Preface By Alliance
    In 1994, at an international meeting in Moscow, representatives of Alliance were asked by a Russian friend to provide some analyses of the circumstances of the writing of Stalin's masterpiece: "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR".
    Bill Bland was asked to write an analysis of this. Characteristically of Bland, this was submitted, within a few months of the request to this friend. The article expanded on this episode, from the sketch that Bland had already provided in his master-work "The Restoration of Capitalism in the USSR".
    The receipt of the article was acknowledged in private, but never was publicly acknoweldged. However some elements of its thought can indeed be traced to the circle of that friend.
    Due to pressure of time, this article was never published by either Communist League or Alliance.  This web-publication then is the first publication of this work. It may be asked what prompts this at this stage? The main matter prompting us to publish this is the recurring question:     Both these question will be elaborated in due course. Nonetheless, the movement has profited enormously from the works of Bland, and this work should no longer rest in some dusty file.
    Editors Alliance February 2003.


    BY 1922 THE FORCES OF OPEN COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN THE SOVIET STATE HAD BEEN DECISIVELY DEFEATED.

    FROM THEN ON, THOSE WHO WISHED TO END WORKING CLASS POWER, ON WHICH THE CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF SOCIALISM DEPENDS, WERE COMPELLED TO PURSUE THEIR AIMS BY POSING AS 'MARXIST-LENINISTS' WHILE SEEKING TO DIVERT THE POLICIES OF THE RULING COMMUNIST PARTY ALONG LINES WHICH IN FACT WEAKENED SOCIALISM AND PAVED THE WAY FOR THE RESTORATION OF A CAPITALIST SOCIETY.

    WE CALL SUCH PEOPLE 'REVISIONISTS', BECAUSE THEY SEEK TO 'REVISE' MARXISM-LENINISM IN SUCH A WAY AS TO SERVE THEIR ANTI-SOCIALIST AIMS.

    IN ORDER TO APPRECIATE THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF STALIN'S MONUMENTAL WORK 'ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN THE USSR', WE MUST SEE IT IN ITS CONTEXT OF THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE BETWEEN MARXIST-LENINISTS AND REVISIONISTS.

                                        *   *    *    *  *

    TOWARDS THE END OF, AND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING, THE SECOND WORLD WAR, SOME INFLUENTIAL SOVIET ECONOMISTS PUT FORWARD REVISIONIST IDEAS AND TRIED TO SECURE THE ADOPTION OF REVISIONIST POLICIES.

    In 1943 the journal 'Pod znamenem Marksisma' (Under the Banner of Marxism) published an editorial entitled 'Some Questions of Teaching Political Economy'. It was believed to be the work of one of the editors, the economist Lev LEONTIEV:     The editorial put forward the revisionist thesis that the     and that, under socialism, policy decisions of the Soviet state in the economic field constituted 'economic laws'. It denounced as:     so that     The revisionist content of the editorial attracted considerable attention among economists outside the Soviet Union - for example, the 'New York Times' on 2 April 1944 summarised the editorial under the headline:     but     On 5 July 1945, Nikolai VOZNESENSKY, who had been Chairman of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) since 1938,     Marxist-Leninist economists objected to the scheme on the grounds that     Voznesensky's scheme was rejected, and:     At this time, Voznesensky was closely associated with Mikhail RODIONOV (who had been Premier of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) since 1943). In 1945 the two had     Other prominent figures associated with this trend were Anastas MIKOYAN (who had been a member of the Politburo of the CC of the CPSU since 1935 and a USSR Deputy Premier since 1937), Aleksey KOSYGIN (who had been a USSR Deputy Premier since 1940 and Premier of the Russian Federation since 1943), and Aleksey KUZNETSOV (who had been lst Party Secretary in Leningrad in 1945-46 and a secretary of the CPSU since 1946).

    The principal feature of this trend was the revisionist proposal that, now that the war was over, the traditional priority accorded in socialist economic planning to the production of means of production could and should be relaxed:

    The group, around Voznesensky used their power-base in Leningrad to introduce in the Russian Republic some of the policy changes for which they stood. They introduced     Between 1946 and 1948, leading Leningrad figures established friendly relations with Yugoslav leaders who were, in the latter year, denounced by the Cominform as revisionists. Yugoslav Politburo member Milovan DJILAS describes how Aleksandr VOZNESENSKY, Nikolay's elder brother who was Minister of Education in the Russian Republic, expressed revisionist views to him in 1946:     Djilas reports that a Yugoslav delegation to the Soviet Union in January 1948 was received in Moscow with 'reserve', but was warmly welcomed in Leningrad. He tells us that since the delegation     Vladimir DEDIJER, the Yugoslav Director of Information, confirms that the Yugoslav delegation:     Naturally, these developments did not go unnoticed in Moscow. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union noted in its letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia of 4 May 1948 that the last Yugoslav Party delegation to the Soviet Union had preferred to obtain 'data' from officials of the Party Leningrad organisation rather than from officials in Moscow:     In this connection, Robert Conquest points out:     In September 1946 a book was published in Moscow by the Hungarian-born economist Evgeny VARGA, Director of the Institute of World Economy and World Politics. It was entitled 'Changes in the Economy of Capitalism as a Result of the Second World War'.

    The book incorporated a number of revisionist theses:

    Varga's book was naturally heavily criticised by economists loyal to Marxism-Leninism on these questions. For example, in May 1947, Varga's book     Although     at this time Varga was willing to make only one minor admission of error -- on the character of the People's Democracies:     Five months later, in October 1947,     In October 1948,     The main item on the agenda was a further critical discussion on Varga's book.

    Konstantin OSTROVITIANOV, the Director of the Economics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, denounced the work as 'un-Marxist':

    Varga, however, still refused to admit more than two errors in his work:     In closing the discussion, Ostrovitianov commented:     In 1947 Voznesensky published a book entitled 'War Economy of the USSR in the Period of the Patriotic War' which, like Varga's book, put forward some revisionist theses -- including that put forward in the 1943 'Under the Banner of Marxism' editorial.
 
    Firstly, it asserted that a socialist economic plan was equivalent to an economic law:     As the New Zealand-born economist Ronald MEEK states, this thesis     Secondly, it favoured the concept that the state planning authorities should base the distribution of production resources in the economy on the law of value:     Thirdly, it favoured a relaxation of the principle that socialist economic' planning should give priority to the production of means of production. The chapter headed 'Post-War Socialist Economy' proposes:     In spite of these revisionist deviations the book was, in general, favourably reviewed and, in 1948, was awarded a Stalin Prize.

    The Australian economist Bruce McFARLANE points out that Vosnesensky's economic theories were put into effect by the revisionists in the 'economic reforms' which followed Stalin's death:

    In 1947,     As a part of this campaign, in 1948 the group around Voznesenky proposed     In 1948 Pyotr POPKOV, First Secretary of both the Leningrad Regional and City Committees of the Party, proposed to Nikolay Voznesensky     Voznesensky did not inform the Central Committee of Popkov's approach.

    The Soviet Marxist-Leninists saw these proposals as a move to make the Communist Party in the Russian Republic the centre of an anti-Party, anti-socialist conspiracy.

    In January 1949, the group around Voznesensky felt in a strong enough position to introduce on a country-wide scale the 'economic reforms' proposed by Voznesensky -- in particular, the close relation of the wholesale prices of commodities to their value - which would prepare the ground for making profit the regulator of production:     The 'reform' was described as Voznesensky's     It must be noted that     In 1948,     As a result, on 10-20 January 1949 an All-Russia Wholesale Fair was held in
Leningrad.

    On 13 January 1949, after the fair had opened, the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Mikhail Rodionov,

    Georgi Malenkov circulated Rodionov's message to Lavrenti BERIA, Nikolai Voznesensky and Anastas Mikoyan, writing on it:     By now the Marxist-Leninist members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU were satisfied that leading Party members in Leningrad were involved in a conspiracy aimed at diverting the Party's policy away from Marxist-Leninist principles and at driving a wedge between the Leningrad Party and the Central Committee.

    On 15 February 1949, the Politburo adopted a resolution "On the Anti-Party Actions of Comrades Aleksey A. Kuznetsov, Mikail I. Rodionov and Pyotr S. Popkov'. The resolution strongly criticised the named Party members for 'anti-state activities'.

    The accusation was made in the resolution that

    The resolution further stated:     The Politburo:     Voznesensky was also reprimanded:     On 21 February 1949,     On 22 February 1949,     On 5 March 1949,     By decision of the USSR Council of Ministers on the same date,     In March 1949, Varga felt compelled to write a letter to the Party newspaper 'Pravda' (Truth) denying foreign press reports that he was 'of Western orientation':     In April 1949, Varga published in 'Voprosy ekonomiki' (Problems of Economics) a long article admitting the justice of most of the criticisms made of his book:     Varga admitted that these errors were particularly dangerous because they were reformist departures from Marxism-Leninism     and because they related to the evaluation of the nature of the bourgeois state:     Varga agreed with his critics that the fundamental reason for his chain of reformist errors was his incorrect attempt to separate economics from politics:     In particular, admitted Varga. this incorrect methodology led to his incorrect characterisation of the state under monopoly capitalism as, in 'normal' times, the machinery of rule of the capitalist class as a whole, and not as the machinery of rule of monopoly capital:     It was this failure to make clear     declared Varga, which had led him to suggest that the proletariat could gradually increase its influence in the state apparatus until the point was reached where it had the decisive role in the state. Quoting from his book, Varga admitted:     Varga also now accepted that the characterisation he gave in his book of the nature of nationalisation in modern capitalist countries was erroneous:     A similar fundamental error, admitted Varga, led to     Varga confirmed his earlier admission of error in characterising the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe both as 'state capitalist' and now also as of 'relatively small' significance:     He also now accepted that he had been in error in asserting that genuine state economic planning could occur in modern capitalist countries:     Finally, Varga agreed that he had been seriously wrong in paying little attention to the intensification of the general crisis of capitalism:     Thus, Varga had now admitted that all the theses for which he had been criticised were incorrect, except for his thesis that wars were no longer inevitable under imperialism.     On 14 July 1949, the Central Committee of the CPSU adopted a resolution declaring that     and took the decision     Although unable to prevent the dismissal (and later trial) of Voznesensky, the concealed revisionists in leading positions in the CPSU were strong enough to prevent publication of this resolution. Indeed,     This was a few days before (on 13 January 1952) the Marxist-Leninists launched their public exposure of the revisionist plot to murder Andrei ZHDANOV and Aleksandr SHCHERBAKOV by criminally incorrect medical treatment.     In July 1949,     The matter was referred to the Party Central Committee, which     On 9 September 1949, the Party Control Commission submitted to Malenkov its recommendation     In the autumn of 1949,     On 13 August 1949,     and on 27 October 1949,     On 13 January 1950 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet issued     Malenkov     A movement     On 26 September 1950, the indictment was published in what came to be known as 'the Leningrad Affair'. The defendants were Voznesensky, Kusnetsov, Rodionov, Popkov, Kapustin, and four others.
     (Political Archives' (1990): op. cit. p. 151).

    They

    The trial of the defendants in the 'Leningrad Affair'     According to the official record of the trial, as quoted by the Supreme Court of the USSR in April 1957:     All the accused were found guilty. Voznosensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov, Kapustin and one other were sentenced to death. The other defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment of from 10 to 15 years.

    The death sentences were carried out on 1 October 1950.


    As long ago as 1940 or 1941, Stalin had proposed the preparation of a new textbook of political economy to cover the political economy of socialism:     However, the German attack upon the Soviet Union in June 1941 held up serious work on the preparation of the new textbook, and     and a conference     The materials of the conference were sent to Stalin, who wrote on the issues raised some 'Remarks', which were circulated -- privately at first -among economists, some of whom, in turn, wrote and circulated criticisms of Stalin's 'Remarks':     Over the years, the Marxist-Leninists in the leadership of the CPSU, headed by Stalin, were engaged in a continuing struggle against spurious Marxism-Leninism - revisionism. Stalin referred to this struggle many times, admitting that the revisionist forces had not been entirely unsuccessful in the field of ideology:     Over the years, the still concealed revisionists in leading positions in the Soviet Party and state were able, slowly but steadily, to increase their own influence and reduce that of the Marxist-Leninists.

    Until 1927, Stalin made numerous contributions to the decisions and work of the Communist International. After 1927, the concealed revisionists succeeded in stopping these contributions. In order to try to accommodate this fact to the revisionist myth that Stalin exerted dictatorial powers both in the CPSU and the Comintern, the false story was spread that

    Although the Central Committee of the CPSU had announced in 1946 the publication of Stalin's 'Works' in 16 volumes, in 1949 publication in the Soviet Union was halted at Volume 13, covering the period only to 1934.
    (Preface to: Josef V. Stalin: 'Works', Volume 1; Moscow; 1952; p. xi-xiv).

    In October 1952, the revisionists succeeded in demoting Stalin from the position of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU to that of one of several Secretaries:

    This limitation of Stalin's influence was concealed to some extent by the 'cult of personality' which the concealed revisionist conspirators had built up around Stalin. Nevertheless, it was noted by the more astute analysts:     and continued until Stalin became virtually what the American William McCAGG, Junior calls 'the Prisoner in the Kremlin':     THESE WERE THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE CONCEALED REVISIONISTS WERE ABLE TO FORCE THROUGH THE DECISION THAT THE LEADING ROLE AT THE FORTHCOMING 19th CONGRESS OF THE CPSU, FIXED TO OPEN ON 3 OCTOBER 1952, SHOULD BE PLAYED NOT BY THE FIRM MARXIST-LENINIST STALIN, BUT BY SECRETARY GEORGI MALENKOV -NOT A REVISIONIST CONSPIRATOR BUT A FIGURE WHOM THEY CALCULATED, CORRECTLY, THAT THEY COULD USE AS AN UNWITTING TOOL IN THE NEXT STAGE OF THEIR CONSPIRACY TO TURN THE PARTY FROM THE PATH OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND DEFENCE OF SOCIALISM:     IN THESE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SOVIET MARXIST-LENINISTS DECIDED TO STRIKE A BLOW AGAINST REVISIONISM BY PUBLISHING, ON THE VERY EVE OF THE CONGRESS, STALIN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE DRAFT TEXTBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY:

    Thus, at the Congress, in spite of Stalin's demotion

    This article will not attempt a detailed analysis of 'Economic Problems'.
    IT WILL MERELY SUMMARISE ITS CENTRAL THEME, IN WHICH STALIN     The first part of Stalin's 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR', dated 1 February 1952, consisted of Stalin's contribution to the discussion on the draft textbook on political economy.

    Its most important points were:

    Firstly, in opposition to Leontiev, Voznesensky and others -- (see pages above on 1, 7)  -- it affirmed the objective character of economic laws under socialism:

    As the British economist Peter WILES points out:     Secondly, in opposition to Voznesensky and others -- see page 7 -- it denied that the law of value should exert a regulating influence on a socialist economy:     Thirdly, in opposition to Varga and others (see above, page 5), it maintained that since the Second World War the general crisis of world capitalism had deepened:     Fourthly, in opposition to Varga and others (see page 5, 14), it maintained that war would continue to be inevitable as long as imperialism existed:     Fifthly, it suggested rough drafts for basic economic laws of modern capitalism and of socialism.     Sixthly, it criticised     The second part of Stalin's 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR', dated 21 April 1952, consisted of Stalin's reply to a critical letter from the economist Aleksandr NOTKIN.

    Its most important point was that 'under socialism means of production are not commodities' ;

    except in the field of foreign trade:     The third part of Stalin's 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR', dated 22 May 1952, consisted of Stalin's response to a criticism from an economist named L. D. Yaroshenko, who complained that the first part of Stalin's 'Economic Problems' contained     of his (Yaroshenko's - Ed.) opinion.

    In his reply, Stalin stated bluntly that the reason for this omission was

    In this section Stalin makes the following principal points:

    Firstly, that the relations of production do not always function as a brake on the development of the productive forces:

    In fact, the relations of production at some periods function as a brake on the development of the productive forces, and at other periods as mainspring impelling them forward:     Even under socialism, Stalin points out, there are contradictions arise between the relations of production and the productive forces:     Secondly, that under socialism the relations of production are not a component part of the productive forces:     If this were so, Stalin points out, we should have     Thirdly, that the political economy of socialism cannot be reduced to the rational organisation of the productive forces:     Fourthly, that the transition from socialism to communism requires more than a rational organisation of the productive forces:     In fact,     These conditions are:     Yaroshenko objected to Stalin's proposed basic economic law of socialism on the grounds that     To which Stalin replied:     Stalin drew the following conclusions at the end of Part Three of 'Economic Problems':     The fourth and final part of Stalin's 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR', dated 28 September 1952, consisted of Stalin's response to a criticism from economists A. V. SANINA and Vladimir G. VENZHER.

    Firstly, in opposition to Sanina and Venzher, Stalin repeated the point already made in Part One -- see page 21 -- affirming the objective character of economic laws under socialism:

    Secondly, also in opposition to Sanina and Venzher, Stalin rejected the concept that collective farm property should be raised to the level of public property by selling the basic means of production to them:     In contrast, Stalin repeated the proposal made earlier (see page 25) that collective farm property should gradually be raised to the level of public property by bringing about a direct exchange of products between the collective farms and state industry:     As has been said, the 19th Congress of the CPSU opened on 3 October 1952 -- the day after publication Stalin's 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR' had been completed.
 
    Stalin's work dominated the proceedings and decisions of the congress:     and in his report to the Congress, Secretary of the CC Georgi Malenkov endorsed Stalin's criticism of Voznesensky's revisionist views - still without mentioning the latter's name:     In the political situation following the publication of Stalin's 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR' and its endorsement at the 19th Congress of the CPSU, the Soviet Marxist-Leninists were able to break through the curtain of silence which the concealed revisionists had been able to draw around the criticism of Voznesensky's economic views, and around his treasonable conduct and trial.

    On 12 and 21 December 1952, two articles were published in 'Izvestia'; (News) by the philosopher Petr FEDOSEYEV extolling Stalin's last work. On 24 December 1952 a further article was published in 'Pravda' (Truth) by the chief editor of the newspaper, Mikhail SUSLOV. The article agreed with Fedoseyev's conclusions, and (for the first time since 1949) mentioned Voznesensky by name:

    Suslov went on to express strong criticism of Fedoseyev for failing to make a self-criticism of his (Fedoseyev's - Ed.) endorsement of Voznesensky's revisionist views in the 1940s:     Suslov's article contained the text of the previously unpublished Central Committee resolution of July 1949 (see pages 14-15) criticising Voznesensky's book and its endorsement by 'Bolshevik'.

    In January 1953, a letter from Fedoseyev dated 31 December 1952 was published in 'Pravda', in which he said:

    After the death of Stalin in 1953, the new revisionist leaders hastened to rehabilitate their executed fellow-conspirators:

    On 30 April 1954,

    in the 'Leningrad Affair'. And on 3 May 1954,     The 'rehabilitation' of the conspirators made it necessary to find scapegoats to blame for the alleged 'miscarriage of justice' in the 'Leningrad Affair' and for the 'torture' which would account for their 'false' confessions.

    Thus, in December 1954 the former USSR Minister of State Security, Viktor ABAKUMOV, was put on trial, together with five of his assistants, charged with having:

    All the accused were found guilty, and four of them (including Abakumov) were sentenced to death and executed,
    (Communique, ibid. p. 12)     After the death of Stalin in 1953 and the accession to power of the new revisionist leadership of the CPSU headed by Nikita KHRUSHCHEV, Varga     And in 1963, Varga was awarded     It was not until the infamous 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 that the 'rehabilitation' of the conspirators in the 'Leningrad Affair' was made more widely known -- and even then only in the 'secret speech'. The 'blame' for the alleged 'miscarriage of justice' was now placed upon Stalin:     Before 1957, the name of Georgi Malenkov was not mentioned in connection with the 'Leningrad Affair':     But after Malenkov came to realise the true character of the revisionist conspirators and began to oppose them, secret internal Party documents began to accuse him of involvement in the 'Leningrad Affair'. In February 1955,     However,     Thus, 'blame' attributed by the revisionists f or the 'miscarriage of justice' in the 'Leningrad Affair' was not based on any historical facts. It was shifted from one scapegoat to another according to the changing tactical needs of the revisionist conspirators.     In 1964 Varga published a new book entitled 'Ocherki po problemam politekonomy kapitalizma' (Essays on Politico-Economic Problems of Capitalism).

    In the new ideological climate, Varga presented his work as a polemic against 'the distortion of economic science in the time of Stalin', saying:

    He admitted that his earlier 'self-criticism' had not been made as a result of pressure from within the Soviet Union:     but he now reaffirmed virtually all the points he had previously withdrawn, He even denounced as 'entirely unfounded' the basic economic law of modern capitalism put forward by Stalin, which he had endorsed in 1952:     Shortly before his death. Varga wrote     The document was     According to Varga's 'Testament', under Stalin's leadership the dictatorship of the proletariat degenerated into the 'dictatorship of the top group of the Party bureaucracy':     until the Soviet Union became virtually 'a fascist state':     What, no doubt, made Varga's anti-Stalin diatribe unacceptable to the new Soviet revisionist leadership was his assertion that under the 'reforms' nothing had fundamentally changed, and that real change required a new top leadership:     Varga died on 8 October 1964. His glowing obituary, published in 'Pravda' on 9 October, was signed by Nikita Khrushchev, Anastas Mikoyan and other revisionist leaders. It described him as:     THE PUBLICATION IN OCTOBER 1952 OF STALIN'S 'ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN THE USSR' MUST BE SEEN AS A POWERFUL BLOW BY THE SOVIET MARXIST-LENINISTS AGAINST THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF REVISIONIST IDEAS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION.



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