejfulla suggested that we should support them. This in a
time when the unity of the people, of all the forces, patriots and antifascists
in the National-liberation Front needed to be stronger and more united than
ever, in order to deliver to the enemy the final blow. Sejfulla had many such ideas in his mind. If he were still alive, he
could have found a post in the Democratic or even in the Socialist
Party, but he could go no further with the Communist Party because
their ways and views had nothing in common. I knew him personally during the war and after the liberation, when I
worked for a short period in the Ministry of Culture, which was led by him. I
may say that, he didn’t deserve to be a leader in the Communist Party, not only
because of the views he held, but also because of his personality. Due to his
misanthropic nature and his lack of a basic camaraderie, he did not create good
feelings or admiration. During the war, I often met him at Zeqi Agolli, where
he had set himself up. I used to go to a particular house, which had been a
shelter for the illegals, including myself, because my family was acquainted
with his mother. I had heard about the poet Lame
Kodra (Sejfulla
Maleshova) and had read some of his verses that had come to my
possession and I liked them. I do not want to talk about some of the selfish sellouts, that Sejfulla indulged
in, for his materialistic life, for the food etc. We, the illegals, ate what was served to us, it was not in our
minds to expect the Party to satisfy all our requests. Whereas, at the place
where Sejfulla lived, on the shelf of the hostess he stored many apples and
oranges which he never shared any of with his friends. This did not make a good
impression on us, but the thing that we noticed most of all was his anti-social
nature. We usually think of poets as quiet people, reserved and meditative.
They are like this because of the creative process that goes on in their minds
or burns deep in their hearts. However, this was not the case with Sejfulla.
When we got together, around the stove, he never wanted to read any of his
verses. Neither did he accept my proposal to come to the youth meetings in
order that they could get to know him, to discuss and to read some of his
works. Except for a verse dedicated to Qemal Stafa,
I do not know of any other texts or lyrics dedicated to the partisans or the
martyrs that he might have written; unlike Shevqet
Musaraj, Fatmir Gjata, Kole Jakova and
others. I was present when he was recommended to write a Hymn for our National-liberation Army. He
promised, but he never did write anything. I have the impression that he was not that productive with regards to
his compositions, he wrote with difficulty, sat too long over the blank paper,
with scattered lines, one on the top, one in the middle and one at the bottom.
This had concerned me but, maybe this was his style. Maybe those were the first
lines of the stanzas, which were to be completed later on…. Yet Sejfulla was also lazy in his political activities, too. He stuck to
an illogical base and did not budge from it.
He did not go out for meetings with the patriots and nationalists, as
did, for example, Ymer Dishnica and others.
Likewise, he did not write articles for our newspapers as did Enver, Nako, Ymer Dishnica (Bardhi) and
many others. In Enver’s correspondence can be found a criticism of Sejfulla for
dragging his feet in writing about the functioning of the national-liberation
councils in both the liberated and soon to be liberated areas of the country, a
function that he had been assigned to carry out. As I said, after the liberation, I worked for a short period with
Sejfulla, when he led the Commission of he Central Committee for the
ideological issues in the Ministry of Culture.
I dealt with the press and the radio etc. During the work process, I noticed
that he lacked organizational skills. We left the meetings that he headed,
disillusioned, because he did not familiarize us with the things that we had to
do concerning the directives assigned to him, on mass education, on agitation
and propaganda, press, radio etc. Lacking these skills, he kept us for hours
talking about linguistic orthography, on which he felt competent and, indeed,
seemed to be so. After the liberation, he became more active, especially in the
area of literature, which, certainly, he knew quite well. Sejfulla had a sharp
critical sense and was not a conformist. He persistently insisted on his own
views, and the men of letters remember, very well, his debates in the Writers’ Association. Apart from the physical fitness training that he kept up, even during
the war, Sejfulla also played tennis every afternoon. He never got married and he
lived with his old mother. Sejfulla was criticized fort his liberal, democratic-bourgeois views,
which did not comply with the Party line and, in the end he was excluded from
of the Party. It was thought that he or Ymer Dishnica ‘had sold their spirit to
the devil’. They were not sent to prison, but instead, they were sent to
regional districts, in Berat and Fier. Concerning Nako Spiru, I will
spend more time writing about him because I knew him better. I worked with him
from November 1941 (the time of the Communist Youth foundation meeting), until
the liberation. Usually we worked together in Tirana or we kept in contact when
either he, or I traveled to other towns in the liberated areas or to the
partisan units. We got on well with each other. When he was not in Tirana he entrusted
me with the role of courier to the youth organizations in the areas. He was
aware of my relationship with Enver and was open with me. He told me about his
family and their merchant-bourgeois background, towards which he held a
communist attitude, especially towards his father. He loved and praised his
mother, who, as I got to know later, was a very intelligent woman. She had
aristocratic flairs, which originated, not from her wealth, but from the
cultural influences attained in the Greek schools, in Corfu or elsewhere, which
she had attended. Nako was open to me even about his personal matters. He even told me
about his dilemma in choosing between two girls, whom he both liked for their
intelligence and determination, etc. I laughed and said: ‘ Nako it is very kind of you to
allow me to listen to your reasons, but you had better listen to your heart and
then decide’. He finally decided and married Ramize
Gjebrena. Because of the strict laws
of war and the mentality of some of the leaders of the command in which she was
serving, she was killed. Nako was devastated and disgusted by this bestial
gesture. Enver felt the same, and has, in his letters, shown his complete
disapproval of this act. In the early years after liberation, Nako Spiru had not yet started a
family. During this time, he still lived at the “Dajti” Hotel and ate in the
collective canteen opened by the Youth Central Committee. Then, he married Liri Belishova, and moved to a house by our park,
with a back door from where it was easier and shorter to communicate with our
house. When Nako politically ‘turned’ and made approaches to Enver, seemingly
to ‘correct’ his attitude from the Berat backstage, he was the only one of the
members of the Political Bureau who came often to talk with Enver and he became
a ‘free and easy’ guest in the house. After the liberation, Nako was appointed as the head of the Planning Commission. This function ultimately
forced Nako to cooperate with the Yugoslav advisers, sent to this institution. After Enver’s visit to Beograd, in June 1946,
the Fellowship, Cooperation and Reciprocal Support
Treaty was signed between Albania and Yugoslavia. Then we started
the proceedings on a project for a 2-year plan. The Yugoslavs, in their budget,
allocated a fair amount of funds to support Albania, but which remained only on
paper. When Nako began visiting Belgrade, he began to notice that Tito and other ‘friends’ were using cunning
tricks towards Albania and that they were preparing its economic, military and
political integration. Nako, with his intelligence and as a communist and
patriot, could not undertake and carry the grave responsibility of the plans
that the Yugoslavs had towards Albania. Nako had nothing in common with Koci Xoxe, who was co-operating with the
Yugoslav Leadership and who had close links with Rankovich,
who was Minister of Internal Affairs and
perhaps also, Secretary of the Yugoslav Communist
Party. He and Milovan Gjilas (or Djilas –
Editor), who, at that time, dealt with ideology, were close
collaborators with Tito. At first, Nako
somehow managed to avoid meeting Koci Xoxe,
because he had made things difficult for himself. During the time that Niaz Dizdarevich was in Albania along with Velimir Stojnich, they were organizing the Berat
backstage. Nako was given special orders to gather data against Enver Hoxha.
Dizdarevich, being quite close to Nako (since he had been sent specially to
support the Youth Organization), managed
to get a hold of a letter from Nako, which spoke negatively about Enver. Nako
wrote the letter in Italian because that was the language in which they
communicated. Naturally, this was an intentional act by Nako. We got to see an extract from it, published
by the Yugoslavs, after the falling out in 1948, in a book, translated into
Albanian about “Albania-Yugoslavia Relations”.
(I read in a recent edition that the Yugoslavs had published the full letter in
June 1947). I responsibly say that, even if it was published on that particular date
(in Serbo-Croatian), Enver knew nothing about it. It was not mentioned either
in Tito’s letters or in the talks within the Mission. In these, they only
discussed the issue that: ‘in your Leadership exist two lines…’ Nako and Koci were the only that did know about the existence of the
letter). Enver and I were surprised how Nako could have uttered such words
regarding his friend, because, as far as I had known, Nako and Enver had an
open and easy-going relationship with each other. Their entire correspondence
shows a reciprocal appraisal, friendly relations, where there had been room for
criticism and jokes also. It is a fact that Nako, having being affected by the
atmosphere of the Berat backstage, handed the document to the Yugoslavs, who
later on, held it over his head like the sword of ‘Damocles’. Niaz Dizdarevich
along with others, might well have done this. I know only of one case where he
overtly performed in a dishonorable manner. In order to gather more information
about Enver Hoxha, he pretended to fall in love with and got engaged to a
friend of ours, a member of the Party Central Committee. However, when his
mission was completed, he left her and went away. When the case of Koci Xoxe
came out, in front of the First Congress of ACP, this particular friend
confessed to the Party Leadership about what Dizdarevich had been interested
in, what he had asked of her and what she had told him. When the Yugoslav pressure on Albania increased, Nako was in a dilemma as
to whether he should follow the Yugoslavs’ way and cooperate with Koci Xoxe, or
to make a turn and approach Enver. He decided to approach Enver. After what
happened in Berat, Enver felt good about Nako’s approach to him, so their old
fellowship was renewed and they went on discussing openly about the doubtful
proposals and steps that the Yugoslavs were undertaking towards Albania. I am a
witness of this because, Nako not only kept visiting us more often without any
official ‘rendezvous’, but also Enver often invited him to stay for lunch,
especially when he was still without a family. Even at the dining table, we
went on talking about business. On one of these occasions, Nako proposed: ‘What if we ask the Soviets if we can send a delegation to Moscow?’ I do not know what Enver and
Nako discussed with regard to this issue later on. However, I want to narrate
firstly about what Nako did in Moscow and what conclusions I drew later, based,
not only on the events that took place, but also what was written in certain
published documents. By the end of April 1946, a delegation of the Association for Friendship between Albania and the Soviet Union set off to Moscow, led by Nako Spiru. As the head of
this association, I was also part of this delegation. Apart from the various
visits, we also attended the spectacular May Day parade in front of Lenin’s
Mausoleum. From the steps, on the side of the main tribune, where all the
foreign delegations stood, we saw Stalin for the very first time. He entered,
with other leaders, into the tribune over the Mausoleum, where he welcomed and
laughed with the children and the participants. On one of the days in Moscow, Nako told me that he had requested a
meeting at the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union with one of the secretaries, such as Suslovin or some other. The members of the
delegation were out of Moscow but I was not with them due to health reasons.
Nako was very late and I thought that this was because Moscow was such a large
city. I did not know if he was late because of the journey or because of the
talks in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union. We were accommodated in the “National” Hotel and, while I was staying in
one of its halls and reading the ‘Ogonjok’ magazine (even though I knew just a
little Russian at that time), Nako arrived. He seemed quiet stunned. His face
was red, almost bruised and he had heavy and swollen eyelids. I immediately
asked him “What’s the
matter with you Nako? Are you Ok?” ‘I have a terrible headache’ he replied. It is true that when his head ached it was reflected in his face and
eyes, but never as much as that particular day. I asked him again ‘How did it go? Who did you met?’. His face gave me the impression that he was not satisfied with the level
of the meeting. He said that it was the director of
the Directorate of Foreign Affairs of the Central Committee who had welcomed him (I don’t remember if it was the
famous Vinogradov, who as it was said,
‘dozed’ when he led meetings, but also listened and followed all of what was
said). Then, I understood Nako’s state as being due to his inner rage because
he had not been welcomed correctly by one of the secretaries (at least that is
what he said me). I did not ask him what he had discussed with them. The only
thing that I knew was, that he, as member of the Political Bureau and
Government, would request that the Soviet Union would agree to the Albanians
sending a state delegation. After Nako’s suicide, and after the Yugoslavs had
published the extract of his letter with the bad comments about Enver and, in
particular, after the publication of Milovan Gjilas, Tito and Cardeli, and
Stalin’s books about Enver and Nako’s case, - I drew my own conclusions, which
were highly personal. It seems that Nako did not go to the Central Committee of the Soviet
Union Communist Party solely with the request about the visit of the Albanian state
delegation; he also reported about the direction that Albanian-Yugoslavian
relations were taking. Undoubtedly, the Soviets had their people in Yugoslavia
and Albania, too, and they had to have been aware of the Yugoslavian plans
towards Albania and the Balkans. Anyway, the data given by Nako was not thrown
into the wastebasket. I have the impression that Nako, when he was at the
Central Committee of the Soviet Union Communist Party; he also spoke about Koci Xoxe, about his link with the Yugoslavs. In addition,
he also spoke about Enver, and he may
have regretted both, accusing him in Berat and of the incident regarding the
letter handed to Niaz Dizdarevich. I am unable to say if Nako himself told them
about his letter which the Yugoslavs were using as blackmail. Before his
suicide, he requested a relatively long period to write self-criticism; this makes me believe that he had
informed the Soviets about his difficult situation and he expected them to give
him some help. Other facts witness this. During the debates in the Political Bureau regarding
his case, he came up with the question: ‘Have you consulted the Soviet Legation about this
analysis?’ Later, after Nako Spiro’s suicide, an employee of the Yugoslav Embassy
called Gagarinov, referred to Enver’s
words, telling Enver that Nako had sent to the Embassy a letter, which stated
that ‘because of
the grave charges that the Yugoslav Leadership had made against me, I am forced
to commit a suicide…’ When Nako had written this particular letter, the rest of the contents
were not made known to Enver. It is a known fact that the Soviets,
particularly, Troick, mourned and did
not hide their sorrow. Meanwhile, they did not make a single move to prevent
this act…they did not judge it convenient to get involved in this case…. After Nako’s suicide, the Soviets did appear on the stage. Stalin himself,
who, in January 1948 called Gjilas to Moscow (as he mentions in his memoirs),
the first words that Stalin addressed to him were ‘…now even
the members of the Central Committee of the ACP are committing suicides …’ Stalin told him other things about Albania, which are written elsewhere
in these notes. Let us return to before Naku’s suicide. Josip Broz Tito was dissatisfied, not only
with Nako’s accusing letter, but he even sent his deputy to analyze, in detail,
the charges brought about in this letter. This accusational-lecture lasted for
hours and continued to the next day, according to the translation from
Serbo-Croatian. Koci Xoxe came on stage after the mission had made all its
charges. He began by insisting on viewing Nako’s case as soon as possible. Enver replied that there was no need to hurry, that they
needed to put together the arguments and then to introduce and discus Zlatich’s charges
in the Political Bureau. Koci Xoxe disagreed….. Comrade Zlatich said that ‘the problem lies in Nako Spiru’s case and the
analyses should come up from there’. Enver pointed out that the charge did not only involve Nako, and that
the entire Party line and its leadership were gravely charged. Therefore, in no
way could they ignore the Political Bureau. Enver was convinced about this and
he also said to Koci that, all the problems that had arisen needed to be
analyzed and only then and there would Nako’s case be sorted out. These persistent barriers of not
having to hurry and of having to present the case to the Political
Bureau, made Koco lose his patience. Enver writes in his memoirs: ‘Koci, in revealing himself
began to attack’: ‘Comrade Commandant….keep in mind that we have always warned you that
‘you are listening to Nako too much’. Do not forget that you, actually,
encouraged by Nako, insisted on the autocratic plan! Do you still want the
previous line to continue? We are surprised by your insistence. After all, we
are not obliged to listen to the enemies in the Bureau. Let’s summon their
chief and then the others in turn’. This was Koci Xoxe’s typical attitude. It was not totally clear to Enver why there was too much hostility
between Nako and Koci. Also, at that time he was unaware that they were
involved with the Berat backstage, in their own particular way. They were each
trying to see who could win the majority of support from the Yugoslavs’ envoys
and then, climb the steps up to the post of the Party’s General Secretary. At
the beginning, both Nako and Koci set up their own coteries, ranging from the
administration that they led and going right up to the Political Bureau. Their ambitious rivalry seemed like a race to show which of them could
perform better: the economic sector led by Nako, or the peace and order sector
led by Koci. It came to that point where the youth organization became part of
this race, which was led by Nako’s close friends Liri
Belishova, and Fadil Pacrami etc., who bragged about their own deeds - comparing
them to those of the Party, led by the ‘ignorant’ Koci Xoxe. When Nako Spiru
regained his senses and began to be smitten with remorse about the letter that
he had handed over to the Yugoslavs, he made his move and began to get closer
to Enver and to the Soviets. However, the Yugoslavs could not forgive this act. Koci Xoxe thought that the time of his revenge
had come at last, and that he would be able to first best Nako and then Enver.
By this time, part of the Political Bureau, including Pandi Kristo and Kristo
Themelko, strongly supported Koci. The composition of the Politburo was critical. In the summer of 1946, Hysni Kapo and Gogo
Nushi were co-opted into the Bureau, neither of whom were involved
with the two conflicting sides. Liri Belishova,
Fadil Pacrami and Mehmet Shehu were also proposed to be co-opted to
the Bureau. All three of them were Nako Spiru’s supporters with regard to his
attitude towards the Yugoslavs. It was well-known that Liri and Fadil were
against the Yugoslavs, and it was portrayed they were ‘compromised’ in their
attitudes. This stemmed from the Yugoslav sabotage of the youth’s actions in
the construction of the Durres-Peqin railway and
the arrogant intervention of the Yugoslav envoy, Brana
Perovich, in the youth organization. Meanwhile, Mehmet Shehu being
a Chief of Staff of our Army, set himself against the cadres and Yugoslav
Army’s intervention. However, the three of them were not admitted as members, not even as
candidates, but only as ‘three comrades in the
Political Bureau’. In this way it was possible hold meetings without
their presence, as happened when Nako’s case was analyzed. Koci Xoxe could
not openly oppose the co-option of Nako’s supporters, but he in this way tried
to obstruct them, leaving them behind the doors. Both Enver and Nako had introduced two candidates from the youth
organization. Enver being the Head of the Government and Commander in Chief of
the Armed Forces had taken Mehmet from his studies at the Military Academy in
Moscow and had appointed him Chief of Staff of our Army, and so, he could not
impose his personal opinion on the Political Bureau. This shows Enver’s
weakened position as General Secretary of the Party after the criticism made to
the Party line and to him personally by the conspirators of the backstage set
up by the envoy of the Yugoslav Headship at the Berat Plenum. Enver did not
expect support from the other Bureau members, Bedri
Spahiu and Tuk Jakova, who
did not want to get involved with either side. Koci’s insistence on not bringing up the case in the Bureau, seemed to
be a line defined by Beograd, who feared
that there, Nako would draw up the curtain of Stoinich
and Dizdarevich’s backstage at the Berat
Plenum. Finally, Enver made, what he called a ‘compromise’, and told Koci that
he agreed to take Nako aside and to make him aware of the charges that Zlatich
had brought up, in order not to launch them openly and directly in the Bureau
meeting. At the same time, Enver warned Koci not to say a word about Zlatich’s
charge against Nako as an ‘agent of imperialism’. By mid November, Nako was called
into the presence of Enver, Koci and Pandi Kristo,
who kept the minutes. Nako was aware of the charges brought about by Zlatich, on ‘anti-Yugoslavism’
and ‘its role in the economy’ etc. He responded in a way that startled and
disillusioned Enver very much. It is true that, during the time that he had
known Nako, he had disillusioned him a few times but was satisfied with his
good sides and actions. However, his response at this particular meeting was
rather shocking. When he heard the charge about ant-Yugoslavism, Nako, after puffing a
ring of smoke out of his cigarette; as Enver describes in his memoirs; he
replied: ‘Really! And you are shocked? In two weeks time I will convert the whole
of Albania into a pro-Yugoslav country! Enver was not able to control himself and replied harshly to Nako by
saying: ‘What do you think Albania is that you could convert it into a
‘pro-Yugoslav’ or ‘anti-Yugoslav’ country? Who on earth do you think you are
that can work such magic?’ Enver did not know that these words, which would hold Nako back, would,
at the same time, please Koci and Pandi. This was what they had wanted, in
order to enhance the confrontation between Enver and Nako. Nako apologized for having expressed himself in such a way, i.e.
incorrectly. Likewise, he said that he
had no intention of seeking any distance, or disruption with the Yugoslav
comrades, but said: ‘I have expressed my rebukes and criticisms on what I have judged as
incorrect. You have never opposed me.’ ‘How come that we have not opposed you’ replied Koci Xoxe, ‘We have
argued much between ourselves’. ‘I do not mean our arguments’ Nako replied in a cool-headed manner,
staring at Koci Xoxe’s face. ‘Those are quite a different matter and have nothing to do with the
charges.’ ‘That’s where they have led to’ Koci scowled ‘that’s why I opposed you.’ ‘The reasons why we oppose each other need a thorough analysis….Comrade
Enver has requested this several times.’ Nako continued. ‘It’s not so, Nako, let’s focus on what has been said to us’, Koci began
to speak softly and timidly, as if begging, as Enver recalls. ‘What has been said does not only pertain to me’ Nako replied. ‘The withdrawal’ on both
sides, especially of Koci Xoxe, who not long before had taken the law in his own
hands, made Enver think that there was a secret, or an enigma between the two
of them, which both frightened and disarmed them. As Enver told me later, any
time that Nako or Berat were mentioned, he got the impression that such a
situation existed and that their quarrels had the origin in an entanglement.
Being somewhat afraid at certain moments, they put aside their differences made
a concession to each other, even making “deals” on the spot, only to continue
their unending quarrels later on. This particular meeting lasted for hours. Then it was agreed to put the
case forward in the Bureau. Enver had stated that deep inside himself he knew
that Nako would know how to defend, not only him but also the correct line that
the Party had followed. That is why he would support Nako and would direct the
case in the right direction so that the Bureau would make a sensible judgment
of the case. Koci Xoxe and his friends had something else in their minds. They
disagreed on a thorough analysis of the key issues because, in this way, their
foul deeds would come out into the open and, as a consequence, they would lose
their tempers. That is why Koci, at the beginning of the meeting, as soon as
Enver had put forward the main lines of the Yugoslavs’ charges, launched his
“bomb” by saying: ‘Comrade Commandant has forgotten one thing! Nako Spiru is not accused
of distorting the economic orientation unintentionally. Rather, he has done
this as an agent of imperialism! We will listen and analyze him from
this aspect.’ Enver has said several times that at this moment he was caught by
surprise by what Koci had said, since they had agreed not to mention, for the
time being, the charge that the Yugoslavs had brought against Nako as a
‘imperialist agent’. This startled Nako at the same time, who, as Enver
describes it, was completely taken aback.
‘This “bomb”, launched by Koci, confused the other members of the
Political Bureau, who were somewhat suspicious and were completely speechless.
Facing such a grave charge, Nako requested 5 days in order to get ready. But,
Koci Xoxe went on attacking: ‘Why do you need 5 days? Ask him why?
Have you consulted the Soviet Legation on this analysis?’ Are you
expecting them to come and help you and to say to us: Don’t do anything to
Nako?’ Koci even set the time to meet again on the following day. Enver intervened and told Koci not to be in such haste in giving
“ultimatums” on when the Bureau should meet and added, that at the next
meeting, he would not allow anyone to speak in such a tone. He also made it clear that in the meeting there would be an analysis made or our
line and our work and, in this framework, we would discus why and how the
question of comrade Nako’s responsibility, not only regarding the charges
brought against him by Zlatich but also those that Koci had brought against
him. I recall that Enver, after coming back from this meeting, came upstairs
to his studio, where I was, and told me about the notes that I made above,
taking into consideration that I had known Nako for a long time. Enver seemed very preoccupied regarding the situation and the atmosphere
that would prevail at the next meeting of the Bureau. He expressed to me his
conviction that, Nako in his confrontation with the Yugoslavs was not wrong and
that this was a correct and an inevitable confrontation. He also told me that
Nako’s reaction to the charges had impressed him. He was, at the same time,
both agitated and puzzled. There, for the first time, Enver said, I saw that he
was an impulsive character and someone who never rested. At that moment he
froze he did not know what to do. Finally, in a very surprising manner, he requested
5 days time to get ready for the meeting. ‘Why did Nako yield like this? -wondered Enver ‘You know very well his
impulsive character, and that is why I do not like this…’ he said to me. ‘If
necessary, we may have given him more than 5 days, but all the comrades of the
Bureau who knew how clever and skillful Nako was at writing, said that all
those days were useless.’ That night, Enver did not close his eyes. For the first time he told me
about Koci Xoxe’s arrogant attitude, not only towards Nako but also to him,
implying that Enver had supported Nako too much. Thus, Enver wondered if Koci,
as a warning or as a threat, uttered the words ‘Please don’t support him
anymore!’ At that time he had no idea what Koci had hatched at the Berat
backstage and what “cards” had he against Nako Spiru. Enver knew very well that
Koci was the “favorite” of the Yugoslavs, but it was still the time when
“fellowship” with Tito’s Yugoslavia and the relationship with his headmen and
mission envoys (such as: Rankovich, Tempo, and Stojnich Zlatich) was not considered a
“sin”. Enver felt that the “Trojan Horse” muzzle was in Koci’s hands and that
the basic rules of the life within the Party were being infringed upon
incorrectly. I personally noticed, Nako’s agitated state the following day, when he
visited us at home. He begged Enver to help him by intervening, once again with
the Bureau, so that they would give him 5 days time to prepare. Enver warmly
and cordially reminded him about the hard times that they had gone through during
the war. Among other things, he said: ‘Are you supposed to weep now? This is not like you. You should drop
your charges and express your opinions and reasons.’ Nako insisted again: ‘That’s why I need more time to get ready!’ Enver told Nako that it wasn’t himself who made the decisions. It was up
to the decision of the Bureau. At the Bureau we are amongst friends, and the
help that I could offer in this situation is that, you Nako, speak openly and
honestly. Be cool-headed and brave so we are able to judge fairly and to
properly answer the charges. This was the last moment that I ever saw Nako. He was convinced that
Koci would “burn” him in the Bureau, by showing the letter that Nako had
written, against Enver, to the Yugoslav leadership. Apparently, because he was
not given the 5 days (not, as he said, to write a self-criticism, but expecting
the Soviets to intervene and help him), he locked himself in his office and
committed the suicide. This was unexpected by Enver. He was greatly upset and, I recall that in
those moments, he continually walked around the room repeating: ‘I don’t get it, why did he go
so far!’ Even though we communists
condemn suicide, Nako had a decent burial. Enver advised me to stay by his
wife’s side, Liri Belishova, who faced,
with courage and patience, the loss of her husband at such an early age. I do
not know how aware Liri was about Nako’s inner drama, but I could say that they
were close during the war and as business friends. In my opinion, Nako would
not be able to restrain himself from talking; not only with Liri but also with
other friends around him, about what he really thought about Koci Xoxe and the
Yugoslavs and also about the problems that he had with them. Nevertheless,
neither his wife nor his friends could defend him due to the difficult
circumstance that had been created. Unfortunately, all this has been written
down in black and white, in procès-verbal and even in her own letters and it
completely goes against what Liri says in talking about Nako, whom she
exaggeratedly praises with superlatives, at the others’ expense. In February 1948, the 8th Plenum
of the Party’s Central Committee was convened. At that time it
expelled Mehmet Shehu, Liri Belishova, Fadil
Pacramin and some others; however, Koci
Xoxe did not hold back his comments about Enver Hoxha, identifying him as the person who was mainly
responsible for the wrong line against the Yugoslavs. After the Plenum had been
convened there was loud discussion concerning the proposition that the Party
needed to be lead by a “proletarian nucleus”, and, of course, at the center
would be Koci himself. Nako Spiro was, (except for that short period of the confrontations that
were raised in Berat and which went on for a few months or nearly a year after
the liberation) during the war and after liberation, the most respected and
closest collaborator of Enver. Enver was linked with Nako by political,
cultural and social ties. On the other hand, he was also linked with Koci,
because of the job, being the organizational secretary. Enver “respected” him
as a “worker” or “proletarian” as he liked to be called, and also due to the
fact that he was part of the Korca Communist Group. Thus, both Nako’s attitude
in Berat and his subsequent suicide was a loss to Enver Hoxha. Due to these
events, Enver’s position in the Bureau was weakened. This is the logic of the
facts. CHAPTER
19: THE SOVIETS ENTER ONTO THE STAGE During the turbulent and suspicious situation that
was created after Nako Spiru’s suicide, the Soviets
decided to enter the scene. Dimitrov,
a month after Nako’s tragic act and in the wave of Tito’s charges and threats,
invited Enver Hoxha, to lead a
delegation, on a visit to Bulgaria. In my opinion, this invitation was not
given without first obtaining Stalin’s approval. Enver describes in detail this official
and friendly visit and his impressions on the meetings with the great Dimitrov.
He also describes all the hassles and the brutal interventions of Koci Xoxe and
of the Yugoslav agitations. In the Fellowship and
Collaboration Treaty that was signed between Dimitrov and Enver, it
stated that Yugoslavia’s role should be mentioned. As it is now known, this
Treaty was not revealed, even after the aggravation of the relations between
Albania and Soviet Union and with the countries having people’s democracy,
until after 1960. In a particular case, and I do not quite remember if
it was on our way to, or coming back from a meeting, Tito invited Enver and me to
pay a visit to his house in Dedinia. He was very friendly. After having
cocktails, he suggested that we all watch a movie. I sat between Enver and Tito
while Alexander Rankovich sat behind us. At that time, Tito was not yet
married to Jovanka. He had divorced his
ex-partisan wife and mother of his two sons, Marko and one other, who, in the
Second World War, while participating in the actions of the Red Army, was
injured, and had lost an arm. We met him when he took part in the Second
Congress of our youth that was held in Tirana in a large military building,
behind the main University building. This was the second time that I had met Tito. The
first time was in Beograd in 1946, when I was there with a delegation, which
participated in the Congress of their Front. Joseph Broz Tito invited me
separately, as Enver Hoxha’s wife, one afternoon to the White Palace. Koca Papovich and
Gjilas were also there. I was accompanied by the ad interim
envoy from our embassy in Beograd, the good comrade, Vasil Konomi, who, unfortunately, had an early death. At that
time, I was young, timid and had no experience with these high-level meetings.
However, I left the visit with a somewhat bad impression, particularly due to a
certain lack of seriousness on their parts. This was especially true of Koca
Popovich who went so far with his compliments about my beauty and youth, and
who ‘embarrassed’ me a lot. Vasil told
me that everyone in Beograd knew of Koca Popovich’s mundane behavior, which
seemed to stem from his aristocratic family background. After the visit to Bulgaria and the signing of the
Treaty by the two countries, which of course was done with Stalin’s approval,
we read in Milovan Gjilas’ memories about the other steps taken by Stalin regarding
Albania. In his book, Gjilas
writes that on the 9th of January, 1948, he was invited by Stalin to give
him some explanations. Stalin got down to the ‘nitty-gritty’ by saying: ‘So the
members of the Central Committee of the ACM are committing suicide!’ Certainly Stalin
was speaking about Nako Spiru. Gjilas also writes that as Stalin had
told him, in this very meeting, that Yugoslavia could engulf Albania and made
his meaning more clear by miming this statement with the gesture of his fingers
in front of his mouth. Gjilas was intelligent and cultured and he knew very
well that Stalin’s words should often be carefully analyzed. Stalin made his declarations so synthesized
that, when the press commented on them, diplomats and other politicians had to
carefully study them in order to decode their real meaning. Thus, Gjilas
himself states that Stalin’s words might be a “trap”
for Yugoslavia. In my opinion it was a known fact that the Soviet Union, and
Stalin himself, were suspicious of the plans of the Yugoslavian leadership and
of Tito, on the extension of their influence throughout the Balkans. Gjilas makes a dramatic description of Stalin’s
criticisms towards Dimitrov regarding an article that he had written for the newspaper
“Pravda” about the Balkan Federation, in
which he proposed that Romania should be a part of it. Gjilas also describes
how the hero of the famous Leipzig Lawsuit blushed, even though he had bravely
faced Goering. Dimitrov was justified in
blushing, because he was the key figure in the leadership of the Comintern and it
wasn’t easy for him to have his name tarnished in front of the others. I think, or more precisely, I guess, that
this criticicism could not be unknown to Dimitrov and that it was made on
purpose for the Yugoslavs. There is a French saying: ‘Aux bons entendeurs,
salut!’ ‘Let’s hear those who have
ears’. Dimitrov was close to Stalin,
he was his friend and admirer, and I do not think that he could make political
moves for the future, such as for the Balkan Federation, without prior
consultations with Stalin. We, the Albanians, also knew, but only in
December 1947, when we went to Sofia, that Stalin agreed to a Balkan Federation, and Enver and all of us without doubt, imagined
that this would be under Dimitrov’s leadership. By the end of 1947 and early
1948, the Soviets were noticing that Yugoslavia and Tito were moving away from
Soviet influence. Stalin organized a scene in front of Gjilas’ eyes, where he
requested a unification of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the Federation, a fact
that Tito could never accept, because be could not bear having Dimitrov as a
leader. The most immediate and easier action of interest for Tito was the
unification, or better still, the annexation of Albania by Yugoslavia. In this way he would ‘solve’ the Kosovo issue
along with the situation of the other Albanian territories in Yugoslavia, by
not giving up Kosovo and the other regions, but by taking over the territory of
the Albanian State. Nevertheless, Stalin said: ‘No,
before this comes the union with Bulgaria and then, afterwards with Albania!’ This change was made within a month, from December to
January! It is clear that Stalin gave up the idea of a Balkan Federation in
spite of Yugoslavia and Tito’s ambitions. This was buried in a theatrical play
on the spot and was never mentioned again.
When Stalin said to Gjilas: ‘engulf Albania, yes, yes engulf it…’ Gjilas
was right to suspect that this was a “trap”. The 8th Party
Plenum was held in February, and, at
that time, measures were taken against those who opposed the Yugoslavian line.
Then began the preparations for the 1st
Party Congress, in which the Yugoslavs and Koci Xoxe were planning to finally succeed
in the removal of Enver Hoxha as General Secretary and the annexation of Albania. However, they
accomplished neither of the two. The Yugoslav leadership with Tito at its head,
excited at the possibility of putting Albania under their feet, prepared to
send two military divisions to the Albanian/Greek border because there was
civil war in Greece, which ostensibly threatened Albania. Enver Hoxha reported
this to Stalin. He (Stalin), was enraged by this initiative that even went as
far as to complicate the relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain,
with whom he had signed an agreement, at the Yalta Conference, defining the
areas of influence in the Balkan and elsewhere. We could say that this was the ‘straw that broke the
camels back’ and the relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were
greatly aggravated. Then came the letters that Stalin
and Molotov had sent to Tito (in March, May 1948). Later on, in June, the Information Bureau resolution was made
public. Albania is rescued. _____________________________________________END
THIS INSTALMENT______________________________________ .
First published in Albanian; by “LIRA” Tirana 1998 (Print Run: 2000).This is Part Five of a translation, that was commissioned and edited, with authorisation from Nexhmije Hoxha.