COMPASS;
Journal of Communist
League; April 1994; N.112
THE
"POPULAR FRONT' IN FRANCE
We have seen that after the coming to power of the Nazis
in Germany, the basic strategy of the West European imperialists became
one of appeasement of German imperialism.
Accordingly, the policy of the revisionist leaders
of the Communist International -- who were objectively the servants of
imperialism -- changed to one of resisting Nazism in words, while
supporting appeasement in deeds.
THIS CHANGE OF POLICY WAS REFLECTED IN THE 'UNITED
FRONT AGAINST FASCISM' POLICY OF THE COMINTERN, INTRODUCED IN 1934 on the
initiative of Georgi Dimitrov*:
Great alarm was caused in France in early 1934 by manifestations
of militant fascism. There took place in Paris:
" . . . on February 6, 1934. . . . a concerted Right-wing demonstration
of anti-republican feeling. . . .
The demonstration of February 6 . . . appeared to be an overwhelming
show of anti-parliamentary strength".
(Ronald Tiersky: 'French Communism: 1920-1972'; New York; 1974; p.
54, 55).
In this atmosphere spontaneous united resistance to
fascism developed:
"On the 12th (February 1934 -- Ed.), separately organised Communist
and Socialist demonstrators met at Place de la Nation. . . . The rank-and-file
of both delegations, taking the initiative, rushed together chanting repetitively
'Unity! Unity! Unity!'. Quickly, Leon Blum*, Paul Faure*, Marcel Cachin*
and Jacques Duclos* were hoisted on to improvised insisted platforms to
speak".
(Ronald Tiersky: ibid.; p. 55-56).
It was in these circumstances that the Comintern chose
to inaugurate the united front against fascism' policy through the French
Communist Party, among whose leaders was Maurice Thorez*.
Albert Vassart*, who represented the French Communist
Party at the Comintern in 1933-34, has recounted how the instructions to
abandon the pseudo-left policy of 1930-34 were conveyed to the FCP:
"It should be recalled that during March and April (1934 -- Ed.) the
Socialist Party had made several proposals for joint actions to the Communist
Party, of which nothing came".
(Celie & Albert Vassart: 'The Moscow Origin of the French "Popular
Front"', in: Milorad M. Drachkovitch & Branko Lazitch (Eds.: 'The Comintern:
Historical Highlights: Essays, Recollections, Documents'; Stanford (USAj:
1966; p. 245).
Now, however,
After the Nazi seizure of power, Ernst Thaelmann*, the
leader of the German Communist Party, had been arrested by the Nazis, and
in May 1934:
". . . the Comintern sent a message to the French Communist Party,
asking it to wage a campaign to save Thaelmann. . . . The Comintern also
asked the French Communist Party to appeal directly to the Socialists,
which it did. The Socialist leadership accepted on June 5, and a meeting
between the delegates of the two parties took place on June 11. The Socialist
Party delegates expressed their willingness to undertake a joint campaign,
under the sole condition that the Communist Party call a halt to its attacks
against the Socialist leaders. The Communist delegates declined this condition,
and the negotiations were broken off. . . .
The Communists' desisting from attacking the Socialist leaders was
a conditio sine qua non (essential condition -- Ed.)".
(Celie & Albert Vassart: op. cit.; p. 247-48).
The revisionist leaders of the Comintern, however, Socialists'
'essential condition' should be met:
"Manuilsky* . . . remarked that the Communist Party leadership must
not be given time to 'make a mess of things again't Vassart suggested to
him that a counter-proposal be drafted which not only would accept the
idea of 'non-aggression', but would go even further".
(Celie & Albert Vassart: op. cit.; p. 248).
Accordingly, Vassart drafted a letter to be sent by
the French Communist Party to the French Socialist Party. The main point
of the draft was that the Communist and Socialist Parties would organise:
" . . . common action against fascism".
(Albert Vassart: Draft of Proposal to Socialist Party, in: Celie &
Albert Vassart: op. cit.; p. 250).
but it included the pledge of mutual abstention from
criticism:
"During this period of common action, the two parties shall abstain
from reciprocal attacks, insults and criticsm against the organisations
and party militants loyally participating in the action".
(Ce1ie & Albert Vassart: op. cit.; p. 250-51).
Vassart's text:
". . was approved at once by the Secretariat of the Comintern and was
cabled to the French Communist Party for submission to the Socialists".
(Ce1ie & Albert Vassart: op. cit.; p. 251).
In these circumstances:
" . . . Thorez brought about the shift in the party line at the national
conference of the Communist Party in Ivry, June 23-26".
(Celie & Albert Vassart: op. cit.; p. 251).
"The change in FCP policy only came in June (1934 -- Ed. at the Party's
national conference at Ivry. Fresh from a visit to Moscow and with a telegram
of instructions recently arrived from the Comintern, Maurice Thorez, the
party leader, used his closing speech to start the delicate process of
reversing policy by calling for unity of action with socialist workers
to be achieved 'at any price"'.
(David A. L. Levy: 'The French Popular Front: 1936-37', in: Helen Graham
& Paul Preston (Eds.): 'The Popular Front in Europe'; Basingstoke;
1987; p. 61).
"The changes (in the policy of the French Communist Party -- Ed.) originated
entirely in Moscow".
(Franz Borkenau: 'European Communism:'; London; 1953 (hereafter listed
as 'Franz Borkenau (1953)'; p. 123).
"On June 1l, 034 the ECCI sent a letter to the CC of the French Communist
Party drafted in cooperation with the FCP representative on the ECCI. This
letter contained a number of recommendations which helped the French Communists
at the Conference at Ivry to adopt important decisions. The letter emphasised
that the main blow should be directed against fascism, that a front of
workers of all political trends should be raised against this enemy".
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the CPSU: 'Outline
History of the Communist International"; Moscow; 1971; p.356.
In his closing speech to the Conference of the French
Communist Party on 26 June 1934, Thorez assured the Socialists that his
party stood for united action against fascism 'at all costs' and,
in the event of agreement being reached on such united action, would refrain
from all criticism of the Socialist Party:
In July 1934:
" . . . a 'Pact of Unity of Action' was signed".
(Ronald Tiersky: op. cit.; p. 56).
between the Communist and Socialist Parties.
In the autumn of 1934, the French 'united front against
fascism' was broadened to include openly bourgeois parties like
the Radical Party (officially, the 'Radical-Socialist Party'):
"In mid-1934, the 'united front' tactics were limited to cooperation
with the Socialist Party. Within a few months, however, they were widened
to include other groups in French society. The Party leaders introduced
a new slogan, the movement".
(Daniel R.Brower: The New Jacobins: The French Communist Party and
the Popular Front'; Ithaca (USA); 1968; p. 68).
"The Radical-Socialists . . . are neither radical nor socialist, but
represent . . . the peasant freeholder, the small shopkeeper, the minor
industrialist".
(Richard L. Stokes: 'Leon Blum: Poet to Premier'; New York; 1937; p.
202-03).
The Communist Party:
" . . . proposed an alliance . . . of Communists, Socialists and small
capitalists with the purpose of launching a parliamentary offensive against
Fascism. For this projected entente was coined the name of 'Popular Front"'.
(Richard L. Stokes: op. cit.; p. 207).
"The phrase 'Popular Front' was first used by Thorez on 24 October 1934".
(Maxwell Adereth: 'The French Communist Party: A Critical History (192084):
From Comintern to "The Colours of France"'; Manchester; 1984; p. 89).
(It should be noted that a more correct translation
of the French term 'Front Populaire' is 'People's Front', but the English
term 'Popular Front' has become so widely used that it will be retained
here).
The Opportunist Basis of the Theory of
the 'Popular Front'
During its pseudo-left period, the revisionist leadership
of the Communist International defined fascism as 'the open dictato ship
of 'certain elements' of finance capital, namely 'the most reactionary,
most chauvinist and most imperialist elements':
"Fascism is the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary,
most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of finance capital".
(Theses of the 13th ECCI Plenum on Fascism, the War Danger and the
Tasks of the Communist Parties' (December 1933), in: Jane Degras (Ed.):
'The Communist International: 1919-1943: Documents' (herafter listed as
'Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971)'), Volume 3; London; 1971; p. 206).
During its later rightist period, under Dimitrov, the
Communist International retained this definition:
"Fascism in power was correctly described by the 13th Plenum of the
ECCI as the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most
chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International, in: Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The United Front: The Struggle
against Fascism and War' (hereafter listed as 'Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938)';
London; 1938; p. 10).
This definition implies that fascism in power does
not serve the interests of the capitalist class as a whole, not even the
interests of finance capital as a whole, but only the interests
of certain elements of finance capital. It follows from this definition
that there are elements within finance capital -namely the less
reactionary, less chauvinistic and less imperialist elements -- whose interests
are not served by fascism, and which, therefore, may be won over to active
participation in a 'Popular Front'.
It is, of course, true that there may be sections
of the capitalist class -- such as those of ethnic minorities -- who may
be won to support a 'Popular Front against Fascism', which threatens
their existence not only as capitalists but as human beings.
But, according to Dimitrov's theses, the 'anti-fascist
Popular Front must be formed on the basis of a united front of the workers.
He demands:
" . . . the formation of a wide, popular anti-fascist front on the
basis of the proletarian united front".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International, in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938): op. cit.; p. 39).
and he demands that such a government should carry out
revolutionary, anti-capitalist measures:
"A situation may arise in which the formation of a government of
the proletarian united front, or of an anti-fascist People's Front,
will become not only possible but necessary. . . .
We demand that it should carry out definite and fundamental revolutionary
demands. . . For instance, control of production, control of
the banks, disbanding of the police and its replacement by an armed workers'
militia, etc. . . ."
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International, in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938): op. cit.; p. 70, 75).
But a government which serves the interests of the working
class by fulfilling 'revolutionary anti-capitalist demands' and at the
same time serves the interests of (non-finance) capital and even elements
of finance capital is an impossibility:
"Between the capitalists of town and country, on the one hand, and
the working class, on the other hand, there is an irreconcilable antagonism
of interests".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'The Right Deviation in the CPSU (B)' (April 1929),
in: 'Works', Volume 12; Moscow; 1955; p. 32).
It follows that a Popular Front government can exist
in a country where the capitalist class holds political power only if
the participating Communist Party serves the interests, not of the working
class, but of the capitalist class, that is, if it has surrendered
to opportunism, defined as:
" . . . adapting the Labour Movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie".
(L. Harry Gould: 'Marxist Glossary'; San Francisco; 1946; p. 60).
If the leaders of a bourgeois political party are satisfied
that a Communist Party has surrendered to opportunism, they may adhere
to a Popular Front which includes such a party in order to gain some
electoral advantage. Thus, in July 1935 the Radical-Socialist Party
joined the Popular Front; they:
" . . joined the coalition principally as an electoral stratagem".
(Richard L. Stokes: op. cit.; p. 215).
since
" . . . they feared isolation in the coming elections if they cut themselves
off from the Socialists". (Daniel R. Brower: op. cit.; p. 103).
The National Committee of People's Anti-Fascist
Unity (1934)
In November 1934, a 'National Committee of People's
Anti-Fascist Unity' was formed to lay
" . . . plans for a great joint celebration of Bastille Day in July
1935".
(Joel Colton: 'The Formation of the French Popular Front: 1934-6',
in: Martin S. Alexander & Helen Graham (Eds.): 'The French and Spanish
Popular Fronts: Comparative Perspectives'; Cambridge; 1989; p. 17).
The 'National Committee of People's Anti-Fascist Unity
was now:
" . . . transformed into an electoral committee that united Socialists,
Communists and Radicals with a number of smaller organisations. The purpose
of the Committee was to prepare for the 1936 general elections".
(Ronald Tiersky: op. cit.; p. 56).
By January 1935, the Popular Front included ten organisations:
1) The Communist Party;
2) the Socialist Party;
3) the Radical Party;
4) the Socialist-Republican Union;
5) the League of the Rights of Man;
6) the Vigilance Committee of Anti-Fascist Intellectuals;
7) the World Committee against Fascism and War;
8) the Movement of Ex-Servicemen;
9) the General Confederation of Labour; and
10) the Unitary General Confederation of Labour.
(Programme of the Popular Front: in: Denis N. Pritt: 'The Fall of the
French Republic; London; 1941; p. 68).
THE 7th WORLD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL
(1935)
The 7th (and last) World Congress of the Communist
International took place in Moscow in August 1935, having been postponed
from September 1934.
"The Congress had been put off by the Comintern Presidium".
(Daniel R. Brower: op. cit.; p. 82).
The keynote of the conference was the formal
approval and international application of the united front and Popular
Front tactics applied in the last year by the French Communist Party on
the instructions of the Comintern leadership:
"The 7th World Congress of the Comintern . . . insisted upon the international
significance of the new methods evolved in France".
(Franz Borkenau (1953): op. cit.; p. 149).
"Dimitrov . . . welcomed the events in France, praised the FCP and got
the whole movement to adopt the building of a Popular Front as its new
strategy".
(Maxwell Adereth: op. cit.; p. 73).
"This deep strategic turn in the international revolutionary movement
was made at the 7th Congress of the Comintern, held in July 1935, which
raised the Popular Front slogan".
(Jezi Lukaszevicz: 'Embodiment of the Loftiest Aspirations of the Communist
Movement', in: 'Georgi Dimitrov and the Unification of the Revolutionary
and Democratic Forces for Peace, Democracy and Socialism'; Sofia; 1974;
p. 151),
"The 7th Congress of the Communist International . . . played . . .
a decisive role in the liquidation of left sectarianism".
(Dolores Ibarruri: 'An Example and a Lesson for ever , in: 'Memories
of Georgi Dimitrov'; Sofia; 1972; p. 205).
The main report, on 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks
of the Communist International', was given by Dimitrov.
He presented a criticism of the previous left-sectarian
policy, but as 'mistakes' committed by the Communist Parties rather
than as mistakes on the part of the leadership of the Communist International:
"In this connection (in connection with the struggle against fascism
-Ed.) we cannot avoid referring also to a number of mistakes committed
by the Communist Parties, mistakes that hampered our struggle against
fascism.
In our ranks there was an impermissible underestimation
of the fascist danger. . . .
When National-Socialism had already become a menacing
mass movement in Germany, there were comrades who regarded the Bruening*
government as already a government of fascist dictatorship. . . .
The ultra-Lefts . . shouted: 'No coalitions with
counterrevolutionary Social-Democrats!', regarding all Social-Democrats
as counter-revolutionaries at bottom".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International', in: Georgi M, Dimitrov (1938): op. cit.; p. 23, 24, 73).
He repudiated the former pseudo-left line of the Communist
International that the working class had no interest in defending bourgeois
democracy against fascism:
"In the capitalist countries we defend and shall continue to defend
every inch of bourgeois-democratic liberties, which are being attacked
by fascism and bourgeois reaction, because the interests of the class struggle
of the proletariat so dictate". (Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive
and the Tasks of the Communist International', in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938):
op. cit.; p. 34).
"It is not at all a matter of indifference to us what kind of political
regime exists in any given country: whether a bourgeois dictatorship in
the form of bourgeois democracy, even with democratic rights and liberties
greatly curtailed, or a bourgeois dictatorship in its open fascist form.
. . . We shall defend every inch of the democratic gains which the working
class has wrested in the course of years of stubborn struggle, and shall
resolutely fight to extend these gains."
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: Unity of the Working Class against Fascism', in:
Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938): op. cit.; p. 109).
He also repudiated the former pseudo-left line of the
Communist International that Social-Democracy remained everywhere the bulwark
of the bourgeoisie, saying that it was
" . . . increasingly difficult, and in some countries actually impossible,
for Social-Democracy to preserve its former role of bulwark of the bourgeoisie".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'Unity of the Working Class against Fascism',
in: Georgi Dimitrov (1938): op. cit.; p. 104).
Therefore, emphasised Dimitrov, it is necessary to distinguish
between Right and Left Social-Democrats on the basis of whether they oppose
or support, respectively, the building of a united front against fascism:
"A process of differentiation is taking place in all the Social-Democratic
Parties. Within their ranks two principal camps are forming: side
by side with the existing camp of reactionary elements . . . who rabidly
reject a united front with the Communists, there is beginning to form
a camp of . . . elements . . . who are in favour of the creation of
a united front with the Communists".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International', in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938): op. cit.; p. 30).
"The attitude to the united front marks the dividing line between the
reactionary sections of Social-Democracy and the sections that are becoming
revolutionary".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'Unity of the Working Class against Fascism',
in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938): ibid.; p. 106).
In contrast to the former pseudo-left line of the Communist
International, Dimitrov put forward the correct Marxist-Leninist line of
building a united front against fascism embracing all workers who were
prepared to resist fascism, irrespective of their views on other questions:
"It is necessary to strive at the same time both for short-term and
long-term agreements that provide for -ioint action with Social-Democratic
Parties, reformist trade unions and other organisations of the toilers
against the class enemies of the proletariat. The chief stress in all
this must be laid on developing mass action locally to be carried
out by the local organisations through local agreements".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International', in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938): op. cit.; ; p. 37).
However, as has been said, he introduced the new, opportunist
concept of the desirablility of extending such a workers' united front
into:
". a wide, popular anti-fascist front on the basis of the proletarian
united front".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International', in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938): op. cit.; p. 39).
although this did not mean that the formation of a united
front must necessarily precede the formation of a Popular Front:
"Some comrades are quite needlessly racking their brains over the problem
of what to begin with the united proletarian front or the anti-fascist
Popular Front. .
The united proletarian front and the anti-fascist Popular Front are
connected by the living dialectics of struggle; . . . they are interwoven,
the one passing into the other in the process of the practical struggle
against fascism".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'Unity of the Working Class against Fascism',
in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938): op. cit.; p. 101).
Such a Popular Front against fascism could embrace,
according to Dimitrov, parties and organisations which - objectively
are led by representatives of the capitalist class, mentioning specifically
the French Radical-Socialist Party:
"In forming the anti-fascist Popular Front, a correct approach to those
organisations and parties which have in them a considerable number of the
working peasantry and the mass of the urban petty bourgeoisie is of great
importance.
In the capitalist countries the majority of these
parties and organisations, political as well as economic, are still under
the influence of the bourgeoisie and follow it. The social composition
of these parties and organisations is heterogeneous. . . . but control
is in hands of ., . . the agents of big capital. . . . We can and must
try to draw these parties and organisations, or certain sections of them,
to the side of the anti-fascist Popular Front, despite their bourgeois
leadership. Such, for instance, is today the situation in France with the
Radical Party".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International', in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938): op. cit.; p. 40).
Naturally, Dimitrov singled out the united front and
Popular Front policies of the French Communist Party for special praise:
"The French Communist Party is setting an example to all the sections
of the Comintern of how the tactics of the united front should be applied".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International', in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938): ibid.; p. 45).
The formation of a united front or Popular Front could
lead in any capitalist country, declared Dimitrov, under conditions
of political crisis, to the election of a united front or Popular
Front government:
"We recognise that a situation may arise in which the formation of
a government of the proletarian united front, or of an anti-fascist
Popular Front, will become not only possible but necessary in the interests
of the proletariat. In that case we shall declare for the formation of
such a government without the slightest hesitation. . . .
Under what objective conditions will it be possible
to form such a government? In the most general terms. . . . under conditions
of political crisis. . . .
Such a possibility (of a united front or Popular
Front government -Ed.) is not to be ruled out in any of the capitalist
countries".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International', in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938): ibid.; p. 70, 71).
The new line put forward by Dimitrov at the 7th World
Congress of the Comintern was accepted without opposition:
"None of the speakers objected to the tactical line we have proposed.
. . .
At none of the previous Congresses of the Communist International
has such ideological and political solidarity been revealed as at the present
Congress".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'Unity of the Working Class against Fascism',
in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938): ibid.; p. 94).
At the conclusion of the congress, a new Political Secretariat
was elected, consisting of
Georgi Dimitrov (Bulgaria) (General Secretary);
Klement Gottwald* (Czechoslovakia);
Otto Kuusinen* (Finland);
Dmitry Manuilsky (Soviet Union);
Andre Marty* (France);
Wilhelm Pieck* (Germany); and
Palmiro Togliatti* (Italy),
that is, of 6 concealed revisionists (Dimitrov, Kuusinen,
Manuilsky, Marty, Pieck and Togliatti), and 1 more or less solid Marxist-Leninist
(Gottwald).
The Programme of the Popular Front (1936)
Work on an agreed joint programme for the Popular Front
continued until January 1936, when
". . . a joint electoral programme was made public".
(Ronald Tiersky: op. cit.; p. 56).
The programme was divided into two parts -- political
and economic. The main points of the political programme were:
"Against the Fascist Leagues:
Effective disarmament and dissolution of semi-military formations.
Trade Union Liberties:
Application and observance of trade union rights for all. . . .
Education
Extension of compulsory attendance at school up to the age of fourteen.
. . .
The Defence of Peace
International collaboration within the framework of the League of Nations
for collective security, by defining the aggressor and by the automatic
and joint application of sanctions in case of aggresssion. . .
Nationalisation of the war industries and suppression of private trade
in arms".
(Programme of the Popular Front: in: Denis N. Pritt: op. cit.; p. 69-70).
The main points of the economic programme were:
"The establishment of a national unemployment fund.
Reduction of the working week without reduction of weekly wages. .
. .
A system of adequate pensions for aged workers. ...
A scheme of large-scale works of public utility. ....
In order to put an end to the levies taken by speculators from both
producers and consumers, the setting up of a National Grain Board representing
all sections concerned.
Support for agricultural cooperatives, extension
of agricultural credits, reduction of leasehold rents.
Suspension of distraints and regulation of debt
repayments. . . .
In order to remove credit and savings from control
of the economic oligarchy, to transform the Banque de France . . . into
the Banque de la France (i.e., to nationalise it). . . . Control of the
trade in armaments. . Control of exports of capital".
(Programme of the Popular Front: in: Denis N. Pritt: ibid.; p. 71-73).
The general election which took place in April/May 1936
resulted in a victory for the Popular Front.
The first Popular Front government came to office in
June 1936, headed by the leader of the Socialist Party, Leon Blum, as Prime
Minister.
As we have seen, the 7th World Congress of the CI:
" . . . had foreeen Communist participation in an 'anti-fascist Popular
Front government' only if pre-revolutionary conditions existed".
(Daniel R. Brower: op. cit.; p. 141).
Consequently, since:
" . . . his (Blum's --Ed.) ministers were mostly Socialists and Radicals,
the Communists refused his urgent invitation to participate".
('New Encyclopaedia Britannica: Macropaedia', Volume 7; Chicago; 1983;
p. 673).
The Matignon Agreement (1936)
In May 1936:
"a series of strikes and occupations of enterprises broke out all over
France".
(Ronald Tiersky: op. cit.; p. 59).
"This strike movement . . . was, in the main, largely spontaneous".
(Alexander Werth: 'The Destiny of France'; London; 1937; p. 293).
and:
". . . by the beginning of June, approximately 1,000 establishments
had been occupied, 12,000 were on strike and over 2 million workers were
participating in what had become virtually a general strike".
(Ronald Tiersky: op. cit; p. 59).
In this situation, a few days after after taking office,
Prime Minister Leon Blum invited representatives of the employers to a
conference at the Hotel Matignon (the Premier's official residence) in
Paris. Here,
" . . . alarm at what seemed a revolutionary situation extracted revolutionary
concessions from the employers".
(Alfred Cobban: 'A History of Modern France', Volume 3: 'France of
the Republics'; London; 065; p. 147).
On 9 June 1936,
". . the famous 'Matignon Agreement' was signed and the basis was laid
for the implementation . . . of the most serious social reforms in France
since the birth of the Third Republic. The major gains were a pay rise
averaging 12%. . . .; nationalisation of the armaments industry; an agreement
in principle to impose government control on the privately owned and run
Bank of France; the introduction of a 40 hour week; agreement on the principle
of collective bargaining; formal recognition by the Patronat (the
employers' organisation -- Ed.) of the right of unions to represent the
workers; and, probably the most popular of all, introduction of two weeks'
paid vacation".
(Ronald Tiersky: op. cit; p. 59-60).
The Progressive Phase of the Popular Front
Government (1936-37)
In the situation which accompanied Matignon:
" . . . the victory of the working-class movement meant an enormous
increase in the strength of the Popular Front".
(Denis N. Pritt: op. cit.; p.87).
In June/July 1936, legislation was passed by the Popular
Front government:
1) introducing the 40-hour working week, holidays with pay and collective
labour contracts;. (Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 2; p. 2,141).
2) dissolving the Croix de Feu (Fiery Cross) and other fascist organisations;
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 2; p. 2,152).
3) nationalising the armaments industry;
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume2; p. 2,171).
4) establishing a National Wheat Board
" . . . to guarantee farmers a remunerative price for their products".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 2; p. 2,177).
5) establishing state control of the Bank of France, so
" . . curbing the power of the oligarchy of the 200 largest stockholders".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 2; p. 2,191).
6) instituting a large-scale programme of public works for the relief
of unemployment; Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 2; p. 2,201).
Despite the Matignon settlement, most workers
" . . . continued their occupations and strikes even after the Agreement
had been signed". (Ronald Tiersky: ibid.; p. 60).
This situation, within days of the formation of the
Popular Front government, brought out the contradictions in the Front as
it had been constituted -- the contradictions between the parties ostensibly
representing the interests of the working people and those objectively
representing the interests of the capitalist class. The latter demanded
that the sit-in-strikes be called off, and the Communist Party was, therefore,
compelled to choose between, on the one hand, remaining loyal to the interests
of the workers and the programme of the Popular Front on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, maintaining the unity of the Popular Front.
Thorez's slogan of 'unity of action at all costs'
made the choice a foregone conclusion in a party the leadership of which
had long covertly deserted Marxism-Leninism and embraced opportunism. Even
Dimitrov himself had felt compelled to warn the 7th Congress of the CI
of the danger of opportunism in united front and Popular Front tactics:
"We must increase in every way our vigilance toward Right opportunism
bearing in mind that the danger of Right opportunism will increase in proportion
as the wide united front develops". (Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive
and the Tasks of the Communist International', in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938):
op. cit. p. 86).
and had cited Stalin on the danger of sacrificing
principle to expediency:
"In its work the Party must be able to combine the strictest adherence
to principle (not to be confused with sectarianism!) with the maximum of
ties and contacts with the masses (not to be confused with tailism!)".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'The Prospects of the Communist Party of Germany
and the Question of Bolshevisation' (February 1925), in: 'Works', Volume
7; 1954; op. 39; cited in: Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive and
the Tasks of the Communist International', in: Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938):
op. cit.; p. 86).
But, as we have seen, Dimitrov had insisted that the
basic content of united front tactics was the defence of the immediate
interests of the working class -- including its defence against fascism:
"What is and ought to be the basic content of the united front at the
present stage? The defence of the immediate economic and political interests
of the working class, the defence of the working class against fascism,
must form the starting point and main content of the united
front in all capitalist countries".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International', in: 'Georgi M. Dimitrov (1938): ibid.; p. 35-36).
In giving priority to the organisational maintenance
of the Popular Front over the principles on which the Front had been created,
the French Communist Party had clearly sunk into opportunism. But this
opportunism was, in fact, tacitly sanctioned by the Comintern, for the
resolution of the 7th World Congress had instructed Communist Parties that
if the principles on which the united front or Popular Front had been formed
were broken, they should not declare the front at an end, but should:
1) "appeal to the masses';
2) 'continue to struggle for the restoration of the disrupted unity':
"The Communists, if the agreement is broken, must immediately appeal
to the masses while continuing their tireless struggle for the restoration
of the disrupted unity of action". (Communist International: Resolution
on 'The Offensive of Fascism and the Tasks of the Communist International
in the Fight for the United Front against Fascism', in: 'Full Text of the
Resolutions adopted at the 7th Congress'; London; 1936; p. 18).
Following these instructions, the revisionist-led
French Communust Party continued loyally to support the Popular Front long
after it had ceased to resist fascism or defend the interests of working
class.
Indeed, the more openly reactionary partners in the
Popular Front did not hesitate to make use of the Party's fidelity to the
maintenance of the unity of the Popular Front slogan, and of the prestige
of the Communist Party among the working class, to serve their interests.
So, the Communist Party was called in to use its
influence, in the interests of 'the unity of the Popular Front', to put
an end to the strike movement. On 11 June, Maurice Thorez declared
that the time had come to end the strikes even when their aims had not
been achieved:
"All the conditions have still not been met for Soviet Power in France.
. . .
It is necessary to know how to end (strikes -- Ed.) as soon as satisfacton
has been obtained. It is even necessary to consent to compromise if all
the demands have not yet been accepted. All is not possible now. We must
not risk destroying the . . . cohesion of the Popular Front".
(Maurice Thorez: 'The Fight for Bread', in: 'Oeuvres' (Works), Volume
3, Book 12; Paris; 1954; p. 47, 48).
"So eager were the Communist leaders to obtain the regional collective
contract that they accepted the management's demand that the factories
be evacuated before negotiations began, They did so regardless of the workers'
reaction. . . .
In general, the Communist leadership in parliament and in the labour
confederation supported the government's policy of social pacification".
(Daniel R. Brower: op. cit.; p. 147, 150).
Following Thorez's appeal:
". . the Communist Party was thereafter unequivocally committed to the
peaceful settlement of the conflict. Its motto, proclaimed in bold headlines
on 'L'Humanite's front page on June 14, was 'THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS ORDER".
. . . .
From that moment on, the Communist leaders worked to end the strikes.
. . Within a few days, the majority of strikes in the capital had been
settled".
(Daniel R. Brower: ibid.; p. 153).
The Outbreak of the Spanish Civil War (1936)
In July 1936 Spanish fascist generals, headed by Francisco
Franco*, launched an armed rebellion against the Popular Front government
which had been elected in Spain in February. The outbreak of the Spanish
Civil War proved a critical test for the French Popular Front:
"The Spanish crisis tested it (the Popular Front -- Ed.) at its ideological
weak point -- on the issue of anti-fascism".
(David A. L. Levy: op. cit,.; p. 72).
The Spanish Popular Front government, which regarded
the Popular Front government in France as its 'sister', immediately applied
to the French government for the sale of arms for its defence:
"On July 26 the Frente Popular appealed confidently to the Front
Populaire for supplies of arms".
(Richard L. Stokes: op. cit.; p. 258-59).
"The case for supporting the Spanish Government seemed overwhelming.
Not only was the Spanish Government ideologically the friend of the French
Popular Front Government, but . . . it was the friend of France".
(Alexander Werth: op. cit.; p. 375j.
However, the Blum government refused:
"Blum refused to help".
(Maxwell Adereth: op. cit.; p. 79).
"The French Government . . . would deliberately not permit the Spanish
Government to buy arms, although the Spanish Government had the money to
pay for them, had the means of importing them and, by all international
precedent, had every right to buy them".
(Denis W. Brogan: op. cit.; p. 714).
This was not because the mass of the French working
people were reluctant to assist the Spanish government:
"Feeling ran high among the French working class not only against Italy
and Germany, but also against the Blum Government, which had 'taken sanctions
against the legal government of Spain"'.
(Alexander Werth: op. cit.; p. 381).
"Many of his (Blum's -- Ed.) working-class supporters interpreted moderation
as akin to betrayal and their willingness to support the government declined
accordingly".
(David A. L. Levy: op. cit.; p. 75).
The refusal of the French government to sell arms to
Spain was all the more unprincipled because treaty obligations prohibited
the Spanish government from buying arms from any other country but France:
"In 1935, the Spanish government had signed a trade agreement with
France. One of the clauses stipulated that in case of need the Spanish
government could not purchase arms from any country other than France.
With this agreement in its hand, the Republican government appealed to
the French for the arms and equipment needed to protect the nation from
aggression. The French government flatly refused to sell (not to give,
loan or aid, but to sell!)". (Dolores Ibarruri: 'They shall not pass: The
Autobiography of "La Pasionaria"'; London; 1966; p. 201-02).
In fact, Blum's decision was dictated by the threats
of the British government that if France became involved in war as a result
of supplying arms to Spain, Britain would regard her obligations to give
military assistance to France under the Locarno Treaty of 1925 as no longer
valid:
"At the beginning of August (1936 -- Ed.), M. L6on Blum was informed
that the guarantee given by Great Britain to maintain the frontiers of
France would not remain valid in the event of independent French action
beyond the Pyrenees".
(Andre Geraud ('Pertinax'): Preface to: Eleuthere N. Dzelepy: 'The
Spanish Plot'; London; 1937; p. viii).
"This British warning . . . was conveyed to M. Yvon Delbos*, the French
Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of a visit by Sir George Clerk*,
British Ambassador in Paris. Sir George is understood to have said that
if France should find herself in conflict with Germany as a result of having
sold war material to the Spanish government, England would consider herself
released from her obligations under the Locarno Pact and would not come
to help".
(Julio Alvarez del Vayo: 'Freedom's Battle'; London; 1940; p. 69-70).
In short, the Popular Front government betrayed the
anti-fascist basis on which it was elected, to become an appendage of the
pro-fascist British Conservative government:
"The policy of the Blum Government may be summed up in a few words:
caution, and rapprochement with England".
(Alexander Werth: op. cit.; p. 370).
In this capacity, the Popular Front government was permitted
to be the official sponsor of the so-called 'Non-Intervention,
agreement which originated in fact in London:
"The simple truth is that Non-Intervention was fathered in London.
. In M. Blum and the French Government they (the British government Ed.)
found the ideal sponsors for their creation and thus they were able to
kill two birds with one stone. On the one hand they were able to avoid
what would surely have been a quick and dangerous revulsion from the millions
of supporters of the People's Front in France, who would certainly have
raged against that plan had it been frankly labelled what it was, the work
of a British Tory Government. On the other hand they were able to justify
the plan to their own Labour opposition, in Parliament and in the country,
by evoking its supposed paternity".
(Julio Alvarez del Vayo: op. cit.; p. 68)
Even without the associated betrayal of the interests
of the French working class, the betrayal of the Spanish working people's
struggle against fascism began to drain the Popular Front of the working
class support on which its existence depended:
"The Spanish Civil War and the non-intervention agreement that followed
were among the events that would shatter the momentum and unity of the
Popular Front".
(Joel Colton: op. cit.; p. 23).
"Despite the prudential arguments. . . . that policy took the life out
of the Popular Front". (Denis W. Brogan: op. cit.; p. 715).
In these circumstances, right-wing politicians achieved
considerable success in building up the false notion those who supported
the sale of arms to Spain were 'risking world war'. In a speech in September
1936, Blum himself gave as the reason for the government's refusal to sell
arms to Spain that:
" . . . to give the Spanish government its legal rights was to risk
a great war".
(Leon Blum: Speech at Luna Park (September 1936), in: Denis W. Brogan:
op. cit.; p. 715).
As a result of this demagogic campaign,
". . . when the Premier was ready, a few months afterwards, to challenge
a vote of confidence on the Spanish question. . . . he had behind him a
solid majority of the nation".
(Richard L. Stokes: op. cit.; p. 261).
In the foreign policy debate in the Chamber of Deputies
in December 1936,
". . . Jacques Duclos proclaimed that his party should vote against
the government, but would not".
(Daniel R. Brower: op. cit.; p. 175).
The Communist deputies, therefore, abstained, since:
". . political unity in parlliament remained for them an absolute imperative".
(Daniel R. Brower: ibid.; p. 175).
Furthermore, they went on and:
" . . . expressed their confidence in the policies of the Blum cabinet".
(Daniel R. Brower: ibid.; p. 05).
and the Party's expressions of continued fidelity to
the Popular Front were accepted:
"The coalition leaders decided immediately after the vote that the
Communist expressions of continued fidelity to ther Popular Front should
be accepted".
(Daniel R. Brower: ibid.; p. 175).
The parliamentary debate on the government's foreign
policy:
". . . proved only that the Communist Party was virtually powerless
in parliament".
(Daniel R. Brower: ibid.; p. 175).
In August 1936:
" . . . the French government appealed to the other countries, inviting
them to conclude a non-intervention pact regarding the Spanish conflict".
(Pierre Broue & Emile Temime: 'The Revolution and the Civil War
in Spain'; London; 1972; p. 332).
Even if it had been observed by all parties, acceptance
of the principle of 'non-intervention' was in itself a victory for the
fascist powers, since:
" . . . giving one's support to the legal government of Spain was placed
on the same footing as giving it to the insurgents".
(Pierre Broue & Emile Temime: ibid.; p. 334).
The 'Non-Intervention Committee' -- officially the 'International
Committee for the Application of Non-Intervention in Spain' -- eventually
embraced representatives of 25 states. It held its first meeting on September
1936 in London. Although the fascist powers (excluding Portugal) were members
of the committee, far from observing non-intervention, they used it as
a cover for extensive military intervention in Spain on the side of the
fascists.
In January 1937 the Communist Party:
" . . . agreed to vote for a bill authorising the government to prevent
the departure of volunteers for Spain".
(Edward Mortimer: 'The Rise of the French Communist Party (1920-1947);
London; 1984; op. cit.; p. 263).
Despite this gross and flagrant violation of the anti-fascist
principles on which the Popular Front had been formed, the French Communist
Party remained within the Popular Front. Its policy was:
" . . . symbolised by the slogan 'unity at any price'. Over the next
two years they would demonstrate this priority more than once".
(Ronald Tiersky: op. cit.; p. 63j.
"The Communists shrank from assuming the responsibility for breaking
up the Popular Front". (Geoffrey Fraser & Thadee Natanson: 'Leon Blum:
Man and Statesman'; London; 1937; p. 270).
even after 'non-intervention' had:
The French capitalist class had been:
" . . . ready to make very considerable sacrifices as long as its fundamental
positions remained untouched and it could by this means gain a breathing-space
in which to set about undermining and annulling the gains recorded by the
working class".
(Clemens Dutt: 'The People's Front and the Class Struggle in France',
in: 'Labour Monthly', Volume 21, No. 1 (January 1939); p. 37).
Almost as soon as the Blum government had been formed,
". . . acting in conjunction with British financial and government
forces, the closely-knit French financial oligarchy began sending its capital
abroad".
(Clemens Dutt: ibid,; p. 37).
"The flight . . . was a recognised method by which pressure was put
on French governments by the Paris Bourse and financial sharks and speculators".
(Denis N. Pritt: op. cit.; p. 92-93).
Although, as we have seen, the programme of the Popular
Front had included
" . . . control of exports of capital",
(Denis N. Pritt: ibid.; p. 73).
the Blum government:
". . . almost passively looked on while the country was drained of
funds by the flight of capital".
(Henry W. Ehrmann: 'French Labour: From Popular Front to Liberation'
York; 1947; p. 68).
By September 1936:
" . . . some 40 milliards of francs had taken flight abroad".
(Clemens Dutt: ibid.; p. 37).
and:
" . . . the gold reserve had sunk below fifty milliard francs".
(Alexander Werth: op. cit.; p. 334).
On 25 September the franc was devalued, and the Communist
Party deputies:
"voted for it".
(Daniel R. Brower: op. cit.; p. 238).
in spite of the fact that the act of devaluation:
" . . . entailed . . . a considerable rise in the cost of living".
(Geoffrey Fraser & Thadee Natanson: op. cit.; p. 274).
so that:
In December 1936 the Popular Front government introduced
legislation to impose compulsory conciliation and arbitration on
workers. The Communist deputies supported the Bill.
('Keesings's Contemporary Archives', Volume 2; p.
2,356).
"Statistics show that more and more of the cases submitted to arbitration
were decided by the super-arbiter and not by arbiters chosen by the parties
(of 2,471 awards rendered from March 1938 to February 1939, all but 4%)
. . .
The super- arbiter . . . represented the state".
(Henry W. Ehrmann: op. cit.; p. 48).
Militant workers correctly saw the institution of compulsory
conciliation and arbitration, which in fact put an end to free collective
bargaining, as a further betrayal of programme of the Popular Front and
the interests of the working class:
"To accept without reservation an institution like compulsory arbitration
amounted to an almost complete abandonment of labour's rinciple of 'direct
action"'.
(Henry W. Ehrmann: ibid.; p. 58).
In February 1937 Blum officially declared a 'pause'
in the implementation of the government's programme of social reform.
This was
" . . a decision to conciliate French finance capital by suspending
further reforms.
(Clemens Dutt: op. cit.; p. 37).
It:
" . . . actually meant an attempt to return to a more orthodox financial
policy".
(Henry W. Ehrmann: op. cit.; p. 68).
and:
" . . . the Pause . . . soon became a permanent halt".
(Denis N. Pritt: op. cit.; p. 96).
However, the Communist Party:
In March 1937, an anti-fascist demonstration in the
Clichy district of Paris was attacked by police:
"The police made ample use of their firearms. Before the fighting was
over. . . . six demonstrators were dead or dying of their wounds".
(Daniel R. Brower: op. cit.; p. 182).
In addition, the atrocity resulted in:
"The wounding of some 60 others".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 2; p. 2,508).
Far from condemning the police behaviour, however, the
Communist Party supported it:
"In parliament, . . . the Communist leadership continued to place coalition
unity above all else. . . . Jacques Duclos himself presented for the majority
the motion of confidence in the government's handling of the riot".
(Daniel R. Brower: op. cit.; p. 184).
"Duclos actually tabled a motion in the Chamber to approve the government's
handling of the riot".
(Edward Mortimer: op. cit.; p. 264).
The Resignation of the Blum Government
(1937)
In June 1937, Blum:
". . . requested emergency plenary financial powers" .
(Ronald Tiersky: op. cit.; p. 64).
The essence of the measure, as Blum told the Chamber
of Deputies, was to adopt 'orthodox' financial measures which would entice:
"The capital which has gone abroad to return to France,. That is our
essential objective". ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 2; p.
2,625).
The Communist Party at first refused:
". . . to support the Government's financial proposals on the grounds
that they would increase the cost of living and ultimately fail to regulate
the financial problem".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 2; p. 2,625).
but when Blum:
". . . declared that, if the Front fell, he would place the full blame
on the Communists, the latter withdrew their refusal to vote for the Government's
Bill".
(Keesing's Contemporary Archives , Volume 2; p. 2,625).
Accordingly:
". . . the Chamber granted him the powers. . . . . . . All the Communists
were still supporting the government".
(Ronald Tiersky: op. cit.; p. 64).
When the bill came before the Senate, however, this
upper house:
". . . defeated the Government".
(Denis N. Pritt: op. cit.; p. 97).
But:
The Blum government was replaced by a new Popular Front
government headed by the Radical Camille Chautemps* as Prime Minister.
This was
" . . . another mixed Radical and Socialist Government, with a slightly
more Radical tinge". (Clemens Dutt: ibid.; p. 38).
"Once the Chautemps cabinet was in power, the Communist leaders renewed
their policy of 'loyal support"'.
(Daniel R. Brower: op. cit.; p. 193).
"The Communists remained in support of the government between January
and June 1937 . . . as political momentum swung back to the Right".
(Ronald Tiersky: op. cit.; p. 87).
Indeed, when Chautemps:
. . . whose hostility towards the FCP was well known, was in the process
of forming his cabinet in June 1937, the Communist leadership nevertheless
offered to participate in his government".
(Ronald Tiersky: op. cit.; p. 87).
The offer was rejected, and from this time:
" . . . the attack of finance capital was growing rapidly. A new onslaught
started on the franc". (Denis N. Pritt: op. cit.; p. 101).
As a result:
". . . Chautemps was forced to announce that he would try to win the
support of the banks, i.e., that he would follow a policy acceptable to
the Right".
(Clemens Dutt: op. cit.; p. 39).
and accordingly:
". . . the Chautemps Government was accorded 'full powers' to deal
with the situation".
(Clemens Dutt: ibid.; p. 38).
and proceeded to adopt an 'orthodox' financial programme.
The rank-and-file of the Socialist Party were so
outraged at the unprincipled betrayal of the interests of the working people
by the Chautemps, that they forced their party to withdraw its support
from the Chautemps government:
"The Socialists withdrew their support in Parliament, the Government
fell".
(Denis N. Pritt: op. cit.; p. 102).
Thus, in January 1938 the first Popular Front government
headed by Chautemps resigned, to be replaced a few days later by a second:
"Chautemps became Premier once more, this time with a purely Radical
government".
(Denis N. Pritt: ibid.; p. 102).
This government received the parliamentary support of
the Communist Party:
"The Communists supported the government".
(Denis N. Pritt: ibid.; p. 102).
"The new Popular Front government of M. Chautemps obtained a vote of
confidence in the Chamber of Deputies by 501 votes to 1".
(Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 3; p. 2,908).
But in the circumstances outlined above, the second
Chautemps government deemed it tactically desirable to pose at first as
a loyal executor of the Popular Front's programme:
"This government . . . promised to take action against the Fascist
conspirators and to introduce old-age pensions and other reforms contained
in the the Popular Front programme, whilst at the same time it said that
there would be no interference with what had already been gained.
The curious result of this was that this government
of M. Chautemps received an almost completely unanimous vote from the Chamber
of Deputies; the Communists supported it for the sake of maintaining the
Popular Front; the Right Wing and the Fascists supported it because they
knew how hollow were all its declarations".
(Denis N. Pritt: op. cit.; p. 102).
So, in March 1938,
". . . Chautemps put forward a demand for 'exceptional powers' in order
to carry out a series of measures. These meant dropping old age pensions,
asking for 'greater flexibility' in the application of the 40hour week,
cutting down social services, and dropping a great deal of the programme".
(Denis N. Pritt: ibid,; P. 102).
The move to the right:
"was tried too soon",
(Denis N. Pritt: ibid.; p. 102)o
and:
"Chautemps's government fell when the Socialists rejected a demand
for full powers". (William L. Langer (Ed.): 'Encyclopedia of World History';
London; 1972; p. 990).
The Second Blum Government (19381
In March 1938 a second Blum government came to office,
" . . . composed only of Radicals and Socialists".
(Denis N. Pritt: ibid.; p. 03).
It was announced that:
". . . the Communists, though not forming part of the government, will
give it their support". ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 3; p.
2,981).
Once again:
The last of the French Popular Front governments, which
came to office in April 1938, was headed by Edouard Daladier*, as Prime
Minister. It was a government
". . . largely composed of Radicals".
(Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 3; p. 3,020).
Nevertheless:
" . both the SFIO (the Socialist Party -- Ed.) and FCP voted for this
investiture".
(Ronald Tiersky: op. cit.; p. 67j.
Daladier:
" . . . preserved the fiction of relying on the coalition (the Popular
Front -- Ed.), but ignored it in making his policies".
(Daniel R. Brower: op. cit.; p. 219).
The Chamber of Deputies:
". . . gave M. Daladier special powers to carry through. . .
financial measures by decree". ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume
3; po 3,024).
so that he:
". . . dispensed with Parliament and governed by means of emergency
decrees",
(Clemens Dutt: op. cit.; p. 41).
These measures were not opposed by the Communist Party:
"The Communists and Socialists . . . did not oppose his (Daladier's
-- Ed) financial decree-laws which included . . . new exceptions
to the 40-hour working week (one of the most highly prized 'conquests'
of 1936".
(Edward Mortimer: op. cit.; p. 2731.
Thus, by this time
" . . . the Popular Front was all but officially dissolved".
(Ronald Tiersky: op. cit.; p. 67).
By May 1938 this continuing betrayal of the interests
of the working people had, by May 1938, greatly weakened Communist support
among working people:
"In May 1938, all the signs pointed to a decline of Communist support
among the workers, due to the party's approval of the conservative economic
and social policies of Daladier". (Daniel R. Brower: op. cit.; p. 239).
"A mass meeting planned for 6 July (1938 - Ed.) to call for aid to Spain
had to be cancelled for lack of support. The collapse of the Popular Front
was so evident that public enthusiasm for the idea could not be rekindled".
(Edward Mortimer: op. cit.; p. 274).
The Daladier government now undertook an offensive against
the working class, abolishing in November 1938 the 5-day working week ('Keesing's
Contemporary Archives', Volume 3; p. 3,222).
"The last stages of disintegation came quickly. In August Daladier
made his famous speech threatening the 40-hour week. His subsequent appearance
as the champion of the anti-working class forces was foreshadowed by his
repression of the Marseilles dock strikers".
(Clemens Dutt: op. cit.; p. 41).
THE ULTIMATE BETRAYAL OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE THE POPULAR FRONT AGAINST
FASCISM CAME WHEN DALADIER, REPRESENTING THE FRENCH POPULAR FRONT GOVERNMENT,
JOINED WITH NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN*, ADOLF HITLER* AND BENITO MUSSOLINI* IN
SIGNING THE MUNICH AGREEMENT WHICH EFFECTIVELY HANDED OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA
TO THE NAZIS.
When the Munich sell-out was debated in the Chamber
of Deputies in October, the Communist Party, for the first time since the
formation of the Popular Front government, voted against. But so
discredited had the Party become by this time, that ONLY TWO OTHER DEPUTIES
JOINED THOSE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN OPPOSING IT:
Since the Popular Front had now completed its task of
sabotaging resistance to Nazi expansion, at the end of October 1938:
THE REVISIONIST LEADERS OF THE COMINTERN AND THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY
HAD ACCOMPLISHED -- BY MEANS OF A RIGHT OPPORTUNIST DEVIATION FROM UNITED
FRONT TACTICS - THE TASK OF AIDING AND ABETTING THE APPEASEMENT POLICY
OF THE WEST EUROPEAN IMPERIALISTS TO HAND OVER THE KEY DEFENCES OF CENTRAL
EUROPE TO THE NAZIS.
BLUM. Leon, French lawyer and social-democratic politician (1872-1950);
leader, French Socialist Party (1914-1950); Premier (1936-37, 1938); imprisoned
by Vichy government (1940-45); Premier (1946);
BRUENING, Heinrich, German lawyer and politician; director, Federation
of Christian Trade Unions (1921-30); Chairman, Catholic Centre Party (192933);
Chancellor (1930-32); to USA (1934); Professor of Government, Harvard (1939-452);
to Germany (1952); Professor of Political Science, Cologne (1951-55).
CACHIN, Marcel, French revisionist politician (1869-1958); member,
ECCI Presidium (1928-43); Senator (1935-58).
CHAMBERLAIN, A. Neville, British Conservative politician (1869-1940);
Chancellor of the Exchequer (1923-24, 1931-37); Minister of Health (1924-29,
1931); Premier (1937-40).
CHAUTEMPS, Camille, French Radical-Socialist politician (1888-1963);
Premier (1930); Minister of Education (1931); Minister of Interior (1932-33);
Premier (1933-34); Minister of Public Works (1936); Minister of State (1936-37);
Premier (1936-37); Premier (1937-38); Minister of Coordination (1938-39);
Minister of State (1939); to USA (1940).
CLERK, George, British diplomat (1874-1951); Minister to Czechoslovakia
(1919-26); Ambassador to Turkey (1926-33); Ambassador to Belgium (1933-34);
Ambassador to France (1934-37).
DALADIER, Edouard, French Radical-Socialist politician (1884-1970);
Premier (1934); Minister of Defence (1936-38); Premier (1938-40); imprisoned
by Vichy authorities (1940-345).
DELBOS, Yvon, French politician (1885-1956); Minister of Justice and
Foreign Affairs (1936-38); Minister of Education (1939-40).
DIMITROV, Georgi M., Bulgarian revisionist politician (1882-1949);
director, West European Bureau, CI (1929-33); arrested in connection with
Reichstag Fire (1933); to Moscow (1934); secretary-general, CI (1935-43);
to Bulgaria (1945); secretary-general, BCP (1945-49); Premier (1946-49).
DUCLOS, Jacques, French revisionist politician (1896-1975); worked
for West European Bureau, CI (1929-32); secretary-general, FCP (1950-64).
FAURE, Paul, French social-democratic politician (1920-44); expelled
from Socialist Party (1944).
FRANCO, Francisco, Spanish military officer and fascist politician
(1892-1975); Chief-of-Staff (1935-36); Governor, Canary Islands (1936);
leader of fascist revolt (1936-39); established fascist dictatorship with
himself as 'Caudillo'.
GOTTWALD, Klement, Czechoslovak Marxist-Leninist politician (1896-1953);
secretary-general, CzCP (1929-53); member, ECCI secretariat (1935-43);
Deputy Premier (1945-46); Premier (1946-48); President (1948-53).
HITLER, Adolf, German fascist politician (1889-1945); Chancellor (1933-34);
Fuehrer (Chancellor/President) (1934-45); committed suicide (1945).
KUUSINEN. Otto W., Finnish revisionist politician (1881-1964); secretarygeneral,
CI (1921); member, political secretariat, ECCI (1928-43); President, Karelo-Finnish
Republic (1940-56); member, political bureau, CPSU (1952-53, 1957-64).
MANUILSKY, Dmitry Z., Soviet revisionist politician (1883-1959); member,
ECCI political secretariat (1926-43); Ukrainian Deputy Premier and Foreign
Minister (1944-50).
MARTY, Andre, French revisionist politician (1886-1956); member, political
secretariat, ECCI (1935-43); Commander-in-Chief, International Brigades
(1936-39); expelled from CPF (1953).
MUSSOLINI, Benito A. A., Italian fascist politician (1883-1945); Premier
(1922-45); captured and executed by partisans (1945).
PIECK, Wilhelm, German revisionist politician (1876-1960); member,
political secretariat, ECCI (1931-43); to Germany (1946); president, Socialist
Unity Party (1946-80); President, German Democratic Republic (1949-80).
THAELMANN, Ernst, German Marxist-Leninist politician (1886-1944); chairman,
CPG (1925-33); member, political secretariat, ECCI (1931-33); arrested
by Nazis (1933); executed by Nazis (1944).
THOREZ, Maurice, French revisionist politician (1900-64); secretary-general,
FCP (1930-64); member, ECCI Presidium (1931-43); Vice-President (194647,;
chairman, FCP (1964).
TOGLIATTI, Palmiro, Italian revisionist politician (1893-1964); menber,
ECCI secretariat (1926-43); secretary-general, ICP (027-64).
VASSART, Albert, French revisionist politician (1898-1958); secretary,
CC, FCP (1932-39); expelled from FCP (1939); became active anti-communist.
Adereth, Maxwell: 'The French Communist Party: A Critical History (1920-84):
From Comintern to "The Colours of France"'; Manchester; 1984.
Alvarez del Vayo, Julio: 'Freedom's Battle'; London; 1940.
Borkenau, Franz: 'European Communism'; London; 1953.
Brogan, Denis W.: 'The Development of Modern France (1870-1939); London;
1967.
Broue, Pierre & Temime, Emile: 'The Revolution and the Civil War
in Spain'; London; 1972.
Brower, Daniel R.: 'The New Jacobins: The French Communist Party and
the Popular Front'; Ithaca (USA); 1968.
Cobban, Alfred: 'A History of Modern France': Volume 3: 'France of
the Republics'; London; 1965.
Colton, Joel: 'The Formation of the French Popular Front: 1934-6',
in: Alexander, Martin S. & Graham, Helen (Eds.): 'The French and Spanish
Popular Fronts: Comparative Perspectives'; Cambridge; 1989.
Communist International: 'Full Text of the Resolutions adopted at the
7th Congress'; London; 1936,
Degras, Jane (Ed.): 'The Communist International: 1919-1943: Documents';
London; 1971.
Dimitrov, Georgi M.: 'The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist
International', in: 'The United Front: The Struggle against Fascism and
War'; London; 1938.
: 'Unity of the Working Class against Fascism', in: 'The United Front:
The Struggle against Fascism and War'; London; 1938.
Dutt, Clemens: 'The People's Front and the Class Struggle in France',
in: 'Labour Monthly', Volume 21, No. 1 (January 1939).
Ehrmann, Henry W.: 'French Labour: From Popular Front to Liberation';
New York; 1947.
Fraser, Geoffrey & Natanson, 1937.
Geraud, Andre ('Pertinax'): Preface to: Dzelepy, ~leuth6re N.: 'The
Spanish Plot'; London; 1937.
Gould, 1. Harry: 'Marxist Glossary'; San Francisco; 1946.
Ibarruri, Dolores: 'An Example and a Lesson for ever', in: 'Memories
of Georgi Dimitrov'; Sofia; 1972.
- 'They shall not pass: The Autobiography of "La Pasionaria"'; London;
1966.
Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the CPSU: 'Outline
History of the Communist International'; Moscow; 1971.
Langer, William L. (Ed.): 'Encyclopedia of World History'; London;
1972.
Levy, David A. L.: 'The French Popular Front: 1936-37', in: Graham,
Helen & Preston, Paul (Eds.): 'The Popular Front in Europe'; Basingstoke;
1987.
Lukaszevicz, Jezi: 'Embodiment of the Loftiest Aspirations of the Communist
Movement', in: 'Georgi Dimitrov and the Unification of the Revolutionary
and Democratic Forces for Peace, Democracy and Socialism,'; Sofia; 1974.
Mortimer, Edward: 'The Rise of the French Communist Party: 1920-1947';
London; 1984.
Pritt, Denis N.: 'The Fall of the French Republic'; London; 1941.
Stalin, Josef V.: 'Works, Volume 7; Moscow; 1954; Volume 12; Moscow;
1955.
Stokes, Richard L.: 'Leon Blum,: Poet to Premier'; New York; 1937.
Thorez, Maurice: 'Oeuvres' (Works), Volume 2, Book 6; Paris; 1951;
and Volume 3, Book 12; Paris; 1954.
Tiersky, Ronald: 'French Communism: 1920-1972'; New York; 1974.
Vassart, Cqlie & Albert: 'The Moscow Origin of the French "Popular
Front"'; in: Drachkovitch, Milorad M. & Lazitch, Branko (Eds.): 'The
Comintern: Historical Highlights: Essays, Recollections, Documents'; Stanford
(USA); 1966.
Thadee: 'Leon Blum: Man and Statesman'; London;
Wall, Irwin M.: 'French Communism in the Era of Stalin: The Quest for
Unity and Integration: 1945-1962'; Westport (USA); 1983.
Werth, Alexander: 'The Destiny of France'; London; 1937.
'Keesing's Contemporary Archives'
'New Encyclopaedia Britannica: Macropaedia', Volume 7; Chicago; 1983.
Also See: Index below for other articles on Dimitrov (see
alphabetical links);
And: THE USSR & THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR
at:
http://ml-review.ca/aml/CommunistLeague/Compass123-Spain1996.htm
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