UNITED FRONT TACTICS
THE MARXIST-LENINIST TACTICS
OF THE UNITED FRONT
In January 1921 the Central Committee of the United
Communist Party of Germany published an Open Letter which
"Called on all workers, trade unions and socialist
organisations to unite their forces in combating reaction and the capitalists'
offensive against the working people's vital rights".
At the 3rd Congress of the Communist International in
June/July 1921, Lenin expressed strong support
for the tactics embodied in the Open Letter:
(Central Committee, United Communist Party of
Germany: Open letter, in: 'Die Rote Fahne' (The Red Flag), 8 January 1921,
in: Note to: Vladimir I. Lenin Collected Works', Volume 32; Moscow; 1965;
"The Open Letter' is a model political step. This
is stated in our theses and we must certainly stand by it".
And in a letter to Grigory Zinoviev*,
(Vladimir I. Lenin: Speech in Defence of the Tactics
of the Communist International, 3rd Congress of Communist International,
(July 1921), in: 'Collected Works', Volume 32; Moscow; 1965; p. 470).
"The tactic of the Open Letter should definitely be
applied everywhere. . All those who have failed to grasp the necessity
of the Open Letter tactic should be expelled from the Communist
International within a month after its Third Congress".
In December 1921, the name of 'United
Front Tactics' was applied to these Marxist-Leninist
tactics, which were in essence to work for the formation of united fronts
of all workers around specific limited objectives. All workers, and
organisations composed predominantly of workers, were encouraged to take
an active part in a united front with the aims of which they were in
agreement, irrespective of their views and policies on other questions:
(Vladimir I. Lenin: Letter to Grigory Y. Zinoviev
(10 July 1921), in: 'Collected Works', Volume 42; Moscow; 1969; p. 321).
"The interests of the communist movement generally
require the communist parties and the Communist International as a whole
to support the slogan of the united front of the workers and to
take the initiative in this matter.
United front tactics were not only supported by
Lenin who moved in the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party:
The united front of the workers means the united front
of all workers who want to fight against capitalism, which includes those
who still follow the anarchists, syndicalists, etc".
(Executive Committee of the Communist International:
Directives on the United Front of the Workers (December 1921), in: Jane
Degras (Ed.): 'The Communist International: 1919-1943: Documents' (listed
henceforward as (Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971)'), Volume 1; London; 1971; p.
"The world situation and the situation of the international
proletariat . . demands . . . the establishment of a united front of all
parties supported by the proletariat, regardless of the differences separating
them, so long as they are anxious to wage a common fight for the immediate
and urgent needs of the proletariat. . . . It calls on the proletarians
of all parties to do everything they can to see that their parties are
also ready for joint action.
Tear down the barriers erected between you and come
into the ranks, whether communist or social-democrat, anarchist or syndicalist,
to fight for the needs of the hour.
Proletarians of all countries, unite!"
(Executive Committee of the Communist International
and Red International of Labour Unions: Manifesto on the United Front (January
1922), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): ibid., Volume 1; p. 317, 318, 319).
"That the line of joint action with workers of the
Second International proposed by a number of communist parties of the Communist
International . . . be approved".
they were elaborated under his direction:
(Vladimir I. Lenin: Draft Decision of the Politburo
of the CC, RCP (B) on the Tactics of the United Front (December 1921),
in: 'Collected Works', Volume 42; Moscow; 1969; p. 367).
"These theses on the united front . . . were
elaborated under Lenin's direction".
The tactics recognised that some organisations and parties
composed predominantly of workers and claiming to represent their interests
in fact served the interests of capital. Indeed, the fundamental aim of
united front tactics was:
(Nicos Poulantzas: 'Fascism and Dictatorship: The
Third International and the Problem of Fascism'; London; 1974 p. 157).
"To convince the socialist rank and file that 'their
leaders do not want to fight, not even for a piece of bread"'.
For this reason, the emphasis of united front tactics
was laid on building the united front from below, by appealing to
workers over the heads of their leaders:
(Franz Borkenau: 'World Communism: A History of the
Communist International' (herafter listed as 'Franz Borkenau (1971)');
Ann Arbor (USA): 1971; p. 224).
"The united front is not and should not be merely
a fraternisation of party leaders. . . . The united front means the association
of all workers, whether communist, anarchist, social-democrat, independent
or non-party or even Christian workers, against the bourgeoisie. With the
leaders if they want it so, without the leaders if they remain indifferently
aside, and in defiance of the leaders and against the leader if they sabotage
the workers united front. . .
Nevertheless, the Communist International at this stage
firmly rejected a policy of accepting a united front only
from below, since such a policy would have hindered the exposure of organisations
and parties which were in fact opposed to united front tactics:
Build the united front locally too, without waiting
for the permission of the leaders of the Second International . . . in
every factory, in every mine, in every district, in every town. . . . The
communist party is ready to fight shoulder to shoulder with any workers
against the capitalists".
(ECCI Statement in the Results of the Berlin Conference
(April 1922), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 1; p. 341,
"The resistance of the leaders of the Second International
has frustrated the attempt to organise the proletarian united front from
above. hat makes it a duty to rally all forces to organise the proletariat
for the common struggle in opposition to the leaders of the Second International.
Build the united front from below!"
(ECCI Statement on the Meeting of the Committee of
Nine (May 1922), in: Jane Degras (Ed.)(1971): ibid., Volume 1; p. 351).
"Our congresses . . . instructed our executives to
use every favourable opportunity to approach Amsterdam and the social-democrats
with the demand for a common fight against capitalist attack. . . . And
if they stand out stubbornly against it, to bring about a united front
over their heads'".
This was, indeed, Lenin's policy:
(Appeal from the ECCI and RILU to All Workers on the
United Front (January 1923), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): ibid., Volume
2; London; 1971; p. 2).
"Once more we propose to the leaders of the Second
and the Amsterdam Internationals a united front with the communists. We
are ready to negotiate with the social-democratic and trade union leaders,
although our opinion of them has been again confirmed, and most strikingly,
by recent events".
(ECCI. Letter to the Franco-German Workers' Conference
at Frankfurt (March 1923), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): ibid., Volume
2; p. 15).
"The purpose and sense of the tactics of the united
front consist in drawing more and more masses of the workers into the struggle
against capital, even if it means making repeated offers to the leaders
of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals to wage this struggle together".
THE NEED FOR AN ANTI-FASCIST
UNITED FRONT IN GERMANY IN 1930-33
(Vladimir I. Lenin: Draft Resolution on the Report
of the RCP Delegation in the Comintern (March/April 1922), in: 'Collected
Works', Volume 42; p. 411)
Between 1930 and 1933 the basic strategy of European
imperialism was to secure the establishment of a German state dominated
by the Nazi Party (the National Socialist German Workers’ Party)
in order that this might pursue its declared policy of waging all-out
war against the socialist Soviet Union.
At the parliamentary elections of June 1932, the voting
figures were as follows:
Votes Polled %Vote Deputies Elected
8.6 million 24%
Communist Party: 4.6 million
13.2 million 37%
15.4 million 45%
Grand Total: 35.0 million
(Data From 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume
I; p. 415).
In these circumstances, where the threat of a fascist
dictatorship had clearly become acute, it is clear that the correct
tactic for German Marxist-Leninists to have adopted would have been to
strive to form a defensive anti-fascist united front of all those prepared
actively to resist fascism, whatever their views on other questions.
The German revisionist leader Wilhelm
Pieck* admitted at the 13th Plenum of the ECCI in December 1933
-- after the imposition of the Nazi dictatorship:
"The sole force which could have prevented the fascist
dictatorship, or can defeat it, is the German working class united".
Striving to form an anti-fascist united front is not a
diversion from the revolutionary struggle for socialism, but an essential
feature of that struggle.
(Wilhelm Pieck: 'We are fighting for a Soviet Germany',
in: '13th Plenum ~f the ECGI'; London; 1934; p. 57).
As, with the increasing decay of capitalism in its
imperialist stage, the movement for socialist revolution grows, the limited
political freedoms existing under bourgeois democracy become too dangerous
for the ruling class to tolerate. And since the growth of the revolutionary
movement for socialism cannot be completely concealed from the ruling class,
it is inevitable that the latter will seek to strike a pre-emptive blow
against the revolutionary movement and against bourgeois democracy.
In this situation, the movement for socialist revolution
needs the protection of a broader movement embracing all those who,
whatever their views on other matters, are firmly opposed to fascism. When,
therefore, the fascists launch an offensive against bourgeois democracy,
this broad defensive anti-fascist front can, under Marxist-Leninist
leadership, be transformed into an offensive revolutionary socialist
front which can carry through the socialist revolution.
REVISIONIST DOMINATION OF
In December 1922 Lenin suffered a second stroke which
effectively ended his active political life. He died in January
Stalin played an active
role in the leadership of the Communist International for several years,
but his 'Works' contain no contribution to Comintern affairs after 8th
Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in May 1927.
Anti-socialist historians generally attribute this
fact to 'a loss of interest' in Comintern affairs on the part of Stalin.
Robert McNeal*, for example, alleges:
"Stalin did not share Lenin's commitment to the idea
of the Communist International and was not active at its seven 'World Congresses."
The historical truth is that in 1927 Stalin was removed
from active leadership of the Comintern by a dominating coalition
of concealed revisionists. Revisionists are defined by Marxists-Leninists,
(Robert H. McNeal: 'Stalin: Man and Ruler'; Basingstoke;
1968; p. 218).
"Elements posing as Marxist Leninists, but in fact
distorting Marxism-Leninism in such a way as to serve the interests of
Thus, the leading body of the Comintern - the Political
Secretariat - elected in September 1928, following the 6th Congress,
consisted of the following eleven members:
Of the eleven, two (Bell and Molotov) were more or less
solid MarxistLeninists, while the remaining nine (Barbe, Bukharin, Chu,
Humbert-Droz, Kuusinen, Piatnitsky, Remmele, Smeral, and Tasca) were concealed
However, since the Marxist-Leninists in the Soviet
Union retained control of Soviet security, it was unsafe for the revisionists
in the leadership of the Comintern to pursue openly counter-revolutionary
policies. They were, however, able to distort Marxism-Leninism along
revisionist lines, i.e., so as to make Comintern policies serve,
to a limited extent, the interests of one or another capitalist class"
In July 1929:
". . Bukharin was ousted from the presidency of the
Comintern. No new president was nominated".
In the next period, the Communist Parties of Western Europe
were directed by
(Franz Borkenau (1971): op. cit.; p. 339).
the concealed revisionist Dmitry
"In the West at any rate, Manuilsky was now sole leader
of the communist parties".
THE PSEUDO-LEFT REVISIONIST DISTORTION
OF UNITED FRONT POLICY (1930-33)
(Franz Borkenau: European Communism'; London; 1953
(herafter listed as 'Franz Borkenau (1953)' ; p. 65).
The basic strategy of revisionists -- of phoney Marxist-Leninists,
who are really opposed to socialism -- in the period of the rise to power
of Nazism was to oppose fascism in words, while working in practice
to prevent the formation of a genuine anti-fascist united front which would
disrupt their real aims. This strategy was achieved by securing the adoption
by the Communist International of a pseudo-left deviation from Marxism-Leninism
in the tactics of the united front.
In September 1924, Stalin defined social-democracy
as 'objectively' the 'twin' of fascism, as 'the moderate wing' of fascism:
"Social-democracy is objectively the moderate
wing of fascism. These organisations (Social-Democracy and fascism -- Ed.).
. . are not antipodes, they are twins".
At the 10th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist
International, in July 1929, Otto Kuusinen
distorted Stalin’s thesis to identify social-democracy with fascism
under the name of 'social-fascism’:
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Concerning the International
Situation' (September 1924), in 'Works’, Volume 6; Moscow; 1953; p. 294).
"The aims of the fascists and social-fascists are
the same. Social-fascism openly shows itself up as fascism".
Indeed, the very term 'social-fascism' implies:
(Otto Kuusinen: Report to 10th Plenum of ECCI, in:
'International Press Correspondence', Volume 9, No. 40 (20 August 1929);
"A straight identification of social-democracy with
On this incorrect assumption -- that all social-democrats
were in reality fascists - were developed the pseudo-left tactics known
(Nicos Poulantzas: op. cit.; p. 148).
"Down to the end of 1933, Moscow called the socialists
(social-democrats -- Ed.) 'social-fascists"'.
(Franz Borkenau (1953): op. cit.; p. 74).
"A new tactic was gradually evolved in the Comintern,
which subsequently became known officially as the 'class-against-class'
The period of the 'class-against-class' tactics became
known in the Comintern as 'the
The tactic of class-against-class' was based on the
assumption that the reformist organisations as a whole had already gone
over completely to the side of the bourgeois class. No proper distinction
was drawn between the Right-wing leaders and the rank-and-file Social-Democrats."
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee,
CPSU: 'Outline History of the Communist International'; Moscow; 1971; p.
"The switch from united front' to 'class against class'
tactics inaugurated what came to be known . . as 'the third period",
Or, more correctly, as:
(Jane Degras: 'United Front Tactics in the Comintern',
in: David Footman (Ed.): 'International Communism'; London; 1960; p. 22).
"The third period of the general crisis of capitalism".
The social-democrats were now presented as 'the main
bulwark of the capitalist class' and so as 'the main enemy'
of the working class, against whom the main blow should be directed.
(Agitprop Department of the ECCI: Theses on the 15th
Anniversary of the Foundation of the Communist International (March 1934),
in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p. 317).
The 12th Plenum of the ECCI, in August/September 1932:
"Reaffirmed the need for directing the main blow against
Social-Democracy as being the social pillar of the bourgeoisie."
and at the same Plenum Otto Kuusinen declared:
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU: op. cit.;
"Social-Democracy still remains the main social support
of the bourgeoisie.
Even at the 13th Plenum in December 1933, after the Nazis
had seized power, Wilhelm Pieck was still insisting that:
The main blow . . . must in the present period . .
. be directed against social-fascism and the reformist trade-union bureaucracy."
(Otto Kuusinen: 'The International Situation and the
Tasks of the Sections of the Comintern', in: '12th Plenum of the ECCI''
London; 1932; p. 105, 141).
"Social-Democracy is fulfilling its task today as
the main bulwark of the bourgeoisie". (Wilhelm Pieck: 'We are fighting
for a Soviet Germany', in: '13th Plenum of the ECCI' London; 1933; p. 7).
Indeed, the 'class-against-class' deviation expressed
the view that the left-wing of Social-democracy (that which supported united
front tactics) was "more dangerous" than the right-wing (that which
opposed united front tactics).
For example, at the 10th Plenum in July 1928:
"The communist parties were set the task of decisively
intensifying the struggle against Social-Democracy and especially against
its 'Left ' wing. . . . Equating Social-Democracy . . . with fascism and
advancing the slogan of dealing the main blow against its left elements,
who could become the allies of the Communists in the fight against reaction
and fascism, was a mistake."
Under the 'class-against-class' tactics, a united front
was therefore permissible only from below, that is, with the
rank-and-file of the social-democratic party:
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU: op.
"An important question . . is the question of the
consistent operation of the united front from below".
In accordance with this policy, even when, in November
1931, the leader of the Social-Democratic Party, Rudolf
Breitscheid*, offered a united front against fascism to the Communist
Party of Germany, 1931, it:
('Guide to the 12th Plenum, ECCI'; London; 1933; p.
"What we now need is the united front from below".
(ECCI: May Day Manifesto (April 1933),in: Jane Degras
(Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p. 267).
"The 13th Plenum of the ECCI calls upon all sections
of the Communist International persistently to fight for the realisation
of a united militant front with the social-democratic workers, in spite
of and against the will of the treacherous leaders of social-democracy".
(13th Plenum, ECCI: Theses on Fascism, the War Danger
and the Tasks of the Communist Parties (December 1933), in: Jane Degras
(Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p. 303).
"Was rejected by the CPG as a 'demagogic manoeuvre."
An open letter from the CPG Central Committee, published
in 'Rote Fahne' of 5 January 1932, charged that:
(Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p.
"The social-democratic leaders and the SWP (Socialist
Workers' Party -- Ed.) were proposing a united front in order to create
confusion and to undermine the proletarian united front under CPG leadership".
The new tactic implied the abandonment of the Marxist-Leninist
tactic of the united front:
(Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): ibid., Volume 3; p. 214).
"The new left policy summarised in the 'class against
class' slogan implied the abandonment of united front tactics."
This tactic, instead of exposing the social-democratic
leaders as saboteurs of the united front against fascism, helped these
leaders to conceal their role in this capacity.
(Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 2; p.
Furthermore, a number of Communist Parties in this
period put forward the slogan of a 'Red United Front’, i. e., a
front limited to conscious revolutionaries:
"A number of communist parties at this period put
forward the slogan of a 'Red United Front’ . . This in effect implied that
the united front could unite only workers who consciously supported the
Communists, leaving the workers who followed the lead of the reformists
beyond the pale of the united front. . .
During this period, too, the Communist International rejected
the concept that there was a qualitative difference between bourgeois democracy
and fascism, so rejecting the concept that the working class had an
interest in defending bourgeois democracy against the threat of fascism.
The 11th Plenum in April 1931:
In lieu of the slogan of a united workers’ front this
group (the Neumann*-Remmele group -- Ed.)
proposed the slogan of a 'red workers' front', which narrowed beforehand
the limits of unity policy."
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU:
op. cit.; p. 313, 323).
"Came to the conclusion that it was necessary to put
an end to the practice of drawing a line ‘between fascism and bourgeois
democracy, and between the parliamentary form of the dictatorship of the
bourgeoisie and its open fascist form.'"
And a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Germany in May 1931 stated:
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU: op. cit.;
"Any attempt to draw a contrast, in liberal fashion,
between fascisrn and bourgeois democracy . . . would in effect but help
Social-Democracy to deceive the workers".
In consequence of this incorrect formulation, some
existing right-wing bourgeois governments were wrongly labelled as 'fascist',
so that the danger of genuine fascism was underestimated and 'defence against
fascism' was held to be no longer necessary:
(CC, CPG: Resolution of May 1931, in: Ernst Thaelmann:
'Some Mistakes in Our Theoretical and Practical Work and the Way to overcome
Them', in: 'Communist International', Volume 8, No. 22 (December 1931);p.
"The identification of bourgeois-democratic methods
of rule with those of fascism led to a certain underestimation of fascism,
to various bourgeois parliamentary regimes being defined as fascist regimes.
This obscured the real dimensions of the danger which the actual fascist
The mistaken concept that the Social-Democrats and not
the Nazis were the principal enemy of the working class even led to a degree
of collaboration between the Communist Party of Germany and the Nazi
Party against the Social-Democratic Party -- as in the case of the
referendum for the dissolution of the Prussian government in 1931:
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU: op. cit.;
"The von Papen*-Schleicher*
Government . . . has established a form of fascist dictatorship".
(ECCI Theses of 12th Plenum on the International Situation
and the Tasks of the Comintern Sections (September 1932), in: Jane Degras
(Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p. 224).
"The Nazis and nationalists, in 1931, launched a referendum
for the removal of the Prussian state government -- a coalition of social-democrats,
liberals and catholics".
The leadership of the CPG decided that the Party would
abstain in this matter:
(Franz Borkenau (i953j: op. cit.; p. 75).
'The leaders of the CPG decided to abstain".
and, on the instructions of the Communist International,
supported the referendum:
(Edward H. Carr: 'The Twilight of the Comintern';
London; 1982 (hereafter listed as 'Edward H. Carr (1982)'); p. 42).
"At the end of July 1931, to the astonishment of its
members, the CPG made a completely unexpected volte-face".
(Arthur Spencer: 'National Bolshevism', in: 'Survey'
, No. 44-45 (October 1962); p. 148).
"The . . . instruction was sent by telegram on July
20. . . . The central committee of the CPG bowed to the will of Moscow".
At the 12th Plenum of the ECCI in August/September 1932,
Osip Piatnitsky reported:
(Edward H. Carr (1982): op. cit.; p. 42).
"In August 1931 the CPG supported the referendum initiated
by the NSGWP (the Nazi Party -- Ed.) against the social-democratic Prussian
Government. The central committee had at first decided to oppose the Nazi
move, but were persuaded by the ECCI to reverse their position".
(Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p.
"You know that the CPG leadership was opposed to participation
in the referendum on the dissolution of the Prussian Landtag. Some party
newspapers had published articles against participation. But . . . the
central committee, in consultation with the Comintern, reached the conclusion
that the party should take an active part in the referendum".
One possible barrier to the imposition
of a Nazi dictatorship remained: The German trade union movement.
(Osip Piatnitsky: Speech at 12th Plenum of ECCI, in:
Jane Degras (Ed.) -(1971: op. cit., Volume 3; p. 155).
Steps were accordingly taken by the revisionists to
render this effectively impotent -- the revisionist leaders of the Comintern
instructed Communists -- and urged their supporters -- to withdraw from
the mass trade unions and form new tiny, impotent 'revolutionary' splinter
Lenin had already ridiculed this pseudo-left deviation
in April 1920 in '"Left-wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder':
"We cannot but consider the ponderous, very learned
and frightfully revolutionary disquisitions of the German Lefts on why
Communists cannot and should not work in reactionary trade unions, why
it is permissible to refuse to do such work, why it is necessary to leave
the trade unions and to create in their stead brand-new, clean little 'workers'
unions invented by exceedingly nice (and, for the most part, probably very
youthful) Communists, etc., etc., to be equally ridiculous and childish
Now the pseudo-left line on the trade unions was put forward
once more, this time by the revisionist Solomon Lozovsky*:
(Vladimir I. Lenin: '"Left-wing" Communism, an Infantile
Disorder: A Popular Essay in Marxian Strategy and Tactics' (April 1920),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 10; London; 1946; p. 90).
"Early in 1928 the Comintern received a proposal from
S. Lozovsky concerning some fundamental questions of tactics in the trade
union movement. He stated that 'work within the reformist unions, given
the existence in the country of a revolutionary centre, should have as
its logical aim the affiliation to the revolutionary centre".
In August 1930 the 5th Congress of the Red International
of Labour Unions:
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU: op. cit.;
"Ratified the decision of the revolutionary trade
union opposition in Germany and Poland to drop the slogan ‘into the reformist
unions'. 'Parallel red unions' were to be established wherever the situation
warranted this step".
As a result of this step, when the Nazi coup took place
(Resolution of 5th Congress of RILU, in: Jane Degras
(Ed.) (1971).: op. cit., Volume 3; p. 142).
"The trade unions . . . had to be split, and minute
and irrelevant communist splinter unions were created everywhere".
(Franz Borkenau (1953; op. cit.; p. 71).
"The CPG call for a general strike aroused no response
At the 7th World Congress of the CI in 1935, it was admitted
that this move had been a sectarian mistake:
(Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p.
"A sectarian mistake was committed: the revolutionary
trade union opposition was transformed into new trade unions and as a result
found itself isolated".
For some time after the Nazi coup in Germany, the Communist
International insisted that its ‘class-against-class' tactics loyally followed
by the Communist Party of Germany -- tactics which had paved the way for
that coup --had been correct. In April 1933 the ECCI Presidium resolved
(Wilhelm Pieck: Report of the ECCI to the 7th World
Congress of the CI (August 1935), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): ibid.,
Volume 3: p. 350).
"The political line and the organisational policy
followed by the CC of the Communist Party of Germany . . . was completely
Indeed, the ECCI maintained that the Nazi coup had ‘accelerated
the development of the socialist revolution in Germany':
(ECCI Presidium: Resolution on the Situation in Germany
(April 1933), in: Jane Degras (Ed.): ibid., Volume 3; p. 257).
"The establishment of an open fascist dictatorship,
which is destroying all democratic illusions among the masses and liberating
them from social-democratic illusions, is accelerating the rate of Germany's
advance towards the proletarian revolution".
(ECCI Presidium: Resolution on the Situation in Germany
(April 1933), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): ibid., Volume 3; p. 262).
THE REVISIONISTS IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST
PERVERTING UNITED FRONT TACTICS ALONG PSEUDO-LEFT LINES,
SUCCEEDED IN SABOTAGING EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE TO THE NAZI COUP OF JANUARY
After the coup had succeeded, the needs of the imperialist
powers in Western Europe changed. The basic need was now to encourage
appeasement of the German imperialists, that is, to reprove them for
aggression in words, while encouraging them in deeds
to expand towards the Soviet Union.
IN 1934 THE REVISIONISTS WHO DOMINATED THE COMMUNIST
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGINGLY REVISED THEIR POLICIES TO MEET THE NEW NEEDS OF
COMPASS is published by: THE COMMUNIST
LEAGUE, Ilford, Essex.
The aim of the Communist League is to establish
in Britain a Marxist-Leninist Party of the working class free of all revisionist
BARBE, Henri, French revisionist politician (1902-66);
Member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1927-31); expelled from French CP (1934);
Secretary-General, fascist French People's Party (1936-39); imprisoned
as war criminal (1945-49).
BELL, Thomas, British Marxist-Leninist politician (1882-1940);
Member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1928-29); President, Association of
Friends of the USSR (1930-36); worked for International Red Aid (1936-39).
BREITSCHEID, Rudolf, German social-democratic politician
(1874-1944); Prussian Minister of Interior (1918-19); Chairman, Communist
Fraction in Reichstag (1922-33); to France (1933); arrested by Nazis (1940);
died in Buchenwald concentration camp (1944).
BUKHARIN, Nikolay I., Soviet revisionist politician
(1888-1938); Deputy Chairman, ECCI (1919-26); Member, ECCI Political Secretariat
(1926-29); Editor-in-Chief, 'Izvestia' (1933-37); found guilty of treason
and executed (1938).
CHU Chiu-pai, Chinese revisionist politician (1899-1935);
Secretary, CPC (1927-28); Member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1928-31);
to China (1930); Commissar for Education in Chinese Soviet Government (1934-35);
executed by Kuomintang troops (1935).
HUMBERT-DROZ, Jules, Swiss revisionist politician (1891-1971);
member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1926-28); to Switzerland
(1931); expelled from Swiss Party (1943); secretary, Swiss Social-Democratic
KIJUSINEN, Otto V., Finnish revisionist politician
(1881-1964); member, ECCI Political Secretariat, (1928-43); President,
Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic (1940-58).
LOZOVSKY, Solomon, Soviet revisionist politician (1878-1952);
Secretary-General, Red International of Labour Unions (1921-37); Director,
State Literary Publishing House (1937-39); USSR Deputy Commissar/Minister
of Foreign Affairs (1939-46); deputy chief, Soviet Information Bureau (1941-48);
arrested and found guilty of treason (1949); died in prison (1952).
McNEIL, Robert H. American historian (1930- ); Assistant,
later Associate, Professor of History, University of Alberta (1954-58);
Associate Professor of History, University of Toronto (1964-69); Professor
of History , University of Massachusetts (1969- ).
MANUILSKY, Dmitry Z., Soviet revisionist politician
(1883-1959); Secretary, CP Ukraine (1921-22); member, ECCI Political Secretariat
(1926-43); principal representative of RCP on CI (1923-43); Ukrainian Deputy
Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1944-50).
MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav H., Soviet Marxist-Leninist politician
(1890-1986); member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1928-30); USSR Premier
(1930-41); USSR Commissar for Foreign Affairs (1939-49); USSR Deputy Premier
and Commissar/Minister of Foreign Affairs (1953-57); Minister of State
Control (1956-57); Ambassador to Mongolian People’s Republic (1957-60);
USSR Representative on International Atomic Energy Committee (1960-62);
expelled from CPSU by revisionists (1962); readmitted (1984).
NEUMANN, Heinz, German revisionist politician (1902-37);
CPG representative on CI (1925-32); to Soviet Union (1935); arrested, found
guilty of treason and executed (1937).
PAPEN, Franz von, German diplomat and politician (1879-1969);
Chancellor (1932); Vice-Chancellor (1933-34); Minister/Ambassador to Austria
(1934-38); Ambassador to Turkey (1939-44); acquitted of war crimes, Nuremberg
PIATNITSKY, Osip A., Soviet revisionist politician
(1882-1939); member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1926-35); arrested (1937),
found guilty of treason (1938); executed (1939).
PIECK, Wilhelm, German revisionist politician (1376
1960) member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1931-43); to Berlin (1945) President,
Socialist Unity Party (1946-60) President, German Democratic Republic
REMMELE, Hermann, German revisionist politician (1886-19339);
Secretariat (1926-33); to Soviet Union (1933); expelled
from CI (1933); arrested (1937); found guilty of treason (1938); executed
SCHLEICHER, Kurt von, German military officer and politician
(i882-1934j; lieutenant-general (1931); Minister of Defence (1932); Chancellor
(1932-33); murdered by Nazis (1934).
SMERAL, Bohumir, Czechoslovak revisionist politician
(1880-1941); member, ECCI Presidium (1922-35); to Czechoslovakia (1935);
to Soviet Union (1938); died in Moscow (1941).
TASCA, Angelo, Italian revisionist politician (1892-1960);
member, ECCI Secretariat (1929-209); expelled from ICP and CI, to Paris
(i929); editor, social-democratic newspaper 'Populaire' (1934-37); director,
Italian service, French radio (1937-40); died in Paris (1960).
ZINOVIEV, Grigory E., Soviet revisionist politician
(1883-1936); Chairman, ECCI (1919-26); expelled from Party (1926, 1932,
1934); found guilty of treason and executed (1936).
Borkenau, Franz: 'European Communism'; London; 1953.
Borkenau, Franz: 'World Communism: A History of the
Communist International'; Ann Arbor (USA); 1971;
Carr, Edward H.: 'The Twilight of the Comintern';
Degras, Jane: 'United Front Tactics in the Comintern',
in: Footman, David (Ed.): 'International Communism'; London; 1960;
Degras, Jane:'The Communist International: 1919-1943:
Documents', Volumes 1, 2 & 3; London; 1971.
Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet Union: 'Outline History of the Communist
International'; Moscow; 1971;
Lenin, Vladimir I.: 'Collected Works', Volume 32;
Moscow; 1965; Volume 42; Moscow; 1969;
Lenin, Vladimir I.: 'Selected Works', Volume 10; London;
McNeal, Robert H.: 'Stalin: Man and Ruler'; Basingstoke;
Poulantzas, Nicos: 'Fascism and Dictatorship: The
Third International and the Problem of Fascism'; London; 1974;
Spencer, Arthur: 'National Bolshevism', in: 'Survey',
No. 44-45' (October 1962);
Stalin, Josef V.: 'Works', Volume 6; Moscow; 1953.
'12th Plenum of ECCI'; London; 1932.
'13th Plenum of ECCI'; London; 1934.
'Guide to the 12th Plenum ECCI'; London; 1933.
'International Press Correspondence'.
'Keesing's Contemporary Archives
GO TO SUBJECT
GO TO CATALOGUE
GO TO "WHAT'S
GO TO HOME