ALLIANCE Marxist-Leninist
(North America): July 2000
PART TWO OF:
"UPON THE CURRENT SITUATION,
UNITY, AND IDEOLOGY."
AN OPEN LETTER TO LUDO MARTENS;
"PARTI DU TRAVAIL" BELGIUM; FROM:
ALLIANCE (ML)(North America);
COMMUNIST LEAGUE (Britain);
MARXIST-LENINIST COMMUNIST PARTY
(Turkey). First published Great Britain March 1996.
B) STALIN AND THE 1927 CHINESE REVOLUTION
Stalin, in 1925, distinguished "at least three categories
of colonial and dependent countries" :
"Firstly countries like Morocco who have little or
no proletariat, and are industrially quite undeveloped. Secondly countries
like China and Egypt which are under-developed industries and have a relatively
small proletariat. Thirdly countries like India.. capitalistically more
or less developed and have a more or less numerous national proletariat.
Clearly all these countries cannot possibly be put on a par with one another."
JVS W : Vol 7 : "Political Tasks of the University of
the People's of the East. Speech Delivered at a meeting of Students of
the Communist University of the Toilers of the East", May 18th, 1925. pp.
135-146.
In each country the conditions were different
and had to be concretely studied before deciding the exact tactic:
"In countries like Egypt and China, where the
national bourgeoisie has already split up into a revolutionary party and
a compromising party, but where the compromising section of the bourgeoisies
is not yet able to join up with imperialism, the Communists can no longer
set themselves the aim of forming a united national front against imperialism.
In such countries the Communists must pass from the policy of a united
national front to the policy of a revolutionary bloc of the workers and
the petty bourgeoisie. In such countries that bloc can assume the form
of a single party, a workers and peasants
party, provided, however, that this distinctive party actually represents
a bloc of two forces - the Communist Party and the party of the revolutionary
petty bourgeois. The tasks of this bloc are to expose the half-heartedness
and inconsistency of the national bourgeoisie and to wage a determined
struggle against imperialism. Such a dual party is necessary and expedient
provided it does not bind the Communist Party hand and foot, provided it
does not restrict the freedom of the Communist Party to conduct agitation
and propaganda work, provided it does not hinder the rallying of the proletarians
around and provided it facilitates the actual leadership of the revolutionary
movement by the Communist party. Such a dual party is unnecessary and inexpedient
if to does not conform to all these conditions for it can only lead to
the Communist elements becoming dissolved in the ranks of the bourgeoisie
to the Communist Party losing the proletarian army.
The situation is somewhat different in countries like
India. The fundamental and new feature of the conditions of life
in countries like India is not only that the national bourgeoisie has split
up into a revolutionary part and a compromising part, but primarily that
the compromising section of the bourgeoisie has already managed, in the
main, to strike a deal with imperialism, Fearing revolution more than it
fears imperialism, and concerned with more about its money bags than about
the interests of its own country, this section of the bourgeoisie is going
over entirely to the camp of the irreconcilable enemies of the revolution,
it is forming a bloc with imperialism against the workers and peasants
of its own country."
(JVS W; "Tasks of University of People's of East"; Ibid;
May 18th, 1925. pp. 135-146).
How did this concretely relate
to China? Who were the revolutionary bourgeoisie; and what was the single
party that represented the workers and peasants that Stalin refers to?
The party he was discussing was the KUOMINTANG (KMT).
The MANCHU DYNASTY of China obstructed
democratic reforms along with the foreign imperialists who controlled Chinas
economy. The so called enlightened
bourgeoisie of China tried to
change this. They were exemplified by SUN YAT SEN, who was himself
influenced by Lenin and the USSR. A ferment followed the VERSAILLES
TREATY of 1919. This granted Germanys
former colony in SHANDONG TO JAPAN instead of granting autonomy.
This further fuelled Japans
ambitions in China and especially in Manchuria. The 4 th May demonstration
in Beijing was the signal for organised resistance.
Sun Yat Sen founded the KUOMINTANG
(KMT) (National Peoples
party) the party of the revolutionary bourgeoisie in 1912. This was the
party that Stalin referred to. The CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (CCP) was
formed in July 1921, with assistance from the COMINTERN and its representative
MARING. (Jonathan Spence : "The Search For Modern China"; 1990; New
York; p. 325.)
Early on the CCP had a close relationship
with the KMT. Sun Yat Sen asked ADOLF JOFFE (Soviet diplomat) for
assistance in reorganising the KMT. The USSR supported the training of
Chinese communists and revolutionary democrats, in the USSR itself:
"After founding the KMT Dr. Sun Yat Sen put forward the
Three GREAT POLICIES, alliance with Russia, cooperation with the
Communist Party, and assistance to the peasants and workers. He was the
father of China's bourgeois democratic revolution. . In 1922 he began reorganising
the Kuomintang (KMT).. As the First revolutionary War in China developed
rapidly, both the CCP and the KMT felt the need for more revolutionary
cadres and asked the Soviet Union to train more people. In response the
Soviet Union founded Sun Yat-Sen University For the Toilers of the East
solely for the Chinese students.. At the end of 1925, with the help of
VASIL CONSTANTIN BORODIN, the Soviet political adviser to the National
Government in Guangzhou, the KMT and the CCP jointly selected 310 students
to be set to Sun Yat-Sen University."
(Deng Mao Mao;" Deng Xiaoping - My Father"; New York;
1995; p.33; 82; 105.)
After the death of Sun-Yat Sen, the KMT
fell to the leadership of CHIANG KAI-SHEK, who reneged on the policy
of Sun Yat-Sen. By 1927 China was a colonial state dominated by
British and USA imperialism. The stages of the revolution flowed from the
CI Theses. Stalin analysed the situation as follows :
What are the
stages in the Chinese Revolution? In my opinion there should be three:
The first stage is the revolution of an all-national
united front, the Canton period, when the revolution was striking chiefly
at foreign imperialism, and the national bourgeoisie supported the revolutionary
movement;
The second stage is the bourgeois democratic revolution,
after the national troops reached the Yangtze River, when the national
bourgeoisie deserted the revolution and the agrarian movement grew into
a mighty revolution of tens of millions of the peasantry. The Chinese revolution
is now at the second stage of its development;
The third stage is the Soviet revolution which has not
yet come, but will come.
(J.V.Stalin; "On the International Situation and the
Defence of the USSR"; Joint Plenum of CC and the CPSU Control Commission;
August 1 1927. Vol 10; p.16-17).
Stalins
First Stage And The Second Stage Together Constitute What Is Termed The
Bourgeois Democratic Revolution. Stalin emphasised that the main
axis was the agrarian movement:
The characteristic
feature .. Of the Turkish revolution (The Kemalists).. is that it got stuck
at the first step,
at the first stage of its development, at the stage of the bourgeois liberation
movement, without even attempting to pass to the second stage of its development,
the stage of the agrarian revolution.
(Stalin; Ibid; p.346).
Unfortunately, the CCP rejected Stalins
advice on moving from the first stage to the second stage using the agrarian
revolution. Because of this the CCP was defeated; allowing Trotsky And
Zinoviev a pretext to attack Stalin. Replying, Stalin again outlined the
history of the Chinese Revolution. The desertion of the Chinese Kuomintang
Right Faction had been fully anticipated by Stalin in February 1926:
"It is necessary to adopt the course of arming the
workers and peasants and converting the peasant committees in the localities
into actual organs of governmental authority equipped with armed self-defence,
etc.. The CP must not come forward as a brake on the mass movement; the
CP should not cover up the treacherous and reactionary policy of the Kuomintang
Rights, and should mobilise the masses around the Kuomintang and the CCP
on the basis of exposing the Rights... The Chinese revolution is passing
through a critical period, and.. it can achieve further victories only
by resolutely adopting the course of developing the mass movement. Otherwise
a tremendous danger threatens the revolution. The fulfilment of directives
is therefore more necessary than ever before."
(ECCI Directive to the CCP; February 1926; Cited JVS
W: Vol 10; p.21).
Stalin repeatedly urged the CCP, through
1926 and early 1927 to break the bloc with the right KMT and move to a
militant revolutionary struggle. The CCP did not heed :
"The victory of the revolution cannot be achieved unless
this bloc is smashed, but in order to smash this bloc, fire must be concentrated
on the compromising national bourgeoisie, its treachery exposed, the toiling
masses freed from its influence, and the conditions necessary of the hegemony
of the proletariat systematically prepared. In other words, in colonies
like India it is a matter of preparing the proletariat for the role of
leader of the liberation movement, step by step dislodging the bourgeoisie
and its mouthpieces from this honourable post. The task is to create an
anti-imperialist bloc and to ensure the hegemony of the proletariat in
this bloc. This bloc can assume although it need not always necessarily
do so, the form of a single Workers and Peasants Party, formally bound
by a single platform. In such centuries the independence of the Communist
Party must be, the chief slogan of the advanced communist elements, of
the hegemony of the proletariat can be prepared and brought about by the
Communist party. But the communist party can and must enter into an open
bloc with the revolutionary part of the bourgeoisie in order, after isolating
the compromising national bourgeoisie, to lead the vast masses of the urban
and rural petty bourgeoisie in the struggle against imperialism."
(J.V.Stalin "Stalin's Letters to Molotov"; Edited Lars
T. Lih; Oleg V. Naumov; and Oleg V. Khlevniuk; Yale 1995; p.318-9).
The EXECUTIVE COUNCIL CI (ECCI)
adopted Stalins view; in a directive
sent to the CC of the CCP in February 1926. At the 7th Plenum of ECCI,
(Moscow November 22nd to December 16th, 1926), the "RESOLUTION ON THE
CHINESE SITUATION" followed Stalin. This declared the revolution in
China was in transition to a
new stage as the national bourgeois
were about to desert the national-democratic revolution; so the revolutionary
forces would be the working class, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie;
and that the working class must become the LEADING force :
"Now the movement is on the threshold of the 3rd stage,
on the eve of a new realignment of classes. In this stage the driving force
of the movement will be a bloc of an even more revolutionary nature - of
the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie to the exclusion
of the majority of the capitalists bourgeois... When the national bourgeoisie
desert the revolution and conspire against it.. the proletariat is the
dominating force of this bloc."
(Resolution of the Chinese Situation; 7th Plenum ECCI;
In R.C.North and X.J.Eudin:"M.N.Roy's Mission to China: The Communist-KMT
Split 1927"; Berkeley; 1963; p.135).
The ECCI emphasised the agrarian revolution:
"In the present transitional stage of the development
of the revolution, the agrarian stage of the development of the revolution,
the agrarian question becomes the central question. The class which ..
succeeds in giving a radical answer to it will be the leader of the revolution".
(Ibid p.137).
The ECCI made clear that the working class
had a choice: Either attempt to maintain the alliance with the national
bourgeoisie, who were on the point of desertion of the national democratic
revolution; Or; cement an alliance with the peasantry through the
agrarian revolution. Failing to choose the latter would be disastrous :
"The fear that the aggravation of the class struggle
in the countryside will weaken the united anti-imperialist front is baseless..
Not to approach the agrarian question boldly by supporting all the economic
demands of the peasant masses is positively dangerous for the revolution.
To refuse to assign to the agrarian revolution a prominent place in the
national-liberation movement for the fear of offending the dubious and
disloyal cooperation of a section of the capitalist class is wrong. this
is not the revolutionary policy of the proletariat.
The present situation is characterised by its transitional
nature when the proletariat must choose between allying itself with a considerable
section of the bourgeoisie or further consolidating its own alliance with
the peasantry. If the proletariat does not put forward a radical programme
it will fail to attract the peasantry into the revolutionary struggle and
will lose its hegemony in the national-liberation movement. Under direct
or indirect imperialist influence, the bourgeoisie will regain the leadership
of the movement once more."
(Ibid p.138).
As well as mass work, the CCP should work
through the KMT government and the revolutionary army :
"The revolutionary armies will strike root in the peasant
masses as the standard bearer of agrarian revolution.. The CCP and their
revolutionary allies must penetrate the new government, so as to give practical
expression to their agrarian programme by using the government machinery
to confiscate land, reduce taxes, and invest real power in the peasant
committees, thus carrying out progressive reforms on the basis of a revolutionary
programme.. .
The Communists must enter the Canton government in order
to support the revolutionary Left wing in its struggle against the weak
and vacillating policy of the Right..
The Communists must stay in the Kuomintang and intensify
their work in it.. The CCP must strive to develop the KMT into a real peoples'
party.. a solid revolutionary bloc of the proletariat, peasantry, the urban
petty bourgeoisie and the other oppressed and exploited strata of the population.
For this the CCP must work along the following lines
a) Systematic and determined struggle against the ..
right wing attempting to convert the KMT into a bourgeois party.
b) Definite formation of a Left wing in the KMT and establishment
of close cooperation with it." (Ibid p.140-41).
The ECCI representative in China GRIGORI
VOITINSKY and the leader of the CPSU Mission in China MIKHAIL BORODIN,
both opposed these directives. They were supported by the CC of CCP; then
headed by General Secretary CHEN TU-HSIU. To help implement the
ECCI 7th Plenum Theses by the CCP, in January 1927, M.N.Roy was sent as
a special ECCI representative.
The CCP did not heed the warning signs
and advice, to escape the struggle from the CI and Stalin. The Chinese
national bourgeois led by Chiang Kai-Shek; launched its coup on April 12th,
192, viciously butchering the Shanghai workers, and the militants
of the CCP. Stalin commented :
"In the First period of the Chinese revolution.. the
national bourgeoisie (not the compradors) sided with the revolution...Chiang
Kai-Shek's coup marks the desertion of the national bourgeoisie from revolution".
April, 1927. (JVS: 'Question of Chinese Revolution' Works;
Vol 9; p. 226, 229).
Even now, Roys
arguments were rejected. But Roy managed to pressure the CCP to hold the
5TH CCP CONGRESS IN WUHAN (April 27th to May 9th 1927). Chen argued to
delay the agrarian revolution. But Roys
pressure forced the CCP, to verbally accept the ECCI line; however this
was short lived. The CCP leadership refused to follow even their own
5th Congress directives.
On May 21st, 1927 Colonel Hsu Ke-hsiang
seized control of Changsha, and launched a White terror. 20,000 workers
and peasants were killed. The CCP sabotaged the peasant army in its attempt
to fight back, and forced a retreat. They were then of course easy fodder,
and were slaughtered. Still, the CCP and Borodin refused to go to the masses.
Chen Tu-hsiu's line was traitorous:
"The basic point in all Chen Tu-hsiu's speeches has been
the demand that the general leadership in the movement be handed over to
the KMT".
Tsia Ho-sen: "Istoriia opportunizma v Kommunisticheskoi
Partii Kitaia" (An account of Opportunism In the Chinese Communist Party)
In :"Problemy Kitaia" (Chinese Problems); No. 1, 1929; p.35.
-
DESPERATE, ROY WIRED THE ECCI FOR SUPPORT.
A reply telegram from the ECCI, on May 30th, 1927; buttressed
Roy. Meanwhile the Wuhan Left KMT met Chiang Kai-Shek, and Feng Yu-hsiang
and combined against the CCP. Roy warned the CCP a coup was imminent. Again
this was ignored. The CCP refused to launch agrarian struggle. Instead
Chen Tu-hsiu wrote a telegram to the ECCI :
"90% of the National Army are.. opposed to excesses
in the peasants' movement. In such a situation, not only the KMT but also
the CCP is obliged to adopt a policy of concessions, It is necessary to
correct excesses and to moderate the activities of the confiscation of
land."
(Chen Tu-hsiu: Telegram to ECCI; June 15th 1927; In M.N.Roy
:"Revolution and Counter revolution in China"; Calcutta; 1946; p.482).
Now the CC dismantled the workers struggle
and peasants struggles, fearing a rupture with the KMT. The two Communist
ministers resigned, to make the government appear "more respectable"!!
All to no avail. On July 15th, the KMT expelled members of the CCP from
the KMT and the army.
The ECCI Resolution of July 14th had noted that :
"The revolutionary role of the Wuhan Government is played
out; it is becoming a counter-revolutionary force".
(ECCI: Resolution On the Present Situation on the Chinese
Revolution, in : "International press Correspondence", Volume 7, No. 44;
July 28th; 1927; p.984).
A White Terror ensued :
"Between January and August 1928 alone, more than 100,000
people lost their lives. The Party organisations suffered serious damage.
By the end of 1927 Party membership had been reduced from more than 50,000
to some 10,000."
(Deng Mao;" Deng Xiaoping - My Father"; New York; 1995;
p.119).
Stalin characterised the new development
as the desertion of the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia from the revolution:
The present
period is marked by the desertion of the Wuhan leadership of the KMT to
the camp of counter-revolutionary intelligentsia from the revolution..
This desertion is due firstly to the fear .. In face of the agrarian revolution
and to the pressure of the feudal landlords on the Wuhan leadership, and
secondly to the pressure of the imperialists in the Tientsin are who are
demanding that the KMT break with the Communists as the price for permitting
its passage Northwards."
(J.V.S:: "Notes on Contemporary Themes"; Works Vol 9;
p.366-67).
But Stalin pointed out that NOW it was correct to
propagandise in favour of the formation of soviets :
If in the
near future - not necessarily in a couple of months, but in 6 months or
a year from now, a new upsurge of the revolution should become a fact,
the question of forming Soviets of Workers and peasant
deputies may become a live issue as a slogan of the day, and as a counterpoise
to the bourgeoisie. Why? Because if there has been an upsurge of the revolution
in its present phase of development, the formation of Soviets will be an
issue that has come fully mature. Recently a few months ago it would have
been wrong for the CCP to issue the slogan of forming soviets, for that
would been adventurism, which is characteristic of our opposition, for
the KMT leadership had not yet discredited itself as an enemy of the revolution.
Now on the contrary, the slogan of forming Soviets may become a really
revolutionary slogan if (If!) A new and powerful revolutionary upsurge
takes place in the near future. Consequently alongside the fight to replace
the present KMT leadership by a revolutionary leadership it is necessary
at once even before the upsurge begins to conduct the widest propaganda
for the idea of Soviets among the broad masses of the working people, without
running too far ahead and forming Soviets immediately, remembering that
Soviets can only flourish at a time of powerful revolutionary upsurge.
(J.V.S: "Notes on Contemporary Themes" Works: Vol 9;
p.366-7).
Here Stalin rebuked Trotsky who had been
calling for Soviet Now!
for some time, quite incorrectly. The ECCI instructed the CCP to resign
from the Wuhan Government apparatus whilst simultaneously staying within
the KMT, and turn it into a bloc LED by the working class; that the arming
of peasants and workers was crucial; that an illegal party apparatus be
built up. Finally, the resolution attacked the CCP for its grave right
opportunist errors :
The leaders
of the CCP have pursued a policy of damming back the masses. The revolutionary
instruction of the ECCI were rejected by the leaders of the CCP. Matters
even went so far that the CCP agreed
to the disarming of workers
(Resolution of the ECCI: "On the Present Situation of
the Chinese Revolution"; Ibid; Inprecorr July 28th; 1927).
UNFORTUNATELY, THE CCP NOW SWUNG FROM
RIGHT OPPORTUNISM INTO LEFT WING ADVENTURISM. They tried to organise an
uprising in Nanchang, in July 1927. Zhou En Lai, Mao Ze Dong, Chu De, Li
Li-San and others were involved. Stalin disavowed this military adventurism
:
The whole
business of the Southern revolutionary movement, the departure of the troops
of Yeh Ting and Ho Lung from Wuhan, their march into Kwantung and so forth-
I want to say that all this was undertaken on the initiative of the CCP.
(J.V.S: "The Political Complexion of the Russian Opposition";
Works; Vol 10; p.161-2)
The CCP eventually did launch agrarian
struggle. But they were now consistently ultra-left in their theory and
practice. Mao Ze Dong was one who preached at this stage: Socialism
now. Stalin stated :
The COMINTERN
was and still is of the opinion that the basis of the revolution in China
at the present period is the agrarian -peasant revolution
(J.V.S: "The Political Complexion of the Russian Opposition";
Works; Vol 10; p.161).
Yet Mao took a Trotskyite line. He argued
that the line of the ECCI and Stalin had been wrong for some time. On August
20th Mao wrote to the CCP CC misrepresenting the ECCI position:
The international
proposes the immediate establishment of Soviets of workers and peasants
and soldiers in China. Objectively China has long since reached 1917, but
formerly everyone held the opinion that we were in 1905. This has been
an extremely great error. Soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers are
wholly adapted to the objective situation. In the period of soviets of
workers, peasants and soldiers, we should no longer use the flag of the
KMT. We must raise high the flag of the CCP to oppose the flag of the KMT.
(Mao : In "Chung -Yang tung-hsin" (Central Newsletter)
No.3; August 30th 1927, p.38-41).
It was in this Ultra-Left spirit that
a hastily and ill-prepared insurrection was carried out. The Canton Insurrection
of December 11th, 1928 was an instance of a completely failed putsch,
as opposed to a proletarian uprising. Here a major portion of blame lies
with HEINZ NEUMANN an Ultra-Left ECCI representative. The Canton
Commune, drowned in blood as
the KMT smashed it. The ECCI again criticised the CCP, in February 1928
at the 9th Plenum of the ECCI :
The Canton
Insurrection.. A heroic attempt of the proletariat.. Revealed a whole series
of blunders by the leaders:- Insufficient work among the workers and peasants,
and among the enemy forces, a wrong appraisal of the yellow trade unions;
inadequate preparation of the party organisation and the Young Communist
League... complete ignorance of the national party center of the Canton
events, weaknesses in the political mobilisation of the masses.
(Resolution On Chinese Question of the 9th Plenum of
the ECCI: In "International Press Correspondence", Vol 8, No.16; March
15th, 1928; p. 322).
Mao helped plan
this adventure. He also organised another putsch the military attack upon
CHANGSHA. This was a part of a mission he was given to enter Hunan
to carry out the AUTUMN HARVEST
UPRISING.
"In September 1927 Mao Ze Dong was entrusted by the Central
Committee to go to Hunan as its special representative to organise the..
Autumn Harvest Uprising and to found the 5,000 strong 1st Division of the
1st Corps of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army."
(Deng Mao Mao; Ibid; p.121).
Unfortunately, Mao again would not apply
Marxism-Leninism. Mao explained his Programme to Edgar Snow :
My programme
there called for the realisation of 5 points:
1. Complete severance of the provincial party from the
KMT;
2. Organisation of a peasant worker revolutionary army;
3. Confiscation of the property of small and middle and
as well great landlords;
4. Setting up the power of the CP in Hunan independent
of the KMT; and;
5. The organisation of the Soviets. The fifth point at
that time was opposed by the Comintern.
(Mao Ze Dong: Cited by E.Snow; "Red Star Over China";
London; 1937; p.163).
In fact only on points 1, 2 and 4, was
Mao fully consistent with the ECCI. The other points were Leftist deviations.
Stalin had pointed out that IF conditions were mature, Soviets were
appropriate :
If in the
near future - not necessarily in a couple of months, but in 6 months or
a year from now, a new upsurge of the revolution should become a fact,
the question of forming Soviets of Workers and peasant
deputies may become a live issue as a slogan of the day, and as a counterpoise
to the bourgeoisie. Why? Because if there has been an upsurge of the revolution
in its present phase of development, the formation of Soviets will be an
issue that has come fully mature.... if (IF!) A new and powerful revolutionary
upsurge takes place in the near future."
(JVS: "Notes on Contemporary Themes"; Works; Vol 9; p.366).
Given the putchism,
and the decimation of forces, conditions were not ripe, as Mao alleged.
As Stalin had pointed out to Trotsky :
The opposition
does not understand that the point is not at all to be the first
in saying a thing; running too far ahead and disorganising the revolution
, but to say it at the right time and to say it in such a way that it will
be taken up by the masses and put into practice.
(JVS: "Notes on Contemporary Themes"; Ibid; vol 9; p.369).
The Autumn
Harvest Uprising failed. The
peasant
bias of Mao had ensured that with the poor organisation, the urban proletariat
was not prepared by the insurrectionists. As the official party history
of the period says:
The peasants
did not obtain any aid from the urban proletariat... At the time of the
Hunan harvest uprising, Changsha simply had no workers
movement whatsoever.
(Hua Kang: "Chung-kuo Ta Ko-Ming-shi""History of the
Great Chinese Revolution"; 1932; p.366).
Consequently Mao was dismissed from the
CCP CC in November 1927. (J.Spence; Ibid; p.370). Mao now took his surviving
troops into the Jinggang mountain range bordering Jiangxi and Hunan. Having
previously proclaimed Socialism
Now; Mao encountered resistance
from the rich peasantry, so he significantly changed his philosophy. (J.Spence;
Ibid; p.371).
This Right phase of Mao, was where
he developed the so called New
Democracy. Under KMT attack,
Mao shifted camp to Ruijin with the remnants of his army; located between
Jiangxi and Fujian. Mao now cultivated the rich peasantry. (J.Spence; Ibid;
p.372).
With ZHU DE the JIANGXI SOVIET
was established. This was only one of about 12 set up across the country
by other members of the CCP.
Despite these Soviets, the workers
and peasants had been temporarily defeated. A period of battles between
the various warlords followed. Chiang Kai-Shek leading the KMT emerged
as victorious. By 1928 Chiang Kai-Shek ruled a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
that ruled from Canton to Mukden.
(J.Spence: "Search For Modern China"; Ibid; p.365).
The official ideology was a virulent
anti-communist, anti-imperialist nationalism
The failed 1927 revolution gave Trotsky
a chance to attack Stalin. This attack took the following forms:
i) Trotsky and Zinoviev argued it was incorrect to
enter a bloc with the KMT Revolutionary Bourgeoisie. Stalin Replied:
What were
the Kuomintang (KMT) and its government at the first stage of the revolution
in the Canton period? They were a bloc of the workers, the peasants, the
bourgeois intellectuals and the national bourgeoisie. Was Canton at that
time the centre of the revolutionary movement, the place darmes
of the revolution? Was it correct policy to support the Canton Kuomintang
as the government of the struggle for liberation from imperialism?... Yes
it is true.
(JVS: "The International Situation and the Defence of
the USSR;" Speech to Joint Plenum CC and Central Control Commission CPSU(B);
Aug 1, 1927; Works; Vol 10; p.16-17).
ii) Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev alleged the united
front retarded the revolution. Stalin Replied :
But what does
a united front with the national bourgeoisie at the first stage of the
colonial revolution mean? Does it mean that the Communists must not intensify
the struggle of the workers and peasants against the landlords and the
national bourgeoisie, that the proletariat ought to sacrifice its independence?
No.. A united front can only be of significance only where and only on
condition that, it does not prevent the CP from conducting its independent
political and organisational work, from organising the proletariat. From
rousing the peasantry against the landlords, from openly organising a workers
and peasants revolution and
from preparing in this way the conditions for the hegemony of the proletariat.
(JVS: "The International Situation and the Defence of
the USSR;" Speech to Joint Plenum CC and Central Control Commission CPSU(B);
Aug 1, 1927; Works; Vol 10; p.17).
Stalin was well aware that the CCP was hesitant:
I know that
there are some Kuomintangists and even Chinese Communists who do not consider
it possible to unleash revolution in the countryside, since they fear that
if the peasantry were drawn into the revolution it would disrupt the united
anti-imperialist front. That is a profound error comrades. The more quickly
and thoroughly the Chinese peasantry is drawn into the revolution, the
stronger and more powerful the anti-imperialist front in China.
(JVS: "The International Situation and the Defence of
the USSR;" Speech to Joint Plenum CC and Central Control Commission CPSU(B);
Aug 1, 1927; Works; Vol 10; p.20).
I know that
among the Chinese communists there are comrades who do not approve of workers
going on strike for an improvement of their material conditions and legal
status and who try to dissuade the workers from striking. (A voice: That
happened in Canton and Shanghai.)
That is a great mistake, comrades. Its is a very serious under-estimation
of the role and importance of the Chinese proletariat. This fact should
be noted in the theses as something decidedly objectionable. It would be
a great mistake if the Chinese Communists failed to take advantage of the
present favourable situation to assist the workers to improve their material
conditions and legal status, even through strikes. Otherwise what purpose
does the revolution in China serve?
(JVS: "The International Situation and the Defence of
the USSR;" Speech to Joint Plenum CC and Central Control Commission CPSU(B);
Aug 1, 1927; Works; Vol 10; p.20).
iii) Trotsky accused Stalin of not warning CCP against
Wuhan
Stalin referred back to documents sent to Wuhan.
As for the
oppositions assertions that
the Comintern failed to warn the CCP of the possible collapse of the Wuhan
KMT, that is one of the usual slanders..Permit me to quote some documents
to refute the slanders of the opposition. First Document of May 1927:
The most important
thing now in the internal policy of the KMT is to develop the agrarian
revolution systematically in all provinces particularly in Kwangtung, under
the slogan of All power to the
peasant associations and committees in the countryside.
This is the basis for the success of the revolution and of the KMT. This
is the basis for creating in China a big and powerful political and military
army against imperialism and its agents. Practically the slogan of confiscating
the land is quite timely for the provinces in which there is strong agrarian
movement, such as the Hunan, Kwangtung, etc. Without this the extension
of the agrarian revolution is impossible.
It is necessary
to start at once to organise 8 or 10 divisions of revolutionary peasants
and workers with absolutely reliable officers. This will be a Wuhan guard
force both at the front and in the rear for disarming unreliable units..
Disintegrating activities must be intensified in the rear and in Chiang
Kai-Sheks units..
The Second Document of May 1927: (Ed: This formed the 1926
ECCI Directive referred to earlier):
Without an
agrarian revolution victory is impossible, Without it the Central Committee
of the KMT will be converted into a wretched plaything of unreliable generals.
Excesses must not be combatted by means of troops, but through the peasant
associations... You must not sever yourselves from the working-class and
peasant associations.. Some of the old leaders of the CC of the KMT are
frightened by events. An increased number of new peasant and working class
leaders must be drawn in from the masses into the CC of the KMT. Their
bold voices will either stiffen the backs of the old leaders or result
in their removal. The present structure of the KMT must be changed... reinforced
with new leaders who have come to the fore in the agrarian revolution..
Dependence upon unreliable generals must be eliminated. Mobilise about
20,000 Communists, add about 50,000 revolutionary workers and peasants..
Form several new army corps.. If this is not done there is no guarantee
against failure... Punish officers who maintain contact with Chiang Kai-Shek
or who incite the soldiers against the people.. Persuasion is not enough.
It is time to act. If the Kuomintangists do not learn to be revolutionary
Jacobins, they will perish as far as the people and the revolution are
concerned.
As you see, the Comintern foresaw events it gave timely warning
of the dangers and told the CCP that the Wuhan KMT would perish if the
Kuomintangists failed to become revolutionary Jacobins.
(JVS: "The International Situation and the Defence of the
USSR;" Speech to Joint Plenum CC and Central Control Commission CPSU(B);
Aug 1, 1927; Works; Vol 10; p.33-35).
Despite this defeat, the Marxist-Leninist tactics and
strategy that had been outlined was correct. Stalin pointed out, that the
Opposition, with their ultra-left tactics, would not have even reached
the current situation:
The fact that
the CCP has in a short period grown from a small group of 5 or 6 thousand
into a mass party of 60,000 members; the fact that the CCP has succeeded
in organising nearly 3,000,000 proletarians in trade unions; the fact that
the CCP has succeeded in rousing the many millions of the peasantry from
their torpor and in drawing tens of millions of peasants into the revolutionary
peasant associations; the fact that the CCP has succeeded during this period
in converting the idea of the hegemony of the proletariat from an aspiration
into a reality- the fact that the CCP had succeeded in a short period of
time in achieving all these gains is due among other things, to its having
followed the path (of) Lenin, the path indicated by the Comintern.
(Stalin; Speech; "Joint Plenum"; Ibid; Vol 10; p.38).
TO CONCLUDE, IN THE CHINESE REVOLUTION
STALIN PROPOSED :
-
A two stage National Democratic Revolution followed by
the Socialist Revolution.
-
The allies for the First Stage would include the reforming
National Bourgeoisie, in China Called the Kuomintang (KMT).
-
But as the National Democratic Revolution wins; and; the
masses move to the Second Stage; inevitably this Revolutionary National
Bourgeoisie will desert.
-
Leninist policy is to pre-empt the desertion; enter the
Socialist phase, with agrarian revolt, before the bourgeoisie attacks.
-
But Stalins
advice was ignored by the CC of the CCP
In private STALIN was severely critical of the CCP
Stalin knew the lack of resolve and understanding of the
leaders of the CCP including of course, MAO ZE DONG :
"The main thing now is whether or not the current Chinese
CP can manage to retreat with honour from this new period (the underground
beatings, executions, betrayals and provocations among their own ranks
etc) to come out hardened tempered, without splitting up, breaking into
pieces, disintegrating and degenerating into a sect or a number of sects.
We cannot exclude this danger at all, nor can we exclude the possibility
of an interval between this bourgeois revolution and a future bourgeois
revolution- analogous to the interval that we had between 1905 and 1917.
Moreover I believe that such a danger is more real.
Why?
Because unfortunately we don't have a real or, if
you like, actual Communist Party in China. If you take away the middle-ranking
who make good fighters but who are completely inexperienced in politics,
then what is the current Central Committee of the Chinese CP (CCP)? Nothing
but an amalgamation of general phrases gathered here and there not linked
to one another with any line or guiding idea.
I don't want to be very demanding to the CC of the CCP.
I know that one can't be too demanding to it. But here is a simple demand:
Fulfil the directives of the Comintern.
Has it fulfilled these directives?
No. No because it did not understand them, because it
did not want to fulfil them and has hoodwinked the Comintern, or because
it wasn't able to fulfil them. That is a fact.. the current CC was forged
in the period of the nationwide (democratic) revolution and received its
baptism by fire during this period and it turned out to be completely unadaptable
to the new agrarian phase of the revolution. The CC of the CCP does not
understand the point of the new phase of the revolution. There is not a
single Marxist mind in the CC of the CCP capable of understanding.. The
CCP CC was unable to use the rich period of the bloc with the Kuomintang
in order to conduct energetic work in openly organising the revolution,
the proletariat, the peasantry, the revolutionary military units, the revolutionizing
of the army, the work of setting the soldiers against the generals. The
CCP CC has lived off the KMT for a whole year and has.. done nothing to
turn the conglomerates of elements (true, quite militant) into a party,
into real party.. The CCP sometime babbles about the hegemony of the proletariat.
But the intolerable thing is.. the CCP does not have a clue (literally
not a clue) about hegemony - it kills the initiative of the working masses,
undermines the "unauthorized" actions of the peasant masses, and reduces
class warfare in China to lot of big talk about the "feudal bourgeoisie"..
That is why I now believe the question of the party is the main question
of the Chinese revolution?"
JVS: "Stalin’s Letters to Molotov"; Letter No. 36; July
1927; See "Stalin's Letters"; Ibid; p.140-41.
Stalin thought that the CC CCP was
incompetent; that the CCP CC needed intense re-education and "nannying".
The CCP CC included Mao Ze Dong. Later, Stalin changed his opinion of the
CC CCP. Instead of being incompetent;
he thought they were anti-Marxist-Leninist. Despite his set back in Hunan,
and his demotion from the CC of the CCP in 1927; Mao rapidly continued
to capture leading positions in the CCP:
"In November 1931, the First National Congress of the
Chinese Workers and Peasants Soviet was held in Ruijin. That Congress elected
Mao Ze Dong chairman of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese
Soviet Republic."
(Deng MaoMao;" Deng Xiaoping-My father"; New York; 1995;
p.203).
After the defeat of the 1927 revolution,
and the criticism of the ECCI, the CCP underwent a dramatic Ultra-Left
shift. This was an equal, and
opposite and equally disastrous
turn in its own right. Hereafter the leaders of the CCP were WANG MING,
and LI LI SAN in an ULTRA-LEFT FACTION; and MAO ZE DONG,
DENG XIAOPING, LIU SHAOQI, LIN BIAO, PENG
CHEN in the other major faction. The Mao faction won over the Ultra-Leftists.
In so doing, at times it took some left-opportunist lines; but ultimately
it established a RIGHT OPPORTUNIST line. This line was pro-petit
bourgeois and pro-capital.
Mao accused STALIN of "interference":
"Without the demise of the Third International the Chinese
Revolution could not have succeeded. When Lenin was alive, the Third International
was well led. After Lenin's death, the leaders of the Third International
were dogmatic leaders (for instance leaders [like] Stalin, Bukharin were
not that good). Only the period under Dimitrov was well led. Dimitrov's
reports were well reasoned. Of course the Third International had [its]
merits as well, for instance, helping various countries to establish a
[communist] party. Later on [however] the dogmatists paid no attention
to the special factors of various countries [and] simply transplanted everything
from Russia. China [for one] suffered great losses. We used the rectification
pattern for more than 10 years, criticised dogmatism [and] did things independently,
and on [our own] initiative according to the spirit and essence of Marxism.
[Only then] did [we] achieve the victory of the Chinese revolution. Lenin
1ikewise did not recognise the Second International. As a result, the October
revolution succeeded. I don't think we should have any more [communist]
internationals. Ever since its foundation, the Cominform has done only
one thing: that is to criticize Yugoslavia."
Kang Shen interjected : It also criticised France
and Japan.
Chairman Mao : But
it does not mean [we] do not want to have it forever; but [if we are to
have it] we'd want to have the type in the initial stage of the 3rd International
[when] various countries [had their own independence], exercised their
own initiative and did things according to their own circumstances and
not interfering with others' business. I've talked this way with many Soviet
comrades, with Yudin and Mikoyan."
(Mao Ze Dong "Summary of a Talk With the Representatives
of Press and Publishing Circles."; 10 March 1957; In: "The Secret Speeches
of Chairman Mao-From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward"; Ed.
Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek and Eugene Wu. Harvard, 1989. p. 255-256).
MAO AND TROTSKY AGREE THAT STALIN SABOTAGED THE 1927 REVOLUTION
!
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