LONG
LIVE KOREAN REUNIFICATION AND INDEPENDENCE!
DOWN
WITH KOREAN REVISIONISM!
by
N. Steinmayr
UNDER
THE AUSPICES OF ALLIANCE MARXIST-LENINIST (NORTH AMERICA), COMMUNIST LEAGUE
(BRITAIN), INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE - MARXIST-LENINIST; January 1999
LONG
LIVE KOREAN REUNIFICATION AND INDEPENDENCE!
DOWN
WITH KOREAN REVISIONISM!
Introduction
3
1. Brief Historical Background 7
2. Japan’s Colonial Rule
8
3. The Marxist-Leninist Strategy
for the Revolutionary Process
in Colonial-Type Countries 11
4. Kim Il Sung and the Anti-Japanese
Armed Struggle
13
5. Korea’s Partition
16
6. "Progressive Democracy"
in North Korea
18
7. The Korean War (1950-53) 24
8. Establishing "Socialist Relations
of Production" in the DPRK 27
9. "Socialist Construction"
in the DPRK
37
10. Juche: A Revisionist Theory
and Practice
46
11. The DPRK and the
Non-Aligned Movement 63
12. Recent Developments in
the DPRK
68
13. The Struggle for Reunification
and Independence
73
Conclusion
86
Abbreviations
87
Selected Bibliography
88
INTRODUCTION
At the end of the XXth century, we are still faced with the anachronistic
endurance of Korea’s partition between north and south that has lasted
for about 55 years. This division represents a tragic and anomalous chapter
after a 5,000-year-long history of Korea as a unified and homogeneous nation,
developing its own distinct cultural, linguistic and psychological features.
No sooner had the Korean people successfully liberated themselves from
Japanese colonialism in 1945 than Washington arbitrarily and artificially
amputated the country into two halves, through
US military and political interference. partition
of Korea was created and remaAfter
replacing Japanese colonial rule with its military occupation in the south,
Washington could instigate and later unleash - under the nominal aegis
of the United Nations - its hot war confrontation in Korea during 1950-53.
Korean resistance foiled American attempts to dominate the entire peninsula,
forcing Washington to sign an armistice
in July 1953 and stabilise the military
demarcation line along the 38th parallel. This armistice has by now become
the century’s longest running,
due to the American refusal to reach a final peace agreement. And in the
meantime US imperialism has deployed in
South Korea the world’s highest concentration of conventional and nuclear
weapons, together with thousands of troops.
This enormous military threat against the north is highlighted by regular
war exercises in conjunction with anti-north confrontation propaganda.
There have also been uninterrupted US sanctions and embargoes since the
early fifties. All this has increased tension in the region and has been
detrimental to the current economic situation in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK). Because of all this savage and unjustified aggession
and interference on the part of US imperialism, therefore, the cold war
still carries on unabated in the Korean peninsula. Likewise, in order to
avert the constant danger of a second Korean War, never have the Korean
people given up their inalienable right to live peacefully re-united, sovereign
and independent in their own land.
During the current era of imperialism, the peoples’ independence - in Korea,
just as elsewhere - represents a major issue requiring an adequate and
just solution in the interest of all those countries that still remain
subjugated in a semi-colonial and dependent status. The post-1945 national
liberation revolutions - marking an historical landmark in our century
- had indeed determined the collapse of the traditional colonial system
of imperialism. De-colonisation, however, immediately prompted the USA
and other competing imperialist powers to retain their own spheres of influence,
among nominally independent states, by devising an endless series of economic,
political, military, diplomatic and other forms of domination and enslavement.
Direct colonial exploitation has thus been replaced by neo-colonialism,
which now affects - under the cloak of imperialist globalization - the
overwhelming majority of mankind.
Within the above general framework, and in order to pursue its hegemonic
aims in north-east Asia, Washington has for more than half a century implemented
its "two Koreas" policy
- a policy intended to perpetuate
Korea’s division through the US permanent military occupation and economic
domination of the Republic of Korea (ROK), sheltered under the American
"nuclear umbrella" and reduced to a semi-colonial status. Such unwanted
interference has permitted a succession of fascist dictatorships and pseudo-democratic
regimes in the ROK, now gripped by its most severe crisis and totally reliant
upon the dictates imposed by Washington and the IMF. On the other hand,
the DPRK has spearheaded the Korean people’s struggle for the reunification
of their country - a vital question that cannot be solved peacefully and
independently as long as the constant threat of war hangs over the Korean
peninsula because of the US military occupation in the south.
In sharp contrast to the sycophantic and servile policies towards Washington,
as pursued by the South Korean ruling bourgeoisie, the DPRK has always
correctly singled out the continued US military presence in the south -
hardly justifiable today, after the disappearance of the "Soviet threat"
in Asia - as the principal stumbling block to any peaceful solution of
the Korean question and to stability in the region. Hence, as a matter
of principle, Pyongyang continues to demand that the US withdraw its troops
as a precondition
to national reunification, to be achieved without reliance on outside forces
and by transcending the ideological and socio-political differences existing
between North and South Korea. This anti-imperialist stance fully complies
with the current historical trend towards the self-determination, sovereignty
and independence of the peoples, particularly in the semi-colonial and
dependent countries of the Asian, African and Latin-American continents.
As always - all the democratic, progressive, peace-loving forces world-wide
have the obligation to step up their unconditional
support for the just cause of Korea’s independence.
This goal can only be achieved
by dismantling US military bases in the Korean peninsula, by sending American
soldiers back to their homes in the USA and by breaking off all links of
dependence on US imperialism. Once outside interference is eliminated,
the military demarcation line, which has tragically bisected brothers and
sisters of the same blood for such a long time, would soon disappear. The
way would be opened towards a peaceful settlement of the Korean national
question which is, after all, an internal affair of the Korean people themselves.
While resolutely supporting Korean reunification and independence, it is
also up to the Marxist-Leninist parties and organisations to tackle the
issue of Korean revisionism - as it has developed in North Korea since
1945, without having been affected by the final collapse of the USSR and
other revisionist countries during the late eighties. By having creatively
applied and modified socialist principles to Korea’s specific conditions,
the DPRK claims to have established a socialist society that proceeds towards
communism by means of Juche or Kimilsungism.
Nonetheless, the only revolutionary compass in the hands of the working
class in order to advance towards socialist, and ultimately communist,
societies still remains Marxism-Leninism - i.e., the doctrine of scientific
socialism as elaborated by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. It is, therefore,
from a Marxist-Leninist perspective that the conclusion must be drawn about
the undisputed fact that revisionism
only, and not genuine socialism, has been thoroughly implemented in the
DPRK up to the present. .
Following liberation from Japan, North
Korea was still a semi-feudal country whose capitalist development had
just started to take off. It proceeded along the path of "progressive democracy"
by overthrowing pro-Japanese capitalist forces and establishing the joint
dictatorship of several classes in society, including the national bourgeoisie.
Thanks to important reforms of an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal character
(with particular regard to agricultural cooperativization and the nationalisation
of its main industries), North Korea was able to rapidly overcome its century-long
backwardness and transform itself along democratic lines. But neither before
nor after the Korean War, at no time since
1945 has the national-democratic stage of the Korean revolution developed
into its subsequent, socialist stage under the dictatorship of the proletariat.
"Socialist relations of production" in North Korea were officially proclaimed
in 1958. But they were, in fact, established without a socialist revolution,
i.e., without overthrowing the national capitalist class, which had in
the meantime been "remoulded", persuaded to embrace socialism and "voluntarily"
absorbed into the "socialist state."
During the late fifties, in order to solve the crucial issue of the dictatorship
of the working class, which is indeed essential in strengthening true socialism,
the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, simply equated the new democratic
system of various classes exercising state power in the DPRK with the dictatorship
of the proletariat itself. No working class leadership has ever been subsequently
established. And in the absence of a genuine proletarian dictatorship,
revisionism could pervade all aspects of social and political life. In
essence, therefore, the North Korean revolution
can never be regarded as a socialist revolution..
Under the banner of Juche, collectivism was corrupted and began to be transformed
into servility towards, and absolute loyalty to, the leader, whose adulation
has now reached unimaginable proportions. This personality cult around
Kim Il Sung has in turn allowed nepotism and hereditary succession of power
with his son, Kim Jong Il, gradually replacing Kim Il Sung as the DPRK’s
leader. Policies are now supposed to be implemented by means of "love and
trust." Korean revisionism, in the meantime, has evolved into an idealistic
and eclectic philosophy confusing socialism and communism with independence,
just as the anti-imperialist cause is identified with the socialist revolution!
Such vulgar distortions of scientific socialism have led to a total negation
- both in theory and in practice - of Marxism-Leninism in the DPRK. Consequently,
they have consolidated a fully fledged revisionist society under the banner
of Juche. Its creator, Kim Il Sung, cannot escape political responsibility
for having added further confusion and ideological disorientation to the
wide-ranging arsenal of modern revisionist trends that prevent the real
emancipation of the working class by upholding socialism and communism
in words, but not in deeds, under false red flags. It is from the standpoint
of a principled Marxist-Leninist criticism that Kim Il Sung should be characterised
as a revisionist, notwithstanding his enormous merits as a progressive
revolutionary patriot who had energetically mobilised all forces in society
to liberate Korea from Japan’s colonial rule and to later challenge US
imperialism with the aim of achieving the country’s reunification and independence.
Though the two questions are somehow intertwined, the issue of Korean reunification
and independence stands separately from the issue of Korean revisionism.
In order to increase internationalist solidarity and assistance to the
Korean people, communist parties and organisations world-wide should struggle
at the forefront of all initiatives aimed at supporting the DPRK in its
heroic, anti-imperialist efforts to challenge US domination and interference
in the Korean peninsula and to achieve a lasting peace in a reunified and
truly independent state. But while militantly
defending the Korean people’s inalienable right to their independence,
Marxist-Leninist forces should be equally clear about the limitations of
Korean revisionism and the serious damage it is doing to the genuine cause
of scientific socialism and communism.
Support of Korean reunification and independence must not
imply political support of "Korean socialism" under the banner of Juche.
Marxist-Leninists stand by a clear set of principles that are dialectically
implemented according to different situations in different parts of the
world. But on the pretext of creatively applying them, there exists no
need today to invent new "socialisms" and thus deviate from the true revolutionary
theory and practice of scientific socialism. Everywhere, the working masses
are continuously subjected to imperialist oppression and exploitation,
just as they face poverty, social deprivation, unemployment and war. In
particular, as the contradictions between the popular masses in semi-colonial
and dependent countries, on the one hand, and imperialism and monopoly
capital, on the other, together with the contradictions between the proletariat
and the bourgeoisie all the world over, are increasingly sharpening and
producing an incurable global crisis, it is only Marxism-Leninism
- the revolutionary ideology of the working class - that can provide a
reliable orientation towards social and national liberation, towards socialism
and communism.
1. BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
After centuries of foreign invasions and internal strife, the unification
of the Korean peninsula was attained in the seventh century AD and lasted
- with occasional interruptions and more foreign occupations from neighbouring
Asian states (namely, China and Japan) - until 1945.
Unification was first achieved under the Silla dynasty which had been capable
of conquering, with Chinese support, the Korean kingdoms of Koguryo and
Paekche by 668 AD. Although the Silla state was still obliged to recognise
China as a suzerain nation, it could independently develop its peculiar
philosophical, literary and artistic features, initially stimulated by
Buddism. Silla’s decline became increasingly associated with the parasitic
nature of its nobility, as well as with the continuous struggles and palace
coups among its various kings succeeding to the throne. In addition to
the collapse of the old social order based on the so-called ‘bone-rank’
system (i.e., hereditary bloodline), social instability ultimately determined
the replacement of Silla with the state of Koryo. From 918 until 1392,
the Koryo period was also affected by divisions among its ruling class,
aggravated by numerous rebellions of peasants and slaves. Moreover, following
Mongol incursions throughout the Korean peninsula, Koryo was forced to
became subservient to Mongol power during the thirteenth century.
In 1392 the Koryo dynasty was succeeded by the Yi dynasty, the longest
in Korean history as it remained in power until 1910. Though heavily influenced
by China, the initial period of the Yi dynasty was characterised by rich
cultural developments in Confucian studies (at the expense of Buddism),
historical writings, fine arts, medicine, science and technology. Subsequent
Japanese invasions (1592-1598) and Manchu invasions from China (1627-1637)
gradually contributed to the progressive decline of the Yi rulers who implemented
- from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries - a policy of isolationism.
Thence the reduction in status to that of "Hermit Kingdom."
Korea was compelled to terminate its isolationism during the second half
of the nineteenth century under trading and other pressures from Japan,
Russia and the Western powers. The Korean-Japanese Treaty of Kanghwa (1876)
pronounced Korea as an independent state, but subjected it to many Japanese-imposed
conditions. In the meantime, American, British, German, French and other
Western powers emerged on the Korean scene, competing among themselves
to secure trade and economic advantages and concessions in the country.
Under constant foreign pressure, the Korean government had to face mounting
social dissatisfaction and instability, crushing internal revolts such
as the 1894 Tonghak rebellion. At the turn of the nineteenth century, Korean
society still retained the feudal fetters that hindered the initial growth
of capitalism. In parallel with foreign exploitation of Korea’s main resources,
some local textile, paper and other industries had, in fact, emerged and
by 1903 five banks, including the Korea Bank, had also been set up.
Following its victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), Japan began
to replace the Korean Min government with pro-Japanese elements. Russian
ambitions to meddle in Korean affairs were later shattered by Japan’s decisive
military victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Through American
mediation, Japanese supremacy over the Korean peninsula was further strengthened
and recognised by the Treaty of Portsmouth at New Hampshire (5-9-1905).
Two years later, on 24-7-1907, an agreement was signed by the Japanese
and Korean governments, preventing the latter from taking any independent
decisions in internal and foreign policies. Koreans were only allowed to
operate under conditions of "advice" and this de facto Japanese
domination of the country became formally sanctioned with the treaty of
annexation, promulgated on 29-8-1910. The last Korean emperor Sunjong effectively
abolished the monarchy, thus terminating the reign of the Yi dynasty.
Japan’s direct colonial rule over the Korean peninsula - as established
in 1910 - lasted until Korea’s final liberation on 15-8-1945. For more
than thirty years, therefore, Japan’s colonial plunder of Korea’s resources
and manpower prevented the normal development of capitalist relations of
production by keeping the country in a backward, agrarian, semi-feudal
state. Japanese imperialism secured exclusive ownership in all key branches
of Korean industry and in agriculture, maximising its profits through the
harsh exploitation of the local labour force. Given the extent of this
colonial yoke, the Korean bourgeoisie remained weak and divided between
its comprador section and its national section.
The comprador capitalist class in Korea, or comprador bourgeoisie, was
made up by comparatively big capitalists who - in alliance with feudal
land-owners - were allied with Japanese imperialism. On the other hand,
the non-comprador, national capitalist class in Korea, or national bourgeoisie,
mainly consisted of middle and small entrepreneurs. Since it was subjugated
by both the Japanese imperialists and the Korean comprador capitalists,
this national capitalist class was particularly disaffected with foreign
colonial rule. Nonetheless, the most exploited classes suffering under
Japan’s imperial yoke in Korea consisted of peasants and workers. During
the thirties - as Japan’s military preparations were increasing for its
aggression against China - the heavy industry sector in Korea was specifically
stimulated by major Japanese companies through various mining projects.
Korean manpower was mobilised in mines and factories, in both Korea and
Japan, as effectively slave labour required for Japan’s war efforts. Under
close Japanese supervision, by 1944 there were 350,000 Koreans working
in Korea’s mines in addition to 600,000 working in various factories throughout
the country. Since 1910, some 700,000 Koreans were forcibly sent to work
in Japan and, by 1940, the number of Koreans who had moved to Japan as
economic immigrants reached over a million.
As for Korea’s countryside, the Japanese took over land and property, thus
increasing poverty and homelessness among its peasants. The overwhelming
majority of the big landlords (i.e., 81% of the landlords owning more than
200 hectares of land) were Japanese. Landless peasants accounted for some
80% of the farm households and over half of the total crop area was possessed
by landlords who accounted for only 3% of farm households. The latter extracted
from the peasants farm rents which amounted from 50% to 90% of their total
yields. Colonial, feudal and capitalist oppression and exploitation often
forced the destitute rural population - always on the verge of starvation
- to migrate to towns or abroad.
Attempts by Koreans to fight for their independence were bloodily suppressed
by the Japanese authorities (according to official Japanese statistics,
during the initial period of colonial rule in Korea - from 1911 to 1918
- there were 330,025 cases of summary conviction). Whether in their own
land or in Japan, Koreans were regarded and treated as racially inferior,
possessing none of the political rights enjoyed by the Japanese. Through
enforced "Japanization", harsh measures were undertaken to eliminate traces
of Korean identity: Japanese was, in fact, declared as the official language
in Korea during the 1930s and all forms of cultural expression with a national
Korean content were abolished under the slogan "Japan and Korea Are One
Entity". This racial discrimination became particularly brutal during the
Second World War, as more than 200,000 Korean women and girls were rounded
up by Japanese troops to be confined as their sex slaves. According to
some scholars, this harsh colonial rule by Japan produced the effect of
deepening Korean nationalism by later determining what Cumings describes
as "national solipsism", i.e., the idea of an:
"untainted, self-contained community
of Koreans" intending to resist any outside pressure.
Bruce Cumings, The Origins of
the Korean War, vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950,
Princeton, 1990, p. 367.
THE MARCH FIRST MOVEMENT
(1919)
Significant nationalist uprisings developed in Korea nine years after its
annexation to Japan: more than two million people from all walks of life
were involved in about 3,200 demonstrations and revolts throughout the
country during 1919. An additional force of 6,000 Japanese troops was thus
dispatched to Korea: 7,509 Koreans were killed, with many thousands arrested,
wounded and beaten. Many activists and nationalists were forced either
to go underground or to carry on their struggle overseas.
This movement became known as the March First Movement, or the Mansei
revolution, since a declaration proclaiming "the independence of Korea
and the liberty of the Korean people" was signed on 1-3-1919 in Seoul by
33 prominent patriots (land-owners, capitalists, religious leaders, intellectuals
and others). The declaration called for peaceful resistance to Japan and
appealed to foreign powers for assistance. But as Japan had succeeded in
repressing the movement, some nationalists went into forced exile to China
and America and it was outside Korea that a provisional Korean government,
led by Syngman Rhee (living in Washington), was set up. At that time about
600,000 Koreans lived in south-eastern Manchuria, about 200,000 in the
Maritime Provinces and about 6,000 in Hawaii and the USA. The geographical
dislocation of the various nationalists around the world, together with
their internal disputes and differences about whether to use either peaceful,
diplomatic means or armed force against Japan, soon led to the virtual
collapse of the provisional government.
Under the impact of the 1917 October Revolution, Marxism-Leninism began
to permeate Koreans, so that a variety of communist-oriented organisations
emerged inside and outside the country. The first socialist organisation,
set up in 1918 in the Far Eastern Region of the Soviet Union, was the Korean
Socialist Party. The party split three years later into the Communist Party
of Koryo in Irkutsk and another Communist Party of Koryo in Shanghai. During
the same time, the Proletarian Fellowship Society and the League of Men
of Advanced Ideas merged into the Proletarian Union. The Union later joined
with the Irkutsk organisation, thus forming the Society for the Study of
the New Ideas in 1923 (later renamed the Tuesday Society). There also existed
the Seoul Youth Society (1921), the North Star Society (1923) among Korean
students in Japan (later renamed the North Wind Association), and various
other radical associations and clubs. Labour organisations were established
as well: the Workers’ Mutual Aid Society of Korea, the Korean Federation
of Workers and Peasants and the Korean Federation of Youth.
Between 1920 and 1925 mass struggles gained momentum in the country with
the participation of about 27,000 workers in more than 330 strikes. A certain
degree of unity among some of the above political organisations was achieved
in April 1925 with the foundation of the Communist Party of Korea (CPK).
But this unity remained short-lived as internal sectarian strife soon began
to reappear within the newly created party. In the meantime, the Seoul
Group did not merge with the CPK and two new groups emerged on the scene:
the ML Group and the Seoul-Shanghai Group. These extreme sectarian divisions
- both before and after the formation of the CPK - produced little impact
on the Korean situation, to the advantage for neither the communist cause
nor the anti-Japanese struggle. After three years of factional strife,
the CPK, which had provisionally been admitted to the Communist International
in 1926, ceased to exist and dissolved by the end of 1928.
In indicating the shortcomings of the communist movement in Korea, the
Communist International expressed its criticism to both the preponderant
factional struggle within the CPK and the composition of its cadres (mainly
consisting of intellectuals and students). In a 1928 resolution on the
Korean question, the Executive Committee of the Communist International
highlighted the necessity - for the Korean communists - to carry out an
agrarian revolution while strengthening the proletarian character of the
revolutionary movement in the country:
"The main line to be followed by
the Communist movement in Korea in the present phase of development is
. . . to strengthen the proletarian revolutionary movement, to guarantee
its complete independence with regard to the petty-bourgeois national revolutionary
movement . . . The Korean communists must do their utmost to attract first
of all industrial workers and also poor peasants, who have not given up
their farming, into the Party. The Communists will be able to accomplish
this great task only if they effect a sharp break with the old methods
of organisation of intellectual circles and undertake mass Bolshevik work,
particularly in the factories and trade unions."
"Resolution of the ECCI on the
Korean Question", 10-12-1928, in D. Suh, Documents of Korean Communism
1918-1948, Princeton, 1970, pp. 250-1.
3. THE MARXIST-LENINIST STRATEGY
FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS IN COLONIAL-TYPE COUNTRIES
Marxist-Leninist
parties and organisations in each country aim to lead their respective
working classes towards the establishment of socialist, and ultimately
communist, societies by successfully accomplishing the socialist revolution.
The revolutionary process will necessarily differ in each country - according
to its specific conditions and its stage of development. Colonial-type
countries usually encompass all those relatively underdeveloped countries
that are somehow dominated by a foreign imperialist power. A
colonial-type country can be
1. a
colony, which is directly ruled by a Great
Power (such was the status of the whole
of Korea under Japanese imperial rule from 1910 to 1945);
or
2. a
semi-colony or neo-colony, which is nominally
independent but is in fact dominated by a Great Power (such is the case
of South Korea under US imperialist domination
from 1945 until today).
In these colonial-type
countries, the revolutionary process which achieves the national liberation
of the country from the foreign yoke is regarded as a
national-democratic revolution. The
revolutionary process which achieves the political power of its working
class is regarded as a socialist revolution.
One relevant
feature in the social structure of a colonial-type country is the role
played by the local capitalist class, which is divided into two sections:
1. the
comprador capitalist class or comprador bourgeoisie, which
has close links with the landlord class and whose exploitation of the local
working class is primarily based upon foreign trade and upon its connections
with foreign corporations and multinationals. Like the landlord class,
this section of the bourgeoisie relies and depends upon the dominating
Great Power; and
2. the national
capitalist class or national bourgeoisie,
whose exploitation of the local working class is based on the ownership
of industrial enterprises and whose economic advancement is held back by
the dominating Great Power.
As Stalin noted
in 1925, in some colonial-type countries the native bourgeoisie
"is splitting up in two parts,
a revolutionary part (the national bourgeoisie - Ed.) . . . and a compromising
part (the comprador bourgeoisie - Ed.), of which the first is continuing
the revolutionary struggle, whereas the second is entering a bloc with
imperialism."
J. V. Stalin, "The Political Tasks
of the University of the Peoples of the East: Speech Delivered at a Meeting
of Students of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East", 18-5-1925,
in Stalin,Works, vol. 7, Moscow, 1954, p. 147.
The 6th Congress
of the Communist International, in September 1928, agreed that the native
bourgeoisie in colonial-type counties maintained a differentiated attitude
towards imperialism.
"One part, more especially the
commercial bourgeoisie, directly serves the interests of imperial capital
(the so-called comprador bourgeoisie). In general, they maintain, more
or less consistently, an anti-national, imperialist point of view, directed
against the whole nationalist movement, as do the feudal allies of imperialism
and the more highly paid native officials. The other parts of the native
bourgeoisie, especially those representing the interests of native industry,
support the national movement."
"Extracts from the Theses on
the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries Adopted
by the Sixth Comintern Congress", 1-9-1928, in J. Degras (Ed.), The
Communist International: 1919-1943: Documents, Vol. 2, London, 1971,
p. 538.
In colonial-type
countries the national bourgeoisie is indeed a class in favour of the national-democratic
revolution, but objectively opposed to the socialist revolution. It follows
that the class forces which are objectively in favour of the national-democratic
revolution are wider and stronger
than the forces objectively in favour of the socialist revolution. Hence,
in order to mobilise the maximum class forces available for both the national-democratic
and socialist revolutions, the Marxist-Leninist strategy is to strive to
advance the revolutionary process in colonial-type countries through two
stages:
1. the
first stage of the national-democratic revolution;
and
2. the
second stage of the socialist revolution.
During the first
national-democratic stage, the Marxist-Leninist party aims at allying
itself with the national bourgeoisie,
to the extent that this class remains genuinely revolutionary.
"Temporary cooperation is permissible,
and in certain circumstances even a temporary alliance, between the Communist
Party and the national-revolutionary movement, provided that the latter
is a genuine revolutionary movement, that it genuinely struggles against
the ruling power, and that its representatives do not hamper the Communists
in their work." "Extracts from the Theses
on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries Adopted
by the Sixth Comintern Congress", 1-9-1928, in J. Degras (Ed.), op.
cit., vol. 2, p. 542.
Such cooperation,
such an alliance with the national bourgeoisie, is only temporary because
the aim of the Marxist-Leninist party is to win for the working class the
leading role in advancing from the national-democratic revolution into
the socialist revolution. This leadership of the working class can only
be won by struggling with the national
bourgeoisie.
The latter, in fact, will inevitably desert the revolution and go over
to the counter-revolution as soon as the working class becomes capable
of achieving a socialist revolution.
"The proletariat pushes aside the
national bourgeoisie, consolidates its hegemony and assumes the lead of
the vast masses of the working people in town and country, in order to
overcome the resistance of the national bourgeoisie, secure the complete
victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and then gradually convert
it into a socialist revolution."
J.V. Stalin, "Questions of the
Chinese Revolution", April 1927, in Stalin,Works, vol. 9, Moscow,
1954, p. 225.
"The bourgeois-democratic revolution,
consistently pursued, will be transformed into the proletarian revolution
in those colonies and semi-colonies where the proletariat acts as a leader
and exercises hegemony over the movement . . . In these (colonial-type
- Ed.) countries the main task is to organise the workers and peasants
independently in the Communist Party of the proletariat . . . and emancipate
them from the influence of the national bourgeoisie."
Programme of the Communist International
Adopted at its Sixth Congress", 1-9-1928, in J. Degras (Ed.), op. cit.,
vol. 2, pp. 507, 522.
Once the working
class, in alliance with the peasantry, has gained the leadership in the
revolutionary process and has begun to transform the national-democratic
revolution into a socialist revolution by overthrowing the national bourgeoisie
and other exploiting classes, the Marxist-Leninist strategy is to bring
about the final victory of socialism by
establishing the dictatorship of the working class.
The transition from the first national-democratic stage into the socialist
one proceeds "uninterruptedly".
As Lenin said,
Kim Il Sung was
born on 15-4-1912 in Mangyongdae, near Pyongyang, of a peasant family with
clear patriotic traditions. In 1926, at the early age of 14 as a schoolboy
in Huatien, Manchuria he formed the Down-With-Imperialism Union (DIU),
whose goal was to defeat Japanese imperialism and achieve Korean liberation
and independence. One year later Kim Il Sung reorganised the DIU into the
Anti-Imperialist Youth League (AIYL) and also founded the Young Communist
League (YCL), a vanguard youth communist organisation. These two organisations,
together with the Peasants’ Union, the Children’s Pioneers and other organisations,
were clandestinely organising the struggle against Japanese imperialism
throughout Korea.
In 1928 Kim
Il Sung led the students’ struggle against the Kirin-Hoeryong railway project,
a scheme designed to extend Japanese communications into Manchuria. He
soon emerged as the leading figure among a "new generation of communists",
somehow different from those involved in the early communist movement in
Korea. DPRK’s current political literature emphasises the fact that this
new generation represented a rupture with factionalism for two reasons.
Firstly, they had embraced communist ideas from the outset of their struggle,
with no involvement in former sectarian groups. Moreover, they had belonged
mainly to peasant and working class families.
After having
been detained for seven months in the Kirin prison, Kim Il Sung became
instrumental in organising the anti-Japanese armed struggle. It was in
Kuyushu on 6-7-1930 that the first unit of the Korean Revolutionary Army
(KRA) was formed upon the initiative of members of the YCL and the AIYL.
Small KRA groups were dispatched to various locations but especially in
the countryside. However KRA bases could barely operate within Korean territory,
for it was strictly controlled by Japanese authorities. They therefore
decided to set up the armed struggle’s headquarters in the wooded area
along the Tuman-gang river in East Manchuria, a region whose population
was made up by nearly 400,000 Koreans (i.e., 80% of its total number).
The anti-Japanese
armed struggle grew and developed through different and difficult stages.
In September 1931, Japan launched its invasion in Manchuria, thus threatening
the guerrilla bases and urgently prompting the formation of the Anti-Japanese
People’s Guerrilla Army (AJPGA) in Antu, Manchuria, on 25-4-1932. On the
occasion of its founding, Kim Il Sung stated:
"The aim and mission of the people’s
guerrilla army is to overthrow the colonial rule of Japanese imperialism
in Korea and bringing national independence and social emancipation to
the Korean people. . . The foundation of the AJPGA will open up a phase
in implementing the line of the anti-Japanese united front and the policy
for founding a Marxist-Leninist party."
Kim Il Sung, "On the Occasion of
Founding the Anti-Japanese People’s Guerrilla Army: Speech at the Ceremony
to Found the Anti-Japanese People’s Guerrilla Army", 25-4-1932, in Kim
Il Sung, Works, vol 1, Pyongyang, 1980, p. 47. +
In March 1933 guerrilla
units crossed the Tuman-gang river, advancing into the Onsong district
on the northern border of Korea. A "people’s revolutionary government"
was set up in the liberated areas so that the ranks of the guerrilla army
could considerably grow and strengthen. In March 1934 the AJPGA was reorganised
into the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army (KPRA) with divisions, regiments,
companies, platoons and squads, systematically organised and placed under
a unified organisational system. Battles were fought against Japanese forces,
as KPRA units were extending their operations into wider areas of Korea
and North and South Manchuria. In the meantime, Japanese authorities were
reacting by intensifying repression of these mounting popular struggles.
According to official Japanese figures, in the period 1931-35 more than
900 strikes took place involving over 70,000 workers and during the same
time more than 453,800 Koreans were arrested, imprisoned or punished.
Various paramilitary organisations were also active in the guerrilla zones:
the Red Guards (Anti-Japanese Self-Defence Corps), the Children’s Vanguard,
the Youth Voluntary Army and the Shock Brigade. Self-governing bodies and
people’s committees were created and, in order to increase popular support,
on 5-5-1936 the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland (ARF)
was also founded. The creation of this anti-Japanese united front organisation
represented -according to Kim Il Sung :
"an event of epochal significance
in consolidating the mass basis of revolution."
The ARF was, in fact, intended to unite all patriotic sections of Korean
society, with the exclusion of pro-Japanese landlords, comprador capitalists
and traitors to the nation. Its main aim was:
"to mobilise the entire Korean
nation and realise a broad-based anti-Japanese united front in order to
overthrow the piratical Japanese imperialist rule and establish a genuine
people’s government in Korea." (
Kim Il Sung, "The Ten-Point Programme
of the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland", 5-5-1936, in
Kim Il Sung, Works, vol 1, Pyongyang, 1980, p. 112. )
In November 1937 Kim Il Sung reiterated and emphasised the independent
character of the Korean struggle in the
following terms:
"The Korean communists should,
above all, adhere to a firm independent position in order to crown their
revolutionary tasks in success . . . The masters of the Korean revolution
are the Korean people and the Korean communists. The Korean revolution
must be carried out by the Korean people under the leadership of the Korean
communists . . . Victory and glory belong to the Korean communists who
are fighting unyieldingly under the unfurled banner of the Korean revolution."
Kim Il Sung, "The Tasks of Korean
Communists: Treatise Published in Sogwang, Organ of the Korean People’s
Revolutionary Army", 10-11-1937, in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol 1, Pyongyang,
1980, pp. 166-7.
After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in July 1938, military and
political activities against Japanese imperialism intensified in scope
throughout Korea. However, it was decided to postpone the creation of a
new Korean communist party to a later date. Subsequent to Japan’s forced
mobilisation of Korean men and women during the Second World War, extensive
preparations were made for anti-Japanese revolts as a prelude to the KPRA’s
general offensive throughout the country. After Nazi Germany’s unconditional
surrender on 9-5-1945 and the subsequent Soviet declaration of war against
Japan on 9-8-1945, KPRA units crossed the Tuman-gang river, rapidly advancing
to the areas of Kyonghung and Kyongwon. Other units, in the meantime, landed
at Unggi, Rajin and Chongjin. As the KPRA had successfully intensified
its attacks and liberated many areas, the Japanese army was forced to surrender
unconditionally on 15-8-1945, the day that marks the Korean people’s final
liberation from Japan’s 35-year-long colonial rule.
The anti-Japanese armed struggle has indeed gone down in Korea’s history
as an heroic national-liberation war which had activated and mobilised
all patriotic forces, from both inside and outside the country, in order
to successfully liquidate Japanese imperialism. Korea’s
national liberation movement developed autonomously and relied mainly on
its own forces,
with no direct assistance from outside. Nor did it maintain organic links
with either the USSR or the Third Communist International. During this
time, Kim Il Sung ardently fought for his country’s liberation as a revolutionary,
patriotic leader. But in the DPRK today, an almost exclusive
merit is attributed to his role and leadership
for having achieved Korea’s liberation:
"The brilliant victory of the anti-Japanese
armed struggle was ascribable only
to the sagacious guidance of the respected and beloved leader Comrade Kim
Il Sung, a gifted revolutionary, great thinker and theoretician, ever-victorious
iron-willed brilliant commander, and outstanding military strategist. All
the factors in victory of the anti-Japanese armed struggle could be formed
just by his ingenious organisation and guidance. . . . The brilliant victory
of the anti-Japanese armed struggle could be possible thanks to the identity
of thought and will and revolutionary unity of the revolutionary ranks
with the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung as the pivot. . . . The steel-strong
unity of thinking and will and revolutionary cohesion of the revolutionary
ranks could be achieved because the revolutionary thought and theories
of the respected and beloved leader Comrade Kim Il Sung were correct and
great and his guidance was sagacious. And nothing could break that unity
and cohesion. . . . The victory of the anti-Japanese armed struggle was
the brilliant victory of the superb military strategy and guerrilla tactics
of the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung."
Kim Han Gil, Modern History
of Korea, Pyongyang, 1979, pp. 169-71. My emphases.
The artificial division of the Korean peninsula and its people was a decision
taken by the US State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in Washington, DC,
during the night of the 10-11 August 1945, four days prior to Korea’s final
liberation. Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy directed two colonels,
D. Rusk and C. H. Bonesteel, to decide - and they were given around 30
minutes in which to do so - where to draw a line of demarcation on Korea’s
map. The line was drawn along the 38th parallel so that the surrender of
the Japanese army could be offered to Soviet forces (which moved into north-eastern
Korea on 12 August) in the north and to American forces in the south. This
arbitrary partition - created in total disregard of the national liberation
struggle that had been fought by the Korean people for their self-determination
and independence - was the product of US imperialism’s expansionist attempts
to extend its tentacles into the Asian continent.
By mid-1946, the cold war against the USSR and the newly formed people’s
democracies had soon emerged. In Korea as well, the USA was:
"in an ideological battleground
upon which (America’s - Ed.) entire success in Asia may depend", according
to President Truman himself.
"
Truman
to E. W. Pauley, Ambassador-at-large for German and Japanese reparations’
policy, 16-7-1946, in Foreign Relations of the US, 1946, vol. 8,
The Far East, Washington, DC: Department of State Publication 8554,
1971, pp. 713-4.
After partitioning the country, US imperialism established a fresh military
occupation in South Korea, where it has imposed - for more than half a
century - a succession of fascist or pseudo-democratic regimes congenial
to American strategic and economic interests.
American domination in the south immediately replaced Japanese rule by
dismantling the self-governing bodies and the people’s committees created
during the war, by establishing a ruthless military administration, by
suppressing any democratic rights and denying national independence to
the Korean people. Different developments soon began to unfold in the north
and in the south. Consequently, Korean efforts to reconstruct and democratise
their country were made particularly complicated by the US military occupation
and interference in the south, where the ROK was created with the installation
of Syngman Rhee as its dictator.
During early 1948, the universal aspiration of the Korean people to national
reunification was unanimously expressed at the Joint Conference of Representatives
of North and South Korean Political Parties and Social Organisations, organised
in Pyongyang in April 1948 and attended by 695 representatives of 56 different
parties and organisations. Their final resolution demanded the withdrawal
of both Soviet and American troops from Korean territory, supported the
establishment of a provisional government representing the whole of Korea,
while rejecting American attempts to hold separate elections in the south.
The resolution concluded as follows:
"In order to prevent the split
of the country and domination of the south Korean people by the US imperialists,
we, both south and north Korean political parties and social organisations
should pool our forces so that we can further develop a movement throughout
the country to frustrate the separate elections in south Korea and to support
the Soviet proposal on granting the Korean people the right to establish
a unified democratic independent country by themselves by having foreign
troops withdrawn from Korea without delay."
Joint
Conference of Representatives of North and South Korean Political Parties
and Social Organizations in Pyongyang, Resolution on the Political Situation
in Korea, 23-4-1948, quoted in Korea is One, Pyongyang, 1978,
p. 190.
Contrary to the above wishes of the Korean people, a short time later,
on 10-5-1948, the Americans engineered separate elections in South Korea,
at a time when substantial areas of the country were outside Rhee’s control.
But all over Korea, general elections to the Supreme People’s Assembly
(SPA) took place on 25-8-1948. In the north elections were held on the
basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage to select 212 deputies (99.97%
of the eligible voters participated and 98.49% of them voted for the candidates
of the Democratic National United Front of North Korea). Overcoming considerable
obstacles, secret elections also took place in the south in order to choose
360 deputies (but given the extent of political repression, participation
in the elections was limited to 77.52% of the eligible voters). A total
of 572 deputies (out of which 102 belonged to the North Korea’s communist
party - then called the Workers’ Party of Korea, WPK) took part in the
first session of the SPA on 2-9-1948, adopted the constitution of the new
state and elected Kim Il Sung as its prime minister. His government stressed
the urgency to reunify the divided country through the simultaneous withdrawal
of Soviet troops from the north and American troops from the south. A few
days later, on 9-9-1948, the SPA officially proclaimed the founding of
the DPRK:
"an epoch-making step forward in
the struggle for the reunification and independence of the country and
for its democratic development."
Kim
Il Sung, "Report to the Third Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on
the Work of the CWorks, vol. 10, Pyongyang, 1982, p. 159.
By the end of 1948, Soviet troops (numbering about 10,000 in mid-1946)
were all withdrawn while the continued military presence of the US in the
south prompted yet another joint initiative for the peaceful solution of
the Korean question. The Democratic Front for the Reunification of the
Fatherland (DFRF) was, in fact, created in May 1949 with the participation
of various political parties and social organisations from both the north
and the south of the country. Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War in
June 1950, both the DFRF and the DPRK’s government put forward various
proposals in order to achieve a peaceful reunification of Korea.
6. "PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY"
IN NORTH KOREA
At the time of its liberation in 1945, North Korean society still maintained
a semi-feudal character as capitalist development had been hampered by
Japan’s 35-year-old colonial domination. North Korea soon embarked along
the path of "progressive democracy" in order to carry out its anti-imperialist
and anti-feudal revolution. The immediate post-war task was therefore:
"to form a democratic national
united front embracing all the patriotic, democratic forces of our country
such as the workers, peasants, progressive intellectuals, conscientious
national capitalists and conscientious men of religion and, on this basis,
to establish a Democratic People’s Republic." Excluded from power were
the pro-Japanese comprador capitalists and landlords.
Kim
Il Sung, "On Building the Party, State and Armed Forces in the Liberated
Homeland: Speech Delivered to Military and Political Cadres", 20-8-1945,
in Kim Il Sung,Works, vol 1, Pyongyang, 1980, pp. 235-6.
As Kim Il Sung indicated
in 1945, democracy - in this sense - was:
"not a democracy for one class
only, one political party, one organisation or one religion; it is a democracy
for the broad masses of people."
Kim
Il Sung, "On Progressive Democracy: A Lecture Given to the Students of
the Pyongyang Worker-Peasant Political School", 3-10-1945, in Kim Il Sung,
Works, vol 1, Pyongyang, 1980, pp. 259.
Progressive democracy
was therefore intended to establish
a joint dictatorship of several classes in North Korea with the inclusion
of the national bourgeoisie, as well:
"a Democratic People’s Republic . . . must
be built by forming a democratic united front . . . which embraces . .
. even the national capitalists with a national conscience."
Kim
Il Sung, "On the Building of New Korea and the National United Front: Speech
to the Responsible Functionaries of the Provincial Party Committees", 13-10-1945,
in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol 1, Pyongyang, 1980, pp. 298.
Emphasis was placed on the assumption that - in North Korea’s specific
conditions after 1945 - a socialist system or a Soviet power was indeed
premature. Korean communists were therefore instructed by Kim Il Sung to
adhere to:
"the principle of uniting to the
maximum all forces that love the country and people."
Kim
Il Sung, "On Building a Marxist-Leninist Party in Our Country and its Immediate
Tasks: Report to the Inaugural Congress of the Central Organizing Committee
of the Communist Party of North Korea", 10-10-1945, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol 1, Pyongyang, 1980, p. 286)..
"There is no reason why communists
and nationalists cannot unite in the efforts for nation-building. . . .
Unity alone is the patriotic road for the country and the people and the
true road to nation-building, the road to guaranteeing a new, democratic
Korea."
Kim Il Sung, "Talk with Participants in the Nationalist Movement", 5-11-1945,
in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol 1, Pyongyang, 1980, p. 347.
In North Korea’s progressive democracy, communism - rather than being perceived
in a Leninist, Bolshevik sense - became associated with Korean patriotism
and independence. Kim Il Sung reported the following anecdote during a
mass rally in Sinuiju:
"Somebody asked me just now: General,
are you also a communist? Yes, I am a communist. Communists are true patriots
fighting unswervingly for the complete independence of the country and
the happiness of the people. If a man called a communist does not love
his country and nation, he is not a true communist. I am not the kind of
communist who looks up to foreign countries but one who relies on our own
people and fights for the benefit of the Korean nation and people."
Kim
Il Sung, "Which Path Should Liberated Korea Take?: Speech at a Mass Rally
in Sinuiju", 27-11-1945, in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol 1, Pyongyang,
1980, pp. 398.
Imbued with considerable doses of nationalism, the Communist Party of North
Korea (CPNK, renamed Workers’ Party of North Korea in August 1946, and
then Workers’ Party of Korea) was officially founded on 10-13 October 1945.
Besides the CPNK, other parties and social organisations emerged during
late 1945 and early 1946: the Democratic Party (mainly made up of small
and middle class capitalists and Christians), the Chondoist Chongu Party
(made up of Chondo believers, mostly peasants) and the New Democratic Party
(made up mainly of middle peasants and intellectuals). Social organisations
included the General Federation of Trade Unions, the Peasant Union, the
Democratic Youth League, the Democratic Women’s Union, the General Federation
of Unions of Literature and Arts, the General Federation of Industrial
Technology, the Christian Federation, the Buddist Federation and others.
Representatives from all these parties and organisations - together with
those from local committees - convened in Pyongyang on 8-2-1946 in order
to establish the Provisional People’s Committee of North Korea (PPCNK)
functioning as the democratic government and aiming at deepening the anti-imperialist
and anti-feudal democratic revolution.
Some time later, Kim Il Sung would state that, since the establishment
of the 1946 provisional government, North Korean society had entered the
period of gradual transition to socialism.
"The Provisional People’s Committee
of North Korea formed in February 1946 played a great historic role. A
form of people’s government relying on a democratic national united front
which rallied broad anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic forces in
the country on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance led by the working
class, this committee carried out the function of the people’s democratic
dictatorship."
Kim
Il Sung, "Report to the Third Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on
the Work of the Central Committee", 23-4-1956, in Kim Il Sung,Works,
vol 10, Pyongyang, 1982, p. 157.
"With the establishment of the people’s
government, for the first time in their history, our people became genuine
masters of the country, with state power firmly in hands. Under our Party’s
leadership, the people’s government . . . opened up wide avenues for social
progress. In this way the northern half of the Republic carried out the
tasks of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution and entered
the period of gradual transition to socialism."
Kim
Il Sung, "On the Nature of the Revolution in Our Country at the Present
Stage and the Basic Direction of the First Five-Year Plan: Concluding Speech
at a Meeting of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the
Workers’ Party of Korea", 29-12-1954, in Kim Il Sung,Works, vol
9, Pyongyang, 1982, pp. 169-70.
But contrary to the above claims, made in retrospect during the mid-fifties,
neither the CPNK nor any other party contemplated - during the period of
the so-called progressive democracy - the transition from the national-democratic
stage into the socialist one. The decision was, in fact, taken on 28-8-1946
to merge together the CPNK and the New Democratic Party, thus creating
the Workers’ Party of North Korea (WPNK),
"aimed at building a prosperous, independent, sovereign and democratic
state," but without the slightest reference to an eventual transition towards
socialism.
(The WPNK had an initial membership of 370,000, which increased to 680,000
one year later). The amalgamation that gave birth to the WPNK took place
rather artificially: according to Kim Il Sung:
"even if there were some friction
between the two parties, the question of eliminating it would be solved
by expelling the ultra-‘Left’ sectarians from the Communist Party and the
ultra-Right die-hards from the New Democratic Party, rather than merging
them into one."
Kim
Il Sung, "The Present Political Situation and Our New Tasks: Report to
the Enlarged Joint Meeting of the Central Committees of the Communist Party
of North Korea and the New Democratic Party of Korea", 29-7-1946, in Kim
Il Sung,Works, vol 2, Pyongyang, 1980, p. 282.
No trace of socialism can be spotted in the WPNK’s
programme. Its democratic tasks were the following.
"To confiscate the land of the
Japanese imperialists and the landlords and distribute it among the peasants;
to nationalise the industries, transport, communications, banks, etc.,
belonging to Japanese imperialism and the comprador capitalists and transform
them into the property of the people; to introduce an eight-hour working
day and a social insurance system for factory and office workers; to grant
women equal rights with men; to ensure the people freedom of speech, the
press, assembly, association and religious belief; to institute a democratic
system of public education and establish compulsory education; and to develop
science, national culture and arts."
Kim
Il Sung, "For the Establishment of a United Party of the Working Masses:
Report to the Inaugural Congress of the Workers’ Party of North Korea",
29-8-1946, in Kim Il Sung,Works, vol 2, Pyongyang, 1980, p. 336.
What about Marxism-Leninism? Under the pretext of its creative implementation
in the country’s specific situation, Marxism-Leninism (i.e., scientific
socialism as elaborated by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin for the emancipation
of the working class) was distorted and became equated with Korean independence.
Its vulgar revision is presented by Kim Il Sung as follows:
"Marxism-Leninism is not a dogma;
it is a guide to action. We must learn to apply Marxism-Leninism creatively
to the realities of Korea today. Only through the formation of a mass party
can we win the victory of democracy. This victory is essential for the
complete independence of Korea. The complete independence of Korea means
precisely the victory of Marxism-Leninism in Korea."
Kim
Il Sung, "Report to the Third Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on
the Work of the Central Committee", 23-4-1956, in Kim Il Sung,Works,
vol 10, Pyongyang, 1982, p. 158.
During the 1946 summer the WPNK joined in coalition with the two other
existing political parties and with fifteen social organisations in order
to set up the Democratic National United Front of North Korea (DNUFNK).
Its purpose was to organise elections to the provincial, city, county,
ri (Dong) and sub-county people’s committees during November 1946 and early
1947. The elected representatives from these people’s committees formed
the North Korean People’s Assembly (NKPA) on 17-2-1947.
The NKPA thus became the country’s supreme organ of power, with the North
Korean People’s Committee (NKPC) as its executive body. The 237 NKPA deputies
were affiliated to the existing parties as follows (in percentage): 36%
to the WPNK, 13% to the Democratic Party, 13% to the Chogu Party and 38%
non affiliated. As for their social origin, 22% were workers, 26% peasants,
24% office employees, 15% intellectuals, 3% enterprisers, 4% traders, 2%
handicraftsmen and 4% religious men.
In a later assessment, Kim Il Sung characterised this NKPC as another intermediate
step towards socialism! Only in 1956 would he state that the NKPC had:
"set out to implement the tasks
of the transition period to switch over gradually to socialism by further
extending the results of the democratic reforms in north Korea and developing
a planned national economy."
Kim
Il Sung, "Report to the Third Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on
the Work of the Central Committee", 23-4-1956, in Kim Il Sung,Works,
vol 10, Pyongyang, 1982, p. 158.)
But this is another unsubstantiated claim, since no
transition towards socialism under the leadership of the working class
and its communist party can be envisaged in the official documentary sources
of the forties.
In other words, "progressive democracy" was not viewed - at that
time - as a transition stage which would lead to the dictatorship of the
proletariat in North Korea.
Indeed, this "progressive democracy" in North Korea bears similarities
with the "new democracy" that was implemented in China after its liberation
in 1949. The latter had, in fact, been outlined in Mao Tse-tung’s The
New Democracy (1940), according to which four anti-imperialist and
anti-feudal classes - such as the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty
bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie - were all going to participate
and share power in post-liberated China. But whatever labels can be attached
to these forms of democracy - whether it is "progressive" or "new" - both
Kim Il Sung’s and Mao Tse-tung’s formulations deny the basic Marxist-Leninist
principle that it is only by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat
that real democracy and socialism can be established. As Lenin clearly
indicated,
"The transition from capitalism
to communism is certainly bound to yield a tremendous abundance and variety
of political forms, but the essence will inevitably be the same: the
dictatorship of the proletariat."
V.
I. Lenin, The State and Revolution: The Marxist Theory of the State
and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution, August-Setember
1917, in Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 25, Moscow, 1964, p. 413.
Emphasis in the original.
Both Kim Il Sung’s "progressive democracy" and Mao Tse-tung’s "new
democracy" represent right-wing revisionist
distortions on the revolution in the colonial-type countries. These deviations
were, in fact, later elaborated by the Krushchevite revisionists around
the idea of a state of "national democracy".
It was during the sixties that, in this regard, the revisionist USSR reversed
Lenin’s and Stalin’s policies in order to subvert and disrupt the revolutionary
process in the developing countries. Support was therefore given to newly-emerged,
allegedly non-capitalist, states (such as Nehru’s India or Sukharno’s Indonesia)
in their attempts to encourage their national capitalist classes and all
other patriotic forces to harmoniously pass over to "socialism", mainly
through state nationalisations. Unquestionably, all these policies confusing
"democracy" with "reconciliation" between antagonistic classes are revisionist
formulations and theories that halt the advance towards the dictatorship
of the working class and raise a "Chinese wall" between the first and second
phase of the revolutionary process in the developing countries.
AGRARIAN AND OTHER REFORMS
Although North Korea - compared with the south - possessed a relative advantage
in inheriting most of the country’s heavy industry and mines, the scale
of Japan’s sabotage before its final surrender in 1945 had been so damaging
that 19 hydro-electric plants had been put out of operation, 64 mines totally
flooded, 178 partially flooded, 6 enterprises (including the Pyongyang
Aircraft Factory) completely destroyed and 47 enterprises partially destroyed.
Jon Halliday, "The Economies of North and South Korea", in Sullivan and
Foss (Eds), Two Koreas - One Future?, Lanham, MD, 1987, p. 21.
Nonetheless, remarkable progress was soon achieved, as reconstruction and
economic development began to be planned (on a yearly basis in 1947 and
1948 and on a two-year basis in 1949-50). As compared to 1946, industrial
output grew by 53.3% in 1947, by 117.9% in 1948 and by 236.7% in 1949.
All domains of society were affected by democratic reforms - from the agrarian
reform and the nationalisation of the main industries to new laws on labour
protection, equality of sexes, the democratisation of the judiciary, education
and culture, etc. - thus beginning to eradicate the colonial and feudal
features inherited from the past.
Given Korea’s backwardness and its overwhelming peasant population, of
particular importance was the "Law on Agrarian Reform in North Korea",
promulgated on 5-5-1946. All lands possessed by Japanese colonialists and
by landlords who owned more than five hectares were confiscated without
compensation and distributed free to the landless and poor peasants, according
to the size of their families. Sale, purchase and mortgaging of the distributed
land and all systems of tenancy were now prohibited. The agrarian reform
was carried out successfully in a short time: more than 1,000,000 hectares
of land were confiscated and distributed to over 720,000 peasant households.
A subsequent law on "agricultural tax in kind" required the peasants to
pay the state 25% of their yields (this percentage was later revised in
the range between 10% and 27%, according to crops or land fertility). This
tax was then abolished in 1966.
According to the "Law on the Nationalisation of Industry, Traffic, Transport,
Communications and Banking" (10-8-1946), all major industries, formerly
owned by the Japanese state or by traitors to the Korean nation, were nationalised
without compensation and transferred to the state. As a result, more than
1,000 industrial establishments, railways, communications and banks (i.e.,
over 90 % of all industries formerly owned by Japanese imperialism or by
the comprador bourgeoisie) were brought under state ownership. This nationalisation,
though having a democratic, anti-imperialist and anti-feudal character,
did not liquidate capitalist ownership as a whole: the properties belonging
to the national capitalist class remained unaffected by this nationalisation
and were legally protected. The law protecting private ownership and encouraging
capitalist private businesses was, in fact, approved on 4-10-1946.
The overwhelming state-ownership in the industrial sector, the small private
peasant economy and the urban handicrafts economy could therefore coexist
with the national capitalist sector, comprising private capitalist trade
and industry in towns and rich peasants’ economy in the countryside.
7. THE KOREAN WAR (1950-53)
While disregarding the efforts on the part of the DPRK and DFRK to achieve
Korean reunification by peaceful means during the late forties, Washington
increased its military build-up in South Korea in the prelude to the outbreak
of hostilities. Clashes with the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) along
the 38th parallel became frequent and on 4-5-1949 South Korean forces launched
an attack towards Kaesong, resulting in a total of 4,000 North Korean soldiers,
22 South Korean soldiers and about 100 civilians killed. The Rhee regime
in the ROK, in the meantime, was attempting to repress peasant and labour
disturbances and to stamp out guerrilla activities that had developed in
the south on a large scale. These repressions, aimed at "annihilating rebels",
reached their peak in early 1950, as thousands were murdered and many more
were wounded or displaced and their homes were completely or partly destroyed.
On 25-6-1950, at dawn, the attack from the south - all along the 38th parallel
in the direction of Haeju, Kumchon and Cholwen - eventually initiated the
war against the DPRK, prompting the NKPA’s subsequent military offensive
towards the south. Thus, the Korean people began their three-year-long
Fatherland Liberation War against the military
might of the allied forces of imperialism led by the USA.
With the aim of reducing the whole
Korea into an American neo-colony, US official propaganda was presenting
the Koreans’ struggle for their reunification as civil war. Most Western
sources still refer to an alleged "communist invasion" from the north to
the south. But as to which Korean side would have been to blame for the
outbreak of hostilities, British historian Geoff Simons noted the following
differences:
"The aggressive intentions of Syngman
Rhee towards North Korea were well known, copiously documented, and often
an embarrassment to the United States government and the US military authorities
in South Korea. The North too was equally interested in the possibility
of reunification, though necessarily its interpretation of events was somewhat
different to those emanating from Washington and Seoul. It would however
be a mistake to assume a simple parity of pro-war rhetoric in the South
and the North: even the usual anti-communist sources cite few rantings
from Kim Il-sung to match those of Syngman Rhee and his bellicose supporters.
Statements emanating from Pyongyang allow for the possibility of a militant
(or military) reunification, but the temper is different to that of Rhee;
and emphasis is sometimes given to the need for a peaceful reunification."
Geoff
Simons, Korea: The Search for Sovereignty, London, 1995, p. 192.
Emphasis in the original.
By the early fifties - and particularly after the proclamation of the Truman
doctrine in 1947 - Washington had come to regard events in any one nation
or area in the context of its global imperialist perspective and in order
to attack the USSR and other nations struggling for independence, peace,
democracy and socialism. The cold war was activated by US imperialism and
designated to exacerbate international tension, justify an unrestrained
arms race and increase military expenditures and anti-communist reaction
in all continents. It was within this framework that conditions could be
created for the outbreak of the hot war in the Korean peninsula in 1950.
From June to early September 1950, the US-led UN forces were pushed back
to the small south-east area of Pusan. On 15-9-1950 the American landings
at Inchon (just south of the 38th parallel) forced the NKPA into retreat
and facilitated a UN breakout from Pusan. In November, the rapid advance
of the UN forces towards the Yalu river prompted a massive Chinese intervention,
causing a UN retreat on all fronts. Hasty UN evacuations took place by
sea from Hungnam and Wonsan in North Korea. By January 1951 the UN retreat
halted north of Taejon in South Korea and, after a three-month UN counter-offensive,
the confrontation stabilised around the 38th parallel until the armistice
line was finally agreed upon on 27-7-1953. According to the terms of the
armistice, the exchange of prisoners also took place: 77,000 North Korean
and Chinese soldiers against 12,700 UN personnel, including 3,597 Americans
and 945 Britons.
The 1950-53 war against the Korean people produced about four million deaths
with many more men, women and children wounded, mutilated, traumatised
(perhaps ten million dead and wounded altogether): the greatest number
of casualties was suffered by the North Koreans and the Chinese. US bombers
attacked power plants, factories, bridges and all communications throughout
the north and in entire provinces scarcely a building remained standing.
The war also provided US imperialism with the opportunity to test napalm
and related products on a sustained and widespread basis against both military
and civilian targets in the north. By 1953, in proportionate terms, the
DPRK had been more comprehensively devastated than any country (including
Germany or the USSR) in the Second World War, and more than North Vietnam
would be in the Vietnam War.
As is known, the US attack against Korea was fought under the nominal aegis
of the UN. So troops from countries such as Britain, Japan, Australia and
twelve other states united their military strength against the DPRK. However,
the decision to involve the UN in the Korean
War had not been a UN initiative, but a decision of the USA.
Because of the USSR’s temporary
boycott in the Security Council (that is, in the absence of a Soviet veto),
the US imperialists could secure three Council resolutions authorising
UN intervention in Korea (resolution n. 82 of 25-6-1950, n. 83 of 27-6-1950
and n. 84 of 7-7-1950). It is also important to consider that:
1. the first resolution n. 82 did
not contemplate
UN military intervention in Korea;
2. the USA took military action
before
UN authorisation had been given; and
3. the USA has continued to station
its own forces in South Korea under the name and flag of the UN in line
with the Security Council resolution n. 84. But considering that the UN
charter requires unanimous approval by the permanent members of its Security
Council, resolution n. 84 establishing the "UN Command" in the south can
have no legal effect since - in the absence of the USSR, a then
permanent member nation - it was adopted without the participation of all
the Security Council permanent members.
It is therefore clear that in this instance - just as it is currently occurring
today - US imperialism manipulated and used the UN as an instrument to
pursue its own expansionist ambitions and strategic interests. And the
"UN Command" in the ROK continues
to remain a US product of the cold war.
The armistice talks for the ceasefire, conducted between the "UN Command"
(i.e., essentially a US delegation) and the North Korean/Chinese representatives,
concluded with the signing of the armistice agreement on 27-7-1953 at Panmunjom.
The armistice foiled US designs to occupy the entire Korean peninsula and
thus strengthened the anti-imperialist front in Asia. This armistice (that
has by now become the world’s longest-running)
has never been replaced by a peace treaty, as Korea continues to prolong
its division into two along its 38th parallel. Although the continued military
occupation by US imperialism is in violation of the 1953 armistice agreement
(envisaging the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Korean peninsula),
Washington had been able to conclude a "mutual defence treaty" with the
South Korean government on 8-8-1953 in order to "justify" its military
presence there for an indefinite period of time. On the other hand, all
Chinese troops had left the DPRK by 1958.
During the Korean War the banner of national liberation and independence
was heroically held high by the Korean people in their armed confrontation
against the US-led military intervention in the Korean peninsula. The anti-imperialist
character of the Koreans’ struggle - fought, this time, against US imperialism
- was highlighted by Kim Il Sung as follows:
"The struggle is, on the one hand,
an anti-imperialist national-liberation revolution, with the task of defending
the freedom and independence of the country against the foreign imperialist
aggressors. On the other hand, it is a democratic revolution involving
the entire people . . . The enemies of the Korean people are the US imperialist
aggressors and their minions, the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique - pro-Japanese
and pro-US elements, traitors to the nation, landlords and comprador capitalists.
So, the task of our revolution at the present stage is to destroy our two
enemies, the internal and the external, defend the freedom and the independence
of the country and bring about its reunification . . . The struggle of
the Korean people against the US imperialist invaders is . . . at the same
time a struggle for world peace and security, one which serves as a banner
for the national-liberation movement of the peoples of colonial and dependent
countries."
Kim
Il Sung, "The Organizational and Ideological Consolidation of the Party
is the Basis for Our Victory: Report to the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the
Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea", 15-12-1952, in Kim Il
Sung, Works, vol 7, Pyongyang, 1981, p. 343.
In order to maximise popular support for Korea’s liberation and reunification
during 1950-53, Kim Il Sung placed major emphasis on strengthening unity
among all patriotic elements in Korean society, regardless of their social
status or political allegiance. In the DFRF, in fact, members of the Workers’
Party of Korea (WPK) were working in close contacts with those of the Chongu
Party and the Democratic Party. But during the period September-November
1950 - as the NKPA had temporarily retreated and US-led UN troops had occupied
most of the north - some reactionary forces in the north re-organised themselves
under American protection. Members of the Chongu and Democratic parties
joined the newly-formed reactionary organisations and some of them even
murdered WPK members and their families. In such instances, however, Kim
Il Sung called for political restraint, opposing attempts to characterise
"friendly parties" as reactionary organisations. As he indicated to WPK
cadres in November 1951:
In order to rehabilitate the post-1953 economy, totally ruined by the Korean
war, and lay the economic foundations of socialism, priority was given
to the development of heavy industry
in parallel with the development of light industry and agriculture. The
post-war reconstruction took place through three stages:
1. the preparatory work for economic
rehabilitation was carried out during the second half of 1953;
2. a three-year plan (1954-56)
was then implemented in order to reach pre-war levels in all branches of
the economy. It was successfully fulfilled within two years and eight months
and overfulfilled by 22% by the end of 1956;
3. the subsequent five-year plan
(1957-61) was meant to lay the socialist foundations of industrialisation,
modernising various branches of the economy while raising the cultural
standards of the population and solving problems related to food, clothing
and housing. The plan was successfully completed during the first two and
a half years only.
A major role in achieving these remarkable and fast successes after the
Korean War was played by the so-called Chollima
movement (Chollima traditionally signifies
a horse galloping about 1,000 miles a day). This movement was aimed at
educating and converting people into communist activists by speeding up
innovation and production collectively under the slogan "one for all and
all for one." Emphasis was always placed on Korea’s national peculiarities,
i.e., on the fact that the revolution was a Korean one and - as such -
it should not have copied foreign models. In this regard, the term "Juche"
("independence") appeared for the very first time in a speech, delivered
by Kim Il Sung on 28-12-1955. In attacking dogmatism and formalism:
"there should be no set rule -
Kim Il Sung remarked - that we must follow the Soviet pattern. Some advocate
the Soviet way and others the Chinese, but is it not high time to work
out our own?"
Kim
Il Sung, "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche
in Ideological Work: Speech to Party Propaganda and Agitation Workers",
28-12-1955, in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol 9, Pyongyang, 1982, p. 403.
This independent and national character of the Korean revolution was very
often reiterated and underlined. As Kim Il Sung pointed out in 1959:
"the most important thing in the
revolution is to establish Juche thoroughly, adhering to the principles
of Marxism-Leninism."
Kim
Il Sung, "On Opposing Dogmatism and Establishing Juche in Party Political
Work in the People’s Army: Talk with Military and Political Workers at
the Corps or Higher Levels of The Korean People’s Army", 16-5-1959, in
Kim Il Sung, Works, vol 13, Pyongyang, 1983, p. 256.
According to official Kimilsungist literature, the economic and social
transformations which took place during the mid-fifties both in the cooperativization
of agriculture and in the reorganisation of private trade and industry
led to the establishment of socialist relations of production by 1958.
In the agricultural sector, the principal goal was to turn the individual
and private peasant economy into the cooperative economy. This change was
also dictated by the necessity to improve living standards in the countryside,
as they had considerably deteriorated during the war (in 1953 poor peasants
amounted to 40% of the total population in the countryside). During 1953-54,
agricultural cooperatives were therefore set up on an experimental basis:
1,090 of them (involving 21.5% of the total peasant households) were created
by June 1954. Three different forms of agriculture cooperatives were set
up:
1. the first form consisted of
mutual-aid teams in which work alone was carried out jointly without pooling
the land;
2. in the second, semi-socialist
form, the land was pooled, work was organised jointly and income was distributed
according to the amount of land that had been contributed to the cooperative;
and
3. in the third, socialist form,
both the land and the means of production were pooled and income was distributed
only according to the amount of work done.
Rapid advances were made in agricultural cooperativization which could
attract not only poor peasants, but also an increasing number of middle
peasants. By the end of 1956, 80.9% of the total farm households had joined
the cooperatives (almost all of them belonging to the third form). In general,
rich peasants who usually engaged in trade, as well, remained excluded
from the cooperatives. But although they were not confiscated of their
properties, both rich and middle peasants were instead - according to Kim
Il Sung - "persuaded" and ideologically "remoulded" in order to join agricultural
cooperatives voluntarily.
"In agricultural cooperativization
the voluntary principle was applied not only to the middle peasants but
to all sectors of the rural population, including the rich peasants. .
. . Our Party adopted the policy of gradually remoulding rich peasants
as the cooperative movement developed, while strictly restricting their
exploitative practices. . . . the majority of rich peasants joined the
cooperatives voluntarily."
Kim
Il Sung, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Fourth Congress
of the Workers’ Party of Korea", 11-9-1961, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol 15, Pyongyang, 1983, pp. 136-7.
"The rich peasants were remoulded
into socialist working people by way of restricting their negative tendencies
and educating them with patience, instead of expropriating them. . . .
The voluntary principle was strictly
adhered to in the finishing stage, too.
. . . agricultural cooperation
was completed at last in August 1958. Thus the difficult and complex task
of transforming the small peasant farming and capitalist economy in the
countryside into the socialist cooperative economy was successfully carried
out in a matter of 4-5 years."
Kim
Han Gil, Modern History of Korea, Pyongyang, 1979, pp. 411-2.
Alongside agricultural cooperativization, the reorganisation of handicrafts
and capitalist trade and industry (a sector which had been considerably
reduced since 1945) was stepped up along socialist lines and was allegedly
completed by August 1958. In this instance, as well, cooperatives could
be set up by "remoulding" national capitalists, but without expropriating
their properties:
"We intend to carry out the revolution
to eliminate the capitalist elements in the north not by expropriating
the capitalist merchants and manufacturers, but by transforming them on
socialist lines by drawing them into various forms of cooperative economy."
Kim
Il Sung, "On the Nature of the Revolution in Our Country at the Present
Stage and the Basic Direction of the First Five-Year Plan: Concluding Speech
at a Meeting of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the
Workers’ Party of Korea", 29-12-1954, in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol
9, Pyongyang, 1982, p. 171.
"Our Party should form a solid united
front with the entrepreneurs and merchants. . . .
Various methods . . . can be applied
in curbing the exploitative practices of the entrepreneurs and merchants.
But it will not do to try to confiscate their properties."
Kim
Il Sung, "On Stengthening United Front Work: Concluding Speech at the Seventh
Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea",
18-12-1953, in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol 8, Pyongyang, 1981, pp. 171-2.
"The capitalist elements still remaining
in town and country will have to be restricted and utilised, and remoulded,
step by step, on socialist lines."
Kim
Il Sung, "Every Effort for the Country’s Reunification and Independence
and for Socialist Construction in the Northern Half of the Republic: Theses
on the Nature and Tasks of Our Revolution", April 1955, in Kim Il Sung,
Works, vol 9, Pyongyang, 1982, p. 201.
Just as in the case of the agricultural cooperatives, three forms of producers’
cooperatives were set up:
1. in the first form work was carried
out collectively, while production tools were kept in private ownership;
2. in the second, semi-socialist
form, the means of production was either jointly or privately owned, while
income was distributed according to both the amount of investment which
had been previously made to the cooperative and the work done; and
3. in the third, socialist form,
all means of production and funds were turned into common property and
only socialist distribution applied. Income depended only on the work performed,
and not on the amount invested.
National capitalists joining a cooperative could freely choose which form
of distribution to adopt. They naturally exercised this choice in accordance
with their interests by joining the second form of cooperation and by receiving
dividends upon their investments. They were then encouraged to pass to
the third, higher form of cooperatives and those capitalists who opted
for this transition were paid additional compensation.
As for private trade, this was transformed through the formation of marketing
cooperatives (where marketed goods were either purchased or partly processed
by private traders) and producing-marketing cooperatives (where private
traders were engaged in both producing and marketing their products). These
latter cooperatives were later reorganised - with considerable financial
assistance from the state - as producers’ cooperatives. Such a reorganisation
of private trade and industry into producers’ cooperatives proceeded rapidly
at the rate of 33.7% in 1953, 77.2% in 1957 and was then declared as completed
by August 1958. Kim Il Sung alleged that the mere act of joining a cooperative
could transform a national capitalist into a "socialist worker".
"In transforming private trade
and industry along socialist lines, the Party closely combined the change
of economic forms with the remoulding of people. Joining the producers’
cooperatives, the entrepreneurs and merchants completely broke with their
former life based on the exploitation of others, they have been changed
into socialist working people who produce material wealth by their own
labour. This has also speeded up their ideological transformation."
Kim
Il Sung, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Fourth Congress
of the Workers’ Party of Korea", 11-9-1961, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol 15, Pyongyang, 1983, p. 142.
"Our Party introduced the policy
of transforming the economy of the capitalist traders and industrialists,
together with that of handicraftsmen and small traders, along socialist
lines through various types of cooperative economy. This conformed both
to the demands of socialist construction and to the interests of the entrepreneurs
and traders themselves. Almost all the entrepreneurs and traders, therefore,
accepted our Party’s policy on cooperativization, and the socialist transformation
of private trade and industry was completed in a short time after the war."
Kim
Il Sung, "On Socialist Construction in the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea and the South Korean Revolution: Lecture at the ‘Ali Archam’ Academy
of Social Sciences of Indonesia", 14-4-1965, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol 19, Pyongyang, 1984, p. 246.
"The state confiscated none of the
property of medium and small businesses. . . .The policy of our Party and
the Government of our Republic towards the private traders and manufacturers
is being appreciated even by people who are not communists. A great many
visitors to our country from capitalist countries say that they support
and approve socialism in Korea."
Kim
Il Sung, "Korean Merchants and Manufacturers in Japan Must Make a Strong
Contribution to the Patriotic Work for Their Homeland and Nation: Talk
to the Second Group of Korean Merchants and Manufacturers from Japan on
a Visit to Their Homeland", 19-11-1973, in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol
28, Pyongyang, 1986, p. 499.
"In
the socialist revolution, it (the WPK
- Ed.) did not eliminate rich peasants and capitalist businessmen and entrepreneurs;
it admitted
them into the cooperative economy on the principle of voluntary participation
and led them to be transformed
into socialist working people. Our Party has been leading all these transformed
people to socialism and communism by trusting them as its lasting companions,
rather than as temporary fellow travellers, no matter which class or stratum
they came from."
Kim
Jong Il, Our Socialism Centred on the Masses Shall not Perish: Talk
to the Senior Officials of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party
of Korea, Pyongyang, 5-5-1991. My emphases.
These policies - thoroughly implemented in the DPRK in order to "persuade"
and "remould" rich peasants and capitalists along allegedly socialist lines
- have little in common with scientific socialism. They conform, instead,
to Nikolai Bukharin’s revisionist theory,
in which irreconcilable antagonisms of class interests soon disappear under
socialism as the exploiting classes peacefully and harmoniously come to
embrace socialist and communist policies. But such revisionist assumptions
run contrary to the basic laws of economic and social development. As Stalin
noted,
"There have been no cases in history
where dying classes have voluntarily departed from the scene. There have
been no cases in history where the dying bourgeoisie has not exerted all
its remaining strength to preserve its existence." J.
V. Stalin, "The Right Deviation in the CPSU(B): Speech Delivered at the
Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU(B)",
April 1929, in Stalin, Works, vol. 12, Moscow, 1955, p. 40.
As for the DPRK, it is rather revealing to consider the rapidity through
which complete socialist relations of production
are alleged to have been established by 1958.
In September 1957, in fact, the democratic government was not only
representing workers and peasants, but also the private capitalist sector
(i.e., "entrepreneurs, traders and those in other social sections" who
were supposedly transforming themselves voluntarily into "socialist working
people"):
"Under the people’s democratic
system in our country, the individual entrepreneurs, traders and those
in other social sections participate in government together with the workers
and peasants, and form a component part of the unified front. The entrepreneurs
and traders in our country are fellow-travellers of all the working people,
including the working class, not only when carrying out the democratic
revolution but also the socialist construction in the northern half. The
people’s government supports the legitimate business activities of entrepreneurs
and traders . . . it opens the way to a new life for them by gradually
turning them into socialist working people through voluntary membership
in various cooperatives and by other methods."
Kim
Il Sung, "On the Immediate Tasks of the People’s Power in Socialist Construction",
20-9-1957, in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol 11, Pyongyang, 1982, pp. 273-4.
By March 1958
the then existing government (also inclusive of the national bourgeoisie)
had almost assumed - according to Kim Il Sung - the character of a proletarian
dictatorship which should have accomplished the socialist revolution in
order to overthrow the exploiting classes (i.e., the national bourgeoisie
itself). In fact,
"Today (in March 1958 - Ed.), our
people’s power is a state power that belongs to the category of the dictatorship
of the proletariat. In the northern half of the Republic, now that we are
in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, the functions
of the proletarian dictatorship of our people’s power must be strengthened
even more. . . . Although great achievements have been obtained in our
socialist construction, we cannot say that the exploiting classes have
now been completely destroyed in the northern half. . . . As long as small
commodity producers, private merchants and manufacturers, even in limited
numbers, remain in urban and rural areas, as long as the tasks of the socialist
revolution have not yet been accomplished . . . how can we neglect to consolidate
the dictatorship of the proletariat? . . . The dictatorship of the proletariat
is a powerful weapon of the working class in thoroughly crushing all the
counter-revolutionary elements hostile to the socialist revolution and
in defending the interests of the working people and the revolution."
Kim
Il Sung, "For the Successful Implementation of the First Five-Year Plan:
Concluding Speech at a Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea", 6-3-1958,
in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol 12, Pyongyang, 1983, pp. 115-6.
But in a matter of six months only, by September
1958, socialist
relations of production were declared to have been completely established
in both the industrial and agricultural sectors of the economy. Thus, an
allegedly socialist society, free from exploitation and oppression - but
achieved without the socialist revolution in a very short period of time
- had suddenly emerged.
"Thanks to the correct policies
of the Party and the Government and to the devotion and efforts of our
working people, we have already made tremendous achievements in socialist
construction. . . .
The Party and
Government adhere to the line of gradually transforming private trade and
industry along socialist lines, through the organisation of production-and-marketing
cooperatives. It has been only in the interests of individual tradesmen
and manufacturers that they have been made to pool their small businesses
to engage in production and trade.
As a result
of this policy by the Party, entrepreneurs and tradesmen in our country
started to transform themselves into socialist workers. Thus, today (in
September 1958 - Ed.) the socialist transformation of private trade and
industry has already been completed in our country. . .
Socialist transformation
of agriculture enabled us to solve the problems that existed between socialist
industry and the individual peasant economy. . . . Our agriculture has
been turned from a scattered, individual peasant economy to a completely
cooperativized socialist economy. . . .
Our Party .
. . fulfilled this task very smoothly in only three or four years after
the war. . . .
As a result,
the worker-peasant alliance, the basis of the people’s democratic system
in our country, has been still more strengthened on new socialist foundations.
. . .
There are no
longer any landlords or capitalists in our country. Exploitation of man
by man has disappeared for ever in our society. . . .
In our country,
socialist relations of production have already been successful in all fields
of the national economy."
Kim
Il Sung, "Report at Celebrations Marking the Tenth Anniversary of the Founding
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea", 8-9-1958, in Kim Il Sung,
Works, vol 12, Pyongyang, 1983, pp. 409, 411-12, 415, 417.
"The socialist transformation of
production relations has now been completed in the urban and rural districts
of our country. Thus, our society has become a socialist one, free from
exploitation and oppression. The main task confronting us is to consolidate
the socialist system in the northern half of the republic and, by developing
it still further, to complete the building of a socialist society."
Kim
Il Sung, "Against Passiveness and Conservatism in Socialist Construction:
Speech at a National Meeting of Production Innovators", 16-9-1958, in Kim
Il Sung, Works, vol 12, Pyongyang, 1983, p. 440.
On the basis of the above official sources of the 1957-58 period, therefore,
ample evidence can prove that "socialism"
had been achieved in North Korea without the socialist revolution
(i.e., without expropriating and overthrowing the
national capitalist class), without the establishment of the dictatorship
of the proletariat (thus
rejecting the Marxist-Leninist concept that the dictatorship of the working
class is essential to construct and maintain socialism once the exploiting
classes have been overthrown) and by peacefully
and "voluntarily" absorbing the national capitalist class into the state,
either through direct participation
in government or through cooperatives. There is no doubt that this capitalist
class was numerically small and that its power had been considerably reduced
by the democratic reforms implemented in the country after 1945. Nonetheless,
this capitalist class did exist and did actively participate in establishing
Korean-style socialism. The issue of the proletarian dictatorship was therefore
simplistically solved, during the late fifties, by equating
the new democratic system of various classes exercising state power in
North Korea with the dictatorship of the proletariat itself.
From their very inception, in fact, political developments in North Korea
proceeded along a direction radically different from, and in opposition
to, the revolutionary transformations that had established Soviet power
in Russia in 1917. Indeed, we should consider that at that time in Russia
- just as in North Korea during the forties and fifties - the peasantry
represented the overwhelming majority of the population. Nonetheless, it
was under the leadership of the working class - and in alliance with the
poor peasants - that the Bolshevik party could open up the new era of proletarian
revolutions by overthrowing and expropriating the bourgeoisie, by transferring
the land to the peasants and nationalising it, and by establishing a socialist
Soviet state by means of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Clearly,
this revolutionary pattern was not followed in North Korea.
FACTIONALISM DURING THE FIFTIES
From the end of the Korean war onwards, considerable attempts were made
by Kim Il Sung to establish Juche
thoroughly. Placing major emphasis on the national character of the Korean
revolution, the struggle to establish Juche became associated with efforts
to root out attitudes which were typified as dogmatic, formal and unsuitable
to Korea’s reality. Kim Il Sung’s first reference to Juche in December
1955 was, in fact, made in a speech entitled "On Eliminating Dogmatism
and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work". According to
Kimilsungist literature, this ideological struggle under the banner of
Juche became increasingly incompatible with factionalism, flunkeyism and
dogmatism.
"The anti-Party factionalists,
flunkeys and dogmatists, swallowing foreign things whole and copying them
mechanically, opposed overtly and covertly our Party’s independent lines
and creative policies which embodied the Juche idea. They not only took
exception to the basic line of economic construction most suited to the
actual conditions of Korea and the policy for socialist transformation
of the relations of production but also prevented the Party’s ideological
work from being conducted in conformity with the demand of the Korean revolution.
They even fell victim to national nihilism which extols foreign things
without consideration while slighting one’s own. The
harm done by flunkeyism and dogmatism became intolerable."
Kim
Han Gil, Modern History of Korea, Pyongyang, 1979, p. 417.
During the Korean war, factionalist activities within the WPK centred around
the group led by Pak Hon Yong and Li Sung Yop, who were accused of counter-revolutionary
intrigues and treachery in collusion with US imperialism. In parallel with
Kim Il Sung’s fast ascent to power, a considerable number of political
figures were then expelled from the WPK or purged during 1956-58. These
purges affected prominent cadres who had held positions such as deputy
premier (2 cases), minister of construction, minister of coal industry,
minister of railroads, minister of commerce, minister of labour, vice minister
of culture and propaganda (2 cases), vice minister of defence (2 cases),
formerly vice minister of home affairs, bureau chief of the cabinet secretariat,
commander of the Pyongyang Reconstruction Corps, editor-in-chief of Minchu
Choson, NKPA commander in chief, NKPA division commander, political
committee chief of national defence, principal of the Central Party School,
vice chairman of the Central Women’s Alliance, member of the SPA judicial
committee, chief of propaganda of the central committee secretariat, ambassador
to the USSR, ambassador to Poland, etc. As the WPK’s fourth congress convened
in September 1961, Kim Il Sung’s position had clearly consolidated and
proved to be unchallengeable. According to the official version of events,
as presented by Kim Il Sung himself,
"In 1955 . . . our Party laid down
a firm policy to oppose dogmatism and establish Juche in all spheres, and
went on to wage a resolute struggle to carry it through. . . .
The attack of
the opportunists on our Party became most pronounced around the years 1956-57.
At that time a handful of anti-Party factionalists and obstinate dogmatists
lurking in our Party challenged it, teaming up with each other on a revisionist
basis, with the backing of outside forces. They not only slandered the
lines and policies of our Party, but also conspired to overthrow its leadership.
. . .
. . . the struggle
against opportunism after the war was the most intense battle against the
enemy within the communist movement itself. . . .
Our Party decisively
crushed the factionalism which had done tremendous harm to the communist
movement all through its history, thus achieving a firm unity of thought
and purpose within its ranks. The Party defended its Marxist-Leninist revolutionary
line against modern revisionism, rooted out dogmatism and established Juche
throughly."
Kim
Il Sung, "On the Occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Workers’ Party
of Korea: Report Delivered at the Celebration of the 20th Anniversary of
the Workers’ Party of Korea", 10-10-1965, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol 19, Pyongyang, 1984, pp. 427-9.
Anti-communist sources - mainly on the basis of defectors’ accounts - point
to the existence of the Soviet and Yenan (Chinese) factions within the
WPK. In contact with the respective Soviet and Chinese embassies in Pyongyang,
these two factions were orchestrating their opposition to Kim Il Sung during
the fifties. It is moreover suggested that - rather than one’s factional
affiliation or background - the crucial factor often depended on one’s
personal relationship to Kim Il Sung. Hardly any documents remain available
in order to verify the existence of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese lines among
those groups that did challenge Kim Il Sung’s position and his Juche ideology.
Nor is it possible to assess - for the same reason - the political strength
of possible Marxist-Leninist groups or individuals fighting to implement
scientific socialism in North Korea. But the very fact that purges and
factional struggles in the DPRK reached their peak during this time (particularly
in 1956-57) - i.e., during the period leading to the official establishment
of "socialist relations of productions" under the banner of Juche - may
indeed suggest a degree of Marxist-Leninist opposition to the revisionist
course hastily implemented by Kim Il Sung and his supporters.
We should also consider that, in the meantime, major developments were
taking place in the international communist movement:
1. the emergence of Khrushchevite
revisionism in the USSR, reforming the
country along capitalist lines (particularly after the 1956 20th congress
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union); and
2. the unfolding of equally revisionist
lines in China,
with particular regard to the liquidation, by the mid-fifties, of the Marxist-Leninist
grouping headed by Kao Kang and the subsequent launching of the "Great
Leap Forward" (a revisionist campaign initiated by Mao Tse-tung - in alliance
with the Chinese comprador bourgeoisie - in order to mobilize the peasantry
into conflict with the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie
headed by Liu Shao-chi).
Given the extent of the above revisionist trends developing in the USSR
and China, it is highly unlikely that these two countries would have exerted
- at that time - their political influence in the DPRK in order to support
the consistent implementation of Marxism-Leninism rather than Juche.
The period leading to Kim Il Sung’s consolidation in power during the late
fifties also coincided with a remarkable numerical increase of the WPK’s
members. In January 1956 the total membership amounted to 1,164,945 (with
58,259 cells and sub-cells), an extraordinarily high figure out of a population
of about 10 million: 22.6% of members were workers, 56.8% poor peasants,
3.7% middle peasants, 13% office employees and 3.9% belonging to other
categories.
Kim Il Sung, "Report to the Third Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea
on the Work of the Central Committee", 23-4-1956, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol 10, Pyongyang, 1982, pp. 221, 236.
In its composition, therefore, the WPK consisted of more than 60% peasants
and less than one -fourth workers. At the time of the WPK’s fourth congress
in 1961, the party increased its total membership to 1,311,563 (1,166,359
full members and 145,204 probationary members).
Kim Il Sung, "Report on The Work of the Central Committee to the Fourth
Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea", 11-9-1961, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol 15, Pyongyang, 1983, p. 226.
9. "SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION"
IN THE DPRK
From the early sixties onwards, the DPRK embarked on the "all-round socialist
construction" by continuing to develop its economy on the basis of centrally
organised plans. A series of new, democratic, progressive, often socialist
oriented reforms significantly transformed North Korean society on the
basis of the following economic plans:
1. the first seven-year plan, extended
by three additional years (1961-70);
2. the six-year plan (1971-76)
(1977 was designated a "buffer year");
3. the second seven-year plan (1978-84),
extended by two more years;
4. the third seven-year plan (1987-93).
In the first seven-year plan, priority was given to heavy industry while
developing light industry and agriculture at the same time. Its fundamental
task was to carry out a comprehensive technological reconstruction (particularly
in the countryside by means of farm mechanisation and by completing the
irrigation and electrification systems), together with a cultural revolution.
The plan was successfully carried out in two phases (1961-64 and 1965-70).
Both US imperialism’s war mongering provocations (in parallel with the
Carribean crisis against Cuba and its war against Vietnam) and also the
negative effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the DPRK’s economy required
greater military efforts in strengthening the country’s defence capabilities.
The economic plan was therefore partly modified and later extended by three
years. Industrial output grew by 12.8% per annum during the sixties.
The successful completion of the plan’s targets by 1970 led Kim Il Sung
to declare the final conversion of North Korea into an independent and
socialist industrial state, based on economic self-reliance:
"by Juche industry we mean an industry
which emphasises developing production, basically using our own raw material."
Kim
Il Sung, "Let Us Further Consolidate and Develop the Achievements Gained
in the Struggle to Attain the Six Goals: Concluding Speech Delivered at
the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth Central Committee of the Workers’
Party of Korea", 14-12-1962, in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol 16, Pyongyang,
1984, p. 471.
The subsequent six-year plan (1971-76) was intended to consolidate and
further advance industrialisation while deepening the technical revolution.
It was particularly important to reduce distinctions between industrial
and agricultural workers and to alleviate women from their heavy household
duties. The plan was declared fulfilled a year and four months ahead of
schedule: between 1971 and 1976 industrial output developed at an annual
rate of 16.3% and in 1976 the overall volume of industrial production increased
by 2.5 times since 1970.
The goals of the second seven-year plan (1978-84), which was then extended
for two more years until 1986, aimed at further strengthening the independent
character of the economy. It mainly relied on the DPRK’s own mineral resources
(such as coal, iron-ore, magnesium, graphite, lead and zinc) and gave priority
to the development of energy (mainly hydro-electric) and extractive industries.
The economy became increasingly modernised and more Juche oriented. In
a similar fashion, the last seven-year plan (1987-93) required further
modernisation of the economy. As in the past, its goals set as a priority
the development of heavy industry, in parallel with the simultaneous advancement
of light industry and agriculture.
Problems, however, emerged during the early nineties. While economic growth
had increased by 2% to 3% annually during the eighties, it turned negative
in 1989 and dropped by 3% to 5% annually until 1992. International sources
estimated that in 1991 the DPRK possessed a gross national product (GNP)
at $22,900 million (compared with $280,800 million in the south), a per
capita GNP at $1,038 (compared with $6,498 in the south) and an external
trade at $2,700 million (compared with $153,400 million in the south).
As the gap between the economies in the north and in the south was widening,
DPRK’s economic failures in its planned targets were officially admitted
in December 1993 (refer to chapter 12).
This entire period of "socialist construction" in the DPRK parallelled
with relevant political and ideological initiatives, which were intended
to deepen the Juche character of its society. It was during the early sixties
that the Chongsanri spirit and method,
together with the so-called Taean work system, began to be thoroughly implemented.
According to the Chongsanri spirit and Chongsanri method (principles that
are still embodied in the current constitution), cadres appointed at higher
positions must help and assist their subordinates and mix with them. This
"mass line" allows officials to grasp the real situation and arouse enthusiasm
and initiatives among the masses.
A new system in industrial management was also introduced during the sixties
through the Taean work system.
Accordingly, all decisions regarding organisation and management in factories
and enterprises are collectively taken by the WPK committees, which are
also supposed to play a political role by raising enthusiasm among workers.
With the adoption of this system, the former individual management by one
director in enterprises was replaced by collective responsibility. As Kim
Il Sung pointed out,
"The Taean work system and the
Chongsanri spirit and method constitute the economic management system
and the method of mass leadership which together embody our Party’s revolutionary
mass line. As required by the Taean work system and Chongsanri spirit and
method, the leading officials should thoroughly abolish bureaucracy and
formalism and go deep into the reality in order to help the officials at
lower echelons and to solve complex problems; they should always give priority
to political work and organise the masses to implement the economic tasks.
Moreover, they should direct production and manage enterprises by relying
on the Party organisations and on the masses."
Kim
Il Sung, "Let Us Further Consolidate and Develop the Achievements Gained
in the Struggle to Attain the Six Goals: Concluding Speech Delivered at
the Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth Central Committee of the Workers’
Party of Korea", 14-12-1962, in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol 16, Pyongyang,
1984, p. 471.
A new organisational system also became operational in the countryside
during the sixties. The county people’s committees (which formerly provided
guidance mainly through administrative methods) were replaced by the county
cooperative farm management committees. All agro-technicians were placed
under the authority of these committees, as the state provided more material
and scientific assistance to the rural economy. According to the "Theses
on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country" (adopted by the WPK in
February 1964), three basic principles were proclaimed in agricultural
policies:
1. the implementation of a technical
revolution involving irrigation, mechanisation, electrification and chemicalization
in rural areas, in parallel with a cultural and ideological revolution;
2. the consolidation of the working
class leadership among the peasantry, so that industry could assist agriculture
with the aim of gradually diminishing distinctions between town and countryside;
and
3. the improvement of management
performances in agriculture with the ultimate goal of transforming the
cooperative economy into state ownership (i.e., into social ownership by
the whole people).
Public education was further enhanced with the introduction of universal
compulsory primary education in 1956. Secondary education became compulsory
in 1958. The current 11-year compulsory education (one year of preschool
education plus ten years at primary and secondary schools) has been in
force since 1972. From the sixties onwards, major emphasis has been placed
on ideo-political education along Juche lines. The ideological, technical
and cultural revolutions - the so-called Three Revolutions - have become
components of a single revolutionary process through which the working
masses are supposed to advance towards socialism and communism.
Under the banner of Juche, all members of society are educated, persuaded,
remoulded and transformed into "men of a communist type". For this purpose
- with the aim of gradually liquidating all class distinctions - the so-called
working-classization of the whole North Korean society began during the
sixties. This idea was presented by Kim Il Sung in 1966 in the following
terms:
"In our society, where the exploiting
classes have been wiped out and the socialist system has triumphed, an
important task of the dictatorship of the proletariat is to educate and
reshape the working people and working-classize the whole of society"
Kim
Il Sung, "The Present Situation and the Tasks of our Party: Report to the
Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea", 5-10-1966, in Kim Il Sung,
Works, vol 20, Pyongyang, 1984, pp. 365-6.
In 1970 Kim Il Sung assessed the impact of the above policies as follows:
"Our Party . . . has conducted
its work of revolutionising and working-classizing the working people by
means of persuasion and explanation, putting the main stress on ideological
education. We have worked unceasingly to revolutionise and working-classize
the masses of all social backgrounds on the principle of boldly trusting
any person who wants to follow our Party and winning him over to the revolutionary
cause even though his origin, environment and social and political backgrounds
are dubious."
Kim
Il Sung, "Report to the Fifth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on
the Work of the Central Committee", 2-11-1970, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol 25, Pyongyang, 1986, p. 216.
References to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" (a term occasionally
used by Kim Il Sung up to the sixties) seem to disappear altogether in
the official Kimilsungist literature from the seventies onwards. At the
same time, Juche
began to pervade all aspects of political and social life in North Korea.
As Kim Il Sung stated during the early seventies,
"Our Party has endeavoured to embody
the Juche idea thoroughly in all areas of the revolution and construction
in the same way that it established Juche in ideology. All the lines and
policies of our Party stem from the Juche idea, and they are permeated
with it. Our Party’s consistent principle of independence in politics,
self-support in economy and self-defence in guarding the nation is the
embodiment of the Juche idea in all realms. . . . All our achievements
represent a shining victory for the Juche idea of our Party."
Kim
Il Sung, "Report to the Fifth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on
the Work of the Central Committee", 2-11-1970, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol 25, Pyongyang, 1986, pp. 285-6.
"The Juche idea is the sole guiding
idea of our Party and the guiding principle for all activities of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. Taking the Juche idea as a steadfast guide
in revolution and construction, we have firmly established Juche in all
fields of our activities."
Kim
Il Sung, "On the Present Political and Economic Policies of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea and Some International Problems: Answers to
Questions Raised by Newsmen of the Japonese Newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun",
10-1-1972, in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol 27, Pyongyang, 1986, p. 22.
Later, during the
early eighties, Kim Il Sung would relate Juche to his idea of a "communist
paradise" in the DPRK:
"Our Party’s unity and cohesion
have now reached an ever higher level. The whole Party is rallied rock-solid
behind its Central Committee and is knit together in ideology and purpose
on the basis of the Juche idea, and no force will ever break its unity
and cohesion that are based on this idea."
Kim
Il Sung, "Report to the Sixth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on
the Work of the Central Committee", 10-10-1980, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol 35, Pyongyang, 1989, p. 353.
"The struggle to infuse the whole
society with the Juche idea is a noble task to build a communist society,
the ideal of humanity, by stepping up our revolution which was pioneered
and has advanced under the banner of this idea. . .
Modelling the
whole society on the Juche idea is the general task of our revolution and
a historic mission for the Government of the Republic. This government
must fulfil its mission with credit by building a communist paradise in
this land as quickly as possible though a vigorous struggle to model the
whole society on the Juche idea."
Kim
Il Sung, "Tasks of the People’s Government in Modelling the Whole Society
on the Juche Idea: Policy Speech at the Joint Meeting of the Central Committe
of the Workers’ Party of Korea and the Supreme People’s Assembly of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea", 14-4-1982, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol 37, Pyongyang, 1991, pp. 99-100.
A major role in advancing society along the above directions was played
by the Chollima Workteam Movement
during the sixties, later developed - from 1975 onwards - as the Three-Revolution
Red Flag Movement. These movements served
the purpose of educating and remoulding people from different walks of
life by means of strengthening collectivism in society under the slogan
"let’s live and work in a communist way." In the countryside, in particular,
these movements were aimed at removing selfish, petty-bourgeois, backward
ideas that were still rooted among peasants.
"More than a collective innovation
movement in production, it (the Chollima Workteam Movement - Ed.) is also
an excellent vehicle for educating and reforming the working people in
a communist way and is a mass movement to speed up the revolutionization
and working-classization of all society."
Kim
Il Sung, "Report to the Fifth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on
the Work of the Central Committee", 2-11-1970, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol 25, Pyongyang, 1986, p. 216.
Not only the peasantry, but also the intelligentsia and the national bourgeoisie
were all equally remoulded, revolutionised and "working-classized". This
was presented as "class struggle".
But class struggle according to Juche is not class struggle in the Marxist-Leninist
sense. In the absence of a truly proletarian state in the DPRK, class struggle
could not constitute the necessary medium to strengthen the political power
of the working class under its dictatorship. Instead, class struggle was
finalised towards achieving harmony and "cooperation" among all classes
and members of society for the sake of "unity and solidarity" under the
banner of Juche.
"It is our standpoint to apply
the propositions of Marx and Lenin creatively to the new historical circumstances
and the specific practices of our country. . . . .
. . the class struggle in socialist society is a struggle aimed at achieving
unity and solidarity, and is by no means a class struggle waged between
the members of that society at war with each other. In a socialist society
the class struggle certainly exists, but it is carried on
by means of cooperation for the purpose of achieving unity and solidarity.
. . .
Our class struggle
is designed not only to working-classize the peasantry and terminate its
existence as a class, but also to revolutionise the previous middle class
including the intelligentsia and urban petty bourgeoisie and remould them
on the pattern of the working class. This is the principal form of the
class struggle we are now waging."
Kim
Il Sung, "On the Questions of the Period of Transition from Capitalism
to Socialism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat: Speech Delivered
to Party Ideological Workers", 25-5-1967, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol 21, Pyongyang, 1985, pp. 233-4. My emphasis.
Admittedly, the above positions represent
an evident negation of the class struggle between antagonistic classes
and ideologies. According to the founders of scientific socialism, it is
only the proletarian state that can guarantee the necessary economic, political,
ideological preconditions for the gradual and final extinction of classes.
On the contrary, this ultimate goal of a classless, communist society is
allegedly achieved in the DPRK by ideologically conforming anyone - regardless
of one’s social status - to a uniform pattern of behaviour under Juche.
Indeed, collectivism
has provided the basis for such a hybrid amalgamation of different classes,
allegedly united under the working class’ leadership.
"Collectivism is one of the intrinsic
characteristics of the working class. It is the basis of social life in
socialist and communist societies where the working people are closely
united and work towards common goals. We must continue to pay particular
attention to strengthening the education of the working people in collectivism."
Kim
Il Sung, "Report to the Fifth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on
the Work of the Central Committee", 2-11-1970, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol 25, Pyongyang, 1986, p. 246.
But ironically, collectivism began to translate
into collective forms of servility towards the leader, Kim Il Sung.
In this regard, he himself in 1975 indicated the following:
"At Party meetings no single person
should be allowed to run a one-man show. . . . One of the important matters
in Party organisational life is to harden the Party spirit. . . The Party
spirit means, in short, loyalty to the leader and the Party. . . . The
members of the Party Central Committee must unite firmly around the General
Secretary with one mind and one will. In this way they will say "A" if
the General Secretary says "A" and they will say "B" if the General Secretary
says "B". They must say the same thing and act in concert."
Kim
Il Sung, "Let Us Meet a Revolutionary Upheaval Victoriously by Strengthening
the Party, Governnments Organs and People’s Army and Carrying Out Great
Socialist Construction More Efficiently: Concluding Speech at the 10th
Plenary Meeting of the Fifth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of
Korea", 17-2-1975, in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol 30, Pyongyang, 1987,
pp. 46-7, 61.
Consequently, and notwithstanding all preachings about collectivism in
society, the personality cult
around Kim Il Sung and his nepotism
began to reach unimaginable proportions in North Korea from the sixties
onwards. Millions of copies of Kim Il Sung’s writings, together with interpretations
and analyses of his writings and other reference books, began to be published
and distributed all over the country. In 1969, for example, expenditures
for such cultural activities from WPK’s funds were reported to be thirty
times the amount spent in the year 1960. During the sixties 39 million
copies of the Selected Works of Kim Il Sung were published, along
with 8.8 million copies of the History of the Revolutionary Activities
of Comrade Kim Il Sung and 45.5 million copies of other "revolutionary
guidance" books - and this took place at a time when the total population
was only 14 million, out of which 6.6 million were under 14 years of age.
Political education centred almost exclusively on studying the life and
works of Kim Il Sung and party members were required to spend, for this
purpose, a minimum of two hours per day. In the meantime, between 1966
and 1970, several members of Kim Il Sung’s family were appointed to top
party and government positions. At the WPK’s 5th Congress in 1970, Kim
Il Sung was officially described as:
"the great leader of the 40 million
Korean people, peerless patriot, national hero, ever-victorious, iron-willed
brilliant commander, one of the outstanding leaders of the international
Communist movement and working-class movement, and General Secretary of
the Central Committee of our Party."
Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report,
2-11-1970, KCNA International Service.
Furthermore, in order to prove Kim Il Sung’s personal legitimacy as successor
of "a patriotic and revolutionary family that have fought from generation
to generation for the independence of the country and the freedom and liberation
of the people against foreign aggressors", official publications presented
his genealogy as follows:
his great-grandfather, Kim Ung
U, was a patriot who led a revolt against the Americans in 1866;
his grandfather, Kim Bo Hyon, and
his grandmother, Li Bo Ik, were also patriots who fought against the Japanese;
his grandfather on the mother’s
side, Kang Don Uk, was an anti-Japanese fighter;
his father, Kim Hyong Jik, was
an outstanding leader of Korea’s national-liberation movement;
his mother, Kang Ban Sok, was an
anti-Japanese revolutionary fighter too;
his uncle, Kim Hyong Gwon, was
a revolutionary fighter and communist;
his uncle on the mother’s side,
Kang Jin Sok, was an anti-Japanese fighter;
his two younger brothers and his
cousin, Kim Won Ju, were also revolutionary fighters and communist.
Brief
History of the Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Kim Il Sung,Party
History Istitute of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea
(Ed.), Pyongyang, 1969, pp. 3-7.
Kim Il Sung became the DPRK’s president in 1972, a position he held until
his death in 1994. But a dynastic power succession plan had been drafted
since the early seventies in order to settle the continuation of the Juche
cause under the leadership of Kim Il Sung’s son, Kim Jong Il. Evidence
suggests that, in this instance, Kim Il Sung encountered opposition as
more than 1000 political and military cadres were reported to have been
purged.
But by the WPK’s 6th Congress, held in 1980, this opposition appeared to
have been overcome as Kim Jong Il was elected as party secretary and was
confirmed as his father’s heir successor. In a similar fashion to that
accorded to his father, the 6th Congress described Kim Jong Il as the:
"dear leader", "endessly loyal
to the great leader, perfectly embodying the ideas, outstanding leadership,
and noble traits of the leader, and brilliantly upholding the grand plan
and intention of the leader at the highest level" and possessing "bright
wisdom, deep insight, strong sense of revolutionary principles and strong
will."
quoted
in Chong-Sik Lee, "Evolution of the Korean Workers’ Party and the Rise
of Kim Chong-il" in Robert A. Scalpino and Jun-Yop Kim, North Korea
Today: Strategic and Domestic Issues, Berkeley, 1983)., p. 76.
A book, which was
widely circulated in the DPRK in 1990, presented Kim Jong Il as:
"the giant of out times . . . a
unique person distinguished in all aspects - wisdom, leadership ability,
personality and achievements."
The relevance of his blood relationship
with his parents and ancestors was also highlighted in this book:
"It was a brilliant dawn for the
future of Korea that he (Kim Jong Il - Ed.) was born to General Kim Il
Sung . . . and the heroine of the anti-Japanese war Kim Jong Suk . . .
Not only his
parents but also his ancestors had fought for generations for the independence
of the country . . . so, the blood of a peerless patriotic family runs
through the veins of Secretary Kim Jong Il."
Kim
Gang Il, The Leader Kim Jong Il, Pyonyang, 1990, p. 1.
What indeed constituted a hereditary succession
through Kim Jong Il’s gradual accession to power - almost like a family
affair typical of Korea’s feudalistic dynasties of the past - was presented
in the DPRK as a model of succession for the Juche cause. According to
a Japanese apologist of Kimilsungism,
"In Korea, with the succession
issue of the revolutionary cause successfully settled, the lever of the
Juche idea authored by President Kim Il Sung has been inherited by Secretary
Kim Jong Il, and the Korean people have laid firm groundwork whereupon
to move ahead under the banner of Juche.
It is now obvious
that this event will dynamically function to put the world solidly on the
Juche path and drive it towards the future of independence."
Inoue Shuhachi, Modern Korea and Kim Jong Il, Tokyo, 1984, p. 311.
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
DPRK
North
Korean’s first constitution was approved by the SPA on 8-9-1948 and remained
in force - with some minor amendments made between 1954 and 1962 - until
a new one was adopted in 1972. Without any reference to Juche, socialism
or Marxism-Leninism, the 1948 constitution defined the country as the "Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea", where sovereignty resided in the people who
exercised their power through the SPA and the local people’s assemblies
at various levels. Besides major nationalisations, three forms of ownership
were contemplated: state, cooperative and private.
A new "Socialist Constitution" was
adopted on 27-12-1972, though the name of the state - DPRK - remained unchanged.
This constitution remains in force today, after having been revised and
supplemented on 9-4-1992 and on 5-9-1998 (some articles have, in the meantime,
been amended from time to time). The 1972 constitution explicitly stipulated,
in its original version, that the country was an independent socialist
state representing the interests of all Koreans and that it was guided
by "the Juche idea of
the Workers’ Party of Korea, a creative application of Marxism-Leninism
to the conditions of our country". (my
emphasis) Another reference was made to "Marxism-Leninism", while the "dictatorship
of the proletariat" was only mentioned once. But later, the 1992 constitutional
revision deleted altogether any reference to "Marxism-Leninism" and the
"dictatorship of the proletariat." It is now stated that the DPRK is guided
by "the Juche idea, a world outlook centred
on people, a revolutionary ideology for achieving the independence of the
masses of people." (my emphasis).
The "socialist constitution" clearly indicates that socialist relations
of productions have been established in North Korea: "class antagonisms
and all forms of exploitation and oppression of man by man have been eliminated
for ever", the DPRK relies "on the socialist production relations and on
the foundation of an independent national economy", it "shall strive to
achieve the complete victory of socialism in the northern half". In his
speech made at the SPA two days prior to the approval of the constitution
in December 1972, Kim Il Sung stated that both the socialist transformation
of the economy and agricultural cooperativization had been completed in
the DPRK by 1958. He also confirmed, once more, that this sudden establishment
of socialist relations of productions had been made possible by the inclusion
of the national bourgeoisie:
"from the beginning our policy
with regard to the national capitalists was not only to carry out the anti-imperialist,
anti-feudal, democratic revolution with them, but also to take them along
with us to a socialist, communist society."
Kim
Il Sung, "Let Us Further Strengthen the Socialist System of Our Country:
Speech Made at the First Session of the Fifth Supreme People’s Assembly
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea", 25-12-1972, in Kim Il Sung,
Works, vol. 27, Pyongyang, 1986, p.484. My emphasis.
Since the abolition of class antagonisms is declared as final and no provision
is made to the recognition of class struggle
under socialism, the 1972 constitution
endorses revisionism. The uninterrupted development of the revolution cannot,
indeed, be separated from consistently waging class struggle during the
whole period of socialist construction. The fundamental antagonistic contradiction
between socialism and capitalism continues to affect various political,
ideological, economic and cultural fields of social life until the final
triumph of communism. It’s only through class struggle that both antagonistic
contradictions (i.e., between workers in power and the overthrown bourgeoisie)
and non-antagonistic ones (i.e., those among the working people) are continuously
resolved while socialist society develops towards communism. Needless to
say, class struggle within a socialist country is closely linked with class
struggle outside it, i.e., against imperialism, capitalism and revisionism,
which all exert a powerful pressure in order to strangle and destroy socialism
- through military aggression, ideological degeneration, political interference,
economic blockades or starvation, etc. From the sixties onwards, revisionist
degeneration could, in fact, take place in the USSR and other countries
that had not recognised the necessity of class struggle under socialism.
Their recent set-backs have, in fact, fully validated Lenin’s teaching
that "the dictatorship of the proletariat is not an end, but a continuation
of class struggle in new forms". This basic proletarian principle has always
been absent in the DPRK’s constitution.
Some other relevant points embodied in the current constitution are the
following:
1. the right of the electors to
recall deputies if the latter are "not to be trusted";
2. the implementation of the Chongsanri
spirit and Chongsanri method;
3. the support of the Three-Revolution
Red Flag Movement;
4. abolition of taxes while providing
people "with every condition for obtaining food, clothing and housing";
5. planned economy;
6. compulsory 11-year education;
7. free medical service and preventive
medicine;
8. self-reliance in defence;
9. the implementation of the collectivist
principle, "one for all and all for one" ("collectivism is the basis of
life of socialist society");
10. emphasis on marriage and the
family, regarded as "the basic unit of social life."
State institutions in the DPRK include the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA),
the highest state organ which exercises legislative power and is elected
for a period of five years (687 deputies were recently elected to the 10th
SPA in July 1998), the National Defence Commission (the highest military
leadership organ), the SPA Presidium, the Cabinet (the highest administrative
and executive body), the local People's Assemblies, the local People's
Committees, the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Court. Kim Il Sung,
who had served as president until his death in 1994, has now been made
the DPRK’s "eternal" president.
10. JUCHE: A REVISIONIST
THEORY AND PRACTICE
The ruling ideology in the DPRK is Juche, initially formulated by Kim Il
Sung and later developed by Kim Jong Il. As it is closely associated with
its creator, Kim Il Sung, Juche
becomes synonymous with Kimilsungism
or Korean revisionism.
It is so pervasive that, since 1997, the Juche Era has been institutionalised
in the DPRK, commencing from the date of Kim Il Sung’s birthday on 15 April
(Sun’s Day) 1912. Juche is regarded not only as suitable to the specific
Korean conditions, but as relevant to the revolutionary process world-wide,
as well. Its definition:
"The historical task of putting
socialism on a new scientific basis was successfully solved by the great
leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, who created the Juche idea and, on this basis,
evolved an original socialist theory.
The respected Comrade Kim Il Sung discovered the philosophical principle
that man is the master of everything and
decides everything.
He explained a new law which governs social movement, the movement of the
motive force, and he thus put socialism
on a new scientific basis. The
socialist and communist cause as clarified by the Juche idea is the cause
of the popular masses for their complete
independence.
Socialism as scientifically systematised by the great leader Comrade Kim
Il Sung is man-centred socialism and socialism centred on the masses. Ours
is a socialism where the popular masses are the masters of everything,
where everything serves them, and which is developing through their united
efforts. The Juche-orientated theory of socialism scientifically clarified
the essence of socialism and the law governing its development, by placing
man at the centre. On this basis, the theory explained that if the building
of socialism is to succeed, a vigorous struggle must be waged to occupy
the two fortresses of socialism and communism, the ideological and material
fortresses, and that here, absolute precedence must be given to the struggle
to take the ideological fortress. . . . The
Juche idea has given scientific definition of man's essential qualities,
for the
first time in history. . . .
Man is a social being with independence,
creativity and consciousness. Herein lie his essential qualities. . . .
Independent, creative and conscious
activities constitute man's mode of existence. . . .
Man transforms nature and society
and develops history ...
..Man's life becomes noble when
he is loved and trusted by the social collective; it is worthless when
he is forsaken by it. Man enjoys the love and trust of the social collective
when he considers the interests of the social collective to be dearer than
those of individuals and when he faithfully serves the social collective.
In the final analysis, the greatest value and worth of man's life is to
lead an independent and creative life, enjoying the love and trust of the
social collective, while at the same time combining his own destiny with
that of the social collective and serving it heart and soul. . . .
In our country, everyone regards
and supports the leader
as they would their own father. They trust and follow the Party, regarding
its embrace as that of their own mother. The leader, the Party and the
people form one socio-political organism, and share the same destiny. The
whole of society overflows with communist morality."
Kim
Jong Il, Socialism is a Science: Treatise Published in Rodong Sinmun,
Organ of the Central Committee of the Workers’Party of Korea, Pyongyang,
1-11-1994, pp. 8-16, 31. My emphases.
Juche puts forward the following propositions:
1. the popular masses are the subjects
of history;
2. society’s historical development
reflects the creative movement of the popular masses;
3. human history is the struggle
of the popular masses in order to implement their
Chajusong, i.e., the spirit of liberty, independence and
self-reliance;
4. the independent thought, consciousness
and initiative of the popular masses perform their decisive role both in
changing nature and in carrying out the revolutionary struggle;
5. it is the leader that interprets,
and gives form to, the masses’ aspirations while directing their efforts.
Individual independence and/or people’s independence lie in loyalty to
the leader and the party.
Proceeding from the above premises, Juche
denies the materialistic and dialectic conception of history,
according to which ideas and sensations essentially reflect the primary,
objective reality existing per se, regardless of our mind and will.
Juche philosophy is idealistic, based on man’s volition and imbued with
metaphysical, almost theological features. It aims at establishing independence
in politics, self-sufficiency in the economy and self-reliance in defence.
The history of Korea itself, that of the international communist movement
and the recent set-backs of socialism are all interpreted in the light
of Juche. Although Juche began to develop in North Korea only from the
mid-50s, official North Korean historiography discovers its fundamental
role retrospectively. For instance,
"the victory of the anti-Japanese
armed struggle was, first of all, a brilliant victory of his (Kim Il Sung’s
- Ed.) great Juche idea and the Juche-oriented revolutionary line."
Kim
Han Gil, Modern History of Korea, Pyongyang, 1979, pp. 169-170.
Emphasis on man’s independence leads to the critique
and misinterpretation of Marxism. The
latter is alleged to have stressed only material and economic conditions
in history, while having underestimated the independent initiative of the
popular masses. Kim Jong Il (who supposedly read almost all the classics
of Marxism-Leninism, including Marx’s The Capital, during his university
years from May 1966 to July 1969) indicates the following "limitations"
of Marxism-Leninism:
"Marxism was a revolutionary doctrine
which represented the era when the working class had emerged in the historical
arena and was waging a struggle against capital. . . . But the times have
changed and history has developed, so Marxism has acquired inevitable
historical limitations. . . .
Ultimately,
Marxism failed to provide a proper explanation concerning the building
of a socialist and communist society by continuing the revolution after
the establishment of the socialist system. Historically, Marxism is an
idea and theory dealing with the requirements of the initial stage of the
socialist cause."
Kim Jong Il, On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea, Pyongyang, 1995.
My emphasis.
"Our Party and people respect Marx,
Engels, Lenin and Stalin as the leaders of the working class and speak
highly of their distinguished services. . . . In their days, Marx,
Engels, Lenin and Stalin represented the aspirations and demands of the
exploited working masses, and the cause of socialism was inseparably linked
with their names. . . .
The conditions
and circumstances of the revolution ceaselessly change and develop. . .
. Our Party has established its own guiding ideology and theory on the
basis of a correct analysis of the historical limitations of their doctrines.
. . The great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung . . .
authored the Juche idea and blazed the trail for the independent development
of our revolution. . . . The historical
limitations of the preceding theories were overcome by the Juche idea.".
Kim
Jong Il, Respecting the Forerunners of the Revolution is a Noble Moral
Obligation of the Revolutionaries: Discourse Published in Rodong Sinmun,
the Organ of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea,
Pyongyang, 25-12-1995, pp. 13-15. My emphases.
"The major limitation of the materialistic
conception of history is that it failed to correctly expound the peculiar
law of the social movement and explained the principles of the social movement
mainly on the basis of the common character of the motion of nature and
the social movement in that both of them are the motion of material."
Kim
Jong Il, The Juche Philosophy is an Original Revolutionary Philosophy:
Discourse Published in Kulloja, Theoretical Magazine of the Central Committee
of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Pyongyang, 26-7-1996, p. 5.
"The theory of socialism in the
preceding age . . . did not regard the social and historical movement as
a movement of the motive force, as a movement which begins and develops
on the initiative and through the role of the popular masses, its motive
force, but as a natural historical process which changes and develops due
to material and economic factors. . . .
In socialist
society, the transformation
of man, his
ideological remoulding, becomes a more important and primary task than
that of creating the material and economic conditions of socialism. . .
.
In the past,
the founders of Marxism evolved socialist theory by putting the main stress
on material and economic conditions. . . .
Marxism defined
man's essential quality as the ensemble of social relations. . . . the
definition of man's essential quality as the sum total of social relations
does not provide a comprehensive elucidation of man's own essential qualities.
. . . The
history of social development is, in the long run, the history of the development
of man's independence, creativity and consciousness."
Kim
Jong Il, Socialism is a Science, Pyongyang, 1-11-1994, pp. 5, 11.
Indeed, this anthropocentric version of Korean socialism, while claiming
to be scientific, runs contrary to the
basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism.
According to Marx, man’s position in society is determined by a specific
social order: outside the existing social framework - and in separation
from it - it is only possible to define man in metaphysical and idealistic
terms. Marx contextualises man both
diachronically and synchronically, i.e., both in history and in society.
If one detaches man from his social class and considers him as an individual
abstraction, one supports idealism and perpetuates capitalism - no matter
how much capitalism can be disguised under false red flags and through
pseudo-revolutionary phraseology. Dialectical and historical materialism
rejects the abstract and general treatment of this issue and demonstrates
the decisive role played by the modes of
production as
the real bases of every particular social order. The mode of production,
in fact, lies at the foundation of the entire system of social relations
where the very "essence" of man can be perceived. As early as January 1859
in his Preface to A Contribution to The Critique of Political Economy,
Marx succinctly formulated the fundamental and truly revolutionary features
of historical and dialectical materialism in the following terms:
"In the social production of their
existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent
of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage
in the development of their material forces of production. The totality
of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of
society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure
and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode
of production of material life conditions the general process of social,
political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that
determines their existence, but their social existence that determines
their consciousness."
Karl
Marx, Preface to A Contribution to The Critique of Political Economy,
in Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 29, London, 1987, p. 263.
As the material productive forces - at a certain stage of their development
- enter into conflict with the given relations of production, a phase of
social revolution takes place so that one social system is replaced by
another. The primitive community, the slave-owning society, feudalism,
capitalism and socialism constitute different kinds of social order so
far achieved in history. The clear definition of the social system can
also reflect the degree of historical development which - from a lower
social order to a higher one - leads to the establishment of socialism.
The principal aspect of capitalist relations of production, in fact, is
highlighted by the enslavement of the working class to capital. Consequently,
the replacement of capitalism with socialism - by virtue of economic development
- requires the liquidation of the exploitation of man (i.e., workers) by
man (i.e., the bourgeoisie) and the establishment of the proletarian state,
which struggles to achieve a communist society.
Under both capitalism and socialism, ideas possess a
class character: in every society -
as Marx and Engels indicated - the dominant ideas are those of the ruling
class. New social ideas and theories can, therefore, emerge and develop
as they reflect the newly created needs in material life. These new revolutionary
ideologies assist progressive forces in society and become the possession
of the popular masses in forcing their way through history by overthrowing
the moribund social forces hampering progress. Therefore, in parallel with
the advancement of the proletariat, it is Marxism-Leninism - the revolutionary
ideology of the working class - that asserts itself as the dominant ideology
in a socialist society, a society that is built for the very first time
in history under the working class’ leadership.
According to Juche, instead, it is an abstract man that possesses the freedom
to transform both nature and society by
his own volition. Kim Jong Il argues that:
"the social movement is caused
and developed by the volitional action
and role of the driving force (the popular masses - Ed.)."
Kim
Jong Il, The Juche Philosophy is an Original Revolutionary Philosophy:
Discourse Published in Kulloja, Theoretical Magazine of the Central Committee
of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Pyongyang, 26-7-1996, p. 5. My emphasis.
Far from representing a new philosophical discovery, such an idealism,
based on the masses’ volitional independence, reiterates Dühring’s
subjective, voluntarist views, formulated in Germany more than a century
ago. But these views had already been refuted by Engels as he clearly indicated
that freedom is based on the understanding
of necessity, on the cognition of the objective laws of nature and society.
Engels noted the following:
"Freedom does not consist in any
dreamt-of independence from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these
laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work
towards definite ends. . . . Freedom of the will therefore means nothing
but the capacity to make decisions with knowledge of the subject. . . .
Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external
nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity; it is therefore
necessarily a product of historical development."
Frederick Engels, Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution
in Science, in Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 25, London,
1987, pp. 105-6.
Socialism replaces capitalism neither on the basis of volitional and subjective
desires nor according to the good wishes of "great leaders", but on the
basis of objective laws of development which are consciously implemented
by the working class. Proceeding from these scientific premises, Marx and
Engels attached fundamental importance to the workers’ self-emancipation
in both material and ideological terms. According to the principles of
the First International, in fact, "the emancipation of the working class
must be the act of the workers themselves."
But North Korea’s society - as admitted by Kim Jong Il - openly departs
from the above principles:
"In socialist society, all
people are transformed into socialist working people, so everyone is a
member of the masses of the people. . . .
The basic criterion
for deciding whether one is a member of the masses of the people or not
is not one’s social and class origin, but one's ideas. The ideological
foundation on which to unite people from all walks of life into the masses
of the people is not just the idea of socialism and communism. Anyone
who loves the country . .
. is qualified to be a member of the masses of the people.
From such a
point of view, at every stage of the revolution, the great leader Comrade
Kim Il Sung united everyone
who was ideologically ready to serve the fatherland, the people and the
nation into one revolutionary force, and he successfully carried out the
revolution and construction. Our Party trusts people of different
classes and strata who
are interested in the revolution. It considers them everlasting
companions,
not chance fellow travellers, on the oad to
revolution, and it is leading them along the
road to socialism and communism.".
Kim
Jong Il, Socialism is a Science, Pyongyang, 1-11-1994, p. 19. My
emphases.
Is this scientific socialism?
Is this "road to socialism and
communism" in North Korea consistent with Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin?
No.
Juche is revisionism and Kim
Il Sung was not a Marxist-Leninist.
Unquestionably, it becomes obvious that the DPRK’s developments flatly
deny the basic Marxist-Leninist strategy for the revolutionary process
in colonial-type countries, according to which a temporary alliance with
the national bourgeoisie should be established only during the initial
national democratic stage of the revolution. On the contrary, the national
capitalist class has been harmoniously integrated into "socialism" - in
accordance with the principles of Juche - and never,
at any time since 1945, has the dictatorship of the proletariat been established
in North Korea. And indeed, the dictatorship
of the proletariat remains the political yardstick in order to determine
whether socialism has been achieved or not.
For genuine Marxist-Leninists, during the entire historical period of transition
from capitalism to the classless, communist society,
"the state can be nothing but the
revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat."
Karl
Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, in Marx and Engels, Collected
Works, vol. 24, London, 1989, p. 95. Emphasis in the original..
This was clearly indicated by Marx more than a century ago in his Critique
of the Gotha Programme, where he refuted Lassalle’s concept of a "free
popular state", which denied the class character of the state itself as
the organ of a given social class. By liquidating the exploiting classes
and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, the most complete
form of democracy - the true democracy for the proletariat, the peasantry
and the other working masses - is guaranteed for the first time in history.
As the Manifesto of the Communist Party pointed out, Karl
Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in
Marx and Engels, Collected Works, vol. 6, London, 1976, p. 504.).
Only proceeding from the above parameters, is it possible to assess whether
scientific socialism has been implemented or not in the DPRK. And in the
absence of a truly proletarian state, the characterisation of the North
Korean society as a socialist one would amount to self-deceit. The
essence of Juche is revisionism. As
a consequence, it ranks among all those ideologies - such as Krushchevite
revisionism, Titoism, Maoism, Cuban revisionism, Leduanism, etc. - that
have deviated from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin in order to "creatively"
develop their own peculiar trends of modern revisionism. Revisionism aims
at setting up and justifying pseudo-socialist societies, where the working
masses remain excluded from power and where socialist democracy is not
implemented in deeds, but only through resounding revolutionary words and
phrases.
In line with its anti-Marxist formulations,
Juche equates socialism and communism with independence
- independence of man, independence of the masses, independence of the
nation, independence that unites all classes in society. As Kim Il Sung
always indicated,
"The cause of building socialism
and communism . . . will provide the masses of the people with complete
independence."
Kim
Il Sung, "For the Complete Victory of Socialism: Policy Speech at the First
Session of the Eighth Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea", 30-12-1986, in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol. 40,
Pyongyang, 1995, p.199.
Kim Jong Il reiterates the same revisionist principle as follows:
"Socialism is the ideal and the
revolutionary banner of the popular masses who are fighting for independence.
The masses achieve their independence by means of socialism and communism.
. . . Ours is an age
of independence."
Kim
Jong Il, Socialism is a Science, Pyongyang, 1-11-1994, p. 1.
"The cause of socialism is a just
cause for realising the independence of the popular masses."
Kim
Jong Il, On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea, Pyongyang, 1995.
"Being the application of the Juche
idea, the revolutionary idea of the era of independence, our socialism
is the best socialism; it is centred upon the masses and strongly champions
. . . the nation’s right to independence and the aspirations of the world’s
people to independence."
Kim
Jong Il, Our Socialism Centred on the Masses Shall not Perish, Pyongyang,
5-5-1991, p. 10.
"Adherence to the Juche character
and national character in the revolution and construction is a fundamental
principle that must be maintained in accomplishing the people's cause of
independence, the cause of socialism. . . . The socialist cause is the
revolutionary cause of independence."
Kim
Jong Il, On Preserving the Juche Character and National Character of
the Revolution and Construction, Pyongyang, 19-6-1997, p. 2.
By upholding the above concept of independence, the role played by the
Third Communist International comes under criticism. As for the history
of the international communist and workers’ movement, in fact, Kim Jong
Il states the following:
"The time is long past when there
was one centre in the international communist movement and individual parties
acted as its branches. . . . In the past . . . the parties of some socialist
countries did great harm to the development of the international communist
movement by failing to rid themselves of the old customs of the Communist
International. The party of a certain country claimed to be the "centre"
of the international communist movement, and ordered other parties to do
this or that. It acted without hesitation to put pressure on other parties
and interfere in their internal affairs if they refused to follow its line,
even though it was a wrong one."
Kim
Jong Il, On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea, Pyongyang, 1995.
"But even after the Comintern had
been dissolved, old practices lasted for a long time in the relations between
communist and workers’ parties, practices expressed in their dogmatic acceptance
of the party lines and policies of a major country which had carried out
the socialist revolution earlier."
Kim
Jong Il, On the Fundamentals of Revolutionary Party Building: A Treatise
Written on the Occasion of the 47th Anniversary of the Foundation of the
Workers’ Party of Korea, Pyongyang, 10-10-1992, p.9.
No detailed analyses are made with regard to the economic, political and
ideological factors that led many parties to abandon socialism and degenerate
along revisionist lines. But the collapse of revisionism in the USSR and
other states becomes ascribable - according to Juche - to the fact that
genuine independence had not been consistently applied and that, in the
meantime, the people had not been properly educated and transformed accordingly.
"The socialist government parties
and the socialist systems collapsed in many countries, not just a few,
because they had failed to establish Juche in their development and activities."
Kim
Jong Il, On the Fundamentals of Revolutionary Party Building, Pyongyang,
10-10-1992, p. 8.
"Because the socialist cause failed
to become the cause of genuine national independence in several countries,
socialism suffered a gradual weakening of its class foundation and was
unable to ward off frustration and collapse due to the anti-socialist manoeuvres
of the imperialists and the renegades from the revolution."
Kim
Jong Il, On Preserving the Juche Character and National Character of
the Revolution and Construction, Pyongyang, 19-6-1997, p. 6.
"Some countries believed that socialism
could be built merely by hastening the progress of economic construction
while keeping control of state power and the means of production, and they
did not put their primary effort into the transformation of the people
to raise their ideological and cultural levels rapidly and prepare them
fully as the driving force of the revolution and construction."
Kim
Jong Il, On Carrying Forward the Juche Idea, Pyongyang, 1995.
According to the North Korean revisionist perspective, since the collapse
of the former revisionist regimes, it is Juche that has:
"fully demonstrated its truth and
viability through the successful advance of the people-centred socialism
set up in North Korea and the accelerated advance of the cause of independence
in the world."
Guiding
Light: General Kim Jong Il, Pyongyang, 1997.
The first organisational attempt to rally political forces around Juche
took place in Pyongyang in April 1992 with an heterogeneous gathering of
progressive, Marxist-Leninist, revisionist and pacifist parties and organisations.
The final declaration, Let Us Defend
and Advance the Cause of Socialism,
was originally adopted by 70 of the organisations present in Pyongyang
in 1992. But the number of the political organisations which have subsequently
supported and signed the declaration has by now risen to more than 200.
The Pyongyang Declaration embodies
and supports - in line with Juche - both the equation of socialism with
independence and the unspecified ideal of a socialism created by the "people".
No mention is made of the class character of the socialist society, to
the very existence and role of the working class, to the necessity of its
dictatorship or to the final goal of communism. Nor any reference is made
to Marx, Engels, Lenin or Stalin. The signatories, nonetheless, affirm
their "firm determination to defend and advance the socialist cause." The
declaration states the following:
"Ours is an era of independence
and the socialist cause is a sacred one aimed at realising the independence
of the popular masses. . . .
Socialist society is, in essence,
a genuine society for the people where the popular masses are the masters
of everything and everything serves them. . . . The
socialist movement is an independent movement. . . .
All parties should cement the ties
of comradely unity, cooperation and solidarity among themselves on the
principles of independence and equality. International
solidarity is essential to the struggle for socialism."
Let
Us Defend and Advance the Socialist Cause,
Pyongyang Declaration, 20-4-1992. My emphasis.
These revisionist and opportunist positions reduce both socialism and internationalism
to empty phrases about independence and solidarity. They may be genuine
manifestations of anti-imperialist feelings, but, as a matter of fact,
the declaration seeks to divert the national and international communist
movement from destroying capitalism and building communism in the world.
These positions, contained in the Pyongyang Declaration, are reiterated
by Kim Jong Il:
"Although the socialist idea is
the ideology of the working class, it does not represent the interests
of one class alone; it is a universal idea for humanity which reflects
the social nature of human beings . . . which reflects the desire for independence
of all nations and the whole of humanity. . . .
The Pyongyang
Declaration is infusing the revolutionary people of the world who aspire
after independence with confidence in victory and a revolutionary fighting
spirit. . . .
The internationalist
unity and solidarity of the revolutionary parties must be achieved on the
basis of independence. . . .
It is an important
task for the revolutionary parties to form a united front with the democratic
political parties and organisations in the struggle to accomplish the cause
of socialism."
Kim
Jong Il, On the Fundamentals of Revolutionary Party Building, Pyongyang,
1992, pp. 37-8.
With this stance two separate issues are somehow confused and inappropriately
identified with one another:
1. The unity
and solidarity among anti-imperialist forces,
which transcend political, ideological, social and religious differences;
and
2. The
unity and solidarity among communist forces,
the aim of which remains the replacement of capitalism with socialism and
communism.
For the purpose of fighting imperialism, domination, aggression and war,
a broad solidarity must indeed be established among all communist and non-communist
organisations and parties in the world. But for the purpose of carrying
out the socialist revolution and supporting proletarian internationalism,
a clear line of demarcation should be drawn between genuinely communist,
Marxist-Leninist forces, on the one hand, and non-communist, democratic
and progressive forces, on the other.
Ours is not the epoch of independence only.
Ours is still the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolutions,
the epoch of the replacement of the old exploiting
society with the new society that liquidates exploitation of man by man.
Therefore, in order to attain this final goal, the working class fulfils
its historical mission by carrying out the socialist revolution in its
own country and thus offering greater support to the international revolutionary
movement. The true significance of proletarian internationalism was explicitly
indicated by Lenin:
"There is one, and only one, kind
of real internationalism, and that is - working whole-heartedly for the
development of the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle
in one’s own country, and supporting
. . . this struggle,
this, and only this, line, in every country
without exception."
V.I.
Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution: Draft Platform
for the Proletarian Party", 10-4-1917, in Lenin, Collected Works,
vol. 24, Moscow, 1964 , p. 75. Emphases in the original.
On the basis of Leninism - and under the famous slogan of The Communist
Manifesto, "Workers of All Countries, Unite!" - cooperation and unity
should be strengthened among all the communist, Marxist-Leninist forces
in different countries. But these forces should indeed avoid reducing the
entire revolutionary struggle to the sole struggle for independence against
imperialism, while subordinating the struggle for the social liberation
and emancipation of the working class. Only victory in this latter struggle
can safeguard genuine national sovereignty, freedom and independence. Excessive
emphasis upon independence alone, devoid of any class content, runs contrary
to Marxism-Leninism, amounts to petty-bourgeois nationalism and echoes
the old slogans of the Second International, whose leaders had abandoned
the socialist revolution in order to replace it with the defence of their
own capitalist homelands.
THE WORKERS’ PARTY OF KOREA
The WPK constitutes the leading political force in the DPRK, recognised
as such by the current constitution. Around 10 percent of the population
(approximately 2 million people) are party members: each member belongs
to a cell of 10 to 100 members in a plant, cooperative or locality. The
party parallels and penetrates government organisations at all levels.
Its supreme organ is the National Party Congress which is supposed to be
held every five years, but in fact has met only six times since 1948.
The WPK’s 6th congress in 1980 was the first in 10 years, and - with no
credible explanations given - another congress has not been held since.
One may wonder how democratic centralism can function in a party that has
not convened its highest decision-making body for 19 years. The WPK Central
Committee (about 329 members, including alternate members) should meet
at least once every six months. The Politburo had 24 members in 1992 (16
of whom were alternates) and its number had fallen to 18 in 1995.
Crucial to the activities of the WPK are supposed to be democratic centralism
and its mass line through the so-called Chongsanri spirit and Chongsanri
method (i.e., cadres mixing with people in order to unite them behind the
party and implement its policies). The WPK is supported by a number of
related organisations: the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the
Fatherland, the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland,
the General Federation of Trade Unions, the Kim Il Sung Working Youth League,
the Union of Agricultural Workers, the Democratic Women's Union, the General
Federation of Literature and Arts Unions, the Journalists Union, the General
Federation of Industrial Technology, the Buddhist Federation, and others.
Besides the WPK, there are also two other political parties (whose free
activities are guaranteed by the constitution): the Korean Social Democratic
Party and the Chondoist Chongu Party.
The WPK’s sole
guiding ideology is represented by Juche, on the basis of which
"our Party put forward for
the first time in the history of the building
of the working-class parties the new
principle that work with people is basic to party activities."
Kim
Jong Il, "The Workers’ Party of Korea Organizes and Guides All the Victories
of Our People", 3-10-1990, in Kim Jong Il, On Enhancing the Party’s
Leading Role, Pyongyang, 1992, pp. 227. My emphases.
The WPK’s main goals are: achieving independence in politics, self-sufficiency
in the economy and self-reliance in national defence. In the WPK’s programme,
major stress is placed on independence which - according to Juche - equates
with socialism and communism.
Since it cannot provide the North Korean working class with a genuine Marxist-Leninist
leadership, the WPK implements its policies by means of "love
and trust" and by over-emphasising sentimental
and patronising attitudes towards the people. As Kim Jong Il explains,
"Love
and trust constitute the essence of politics in socialist society
. . . we call the politics of love
and trust, benevolent politics . . .
If the politics
of love and trust are to be exercised in socialist society, the socialist
party in power must be built into a motherly party . . . the party should
become a genuine guide and defender of the people . . . just as the mother
deeply loves her children and looks after them warmly. . . .
It is a true
feature of our society that all its members form a large harmonious family.
They trust, love and help each other. . . .
The Party loves
and trusts people from all areas of society, without discrimination. In
this sense, we call our Party’s benevolent politics all-embracing politics.
They are politics of invariable love and trust."
Kim
Jong Il, Socialism is a Science, 1-11-1994, pp. 28-9, 33. My emphasis.
"Our Party is genuinely a maternal
party. It leads the people and takes care of them, pursuing the politics
of love and trust - benevolent politics."
Kim
Jong Il, Respecting the Forerunners of the Revolution is a Noble Moral
Obligation of the Revolutionaries, Pyongyang, 25-12-1995, p. 17.
"The relations between the party
and the masses are those between the leader and the led, between the giver
and the receiver of life and between those who look after people’s destiny
and the people who entrust it. The relations between the party and the
people can be firmest and strongest when the party values and takes the
greatest care of the people as their mother. . . .
We should continue
to meet the essential requirements of our Party and ensure that it performs
its duty as the Mother (with capital "M" in the original - Ed.) Party better."
Kim
Jong Il, "The Workers’ Party of Korea Organizes and Guides All the Victories
of Our People", 3-10-1990, in Kim Jong Il, On Enhancing the Party’s
Leading Role, Pyongyang, 1992, pp. 228-9.
But a party that claims to be the revolutionary leading force in a socialist
society cannot be the workers’ "mother". "Love and trust" cannot substitute
for political consciousness in building socialism. The
socialist revolution is carried out - and true socialism is built - only
under the sole political leadership of a communist party which is the vanguard
of the working class, the most advanced detachment of the popular masses.
Such a total negation of scientific socialism in the DPRK becomes even
more apparent as we consider the role of
the leader.
In North Korean society the people, the WPK and its leader are supposed
to constitute an integral whole:
"In the driving force of the revolution,
the leader is the top brain and the centre of unity."
Kim
Sun Ryong, "The Juche Revolutionary Party", in Korea Today, n. 1,
1996).
The leader is said to love the people "unfailingly" and "boundlessly",
while the people reciprocate with love and trust. Just as the party represents
the mother, the leader represents the father: as caring parents, they both
look after their enlarged North Korean family. In the current political
literature of the DPRK, endless references can be found to this distorted
role played by the leader as the people’s father. In this regard, particularly
revealing are the following remarks made by Kim Jong Il:
"We must realise that the greatest
value and worth of life exist in faithfully implementing the revolutionary
tasks set by the leader by trusting in him as a strong moral support at
all times, and we must prove ourselves unfailingly loyal to the leader
through our revolutionary activities to implement his ideology and will.
. . .
Party leadership
implies guidance by the leader, and the concept of and attitude towards
the party are, in essence, identical to the concept of and attitude towards
the leader. . . .
We must value
and respect the party organisation as the parent body of our integrity.
We refer to the leader as the fatherly leader and to the Party as the motherly
Party because the Party organisation with the leader at its centre is the
parent body of our socio-political integrity. . . .
To hold the
fatherly leader in high esteem and to be loyal to him is a moral obligation
for all Koreans. . . .
We call loyalty
to the leader the highest expression of communist morality."
Kim
Jong Il, "On Establishing the Juche Outlook on the Revolution: Talk to
the Senior Officials of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of
Korea", 10-10-1987, in Kim Jong Il, On the Juche Idea, Pyongyang,
1989, pp. 160-2, 170 My emphasis.
"The unity and cohesion of our Party
developed into the unity of the entire Party in ideology and purpose, reinforced
by morality and loyalty, based on the leader’s idea and centring on the
leader."
Kim
Jong Il, The Workers’ Party of Korea is the Party of the Great Leader
Comrade Kim Il Sung, Pyongyang, 2-10-1995, p.7.
"Loyalty and dutifulness to the
leader are the highest expression of the good qualities of Kim Il Sung’s
nation."
Kim
Jong Il, On Preserving the Juche Character and National Character of
the Revolution and Construction, Pyongyang, 19-6-1997, p. 26.
"The leader is the centre of unity
and cohesion . . . He is the great revolutionary leader who defends the
independent demands and interests of the popular masses; he has an unusual
gift of foresight, is all-powerful in the leadership art and noble in personal
virtue, and leads the people wisely in their struggle."
Kim Jong Il, Our Socialism Centred on the Masses Shall not Perish,Pyongyang,
5-5-1991, p. 34.
"The essence of ideological and
spiritual qualities of communist, revolutionary workers is the true loyalty
and devotion to the leader, which never change no matter what the circumstances."
Kim
Jong Il, Let Us Further Enhance the Role of Intellectuals in the Revolution
and Construction: A Speech Delivered to the Senior Officials of the Central
Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Pyongyang, 20-9-1990, p.
39.
"Loyalty
to the leader is the highest expression of the sense of revolutionary obligation.
. . .
Carrying forward
the cause of independence of the popular masses, the cause of socialism,
means none other than the continuation of the cause of the leader. . .
.
The communist
morality of our people finds its highest expression in their unqualified
respect for and absolute allegiance to the great leader Comrade Kim Il
Sung."
Kim
Jong Il, Respecting the Forerunners of the Revolution is a Noble Moral
Obligation of the Revolutionaries: Discourse Published in Rodong Sinmun,
the Organ of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea,
Pyongyang, 25-12-1995, pp.5-6, 9. My emphases.
But clearly,
all these preachings have nothing to do with communist morality.
As Lenin pointed out,
"Our morality is entirely subordinated
to the interests of the proletariat’s class struggle. Our morality stems
from the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat."
V.
I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Youth Leagues: Speech Delivered at the Third
All-Russia Congress of the Russian Young Communist League", 2-10-1920,
in Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 31, Moscow, 1966, p. 291.
Marxist-Leninists possess a specific programme and specific aims in order
to overcome the old exploiting society. The cult of the leader in the DPRK
runs contrary to these aims and - as such - cannot contribute to the workers’
emancipation and liberation. The undue emphasis on the absolute loyalty
to the leader contravenes the very essence of socialism, which should be
built by the popular masses under the collective leadership of the revolutionary
party of the working class. The extent to which Kim Il Sung had been, and
still is, adulated as a god inside his country is well-known. Worship has
replaced politics with Juche - something inadmissible from a Marxist-Leninist
viewpoint. Such an excessive personality cult of both Kim Il Sung and Kim
Jong Il cannot but discredit and ridicule the DPRK’s reputation in the
world and among progressive forces.
Through unconditional loyalty to the leader and his personality cult,
Juche’s revisionist paradox becomes
obvious: all people possess independence and freedom to master everything
in the world (including nature), provided only that they achieve their
oneness behind the leader. This is the philosophical device for the revisionist
clique in North Korea to cling to power and to wind the clock of history
back to the reactionary, feudal socialism.
Not only has the personality cult played a reactionary and unhealthy role
in the history of the communist movement, but - as Soviet history could
prove - it also provided the revisionists with an additional weapon in
order to liquidate socialism. Indeed, it has now become clear that the
personality cult around Stalin had been deliberately built up by concealed
revisionists and its practice had been contrary to the expressed wishes
of Stalin himself. In fact, the Krushchevite revisionists created the "cult
of the individual" around Stalin in order:
1. to attack him from the mid-fifties
onwards under the guise of carrying out a programme of liberalization,
that was in fact a programme of dismantling socialism; and
2. to lay the blame on him for
breaches of socialist legality and for deviations from Marxist-Leninist
principles on their part.
It was Stalin
himself that on numerous occasions denounced and ridiculed the personality
cult as a distortion of Marxism-Leninism. For example,
"You speak of your ‘devotion’ to
me. Perhaps it was just a chance phrase. Perhaps. . . . But if the phrase
was not accidental I would advise you to discard the "principle" of devotion
to persons. It is not the Bolshevik way. Be devoted to the working class,
its Party, its state. That is a fine and useful thing. But do not confuse
it with devotion to persons, this vain and useless bauble of weak-minded
intellectuals."
J.V.
Stalin, "Letter to Comrade Shatunovsky", August 1930, in Stalin, Works,
vol. 13, Moscow, 1955, p. 20.
"Marxism does not at all deny the
role played by outstanding individuals or that history is made by people.
. . . Every new generation encounters definite conditions already existing,
ready-made when that generation was born. And great people are worth anything
at all only to the extent that they are able correctly to understand these
conditions, to understand how to change them. If they fail to understand
these conditions and want to alter them according to the promptings of
their imagination, they will land themselves in the situation of Don Quixote.
. . .
Individual persons
cannot decide. Decisions of individuals are always, or nearly always, one-sided
decisions. . . .
Never under
any circumstances would our workers now tolerate power in the hands of
one person. With us personages of the greatest authority are reduced to
nonentities, become mere ciphers, as soon as the masses of the workers
lose confidence in them, as soon as they lose contact with the masses of
the workers."
J.V.
Stalin, "Talk with the German Author Emil Ludwig", 13-12-1931, in Stalin,
Works, vol. 13, Moscow, 1955, p. 107-9, 113.
As for the DPRK, reservations and doubts can also be raised about the way
in which the son, Kim Jong Il, could succeed - as a leader - to his father,
Kim Il Sung. It was in October 1997, for example, that Kim Jong Il was
inaugurated as WPK general secretary, simply by means of a statement jointly
produced by the WPK Central Committee and the Central Military Commission.
But the procedure employed for the appointment violated the party charter,
which calls for the election of the top party position in a full session
of the WPK Central Committee. Nonetheless, legal considerations are supposed
to remain subordinated to the personal desires of Kim Il Sung, who once
had the following to say:
"‘Comrade Kim Jong Il carries out
at all costs what he regards as necessary for the sake of the country and
the people. Particularly, he makes every possible effort to please me by
implementing what I wish and am worried about.’"
Kim
Kyong Hui, "A Model of Loyalty and Filial Devotion", The Pyongyang Times,
27-9-97.
Love and trust between father and son are said to date back to the times
of Kim Jong Il’s childhood. Various official anecdotes have been publicised
in the DPRK in order to substantiate this filial devotion. The following
story is just one example.
"It was one day when
Secretary Kim Jong Il was five years old.
He was standing at the gate of his house, with a wooden rifle on his shoulder.
Seeing him, his mother said, ‘What are you doing there?’ Then, Jong Il
replied, ‘I am guarding my father.’ At lunch time, the President returned
home for a short stay. Looking at his son, the President asked his wife
what was the matter with his son. Hearing from his wife what his son was
doing, the President said, ‘Is that so! He is guarding me,’ and then turned
his eyes to his son with a look of trust in him on his face."
Inoue
Shuhachi, Modern Korea and Kim Jong Il, Tokyo, 1984, p. 129 My emphasis.
In conjunction with Kim Jong Il’s appointment as the WPK’s leader in 1997
(Kim Jong Il had replaced his father as KPA supreme commander in late December
1991), the DPRK’s media reported that:
"legendary stories about (Kim Jong
Il’s - Ed.) affection for the people are on the lips of the people and
meritorious deeds and miracles are reported daily in socialist construction."
Inoue
Shuhachi, Modern Korea and Kim Jong Il, Tokyo, 1984, p. 129 My emphasis.
He was now presented as:
"the Lodestar for Sailing the 21st
Century." Moreover,
"a new age calls for a new leader,
and the age advances under the leadership of an outstanding leader. . .
. Today, mankind is convinced that the thinking and theory of Kim Jong
Il are the guiding thought for the 21st century, and is vigorously studying
and disseminating them on a worldwide scale. . . . The esteemed name of
Kim Jong Il, the leader of the 21st century acclaimed by history and mankind,
is the banner for and blessing of the 21st century."
Guiding Light: General Kim Jong Il, Pyongyang, 1997.
Finally, Kim Jong Il was appointed as the WPK general secretary on 8-10-1997,
a few days later the official KCNA reported mysterious happenings taking
place around Mount Paektu, Kim Jong Il’s birthplace:
"Wonderful natural phenomena have
been witnessed on Mt. Paektu, the time-honoured place of the revolution,
in Korea. It was dawn on September 21 when the South Phyongan Provincial
Party Conference was held to discuss the agenda item on recommending General
Kim Jong Il as General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea. The day
before, it snowed and rained on Mt. Paektu as usual till mid-day. In the
evening, its temperature abruptly increased more than 10 degrees centigrade
higher than the average. And the north-western wind and north-eastern wind,
the typical winds on Mt. Paektu, disappeared and the south-western wind
blew. At night, high and low clouds completely disappeared. As the new
day was breaking, the eastern sky of orange and yellowish brown colours
turned red and a bright sun rose above Mt. Paektu. This grandiose sunrise
continued several days. Meteorological observations in this area say that
on Mt. Paektu, the sunrise has never occurred for three consecutive days,
it showered in the dry season, the sun rose in the rainy season and that
cloud and sunshine appeared by turns every one or three days and even hourly.
However, in the emotional period when the great general Kim Jong Il was
elected as General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, the sunrise
continued for 25 consecutive days, spreading grandiose landscape.
A more mysterious
natural phenomenon was observed on the afternoon of October 8. At around
05:10 when the special communique informed the people of the election of
general Kim Jong Il as General Secretary of the WPK, a coloured cloud appeared
on Mt. Paektu. This cloud slowly moved from the sky above Janggun Peak
toward the Hyangdo Peak. The ground colour of the cloud of big parachute
type was white and its rims were dyed with seven colours. It was all the
more wonderful that the cloud stayed low above Hyangdo Peak for a long
time before moving toward Janggun Peak. The moment, mysterious sounds reminiscent
of cheers and applause came from surface of Lake Chon and a strong whirlwind
rose which carried piles of snow into the sky and dropped them onto the
ground, adorning the sky on Mt. Paektu in various colours. Witnessing these
wonderful natural phenomena, its inhabitants said that nature also celebrated
Kim Jong Il's election as WPK General Secretary."
KCNA,
Pyongyang, 20-10-1997.
Stories like these
can recall Marx’s remark about superstition and religion as being the opium
of the people! And unfortunately, that is the case in the DPRK.
11. THE DPRK IN THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT
Since the end of the Korean War, it became crucial for the DPRK to continue
to defend its independence and economic self-reliance vis-à-vis
US military pressure and its economic sanctions. The revisionist policies
advocating Juche and Chajusong in international relations also allowed
the DPRK to maintain an equidistant position with regard to the USSR and
China. By means of its selective participation in Comecon, for instance,
the DPRK could reap advantages, such as establishing barter trade with
no need for convertible currencies, while keeping its economic independence
intact. Pyongyang always argued that its independence would have been lost,
had the country been integrated in the so-called socialist international
division of labour imposed by Soviet social-imperialism. It was, nonetheless,
on the basis of pragmatical and opportunist considerations that the DPRK
could maintain a "neutral" stand towards the Sino-Soviet dispute. From
the sixties onwards - according to Kim Il Sung - the USSR and China were
both seen as socialist countries that should have sorted out their disagreements
for the sake of unity within an unidentified "socialist camp." But as-a-matter-of-fact,
all three of them - the Soviet Union, China and North Korea - were developing
and defending their respective brands of anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist
positions, i.e., Soviet revisionism, Maoism or Chinese revisionism, and
Juche or Korean revisionism.
A particularly special relationship was, instead, established between
Korean and Titoite revisionisms, based on the assumption that both
countries were upholding socialism and non-alignment. As stated by Kim
Il Sung,
"The relations of friendship and
cooperation between Korea and Yugoslavia constitute a comradely relationship
based on the noble ideas of socialism and non-alignment, a relationship
which makes a valuable contribution to accelerating the work of socialist
construction in the two countries, strengthening the forces of socialism
as a whole, and expanding and developing the non-aligned movement."
Kim
Il Sung, "Answers to Questions Raised by the Director and Editor-in-Chief
of the Review of International Affairs of Yugoslavia", 28-12-1984,
in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol. 38, Pyongyang, 1993, p. 413.
It should be noted that, during his foreign travels, Kim Il Sung visited
Yugoslavia and various other revisionist countries of Europe, but never
did he pay a visit to the only socialist country existing in Europe since
the advent of Krushchevite revisionism, i.e., the People’s Socialist Republic
of Albania.
From the mid-seventies until today, in fact, the DPRK has closely associated
itself with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
regarded as the most natural ally in fighting imperialism and achieving
Chajusong in the international arena. NAM started in the early sixties,
as 25 mainly Asian, African and Latin-American countries had established
some common ground in order to uphold political independence and non-alignment,
to support the national liberation movements and to reject military alliances
with imperialist powers. The movement developed by increasing cooperation
with the UN and by augmenting its membership (currently including more
than one hundred developing countries). Since its first admission to NAM
in 1975, North Korea has been actively promoting non-alignment as part
of its foreign policy towards the "third world" (a term which was used
in its official statements for the first time in 1973) and is currently
holding its position as one of the vice-chairmen in the movement’s coordinating
bureau. South Korea, which had also applied for membership in NAM, was
rejected and continues to remain excluded from it.
In parallel with the DPRK’s active participation in NAM, a similarity of
revisionist views also emerged between Maoism and Kimilsungism during the
seventies - more specifically, between the counter-revolutionary theory
of the "three worlds" and
the equally revisionist, counter-revolutionary idea of Chajusong.
The lines originating from Beijing and Pyongyang converged on the following
points:
1. they both called for total unity
and solidarity among the heterogeneous "third world" countries, irrespective
of the fact that this category of states included, and still includes,
conservative, feudal, bourgeois regimes ruled by kings, reactionary landlords
and dictators who keep their own people in bondage, while maintaining various
forms of dependence on foreign imperialism;
2. they deny the basic Marxist
principles in regard to class struggle, according to which capitalist and
semi-capitalist societies are divided into exploited and exploiting classes,
i.e., into workers and destitute peasantry, on the one hand, and capitalists
and land-owners, on the other. By negating class struggle, both theories
also undermine the efforts of the oppressed people to free themselves from
foreign domination and achieve genuine democratic rights and freedom;
3. while advocating social peace
and conciliation between antagonistic classes, they reject the Leninist
principle that our epoch is pregnant with great social transformations
that will assert a new socialist society; and
4. they both amalgamate views and
theses borrowed from Marxism-Leninism with revisionist, anarchist, Confucian,
Buddhist and other ideas, marked by considerable doses of petty-bourgeois
nationalism and chauvinism.
But within the same revisionist framework, the Maoist theory of the
"three worlds" differs from the Kimilsungist idea of Chajusong in that
the former supported - until about ten years ago - a broad alliance between
the "third world", the "second world" and US imperialism against what used
to be regarded by Beijing as its main enemy - Soviet social-imperialism.
Chajusong, on the other hand, still intends to embrace "third world" and
non-aligned countries together with "socialist" (i.e., revisionist) countries
against its main enemy - US imperialism. But all these divisions of the
globe into the "first", "second", and "third" world, and the "non-aligned"
world do indeed cover up the fundamental contradictions existing between
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between socialism and capitalism,
and between the peoples and imperialism. While Lenin regarded our century
as the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, according to Korean
revisionism we live in the age of Chajusong. As stated by Kim Il Sung,
"The third world, a great anti-imperialist
revolutionary force of our times, was born of the fierce flames of the
national-liberation struggle to enter the arena of history.
The third world
is now a dependable allay of the socialist forces, and a great motive force
to speed the history of mankind forward. Many peoples of the third world
are heading for socialism . . .
Today the third
world constitutes the battle front where the anti-imperialist struggle
is raging most fiercely. It embraces a great many revolutionary countries
. . .
Ours is an
age of Chajusong. Today
many peoples throughout the world are calling for Chajusong and are fighting
against all kinds of subordination."
Kim Il Sung, "On the Occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Foundation
of the Workers’ Party of Korea: Report Delivered at the Commemoration of
the 30th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Workers’ Party of Korea",
9-10-1975, in Kim Il Sung, Works, vol. 30, Pyongyang, 1987, pp.
468-70. My emphasis.
"The non-aligned movement is a powerful
anti-imperialist revolutionary force reflecting the main trend of the present
era. . . . The non-alignment reflects this
trend."
Kim
Il Sung, "The Non-Aligned Movement is a Mighty Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary
Force of Our Times: Treatise Published in the Inaugural Issue of the Argentine
Magazine Guidebook to the Third World", 16-12-1975, in Kim Il Sung,
Works, vol. 30, Pyongyang, 1987, pp. 573-4. My emphasis.
According to Kim Il Sung, the famous Marxist slogan,
"Workers of all countries, unite!",
has been replaced by
"the international slogan of our
times":
"‘Let the world’s people advocating
Chajusong unite!’"
And in line with these revisionist elaborations, it follows that
"mankind’s cause of Chajusong,
the cause of socialism, will surely emerge
victorious by overcoming the obstacles and difficulties that lie in the
way of its advance."
Kim
Il Sung, Let Us Bring the Advantages of Socialism in Our Country into
Full Play: Policy Speech Addressed to the First Session of the Ninth Supreme
People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 24-5-1990,
Pyongyang, 1990, pp. 30-1. My emphasis.
Korean revisionism is highly misleading in this instance:
Independence alone cannot be equated to either socialism or communism.
Just as anti-imperialism cannot be identified with the socialist revolution.
This confusion between two different, though interrelated, stages of the
revolutionary development during our times leads to major disorientations,
divisions and defeats. In particular, it creates the illusion
- among the popular masses fighting for national and social emancipation
in the developing countries - that a shelter from imperialist aggression
and domination has allegedly been found in non-alignment.
Countries like Afghanistan, Algeria, the Arab Emirates, Bangladesh, Colombia,
Congo, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Uganda are all NAM’s full members, just to mention only
a few. Judging these countries through class criteria, almost all of them
are ruled by oppressive, anti-popular cliques. If we follow the revisionist
logic of Chajusong, whom will workers and peasants in these countries unite
with? Should communists hail the replacement of Suharto by another despot
or should they support the Indonesian people’s struggle against dictatorship
and foreign imperialism? Should communists side with the popular, anti-imperialist
struggles in the Asian continent? Or should they side, instead, with the
corrupt, reactionary leaders of the so-called tiger economies who save
their skin by allowing the IMF and imperialism to further squeeze their
own peoples? And what about in Africa, whom should communists support there?
The various dictators and puppets of imperialism or the African peoples’
struggles for social emancipation and freedom?
Unreserved support should indeed be given to all different steps that developing
countries are genuinely undertaking in defending their rights and the sovereign
administration of their national assets against imperialist interference
and neo-colonialist plunder. But never at any time, should Marxist-Leninist
tactics and strategies reduce the entire revolutionary process to a struggle
for independence only. As Lenin indicated, the anti-imperialist, national-liberation
revolution must not be stopped half-way, but carried through up to the
end by liquidating the bourgeoisie and its state power in order to achieve
true freedom, independence, sovereignty and socialism. In the Marxist-Leninist,
internationalist programme, national liberation
is inseparably connected with social liberation:
that is, the termination of the exploitation of one nation by another becomes
part and parcel with the end of the exploitation of one individual by another.
The people’s unity both against external imperialism and the transnational
corporations and against internal capitalism and reaction must be achieved
mainly from below,
among the popular masses who are victims of a double exploitation - by
external imperialism and by their local bourgeoisie. This unity has nothing
in common with the unprincipled unity advocated by NAM, which is now openly
calling for the developing countries’ integration into the "global village"
of imperialism. And this takes place at a time when transnational corporations
are maximising billions of profits through globalization, at the expense
of growing unemployment, poverty, hunger, and other hardships in the developing
countries.
During the recent NAM’s 12th Summit (September 1988), various global, regional,
economic and social issues were dealt with, including the democratisation
of the UN, international economic cooperation, debts, the North-South dialogue,
disarmament and international security, etc. In his concluding remarks,
the head of the DPRK delegation, SPA’s vice chairman Pak Song Chol, expressed
the revisionist wishful thinking as follows:
"The NAM should concentrate its
effort on establishing a package joint strategy in a bid to counter the
challenges of "globalization." It should raise it as the basic strategy
for coping with the negative effect of "globalization" to strengthen economic
relations among the developing countries, organise actions of south-south
cooperation in keeping with the changed circumstances and develop them
more broadly and vigorously. The DPRK government will in the future remain
faithful to the basic idea and aim of the NAM and make active contributions
to accomplishing the human cause of independence under the wise guidance
of General Secretary Kim Jong Il."
KCNA,
Pyongyang, 5-9-1998.
But the summit’s final document did not in the least challenge the current
imperialist globalization. Instead, NAM called for coexistence and cooperation
between imperialist, oppressive powers and developing, oppressed countries.
The 12th summit, in fact,
"agreed that the central focus
of international development efforts should be in the creation of an enabling
environment where developing countries would be able to acquire the requisite
capacities to successfully enter, compete and benefit from globalisation."
The
Final Document of the 12th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, 2-3 September
1998, Durban, South Africa. My emphasis.
It is therefore apparent that the cause of real independence and freedom,
and that of socialism, cannot be consistently supported by either NAM or
Korean revisionism. It is by opposing all various forms of revisionism
and opportunism that Marxist-Leninists can indeed wage a meaningful struggle
against imperialism. As Lenin clearly indicated prior to the building of
the Third Communist International,
Notwithstanding the DPRK’s successes achieved in the industrial and agricultural
sectors until the late eighties, a series of problems led the government
to admit economic failures
at the end of 1993 and to note that industrial output, energy supplies
and agricultural production were below target. It was concluded that three
years of economic adjustments would be necessary, with priority now being
given to the development of agriculture, light industry and foreign trade.
The grave economic situation, increasingly worsening until today, has significantly
decreased people’s living standards, particularly in the countryside. Economic
development is currently planned on a short-term, yearly basis only. Food
shortages have also prompted humanitarian assistance from various international
organisations. Foreign media, in the meantime, have often highlighted the
country’s decline towards economic catastrophe, speculating that malnutrition
and hunger have led to as many as two million North Koreans dying of starvation
since 1995.
Vis-à-vis this crisis, and in line with the principles of Juche
and Chajusong, the DPRK has continued to abide by its policy of economic
self-reliance, based on the exploitation
of the country’s rich mineral resources and its potential for hydro-electric
power.
According to
Pyongyang, self-reliance can prevent North Korea from losing its independence.
"Building an independent national
economy means building an economy which is free from dependence on others
and which stands on its own feet, an economy which serves one’s own people
and develops on the strength of the resources of one’s own country and
by the efforts of one’s own people. . . . It is essential to adhere to
the principle of self-reliance in economic construction.
Self-reliance
is the revolutionary spirit and a principle of struggle of the communists
in carrying out the revolution by their own initiative. One must believe
in one’s own strength and depend on it in economic construction, just as
in all other economic activities for the revolution and construction."
Kim
Jong Il, "On the Juche Idea: Treatise Sent to the National Seminar on the
Juche Idea Held to Mark the 70th Birthday of the Great Leader Comrade Kim
Il Sung", 31-3-1982, in Kim Jong Il, On the Juche Idea, Pyongyang,
1989, pp. 50-1.
These above principles upholding economic self-reliance - as indicated
by Kim Jong Il in the early eighties - have been recently reiterated in
similar terms with the aim of challenging the damaging effects of globalization
on the Asian economies. In a joint article, appearing in Rodong Sinmun
and Kunroja in September 1998, it is also pointed out the following:
"We must heighten vigilance against
the imperialists’ moves to induce us to ‘reform’ and ‘opening to the outside
world.’ ‘Reform’ and ‘opening’ on their lips are a honey-coated poison.
Clear is our stand towards ‘reform’ and ‘opening.’ We have nothing to ‘reform’
and ‘open.’ By ‘reform’ and ‘opening’ the imperialists mean to revive capitalism.
. . . The source of our economy is, first of all, political and ideological
might and unity."
"Let
Us Adhere to the Line of Building an Independent National Economy", joint
article in Rodong Sinmun and Kunroja, in KCNA, Pyongyang,
17-9-1998.
The current economic crisis in the DPRK - that has not deterred Pyongyang
from proceeding along the road of independence and economic self-reliance
- can be ascribed to the following factors:
1. US imperialism’s constant military
and political pressure, together with economic sanctions and embargoes
imposed against the DPKK;
2. political changes in both Russia
and China during the early nineties and their effects on trade relations
with the DPRK; and
3. recent natural calamities.
In addition to the above causes, the crisis must also be viewed as the
outcome of the ruling revisionist class’ inability to provide its people
with a genuine socialist system, while claiming that a socialist "paradise"
has been built in North Korea over the last fifty years.
Unquestionably, US continued military presence
in South Korea represents the principal
cause for both regional instability and the north’s economic crisis. This
forces Pyongyang to place crucial emphasis on, and divert a big proportion
of the economy to its defence. It should never be underestimated that
for decades the DPRK has remained the target of constant nuclear threats
from US imperialism. Recently, KPA troops
have also been redeployed along the northern borders with China and Russia
since the disintegration of the former USSR. Espionage activities and provocations
from South Korea, together with war exercises regularly staged by American,
South Korean and other foreign forces, have highlighted tension, too. In
addition, there has been no armistice supervisory machinery along the demilitarised
zone (DMZ) during the last seven years (talks between the UN Command and
the Korean People’s Army, KPA, in Panmunjom have only resumed in June 1998,
for the first time since 1991). Washington also continues to characterise
the DPRK as one of the seven states sponsoring "terrorism".
Economic sanctions and embargoes against the DPRK -
imposed by US imperialism for about half a century since the early fifties
- are regulated by the US Law on Trade against Hostile Countries, the US
Law on Supervision of Exports and the US Law on Prohibition of Assistance
to the DPRK. Although commitments were recently made by Washington to normalise
its bilateral relations with Pyongyang, these laws are still in force and
are detrimental to the DPRK’s trade with other countries, as well. US products,
technology or services cannot be exported to North Korea, either directly
or through third countries. Exports of commercially-supplied goods to meet
basic human needs may be authorised under individually validated licences
by the US Commerce Department, and on a case-by-case basis only.
Until the late eighties, most of the DPRK’s trade had been in the form
of barter agreements with former Comecon countries and China. But as the
USSR and Comecon were collapsing, the demand for payment in hard currency
at world market prices for its exports, made by Moscow in November 1990,
hit the DPRK particularly hard. A significant reduction of the amount of
China-North Korea trade also took place at the same time, with China following
Russia by conducting trade with foreign exchange from 1993 onwards rather
than on the basis of barter. The official announcement that the traditional
Soviet-North Korean ties had been finally severed came from Russian President
Boris Yeltsin in June 1992, as he confirmed that the 1961 treaty of friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance between Pyongyang and Moscow was no longer
effective. Nor would Russia any longer provide financial or military support
to the DPRK. Similarly, during 1992, ties between Beijing and Pyongyang
also became severely strained following China’s establishment of diplomatic
relations with Seoul in August.
It was during the early nineties, in fact, that both Russia and China opted
for closer trade and diplomatic relations with the ROK and prompted the
simultaneous admission of both Korean states to UN membership. This simultaneous
entry was made possible, notwithstanding the fact that the DPRK had always
strongly opposed the "two Koreas" policy and the "cross-recognition" of
the two separate states. As a consequence, the DPRK had to diversify its
trade by establishing closer trade links with Japan and South Korea. North
Korea, in fact, is necessitated to import petroleum, chemicals, grains
and cereals, cooking coal, machinery and capital equipment, while it exports
non-ferrous metals, steel, magnesia clinker, coal, and cement.
An additional cause of the economic decline over the last four years has
been represented by natural calamites
and their damages to the infra-structures of the country. Traditionally,
conditions for farming have always been unfavourable in North Korea since
mountains represent nearly three quarters of its territory and arable fields
account for about 16% of the land. Extensive floods in 1995 and 1996, followed
by the worst drought in decades in 1997, severely damaged the country’s
economy and seriously undermined the government’s ability to feed the population.
Natural disasters during 1998 - such as downpours, hailstorms, strong winds
and tidal waves affecting crops, vegetable and rice harvests - further
jeopardised the DPRK’s economic capacity. And to complete the picture of
natural calamities during 1998: thousands of hectares of paddy and non-paddy
fields together with more than 180 mining pits were submerged in water.
Electricity supplies were suspended and telecommunication networks were
paralysed. Roads and railways were completely destroyed by landslides,
dwelling houses and buildings were also destroyed in some of the affected
areas with people reported missing or dead.
The economic situation has now reached a critical point, particularly highlighted
by severe food shortages.
Standards of living are better in the capital - with shops mainly selling
biscuits, drinks and dried fish - but they are appalling in the countryside.
Although the current ration of rice (mid-1998) amounts to 450 grams per
person per day, it can be less in some areas especially damaged by natural
disasters. This situation has led to the flourishing of a black market,
but at a very low-key level. Reports of starvation remain unsubstantiated,
but malnutrition is evident in the countryside as people wander around
rivers and fields in search of fish or grass. Peasants toil on the land
with very rudimentary tools, having to walk for long distances without
cycles or other means of transportation. Agricultural machinery and tractors
are now visible only in the Three-Revolution Exhibition in Pyongyang. Interruptions
to electricity and water supply are frequent and the transport system is
very inefficient. Because of energy shortages, few factories seem to be
functioning and in some areas the survival of the people depends on "humanitarian"
aid or projects from UN or non-governmental foreign organisations.
Coping with such an acute and deep crisis, not only has the government
been forced to appeal for humanitarian aid from abroad (which is mainly
donated by the UN World Food Programme, the USA, Japan, China, the EU,
etc.), but it has also allowed provisions for greater foreign investments
into the country. The entire population is, in the meantime, mobilised
by channelling all energies to solve the food crisis collectively and going
voluntarily to the countryside to help farmers. People are constantly reminded
about the economic crisis through television, papers, meetings at workplaces
. . . and urged to find adequate solutions with the patriotic "Chollima"
spirit. During the first half of 1998, for example, more than 1,900 minor
power stations have been built across the country by using flowing water,
wind power, methane, charcoal gas and other power resources.
It was during the early nineties that the DPRK decided to introduce new
measures in a number of areas of economic management:
1. in management development, by
improving production and management on a more scientific basis through
automation and computerisation;
2. in trade diversification and
liberalisation, by increasing efficiency and competitiveness in the foreign
trade sector and by diversifying exports; and
3. in direct foreign investment
and joint ventures. With the aim of encouraging foreign investments in
the country, the constitution was supplemented
in 1992 in order to safeguard the rights and profits of foreign companies
operating in the DPRK. Three sets of laws
were subsequently approved in order to permit contractual joint ventures
and equity joint ventures with foreign companies which can share their
profits in proportion to the investments made. Wholly-owned foreign enterprises
are also allowed to operate in the country. In this case, foreign companies
alone can invest in the DPRK and carry out management on their own account.
Such enterprises operate, in fact, in the newly-created Rajin-Sonbong Free
Economic and Trade Zone in the north-east of the country, where a variety
of benefits are granted to foreign companies, including exemption from,
or reduction of, enterprise income tax. Total
foreign ownership on investments is therefore
now permitted for the first time in the DPRK’s history.
According to a survey
by the Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) in Seoul, in
1995 DPRK’s trade with Japan totaled $594.6 million, representing 29% of
$2.05 billion in total foreign trade. Trade with China was $549.8 million,
or 26.8% of the total trade. The comparable figures were 6.2% for India,
4.1% each for Russia and Hong Kong, 3.9% for Germany and 3.0% for Thailand.
DPRK’s economic relations with South Korea have steadily developed as South
Korea’s firms can maximise their profits by employing cheap North Korean
labor through joint ventures or production on commissions, and by importing
cheap North Korean minerals and steel products. Though through third countries,
the DPRK’s trade with the South totalled $287.3 million in 1995, compared
with $194.5 million in 1994 and $111.3 million in 1991, according to KOTRA.
A Handbook on North Korea, Korea
Herald, Seul, 1996.
Vis-à-vis the DPRK’s worsening economic crisis during the nineties,
and in spite of the severe living conditions of the population, there is
no apparent opposition to the authority and cohesion of the regime. This
political stability was confirmed by the recent elections to the 10th SPA,
held on 26-7-1998, i.e., after more than three years from the expiry of
the five-term of the 9th SPA (last elections had been held in April 1990).
DPRK’s media reported, in fact, that all 100% of the votes had been cast
to the officially appointed candidates. More than one in every ten newly
elected deputies belong to the army: 687 SPA members include, in fact,
75 lieutenant generals or higher military personnel. The army is very much
in evidence in the country because of the high number of soldiers necessary
to counter the threat from the south. The military are also employed on
public projects and in helping the peasants in the countryside. Various
military check-points are located around the country, in order to control
movements from one place to another. In this sense, there exists a militarised
society in North Korea, and also on account of the major emphasis placed
on the army’s role.
Kim Jong Il is always referred to as "General Secretary of the Workers’
Party of Korea, Chairman of the DPRK National Defence Commission, and Supreme
Commander of the Korean People’s Army." His regular visits to army units
around the country for "on-the-spot guidance" appear as the principal item
of news in daily papers.
But the DPRK’s most striking political feature continues to remain the
enormous emphasis placed upon the people’s
unity behind their leader,
Kim Jong Il. This unity is essentially strengthened sentimentally and emotionally:
"love and trust" - and not political and ideological consciousness - are
supposed to pervade all aspects of social and political life. According
to one of Kim Jong Il’s quotations, "the art of moving people lies in the
heart." The DPRK has thus come to resemble a theocracy, where the leader’s
"legendary" exploits and his "on-the-spot guidances" determine everything.
This personality cult has reached astonishing proportions, unprecedented
in our century, and sharply contrasts with the basically equalitarian and
collectivist nature of the North Korean society itself. At the first session
of the 10th SPA, convened in September 1998, for example, Kim Jong Il was
praised as "an outstanding thinker and theoretician, a distinguished statesman
and a peerlessly brilliant commander . . . as the most intimate comrade,
the most faithful helper of Kim Il Sung for more than 30 years."
KCNA, Pyongyang, 5-9-1998.
As for developments in the ideological domain, the uniqueness
and originality of Juche have
been particularly highlighted so that it should be no longer interpreted
as a development or creative application of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine
to the specific conditions of the country. Juche can now stand on its own
principles, totally detached from Marxism-Leninism (already in 1992 any
reference to "Marxism-Leninism" had been deleted from the constitution).
As Kim Jong Il pointed out in 1996,
"The Juche philosophy is an original
philosophy which has been evolved and systematised with its own principles.
The historic contribution made by the Juche philosophy . . . lies not
in its advancement of Marxist materialistic dialectics, but in its clarification
of new
philosophical principles centred on man . . .
The Juche philosophy
is an original philosophy which is fundamentally
different from the preceding philosophy
in its task and principles."
Kim
Jong Il, The Juche Philosophy is an Original Revolutionary Philosophy:
Discourse Published in Kulloja, Theoretical Magazine of the Central Committee
of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Pyongyang, 26-7-1996, pp. 1-2. My emphases.
Nowhere in the country, in fact, can one find a monument or a bust of Marx,
Engels, Lenin or Stalin, but only two small portraits - one of Marx, the
other of Lenin - appear in Kim Il Sung Square in the capital. Marxist education
has long been abolished, as well. Hence, all North Korean students - until
the termination of their university studies - now have to study "The Revolutionary
Activities of Comrade Kim Il Sung" for one or two hours per week and also
"The Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Kim Jong Il" for another one or
two hours per week.
13. THE STRUGGLE FOR REUNIFICATION
AND INDEPENDENCE
A final peace arrangement has yet to be found in Korea, whose division
continues to remain frozen along its 38th parallel, the most heavily armed
border in the contemporary world. This anomalous situation is dramatically
evidenced not only by the 250-km-long military demarcation line (MDL) bisecting
the peninsula and its people, but also by the concrete wall (5-8 m. high,
10-19 m. wide at the bottom and 3-7 m. wide at the top) that runs all along
the MDL’s southern side, since it was built by the South Koreans during
1977-79. Undoubtedly, it is US imperialism that bears the responsibility
for having imposed - for more than half a century - such a tragic and anachronistic
division and for having instigated the political animosity between the
two sides.
During all this time, Washington has amassed
in South Korea its highest concentration of troops outside the
USA (more than 45,000 during
the mid-eighties, a number that has now been reduced to 37,000)
together with its
most modern conventional and nuclear weapons.
ROK’s claims - during the early nineties - that there are no longer US
nuclear missiles stationed in its territory have neither been confirmed
nor denied by Washington. No inspection has ever been conducted to verify
the existence of American nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. But
in any case, when entering South Korean ports and US air installations
in the ROK, American naval and air forces routinely carry a range of nuclear
weapons. It is therefore absolutely clear that - today, as well - US imperialism
can easily target any part of the north by using its air-launched weapons
and sea-borne cruise nuclear missiles.
With complete disregard for the Korean people’s right to self-determination,
sovereignty and independence, the American presence has produced the double
effect of both partitioning the country and arrogantly subjugating South
Korea to semi-colonial status. The maintenance of Korea’s separation between
two states has obviously permitted Washington to dominate South Korea,
viewed as its military strategic foothold in Asia, and to directly interfere
in its internal affairs. Therefore, the general struggle of all Korean
people for their reunification and independence becomes part and parcel
of South Korea’s liberation from the American yoke and of the democratisation
of its society.
Because of American military, political and economic domination, for more
than half a century the ROK has indeed witnessed a succession of barbarous
fascist, military dictatorships and pseudo-democratic regimes, all congenial
to US monopolies’ penetration into the country. Anti-communist, fascist
laws and institutions - such as the National Security Law and the National
Security Planning Agency (formerly known as the Korean Central Intelligence
Agency until 1980) - have particularly contributed to brutally suppress
patriotic and democratic forces in the south, preventing substantial steps
towards national reconciliation. Soon after the Korean war, the ROK-US
Mutual Defence Pact (permitting US troops to be stationed indefinitely
in the south) and a series of other economic and political agreements between
Washington and Seoul strengthened American domination in the ROK. Syngman
Rhee was thus allowed to retain power until 1960, mainly by means of ballot
rigging, martial law, terrorism, repression and massacres of students and
others. Shortly after popular uprisings had forced Rhee’s resignation,
a military coup was staged by Pak Jung Hi together with other fascist,
pro-American elements within the ROK army, whose goal was to achieve "unification
through victory over communism." By dissolving the National Assembly, and
through martial law, anti-communism, suppression of democratic activities
and so on, this fascist dictatorship could securely safeguard American
military and commercial interests in South Korea. The country became a
useful supplier of mercenary troops for US imperialism in its war against
the peoples of Indochina. Towards the end of the Vietnam war, in fact,
South Korean troops in Vietnam could even outnumber American ground troops,
while South Korean businesses could derive immense economic benefits from
Seoul’s support to US military aggression in Vietnam.
Pak’s fascist tyranny exacerbated class contradictions and conflicts: anti-fascist
and anti-imperialist struggles intensified in scope and developed among
various social strata, also involving bourgeois democratic parties. Towards
the late seventies Pak was shot and killed by one of his closest aides
and replaced by other military hardliners. Particularly brutal repressions
were carried out in May 1980, with an estimated 2,000 civilians murdered
by the army in the south-western city of Kwangju. As on other occasions,
this massacre was supported by Washington since ROK was a "treaty ally"
and the USA had "a very strong security interest in that part of the world."
Throughout the eighties, this constant repression of democratic and religious
organisations, trade unions, students, etc., and the denial of their social
and political rights became highly congenial to those South Korean corporations
which could easily maximise their profits by relying on American investments.
Democratic protests thus escalated and involved millions of South Koreans
during the second half of the eighties. Inevitably, the traditional power
of the military was gradually eroded as liberal opposition groups and parties
began to actively engage in the political scene.
The chapter of military dictatorships and fascist repression in the ROK
seemed to have been finally closed. With the appointment, as president,
of Kim Young Sam (Democratic Liberal Party) in February 1993 and with the
subsequent appointment of former political prisoner Kim Dae Jung (National
Congress for New Politics) in February 1998, partial democratic steps were
taken to improve the faltering economy, combat corruption and grant amnesty
to thousands of political prisoners. However, these reformist and democratic
changes must always be contextualized within the framework of the foreign-dependent
capitalism existing in the ROK, one of the so-called tiger economies, now
hit by the Asian crisis and affected by radical social and political struggles
on the part of increasingly impoverished workers. Due to the most serious
economic crisis in the country’s history, Seoul requested the IMF to provide
an emergency rescue package for its economy during late 1997. At the same
time, the permanent US military and economic domination of the ROK continues
to remain the main stumbling block to the full democratisation of its society.
The National Security Law, obstructing contacts and exchanges between the
south and the north, has never been repealed, just as the fascist National
Security Planning Agency still remains active in repressing patriotic and
democratic forces. Indeed, the abolition of these fascist laws and institutions
cannot but represent a preliminary step along the path towards national
reconciliation and peace. The "democratic" credentials of the Kim Dae Jung’s
government - and its "sunshine policy" towards the north - will become
credible and trust-worthy only provided that a new political determination
is displayed to truly democratise South Korean society and to sever ROK’s
dependence on US imperialism.
By maintaining its permanent military presence in the south and the continuation
of the national divide, Washington - with Seoul’s official approval - has
consolidated the so-called "two Koreas"
policy - a policy intended to freeze for ever the separation between the
two Korean states and to maintain a permanent US military foothold in the
South. American
ambitions to dominate the entire Korean peninsula at the height of the
cold war had been frustrated by the outcome of the Korean war and by the
signing of the 1953 armistice agreement. Once its scheme to dominate the
whole of Korea by "prevailing over communism" had proved unachievable,
Washington resorted to its "two Koreas" policy with its long-term aim of
increasingly strengthening its military, economic and political interests
in the whole north-east Asian region. This policy has therefore become
an integral component of the US hegemonic strategy at the expense, in particular,
of the Korean people. As part of the US forces’ arsenal in South Korea,
nuclear weapons began to be deployed from 1957 onwards. It was from the
sixties onwards - until today - that Washington also began to establish
a triangular "security system" between the USA, Japan and the ROK. Amid
strong opposition and resistance by the South Korean students and people,
Seoul was prompted to accept Japan’s terms in normalising their bilateral
relations by means of the ROK-Japan agreements of 22-6-1965. These agreements
were reached in parallel with the 1965 Japan-US treaty, later followed
by the 1969 Japan-US joint statement. These agreements determined South
Korea’s security as "essential to the security of Japan itself." A dangerous
US-Japan-ROK military alliance was thus put into place.
Until about ten years ago - as the USA was competing for world hegemony
with Soviet social-imperialism - it was the "red threat" in Asia that allegedly
justified Washington’s military, nuclear build-up in Korea. The American
imperialist strength in the north-east Asian region was not only made possible
through closer military links with Japan, but also by means of the Sino-American
rapprochement. But with the collapse of the USSR and the disappearance
of its "threat" in Asia, no substantially different attitudes emerged in
Washington which - on account of its imperialist nature and its hegemonic
aims - continues to pursue its "two Koreas" policy by alleging a "southward
invasion from the north." Consequently, a serious threat to peace and security
in the Korean peninsula has been posed by regularly staging yearly military
exercises against the DPRK since 1969 (code-named Team Spirit since 1976)
and by targeting the north with increasingly sophisticated weapons of mass
destruction. The Team Spirit exercises have expanded each year, involving
some 200,000 US and ROK troops and becoming the largest such exercise conducted
by US forces throughout the world. This aggressive US interference in Korea
has effectively subordinated the ROK’s ruling class to American interests
and demands, thus obstructing the way towards national reconciliation and
reunification between the north and the south of the country.
Vis-à-vis the "two Koreas" policy and Seoul’s subservience to US
imperialism, the struggle to uphold the necessity of one Korea only, rather
than two separate halves, has always been consistently maintained by the
DPRK. Its policies, in this regard, reflect the genuine and patriotic aspirations
of all Korean people wishing to live re-united, independent and free from
outside domination and interference. Given the impasse that has prevented
reunification for half a century, Pyongyang’s anti-imperialist stance has
indeed permitted the maintenance of the northern half of Korea as a sovereign
and independent state. The attitude towards US imperialism becomes, in
this case, the main criterion by which to differentiate the patriotic,
anti-imperialist forces in Korea, truly interested in national independence,
from the flunkeyish forces, subservient to foreign imperialism. It is abundantly
clear, in fact, that Korea cannot be peacefully
reunified as long as the constant threat of military confrontation, instigated
by Washington, hangs over its peninsula.
The Korean people’s inalienable right to their full independence represents
a question of both justice and principle
that cannot be bartered for some concessions from US imperialism.
Repeatedly, the DPRK has had to challenge US pressure militarily, economically,
politically and diplomatically for more than half a century. It was soon
after the Korean war that an international conference was organised in
Geneva in April-June 1954 in order to deal with the peaceful settlement
of the Korean question. The DPRK’s proposals to withdraw all foreign armed
forces from Korean territory within six months and to hold free, general
elections were met with approval by the Soviet, Chinese and other delegations,
while they were blatantly rejected by the USA and its allies. On various
occasions, between the fifties and sixties, Pyongyang reiterated the necessity
to speed up the process towards peaceful reunification by requesting official
negotiations between the DPRK’s SPA and the ROK’s National Assembly, to
develop bilateral economic, scientific and cultural exchanges and to allow
unrestricted travel between the north and the south. Particular emphasis
was placed on the proposal to involve - once US troops had withdrawn from
South Korea - all political parties and organisations from the north and
the south in holding general elections and forming a unified Korean government.
The DPRK also suggested to Seoul the reduction of their respective armed
forces to no more than 100,000 units on each side. However, all these various
proposals - even those regarding the establishment of travelling arrangements
- were systematically turned down by both Seoul and Washington, whose official
policies were dictated by their belligerent and uncompromising slogan:
"march north for unification."
But for the first time, during the early seventies, official bilateral
exchanges and contacts between Pyongyang and Seoul led to a series of significant
agreements contained in the North-South
Joint Statement of 4-7-1972.
The agreements contemplated some confidence building measures in order
to avoid armed provocations along the MDL, the resumption of bilateral
contacts and exchanges at various levels and the establishment of direct
telephone links between Pyongyang and Seoul in order to immediately tackle
the solution of any eventual problems or incidents. Most importantly, the
three principles of national reunification, which had been put forward
by Kim Il Sung, were clearly indicated in the joint statement:
"Firstly, reunification should
be achieved independently, without reliance upon outside force or its intervention;
Secondly, reunification should
be achieved by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of arms against
the other side;
Thirdly, great national unity as
one nation should be promoted first of all, transcending the differences
of ideology, ideal and social system."
Kim
Han Gil, Modern History of Korea, Pyongyang, 1979, pp. 548-9.
As for the differences between the two systems existing in the north and
the south, Kim Il Sung always put the accent on their necessity to coexist
within a unitary framework:
"We consider that the north and
the south will be able to promote great national unity in spite of the
differences in their ideas and systems, political views and religious beliefs,
if they all take a patriotic attitude and stand for national reunification.
. . .
Whether one
believes in communism, nationalism or capitalism must not be an obstacle
to great national unity. We are not opposed to the nationalists and capitalists
in south Korea. The majority of the south Korean capitalists are national
capitalists. We have been pursuing a policy of protecting national capitalists.
For the sake of national reunification, we will unite and cooperate with
the people of all backgrounds in south Korea including nationalists and
national capitalists."
Kim
Han Gil, Modern History of Korea, Pyongyang, 1979, pp. 548-9.
In line with the provisions contained in the 1972 statement, a north-south
coordination commission was set up in order to settle various outstanding
issues and implement the principles contained in the joint statement. But
by 1975 the commission had made no concrete progress in fulfilling its
task. Similarly, parallel talks between the Red Cross organisations of
North and South Korea also came to a deadlock. As always, major pressure
was exerted by Washington in line with its "two Koreas" policy of permanent
separation between the two states. Even after the signing of the 1972 north-south
joint statement and the beginning of some bilateral dialogue, Washington
carried on with its policy of aggression and war by fomenting an intensified
wave of anti-communism and anti-north confrontation in the ROK, and by
increasing and updating its military arsenal there. During the mid-seventies,
in fact, more than 42,000 US troops were stationed in the south, together
with an enormous stockpile of more than 1,000 nuclear weapons (i.e., a
concentrated nuclear capability which was 820 times greater than the force
of the atomic bomb dropped at Hiroshima).
The Korean issue was raised at the UN in 1975 and its General Assembly
passed a resolution - the first of its kind - calling for the eviction
of US forces from the ROK, the dissolution of the UN Command stationed
there and the conclusion of a peace treaty to replace the armistice agreement.
In the meantime, no reply was ever given to a proposal which had been sent
by the DPRK’s SPA to the US congress in March 1974 with the aim of finalising
a final peace arrangement between Pyongyang and Washington. After US imperialism’s
defeat in the Vietnam war, instead, the US defence department contemplated
the option of using nuclear weapons in case of hostilities in Korea, viewed
within the perimeter of the "forward defence zone" of the USA.
American interference in South Korea’s internal affairs also intensified
during the seventies. The then South Korean military dictator, Pak Jung
Hi, while barbarically repressing democratic forces at home, felt compelled
by Washington to disavow the spirit and the principles contained in the
1972 joint statement so that the ROK could be maintained as the USA’s anti-communist
bulwark in Asia. Pak Jung Hi’s approach to "peaceful reunification" indeed
translated into the traditional cold war policy of "prevailing over communism"
by force. In 1973 he wrote the following:
"The only way to bring Communists
to their knees is to ‘display strength’ superior to theirs in politics,
economy and other fields of the society. Concentrically
expressing the idea and creed of mine and my colleagues, we set forth ‘unification
by prevailing over communism’."
quoted
in Korea is One, Pyongyang, 1978, p. 198.
By contrast, Kim Il Sung correctly singled out Washington as the main factor
fomenting such divisive policies pursued by Seoul. On 23-6-1973 he declared:
"Adopting two-faced tactics under
the ‘Nixon doctrine’, the United States is not willing to desist from its
plans to instigate south Korea’s bellicose elements to make Koreans fight
Koreans, perpetuate the division of Korea and create two Koreas, even after
the North-South Joint Statement was published and dialogue started between
the two parts of Korea."
Kim
Il Sung, "Let Us Prevent a National Partition and Reunify the Country:
Speech at the Pyonyang Mass Rally to Welcome the Party and Government Delegation
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic", 23-6-1973, in Kim Il Sung, Works,
vol. 28, Pyongyang, 1986, p. 326.
During the seventies, Pyongyang continued to reiterate the three principles
of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity and put
forward the idea of a neutral, confederal state, free from the presence
of foreign troops and military bases: the "Democratic Confederal Republic
of Koryo" which would join the UN as a single state. During the early eighties,
Pyongyang proposed to hold tripartite talks between the DPRK, the USA and
ROK in order to replace the armistice agreement with a final peace arrangement
and to adopt a non-aggression declaration between the north and the south.
These two proposals, too, met with American and South Korean opposition
since their implementation would have made US military presence in the
south redundant. In October 1980, Kim Il Sung also suggested the creation
of a permanent nuclear-free peninsula by indicating the following practical
steps in an envisaged process:
1. The reduction - once all American
troops had been withdrawn - of the military strength of North and South
Korea’s forces to 100,000-150,000 soldiers on each side;
2. the abolition of the MDL and
the dismantling of all military installation in its vicinity; and
3. the formation of a single, combined
army through the amalgamation of the KPA with the ROK’s National Army.
In line with the above anti-imperialist positions, during the early nineties
Kim Il Sung further elaborated the crucial issue of Korean reunification
and independence in the "10-Point Programme
of the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country".
Its main points:
"1. A unified state, independent,
peaceful and neutral, should be founded through the great unity of the
whole nation. The north
and the south should found a pan-national unified state to represent all
parties, all groupings and all the members of the nation from all walks
of life, while leaving the existing two systems and two governments intact.
The pan-national unified state should be a confederal state in which the
two regional governments of the north and the south are represented equally,
and an independent, peaceful and nonaligned neutral state which does not
lean to any great power.
2. Unity should be based on patriotism
and the spirit of national independence. . . .
3. Unity should be achieved on
the principle of promoting co-existence, co-prosperity and common interests
and subordinating everything to the cause of national reunification. .
. .
4. All political disputes that
foment division and confrontation between fellow countrymen should be ended
and unity should be achieved. . . .
5. The fear of invasion from both
south and north, and the ideas of prevailing over communism and communisation
should be dispelled, and north and south should believe in each other and
unite. The north and
the south should not threaten and invade each other. Neither side should
try to force its system on the other or to absorb the other.
6. The north and south should value
democracy and join hands on the road to national reunification, without
rejecting each other because of differences in ideals and principles. .
7. The north and south should protect
the material and spiritual wealth of individuals and organisations and
encourage their use for the promotion of great national unity. . . .
8. Understanding, trust and unity
should be built up across the nation through contact, exchange visits and
dialogue. . . .
9. The whole nation, north, south
and overseas, should strengthen its solidarity for the sake of national
reunification. . . .
10. Those who have contributed
to the great unity of the nation and to the cause of national reunification
should be honoured. . . ."
Kim
Il Sung, 10-Point Programme of the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for
the Reunification of the Country, 6-4-1993.
Indeed, bilateral exchanges aimed at peaceful reunification made rapid
progress during the early nineties, with eight rounds of talks between
the two Korean governments during 1990-92. In
February 1992 both sides ratified
the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Cooperation and Exchange
between the North and the South and the Joint Declaration on
the De-nuclearisation
of the Korean Peninsula.
The agreement reiterated non-interference in each other’s systems, the
replacement of the armistice agreement with a final peace treaty and also
contemplated various forms of mutual cooperation. High-level contacts between
the north and the south followed this agreement. However, while breaching
both the spirit of the non-aggression agreement and the declaration on
denuclearisation, US and South Korean forces staged Focus Lens military
exercises in 1992 and then, in 1993, resumed their Team Spirit military
exercises which included rehearsals for battlefield nuclear war against
the DPRK. These aggressive military moves prompted the DPRK to break off
all high-level contacts with the south. It is important to note, in fact,
that American war games in Korea used to be aimed at imaginary Soviet-
or Chinese-backed invasions. But since the collapse of the USSR and the
normalisation of relations between Beijing and Seoul, they have been aimed
only at the DPRK and its non-nuclear military forces.
Notwithstanding
attempts to establish a bilateral dialogue between the two Korean states
during the early nineties, tension also re-emerged in the Korean peninsula
because of the so-called nuclear crisis.
While possessing its nuclear arsenal
in the region, Washington began to create the suspicion that the DPRK was
diverting plutonium from peaceful nuclear projects towards developing its
own nuclear weapons. The dispute over the DPRK’s possible development of
nuclear weapons began to assume crisis proportions in late 1993, thus escalating
during 1994. In the midst of the crisis, in July 1993, during his visit
to Panmunjom US president Bill Clinton strongly warned the DPRK against
developing its nuclear weapons, since:
"if they ever use them, it will
be the end of their country."
Keesing’s
Record of World Events, News Digest for July 1993, p. 39557.
In its ideological propaganda, Washington continued to brand the DPRK as
the last remaining bastion of "stalinism" sponsoring international terrorism.
But during the crisis, one clearly recognised that no solid proof ever
emerged from the various inspections by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) during 1992-94 that Pyongyang had actually assembled a nuclear
device or was going to do so. Finally, the crisis was solved on 21-10-94
with the signing of a bilateral US-DPRK
agreement (reached without ROK’s direct
involvement). Its main provisions:
1. the USA would organise an international
consortium to provide light-water reactors (LWR), with a total generating
capacity of 2,000 megawatts, by a target date of 2003. In return, North
Korea would freeze all activities on its existing nuclear reactors and
related facilities, and permit them to be continuously monitored by IAEA
inspectors;
2. North Korea would come into
full compliance with the IAEA (i.e., by means of accepting its inspections);
3. the USA would arrange to supply
500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually to make up for energy foregone
by North Korea before the LWR came into operation;
4. the two states would reduce
existing barriers to trade and investment and open diplomatic liaison offices
in Washington and Pyongyang as preliminary steps aimed at eventually normalising
their relations; and
5. the DPRK would re-engage in
the north-south dialogue.
In order to implement the terms of the above agreement, the Korean Peninsula
Development Organisation (KEDO) was created in March 1995. KEDO was charged
with providing North Korea with two LWR to replace its existing graphite-based
models. But as a matter of fact, only limited steps have so far been taken
to properly implement the provisions of the 1994 US-DPRK agreement. Delays
have been experienced, for example, in delivering heavy oil supply to the
DPRK and various sources have recently indicated that the construction
of the reactor project in the DPRK may face indeed a delay of several years.
In the meantime - while an extreme economic crisis has recently affected
North Korea and dramatically deteriorated the living standards of its population
- Washington has not desisted from exerting economic and military pressure
even after the conclusion of its bilateral agreement with Pyongyang in
1994. Contrary to the provisions of this agreement, not only does Washington
continue to maintain its sanctions against the DPRK, but it also continues
to stage regular war exercises in the Korean peninsula, having deployed
additional troops and updated nuclear-powered carriers and attack submarines
around the Korean peninsula. The so-called RIMPAK military exercises in
1998 were intended - as in the past - to discourage the DPRK from an imaginary
"invasion to the south". Furthermore, other anti-DPRK manoeuvres code-named
"98 Foal Eagle" and "98 Hwarang" were staged between October and November
in close military cooperation between the ROK, the USA and Japan, and with
the involvement of additional troops, aircraft carriers and warships of
the US 7th Fleet stationed in Japan. In June 1998, US secretary of defence
William Cohen stated that the USA would
continue to deploy its troops in South Korea even after the north and the
south are reunified.
This constant, provocative show of military strength on the part of US
imperialism - almost driving the north and the south of Korea to the brink
of a second Korean war - has not prevented Pyongyang from maintaining a
channel of communication and dialogue in order to peacefully solve the
national question. In March 1998 the so-called four-way peace talks in
Geneva involved the two Korean states, the USA and China and aimed at creating
a permanent peace arrangement in the Korean peninsula. These talks, nonetheless,
failed to achieve any concrete results because of Washington’s refusal
to include on their agenda the principal outstanding issues of the Korean
question, i.e., its troops’ withdrawal from the ROK and the signing of
a US-DPRK peace agreement. A fourth round of the four-way talks is scheduled
to resume in early 1999 in Geneva. Pyongyang maintains that, once US troops
have been unconditionally withdrawn from the Korean peninsula, all other
outstanding matters can then be resolved by the two Korean states bilaterally,
without necessarily involving the USA and China.
In line with its former anti-imperialist positions, the DPRK regards both
the US troops’ withdrawal from the ROK and the conclusion of a US-DPRK
peace treaty as questions of principle, as preconditional steps towards
genuine reunification and independence. Pyongyang’s insistence on a new
comprehensive peace treaty with Washington is determined by the fact that
the USA and the DPRK had been the only signatories to the 1953 armistice.
In this regard, Kim Jong Il has recently pointed out the following:
"The question of the reunification
of our country is a question of putting an end to the foreign domination
and intervention of South Korea. . . .
The question of easing the tension
and removing the danger of war in our country can be settled, before all
else, when the United States gives up its hostile policy against our republic
and a peace treaty is concluded between the DPRK and the US. Our Republic
and the United States are still in the state of temporary armistice and
the danger of war has not been dispelled from our country. In order to
remove the danger of war and ensure peace, a peace treaty must be concluded
between DPRK and the United States and a new peace-keeping mechanism must
be established."
Kim
Jong Il, Let Us Carry Out The Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung's Instructions
For National Reunification, 4-8-1997, Pyongayng, 1997, p. 2, 15.
In April 1998, the DPRK’s latest proposal for national reunification
and independence has been put forward on the basis of the following five-point
policy:
1. maintaining the principle of
national independence;
2. achieving unity under the banner
of patriotism;
3. improving inter-Korean relations;
4. fighting against domination
by outsiders and anti-reunification forces; and
5. encouraging contacts, dialogue
and solidarity among all Koreans.
Kim Jong Il elaborated
this five-point policy by indicating the following:
"Claiming for independence and
north-south reconciliation and unity while pursuing the policy of dependence
on foreign forces is nothing but an empty talk. . . .
We must categorically
oppose and reject sycophancy to great powers and dependence on foreign
forces, and achieve great national unity on the basis of the principle
of national independence. . . .
The demands
and interests of different classes and strata of the nation are different
from one another, but the primary task facing our nation today is national
reunification, and we must subordinate everything to the cause of national
reunification. . . .
We will also
unite with people from upper classes in power, figures from the ruling
party and the opposition party, big capitalists and generals (in South
Korea - Ed.) under the banner of great unity of the nation, if they value
the common interests of the nation and want the reunification of the country.
. . . Without
fighting against the domination and interference of the foreign forces
and the divisive force at home and abroad, it would be impossible to realise
unity between north and south, the great unity of the nation and the reunification
of the country."
Kim
Jong Il, Let Us Reunify the Country Independently and Peacefully Through
the Great Unity of the Entire Nation: Letter to the National Symposium
to Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Historic Joint Conference of Representatives
of Political Parties and Public Organizations in North and South Korea,
18-4-1998, Pyongyang, 1998, pp. 10, 12,15.
It clearly appears that the above DPRK’s policies neither strengthen nor
advance the socialist cause - i.e., the cause of Marxism-Leninism - in
the Korean peninsula. And it could not be otherwise, since North Korea
is a revisionist state. However, its 1998 five-point policy, aimed at reunification
and independence, does challenge
US imperialism in its aggressive attempts to dominate both the south and
the north of the country. And eventually, even the prospect of an absorption
of North Korea by the South - under the aegis of US imperialism - would
also represent a severe set-back for all peoples of Korea and Asia.
The current struggle waged by the Korean people for their reunification
and independence, free from outside American interference and from its
nuclear threat, becomes an integral component of the world anti-imperialist
revolution. As such,
the Korean people’s struggle against US imperialism must be highly estimated
and unconditionally supported by all democratic and progressive forces
world-wide. In Imperialism and the Revolution Enver
Hoxha brilliantly outlines the correlation
between the anti-imperialist revolution and the socialist revolution
in the following terms:
"When we speak of the revolution
we do not mean only the socialist revolution. In the present epoch of the
revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism, the peoples’ liberation
struggle, the national-democratic, anti-imperialist revolutions, the national
liberation movements, also, are component parts of a single revolutionary
process, the world proletarian revolution, as Lenin and Stalin explained.
‘Leninism,’ says Stalin, ‘has proved
. . . that the national problem can be solved only in connection with and
on the basis of the proletarian revolution, and that the road to victory
of the revolution in the West lies through the revolutionary alliance with
the liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries against
imperialism. The national problem is a part of the general problem of the
proletarian revolution, a part of the problem of the dictatorship of the
proletariat’.
J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 6, p. 144, Alb. ed.
This
connection has become even clearer and more natural today, when, with the
collapse of the old colonial system, most of the peoples have taken a big
step forward towards independence by creating their own national states,
and when, following this step, they are aspiring to go further. They want
the liquidation of the neo-colonialist system, of any imperialist dependence
and any exploitation by foreign capital. They want their complete sovereignty
and economic and political independence. It has now been proved that such
aspirations can be realised, such objectives can be attained only through
the elimination of any foreign domination by and dependence on foreigners
and the liquidation of oppression and exploitation by local bourgeois and
big land-owner rulers.
Hence, the linking and interlacing of the national-democratic, anti-imperialist,
national liberation revolution with the socialist revolution, because,
by striking at imperialism and reaction, which are common enemies of the
proletariat and the peoples, these revolutions also pave the way for great
social transformations, assist the victory of the socialist revolution.
And vice-versa, by striking at the imperialist bourgeoisie, by destroying
its economic and political positions, the socialist revolution creates
favourable conditions for and facilitates the triumph of liberation movements.
. . .
Therefore, when
we draw the conclusion that the revolution is a question put forward for
solution, that it is on the agenda, we have in mind not only the socialist
revolution, but also the democratic anti-imperialist revolution."
Enver
Hoxha, Imperialism and the Revolution, Tirana, 1979, pp. 173-5.
My emphasis.
It is high time for the Korean people to live re-united, free from outside
interference, sovereign in their own territory, and fully independent.
Consistent and unconditional support must therefore be given to all their
anti-imperialist efforts in both North and South Korea, and outside the
country, in order to uphold their inalienable and sacred right to independence.
To achieve the peaceful reunification of Korea, therefore, all political
and diplomatic steps undertaken by the DPRK which challenge US imperialism
must be publicised and defended by the widest possible sections of peoples
in various countries, including the USA. But at the same time, neither
revisionism in the north nor pseudo-democratic capitalism in the south
will ever free the Korean working masses from economic and political exploitation
and oppression. The prospect of real social and national liberation can
only be achieved through a Korean socialist revolution led by a truly Marxist-Leninist
party.
LONG LIVE KOREAN REUNIFICATION
AND INDEPENDENCE!
DOWN WITH KOREAN REVISIONISM!
FOR AN INDEPENDENT AND SOCIALIST
KOREA!
AIYL Anti-Imperialist Youth League
AJPGA Anti-Japanese People’s Guerrilla
Army
ARF Association for the Restoration
of the Fatherland
CPK Communist Party of Korea
CPNK Communist Party of North Korea
CPSU(B) Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (Bolshevik)
DFRF Democratic Front for the Reunification
of the Fatherland
DIU Down-With-Imperialism Union
DMZ demilitarised zone
DNUFNK Democratic National United
Front of North Korea
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea
ECCI Executive Committee of the
Communist International
EU European Union
GNP gross national product
IAEA International Atomic Energy
Agency
IMF International Monetary Fund
KCNA Korean Central News Agency
KEDO Korean Peninsula Development
Organization
KOTRA Korea Trade and Investment
Promotion Agency
KPA Korean People’s Army
KPRA Korean People’s Revolutionary
Army
LWR light water reactor
KRA Korean Revolutionary Army
MDL military demarcation line
ML Marxist-Leninist
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NKPA North Korean People’s Army
NKPC North Korean People’s Committee
PPCNK Provisional People’s Committee
of North Korea
ROK Republic of Korea
SPA Supreme People’s Assembly
UN United Nations
USA United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
WPK Workers’ Party of Korea
WPNK Workers’ Party of North Korea
YCL Young Communist League
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Acknowledgement: the diagram under
the title [hard copy only] has been reproduced from the Far Eastern
Economic Review, vol. 161, n. 49, 3 December 1998.
Copies of "Long Live Korean Reunification
and Independence! Down with Korean Revisionism!" can be requested at
the address below, including payment of AUS$ 2 for each copy (postage included;
Australian cheques or money orders payable to "N. Steinmayr").
N. Steinmayr, PO Box 4276, Melbourne University,
Parkville, 3052, Vic., Australia.