“ALLIANCE!”
MARXIST-LENINIST
Winter
2006 Historical Reprint series
________________________________________________________________
COMPASS For Communist
League (UK)
No 108: October 1993
Book
Review: MOLOTOV'S MEMOIRS
Albert Resis
(Ed.): 'MOLOTOV
REMEMBERS: INSIDE KREMLIN POLITICS'; Chicago; 1993
Molotv stand behind Stalin, at Potsdam
Conference 1945
Vyacheslav Molotov was Stalin's closest
comrade-in-arms, and held for many years very important positions in
the Soviet
Union. One might have hoped, therefore, that his memoirs would have
contained
valuable information on the way in which revisionists managed to wreck
socialism in the USSR and clear the way for the restoration of
capitalism.
The Assassination of Kirov
The book does, indeed, contain one or two
interesting
snippets of information hitherto unknown, or little known, outside the
highest
circles in the former Soviet Union. For example, he tells us:
"Krushchev hinted that Stalin had Kirov
killed. A
commission was set up in 1956.
Tile commission concluded that Stalin was
not
implicated in Kirov's assassination. Khrushchev refused to have the
findings
published since they didn't serve his purpose".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): 'Molotov Remembers:
Inside
Kremlin Politics'; Chicago; 1993; p. 353).
Revelations -- About
the Memoirist
Sadly, however, for the roost part
Molotov's memoirs
-- like most memoirs -- tell us more about Molotov's own deficiencies
than
about the events he recalls.
No one could question Molotov's dedication
to
socialism and the working class. He followed Stalin loyally during the
latter's
lifetime, but it is clear that once Stalin's guiding hand had been
removed, his
political acumen was not sufficiently acute to prevent the revisionists
who
surrounded him from using him as their tool in the critical years from
Stalin's
death in 1953 to his own expulsion from the CPSU by the revisionists in
1957.
Molotov's
Tacit
Endorsement of the Attack upon Stalin
Although he defends Stalin in many
respects, Molotov
admits that he kept silent during Khrushchev's savant attack on Stalin
at the
20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956:
"Some people holding pretty much the same
view
blame me. 'Why did you keep
silent at the 20th Congress? To keep silent, they say, is
tantamount to consent. That's how it turned out. I kept silent and thus
consented".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.;
p. 351).
He gives as his reason for
remaining silent that the Party was 'not ready' for a Marxist-Leninist
analysis
of events and that if he and other Marxist-Leninists had spoken out
against
Khrushchev's slanders at the congress, they would have been 'expelled
from the
Party':
"The Party was not
ready for such an analysis. We would simply have been kicked out. No one would have
supported us. No
one".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 350).
He tells us that:
“I still hoped that if we
remained in the Party we would be able to correct the situation
gradually".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.;
p. 350).
But in fact Molotov was not
completely silent during the attacks on Stalin at the 20th Congress. On
the
contrary, at one of the open sessions of the congress he had no
hesitation in
‘condemning 'the cult of the
individual"'
('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 10; p. 14,748).
which was a clear prelude to
the named attack on Stalin which followed at the secret session.
However, long after it had
become patently obvious to anyone with even a smattering of
Marxist-Leninist
understanding that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was
dominated by
open revisionists who were restoring an essentially capitalist social
order in
the country, Molotov tells us his main preoccupation in the years
following his
expulsion was not so much with fighting revisionism as with trying to
persuade
the revisionist leaders to reinstate him in the Party:
"I send letters to the
Central Committee after each congress asking them to consider my
application
for reinstatement in the Party.
Four times I applied to be
reinstated in the Party. I wrote to Brezhnev. I am going to send
another
application to the 24th Congress".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): op.
cit.; p. 284, 356).
Indeed, he goes so far as to
agree that he deserved punishment for opposing the
revisionists,
and merely maintains that expulsion was excessively severe:
"I ought to have been
punished, true, but expulsion from the Party . .?"
(Albert Resis (Ed.):
ibid.; p. 356).
The
Case of Israel
The general picture of the
development of revisionism in the former Soviet Union is now known, but
it
would have been useful if Molotov had filled in, from his personal
knowledge,
details of some of the more controversial episodes in Soviet history --
such as
the support given by the Soviet regime to the partition of Palestine
and the
coup against Lavrenti Beria.
Unfortunately, he largely
fails to do perform this task.
A paper read to
the Stalin Society earlier this year presented the evidence for the
view that
it was revisionists in the leadership of the CPSU who, under the
leadership of Andrey Gromyko,
Soviet Permanent
Representative to the United Nations and Deputy foreign Minister,
succeeded in
distorting Soviet foreign policy in favour of the partition of
Palestine.
Molotov, who
held the post of Soviet Foreign Minister at the time, gives a very
garbled
version of events. He appears to say that the American imperialists
were
'opposed' to the formation of the state of Israel, while he and Stalin
'supported' it:
"Q: In the formation of
the state of Israel, the Americans were opposed?
A: Everyone objected but us
-- me and Stalin".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.;
p. 65).
But it is clearly nonsense
to say that the US imperialists were opposed to the formation of the
state of
Israel:
"US support of the
partition was critical in bringing about passage of the resolution (for
the
partition of Palestine and the creation of the state of Israel -- Ed.)
by a
two-thirds majority of the Assembly".
('Encyclopedia Americana', Volume 15; Danbury (USA); 1992; p.
533).
However, Molotov
goes on to explain that what he and Stalin supported was not,
in fact,
the formation of a racist Israeli state, but a state of Palestine in
which
Arabs and Jews shared power:
"We proposed, however,
an Arab-Israeli (clearly he means 'Arab-Jewish' ` -- Ed.) union, for
both
nations (clearly he means 'nationalities' -- Ed.) to live together".
(Albert Resis (}d.):
cit.; p. 65).
In other words,
Molotov appears to support the view expressed in the Stalin Society
paper --
that Stalin supported the formation of a Palestinian state in which
Jews and Arabs shared power.
The
Case of Beria
In a paper read
to the Stalin Society entitled "The 'Doctors' Case' and the Death of
Stalin", the evidence was presented for the view that, following the
death
of Stalin, leading revisionists, headed by Khrushchev, deceived honest
members
of the leadership into believing that Lavrenti Beria was an agent of
imperialism and into participating in a military-style coup against
him. The
sole reason which Molotov gives for agreeing to participate in the coup
was
that Khrushchev told him that 'apparently' Beria was 'up to something'!
Molotov's story of these
events is almost identical with that of Krushchev
"If you are interested
in. . . . the final. Politburo session on Beria, you must bear in mind
that
some preliminary work had been done before that. In this Khrushchev
showed he
was an exceptionally energetic and efficient organiser. The initiative
was in
his hands as he was the Party secretary. He was definitely a good
organiser.
He summoned me to the
Central Committee building, and l came over.
'I'd like to talk to you
about Beria., He can't be trusted".
I said: 'I fully support
this idea. He must be removed and
expelled from the ‘Politburo'.
Immediately before the
session we agreed that expelling Beria from the Politburo would not be
enough.
He had to be placed under arrest. Two days later we all gathered in
session.
Khruschev was
the organiser of the entire affair. Why? . Apparently he had been
informed that
Beria was up to something. And Beria had troops under his command.
He was arrested at the
Politburo session. We were all friends. .
. .
I was one of the first to
speak. I said that Beria was a degenerate, . . . and
that he was no communist.
Then Beria took the floor to
defend himself.
Beria had arrived at the
session totally unaware of what lay in store for him.
.
The room was
securely guarded, but sitting in Poskrebyshev's room, which adjoined
the
meeting room, was a group of military officers, headed by Zhukov. The group was
waiting to be called in
to arrest Beria.
Malenkov pressed the button. That
was the signal. The group of officers led by Zhukov entered the room.
Malenkov says: 'Arrest
Beria'.
Q: Was that a complete
surprise for Beria?
A: Exactly . . .
'I fell into a trap",
he cried. He didn't expect that from Khrushchev.
Moskalenko was also involved.
Khrushchev had him promoted to marshal.
Moskalenko was put in charge
of the jail where Beria was kept".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.;
p. 343, 344, 345, 346).
While the official
indictment against Beria was that he was a
". . . hireling
of foreign imperialist
forces",
('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 9; p.13,029).
Molotov insists that Beria
was not an agent of imperialism in this sense:
"Q: To this day, people
still argue whether Beria had been an agent of some foreign
intelligence
service.
A: I don't think he
was". .
(Albert Resis (Ed.): op.
cit.; p. 339).
He charges Beria
only with being 'an agent of imperialism' in that in 1953 he supported
within
the leadership a policy which objectively assisted imperialism:
"He played the role of
an agent of imperialism, that's the point.
I regard Beria as an agent
of imperialism. Agent does not mean spy". (Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.;
p.
340).
Many years later Molotov still declares
that he has 'no
regrets' about participating in the coup and praises Khrushchev for
organising
it!:
"I consented'
(to take part in the coup against Beria -- Ed.). I have no regrets
about it
now. On the contrary, I believed, and I continue to believe, that this
was to
Khrushchev's great credit. That's my opinion".
(Albert Resis (Ed.):
ibid,l; p. 345).
Molotov reveals
that the charge of 'serving imperialism' levelled against Beria was
concerned
with the policy which the Soviet government should adopt towards the
building
of socialism in occupied East Germany. The Marxist-Leninist position
on 'the
export of socialism' was put by Stalin in his interview with American
newspaper
magnate Roy Howard in March 1936:
"Howard:
May there not be an element of danger in the genuine fear existent in
what you
term capitalist countries of an intent on the part of the Soviet Union
to force
its political theories on other countries?
Stalin: There is no justification
whatever for such fears. If you think that Soviet people want to change
the
face of surrounding states, and by forcible means at that, you are
entirely
mistaken. Of course, Soviet people would like to see the face of
surrounding
states changed, but that is the business of the surrounding states".
(Josef V. Stalin: Interview
between Josef Stalin and Roy Howard (March 1936), in: ''Works' Volume 14; London; 1978; p.136-37).
Stalin therefore
maintained that the Soviet government's concern with post-war Germany
was
limited to the question of preventing future German aggression. In a
speech in
November 1943 he defined Soviet war aims in this connection as to
" establish such an
order in Europe as will
completely exclude the possibility of fresh aggression on the part of
Germany".
(Josef V. Stalin: Speech at Celebration
fleeting of Moscow
Soviet (6 November 1943), in: 'War Speeches, Orders of the Day and
Answers to
Foreign Press Correspondents during the Great Patriotic War: July 3rd
1941 -
June 22nd 1945'; London; 1945; p. 82).
As far as can be
gathered from Molotov's somewhat garbled account, Beria
maintained
the position that the Soviet government's only concern with defeated
Germany
should be to ensure that it was anti-fascist and peaceful, and
that the
question of the building of socialism in any part of Germany was a
matter
for the German working people:
"After Stalin's death,.
. .. Beria took an active stand on the German question. . . . Beria,
who was
then becoming particularly active, advanced the following argument: let
it (the
GDR --Ed.) just be a peaceful country. That is sufficient for our
purposes'. .
. . . .
Beria kept insisting that .
. . . . the most important concern was that Germany must be peaceful"
(Albert Resis (Ed.): op.
cit.; p. 333, 334).
However, Molotov
relates, other members of the Politburo -- including Khrushchev and
Molotov
himself, demanded that the Soviet government should move to establish a
socialist society in East Germany:
"The Politburo was
nearly split on the issue. Khrushchev supported my position. . . Malenkov remained silent, and I knew
he would follow Beria, I objected that there
could not be a peaceful Germany unless it took the road to
socialism".
(Albert
Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 335, 336)
This was then, according to
Molotov, the main issue which provided the pretext for accusing Beria
of being
an "imperialist agent". If so, it was an issue in which Beria was
following Marxist-Leninist principles, while Molotov and Khrushchev
were in
breach of them!
Molotov's
Failure Correctly to Assess Revisionism
Even many years after
international revisionism had thrown off its mask, Molotov signally
failed
to recognise its counter-revolutionary character.
Indeed, despite his general
admiration for Stalin, we find him repeating some of the revisionist
slanders
about him:
"He (Stalin -- Ed.)
succumbed to sickly suspiciousness.. . . .
In his last years he suffered from impaired judgment.
In his last years Stalin
suffered from a persecution mania".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.;
p. 317, 324).
We find him praising the
revisionist Yuri Andropov as a 'godsend':
"Andropov. . . . has
introduced a fresh stream of thought and a good direction. . . .
Andropov is a godsend.
.
Andropov . . . is firm in
politics, a man of broad horizons, a reliable person. . . . He has
proved to be
quite trustworthy".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.;
p. 395, 407).
We find him describing the
French revisionist Maurice
Thorez as
“. . .
a very good man -- a
Stalinist",
(Albert
Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 82).
and the German revisionist Walter Ulbricht as
“.
a dedicated communist, a politically conscious
comrade".
(Albert
Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p. 334).
He depicts even Khrushchev as
no worse than 'a not especially dedicated communist'
"I don't consider
Khrushchev an especially dedicated communist".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.; p.
356).
IN 1984, AT THE
AGE OF NINETY-FOUR, MOLOTOV ACHIEVED A LONG-HELD AMBITION. HAVING
SATISFIED THE
REVISIONIST LEADERS OF HIS HARMLESSNESS TO THEIR AIMS, HE WAS
READMITTED TO THE
COMMUNIST PARTY.
HE DIED TWO YEARS LATER --
STILL CLINGING TO THE ILLUSION THAT SOCIALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION WAS
BASICALLY
INTACT AND SECURE, THAT A COMMONWEALTH OF SOCIALIST STATES EXISTED, AND
THAT,
DESPITE SOME MINOR RIGHTIST DEVIATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION WAS ADVANCING
TOWARDS
A COMMUNIST SOCIETY:
"Now we have a powerful
country and a commonwealth of socialist states.
I
think the dreams of counter-revolution
will not come true. Our state, like the entire socialist camp, is still
the
strongest in the world.
.
We are undeviatingly moving
forward, but more slowly than is desirable.
The line we are pursuing is
Leninist, it is socialist, but not enough.
.
We are building socialism
and moving towards communism because state power and the vanguard of
the people
rest solidly on the policy pursued by the Party, That's the main thing.
In our country the vanguard is preserved,
it is
growing it is socialist, communist -- this is the main thing".
(Albert Resis (Ed.): ibid.;
p. 381, 409, 413).
COMpass is published by: The
Communist league, Ilford, Essex, UK
The aim of the Communist League is to
establish in Britain a
Marxist-Leninist
Party of the working class free of all revisionist trends.
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