ALLIANCE 52
DOWN WITH
IMPERIALIST WAR IN IRAQ!
THE MARXIST-LENINIST RESEARCH BUREAU
NEW SERIES : REPORT 3 By
Bill Bland for The Communist League (UK) & The National Committee Marxist-Leninist
Party (NCMLP)
BRITISH NEO-IMPERIALISM
Table Contents
1) The Export of Capital
2) The Import of Capital
3) International Combines
4) The Question of the Inevitability
of War under Imperialism
5) Colonialism
6) Imperial Expansion
7) Decolonisation : Dominion Status
8) Neocolonialism
9) The Partition and Decolonisation
of India
10) The Post-World War II Decolonisation
of the British Empire
11) The UN and Decolonisation
12) "Aid"
13) The Relative Decline of British
Industry
14) The Parasitic Nature of Neo-imperialism
15) The Development of Export Platforms
16) Migration under Imperialism
Conclusion
BIBLIOGRAPHY
In his classic analysis 'Imperialism, the Highest Stage
of Capitalism', Lenin characterises the export of capital
as imperialism's most typical feature:
"Under the old type of capitalism, when free competition prevailed,
the export of goods was the most typical feature. Under modern capitalism,
when monopolies prevail, the export of capital has become the typical feature".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism',
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; London; 1935; p. 56).
By 'exported capital', Lenin means primarily
"if . . . capital invested abroad",
(Vladimir I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 57).
above all to under-developed countries,
where higher profits are obtainable:
"Surplus capital . . . will be used for the purpose of increasing .
. . profits by exporting capital abroad to the backward countries. In these
backward countries, profits usually are high". (Vladimir I. Lenin: ibid.;
p. 57).
Lenin calls profits from such foreign investment as
super-profits:
"Capital exports produce . . . enormous super-profits.
. . They are obtained over and above the profits which capitalists squeeze
out of the workers of their 'home' country".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: Preface to the French and German Editions: ibid.;
p. 12).
At the beginning of the 19th century, it was above all
Britain which had most capital available for export. In the
words of the British economist Charles Hobson, whom Lenin frequently quotes,
by 1815
"...Britain stood, in contrast with Western Europe and the Eastern
States of the American Union, fully a generation ahead in industrial development,
and was possessed of far greater productive resources and capital for investment".
(Charles K. Hobson: 'The Export of Capital'; London; 1914; p. 96).
Hobson gives the following figures for the export of
capital from Britain in the 19th and early 20th century:
1870:
PS 31.7 million Pounds Sterling
1890:
PS 82.6 million
1912:
PS 226.0 million
(Charles K. Hobson: ibid.; p. 223).
The export of capital from Britain continued to grow
in the 20th century, as is shown by the following official figures:
1982:
PS 11.6 thousand million
1986:
PS 33.9 thousand million
1996:
PS 89.3 thousand million
('Annual Abstract of Statistics: 1994'; London; 1994; p. 234; 'Annual
Abstract of Statistics: 1998'; London; 1998; p. 275).
2) The Import of Capital
However, by this time so much British capital had been
invested abroad, that the income from these investments exceeded the amount
of new capital being exported:
1982:
PS 44.4 thousand million
1986:
PS 47.3 thousand million
1996:
PS 96.1 thousand million
('United Kingdom Balance of Payments: 1993'; London; 1993; p. 42;
'United Kingdom Balance of Payments: 1997'; London; 1997; p. 43).
In other words, the export of capital
had given way to the import of capital;
A sphere of influence is a region
". . . within which a particular nation claims, or is admitted, to
have a special interest for a political or economic purpose".
('Oxford English Dictionary', Volume 16; Oxford; 1989; p. 206).
Just as capitalists try to form combines within a country
to limit competition and so increase their profits, so, where appropriate,
they try for the same reasons to form international combines.
"Monopolist capitalist combines -- cartels, trusts, syndicates -divide
among themselves, first of all, the whole internal market of a country,
and impose their control, more or less completely, upon the industry of
that country. But under capitalism the home market is inevitably bound
up with the foreign market. Capitalism long ago created a world market.
As the export of capital increased, and as . . . the 'spheres of influence'
of the big monopolist combines expanded, things tended 'naturally' towards
an international agreement among these combines and towards the formation
of international cartels".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: op. cit.; p. 60).
Thus, there ensues an:
" . . . imperialist struggle between the big monopolists for the division
of the world".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 66).
economically.
International cartels:
". . . show to what point capitalist monopolies have developed. . .
Certain relations are established between capitalist alliances, based
on the economic partition of the world".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 67, 68).
and they have continued to be formed in the second half
of the 20th century. For example, the International Tin Council
was established:
". . . in 1931 by Malaya, Nigeria, the Netherlands East Indies, and
Bolivia, when overproduction and the great depression resulted in the collapse
of tin prices. Production cutbacks did lead to increased prices".
(Latin American Bureau: 'The Great Tin Crash: Bolivia and the World
Tin Market'; London; 1987; p. 46).
Such international cartels divide the world economically
on the basis of the economic strength of those taking part in them:
"The capitalists divide the world . . . in proportion to capital, in
proportion to 'strength', because there cannot be any other system of division
under . . . capitalism".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: op. cit.; p. 68).
But such economic divisions of the world can only be
temporary, because there is, under capitalism,
" . . . extreme disparity in the rate of development of the various
countries".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: op. cit.; p. 88).
and this disparity is increased under monopoly capitalism:
"Finance capital and the trusts are aggravating instead of diminishing,
the differences in the rate of development of the various parts of world
economy".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: op. cit.; p. 89).
This disparity in the rates of development continues
to the present day, as is demonstrated by the following figures showing
the change in industrial production for various countries
in the period 1980 to 1994:
Philippines: +517%
South Korea: +306%
Malaysia:
+249%
Bangladesh: +167%
Singapore: +162%
Ireland:
+146%
Pakistan:
+145%
India:
+140%
Turkey:
+131%
Syria:
+125%
Jordan:
+104%
Sri Lanka:
+100%
Norway:
+90%
Israel:
+75%
Chile:
+73%
Ecuador:
+72%
Trinidad & Tobago: +62%
Fiji:
+60%
Hondura:
+57%
Cyprus:
+56%
Portugal:
+53%
Colombia:
+51%
Morocco:
+50%
Nigeria:
+50%
Denmark:
+48%
Algeria:
+46%
Australia:
+46
Luxembourg: +46%
Finland:
+43%
USA:
+40%
Egypt:
+40%
Japan:
+36%
Austria:
+36%
Canada:
+35%
Mexico:
+35%
Zimbabwe: +29%
Japan:
+36%
Switzerland: +31 %
New Zealand: +28%
Sweden:
+27%
Britain:
+27%
El Salvador: +26 %
Malawi:
+23%
Tunisia:
+22%
Netherlands: +19 %
Spain:
+18%
Italy:
+16%
Belgium: +15%
France:
+15%
Ivory Coast: +10 %
Brazil:
+9%
Bolivia:
+8%
South Africa: +7 %
Greece:
+6%
Senegal:
+5%
Barbados: +4%
Peru:
+4%
Indonesia: -2 %
Germany: -6%
Poland:
-8%
Uruguay: -14%
Hungary: -16%
Paraguay: -20%
Bulgaria: -22%
Zambia: -22%
Romania: -59%
(United Nations: 'Statistical Year Book: 1994': New York;1996; p.204-41)
Because of the uneven development of capitalist economies, international
cartel agreements can only be temporary. After a time, such
an agreement becomes unacceptable to certain of its parties and these organise
for its replacement by a new agreement which will more accurately reflect
the changed economic position. Often such a changed agreement can only
be obtained by war. There is, in other words, a
Lenin concluded from his analysis of imperialism that
under it, wars for the redivision of the world were inevitable:
"We ask, is there under capitalism, any means of remedying
the disparity between the development of productive forces and the accumulation
of capital on the one side, and the division of . . . 'spheres of influence'
by finance capital on the other side -- other than by resorting to war?"
(Vladimir I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 90).
Lenin's view that war was inevitable under imperialism
was accepted in November 1939 by the General Secretary of the Communist
International, Georgi Dimitrov:
"Wars are the inevitable accompaniment of imperialism".
(Georgi Dimitrov: 'The Tasks of the Working Class in the War', in:
Jane Degras (Ed.): 'The Communist International: 1919-1943: Documents',
Volume 3; London; 1965; p. 449).
By April 1948, however, Dimitrov was asserting that,
as a result of 'new international conditions',
" . a new world war today is neither inevitable nor imminent".
(Georgi Dimitrov: 'A New World War today is neither Inevitable nor
Imminent', in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Sofia; 1972; p. 227).
In February 1952, Stalin refuted Dimitrov's revisionist
view on war under imperialism in his classic 'Economic Problems of Socialism
in the USSR':
"Some comrades hold that, owing to the development of new international
conditions since the Second World War. wars between capitalist countries
have ceased to be inevitable. These comrades are mistaken. . . To eliminate
the inevitability of war it is necessary to abolish imperialism".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR', in:
'Works', Volume 16; London; 1986; p. 326, 332).
After Stalin's death, however, Dimitrov's revisionist
thesis that war was no longer inevitable under imperialism was revived
by Nikita Khrushchev in his report to the 20th Congress of the CPSU in
February 1956:
"At the present time, . . . the situation has radically changed. War
is not fatalistically inevitable".
(Nikita Khrushchev: Report of Central Committee to 20th Congress of
CPSU, in: 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 10; p. 14,746).
5) Colonialism
A colony is:
". . . a subject territory occupied by a settlement from the ruling
state".
('Collins English Dictionary'; Glasgow; 1995; p. 311).
The term 'semi-colony' does not appear in the 20-volume
'Oxford English Dictionary', but the prefix 'semi-' is defined as
". . . partially",
('Oxford English Dictionary', Volume 14; Oxford; 1987; p. 944).
leading to the view that a semi-colony is a country
which is partially a colony. However, Lenin defines 'semi-colonies' more
precisely as countries
". . . which, formally, are politically independent, but which are,
in fact, enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: op. cit.; p. 78).
Lenin was insistent that semi-colonial status was less
advantageous to the dominating power than full colonial status:
"Naturally, finance capital . . . is able to extract the greatest profit
from a subordination which involves the loss of political independence
of the subjected countries. . . .
Colonial possession alone gives complete guarantee of success to the
monopolies against all the risks of the struggle with competitors, including
the risk that the latter will defend themselves by means of a law establishing
a state monopoly".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 75, 74).
Writing in the second decade of the 20th century, therefore,
Lenin saw semi-colonial status as a transitional stage on the route
to full colonial status:
"The semi-colonial states provide an example of the transitional forms
which are to be found. . . . Semi-colonial countries provide a typical
example of the 'middle stage"'.
(Vladimir I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 74).
6) Imperial Expansion
An empire is:
". . . an aggregate of subject territories ruled over by a sovereign
state".
('Oxford English Dictionary', Volume 5; Oxford; 1987; p. 187).
As the first capitalist country to become industrialised,
Britain went through a process of unprecedented imperial expansion during
the 19th century:
"For Great Britain, the period of the enormous expansion of colonial
conquests is that between 1860 and 1880, and it was also very considerable
in the last twenty years of the 19th century".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: op. cit.; p. 70).
and Lenin gives figures for the expansion of the British
Empire during the 19th century:
Year
Area
Population
(million sq. miles) (millions)
1860:
2.5
145.1
1880:
7.7
267.9
1899:
9.3
309.0
(Vladimir I. Lenin:
ibid.; p. 70).
Later, other capitalist countries became industrialised
and proceeded to follow a similar course of imperial expansion:
"For France and Germany this period (of imperial expansion -- Ed.)
falls precisely in these last twenty years (1880-1900 -- Ed.)".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 70).
Thus, by 1916, when Lenin wrote his 'Imperialism', virtually
the whole world was occupied by one empire or another.
The victory of the American War of Independence in the
late 18th century was followed in 1839 by:
" . . . rebellions among both French and English colonists. . . . Both
risings were soon crushed, but they caused much alarm to the British Government,
which feared Canada was about to go the same way as the United States.
The result was . . . a report which advised the granting of Dominion Home
Rule to Canada".
(Andrew L. Morton: 'A People's History of England'; London; 1979; p.
471).
Dominion Home Rule was granted to Canada in July 1867.
The term 'Dominion’ derived from the Latin meaning 'under rule', was:
". . . introduced for the first time by Great Britain, 1867, in the
constitution given to Canada to define its autonomous status".
(Edmund J. Osmanczyk: 'The Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International
Relations'; New York; 1990; p, 241).
In the first three decades of the 20th century, Dominion
status was, for the same reasons, accorded to other British colonies regarded,
despite the presence of black minorities (or even majorities), as 'white':
Australia:
January 1901
New Zealand: September 1907
South Africa: December 1931
('The Statesman's Year-Book: 1997-981; London; 1997; p. 30).
The British colonies which became Dominions were in
fact promoted to the position of junior partners in British imperialism.
At an Imperial Conference in 1926, the Dominions
were distinguished from the rest of the British Empire as forming the British
Commonwealth, defined as
". . . autonomous communities within the British Empire . . . united
by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of
the British Commonwealth of Nations". (Edmund J. Osmanczyk: op. cit.; P.
180).
By 1931, the term 'Empire' had become 'politically incorrect'
even in British imperialist circles, and the term 'British Commonwealth
was enlarged to include those countries remaining British colonies, so
that the term 'British Commonwealth' replaced the term:
"...'British Empire' formally in the Westminster Statute 1931".
(Edmund J. Osmanczyk: ibid.; p. 180).
In April 1949,
"The qualifying adjective 'British' was omitted for the first time
in the Declaration of London . . . which was issued by a meeting of the
British Commonwealth Prime Ministers".
(Edmund J. Osmanczyk: ibid.; p. 160).
8) Neocolonialism
Neo-colonialism is the
". . . retention of influence over . . . one's former colonies . .
. by economic or political measures".
('Oxford English Dictionary', Volume 10; Oxford; 1987; p. 317).
After the Second World War, the rise of liberation movements
throughout the world made a continuation of the old colonialism in the
long run impracticable.
But in a colonial-type country, we find certain social
classes the continuation of whose social position as exploiters is dependent
upon the dominating foreign imperialists, namely the comprador bourgeoisie
and landlord classes:
"Where the ruling imperialism is in need of a social support in the
colonies, it first allies itself with the ruling strata of the previous
social structure, the feudal lords and the trading and money-lending bourgeoisie,
against the majority of the people".
(Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial
Countries, 6th Congress of Comintern, in: Jane Degras (Ed.): op. cit.,
Volume 2; London; 1971; p. 533).
Accordingly, colonial powers adopted the strategy of
warding off genuine liberation movements by:
1) seeking to weaken such movements by splitting them along religious
or ethnic lines;
2) negotiating with pro-imperialist political forces within the
colonies -- landlords and comprador capitalists -- to transform the colonies
into neocolonies, which are nominally independent but in reality dependent.
This strategy can be observed clearly, for example,
in the negotiated 'independence' of India.
9) The Partition and Decolonisation
of India
In his book 'India Today', published in 1940, Rajani
Palme Dutt describes India as:
". . . the pivot of modern imperialism. . .
The 370 millions of India constitute . . . nearly nine-tenths of the
subject colonial population of the British Empire".
(Rajani Palme Dutt: 'India Today'; London; 1940; p. 17, 19).
On the principle of 'Divide and Rule', the British imperialists:
"' . divided India into unequal segments -- British India and the so-called
'Indian States'. . . . There are 563 States with a total area of 712,000
square miles and a population of 81 million (in the 1931 census) or nearly
one-quarter (24%) of the Indian population".
(Rajani Palme Dutt: ibid.; p. 391).
As Marx wrote in July 1853,
"The leading princes are the most servile tools of English despotism.
The native princes are the stronghold of the present abominable English
system".
(Karl Marx: 'The East Indian Question', in: Karl Marx & Friedrich
Engels: 'Collected Works', Volume 12; London; 1979; p. 198).
As the Indian liberation movement in strength,
" . . . so imperialism has increasingly thrown the weight of its policy
on the alliance with the Princes, and sought to make the Princes its counter-force".
(Rajani Palme Dutt: ibid.; p. 400).
The Indian people were further divided into
" . . . the Hindus, representing a little over two-thirds of the population,
the Muslims, representing just over one-fifth of the population, and other
minor religious groupings, totalling one-tenth population".
(Rajani Palme Dutt: ibid.; p. 404).
Prior to the British conquest there was
" . . . no trace of the type of Hindu-Muslim conflicts associated with
British rule".
(Rajani Palme Dutt: ibid.; p. 405).
But, as the British civil servant Sir John Strachey
wrote in 1888,
"the truth plainly is that the existence side by side of these hostile
creeds is one of the strong points in our political position in India.
The better classes of Mohammedans are already a source to us of strength
and not of weakness. . . . They constitute a small but energetic minority
of the population, whose political interests are identical with ours."
(John Strachey: 'India'; London; 1888; p. 225).
In furtherance of this policy of 'Divide and Rule',
in December 1906 the All-India Muslim League was formed as a counter to
the Indian National Congress. The British social-democratic politician
Ramsay Macdonald reveals that in this step:
". . . the Mohammedan leaders were inspired by certain Anglo-Indian
officials, and that these officials pulled wires at Simla and in London
and of malice aforethought sowed discord between the Hindu and the Mohammedan
communities".
(James Ramsay MacDonald: 'The Awakening of India'; London; 1910; p.
284).
However, the provincial elections of 1937:
" . . . provided Congress with an overwhelming victory. . . . The Muslim
League did, in comparison, very badly, winning a comparatively small proportion
of the Muslim vote".
(Denis Judd: 'Jawaharlal Nehru'; Cardiff; 1993; p. 27).
In the light of these results, the leader of the Muslim
League, Mohammed Ali Jinnah decided that
". . . the League should strengthen its attraction to Muslim voters
by an appeal to Islamic anxieties".
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 27).
In March 1942, as the Japanese imperialist armies approached
the borders of India, the British government despatched Sir Stafford Cripps
on a mission:
"to attempt to achieve a reconciliation between the Raj and its Indian
opponents".
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 35).
Cripps proposed that
". . . after the war, a constituent assembly, elected in a system of
proportional representation by new provincial assemblies, would determine
the constitution . . ."
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 36).
of a Dominion of India.
The scheme contained:
. . . an important concession to Muslim separatism in the proposal
that any province would have the right to remain outside of the new Dominion".
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 36).
In August 1942, 'Quit India'
" became the official policy of Congress",
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 38).
The British government struck back, and
"the whole of the Working Committee of Congress and a number of other
party leaders were arrested".
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 38).
Congress
" . . . was declared an illegal organisation and its assets and records
were confiscated, curfews were imposed and assemblies of more than five
people were banned; there were mass arrests".
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 38).
The Viceroy, Viscount Wavell, gave
" . . . unabashed support for Jinnah and the Muslim League".
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 40).
and
". . . when the British authorities were obliged, as they inevitably
were, to reopen negotiations about India's future independence, the Muslim
League had made so much progress among India's Islamic community that it
could claim almost equal standing with Congress".
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 39).
and Jinnah could claim that
. . . the Muslim League was the true, indeed the only, voice of Islam
in India".
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 44-45).
In February 1947, the new Labour Prime Minister, Clement
Attlee,
" . . . announced in the House of Commons that the British would withdraw
from India not later than June 1948".
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 49).
and in March 1947 Lord Mountbatten was sworn in as the
last Viceroy of India, charged with bringing about
" . a transfer of power".
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 50).
to
" . . . 'responsible' hands".
('New Encyclopaedia Britannica', Volume 21; p. 109).
In May 1947 Mountbatten showed Nehru a 'secret' British
plan, called significantly 'Plan Balkan', which
" . . . devolved power to the provinces, including the princely states".
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 52).
Nehru denounced the plan as producing
"fragmentation and conflict and disorder".
(Jawaharlal Nehru: Letter to Mountbatten, May 1947, in: Denis Judd:
ibid.; p. 52).
and the British authorities were pleased to amend their
proposals to allow for
"the concept of an Indian state as a continuing entity",
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 52).
although this would be a partitioned state,
in which the predominantly Muslim areas would be permitted to secede and
form the new Dominion of Pakistan.
In August 1947, the
"the British Raj came to an end".
(Denis Judd: ibid.; p. 54).
and power was nominally transferred to rival Dominions
headed by Nehru and Jinnah. Nehru came from a family of Anglicised Indians,
His father, Motilal Nehru, was
" . a wealthy lawyer from the state of Kashmir. Both he and Nehru's
mother . . . were Brahmans, the highest caste in India".
('Encylopedia Americana', Volume 20; New York; 1977; p. 83).
and Nehru himself was educated at Harrow and Cambridge.
In short,
"The United Kingdom's Indian Empire was partitioned, broadly on a religious
basis, between India and Pakistan. . . . The Congress leader, Jawaharlal
Nehru, became India's first Prime Minister. Sectarian violence, the movement
of 12 million refugees, the integration of the former princely states into
the Indian federal structure, and a territorial dispute with Pakistan over
Kashmir".
('Europa World Year Book: 1997', Volume 1; London; 1997; p. 1,591).
all served to limit the independence of both India and
Pakistan.
10) The Post-World
War II Decolonisation of the British Empire
Since the Second World War, the decolonisation of
the British Empire has proceeded apace. The following countries which were
formerly British colonies have become formally independent,
but have remained within the sphere of influence of British imperialism
as member-states of the 'Commonwealth':
Country
Date of Nominal Independence
India:
August 1947
Pakistan:
August 1947
Sri Lanka: February
1948
Ghana:
March 1957
Malaysia: August 1957
Cyprus:
August 1960
Nigeria:
October 1960
Sierra Leone: April 1961
Tanzania:
December 1961
Western Samoa: January 1962
Jamaica:
August 1962
Trinidad & Tobago: August 1962
Uganda:
October 1962
Singapore: September
1963
Kenya:
December 1963
Malawi:
July 1964
Malta:
September 1964
Zambia:
October 1964
The Gambia: February 1965
Maldives:
July 1965
Guyana:
May 1966
Botswana: September
1966
Lesotho:
October 1966
Barbados: November
1966
Nauru:
January 1968
Mauritius: March1968
Swaziland: September
1968
Tonga:
June 1970
Bangladesh: December 1971
Bahamas: July 1973
Grenada: February 1974
Papua New Guinea: September 1975
Seychelles: June 1976
Solomon Islands: July 1978
Tuvalu:
October 1978
Dominica:
November 1978
St. Lucia:
February 1979
Kiribati:
July 1979
St. Vincent & the Grenadines: October 1979
Zimbabwe:
April 1980
Vanuatu:
July 1980
Belize:
September 1981
Antigua & Barbuda: November 1981
St. Kitts & Nevis: September,1983
Brunei:
January 1984
Namibia:
March 1990
Cameroon: November
1995
('Statesman's Year-Book: 1997-981; op cit. p.30)
In November 1995 the former Portuguese colony of
Mozambique joined the Commonwealth.
('Statesman's Year-Book: 1997-98'; op. cit. p. 30).
Today, Britain's colonies have been reduced to the
following:
Country
Area (sq. miles)
Population (thousands)
Anguilla:
60
11
Bermuda:
21
60
British Antarctic Territory: 660,000
-
British Indian Ocean Territory:
23
-
British Virgin Islands:
59
17
Cayman Islands:
100
32
Falkland Islands:
4,700
3
Gibraltar:
3
27
Montserrat:
39
8
Northern Ireland:
5,840
1,570
Pitcairn Island:
2
-
St. Helena:
47
6
South Georgia &
South Sandwich Islands:
1,580
-
Turks & Caicos Islands:
192
14
Total: 612,466
1,826
('Statesman's Year-Book' 1997-98); London; 1997; p. 1,355; 1,368-78).
The following countries which were formerly British
colonies have remained nominally independent and have not
joined the Commonwealth:
Country
Date of Nominal Independence
Egypt:
February 1922
Iraq:
October 1932
Jordan:
March 1946
Burma:
October 1947
Palestine:
May 1948
Sudan:
January 1956
British Somaliland:
May 1991
Aden:
June 1994
('Statesman's Year-Book: 1997-98'; London. 1997; p. 261, 274, 451,
722, 743, 775, 1,154, 1,195, 1,603).
The Republic of Ireland:
"left the Commonwealth in 1948".
('Statesman's Year-Book: 1997-98); London; 1997; p. 29).
and Fiji' s membership of the Commonwealth
In December 1960, the UN General Assembly adopted by
89 votes for, none against, and 9 abstentions (Australia, Belgium, Britain,
Denmark, France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain and the United States),
" . a 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples"'. (Edmund J, Osmanczyk: op. cit.; p. 217).
One year later, in November 1961,
". . . the 'Special Committee for the Realisation of the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples', commonly
known as the 'Committee on Decolonisation' was established by the UN General
Assembly".
(Edmund J, Osmanczyk: ibid.; p. 217).
In November 1972, the UN General Assembly passed by
99 votes to 5
(Britain, France, Portugal, South Africa and the USA) a resolution
asserting that
". . . the further retention of colonialism constitutes a threat to
peace and security".
(Edmund J, Osmanczyk: ibid.; p. 217).
In December 1980, the UN General Assembly
" . . . adopted an 'Action Plan for Full Elimination of Colonialism'."
(Edmund J, Osmanczyk: ibid.; p. 217).
12) "Aid"
The standard dictionary definition of 'aid' is that
it is
". . . material help given by one country to another, esp. economic
assistance or material help given by a rich to a poor or under-developed
country".
('Oxford English Dictionary', Volume 1; Oxford; 1987; p. 273).
In speaking of 'aid', we do not refer to the work of
charitable organisations such as 'Oxfam' and 'Doctors without Frontiers',
but to official aid, to aid between governments.
In 1996, total British official 'aid' was Pounds
Sterling 2.5 thousand million, made up of Pouns sterling 1.4 thousand million
of bilateral aid and Pouns Sterling 1.1 thousand million of multilateral
'aid'. ('Annual Abstract of Statistics: 19981; London; 1998; p. 277).
Firstly, we must say that the idea that 'aid' goes
to the world's poor is very largely a myth:
"The overwhelming majority of British aid failed to reach the poor".
(Independent Group on British Aid: 'Aid is not enough: Britain's Policies
to the World's Poor'; London; 1984; p. 47).
In fact, as 'aid' to under-developed countries has grown,
" . . . poverty in the Third World continues to get worse.
There are now something like a billion people in different parts of
the Third World who are living in 'absolute poverty', that is, without
adequate food, adequate water, adequate clothing, adequate shelter or adquate
sanitation. . . .
Some (aid -- Ed.) schemes can actually leave the poor worse off".
(Independent Group on British Aid: ibid.; p. 3, 34).
and, indeed, the overall effect of 'aid' has been that:
". . . the gulf between rich and poor is getting wider. The share of
the poorest 20% of of the world's people in global income stands at a paltry
1.1%, down from 1.4% in 1991 and 2.3% in 1960".
('Guardian', 11 May 1998; p. 6).
In this connection, it must be remembered that what
constitutes 'aid' to the donor is debt to the recipient, and the mountain
of debt owed by recipients of 'aid' has now become so huge that many
are unable to meet even the interest payments. Today, under-developed
countries owe
". . . the rest of the world . . . $2.2 trillion".
('Guardian', 11 May 19971 p, 6).
where a trillion is a million millions.
('Oxford English Dictionary'. Volume 18 Oxford;
1987; p. 532).
In fact, they:
" . . . owe foreign creditors so much money that just paying the interest
means that their governments can't afford basic infrastructure or proper
education and health systems. In the worst cases, they don't earn enough
foreign currency from exports to pay the annual interest and repayments
due on their debts".
('Guardian', 11 May 1998; p. 6).
In this situation, the banks have usually
". . . agreed to reschedule their debts, usually on payment of fat
rescheduling fees and at even higher rates of interest. Their profits actually
increased during this period. . . .
This system has meant that the debt of Third World governments, rather
than declining has actually been growing".
(Teresa Hayter (1982): op. cit.; p. 9, 10).
Despite this,
". . . no country has repudiated its debts. ...... Brazil briefly called
a unilateral moratorium on interest payments. . . . But in general governments,
including those which bear no respnsibility for incurring the . . . debts,
continue to pay".
(Teresa Hayter (1989): op. cit.; p. 11-12).
The end-result of this situation has been
". . . that wealth has flowed, and still flows, from the Third World
to Europe, the United States, Japan and a few other countries".
(Teresa Hayter (1989): op. cit.; p. 1).
And so,
". . . incredible as it may seem, the poor countries have been an indispensable
source of finance capital for the world-wide expansion of global corporations".
(Richard J. Barnet & Ronald E. Muller: 'Global Reach: The Power
of the Multinational Corporations'; London; 1975; p. 125).
In fact, 'aid' is
" . . . an 'instrument of foreign policy"'.
(Andrew F. Westwood: 'Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework';
Washington;1966; p. i).
of the aid-giving Powers, and its purpose is
" . . . to lure the developing country into a position of complete
subservience to the aid-giving country".
(Naved Hamid: 'Foreign Aid: A Trap?'; Lahore; 1974; p. ii).
This was admitted by US President John Kennedy
in 1961:
"Foreign aid is a method by which the United States maintains a position
of influence and control around the world".
(John Kennedy, in: Teresa Hayter: 'The Creation of World Poverty' (hereafter
listed as 'Teresa Hayter (1982)': London; 1982; p. 83).
and by US President Richard Nixon in 1968:
"Let us remember that the main purpose of American aid is not to help
other nations, but to help ourselves".
(Richard Nixon, in: Teresa Hayter (1982): ibid.; p. 63-84).
The whole 'aid'-giving process
" . . . establishes dependency, destroys self-reliance".
(Gerald Holtham & Arthur Hazlewood: 'Aid and Inequality in Kenya:
British Development Assistance to Kenya'; London; 1976; p. 254).
"The offer to grant development aid, the granting
of aid, the maintenance of aid, the threat to withdraw
aid, and the withdrawal of aid, each offer the potential to exert
political influence".
(Peter Byrd: 'Foreign Policy and Foreign Aid', in: Anuradha Bose &
Peter Burnell (Eds.): 'Britain's Overseas Aid since 1979: Between Idealism
and Self-Interest'; Manchester; 1991; p. 53).
'Aid' is
" . . . useful for prompting a recipient to opt for political and economic
solutions to its problems in a manner most consistent with what the donor
feels to be advantageous".
(Robert S. Walters: 'American and Soviet Aid: A Comparative Analysis';
Pittsburgh; 1970; p. 245).
This analysis is borne out by studies of faid' to individual
countries. For example, R. Andrew Nickson, in his book on British 'aid'
to Nepal, concludes that:
". . . the development impact of British aid to Nepal has been very
low. . . . This poor performance can only be understood only by reference
to the subordination of development objectives to wider foreign policy
objectives in the British aid programme".
(R. Andrew Nickson: 'Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: The Case of British
Aid to Nepal'; Birmingham; 1992; p. 1).
and that this was because:
". . . the overriding political objective of the British government
in Nepal. . . was to maintain excellent relations with the Nepalese monarchy
, thereby ensuring continued access to Gurkha recruits for the British
army".
(R. Andrew Nickson: ibid.; p. 34),
Indeed, most 'aid' is tied to conditions
designed to benefit the capitalists of the donor countries:
"Nearly two-thirds of our bilateral aid programme is . . . tied to
the export of British goods. And there are disturbing hints that the government
intends that in the future still greater weight than before should be attached
to Britain's own industrial and commercial needs in the formulation of
our aid policy".
(Independent Group on British Aid: op. cit.; p. 47).
"Near the end of the 1950s, 'Buy-American' strings were administratively
tied to all (US -- Ed.) foreign aid procurements".
(John D. Montgomery: 'Foreign Aid in International Politics'; Englewood
Cliffs (USA); 1967; p. 20).
'Aid' is of particular benefit to arms manufacturers:
"Debt is fuelled by arms: Pakistan and India between them spend more
than . . . Pounds Sterling 6 billion a year on arms imports. . . .
Britain is at the centre of this trade, with a $5 billion defence export
industry directly employing more than 150,000 people. In 1996, Indonesia
alone spent Pounds Sterling 438 million on British-produced weapons".
('Guardian', 15 May 1998; p. 6).
These considerations apply not only to imperialist governments,
but to international financial organisations such as the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund, the policies of which form:
" . . . an integral part of the foreign policies of Western capitalist
nations towards under-developed countries".
(R. B. Sutcliffe: Foreword to Teresa Hayter: 'Aid as Imperialism';
Harmondsworth; 1971; p. 6).
'Aid' must, therefore, be seen as a means of replacing
the shackles of the old colonialism with new chains of debt. As
the Russian economist Mailakovlevich Volkov expresses it:
"Although the imperialists have lost their colonies, they are as avid
as ever to fleece other people, if they can. To do so in the changed circumstances,
they are building a new system of exploitation in place of the shattered
colonial system, using new methods towards the same end, which is to keep
the now independent peoples under their own economic control". (Mailakovlevich
Volkov: 'The Strategy of Neocolonialism Today'; Moscow; 1976; p. 6).
A key role in this neo-colonialism, which the 'Guardian'
calls
" . . . New Slavery",
('Guardian', 11 May 1998; p. 1).
is played by 'aid'. It is not accidental, therefore,
that 'aid'
"is of very recent origin".
(John A. White: 'The Politics of Foreign Aid'; London; 1974; p. 198).
and that it
"dates from the end of the 1950s".
(Peter Burnell Introduction to: Anuradha Bose & Peter Burnel (Eds.):
op. cit.; p. 2).
that is, it came into being as colonialism gave way
to neo-colonialism, providing a mechanism to maintain in the new
world situation the dominance of the imperialist powers over colonial-type
countries.
In this respect, it is significant that
" . . . the Commonwealth continues to dominate Britain's aid programme",
(Peter Byrd: 'Foreign Policy and Overseas Aid', in: Anuradha Bose &
Peter Burnell (Eds.): ibid.; p. 62).
the top ten recipients of British bilataral 'aid' in
1988-89 being:
Pounds Sterling Milion of "Aid"
India:
73
Bangladesh:
45
Tanzania:
34
Kenya:
33
Mozambique
28
Ghana:
28
Pakistan:
24
Uganda:
21
Sudan:
21
St. Helena:
19
(Peter Byrd: 'Foreign Policy and Overseas Aid', in: Anuradha Bose &
Peter Burnell (Eds.): ibid.; p. 62).
Of course, 'aid' programmes were not confined to Western
imperialist countries. After the death of Stalin and the restoration of
an essentially capitalist economic system in the Soviet Union, that country
embarked on a rival 'aid' programme to that of the USA, Soviet 'aid'
". . . was almost universally provided in the form of loans, on what
would now be regarded as relatively hard terms".
(John A. White: op. cit.; p. 205).
and in the period 1955-65
. . . amounted to an annual average of approximately $450 million,
compared with the US annual average commitments of approximately $1,750
million, . . .
Afghanistan, India and Indonesia in Asia, and the United Arab Republic
(Egypt) and Iran in the Middle East . . . accounted for more than 66% of
cumulative Soviet aid commitments up to 1968".
(John A. White: op, cit.; p. 204. 205).
13) The Relative Decline of British
Industry
In the 19th century,
"Britain was the world's predominant industrial power".
(Bernard Elbaum & William Lazonick (Eds.): Preface to: 'The Decline
of the British Economy'; Oxford; 1986; p. v).
In 1815,
"Britain stood, in contrast with Western Europe and the Eastern States
of the American Union, fully a generation ahead in industrial development".
(Charles K. Hobson: op. cit.; p. 96).
For example, according to the 1907 Census of Production,
the largest of Britain's staple industries:
. . . coal, iron and steel, . . . textiles and shipbuilding -- alone
made up roughly 50% of the total net domestic industrial production and
70% of British exports".
(Bernard Elbaum & William Lazonick (Eds.): 'An Institutional Perspective
on British Decline', in: op. cit.; p. 9).
However, since the 1880s other later developing capitalist
countries had become industrialised. And in the USA, Germany and Japan
this industrialisation
" . . was based on mass production methods and corporate forms of managerial
coordination".
(Bernard Elbaum & William Lazonick: ibid.; p. 2).
Britain was held back
". . from adopting these modern technological and organisational innovations
by the institutional legacy associated with atomistic 19th century economic
organisation".
(Bernard Elbaum. & William Lazonick: ibid.; p. 2).
For example,
"British industrialists clung to family control of their firms".
(Bernard Elbaum & William Lazonick: ibid.; p. 5).
Unwilling to spend large sums of money on technological
modernisation, and so
" . . . forced to retreat from competition with mass production methods,
British firms sought refuge in higher quality and more specialised product
lines".
(Bernard Elbaum & William Lazonick: ibid.; p. 7).
Thus, for example, in the United States textile industry
" . . . ring-spindles comprised 62% of all spindles by 1890 and 87%
by 1913. . . In Britain only 19% of all spindles were ring-spindles in
1913".
(William Lazonick: 'The Cotton Industry', in: Bernard Elbaum &
William
Lazonick (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 18).
Similarly,
" . . . automatic looms made up only 1-2% of all cotton looms in Britain
in 1914. . . . In that year, automatic looms made up 40% of all cotton
looms in the United States".
(William Lazonick: ibid.; p. 19).
and even in 1955
". . . only 12% of British looms were automatic".
(William Lazonick: ibid.;p. 20).
Similarly, Britain's share of world steel production
fell from 7.2% in 1960 to 2.2% in 1981.
(Heldrun Abromeit: 'British Steel:, An Industry
between the State and the Private Sector';
Leamington Spa; 1986; p. 314).
Again, during the inter-war years,
" . . Britain remained the world's foremost producer of ships, accounting
on average for 40% of the world output".
(Edward Lorenz & Frank Wilkinson: 'The Shipbuilding Industry: 18801965'
in: Bernard Elbaum & William Lazonick (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 18).; p.
116).
By 1961-65, however, only 4.5% of tonnage launched was
British, compared with 38.8% Japanese. (Edward Lorenz & Frank Wilkinson:
ibid.; p. 116).
and
". . . by 1990 Britain had ceased to have any effective merchant shipbuilding
industry".
(L. A. Ritchie (Ed.): 'The Shipbuilding Industry: A Guide to Historical
Records'; Manchester; 1992; p. 22).
Similarly, Britain's share of European car production
fell from 26.2% in 1960 to 9.1% in 1982.
(David Clutterbuck & Stuart Crainer: 'The Decline and Rise of British
Industry'; London; 1988; p. 10).
Since this time
"Britain has lagged behind other advanced nations in productivity growth
and has consequently suffered continuous decline in industrial competitiveness".
(Bernard Elbaum & William Lazonick: 'An Institutional Perspective
on British Decline', in: Bernard Elbaum & William Lazonick (Eds.):
op. cit.; p. 1).
Since Britain's industries
"have been characterised by low levels of investment",
(Bernard Elbaum & William Lazonick (Eds.): ibid.; p. 266).
as a result of the unequal development of capitalism,
from about 1880 the British economy underwent a decline.
However, this decline was not absolute. For example,
between 1982 and 1996, Britain's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew as follows:
[In Pounds sterling PS]
1982: PS 238 thousand million
1986: PS 328 thousand million
1992: PS 515 thousand million
1996: PS 643 thousand million
('Annual Abstract of Statistics: 1994'; London; p.240);
('Annual Abstract of Statistics: 1998' ; London; p.283).
It was a
" . . . relative economic decline, that is to say, a
decline in comparison with other economies."
(David Edgerton: 'Science, Technology and the British Industrial 'Decline':
1870-1970'; Cambridge; 1990; p. 4).
Its consequence:
". . . was that Britain's share of world production and exports . fell,
even as its absolute level of production and exports increased".
(David Edgerton: ibid.; p. 4).
In other words, the British economy has
Parasitism is
"the practice of living on or at the expense of another".
('Oxford English Dictionary', Volume 11; Oxford; 1989; p. 208).
Already in 1916, in his 'Imperialism, the Highest Stage
of Capitalism', Lenin described the increasingly parasitic nature
of imperialism. He drew attention to
". . . the extraordinary growth of . . . the category of bondholders
(rentiers), people who live by clipping coupons, who take
no part, whatever in production, whose profession is idleness. The export
of capital, one of the essential economic bases of imperialism, still more
completely isolates the rentiers from production and sets
the seal of parasitism on the whole country that lives by the exploitation
of several overseas countries".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: op. cit.; p. 92).
Already at this time Lenin could say that
. . . the revenue of the bondholders is five times greater
than the revenue obtained from the foreign trade of the greatest trading
country in the world (Britain -- Ed.). This is the essence of imperialism
and imperialist parasitism.
For that reason the term 'bondholder state' (Rentierstaat),
or usurer state, is passing into current use in the economic literature
that deals with imperialism. The world has become divided into a handful
of moneylending states on the one side, and a vast majority of debtor states
on the other. . . .
The rentier state is a state of parasitic decaying capitalism".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 92-93).
He quotes with approval the prophetic characterisation
of the future 'European Community' made in 1902 by the British economist
John Hobson:
"We have foreshadowed the possibility of even a larger alliance of
Western States, a European federation of great Powers which . . . might
introduce the gigantic peril of a Western parasitism, a group of advanced
industrial nations, whose upper classes draw vast tribute from Asia and
Africa, with which they supported great tame masses of retainers, no longer
engaged in the staple industries of agriculture and manufacture, but kept
in the performance of personal or minor industrial services under the control
of a new financial aristocracy. . . . The influences which govern the Imperialism
of Western Europe today are moving in this direction".
(John A. Hobson: 'Imperialism: A Study'; London; 1902; p. 385-86).
On which Lenin comments:
"Hobson is quite right. Unless the forces of imperialism
are counteracted they will lead to what he has described".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: op. cit.; p. 98).
Lenin cites figures showing that in Britain
" . . . the percentage of producers among the total population is becoming
smaller:
Year
% of Workers employed in Basic Industries
1851:
23%
1901:
15%
(Vladimir I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 96).
This process has continued. The employed labour force
in Britain changed between 1979 and 1986 as follows:
June 1979
June 1986
Change
Manufacturing:
7.1 million
5.2 million
-28%
Services:
13.2 million
14.1 million
+7%
Other:
2.2 million
1.8 million
-19%
TOTAL
22.5 million
21.1 million
=7%
(David Clutterbuck &
Stuart Crainer: op. cit.; p. 17).
The interests of the financial/services sectors of
British capital, but not those of the manufacturing sectors, were reflected
in the policies of the Conservative government in Britain in 1979-87:
"The Thatcher government's comparative unconcern with technical change
and its impact on economic performance, are important themes. . . . Britain's
innovative performance continued to decline relative to its major competitors.
One is struck by the Thatcher government's econonic daring, or foolhardiness,
depending on how one sees it. Here was a medium-sized industrial nation
liberalising its markets from a position of industrial weakness, and during
a technological revolution in which it played only a minor part. The mid-19th
century policies of laissez-faire and free trade were fine
when Britain was the undisputed industrial leader. To apply them in the
1980s was decidedly risky".
(Margaret Sharp & William Walker: 'Thatcherism and Technical Advance:
Reform without Progress?', in: Tony Buxton, Paul Chapman & Paul Temple:
'Britain's Economic Performance'; London; 1994; p. 398).
To sum up,
". . . the rentier state is a state of parasitic decaying
capitalism".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: op. cit.; p. 93).
and, further, imperialism is
" . . . moribund capitalism".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 117).
that is, capitalism:
Up to approximately the 1970s, the 'development'
of under-developed countries, which was said to be the aim of 'aid' programmes,
was directed towards development of infra-structures which would
facilitate their colonial-type exploitation - e.g., the building
of roads, port facilities and railways. Industrialistion which would run
counter to this programme was discouraged. The Chinese-born British researcher
Teresa Hayter writes:
"Industrialisation in the dependent areas has been, at least until
recently, systematically discouraged by the industrialised countries and
their agencies".
(Teresa Hayter (1982): op. cit.; p. 96).
The metropolitan powers
" . . . continued to ensure that industrialisation, which might compete
with their industries and deprive them of markets, did not take place".
(Teresa Hayter (1982): ibid.; p. 96).
The governments of under-developed countries were strongly
advised
". . . to the effect that they should concentrate on what they are
supposed to be good at: the production of raw materials and primary commodities".
(Teresa Hayter (1982): ibid.; p. 96).
and imperialist policy in general was to
. . . import cheaper labour into Europe from the Mediterranean, the
Caribbean and Asia, and into the United States from Mexico".
(Teresa Hayter (1982): ibid.; p. 98).
However, since the 1960s in particular,
" . a new category of country, the NICs, or Newly Industrialising Countries".
(Teresa Hayter (1982): ibid.; p. 97).
has emerged.
Companies which operate in more than one country
are often called 'multi-national companies'. However, this
term
". . suggests a degree of internationalisation of management, to say
nothing of stock ownership, which is not accurate".
(Richard J. Barnet & Ronald E. Muller: op. cit.; p. 17).
For example,
". . . a study of the 1,851 top managers of the leading US companies
with large overseas payrolls and foreign sales, . . . reveals that only
1.6% of these high-level executives were non-Americans".
(Richard J. Barnet & Ronald E. Muller: ibid.; p. 17).
A more correct term is, therefore, trans-national
companies the term 'trans-' being a prefix
" . . . with the sense of 'across, through"'.
('Oxford English Dictionary', Volume 18; Oxford; 1989; p. 385).
In recent years, trans-national companies
. . . have become interested in locating the more labour-intensive
parts of their manufacturing processes in under-developed countries in
order to take advantage of the extreme cheapness of labour there".
(Teresa Hayter (1982): op. cit.; p. 98).
Thus, for example,
". . . the annual growth rate of industrial exports between 1960 and
1971 was 30% for Brazil, 18% for Hong Kong, 21% for Mexico, 60% for South
Korea and 35% for Taiwan".
(Teresa Hayter (1982): ibid.; p. 98).
There are additional advantages for these trans-national
companies in this process, which is known as establishing
". . . 'export-platform' investments in cheap-labour countries".
(Mark Casson: Introduction to: 'Multinationals and World Trade: Vertical
Integration and the Division of Labour in World Industries'; London; 1986;
p. 3).
these advantages including
". . . less strict controls on pollution levels, fewer safety regulations,
longer hours worked, better 'labour discipline' or in other words, more
repression and, above all, less protection for the workers from trade unions".
(Teresa Hayter (1982): op. cit.; p. 99).
In other words, imperialist countries have increasingly
opted
" . . . for the labour of the peoples of under-developed countries
to be used overseas. . . . Some of the textile products which were previously
made mainly by Asians in sweat shops in Bradford are now being imported
directly from India, Hong Kong, Singapore and other Asian countries".
(Teresa Hayter (1982): ibid.; p. 98).
At first, the trans-national company may have purely
contractual arrangements with firms in the developing country, but this
tends to give way to the purchase of an interest in the contracting company,
so that contractual relations
" . . . are coordinated through managerial control in an internal market".
(Mark Casson: op. cit.; p. 104).
This process is known as
Migration is
". . . the action of moving from one country to settle in another".
('Oxford English Dictionary', Volume 9; Oxford; 1987; p. 758).
Emigration is outward migration,
that is,
the departure of persons from one country. . . . usually their native
land, to settle permanently in another".
('Oxford English Dictionary', Volume 5; Oxford; 1987; p. 178).
and immigration is inward migration,
that is,
" . . . entrance into a country for the purpose of settling there".
('Oxford English Dictionary', Volume 7; Oxford; 1987; p. 685).
Lenin states that
"' another special feature of imperialism . . . is the decline in emigration
from imperialist countries, and the increase in immigration to those countries
from the backward countries where low wages are paid".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: op. cit.; p. 97).
Since Lenin wrote these words, emigration from Britain
has largely ceased to decline:
1950: 130 thousand
1968: 278 thousand
1978: 192 thousand
1985: 174 thousand
1995: 192 thousand
('Annual Abstract of Statistics: 1952'; London; 1952; p. 36;
'Annual Abstract of Statistics: 19801; London; 1980; p. 26;
'Annual Abstract of Statistics: 1998'; London; 1998; p. 17)
An important factor in this change has been assisted
emigration schemes from Britain to certain Commonwealth countries, such
as Australia and New Zealand. A
. . . million or more British migrants accepted Australia's offer to
migrate for only Pounds Sterling 10 over thirty years or so".
(Norman Hoffman: Introduction to: Betka Zamoyska: 'The Ten Pound Fare:
Experiences of British People who emigrated to Australia in the 1950s';
London; 1988; p. xxi).
"The Assisted Passage Scheme . . . provided passages for British migrants
until the early 1970s".
(Betka Zamoyska: ibid.; p. 15).
"The New Zealand Government operates from the United Kingdom and Eire
two immigration schemes -- the 'Assisted Passage Scheme' and the 'Subsidy
Scheme"'.
('Prospects in New Zealand: Information for Intending Migrants;'; London;
1974; p. 9).
While the number of intending immigrants into Britain
has increased, in recent years the actual increase has been small:
1950: 66 thousand
1968: 222 thousand
1978: 187 thousand
1985: 232 thousand
1995: 245 thousand
('Annual Abstract of Statistics: 1952'; London; 1952; p. 36;
'Annual Abstract of Statistics: 1980'; London; 1980; p. 26).
'Annual Abstract of Statistics: 1998;; London; 1988; p. 17).
Prior to the the Second World War, immigration into
Britain had been relatively free. Up to this time,
". . . Britain had provided a home for people who had to leave their
own countries".
(Philip Page & Heather Newman: 'They came to Britain: The History
of a Multicultural Nation'; London; 1985; p. 43).
But, particularly since the Second World War, Britain
has seen the enactment of increasingly strict visa requirements and immigration
controls. There has been
" a remarkable increase in visa requirements".
(Patricia Tuitt: 'False Images: Law's Construction of the Refugee';
London; 1996; p. 70).
And the purpose of the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration
Act
". . . was simple: to keep out non-white colonial citizens, while simultaneously
making it possible for white colonials to return 'home' if they wished".
(James Walvin: 'Passage to Britain: Immigration in British History';
Harmondsworth; 1984; p. 119).
while the British Nationality Act of 1981
" . . . effectively closed the door to non-whites, yet kept open another
legal door for 6 million patrials and 200 million in the EEC".
(James Walvin: ibid.; p. 217).
The true situation is clearly reflected in the giant
increase in applications for asylum, despite the fact that under British
law refugees have been
" . . . progressively criminalised".
(Patricia Tuitt: op. cit.; p. 19).
Applications for asylum in Britain have increased as
follows:
1988: 4.9 thousand
1995:29.6 thousand
('Annual Abstract of Statistics: 1998'; London 1998; p.21)
Conclusion
Just as the difference between the colonialism of Lenin's
day and the colonial-type domination which is typical today are sufficient
to be reflected in the term 'neo-colonialism', so it would seem the difference
between the imperialism of Lenin's day and contemporary imperialism are
sufficient to be reflected in the term 'neo-imperialism'.
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Private Sector'; Leamington Spa; 1986.
BARNET, Richard J. & Muller, Ronald E.: 'Global Reach: The Power
of the Multinational Corporations'; London; 1975.
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