Later reports will cover the further development of Russia from 1917 onwards.
Printed and published by: comrade BC, for the COMMUUNIST LEAGUE.

The aim of the Communist League is to establish a Marxist-Leninist Party in Britain free of all revisionist trends.
Part One of 'Revisionism in Russia" (to 1914), in COMPASS of April 1975

 The First Imperialist War

Almost from the outset, three trends manifested themselves in the labour movements of the belligerent countries:

In this work Trotsky put forward the view that "the main obstacle to economic development' was the existence the national state":

Settled in Paris, he joined the editorial staff of "Golos" (The Voice) , a newspaper published by a group of Mensheviks headed by Yuli Martov who, unlike the official Menshevik leadership which supported the war effort of the tsarist government, had adopted an attitude of verbal opposition to the war without seeking to organise active revolutionary struggle against the tsarist regime. "Golos" had commenced publication in September l914, and, when it was suppressed by the French government in January 1915, it was replaced by "Nashe Slovo" (Our Word), on the editorial staff of which Trotsky continued to serve.

The chief organiser of the paper was Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko (a former tsarist officer who after the October Revolution became Director of the Political Administration of the Red Army) . Its Paris staff included, in addition to Trotsky, Anatoly Lunacharsky (who later became Commissar for Education), David Ryazanov (later director of the Marx-Engels Institute), Solomon Lozovsky (later head of the Red International of Labour Unions), Dmitri Manuilsky (later head of the Communist International) Grigori Sokolnikov (later Commissar for Finance), and the historian Mikhail Pokrovsky (later director of the Soviet State Archives). Its foreign correspondents included Grigori Chicherin (later Commissar for Foreign Affairs), Aleksandra Kollontai (later Commissar of Social Welfare),  Karl Radek (later to hold a leading position in the Communist International), Moissei Uritsky, Khristian Rakovsky (the son of a Bulgarian landlord, later to become Prime Minister of the Soviet Ukraine), Ivan Maisky (later Soviet Ambassador to Britain), and the Anglo-Russian historian Theodore Rothstein (later Soviet Ambassador to Persia)

^{"With regard to the colonies, we confine ourselves to a negative slogan, i.e., . . "Get out of the colonies'.
(G. Pyatakov: ibid.; p. 25l)}

At the beginning of 1915, "Nashe Slovo" addressed an appeal to the Bolshevik Central Committee and to the Menshevik Organisation Committee proposing a conference of all the groups which took a "negative attitude' towards social chauvinism. In its reply, dated March 1915, the Organisation Committee said:

At their trial Lev Kamenev and two of the deputies declared in their defence that they did not accept the policy of the Party in so for as it enjoined members to work for the defeat of Russia in the war.
Lenin commented:

The practical work of the Bolshevik Party in Russia at this time was directed by the Bureau of the Central Committee, headed by Vyacheslav Molotov. On March 11th. the Bureau issued a manifesto calling for an armed uprising against tsarism and the formation of a Provisional-Government.

On March 12^th; an elected Soviet of Workers' Deputies came into being in Petrograd as an action committee to carry out the uprising and in the following days Soviets were established in Moscow and other cities. On March 13^th, the Petrograd Soviet revived its "Izvestia" ("News").

When the tsar ordered troops to suppress the rising by force, the soldiers -- mostly peasant in uniform -- refused to obey the orders of their officers and joined the revolutionary workers, thus bringing into being a revolutionary alliance of workers and peasants. The workers and soldiers now began to disarm the police and to arm themselves with their weapons. On March 14^th, the Petrograd Soviet was expanded into a "Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies".

On March 15th. the tsar, Nicholas II, abdicated.

The revolution of March 1917 (known as the "February Revolution" under the old-style calendar) had been accomplished by the workers and peasants. Its character was that of a bourgeois-democratic revolution directed against the tsarist autocracy.

On March 12th., the day after the tsar had dissolved the Fourth State Duma, its liberal capitalist members set up an "Executive Committee of the Imperial Duma", headed by the President of the Duma, the monarchist landlord Mikhail Rodzyanko.

On March 15th. this Executive Committee set up a "Provisional-Government", headed by Prince Georgi Lvov as Prime Minister and including among its Ministers Pavel Miliukov (leader of the Constitutional Democrats) as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aleksendr Guchkov (leader of the Octobrists) as Minister of War, and Aleksandr Karensky (a prominent Socialist-Revolutionary) as Minister of Justice.

The capitalist class endeavoured for a few days to save the monarchy, by persuading the tsar to abdicate in favour of his brother Mikhail. But this proved untenable in view of popular feeling against the monarchy, and Mikhail abdicated on the following day, March 16th.

The capitalists, then turned their efforts to attempting to turn Russia into a capitalist parliamentary republic.

On March 17th. the new government issued a manifesto "To the Citizens"; setting out its programme:

A number of factors were responsible for this position: the industrial working class had been diluted during the war by large numbers of peasants from the villages, while Bolshevik leaders such as Lenin and Stalin were in exile.

As a result of this, on March 18th. the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet issued a proclamation calling upon the workers to support the capitalist Provisional Government. Lenin commented:

Lenin summed up the political situation resulting from the February Revolution in the following words:

The victory of the "February Revolution" created a new political situation in Russia which called for a new political line on the part of the Russian Socia1-Democratic Labour Party.

As Stalin expressed it in November 1924:

On March 18th., 1917 the Bureau issued, in the name of the Central Committee, a manifesto to "All Citizens of Russia", calling for the formation of a Provisional Revolutionary Government.

"Citizens! The fortresses of Russian tsarism have.. fallen. . . . It is the task of the working class and the revolutionary army to create a Provisional Revolutionary Government which is to head the new republican order now in the process of birth.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government must take it upon itself to create temporary laws defending all the rights and liberties of the people, to confiscate the lands of the monasteries and the landowners, the crown lands and the appanages, to introduce the 8-hour working day and to convoke a Constituent Assembly on the basis a universal, direct and equal suffrage, with no discrimination as to sex, nationality or religion, and with the secret ballot.
The Provisional Revolutionary Government must take it upon itself to secure provisions for the population and the army; for this purpose it must confiscate all the stores prepared by the former government and the municipalities.....
It is the task of the people and its revolutionary government to suppress all counter-revolutionary plots against the people.
It is the immediate and urgent task of the Provisional Revolutionary Government to establish relations with the proletariat of the belligerent countries for the purpose 0f . . terminating the bloody war carnage imposed upon the enslaved peoples against their will.
The workers of shops and factories, also the rising troops, must immediately elect their representatives to the Provisional Revolutionary Government. . .
Forward under the red banner of the revolution!
Long live the Democratic Republic!
Long live the revolutionary working class!
Long live the revolutionary people and the insurgent army!"
(Manifesto of CC, RSDLP, March 18th., 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works"; Volume 20, Book 2; London; 1929; p. 378-79).

Among the Bolsheviks liberated from exile in Siberia by the "February Revolution" were Josef Stalin and Lev Kamenev, both of whom returned to Petrograd. Kamenev joined the editorial board of "Pravda" on March 23rd., Stalin two days later on March 28^th.:

Kamenev immediately upheld a chauvinist line on the war, contending like the Menshevik leaders that with the victory of the "February Revolution" the working class should adopt a position of "revolutionary defencism": He wrote in "Pravda" of March 28th.:

"The soldiers, the peasants and the workers of Russia who went to war obeying the pull of the now overthrown Tsar. . have freed themselves; the Tsar's banners have been replaced by the red banners of the revolution!. . .
When an army faces an army, it would be the most absurd policy to propose to one of them to lay down arms and go home. This . .would be a policy of slavery which a free people would repudiate with scorn. No, we will firmly hold our posts, we will answer a bullet by a bullet and a shell with a shell. . . .
A revolutionary soldier or officer, having overthrown the yoke of tsarism, will not vacate a trench to leave it to a German soldier or officer who has not mustered up courage to overthrow the yoke of his own government. We must not allow any disorganisation of the military forces of the revolution! ....
Russia is bound by alliances to England, France and other countries. It cannot act on the questions of peace without them."
(L. Kamenev: "Without Secret Diplomacy"; cited in "Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 2; London; 1929, p. 379; 380).

"The present war is an imperialist war. Its principal aim is the seizure (annexation) of foreign, chiefly agrarian, territories by capitalistically developed states.. . .
It would be deplorable if the Russian revolutionary democracy, which was able to overthrow the detested tsarist regime, were to succumb to the false alarm raised by the imperialist bourgeoisie".
(J. V. Stalin: "The War", in: "Works"; Volume 3; Moscow; 1953; p.5; 7).

"The Provisional Government set up by the moderate bourgeois classes of society and associated in interests with Anglo-French capital is incapable of solving the problems raised by the revolution. Its resistance to the further extension and deepening of the revolution is being paralysed only by the growth of the revolutionary forces themselves and by their organisation. Their rallying centre must be the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in the cities and the Soviets of Peasants' and Agricultural Workers' Deputies in the countryside as the embryo of a revolutionary government, prepared in the further process of development, at a definite moment of the revolution, to establish the full power of the proletariat in alliance with the revolutionary democracy".
(Resolution of Bureau of CC, RSDLP; cited in: N. Popov: "Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union"', Part 1; London; n .d.; p. 353-54).

"The solution is to bring pressure on the Provisional Government to make it declare its consent to start peace negotiations immediately.
The workers, soldiers and peasants must arrange meetings and demonstrations and demand that the Provisional Government shall come out openly and publicly in an effort to induce all the belligerent powers to start peace negotiations immediately, on the basis of recognition of the right of nations to self-determination".
(J. V. Stalin: ibid.; p. 8).

"The "Pravda" demands that the government renounce annexations. To demand that a government of capitalists renounce annexations is balderdash".
(V. I. Lenin Speech at a Caucus of the Bolshevik Members of the All-Russian Conference of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, April 17, 1917, in Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 98).

"Our slogan is -- pressure on the Provisional Government with the aim of forcing it openly, before world democracy, and immediately to come forth with an attempt to induce all the belligerent countries forthwith to start negotiations concerning the means of stopping the World War".
(L. Kamenev: "Without Secret Diplomacy", cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works"; Volume 20, Book 2; London; 1929; p. 380).

"The Party (its majority) groped its way towards this new orientation. It adopted the policy of pressure on the Provisional Government through the Soviets on the question of peace and did not venture to step forward at once from the old slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry to the new slogan of power to the Soviets. The aim of this halfway policy was to enable the Soviets to discern the actual imperialist nature of the Provisional Government on the basis of the concrete questions of peace and in this way to wrest the Soviets from the Provisional Government. But this was a profoundly mistaken position, for it gave rise to pacifist illusions, brought grist to the mill of defencism, and hindered the revolutionary education of the masses. At that time I shared this mistaken position with the Party comrades and fully abandoned it only in the middle of April, when I associated myself with Lenin's theses".
(J. V. Stalin: "Trotskyism or Leninism" , in: Works", Volume 3; Moscow; 1953; p. 348).
 
Lenin Returns to Russia

Lenin arrived in Petrograd on the evening- of April 16^th; and was greeted by an enthusiastic crowd of workers and soldiers.

On the following day he reported to the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on the circumstances of his journey through Germany.

Lenin's "April Theses"

 1. The "February Revolution" has brought into being the democratic dictatorship of the working class and peasantry in the shape of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

"The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' -- here you have 'revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry' already realised in life".
(V. I. Lenin: "Letters on Tactics"; in 'Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 120).

'The Provisional Government of Lvov and Co. is a dictatorship . . based . . on seizure by force accomplished by a definite class, namely, the bourgeoisie".
(V. I. Lenin: "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution"., in: ibid.; p. 133).

"What has made our revolution so strikingly unique is that it has established dual power . . . What constitutes dual power? The fact that by the side of the Provisional Government, the government of the bourgeoisie, there has developed another, as yet weak; embryonic, but undoubtedly real and growing government -- the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies".
(V. I. Lenin: "On Dual Power", in: ibid.; p. 115).

"There is not the slightest doubt but that such a combination cannot last long. There can be no two powers in a state. One of them is bound to dwindle to nothing, and the entire Russian bourgeoisie is already straining all its energies everywhere and in every possible way in an endeavour to weaken, to set aside, to reduce to nothing the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, to create one single power for the bourgeoisie'".
(V. I. Lenin: "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution"; in: ibid.;p.l33)

"In Petrograd the power is actually in the hands of the workers and soldiers; the new government does not use violence against them, and cannot do so because there is no police, there is no army seperated from the people, there is no all-powerful officialdom placed above the people".
(V. I. Lenin "'Letters on Tactics", in ibid.; p. 121).

"By direct agreements with the bourgeois Provisional Government and by a series of actual concessions to the latter, the Soviet power has surrendered and is surrendering its position to the bourgeoisie".
(V. I. Lenin "On Dual Power, in ibid.; p. 116).

"The reason (i.e., for the surrender of power to the capitalist class -- Ed.) is in the lack of organisation and class consciousness among the workers and peasants".
(V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 116).

"Russia is now in a state of ebullition. Millions of people, politically asleep for ten years, politically crushed by the terrible pressure of tsarism and slave labour for landowners and manufacturers, have awakened and thrown themselves into politics. Who are these millions of people? Mostly small proprietors, petty bourgeois. . . .
A gigantic petty-bourgeois wave has swept over everything, has overwhelmed the class-conscious proletariat not only numerically but also ideologically".
(V. I. Lenin: 'The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 1321).

"Under the new government of Lvov and Co., owing to the capitalist nature of this government, the war on Russia's part remains a predatory imperialist war".
(V. I. Lenin: Speech at a Caucus of the Bolshevik Members of the All-Russian Conference of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, April 17, 1917, in Ibid; p. 95).

"In our attitude towards the war not the slightest concession must be made to 'revolutionary defencism' ".
(V. I. Lenin; ibid.; p. 95).

'The government of the Octobrists and Cadets, of the Guchkovs and Miliukovs, could give neither peace nor bread, nor freedom, even if it were sincere in its desire to do so".
(V. I. Lenin: "Letters from Afar", in: ibid., p. 34)

"The present situation in Russia . . represents transition from the first stage of the revolution . . to its second stage which is to place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry".
(V. I. Lenin: Speech at a Caucus of the Bolshevik Members of the All-Russian Conference of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies,.April 17, 1917, in Ibid.; p. 97).

"The Provisional Government . . should be overthrown, for it is an oligarchical, bourgeois, and not a people's government. . it cannot be overthrown now; . . generally speaking, it cannot be 'overthrown' by any ordinary method, for it rests on the 'support' given to the bourgeoisie by the second government -- the Soviet of 'Workers ' Deputies, which is the only possible revolutionary government directly expressing the mind and the will of the majority of workers and peasants".
(V. I. Lenin: "On Dual Power", in: ibid; p. 116-17).

"Any one who, right now, immediately and irrevocably, separates the proletarian elements of the Soviets . . from the petty bourgeois elements, provides a correct expression of the interests of the movement."
(V. I. Lenin: "Letters on Tactics', in: ibid.; p. 126).

"It must be explained to the masses that the Soviet of Workers' Deputies is the only possible form of revolutionary government and that, therefore, our task is, while this government is submitting to the influence of the bourgeoisie, to present a patient, systematic, and persistent analysis of its errors and tactics, an analysis especially adapted to the practical needs of the masses.
While we are in the minority, we carry on the work of criticism and of exposing errors, advocating all along the necessity of transferring the entire power of state to the Soviets of Workers' Deputies".
(V. I. Lenin: Speech at a Caucus of the Bolshevik Members of the All-Russian Conference of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, April 17, 1917, in: ibid; p. 99).

"The essence of the situation (i.e., from March 12th. to July 17th., 1917 -- Ed.) was that the arms were in the hands of the people, and that no coercion was exercised over the people from without. That is what opened up and ensured a peaceful path for the development of the revolution. The slogan 'All power to the Soviets' was a slogan for a peaceful development of the revolution, which was possible between March 12 and July 17".
(V. I. Lenin: "On Slogans", in: "Selected Works", Volume 6; London; 19216; p. 167-68).

"We advocated the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war -- are we not going back on ourselves? But the first civil war in Russia has ended.
. . In this transitional period, as long as the armed force is in the hands of the soldiers, as long as Miliukov and Guchkov have not resorted to violence, this civil war, as far as we are concerned, turns into peaceful, prolonged and patient class propaganda. We discard this slogan for the time being, but only for the time being."
(V. I. Lenin: Report on the Current Situation", in: ibid.; p. 95, 96).

"Not a parliamentary republic -- a return to it from the Soviet of Workers' Deputies would be a step backward -- but a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the land, from top to bottom" .
(V. I. Lenin: Speech at a Caucus of the Bolshevik Members of the All-Russian Conference of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, April 17th., 1917, in: "Collected Works", Volume. 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 99).

"The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies must seize power not for the purpose of building an ordinary bourgeois republic, nor for the purpose of introducing Socialism immediately. The letter could not be accomplished.
. . They must seize power in order to take the first concrete steps towards introducing Socialism".
(V. I. Lenin: Report On the Political Situation, 7th. Conference of RSDLP, in: ibid.; p. 283)

"Not the 'introduction' of Socialism as an immediate task, but the immediate placing of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies in control of social production and distribution of goods".
(V. I. Lenin: Speech at a Caucus of Bolshevik Members of the All-Russian Conference of the Soviets of Workers' end Soldiers' Deputies, April 17th., 1917,in: ibid.; p. 101).

"Abolition of the police, the army, the bureaucracy.
All officers to be elected and to be subject to recall at any time, their salaries not to exceed the average wage of a competent worker. .
Confiscation of all private lands.
Nationalisation of all lands in the country, and management of such lands by local Soviets of Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies. A separate organisation of Soviets of Deputies of the poorest peasants. Creation of model agricultural establishments out of large estates. . . . . .
Immediate merger of all the banks in the country into one general national bank, over which the Soviet of Workers' Deputies should have control."
(V. I. Lenin: "On the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 108).

"We must call ourselves the Communist Party -- just as Marx and Engels called themselves Communists. ...
The majority . . of the Social-Democratic leaders are betraying Socialism.....
The masses are distracted, baffled, deceived by their leaders.....
Should we aid and abet that deception by retaining the old and worn-out party name, which is as decayed as the Second International? . .
It is high time to cast off the soiled shirt, it is high time to put on clean linen".
(V. I. Lenin: "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 154, l56, 157).

'The chief fault of the Zimmerwald International, the cause of its breakdown (for from a political and ideological viewpoint it has already broken down), was its vacillation, its indecision, when it came to the most important practical end all-determining question of breaking completely with the social-chauvinists and the old social-chauvinist International. . . 
We must break with this International immediately. We ought to remain in Zimmerwald only to gather information.
It is precisely we who must found, right now, without delay, a new, revolutionary proletarian International".
(V. I. Lenin ibid.; p. 151, 152).

"Before the March revolution of 1917, state power in Russia was in the hands of one old class, namely, the feudal noble landlord class, headed by Nicholas Romanov.
After that revolution, state power is in the hands of another class, a new one, namely, the bourgeoisie. . . .
The passing of state power from one class to another is the first, the main, the basic principle of a revolution, both in the strictly scientific and in the practical meaning of that term.
To that extent, the bourgeois or the bourgeois democratic, revolution in Russia is completed.
But at this point we hear the noise of objectors, who readily call themselves 'old Bolsheviks' : Haven't we always maintained, they say, that a bourgeois-democratic revolution is culminated only in a 'revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry'? . . . .
The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' --here you have 'revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry' already realised in life'.
(V. I  Lenin: 'Letters on Tactics' in: ibid.; p. 119, 120)

'Is the agrarian revolution, which is a phase of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, completed?  On the contrary, is it not a fact that it has not yet been?'
(V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 119-120).

'The bourgeois-democratic content of the revolution means purging the social relations (systems and institutions) of the country of mediavalism, serfdom, feudalism. . . .
'We solved the problems (i.e., economic and social problems -- Ed.) of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in passing, as a 'by-product' of the main and real proletarian-revolutionary socialist work'.
(V. I. Lenin: 'The Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution'; in: "Selected Works'; Volume 6; London; 1946; p. 501; 503.

'The Bolsheviks' slogans and ideas have been generally confirmed by history; but as to the concrete situation, things have turned out to be different, more original, more unique, more multicoloured than could have been anticipated by any one'.
(V. I. Lenin: 'Letters on Tactics", in:  "Collected Works', Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 120).

Trotsky and the "Ideological Rearmament' of the Bolshevik Party

Trotsky's answer was simple, if completely mythical: in May 1917 the Bolshevik Party, on Lenin's initiative, had 'rearmed itself' ideologically by accepting Trotsky's theory of 'permanent revolution"; thus history had "confirmed" the correctness of Trotsky's theory of 'permanent revolution':

"Bolshevism under the leadership of Lenin (though not without internal struggle) accomplished its ideological rearmament on this most important question in the spring of 1917, that is, before the seizure of power".
(L. Trotsky: Note in "The Year 1905;'(January 1922), cited in: L. Trotsky: 'The Permanent Revolution"; New York; 1970; p. 236).

"Precisely in the period between January 9 and the October strike (in 1905 -- Ed.) the author formed those opinions, which later received the name: 'theory of the permanent  revolution' . . . . .
This appraisal was confirmed as completely correct, though after a lapse of twelve years".
(L. Trotsky: Forward to "The Year 1905" (January 1922), cited in: L. Trotsky: ibid.; p. 235).

"I by no means consider that in my disagreements with the Bolsheviks I was wrong on all points.. . .
I consider that my assessment of the motive forces of the revolution was absolutely right.. . .
My polemical articles against the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks . . devoted to an analysis of the internal forces of the revolution and its prospects . . I could republish even now without amendment, since they fully and completely coincide with the position of our Party, beginning with 1917".
(L. Trotsky: Letter to N.S. Olminsky, December 1921 cited in: N. S. Olminsky: Foreword to "Lenin on Trotsky" (1925), cited in: J. V. Stalin: Reply to the Discussion on the Report an "The Social--Democratic Deviation in Our Party', 15th Conference of CPSU (B.), November 3rd., 1926; in 'Works';, Volume 3; Moscow; 1954;p. 349-50).

"Trotskyism: 'No Tsar but a workers' government'. This, surely is wrong".
(V. I. Lenin: Report on the Political Situation, Petrograd City Conference of the RSDLP, April 27th, 1917, in: "Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 1; London;
l929, p. 207).

"Had we said: 'No Tsar, but a Dictatorship of the Proletariat' -- it would have meant a leap over the petty bourgeoisie.'
(V.I. Lenin: Concluding Remarks in Connection with the Report on the Political Situation, 7th. Conference of the RSDLP, May 7th., 1917, in: ibid.; p. 287).

On the contrary, the bourgeois-democratic revolution, as the first stage of the revolutionary process in Russia, had already been realised, politically, in the 'February Revolution'. The strategy of direct advance to the dictatorship of the working class (in alliance with the poor peasantry) was put forward as a new strategy for the new situation following the "February Revolution", a new strategy for the second stage of the revolutionary process.

As Lenin expressed it in his 'April Theses':

"The present situation in Russia. . .represents a transition from the first stage of the revolution to its second stage which is to place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry'.
(V. I. Lenin: Speech at a Caucus of the Bolshevik Members of the All-Russian Conference of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, April 17th., 1917, in: ibid.; p. 97).

'The insurrection triumphed.  But to whom did it hand over the power snatched from the monarchy?  We come here to the central problem of the February revolution. Why and how did the power turn up in the hands of the  liberal bourgeoisie?"
(L. Trotsky: "History of the Russian Revolution", Volume 1; London; 1967; p. l55).

'The bourgeois-democratic revolution was realised during the first period after October. . But, as we know, it was not realised in the form of a democratic dictator-ship (i.e., of the working class and peasantry --but in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat.. . . .
The two lines, the 'permanent' and Lenin's . . were completely fused by the October Revolution'.
(L. Trotsky:  'The Permanent Revolution"; New York; 1970; p. 229, 234).

'Trotsky cannot but know that Lenin fought against the theory of permanent revolution to the end of his life.  But that does not worry Trotsky.
It turns out . . that the theory of permanent revolution 'fully and completely coincided with the position of our Party, beginning with 1917'. . ..
But how could Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution have coincided with the position of our Party when it is known that our Party, in the person of Lenin, combated this theory all the time? ...
Either our Party did not have a theory of its own, and was later compelled by the course of events to accept Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution; or it did have a theory of its own, but that theory was imperceptibly ousted by Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution, 'beginning with 1917'. . . .
Surely the Bolsheviks had some theory, some estimate of the revolution, some estimate of its motive forces. etc?. . . .
What happened to Leninism, to the theory of Bolshevism, to the Bolshevik estimate of our revolution and its motive forces, etc.?…….
And so, once upon a time there were people known as the Bolsheviks who somehow managed, 'beginning' with 1903, to 'weld' together a party, but who had no revolutionary theory.  So they drifted and drifted, 'beginning' with 1903, until somehow they managed to reach the year 1917.  Then, having espied Trotsky with his theory of permanent revolution,' they decided to 'rearm themselves' and 'having rearmed themselves', they lost the last remnants of Leninism, of Lenin's theory of revolution, thus bringing about the 'full coincidence' of the theory of permanent revolution with the 'position' of our Party.
That is a very interesting fairy-tale, comrades. It, if you like, is one of the splendid conjuring tricks you may see at the circus.  But this is not a circus; it is a conference of our Party.  Nor, after all, have we hired Trotsky as a circus artist'.
(J. V. Stalin: Reply to the Discussion on the Report "The Social-Democratic Deviation in our Party", 15th. Conference of CPSU (B.), November 3rd., 1926, in:
"Works", Volume 3; Moscow; 1954; p. 350, 351, 353-54).

The Opposition to Lenin's Theses

"In yesterday's issue of the 'Pravda' Comrade Lenin published his 'theses'.  They represent the personal opinion of Comrade Lenin. . . The policy of the 'Pravda' was clearly formulated in the resolutions prepared by the Bureau of the Central Committee. . . .
Pending new decisions of the Central Committee and of the All-Russian Conference of our Party, those resolutions remain our platform which we will defend . . against Comrade Lenin's criticism.. .
As regards Comrade Lenin's general line, it appears to us unacceptable inasmuch, as it proceeds from the assumption that the bourgeois-democratic revolution has been completed and it builds on the immediate transformation of this revolution into a socialist revolution. . . .
In a broad discussion we hope to carry our point of view as the only possible one for revolutionary Social-Democracy in so far as it wishes to be and must remain to the very end the one and only party of the revolutionary masses of the proletariat without turning into a group of Communist propagandists".
(L. Kamenev: "Our Differences'; cited in: V. I. Lenin: Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 380-81)

"There are two major errors in this.
1. The question of a 'completed bourgeois-democratic revolution is stated wrongly. . . . .
Reality shows us both the passing of the power into the hands of the bourgeoisie (a 'completed' bourgeois-democratic revolution of the ordinary type) and, by the side of the actual government, the existence of a parallel government which represents the 'revolutionary- democratic-dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry'. . .
Is this reality embraced in the old Bolshevik formula of Comrade Kamenev which says that 'the bourgeois democratic revolution is not completed'?
No, the formula . . is dead. . . .
Anyone who is guided in his activities by the simple formula 'the bourgeois-democratic revolution is not completed' vouchsafes, as it were, the certainty of the petty bourgeoisie being independent of the bourgeoisie....
In doing so, he at once helplessly surrenders to the-petty bourgeoisie. . . .
The mistake made by Comrade Kamenev is that in 1917 he only sees the past of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.  In reality, however, its future has already begun, for the interests and the policy of the wage earners and the petty proprietors have already taken different lines.. . . .
This brings me to the second mistake in the remarks of Comrade Kamenev quoted above:  He reproaches me, saying that my line 'builds' on the immediate transformation of this bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.
This is not true. . . .
I declared in plain language that in this respect I only build on 'patient' explaining (is it necessary to be patient to bring about a change which can be realised 'immediately').
(V. I. Lenin:  'Letters on Tactics'; in: "Collected Works', Volume 20 , Book 1  London; 1929; p. 125, 126, 127).

Lenin replied:

'Comrade Rykov says that Socialism must first come from other countries with greater industrial development. But this is not so. It is hard to tell who will begin and who will end.  This is not Marxism, but a parody on Marxism'.
(V. I. Lenin: Concluding Remarks in Connection with the Report on the Political Situation, May 7th. Conference of RSDLP, May 7th., 1917, in: ibid.; p. 287).

At the Petrograd City Conference of the Party, held from April 27th; to May 5th; 1917, a resolution in support of the political line laid down in Lenin's "April Theses" was carried.

The 'April Days'

'The declarations of the Provisional Government naturally cannot offer the slightest cause to assume that the accomplished upheaval will result in a weakening of Russia's role in the common struggle of the Allies. Quite the contrary.  The effort of the whole people to carry the World War through to a decisive victory has only been strengthened. . Naturally, the Provisional Government.  . . in protecting the rights of our fatherland, will hold faithfully to the obligations which we have assumed towards our allies. . The government is now, as before, firmly convinced,  that the present war will be victoriously concluded in complete accord with the Allies'.
(Provisional Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Note to Allied  Governments of May 1st., 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works', Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 371).

The Central Committee of the Party was concerned that this spontaneous movement might develop along insurrectionary lines which, in the existing situation, could only harm the revolutionary movement; on May 4th., therefore, it adopted a resolution drafted by Lenin calling upon all Party members to exert every effort to keep the demonstrations peaceful:

"Party agitators and speakers must refute the despicable lies that we threaten with civil war. . . At the present moment, when the capitalists and their government cannot and dare not use violence against the masses . . any thought of civil war is naive, senseless, monstrous. . . .
All Party agitators, in factories, in regiments, in the streets, etc. must advocate these views and this proposition (i.e., withdrawal of support by the Soviets from the Provisional Government -- Ed.) by means of peaceful discussions and peaceful demonstrations, as well as meetings everywhere'.
(V. I. Lenin: Resolution of CC, RSDLP, May 4th., 1917, in: ibid.; p. 245, 246).

On May 14th  the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet voted in favour of a coalition Provisional Government, in which the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties would be formally represented.

The First Coalition Provisional Government came into being on May 18th with Prince Georgi Lvov continuing as Prime Minister.  Aleksandr Tereshchenko replaced Miliukov as Minister of Foreign Affairs; Aleksandr Kerensky and Viktor Chernov (of the Socialist Revolutionaries) became Minister of War and Minister of Agriculture respectively; Aleksandr Skobelev and Iraklii Tseretelli (of the Mensheviks) became Minister of Labour and Minister of Posts and Telegraphs respectively.

In the following month Lenin commented on the formal entry of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries into the Provisional Government:

'The entrance of Tseretelli, Chernov and Co. into the cabinet has changed to an insignificant degree only the form of the compact between the Petrograd Soviet and the government of the capitalists. ..
Day by day it becomes ever clearer that Tseretelli, Chernov and Co. are simply hostages of the capitalists,  have become the sides of the capitalists who are actually stifling the revolution; Kerensky has sunk to the point where he uses violence against the masses. . .
The Coalition Cabinet represents only a transition period in the development of the basic class contradictions in our revolution. . . This cannot last very long'.
(V. I. Lenin: Postcript to Pamphlet 'The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 159, 160).

The Seventh Conference of the RSDLP'

The Report on the Political Situation was given by Lenin, and the opposition to Lenin's political line was led by Lev Kamenev and Aleksei Rykov.

Kamenev directed his main attack against the slogan 'Down with the Provisional Government!'", implying that this was a Leninist slogan whereas it had been put forward during the 'April Days" by the Petrograd Committee of the Party in violation of the line of the Central Committee.  In place of this (for the moment) incorrect slogan, Kamenev urged that the Party should put forward the completely unrealistic demand for control of the Provisional Government by the Soviets".

Lenin replied:

'We say that the slogan 'Down with the Provisional Government' is an adventurer's slogan.  That is why we have advocated peaceful demonstrations. . . The Petrograd Committee, however, turned a trifle to the Left.   In a case of this sort, such a step was a grave crime.
Now about control. . . . . .
Comrade Kamenev . . views control as a political act. . . We do not accept control. . .
The Provisional Government must be overthrown, but not now, and not in the ordinary way".
(V. I. Lenin: Concluding Remarks in connection with the Report on the Political Situation, 7th. Conference RSDLP, May 7th., 1917,in: "Collected Works', Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 285-86, 287).

Lenin replied:

"Comrade Rykov. . . . says that Socialism must come first from other countries with greater industrial development.  But this is not so.  It is hard to tell who will begin and who will end.  This is not Marxism, but a parody on Marxism.'
(V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 287).

The Leninist political line on the national question in particular, that the Party must advocate the right of oppressed nations to self-determination to the point of secession -- was presented in the Report on the National Question given by Stalin.  This slogan was opposed by Felix Dzherzhinsky and Yuri Piatakov, the latter demanding:

"The only effective method of solving it (i.e., the national question -- Ed.) is the method of a socialist revolution under the slogan 'Down with boundaries.' for only thus can one do away with imperialism --this new factor leading to a sharpening of national oppression. .
Whereas (1) 'the right of nations to self-determination' . . is a mere phrase without any definite meaning; ....
and whereas (2) this phrase is interpreted as meaning much more than is thought of in the ranks of revolutionary Social-Democracy,.  . . .
the Conference . . assumes that paragraph 9 of our programme (i.e., support for the right of nations to self-determination -- Ed.) should be eliminated."
(Y. Piatakov: Resolution on National Question submitted to 7th. Conference, RSDLF; cited in: V. I.Lenin: 'Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 2; London; 1929; p.411, 412).

'Ever since 1903, when our Party adopted its programme, we have been encountering the desperate opposition of the Poles. . . And the position of the Polish Social-Democracy is as strange and monstrous an error now as it was then.  These people wish to reduce the stand of our Party to that of the chauvinists.. . . . .
In Russia we must stress the right of separation for the subject nations, while in Poland we must stress the right of such nations to unite.  The right to unite implies the right to separate. . . .
Comrade Piatakov's standpoint is a repetition of Rosa Luxemburg's standpoint  . . Theoretically he is against the right of separation. . What Comrade Piatakov says is incredible confusion.. . .When one says that the national question has been settled, one speaks of Western Europe.  Comrade Piatakov applies this where it does not belong, to Eastern Europe, and we find ourselves in a ridiculous position. . . .
Comrade Piatakov simply rejects our slogan. The method of accomplishing a socialist revolution under the slogan 'Down with the boundaries' is an utter absurdity. . . We maintain that the state is necessary, and the existence of a state presupposes boundaries. Even the Soviets are confronted with the question of boundaries . . .What does it mean, 'Down with the boundaries'? This is the beginning of anarchy . . .
He who does not accept this point of view is an annexationist, a chauvinist."
(V. I. Lenin: Speech on the National Question, 7th. Conference RSDLP, in: "Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 310, 312, 313, 3l4).

In his "April Theses" Lenin had already demanded a break with the 'Zimmerwald International", proposing that the Party should remain within it only for purposes of information. At the conference, however, this policy was opposed by a considerable body of delegates headed by Grigori Zinoviev, who proposed:

"Our party remains in the Zimmerwald bloc with the aim of defending the tactics of the Zimmerwald Left Wing there. . . .
The conference decides to take part in the international conference of the Zimmerwaldists scheduled for May 31 and authorises the Central Committee to  organise a delegation to that conference".
(Resolution on "The Situation within the International and the Tasks of the RSDLP", 7th. Conference RSDLP, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 2; London; 1929; p. 407).

'..arch-opportunist and pernicious".
(V. I. Lenin: Speech at 7th. Conference, RSDLP, cited in: "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)"; Moscow; 1941; p. 189)

The question was placed on the agenda of the conference at the request of Viktor Nogin, who proposed that a Bolshevik delegation should attend the 'Stockholm Conference'.

Lenin replied:

"I cannot agree with Comrade Nogin . . Back of this whole comedy of a would-be Socialist congress there are actually the political maneuvers of German imperialism.  The German capitalists use the German social-chauvinists for the purpose of inviting the social-chauvinists of all countries to the conference. because they want to fool the working masses. . . . .
Borgjberg is an agent of the German government.. . .
We must expose this whole comedy of the Socialist conference, expose all these congresses as comedies intended to cover up the deals made by the diplomats behind the backs of the masses."
(V. I. Lenin: Speech on the Proposed Calling of an International Socialist Conference, 7th. Conference RSDLP, May 8 1917, in: "Collected Works", Volume 20, Book 1; London; 1929; p. 287, 288, 290).

The conference adopted a series of resolutions in accordance with Lenin's political line:

"On the War',
'On the Attitude towards the Provisional Government';
"On the Agrarian Question';
''On a Coalition Cabinet",
''On Uniting the Internationalists against the Petty-bourgeois Defencist Bloc'',
'On the Present Political Situation" ;
and 'On the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies'.

The First Congress of Soviets

participation in the Provisional Government,
"defence of the fatherland" in the imperialist war;
the military offensive at the front demanded by the Allied powers;
and the war loan 'Liberty Loan').

'We know that the hidden counter-revolutionaries are making ready to take advantage of your demonstration".
(Resolution of First Congress of Soviets, June 21st., 1917, cited by V. I, Lenin:  'Disquieting Rumours", in: 'Collected Works', Volume 20, Book 2  London; 1929; p. 41).

"The dissatisfaction of the majority of the comrades with the calling off of the  demonstration is quite legitimate, but the Central Committee could not act otherwise for two reasons: First, we received a formal prohibition of all demonstrations from our semi-official government : second, a plausible reason was given for this prohibition. . . . .
Even in simple warfare it sometimes happens that for strategic reasons it is necessary to postpone an offensive fixed for a certain date.. . . .
It was absolutely necessary for us to cancel our arrangements.  This has been proved by subsequent events'.
(V. I. Lenin: Speech at the Session of the Petrograd Committee of the RSDLP, June 24th., 1917, in: ibid.: p.245).

The Bolshevik delegates walked out of the congress in protest at Tseretelli's speech, and issued a declaration in which they declared:

"We have not renounced for a single moment in favour of a hostile majority of the Soviet our right, independently and freely, to utilise all liberties for the purpose of mobilising the working masses under the banner of our proletarian class party. . .
What is planned is the disarming of the revolutionary vanguard -- a measure that has always been resorted to by the bourgeois counter-revolution. . . .
Citizen Tseretelli and those who direct him are hardly ignorant of the fact that never in history have the working masses given up without struggle the arms they had received at the hand of the revolution. Consequently, the ruling bourgeoisie and its 'Socialist' Ministers are provoking civil war. .  and they are aware of what they are doing. . . .
We expose before the All-Russian Congress and the masses of the people . . this attack on the revolution that is now being prepared. . . .
The revolution is passing through a moment of supreme danger.  We call upon the workers to be firm and watchful."
(Declaration of Bolshevik Fraction to All-Russian Congress of Soviets, June 24th., 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: ibid.: p. 416).

The Congress elected a Central Executive Committee and instructed it to convene a new congress within three months.

                            Trotsky Returns to Russia

When news of the 'February Revolution' reached America, Trotsky made immediate arrangements to return to Russia. Sailing from New York in a Norwegian ship at the end of March, he was taken off the ship at Halifax (Canada) by British naval police and confined for a month in an internment camp for German prisoners of war at Amherst.

At the end of April he was released from internment, and resumed his journey.  Landing in Norway, he crossed Scandinavia to reach Petrograd on May 17th., 1917.

He went almost immediately to the Smolny Institute, a former private school for girls which was now the head-quarters of the Petrograd Soviet.  In view of his leading role in the Soviet of 1905, he was made an associate member of the Executive of the Soviet, without the right to vote.

He joined a group called the  'Inter-Regional Organisation" (Mezhrayontsi), which had been founded in 1913 and to the publications of which he had contributed from abroad. The Inter-Regional Organisation was a centrist group, which prided itself on being neither Bolshevik nor Menshevik, and its influence was confined to a few working-class districts of Petrograd.  In the early summer of 1917 its leading members included Anatoly Lunacharsky, David Riazanov, Dmitri Manuilsky, Mikhail Pokrovsky, Adolphe Joffe and Lev Karahkhan.

Now Trotsky took a leading role in the organisation, and in founding its organ  'Vperyod' (Forward).
According to Trotsky,

'Whoever lived through the year 1917 as a member of the central kernel of the Bolsheviks knows that there was never a hint of any disagreement between Lenin and me from the very first day. . . .
From the earliest days of my arrival, I stated . . . . . that I was ready to join the Bolshevik organisation immediately in view of the absence of any disagreements whatever but that it was necessary to decide the question of the quickest possible way of attracting the 'Mezhrayontsi' organisation into the party. . . .
Among the membership of the 'Mezhrayontsi' organisation there were elements which tried to impede the fusion, advancing this or that condition, etc."
(L. Trotsky: 'The Stalin School of Falsification"; New York; 1972; p. 5, 6).

On May 23rd., a meeting took place between representatives of the Bolsheviks (including Lenin)  and representatives of the Inter-Regional Organisation (including Trotsky) to explore the possibility of fusion.

As Trotsky's biographer puts it:

"At the meeting of 23 May he (i.e., Lenin -- Ed.) asked Trotsky and Trotsky's friends to join the Bolshevik party immediately.  He offered them positions on the leading bodies and on the editorial staff of 'Pravda'. He put no conditions to them.  He did not ask Trotsky to renounce anything of his past; he did not even mention past controversies. . . .
Trotsky would have had to be much more free from pride than he was to accept Lenin's proposals immediately. He and his friends should not be asked to call themselves Bolsheviks. . . They ought to join hands in a new party, with a new name, at a joint congress of their organisations'.
(I. Deutscher: "The Prophet Armed: Trotsky; 1879-192l'; London; 1970; p. 257-8).

"Trotsky (who took the floor out of turn immediately after me) . . . .
I cannot call myself a Bolshevik. . . .
We cannot be asked to recognise Bolshevism. .  .
The old factional name is undesirable'.
(V. I. Lenin: "Leniniskii Sbornik' (Lenin Miscellany) Volume 4; Moscow; 1925; p. 303).

Not until August, three months before the October Revolution, did the Inter-Regional Organisaion join the Bolshevik Party, while Trotsky was in prison!

The Resignation of the Cadet Ministers

Lenin pointed out that:

'. . by leaving,  they say, we present an ultimatum. . . .
To be without the Cadets, they aver, means to be without the 'aid' of world-wide Anglo-American capital'.
(V. I. Lenin: 'What could the Cadets Count on when leaving the Cabinet?", in:  'Collected Works', Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 16).

'Either suppress such a class by force -- as the Cadets have been preaching since May 19 -- or entrust yourself to its leadership. . . The Tsteretellis and Chernovs, they think would not do that, they would not dare.' They will yield to us.' . . .
The calculation is correct.'
(V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 15, 16).

The "July Days'

In the evening of July 17th. a Bolshevik revolution in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets calling for the transfer of all power to the Soviets was rejected.

On the next day, July 18th., "Pravda" published an appeal from the Bolsheviks calling for an end to the demonstrations:

"For the present political crisis, our aim has been accomplished.  We have therefore decided to end the demonstration.  Let each and every one peacefully and in an organised manner bring the strike and the demon-stration to a close".
(Proclamation of the CC of the RSDLP July 18th.,. 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin   'Collected Works', Volume 21, Book 2; London; n.d., p. 300).

"On July 16-17 . . there were still lacking the objective conditions for a victorious uprising.

1. 'We did not yet have behind us the class that is the vanguard of the revolution.  We did not yet have a majority among the workers and soldiers of the capitals. . . .

2. At that time there was no general revolutionary upsurge of the people . . .

3. At that time there were no vacillations on a serious, general, political scale among our enemies and among the undecided petty bourgeoisie. . . ..

4. This is why an uprising on July 16-17 would have been an error; we would not have retained power either physically or politically.. . . .

Before the Kornilov affair, the army and the provinces could and would have marched against Petrograd".
(V. I. Lenin: "Marxism and Uprising", in: "Collected Works ", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 225-226).

The Order for the Arrest of Lenin

On July 19th. government troops occupied the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Party, and the government issued an order for the arrest of Lenin, Zinoviev and Kameonev.

A movement demanding that Lenin surrender to the arrest order was led by Trotsky.

As Trotsky's sympathetic biographer Isaac Deutscher expresses it:

"Lenin . . made up his mind that he would not allow himself to be imprisoned but would go into hiding. . . . .
.. Trotsky took a less grave view and Lenin's decision seemed to him unfortunate. . . he thought that Lenin had every interest in laying his record before the public, and that in this way he could serve his cause better than by flight, which would merely add to any adverse appearances by which people might judge him."
(I. Deutscher: "The Prophet Armed: Trotsky: 1879-l921"; London; 1970; p. 274).

"Comrades yielding to the 'Soviet atmosphere' are, often inclined towards appearing before the courts.
Those who are closer to the working masses apparently incline towards not appearing.. .
The court is an organ of power. . . .
The power that is active is the military dictatorship. Under such conditions it is ridiculous even to speak of 'the courts'. It is not a question of 'courts', but of an episode in the civil war. This is what those in favour of appearing before the courts unfortunately do not want to understand. . . .
Not a trial but a campaign of persecution against the internationalists, this is what the authorities need. . . .
Let the internationalists work underground as far as it is in their power, but let them not commit the folly of voluntarily appearing before the courts'."
(V. I. Lenin: "The Question of the Bolshevik Leaders appearing before the Courts", in ibid.; p. 34, 35).

"There is no guarantee that if they do appear they will not be subjected to brutal violence. If the court were democratically organised and if a guarantee were given that violence would not be committed it would be a different matter."
(J. V. Stalin: Speech in Reply to the Discussion on the Report of the Central Commitee, 6th. Congress RSDLP, in: "Works", Volume 3; Moscow; 193; p. 182).

"On 23 July, four days after Lenin had gone into hiding, Trotsky therefore addressed the following Open Letter to the Provisional Government:
'Citizen Ministers --
You can have no logical grounds for exempting me from the effect of the decree by dint of which Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev are subject to arrest. . . You can have no reason to doubt that I am just as irreconcilable an opponent of the general policy of the Provisional Government as the above-mentioned Comrades'."
(I. Deutscher: ibid.; p. 276-77).

The New Political Situation following the "July Days"

On July 22nd., the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, against Bolshevik opposition, adopted a resolution of confidence in the Provisional Government as a government of defence of the revolution.

At this time Lenin analysed the new political situation following the "July Days" as follows:

1. As a result of the treachery of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders, dual power had ceased to exist; effective state power passed into the hands of a military dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary capitalist class:

"'The counter-revolution has become organised and consolidated, and has actually taken state power into its hands. . . .
The leaders of the Soviets as well as of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik Parties, with Tseretelli and Chernov at their head, have definitely betrayed the cause of the revolution by placing it in the hands of the counter-revolutionists and transforming themselves, their parties end the Soviets into fig-leaves of the counter-revolution. . . . .
Having sanctioned the disarming of the workers and the revolutionary regiments, they have deprived themselves of all real power."
(V. I. Lenin: "The Political Situation", in: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 36-37).

"The turning point of July 17 consisted in just this, that after it the objective situation changed abruptly. Thc fluctuating state of power ceased, the power having passed at a decisive point into the hands of the counter-revolution. . . After July 17, the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, hand in hand with the monarchists and the Black Hundreds,, has attached to itself the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, partly by intimidating them, and has given over actual state power . . into the hands of a military clique."
(V. I. Lenin: "'On Slogans", in: ibid.; p. 44-45.)

2. Thus, the possibility of the peaceful development of the revolution by the winning of a majority for revolutionary socialism in the Soviets no longer exists:

_{"The struggle for the passing of power to the Soviets in due time, is finished. The peaceful course of development has been rendered impossible.. . . . .}
At present power can no longer be seized peacefully. It can be obtained only after a victory in a decisive struggle against the real holders of power at the present moment, namely, the military clique.. . . .
This power must be overthrown."
(V. I. Lenin: "On Slogans", in: ibid.; p. 44, 45-46, 47).

3. Thus, the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets", which was correct in the period when the peaceful development of the revolution, is no longer correct and should be abandoned:

"The slogan of all power passing to the Soviets was a slogan of a peaceful development of the revolution, possible in April, May, June and up to July 18-22, i.e., up to the time when actual power passed into, the hands of the military dictatorship. Now this slogan is no longer correct."
(V. I. Lenin: "The Political Situation, in: ibid.; p. 37).

"This slogan would be a deception of the people. It would spread among it the illusion that to seize power, the Soviets even now have only to wish or to decree it".
(V. I Lenin: "On Slogans", in: ibid.; p. 45)

4. Even if slogans were given a clear revolutionary content, it would be an incorrect call for "All Power To the Soviets!" - because after the overthrow of the capitalist military dictatorship power, power will not pass to the present impotent and treacherous Soviets, but to revolutionary Soviets, which do not as yet exist:

"Soviets can and must appear in this now revolution, but not the present Soviets, not organs of compromise with the bourgeoisie, but organs of a revolutionary struggle against it. . . .
The present Soviets . . resemble a flock of sheep brought to the slaughter-house, pitifully bleating when placed under the knife. . . The slogan of the power passing to the Soviets might be construed as a 'simple' call to let power pass into the hands of the present Soviets, and to say so, to appeal for this, would at present mean to deceive the people. Nothing is more dangerous than deception."
(V. I. Lenin: "On Slogans", in: ibid.; p. 49).

The Second Coalition Provisional Government

On July 29th. General Lavr Kornilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the army, replacing General Aleksel Brusilov.

On July 31st., Kerensky issued a decree dissolving the Finnish Sejm (Parliament), which had on July 19^th, passed a bill for the autonomy of Finland.

On August 6th., the second coalition Provisional Government was formed, with Aleksandr Kerensky as Prime Minister and Minister of War and including Ministers from the Cadets, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Lenin commented on the formation of the new government as follows:

"Let the Party loudly and clearly proclaim to the people the whole truth: that we are experiencing the beginnings of Bonapartism; that the 'new' government is merely a screen to conceal the counter-revolutionary Cadets and military clique which have power in their hands; that the people will not get peace, the peasants will not get the land, the workers will not get the eight-hour day, the hungry will not get bread, without complete liquidation of the counter-revolution".
(V. I. Lenin: "The Beginning of Bonapartism", in "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d; p. 78-79).

The Sixth Congress of the Party

In Lenin's absence, both the Report of the Central Committee and the Report on the Political Situation were given by Stalin. In the latter, Stalin said:

^{"Some comrades say that since capitalism is poorly developed in our country, it would be utopian to raise the question of a socialist revolution.. . It would be rank pedantry to demand that Russia should 'wait' with socialist changes until Europe 'begins'. That country "begins" which has the greater opportunities. . . .
Overthrow of the dictatorship of the imperialist bourgeoisie -- that is what the immediate slogan of the Party must be.}
The peaceful period of the revolution has ended. A period of clashes and explosions has begun.. . .
The characteristic feature of the moment is that the counter-revolutionary measures are being implemented through the agency of 'Socialists'. It is only because it has created such a screen that the counter-revolution may continue to exist for another month or two. But since the forces of revolution are developing, explosions are bound to occur, and the moment will come when the workers will raise and rally around them the poorer strata of the peasantry, will raise the standard of workers' revolution and usher in an era of socialist revolution in Europe".
(J. V. Stalin: Report on the Political Situation, Sixth Congress RSDLP, in: 'Works", Volume 3; Moscow; 1953; p. 185, 186, 189, 190).

"The first phase, with the participation of thc peasantry anxious to obtain land; the second phase, after the satiated peasantry has fallen away, the phase of the proletarian revolution, when the Russian proletariat will be supported only by proletarian elements and by the proletariat of Western Europe'".
(N. Bukharin: Speech at 6th. Congress, RSDLP, cited in: N. Popov: "Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Part 1; London; n.d.; p. 383).

'What is the prospect Bukharin held out? His analysis is fundamentally wrong. In his opinion, in the first stage we are moving towards a peasant revolution. But it is bound to concur, to coincide with a workers' revolution. It cannot be that the working class, which constitutes the vanguard of the revolution, wil1 not at the same time fight for its own demands. I therefore consider that Bukharin's scheme has not been properly thought out.
The second stage, according to Bukharin, will be a proletarian revolution supported by Western Europe, without the peasants, who will have received land and will be satisfied. But against whom would this revolution be directed? Bukharin's gimcrack scheme furnishes no reply to this question".
(J. V. Stalin: Reply to the Discussion on the Report on the Political Situation, 6th. Congress, RSDLP; in ibid.; p. 196).

"For the purpose of directing it towards peace and, in the event of a proletarian revolution in the West, towards socialism".
(E. Preobrazhensky: Amendment to Resolution on the Political Situation, 6th. Congress RSDLP, cited in H. Popov: ibid.; p. 381).

"I am against such an amendment. The possibility is not excluded that Russia will be the country that will lay the road to socialism. . . We must discard the antiquated idea that only Europe can show us the way".
(J. V. Stalin: Reply to Preobrazhensky on Clause 9 of the Resolution "On the Political Situation", 6th. Congress RSDLP, in: ibid.; p. 199, 200).

"The correct slogan at the present time can be only complete liquidation of the dictatorship of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. Only the revolutionary proletariat, provided it is supported by the poorest peasantry, is strong enough to carry out this task. . . .
The task of those revolutionary classes will then be to strain every effort to take state power into their own hands and direct it, in alliance with the revolutionary proletariat of the advanced countries, towards peace and the Socialist reconstruction of society".
(Resolution on the Political Situation, 6th. Congress RSDLP, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 2; London; n.d.; p. 304).

It also approved resolutions on the trade union movement and on youth leagues, setting out the aim that the Party should win the leading influence in all these bodies. It also endorsed Lenin's decision not to appear for trial:

"Considering that the present methods of persecution by the police and secret service and the activities of the public prosecutor are re-establishing the practices of the Shcheglovitov regime, . . and feeling that under such conditions there is absolutely no guarantee either of the impartiality of the court procedure, or even of the elementary safety of those summoned before the court".
(Resolution on the Failure of Lenin to Appear in Court, 6th. Congress RSDLP, cited in: V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 312).

Finally, the congress issued a Manifesto to all the workers, soldiers and peasants of Russia, which ended:

"Firmly, courageously and calmly, without giving in to provocations, gather strength and form fighting columns! Under the banner of the Party, proletarians and soldiers! Under our banner, oppressed of the villages!
"Long live the revolutionary proletariat!"

"Long live the alliance of the workers and Down with the counter-revolution and its 'Moscow Conference' !"

"Long live the workers' world revolution!"

"Long live Socialism!"

"Long Live the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks)!""
(Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, Sixth Congress, cited in ibid.; p. 316-317).

The "Stockholm Conference"

"Now when our revolution has retreated to the second line of trenches, it is fitting to support this conference. Now, when the Stockholm Conference has become the banner of the struggle of the proletariat against imperialism, . . we naturally must support it".
L. Kamenev: Speech to CEC, August 19th., 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; nd; p. 290).

"What right had Comrade Kamenev to forget that there is a decision of the Central Committee of the Party against participating at Stockholm? If this decision has not been abrogated by a congress or by a new decision of the Central Committee, it is law for the Party. . . .
Not only had Kamenev no right to make this speech, but . . he directly violated the decision of the Party; he spoke directly against the Party. . . .
Kamenev . . did not mention that the Stockholm Conference will include social-imperialists, that it is shameful for a revolutionary-Social-Democrat to have anything to do with such people. . . .
To go to confer with social-imperialists, with Ministers, with hangmen's sides in Russia -- this is a shame and a betrayal. . . . .
Not a revolutionary banner, but a banner of deals, compromises, forgiveness for social-imperialism, bankers' negotiations concerning the division of annexations -- this is the banner which is really beginning to wave over Stockholm. . . .
We have decided to build the Third International. We must accomplish this in spite of all difficulties, Not a step backward to deals with social-imperialists and renegades from Socialism.'"
(V. I. Lenin: "On Kamenev's Speech in the Central Executive Committee concerning the Stockholm Conference", in: ibid.; p94; 95, 96).

"The Stockholm Conference . . failed. Its failure was caused by the fact that the Anglo-French imperialists at present are unwilling to conduct peace negotiations, while the German imperialists are willing.. . .
The Stockholm Conference is known to have been called and to be supported by persons who support their governments. . ..
The 'Novaya Zhizn' deceives the workers when it imbues them with confidence ~ the social-chauvinists. . .
We, on the other hand, turn away from the comedy enacted at Stockholm by the social-chauvinists and among the social-chauvinists, in order to open the eyes of the masses, in order to express their interests, to call them to revolution, . . for a struggle on the basis of principles and for a complete brook with social-chauvinism. . . .
The Stockholm Conference, even if it takes place, which is very unlikely, will be an attempt on the part of the German imperialists to sound out the ground as to the feasibility of a certain exchange of annexations".
(V. I. Lenin: "On the Stockholm Conference", in: ibid; p. 121, 123, 124, 125).

The Moscow State Conference

The conference was opened by Kerensky, who declared that the fundamental tasks of the Provisional Government were the continuation of the war, the restoration of order in the army and the country, and the organisation of a stable power.

The principal speech was made by General Lavr Kornilov, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, while General Aleksei Kaledin, speaking in the name of the Don Cossacks, put forward the following programme:

1) politics to be forbidden in the army;
2) all Soviets and army committees to be abolished;
3) the Declaration of the Rights of the soldiers to be abolished;
4) full authority to be restored to the officers.

"The counter-revolution needs a parliament of its own, a centre of its own; and it is creating it.. . .
The conference to be convened in Moscow on August 25 will inevitably be transformed into an organ of counter-revolutionary conspiracy against the workers, . . against the peasants, . . and against the soldiers . .. into an organ of conspiracy camouflaged by the 'socialist talk' of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who are supporting the conference".
(J. V. Stalin: "Against the Moscow Conference", in: "Works", Volume 3; Moscow; 1953, p. 208, 209).

"First, to expose the conference convening in Moscow as an organ of the conspiracy of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie against the revolution; second, to expose the counter-revolutionary policy of the S-R's, and Mensheviks who are supporting this conference; third, to organise mass protests of workers, peasants and soldiers against the conference".
(Resolution of CC of RSDLP on the Moscow Conference, cited in V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 2; London; n.d.; p. 318).

The Kornilov Revolt

A powerful campaign was then launched in all the media controlled by the counter-revolutionary capitalist class blaming the fall of Riga on the demoralisation of the soldiers brought about by Bolshevik propaganda and agitation.

The Bolsheviks replied that this was not the reason for the fall of Riga, but that the city had been deliberately surrendered to the German armies in order to provide a pretext for a counter-revolutionary conspiracy:

"After the Moscow Conference came the surrender of Riga and the demand for repressive measures. . ..
The counter-revolution needed a 'Bolshevik plot' in order to clear the way for Kornilov. . . .
The counter-revolutionary higher army officers surrendered . . Riga in August in order to exploit the 'defeats' at the front for the purpose of achieving the 'complete' triumph of counter-revolution."
(J. V. Stalin: "We Demand!", in: "Works", Volume 3; Moscow; 1953; p. 277, 278).

"On the instructions of the Prime Minister, I requested you (Kornilov) to send the Cavalry Corps to ensure the establishment of martial law in Petrograd and the suppression of any attempt at revolt".
(B. Savinkov: Statement cited in J. V. Stalin: "The Plot against the Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 367).

"Occupy the city, disarm the units of the Petrograd garrison which joined the Bolshevik movement, disarm the population of Petrograd and disperse the Soviets.. . . .
On the execution of this mission General Krymov was to send a brigade reinforced with artillery to Oranienbaum, which on its arrival was to call upon the Kronstadt garrison to dismantle the fortress and to cross to the mainland".
(L. Kornilov: Explanatory Memorandum, cited in: J. V. Stalin: ibid.;p. 367).

As Stalin commented later:

" A compact was concluded (i.e., between the Provisional Government and General Kornilov -- Ed.) to organise a conspiracy against the Bolsheviks, that is, against the working class, against the revolutionary army and the peasantry. It was a compact for conspiracy against the revolution!
That is what we have been saying from the very first day of the Kornilov revolt".
(J. V. Stalin: "Comments", in: ibid.; p. 350).

"The Kerensky Government not only knew of this diabolical plan, but itself took part in elaborating it and, together with Kornilov, was preparing to carry it out. . .
The 'Kornilov affair' was not a 'revolt' against the Provisional Government, . . but a regular conspiracy against the revolution, an organised and thoroughly planned conspiracy. . . .
Its organisers and instigators were the counter-revolutionary elements among the generals, representatives of the Cadet Party, representatives of the 'public men' in Moscow, the more 'initiated' members of the Provisional Government, and -- last but not least! -- certain representatives of certain embassies. . . .
Kornilov had the support of the Russian and the British and French imperialist bourgeoisie".
(J. V. Stalin: 'The Plot against the Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 367, 373, 379).

On the following day Kerensky -- compelled for political reasons to keep his participation in the plot secret --issued an "appeal" to the population for "resistance" to Kornilov, and appointed Savinkov as Governor-General of Petrograd under a state of siege.

^{On September 10th , on the initiative of the Bolsheviks a broad Committee for Struggle against Counter-Revolution was set up in the capital. Detachments of armed workers ("Red Guards") were formed for the defence of the city, and agitators (mostly Bolshevik soldiers) were sent to meet the advancing troops. The work of these agitators, in the existing circumstances, proved so successful that by September 12th, virtually all the rank-and-file soldiers had deserted Kornilov.}

The political line put forward by Lenin in connection with the Kornilov "revolt" was to organise active struggle against the main enemy, the Kornilov forces, while on a campaign of exposure of the Kerensky government:

"We will fight, we are fighting against Kornilov, even as Kerensky's troops do, but we do not support Kerensky. On the contrary, we expose his weakness. There is the difference. . . .
We are changing the form of our struggle against Kerensky. . . We shall not overthrow Kerensky right now; we shall approach the task of struggling against him in a different way, namely, we shall point out to the people (which struggles against Kornilov) the weakness and vacillation of Kerensky."
(V. I. Lenin "Letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, September 12th., 1917 in "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n .d., p. 137, 138).

As Stalin commented:

"A Directory was the political form the Kornilov-Kerensky 'collective dictatorship' was to have been clothed in.
It should now be clear to everyone that in creating a Directory after the failure of the Kornilov 'revolt' Kerensky was establishing this same Kornilov dictatorship by other means".
(J. V. Stalin: 'The Plot against the Revolution", in: ibid.; p. 370).

"The Kornilov revolt was an attempt on the very life of the revolution. That is unquestionable. But in attempting to kill the revolution and stirring all the forces of society into motion, it thereby, on the one hand, gave a spur to the revolution, stimulated it to greater activity and organisation, and, on the other hand, revealed the true nature of the classes and parties, tore the mask from their faces and gave us a glimpse of their true countenances.
We owe it to the Kornilov revolt that the almost defunct Soviets in the rear and the Committees at the front instantaneously sprang to life and became active.
It is a fact that even the five-man 'Directory' set up by Kerensky had to dispense with official representatives of the Cadets."
(J. V. Stalin: "The Break with the Cadets, in: ibid.; p. 296, 297)

The Political Situation Following the Kornilov "Revolt".

"There has now arrived such a sharp and original turn in the Russian revolution that we, as a party, can offer a voluntary compromise -- true, not to the bourgeoisie, our direct and main class enemy, but to our nearest adversaries, the 'ruling' petty-bourgeois democratic parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. . . . . .
The compromise on our part is our return to the pre-July demand of all power to the Soviets, a government of S-Rs and Mensheviks responsible to the Soviets.
Now, and only now, perhaps only for a few days or for a week or two, such a government could be created and established in a perfectly peaceful way. In all probability it could secure a peaceful forward march of the whole Russian Revolution, and unusually good chances for big strides forward by the world movement towards peace and towards the victory of Socialism.
Only for the sake of this peaceful development of the revolution -- a possibility that is extremely rare in history and extremely valuable . . -- can and must the Bolsheviks, partisans of a world revolution, partisans of revolutionary methods, agree to such a compromise, in my opinion.
The compromise would consist in this that the Bolsheviks .. . would refrain from immediately advancing the demand for the passing, of power to the proletariat and the poorest peasants, from revolutionary methods of struggle for the realisation of this demand. The condition which is self-evident . . would be full freedom of propaganda and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly without any new procrastination."
(V. I. Lenin: "On Compromises". in: 'Collected Works', Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. l53-4). Two days later, on September 16^th Lenin concluded that the time in which a peaceful development of the revolution might occur had probably already passed:

"Perhaps those few days during which a peaceful development was still possible, have aalready passed. Yes, to all appearances they have already passed.".
(V. I. Lenin; ibid.; p. 157).

The incident had exposed completely the counter-revolutionary character of the Provisional Government and of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders. The masses of workers and peasants swung overwhelmingly behind the Bolsheviks. A section of the Mensheviks (the so-called "Internationalists") and a section of the Socialist-Revolutionaries (the so-called 'Left-Socialist-Revolutionaries") departed the open counter-revolutionary leaders and forged a practical bloc with the Bolsheviks.

The incident also brought a great revival to the Soviets, and their bolshevisation. On September 13th the Petrograd Soviet adopted a revolutionary resolution moved by the Moscow Soviet followed suit on September 18th. In these circumstances, the Party revived the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets!"

"'All Power to the Soviets!' - such is the slogan of the new movement".
(J. V. Stalin "All Power to the Soviets!'" ; in: "Works", Volume 2 Moscow; 1953; p. 320).

Trotsky's "Proportional Representation'

"We shall conduct the work of the Petrograd Soviet in a spirit of lawfulness and of full freedom for all parties. The hand of the Presidium will never lend itself to the suppression of a minority". (L. Trotsky: Presidential Address to Petrograd Soviet, September 24^th , 1917, cited in: I. Deutscher: "The Prophet Armed: Trotsky: 1879-1921"; London; 1970;  p. 287).

"Despite Lenin's objections, all parties were represented in the new Presidium of the Soviet in proportion to their strength."
(I. Deutscher: ibid.; p. 287).

"such glaring errors of the Bolsheviks as giving seats to the Mensheviks in the Presidium of the Soviets, etc."
(V. I. Lenin "The Crisis Has Matured", in 'Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d. ; p. 278) .

Lenin Calls for Insurrection

"Having obtained a majority in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of both capitals, the Bolsheviks can and must take power into their hands. . . .
The majority of the people is with us. . ..
Why must the Bolsheviks assume power right now?
Because the impending surrender of Petrograd will make our chances a hundred times worse. . .
What we are concerned with is not the 'day' of the uprising.. . .
What matters is that we must make the task clear to the Party, place on the order of the day the armed uprising in Petrograd and Moscow (including their regions) . . .
No apparatus? There is an apparatus: the Soviets and democratic organisations. . . It is precisely now that to offer peace to the people means to win.
Assume power at once in Moscow and in Petrograd. . we will win absolutely and unquestionably".
(V. I. Lenin: "The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power", in: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 221, 222, 223).

"We have back of us the majority of a class that is the vanguard of the revolution, the vanguard of the people, and is capable of drawing the masses along.
We have back of us a majority of the people.. . . .
We have the advantageous position of a party which knows its road perfectly well. . . . . .
Victory is assured to us, for the people are now very close to desperation, and we are showing the whole people a sure way out. . .
We have before us all, the objective prerequisites for a successful uprising. .
Delay is impossible. The revolution is perishing.
Having put the question this way, having concentrated our entire fraction in the factories and barracks, we shall correctly estimate the best moment to begin the uprising.
And in order to treat uprising in that Marxist way, i.e., as an art, we must at the same time, without losing a single moment, organise the staff of the insurrectionary detachment; designate the forces; move the loyal regiments to the most important points; surround the Aleksandrinsky Theatre; occupy Peter and Paul Fortress; arrest the general staff and the government; move against the military cadets, the Savage Division, etc., such detachments as will die rather than allow the enemy to move to the centre of the city; we must mobilise the armed workers, call them to a last desperate bottle, occupy at once the telegraph and telephone stations, place our staff of the uprising at the central telephone station, connect it by wire with all the factories, the regiments, the points of armed fighting, etc,"
(V. I. Lenin: "Marxism and Uprising", in: ibid.; p. 226, 227, 228-9).

The Central Committee Meeting of October 28th.

The Committee took a hesitant attitude towards Lenin's demand that an insurrection be placed on the immediate order of the day. Stalin's motion that the letters should be sent to the most important organisations for discussion by them was held over until the next meeting. Kamenev's motion that:

"The Central Committee, having considered the letters of Lenin, rejects the practical propositions contained in them",
(Minutes of CC, RSDLP, September 28th., 1917, cited in V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 300).

The Question of the Zimmerwald Conference

In September Lenin pressed the view that the decision to continue further participation in "rotten Zimmerwald" had been a mistake and urged that the Party's delegation should not take part in the conference but should call a conference of the left Zimmerwaldists, without the Centrists:

^"It is now perfectly clear that it was a mistake not to leave it (i.e., Zimmerwald -- Ed.) . . .
We must leave Zimmerwald immediately. . ..
When we leave rotten Zimmerwald, we must decide immediately, at the plenary session of September 16, 1917, to call a conference of the Lefts".
(V. I. Lenin: "On The Zimmerwald Question"; in: "Collected Works", Volume 2, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 150).

The "Democratic Conference"'

It was, of course, completely unrepresentative. As Lenin pointed out:

"The Democratic Conference does not represent the majority of the revolutionary people, but only the conciliatory petty-bourgeois top layer".
(V. I. Lenin: "The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power", in: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 221).

"l. The abolition of private property in landowners' land without compensation and its transfer to the management of peasant committees. .. .

2. The introduction of workers' control over both production and distribution on a state-wide scale, the centralisation of banking, control over the banks and the nationalisation of the most important industries, such as oil, coal, and metals; universal labour duty; immediate measures to demobilise industry; and organisation of supplying the village with industrial products at fixed prices. The merciless taxation of large capital accumulations and properties and the confiscation of war profits for the purpose of saving the country from economic ruin.

3. Declaring secret agreements to be void, and the immediate offer of a universal democratic peace to all the peoples of the belligerent nations.

4. Safeguarding the rights of all nationalities inhabiting Russia to self-determination. The immediate abolition of all repressive measures against Finland and the Ukraine".
(Declaration of Bolshevik Fraction at Democratic Conference, cited in V. I. Lenin "Collected Works";, Volume 21, Book 2;London; n.d.; p. 321-22),

"l. Stopping all repressions directed against the working class and its organisations. Abolition of capital punishment at the front and the re-establishment of full freedom of agitation and of all democratic organisations within the army. Cleansing the army of counter-revolutionary elements.

2. Commissars and other officials to be elected by local organisations.

3. General arming of the workers and the organisation of a Red Guard.

4. Dissolution of the State Council and the State Duma. The immediate convening of the Constituent Assembly.

5. Abolition of all the privileges of the estates (of the nobility, etc.), complete equalty of rights for all citizens.

6. Introduction of the eight-hour day and of a comprehensive system of social insurance."
(Ibid; p. 322).

The most important act of the conference was to set up a "Provisional Council of the Republic", known as the "Pre-Parliament", by which the capitalist class aimed to divert the less politically developed workers and poor peasants from the path of revolution to the path of parliamentary democracy". The Pre-parliament was intended to substitute itself for the Soviets.

In an article published on October 7th., two days after the conference ended, Lenin summed it up as follows:

"In the Soviets, the S-Rs and Mensheviks have lost their majority. They therefore have had to resort to a fraud: to violate their pledge to call a new congress of the Soviets after three months; . . to fix up a 'Democratic' Conference. . . .
The leaders are basing themselves on a minority, in defiance of the principles of democracy. Hence the inevitability of their frauds".
(V.I. Lenin: "Heroes or Frauds"; in: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 244, 245).

The Boycott of the Pro-parliament

"The more one reflects on the meaning of the so-called Democratic Conference, . . the more firmly convinced one becomes that our Party has committed a mistake by participating in it. . . .
A new revolution is obviously growing in the country, a revolution . . of the proletariat and the majority of the peasants, the poorest peasantry, against the bourgeoisie, against its ally, Anglo-French finance capital, against its governmental apparatus headed by the Bonapartist Kerensky.
We should have boycotted the Democratic Conference; we all erred by not doing so."
(V. I. Lenin: "From a Publicist's Diary", in: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 1;. London; n.d. p. 249, 253).

"This pre-parliament . . is in substance a Bonapartist fraud. . . .
The tactics of participating in the pre-parliament., are incorrect. They do not correspond to the objective interrelation of classes, to the objective conditions of the moment..
We must boycott the pre-parliament. We must leave it and go to the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, to the trade unions, to the masses in general . . .We must give them a correct and clear slogan to disperse the Bonapartist gang of Kerensky with his forged pre-parliament."
(V.I.Lenin ibid.; p. 252 253).

On October 6^th , Lenin demanded a reversal of this decision:

"Trotsky was for the boycott. Bravo, Comrade Trotsky!
Boycottism was defeated in the fraction of the Bolsheviks who came to the Democratic Conference.
Long live the boycott!
We cannot and must not reconcile ourselves to participation under any condition.
We must at all costs strive to have the boycott question solved in the plenum of the Central Committee and at an extraordinary party congress. .
There is not the slightest doubt that in the 'top' of our Party we note vacillations that may become ruinous, because the struggle is developing."
(V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 254).

"The participation of our Party in the 'preparliament' . . is an obvious error and a deviation from the proletarian-revolutionary road. . . .
When the revolution is thus rising, to go to a make-believe parliament, concocted to deceive the people, means to facilitate this deception, to make the cause of preparing the revolution more difficult. . . .
The Party congress, therefore, must recall, the members of our Party from the pre-parliament, declare a boycott against it"'.
(V. I. Lenin: 'Theses . . for a Resolution and Instructions to Those Elected to the Party Congress", in: 'Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 2; London; nd.; p. 61).

"I think that your decision to withdraw from the very first session of the 'Soviet of the Russian Republic' predetermines the tactics of the Party during the next period in a direction which I personally consider quite dangerous for the Party".
(L. Kamenev: Statement to CC, RSDLP, October 18th., 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: in: "Collected Works"; Volume 21; Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 302).

"We, the fraction of Social-Democrats-Bolsheviks, declare: with this government of traitors to the people and with this council of counter-revolutionary connivance we have-nothing in common. We do not wish to cover up, directly or indirectly, not even for a single day, that work which is being carried out behind the official screen and which is fatal to the people. . .

In withdrawing from the Provisional Council we appeal to the vigilance and courage of the workers, soldiers and peasants of all Russia.
We appeal to the people.
All power to the Soviets!
All the land to the people!
Long live the immediate, honourable, democratic peace!
Long live the Constituent Assembly! "
(Declaration of the Bolshevik Fraction Read in the Pre-parliament, October 20^th 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 2; London n.d.; p. 324).

The Bolsheviks then walked out of the Pre-parliament.

The Central Committee Meeting of October 23rd.

Twelve of the twenty-one members of the CC were present, including Lenin disguised in wig and spectacles.

The minutes of the meeting recorded the main points only of Lenin's statement:

"Lenin states that since the beginning of September a certain indifference towards the question has been noted. He says that this is inadmissible, if we earnestly raise the slogan of seizure of power by the Soviets. It is, therefore, high time to turn attention to the technical side of the question. Much time has obviously been lost.
Nevertheless, the question is very urgent and the decisive moment is near. . . .
The absenteeism and the indifference of the masses can be explained by the fact that the masses are tired of words and resolutions.
The majority is now with us. Politically, the situation has become entirely ripe for the transfer of power."
(Minutes of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, October 23, 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, B k 2; London; n.d.; p. 106).

"Recognising thus that an armed uprising is inevitable and the time perfectly ripe, the Central Committee proposes to all the organisations of the Party to act accordingly and to discuss and decide from this point of view all the practical questions".
(Resolution of Central Committee, RSDLP, October 23^rd 1917, cited in: ibid; p; 107).

The Campaign of Kamenev and Zinoviev_against the Central Committee's Decision on the Insurrection

"The Congress of Soviets has been called for November 2. . . It must become the centre of the consolidation around the Soviets of all proletarian and demi-proletarian organisations. . . As yet there is no firm organisational connection between these organisations and the Soviets. . . But such a connection is in any case a preliminary condition for the actual carrying out of the slogan "All power to the Soviets?. . . .
Under these conditions it would be a serious historical untruth to formulate the question of the transfer of power into the hands of the proletarian party in the terms: either now or never.
No. The party of the proletariat will grow.. . . And there is only one way in which the proletarian party can interrupt its successes, and that is if under present conditions it takes upon itself to initiate an uprising and thus expose the proletarians to the blows of the entire consolidated counter-revolution, supported by the petty-bourgeois democracy.
Against this pernicious policy we raise our voices in warning."
(G. Zinoviev & L. Kamenev Statement to Party Organisations October 24th, 1917, cited in V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 2; London; nd.; p. 332).

Trotsky's "Soviet Constitutionalism"

Whereas the latter openly opposed Lenin's demands for immediate preparations for insurrection, Trotsky supported these demands in words. He insisted however, in the name of "Soviet constitutionalism" that the actual call to insurrection should be issued not by the Petrograd Soviet, and certainly not by the Party, but by the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

As Trotsky's sympathetic biographer Isaac Deutscher expresses it:

"Trotsky was approaching the problem from his new point of vantage as President of the Petrograd Soviet. He agreed with Lenin on the chances and the urgency of insurrection. But he disagreed with him over method, especially over the idea that the party should stage the insurrection in its own name and on its own responsibility. He took less seriously than Lenin the threat of an immediate counter-revolution. Unlike Lenin, he was confident that the pressure of the Bolshevik majority in the Soviets would not allow the old Central Executive to delay much longer the All-Russian Congress. . . . . .
Lenin . . refused to let insurrection wait until the Congress convened, because he was convinced that the Menshevik Executive would delay the Congress to the Greek Calends, and that the insurrection would never take place as it would be forestalled by a successful counter-revolution.. . .
The difference between Lenin and Trotsky centred on whether the rising itself ought to be conceived in terms of Soviet constitutionalism. The tactical risk inherent in Trotsky's attitude was that it imposed certain delays upon the whole plan of action...
Lenin . . viewed Trotsky's attitude in the matter of insurrection with uneasiness, and even suspicion. He wondered whether, by insisting that the rising should be linked with the Congress of the Soviets, Trotsky was not biding his time and delaying action until it would be too late. If this had been the case, then Trotsky would have been, from Lenin's viewpoint, an even more dangerous opponent than Kamenev and Zinoviev, whose attitude had at least the negative merit that it was unequivocal and that it flatly contradicted the whole trend of Bolshevik policy. Trotsky's attitude, on the contrary, seemed to follow from the party's policy and therefore carried more conviction with the Bolsheviks; the Central Committee was in fact inclined to adopt it. In his letters, Lenin therefore sometimes controverted Trotsky's view almost as strongly as Zinoviev's and Kamencv's, without, however, mentioning Trotsky by name. To wait for the rising until the Congress of Soviets, he wrote, was just as treasonable as to wait for Kerensky to convoke the Constituent Assembly, as Zinoviev and Kamenev wanted to do."
(I. Deutscher: "The Prophet Armed Trotsky: 1879-1921"; London; 1970; pp. 290-29l, 294-95).

Lenin's objections to Trotsky's line on this question were twofold:

Firstly: it would mean dangerous delay in calling the insurrection;

Secondly: since the calling of the Second Congress of Soviets was constitutionally in the hands of the Central Executive Committee (C.E.C) - elected at the First Congress of Soviets in June and dominated by Mensheviks and SocialistRevolutionaries -- it would mean permitting counterrevolutionaries, and not the revolutionary vanguard Party, to "fix the date of the insurrection", or even to postpone it indefinitely.

Lenin saw Trotsky's line as either -- and he left the question open -- "absolute idiocy" or "complete betrayal", and he attacked it continuously up to the moment of the insurrection itself:
On October 10th :

"The general political situation causes me great anxiety . . The government has an army, and is preparing itself systematically.
And what do we do? We only pass resolutions. We lose time. We set 'dates' (November 2, the Soviet Congress - is it not ridiculous to put it off so long? Is it not ridiculous to rely on that?"
(V. I. Lenin: Letter to I.T. Smilga, October 10th., 1917; in: 'Collected Works', Volume 21, Book 1; London; n.d.; p. 265).

'Yes, the leaders of the Central Executive Committee are pursuing tactics whose sole logic is the defence of the bourgeoisie and the landowners. And there is not the slightest doubt that the Bolsheviks, were they to allow themselves to be caught in the trap of constitutional illusions, of 'faith' in the Congress of Soviets. . . . of waiting' for the Congress of Soviets, etc. -- that such Bolsheviks would prove miserable traitors to the proletarian cause. . . .
The crisis has matured. The whole future of the Russian Revolution is at stake. The whole honour of the Bolshevik Party is in question. .
We must . . admit the truth, that in our Central Committee and at the top of our Party there is a tendency in favour of awaiting the Congress of Soviets, against the immediate seizure of power, against an immediate uprising. We must overcome this tendency or opinion.
Otherwise the Bolsheviks would cover themselves with shame forever; they would be reduced to nothing as a party.
For to miss such a moment and to 'await' the Congress of Soviets is either absolute idiocy or complete betrayal.. . .
To 'await' the Congress of Soviets is absolute idiocy, for this means losing weeks, whereas weeks and even days now decide everything. . .
To 'await' the Congress of Soviets is idiocy, for the Congress will give nothing, it can give nothing!. . .
First vanquish Kerensky, then call the Congress.
The victory of the uprising is now secure for the Bolsheviks . . if we do not 'await' the Soviet Congress. . . .
To refrain from seizing power at present, to 'wait', to 'chatter' in the Central Committee, to confine ourselves . . to 'fighting for the Congress' means to ruin the revolution."
(V. I. Lenin: 'The Crisis has Matured", in: ibid.; p. 275, 276, 277, 278).

"I am compelled to tender my resignation from the Central Committee which I hereby do, leaving myself the freedom of propaganda in the lower ranks of the Party and at the Party Congress.
For it is my deepest conviction that if we 'await' the Congress of Soviets and let the present moment pass, we ruin the revolution."
(V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 278).

"Events indicate our task so clearly to us that hesitation actually becomes a crime.. . . To 'wait' under such conditions is a crime.
The Bolsheviks have no right to wait for the Congress of Soviets; they must take power immediately.
To wait for the Congress of Soviets means to play a childish game of formality, a shameful game of formality; it means to betray the revolution."
(V. I. Lenin: Letter to the Central Committee, Moscow Committee, Petrograd Committee, and the Bolshevik Members of the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets, October 16-20, 1917; in: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 2; London; n.d.; p. 69).

"We must not wait for the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which the Central Executive Committee may postpone till November; we must not tarry.. . .
Near Petrograd and in Petrograd -- this is where this uprising can and must be decided upon and carried out . . as quickly as possible.. . ..
Delay means death."
(V. I. Lenin: Letter to Bolshevik Comrades Participating in the Regional Congress of the Soviets of the Northern Region, October 21st., 1917,in: ibid.; p. 91).

"The situation is extremely critical. It is as clear as can be that delaying the uprising now really means death.
With all my power I wish to persuade the comrades that now everything hangs on a hair, that on the order of the day are questions that are not solved by conferences, by congresses (even by Congresses of Soviets), but only . . by the struggle of armed masses.
The bourgeois onslaught of the Kornilovists, the removal of Verkhovsky, show that we must not wait. We must at any price, this evening, tonight, arrest the Minister, having disarmed (defeated if they offer resistance) the military cadets, etc.
We must not wait! We may lose everything!. . .
History will not forgive delay by revolutionists who could be victorious today (and will surely be victorious today!), while they risk losing much tomorrow, they risk losing all.
If we seize power today, we seize it not against the Soviets but for them.
It would be a disaster or formalism to wait for the uncertain voting of November 7. The people have a right and a duty to decide such questions not by voting but by force.. . . .
The government is tottering. We must deal it the death blow at any cost.
To delay action is the same as death".
(V. I. Lenin: Letter to the Members of the Central Committee, November 6th., 1917, in: ibid.; p. 144-145).

"We should search in vain among the minutes or among any memoirs whatever, for any indication of a proposal of Trotsky to 'accommodate the insurrection necessarily to the Second Congress of Soviets'.
(L. Trotsky: "History of the Russian Revolution", Volume 3; London; 1967; p. 332).

"I declare in the name of the Soviet that no armed actions have been settled upon by us.. . . .
The Petrograd Soviet is going to propose to the Congress of Soviets that they seize the power."
(L. Trotsky: Speech to Petrograd Soviet, November 1st., 1917; cited in: L. Trotsky: ibid.; p. 102, 103).

"The Soviet was sufficiently powerful to announce openly its programme of state revolution and even set the date".
(L. Trotsky: ibid.; p. 103).

"An armed conflict today or tomorrow is not included in our plan -- on the threshold of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. We think that the Congress will carry out our slogan with greater power and authority'"
(L. Trotsky: Speech in Petrograd Soviet, November 6th., 1917, cited in: L. Trotsky: ibid.; p. 331-2).

Stalin later referred to:
"the mistake made by the Petrograd Soviet in openly fixing and announcing the date of the uprising. (November 7)."
(J.V. Stalin: "Trotskyism or Leninism? , in: "Works", Volume 6; Moscow, 1953; p. 362).

"Where, and when, and from which side, did the Soviet publish abroad the date of the insurrection?"
(L. Trotsky: ibid.; p. 333).

"It was not the insurrection, but the opening of the Congress of Soviets, which was publicly and in advance set for the 7th. . . 'It flowed from the logic of things', we wrote subsequently, 'that we appointed the insurrection for November 7th.' .. . .
On the second anniversary of the revolution the author of this book, referring, in the sense just explained, to the fact that:
'the October insurrection was, so to speak, appointed in advance for a definite date, for November 7th., and was accomplished upon exactly that date', added:
"We should seek in vain in history for another example of an insurrection which was accommodated in advance by the course of things to a definite date".
(L. Trotsky: ibid.; p. 333-34).

"To 'call' the Congress of Soviets for November 2, in order to decide upon the seizure of power -- is there any difference between this and a foolishly "appointed" uprising?"
(V. I. Lenin: "The Crisis has Matured", in: 'Collected Works", Volume 21, Book l, London; n.d.; p. 277).

"presupposed that the preparation and completion of the revolution were to be carried out through party channels and in the name of the party, and afterwards the seal of sanction was to be placed on the victory by the Congress of Soviets."
(L. Trotsky: "Lessons of October"; London; 1971; p. 45).

"In the first weeks he (i.e. Lenin -- Ed.) was decidedly in favour of the independent initiative of the Party".
(L. Trotsky: "History of the Russian Revolution";, Volume 3; London; 1967; p.265-6).

"The task of insurrection he presented directly as the task of the party. The difficult task of bringing its preparation into accord with the Soviets is as yet not touched upon. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets does not get a word".
(L. Trotsky: ibid; p. l43).

"Lenin, who was not in Petrograd, could not appraise the full significance of this fact (i.e., the invalidation by the Petrograd Soviet of Kerensky's order transferring two-thirds of the garrison to the front --Ed.) . . . .
Lenin's counsel . . flowed precisely from the fact that in his underground refuge he had no opportunity to estimate the radical turn."
(L. Trotsky: "Lessons of October" London; 1971; p. 47-48).

"Lenin's isolation . . deprived him of the possibility of making timely estimates of episodic factors and temporary changes.. . .
If Lenin had been in Petrograd and had carried through at the beginning of October his decision in favour of an immediate insurrection without reference to the Congress of Soviets, he could undoubtedly have given the carrying out of his own plan a political setting which would have reduced its disadvantageous features to a minimum. But it is at least equally probable that he would himself in that case have come round to the plan actually carried out".
(L. Trotsky: "History of the Russian Revolution", Volume 3; London; 1967; p. 327-8).

"According to Trotsky, it appears that Lenin's view was that the Party should take power in October 'independently' of and behind the back of the Soviet'.
Later in, criticising this nonsense, which he ascribes to Lenin, Trotsky 'cuts capers' and finally delivers the following condescending utterance:
"That would have been a mistake".
Trotsky is here uttering a falsehood about Lenin, he is misrepresenting Lenin's views on the role of the Soviets in the uprising. A pile of documents can be cited showing that Lenin proposed that power be taken through the Soviets, either the Petrograd or the Moscow Soviets, and not behind the back of the Soviets.".
(J.V. Stalin: "Trotskyism or Leninism?", in: 'Works', Volume 6; Moscow; 1953; p. 359-60).

"The Central Committee did not adopt this (i.e., Lenin's -- Ed.) proposal the insurrection was led into Soviet channels".
(L. Trotsky: 'Lessons October; London 1971; p. 45).

"When he (i.e., Lenin -- Ed ) arrived in Smolny (i.e., on the evening November 6^th , the day before the insurrection -- Ed.) . . I understood that only at that moment had he finally become reconciled to the fact that we had refused the seizure of power by way of a conspirative plan".
(L. Trotsky: "History of the Russian Revolution", Volume 3; London,.1967; P. 345)

"Lenin proposed that power be taken before November 7^th, for two reasons.
Firstly, because the counter-revolutionaries might have surrendered Petrograd (i.e., to the German armies -- Ed ) at any moment, which would have drained the blood of the developing uprising.

Secondly, because the mistake made by the Petrograd Soviet in openly fixing and announcing the day of the uprising (November 7) could not be rectified in any other way than by actually launching the uprising before the legal date set for it. The fact of the matter is that Lenin regarded insurrection as an art, and he could not help knowing that the enemy, informed about the date of the uprising (owing to the carelessness of the Petrograd Soviet) would certainly try to prepare for that day.

Consequently, it was necessary to forestall the enemy, i.e., without fail to launch the uprising before the legal date. This is the chief explanation for the passion with which Lenin in his letters scourged those who made a fetish of the date -- November 7. Events show that Lenin was absolutely right. It is well known that the uprising was launched prior to the All Russian Congress of Soviets. It is well known that power was actually taken before the opening of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and it was taken not by the Congress of Soviets, but by the Petrograd Soviet, by the Revolutionary Military Committee. The Congress of Soviets merely took over power from the Petrograd Soviet. That is why Trotsky's lengthy arguments about the importance of Soviet legality are quite beside the point".
(J. V. Stalin: ibid; p. 362).

The Extended Central Committee Meeting of October 29th.

Lenin reported on the Central Committee meeting of October 23^rd, and read the resolution on insurrection adapted by that meeting.
Representatives then reported on the situation existing, in their particular sectors.

In the discussion on the present situation, the resolution was strongly opposed by Lev Kamenev and Grigori Zinoviev.
Kamenev said:

"This resolution . . shows how not to carry out an uprising: during this week nothing has been done.. . .
The results for the week indicate that there are no factors favouring a rising. . We have no apparatus for an uprising; our enemies have a much stronger apparatus, and it has probably further increased during this week. . . In preparing for the Constituent Assembly we do not at all embrace the road of parliamentarism. . . Two tactics are fighting here: the tactic of conspiracy and the tactic of faith in the moving forces of the Russian Revolution".
(L.Kamenev: Speech at Extended Meeting of CC, RSDLP, October 29th., 1917; in: Minutes, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 2: London; n.d.; p. 337).

"The Constituent Assembly will take place in an atmosphere that is revolutionary to the highest degree. Meanwhile, we shall strengthen our forces. The possibility is not eliminated that we, together with the Left S-Rs, shall be in the majority there. ….We have no right to risk, to stake everything on one card.. . . .
If the congress takes place on the 2^nd, we must propose that it should not disband until the constituent assembly convenes. There must be a defensive, waiting tactic. . . It is necessary to reconsider, if possible, the resolution of the CC. . We must definitely tell ourselves that we do not plan an uprising within the next five years".
(G. Zinoviev: Speech at Extended Meeting of CC, RSDLP, October 29th., 1917, in Ibid; p. 36, 337).

The Central Committee then continued in session alone, and set up a Military Centre of the Central Committee consisting of Stalin, Sverdlov, Bubnov, Dzerzhinsky and Uritsky.

After the meeting had concluded, Kamenev sent a letter to the Central Committee tendering his resignation from it:

"Not being able to support the point of view expressed in the latest decisions of the CC which define the character of its work, and considering that this position is leading the party of the proletariat to defeat, I ask the CC to recognise that I am no longer a member of the CC".
(L. Kamenev: Letter to CC, RSDLP, October 29th., 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: Ibid. ; p. 260).

The Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region

The congress declared itself in favour of the_immediate transfer of power to the Soviets, the immediate transfer of land to the peasants, an immediate offer of peace and the convening of the Constituent Assembly at the appointed time.

On October 29^-30^th Lenin - wrote a long, "Letter to Comrades" in which he refuted point by point the arguments of Kamenev and Zinoviev against the immediate launching of an insurrection.

^{On October 31st, Kamenev, on behalf of Zinoviev and himself, published a statement in the newspaper "Novaya Zhizn" (New Life) in which he declared that they felt themselves obliged:}

"To declare themselves against any attempt to take the initiative of an armed uprising which would be doomed to defeat and which would have the most dangerous effect on the party, the proletariat, the fate of the revolution. To stake everything on the card of an uprising within the next few days would be tantamount to making a step of desperation";
(L. Kamenev: "L. Kamenev About the Uprising", in "Novaya Zhizn", October 31st., 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: ibid.; p. 261).

"On the eve of the critical day . . two 'outstanding Bolsheviks' attack an unpublished decision of the Party centre in the non-Party press, in a paper which as far as this given problem is concerned goes hand in hand with the bourgeoisie against the workers' party. . . .
I will fight with all my power both in the Central Committee and at the congress to expel them both from the Party.
I cannot judge from afar how much damage was done to the cause by the strike-breaking action in the non-Party press. Very great practical damage has undoubtedly been caused. To remedy the situation, it is first of all necessary to re-establish the unity of the Bolshevik front by excluding the strike-breakers."
(V. I. Lenin: Letter to the Members of the Bolshevik Party, October 31st., 1917, in: ibid.; p. 129-30, 131).

"A self-respecting Party cannot tolerate strike-breaking and strike-breakers in its midst. This is obvious. The more we think about Zinoviev's and Kamenev's appearance in the non-Party press, the more obvious it becomes that their action has all the elements of strike-breaking in it.
We cannot refute the gossipy lie of Zinoviev and Kamenev without doing the cause still more harm. Therein lies the boundless meanness, the absolute treacherousness of these two persons, that in the face of the capitalists they have betrayed the strikers' plans. For once we keep silent in the press, everybody will guess how things stand. . . . .
There can be and must be only one answer to this: an immediate decision of the Central Committee saying that:
'Recognising in Zinoviev's and Kamenev's appearance in the non-Party press all the elements of strikebreaking, the Central Committee expels both from the Party'. . . .
The more 'outstanding' the strike-breakers, the more imperative it is to punish them immediately with expulsion."
(V. I. Lenin: Letter to the Central Committee of the RSDLP, November 1st, 1917; in ibid. p. 133, 135, 136).

"that no member of the CC shall have the right to speak against the adopted decisions of the CC",
(Minutes of Meeting of CC, RSDLP, November 2nd., 1917, cited in: V. I. Lenin: "Collected Works", Volume 21, Book 2; London; n.d.; p. 261).

"Upon Kamenev and Zinoviev the obligation not to make any statements against the decisions of the CC and the line of work laid out by it".
(Ibid.; p. 261).

The Insurrection

In the early morning of November 6^th, the Provisional Government attempted to launch a counter-offensive against the revolutionary forces by issuing orders for the arrest of the members of the Revolutionary Military Committee and for the suppression of the central organ of the Bolsheviks, "Rabochy Put" (Workers Path).

By 10 a.m. detachments of Red Guards had placed a guard on the printing plant and editorial offices of the newspaper, and at 11 a.m. the paper came out with a call for the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government.

In the late evening of November 6^th , Lenin arrived at the Smolny which, as the headquarters both of the Petrograd Soviet and of the Bolshevik Party, had become the directing centre of the insurrection. Throughout the night, revolutionary soldiers and workers came to the Smolny and were armed with weapons supplied by the army units from the city's arsenals.

From dawn on November 7th revolutionary troops and Red Guards occupied the Petrograd railway stations, post offices, telegraph offices, telephone exchanges, government offices and the state bank The Pre-Parliament was dispersed. The cruiser "Aurora", controlled by revolutionary sailors, trained its guns on the Winter Palace, the only territory remaining to the Provisional Government.

During the day the Revolutionary Military Committee issued a manifesto: " To the Citizens of Russia" drafted by Lenin:

^{"The Provisional Government has been overthrown. The power of state has passed into the hands of the organ of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the Revolutionary Military Committee, which stands at the head of the Petrograd Proletariat and garrison.}
The cause for which the people have fought - the immediate proposal of a democratic peace, the abolition of landed proprietorship, workers' control over production and the creation of a Soviet government -- is assured.
Long live the revolution of the workers, soldiers, and peasants!"
(V. I. Lenin: "Manifesto of Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, November 7^th , 1917, in: V. I. Lenin & J. V. Stalin: "'1917: Selected Writings and Speeches"; Moscow; 1938; p. 613).

At 11 p.m. on November 7^th the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets opened in the Smolny.

As Stalin points out:
"It is well known that the uprising was launched prior to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. It is well known that power was actually taken before the opening of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and it was taken not by the Congress of Soviets, but by the Petrograd Soviet, by the Revolutionary Military Committee. The Congress of Soviets merely took over power from the Petrograd Soviet".
(J. V. Stalin: "Trotskyisn Or Leninism?", in: "Works", Volume 6; Moscow; 1953; p. 362).

The Role of Trotsky in the October Revolution

"I am far from denying Trotsky's undoubtedly important role in the uprising.. . . .
It cannot be denied that Trotsky fought well in the period of October . . But Trotsky was not the only one who fought well in the period of October. Even people like the Left Socialist revolutionaries, who then stood side by side with the Bolsheviks, also fought well".
(J. V. Stalin: "Trotskyism or Leninism?", in: "Works', Volume 6; Moscow; 1933; p. 342, 344).

Thus, Trotsky quotes with obvious approval one of the earlier editions of Lenin's "Collected Works", in which the editors say in a note on Trotsky:

"After the Petrograd Soviet went Bolshevik he was elected its President and in that capacity organised and led the insurrection of November 7^th".
(Cited by: L. Trotsky "History of the Russian Revolution", Volume 3; London; 1967; p. 344).

"The bureaucratic revision of history of the party and the revolution is taking place under Stalin's direct supervision".
(L. Trotsky. Ibid.; p. 343).

"The Trotskyites are vigorously spreading rumours that Trotsky inspired and was the sole leader of the October uprising. . Trotsky himself, by consistently avoiding mention of the Party, the Central Committee and the Petrograd Committee of the Party, by saying nothing about the leading role of these organisations in the uprising and vigorously pushing himself forward as the central figure in the October uprising, voluntarily or involuntarily helps to spread the rumours about the special role he is supposed to have played in the uprising. ..
I must say, however, that Trotsky did not play any special role in the October uprising, nor could he do so; being chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, he merely carried out the will of the approrpiate Party bodies, which directed every step that Trotsky took.
On October 29 (at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party -- Ed.) a practical centre was elected for the organisational leadership of the uprising. Who was elected to this centre?
The following five: Sverdlov, Stalin, Dzerzhinzky, Bubnov, Uritsky.
The functions of this practica1 centre: to direct all the practical organs of the uprising in conformity with the directives of the Central Committee. Thus, as you see, something 'terrible' happened at the meeting of the Central Committee, i.e , 'strange to relate' the 'inspirer', the 'chief figure', the 'sole 1eader' of the uprising, Trotsky, was not elected to the practica1 centre, which was called upon to direct the uprising. . . And yet, strictly speaking, there is nothing strange about it, for neither in the party, nor in the October uprising, did Trotsky play any special role, nor could he do so, for he was a relatively new man in our Party in the period of October... He, like all the responsible workers, merely carried out the will of the Central Committee and of its organs. . . This talk about Trotsky's specia
role is a legend that is being spread by obliging 'Party' gossips.
This of course, does not mean that the October uprising did not have its inspirer. It did have its inspirer and leader, but his was Lenin, and none other than Lenin, that same Lenin whose resolutions the Central Committee adopted when deciding the question of the uprising, that same Lenin who, in spite of what Trotsky says, was not prevented by being in hiding from being the actual inspirer of the uprising. . . .
What sort of a 'history' of October is it that begins and ends with attempts to discredit the chief leader of the October uprising, to discredit the Party, which organised and carried out the uprising? Trotsky by his literary pronouncements is making another (yet another!) attempt to create the conditions for substituting Trotskyism for Leninism.".
(J. V. Stalin: 'Trotskyism or Leninism?", in: "Works," Volume 6; Moscow; 1953; p. 341-3, 363, 364).

"at Lenin's suggestion",
(L. Trotsky: 'History of the Russian Revolution;", Volume 3; London; 1967 p. 339).

"The Military Revolutionary Committee from the moment of its birth had the direct leadership not only of the garrison, but of the Red Guard. . .. No place remained for any other directing centre. . .. .
There was but one revolutionary centre, that affiliated with the Soviet -- that is, the Military Revolutionary Committee".
(L. Trotsky: ibid.) p. 340, 341).

The Character of the "October Revolution"

"The immediate and direct aim of the revolution in Russia was a bourgeois-democratic aim, namely to destroy the relics of medievalism and abolish them completely.. . . .
We brought the bourgeois-democratic revolution to completion has done before.
We are progressing towards the socialist revolution, consciously, deliberately and undeviatingly, knowing that no Chinese wall separates it from the bourgeois-democratic revolution.. . . . .
But . . we solved the problems of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in passing, as a "by-product" of the main and real proletarian-revolutionary socialist work".
(V. I. Lenin: "The Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution", in: "Selected Works", Volume 6; London; 1946; p. 500; 501; 503.)

"The October Revolution overthrew the bourgeoisie and transferred power to the proletariat but did not immediately lead to:
the completion of the bourgeois revolution, in general and: the isolation of the kulaks in the countryside, in particular -
these were spread over a certain period of time but this does not mean that our fundamental slogan at the second stage of the revolution -- "together with the poor peasantry, against capitalism in town and country, while neutralising the middle peasantry, for the power of the proletariat" -
-- was wrong . . . .
The strategic slogans of the Party can be appraised only from the point of view of a Marxist analysis of the class forces and of the correct disposition of the revolutionary forces. . . . .
Is it possible for the overthrow of the power of the bourgoisie and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat to be effected within the framework of the bourgeois revolution? . . .
How can it be asserted that the kulaks (who, of course, are also peasants) could support the overthrow of the bourgoisie and the transfer of power to the proletariat'? . .. . .
One of the main tasks of the October Revolution was to complete the bourgeois revolution. . . .and since the October Revolution did complete the bourgeois revolution it was bound to meet with the sympathy of all the peasants . . But can it be asserted on these grounds that the completion of the bourgeois revolution was not a derivative phenomenon in the course of the October Revolution but its essence or its principal aim? . . .
And if the main theme of a strategic slogan is the question of the transfer of power from one class to another, is it not clear from this that the question of the completion of the bourgeois revolution by the proletarian power must not be confused with the question of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and achieving this proletarian power, i.e., with the question that is the main theme at the second stage of the revolution? .
In order to complete the bourgeois revolution it was necessary in October:
first to overthrow the power of the bourgeoisie and to set up the power of the proletariat, for only such a power is capable of completing the bourgeois revolution. But in order to set up the power of the proletariat in October it was essential to prepare and organise for October the appropriate political army, an army capable of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and of establishing the power of the proletariat, and there is no need to prove that such a political army could be prepared and organised by us only under the slogan:
Alliance of the proletariat with the poor peasantry against the bourgeoisie, for the dictatorship of the proletariat".
(J. V. Stalin: "The Party's Three Fundamental Slogans on the Peasant Question", in "Works"; Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 2O8-O9; 210, 211-12).

"Until the organisation of the Committees of Poor Peasants, i.e., down to the summer and even the autumn of 1918, our revolution was to a large extent a bourgeois revolution . . . But from the moment the Committees of Poor Peasants began to be organised, our revolution became a proletarian revolution. . It was only when the October revolution in the countryside began and was accomplished in the summer of 1913 that we found our real proletarian base; it was only then that our revolution became a proletarian revolution in fact, and not merely by virtue of proclamations, promises and declarations."
(V. I. Lenin: Report of the Central Committe of the Russian Communist (Bolsheviks) at the Eighth Party Congress, in: "Selected Works", Volume 3; London; 1943; 10. 37, 33).

"In November 1917 we seized power together with the peasantry as a whole. This was a bourgeois revolution in as much as the class war in the rural districts had not yet developed."
(V. I. Lenin: "Work in the Rural Districts", in: ibid.; p. 171).

CONCLUSION

From the foundation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party to November 1917, the efforts of the revisionists in Russia were directed towards preventing the socialist revolution from taking place, making use in the main of open political opposition, couched in pseudo-Marxist phraseology, either to the revolution itself or to the policies necessary to bring the revolution about. These efforts of the revisionists, dealt with in this report, met with failure. The socialist revolution took place in November 1917.

From the socialist revolution in November 1917 to the summer of 1932, the efforts of the revisionists in Soviet Russia were directed towards preventing the construction of socialism from being brought about, making use in the main of open political opposition, couched in pseudo-Marxist-Leninist phraseology, either to the construction of socialism itself or to the policies necessary to bring about the construction of socialism. These efforts of the revisionists, to be dealt with in a later report, met with failure.

A socialist society was completely -- though not completely securely for all time - constructed in the Soviet Union.

In the period from the summer of 1932 to the mid-1960s, the efforts of the revisionists in the Soviet Union were directed towards restoring a capitalist society, making use in the main of conspiratorial methods of political opposition. These efforts of the revisionists, to be dealt with in a later report, met with success. Today in the Soviet Union the dictatorship of the working class has been liquidated and all the essentials of a state capitalist economic system, based on profit as the motive of production and on the exploitation of the Soviet working class by the new class of state capitalists, have been brought into being.

The Soviet Union has become a neo--imperialist state, pursuing essentially similar aims to those of the older imperialist states, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been transformed by its revisionist leaders from the vanguard party of the Soviet working class to a fascist-type political instrument of the Soviet neo- imperialists.

An analysis of the way in which the revisionists succeeded in dominating, and bringing about the degeneration of, the international communist movement is essential to the task of building a Marxist-Leninist International free of all revisionist trends. The series of reports on "The Origins of Revisionism", of which the preceding report forms one, is an attempt to make such an analysis.

THE END
 

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