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"THE PAKISTANI REVOLUTION" 

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 INTRODUCTION

PART ONE: THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS IN COLONIAL TYPE COUNTRIES

Colonial-type Countries

    Sooner or later a struggle for national liberation from the domination of the Great Power concerned develops in every colonial-type country.

    In the twentieth century, in general, the classes in a colonial-type country which would be benefited by national liberation are:

1) the working class;
2) the urban petty-bourgeoisie;
3) the peasantry, and
4) the national bourgeoisie - i.e., that section of the capitalist class the interests of which are held back by the domination of the Great Power.

    In order to achieve national liberation, therefore the revolutionary classes must build up their own revolutionary machinery of force, the spearhead of which must consist of armed men, strong enough to destroy the anti-national state machinery of force.

Thus, the achievement of national liberation can, normally, be brought about only by armed struggle.

The_Socialist_Revolution

    The social problems of the working class, the poorer strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie and the poorer strata of the peasantry can be solved only by the abolition of exploitation in a socialist society, and this can only be brought about by a socialist revolution.

    The class forces in a colonial type country which stand to benefit from a socialist revolution are narrower than those which benefit from national liberation; they are:

    The revolutionary process in a colonial-type country must, therefore, be fought in two successive 'stages':

    The uninterrupted transition from the stage of national-democratic revolution to the stage of socialist revolution can be achieved only if the leadership of both stages of the revolutionary process is in the hands of the working class.

    This involves a class struggle between the working class and the national bourgeoisie for the leading role in the national-democratic revolution. If the working class succeeds in wresting the leadership of the national-democratic revolution from the hands of the national bourgeoisie, the latter will inevitably desert the revolutionary forces and go over to the side of the anti-national forces - preferring a subordinate role in a colonial-type society to the complete loss of its "rights" of exploitation in a socialist society.

    As the principal political organisation of the landlord and (later) the comprador bourgeois classes in the predominantly Moslem areas of the Indian sub-continent, classes which depended upon foreign imperialism for the maintenance of their social position, the Moslem League was from its   foundation objectively an instrument of British imperialism. And its adoption of Moslem separatism accentuated this role. It became the most important vehicle in the service of the British imperialists for splitting the Indion movement for liberation, and Moslem League ministries were established in then India, for a number of provinces with the support of the colonial authorities.

    This partition was carried out, not on any ethnical basis, but on the basis of the predominant religious victims among the population. The boundaries were drawn, and the property of the Indian Empire divided between the two Dominions, in such a way as to create what was hoped would be a permanent state of tension between them, so strengthening the possibility of the continued domination of both by British imperialism. In fact, partition quickly led to mass shifts of population, the persecution of minorities and wholesale flights of refugees.
    As a result of the religious basis of partition, the new Dominion of Pakistan consisted of two territorial regions in the west and east of the sub-continent, separated by more than a thousand miles from each other. West Pakistan is more than five times the size of East Pakistan (310 thousand  square miles against 55 thousand square miles), but East Pakistan has 8 million (10%) more population than West Pakistan (now 51 million against 43 million).

    The establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan was preceded by the setting up of a "Constituent Assembly" of 69 members, the appointment of Jinnah, leader of the Moslem League, as Governor-General; the appointment of British commanders for Pakistan's armed forces; and the appointment of a government, headed by Liaqua Ali Khan, all but one member of which belonged to the Moslem League.

    In other words, the formation of the artificial state of Pakistan consisted essentially of the negotiated transfer of political power to the pro-imperialist land-owning and comprador bourgeois classes represented politically by the Moslem League.

    This transfer of power was not, of course, purely voluntary; but neither was  it the result of an outright victory of the national-democratic revolution. The position was that the latter had developed to the point where the declining strength of British imperialism was no longer sufficient to enable it to continue to rule the Indian sub-continent in the old directly colonial way. It had become necessary to replace direct colonial rule by indirect neo-colonial domination. Sir Stafford Cripps virtually admitted to this when he told the House of Commons on March 3th, 1947;

"What, then, were the alternatives which faced us? These alternatives were fundamentally two. ... First, we could attempt to strengthen British control in India on the basis of an expanded personnel in the Secretary of State's office and a considerable reinforcement of British troops. The second alternative was that we could accept the fact that the first alternative was not possible, ... We had not the power to carry it out".

            In the East, on the other hand, most of the biggest landowners themselves were Hindus, who moved into India on partition. Taking advantage of religious prejudices, the rich peasants were able in 1950 to secure the passing by the East Pakistan provincial government of the East Pakistan Acquisition and Tenancy Act which limited the size of landholdings; as a result of this measure, most of the remaining Hindu landlords left the country and the excess and vacated land was redistributed, much of it falling into the hands of the rich peasants. Although many of the Bengali landlords managed to evade the effect of the Act by gifting part of their land to nominees before the Act came into effect, the economic power of the landlord class in East Pakistan is relatively much smaller than in the West.

             A further significant difference in the class structure of  West and East Pakistan has been brought about by the more rapid development of capitalist industry in the West. Of the 1,414 industrial enterprises which Pakistan inherited, only 314 (22%) were situated in the East, and this picture has been continued to the present day. The fact that this industrial development was largely financed by foreign capital quickly led to the formation in the West of a new comprador industrial capitalist class, largely recruited at first from businessmen who had emigrated from India.

            A section of the landlord class in the West fused both with this new comprador industrial bourgeoisie and with the old commercial /financial comprador bourgeoisie to create a new comprador ruling class, which after a period of internal struggle, gained control of the state apparatus, of coercion.

            The military dictatorship of Ayub Khan was the instrument of this ruling class, which made use of the state machine to advance to the position of a powerful state monopoly capitalist class - the notorious "Twenty Families" who (according to Dr. Mahbubul Huq, chief economist of the Planning Commission, and M. Raschid, Governor of the State Bank, in 1968) owned 66% of industry, 79% of insurance and 80% of banking.

            Furthermore, a considerable part of the industry which has developed in East Pakistan is controlled by, or financed by, West Pakistani capital.

            Since the foundation of Pakistan, East Pakistan has become a market for the manufactured goods produced in the industrial centres of the West, while its raw materials have been used primarily to develop Karachi and the Punjab. In other words, East Pakistan has been in the position of a semi-colony to the dominant West, as a speaker in the Constituent Assembly expressed it as early as 1948:

            The aim of British imperialism - an aim which was faithfully carried out by the Moslem League government of Pakistan - was to hold back the industrial development of the country so that it might continue to be a market for British manufactured goods and a source of raw materials and super-profits for the British imperialists.

            In May 1948 the government of the new Dominion issued a long statement of  its economic programme. It emphasised that this programme would be based upon private enterprise and foreign capital. It declared that initial emphasis must be laid on the development of agriculture and of industries based on agriculture, as well as on the promotion of handicrafts.

            In February 1950 a British industrial mission headed by Lord Burghley, director of the National Provincial Bank and the British Overseas Airways Corporation, toured Pakistan with the declared aim of exploring the possibility of trade expansion and of assistance by British firms to Pakistan's "economic development". The mission's report, issued in August of the same year, recommended that the basic needs of power, water and transport should come before any intensive industrial growth, stating that of these needs the expansion of water-power was "vitally urgent" and one which would require the assistance of British consulting engineers. It recommended that Pakistani technicians should be trained in Britain, and that British technicians should assist in the operation of Pakistani industry. Its final recommendations were that continued publicity should be carried out making clear the Government's stated policy that no further industries would be nationalised, so encouraging investment from abroad, that company taxation should be reduced and the price of Pakistan's exports lowered.

            The first indication that a section of Pakistan's ruling class was beginning to look beyond London for its inspiration came when Chowdhury Nazir Ahmed Khan, Pakistan's Minister of Industries, denounced the mission's report as "unrealistic", and declared:

            Eventually, in fact, the United States imperialists did "assist" the Colombo Plan, by incorporating it in their own "aid" programme. By the fourth meeting of the Colombo Plan countries at Ottawa in October 1954, the original seven participating countries had increased to seventeen by the addition of the USA, Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, Nepal, South Vietnam, Catnbodia and Laos. Even the meagre "aid" programme embodied in the Colombo Plan had proved beyond the enfeebled capacity of British imperialism.

            In March 1950 there was formed in East Pakistan the Awami (People's) Moslem League, led by Husain Shahid Suhrawardy, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and peasant leader Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani

            Shortly afterwards the Azad (Free) Pakistan Party appeared in West Pakistan under the leadership of Mian Iftikharuddin owner of Progressive Papers Ltd., which controlled a chain of newspapers and journals, including the leading English language newspaper "Pakistan Times".

            In January 1953 the formation of the Ganatantri Dal (Democratic Party) in the East was followed, also in the East, by the revival of the Krishak Sramik (Peasant /Worker) Party, headed by Fazlul Huq  in September of the same year.

            Also in September 1953, the Awami Moslem League dropped the religious adjective from its name to become the Awami League.

        In 1948 the Communist Party of India had split itself into the Communist Party of India and the Communist Party of Pakistan, with Sajjad Zaheer as its first General Secretary. It represented at this time the interests of the working class. In West Pakistan it was forced to go underground after the Rawalpindi "conspiracy" case in 1951; in East Pakistan it was underground from the foundation of Pakistan until November 1953, when it was able to hold its first public meeting. It correctly combined this underground activity with open fractional work within the national -democratic parties, mainly the Awami League and Ganatantri Dal in the East, and the Azad Pakistan Party in the West.
 

Centralisation and Repression

    In July 1948 a State Bank was set up to coordinate financial control of the economy, and in the same month Governor-General Jinnah granted himself special powers by which he could instruct the Governor of a province to take direct control of the provincial administration "in case of emergency". It is interesting to note that this latter step was carried out under Section 92 of the Government of India Act passed in 1935 by the British Conservative Government.

            In September 1948 the government set up a Central Engineering Authority to coordinate public works activities in the provinces, particularly the development of electric power.
            In December 1948 the right to grant oil and mineral concessions was transferred from the provincial governments tb the central government.
            In January 1949 the Constituent Assembly passed the Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act (PRODA), retrospectively to 1947, empowering the Governor-General to debar from public life for up to ten years anyone found guilty by a court or tribunal of any abuse of his official position. As Keith Callard points out:

            In September 1948 Jinnah died, and the Bengali landlords, backed by British imperialism, succeeded in elevating Khwaja Nazimuddin to the vacant post of Governor-General. The new Governor-General, in his turn, nominated another Bengali landlord, Nurul Amin, to succeed him as Chief Minister of East Bengal.
            In September 1950 - in which month Major-General Mohammad Ayub Khan was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army in succession to General Sir Douglas Gracey -- the Basic Principles Committee (appointed in March 1949 to prepare the basis of a Constitution for Pakistan) presented its interim report. Dominated by the "Karachi" landlord/comprador bourgeois clique, the Committee proposed that the country should have, a parliamentary system of government with two Houses, each having equal powers: the lower "House of the People" would be directly elected on the basis of population, while the upper "House of Units" would be elected indirectly by provincial legislatures on the basis of an equal number of members from each province.
            With West Pakistan divided into a number of provinces, and the East made up of a single province, a constitution on this basis would have rendered the pro-British Bengali landlord clique virtually impotent. The Committee's recommendation that Urdu (one of the languages of West Pakistan spoken, according to the 1951 Census, by only 3.3% of the population of the country) should be the official language of Pakistan caused particular indignation in East Bengal.

            In March 1950 the Moslem League in the Punjab - dominated by the powerful Punjabi landlords, headed by Mian Mumtaz Daultana - gained a sweeping victory in the Punjab provincial elections, winning 143 seats out of 194. The "Punjabi" clique, as it came to be known, thus assumed an influential role in the ruling party, and it too was turning towards U.S. imperialism.

            Thus, by 1950 three rival groups had come into being within the ruling class of Pakistan:

            To strengthen its position against the constitutional proposals put forward by the Basic Principles Committee, the "Bengali" clique sought and won the support of the orthodox mullahs (the Moslem priesthood) to assist it by organising a campaign to the effect that the proposals were "insufficiently Islamic" in content.

            In October 1952 the Council of the Moslem League met in Dacca. Here the "Bengali" clique were successful in securing, the adoption of an amendment to the constitution of the League, by which East and West Pakistan would in future have parity of seats on the Council of the League. With West Pakistan divided into several provinces, this effectively enabled the "Bengali" clique to dominate the Moslem League for the time being.

            In December 1952 a revised report on the basic principles of the State Constitution was presented to the Constituent Assembly by Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin. It pandered to the conservative mullahs who had assisted in the fight against the 1950 report by declaring that the Head of State must be a Moslem, who would appoint a board of persons versed in Islamic law to advise on legislation. But its most important proposal was to introduce into the State Constitution the principle which had been incorporated in the constitution of the Moslem League three months earlier, namely, that both the upper and lower Houses would have parity of representation between East and West Pakistan. To weaken the position of the Western cliques still more, it was proposed that West Pakistan should be further sub-divided. Although the decision on an official language was left to the Constituent Assembly, this report represented a significant victory for the pro-British "Bengali" clique.

            Both the "Punjabi" and the "Karachi" cliques naturally found these constitutional proposals unacceptable, and sought to use against them the same weapon which the "Bengali" clique had used against the 1950 report - that of religious fanaticism. They secured the support of the influential organisation of the orthodox mullahs, the Jamaitul-Ulema-e-Islami, to stir up the backward masses against both the report and the government which had presented them, claiming that the new proposals were still "insufficiently Islamic" in content. In the Punjab, violent progroms were organised against a Moslem minority sect, the Ahmadyas, and in March 1953 the Governor-General imposed Martial Law on the province.

        By April the "Karachi" clique judged that the position of the Khwaja Nazimuddin govemment had been sufficiently weakened, and on April 17th 1953, Governor- General Ghulam Mohammad arbitrarily dismissed it from office.

            The pro-British Khwaja Nazimuddin was replaced as Prime Minister by a figure who had the confidence of the United States imperialists, the Ambassador to Washington, Mohammad Ali of Bogra.

            In May 1953 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Director of the Mutual Security Agency Harold E. Stassen paid an official visit to Pakistan, and in the following month the U.S. government made a gift to the government of Pakistan of  700,000 tons of surplus American wheat. In November 1953 Pakistan's Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad met President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles in Washington.

            Prior -to the 1953 coup Pakistan had signed, in February 1951, an agreement with the United States for technical assistance under the "Point Four" programme. But after the coup U.S. "aid" began to flow in considerable quantities. As an article in "Pakistan Today" expresses it:

            In February 1954 Prime Minister Mohammad Ali announced that the Pakistan government had requested military assistance from the United States. When President Eisenhower was pleased to accept the request a few days later, Mohammad Ali declared:

            The first "Five Year Plan" was launched under Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali in 1955. Three years and three governments later, Prime Minister Malik Firoz Khan Noon was saying:

"Despite this dismal record, the accent of the First Five Year Plan was still on private enterprise".
(Mushtaq Ahmad: "Government and Politics in Pakistan"; Karachi; 1963: pt214),

"All that was done during his (i.e., Suhrawardy's - Ed.) regime was the reduction of the targets. ...
The (Noon - Ed.) Government scaled down the size of the development programme from Rs. 1,160 crores (i.e., 11,600 million rupees - Ed.) as originally stipulated, to 1,080 crores (i.e., 10,800 million rupees - Ed.), affecting both the private and public sectors. The 'realistic appraisal' of the resources was, however, not accompanied by an equally realistic reassessment of the use to which these resources were to be put, the new version of the Plan 'retaining all the distinctive features' of its original."
(Mushtaq Ahmad: ibid.; p.78).

        The national bourgeoisie of East Bengal then turned their attention, as a first step, to winning control of the provincial legislature. The report of the Basic Principles Committee of September 1950 had angered public opinion in the province and as a result the Awami League (as it was renamed in September 1953) experienced a great increase in its support. This enabled it to form a "United Front" with two smaller parties - the Krishak Sramik Party and the Nizam-eIslam (Islamic Order) Party. The Communist Party gave the United Front its support.

        The programme of the United Front, in the drafting of which the Awami League, as the strongest party in the coalition, played the leading role, was embodied in a 21-point Charter the main points of which were:

a) complete autonomy for East Bengal in all matters except defence, foreign affairs and currency;
b) recognition of Bengali as a second official language on equal terms with Urdu;
c) consultation between East Bengal and the Centre on the allocation of foreign exchange,
d) dissolution of the existing Constituent Assembly and its replacement by a directly elected body;
e) repeal of repressive legislation.

            The provincial elections took place in March 1954, and resulted in the rout of the Moslem League which won only 10 seats, in a House of  310. Ex-Chief Minister Nurul Amin was defeated by an 18-year-old student with a majority of more than 7,000, and many of the Moslem League candidates lost their deposits.

            The United Front won 223 seats out of 310, while the Communist Party gained 4 of the 10 seats it contested, another 23 members of the Communist Party were elected as candidates representing other parties.

            The central government's plan to weaken the political influence of the "Bengali" landlord /comprador bourgeois clique had succeeded - but at the cost of bringing into the East Pakistan legislative assembly a majority representing the interests of the national bourgeoisie of that province. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali made haste to declare that the provincial election results would in no way affect the composition of the central Constituent Assembly!

            In April 1954 the leader of the Krishak Sramik Party, Fazlul Huq, was invited to form a provincial government, but the central government took immediate steps to bring about its removal. Almost at once violent fighting, in which several hundred people were killed, began between Bengali and non-Bengali workers in plantations and factories, and, according to the "Pakistan Times", was without any doubt brought about by agents-provocateurs in the pay of the central government.

        On May 30th, therefore, the Governor-General imposed Governor's Rule over the province. on the pretext that an "emergency", which the provincial government had been unable to prevent, threatened the security of East Bengal. Major-General Iskander Mirza Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, and a firm supporter of the "Karachi" landlord /comprador bourgeois clique, was flown into Dacca and sworn in as the new Governor of East Bengal. The leaders of the Awami League were arrested, ex-Chief Minister Fazlul Huq was placed under house arrest, and Suhrawardy prudently went abroad for medical treatment.

            In June all political meetings were prohibited in East Bengal, and in July the Communist Party was banned, first in East Bengal, then throughout the country. By July 17th, it was officially stated, 1,292 people had been arrested.

            The "Karachi" clique sought to fight back by taking advantage of the contradictions between the Bengali national capitalists, and the Bengali landlord/comprador bourgeois class - the "Bengali" clique represented in the Constituent Assembly by the Nazimuddin group.
            The Governor-General approached Suhrawardy, the leader of the Awami League, suggesting that the latter would benefit by, and should support, action by the Governor-General to dissolve the Constituent Assembly and arrange for the election of a new, more representative one by the provincial legislative assemblies, since this would mean that the seats in the Constituent Assembly allotted to East Bengal would be occupied predominantly by representatives of the Awami League. Suhrawardy agreed, and issued a statement to this effect from his Zurich hospital.

            Assured of this support, the "Karachi" clique acted quickly. On October 24th, 1954 the Governor-General declared a state of emergency and dissolved the Constituent Assembly. He then instructed Prime Minister Mohammad Ali to reconstruct his government by bringing in a number of new Ministers who had not been elected to the Constituent Assembly, the most important of these being Major-General Mirza as Minister of the Interior, General Mohammad Ayub Khan (Commander -in-Chief of the army) as Minister of Defence, and Dr. Khan Sahib, an Independent, as Minister of Communications.

        The "Karachi" clique now offered a deal to the "Punjabi" clique under which the former would support the "One Unit" scheme, provided the latter would agree:

a) to the limitation of Punjab representation in the West Pakistan legislative assembly;
b) not to oppose the incorporation of Karachi, the capital, in West Pakistan; and
c) not to oppose the establishment of joint electoral rolls throughout the country.

            Meanwhile the "Karachi" clique had been offering a deal to the leaders of the Awami League. The basis of this was that if Suhrawardy would enter the government and work in support of "One Unit", the "Karachi" clique would arrange for the Awami League to participate in a coalition government at the Centre, with Suhrawardy as Prime Minister, and would see that joint electoral rolls were established throughout the country.

            The question of joint electoral rolls or separate religious rolls was an important one for the national capitalists of East Pakistan. Unlike the West, the East contained a large, nine million Hindu minority, comprising 18.4% of the population. This minority could exert a much stronger political influence on the basis of separate representation for Hindus than if Hindus voted alongside the Moslem majority in each electorate.
            Thus, in return for supporting "One Unit" within the government (a concession which would weaken the position of the national bourgeoisie of East Pakistan, the interests of which the Awami League represented) the leaders of the Awami League were offered two actions (participation in the government and joint electorates) which would appear to strengthen the position of the national bourgeoisie of East Pakistan.
            The deal was accepted, and in December 1954 Suhrawardy entered the "Governor's Council" as Minister of Law, in which capacity he played the leading role in drafting the legislation for "One Unit".

            The Federal Court having in May 1955 resolved the "Tamizuddin Khan Case" in favour of the Governor-General, a new Constituent Assembly was indirectly elected in June by the provincial assemblies on the basis of 40 members each from West and East Pakistan.

a) participation in a coalition government at the Centre;
b) a Constitution that would give East Pakistan parity of representation in the National Assembly with West Pakistan and would give Bengali the status of an official language on equal terms with Urdu, and
c) the establishment of a National Economic Council having for its declared policy the maintenance of uniform standards of development in all parts of the country.

            In April 1955 Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad had designated, on behalf of the "Karachi" clique Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani as Governor of the new province, and Dr. Khan Sahib as Chief Minister.

               In January 1956, however, indirect elections were held for the new West Pakistan legislative assembly, with the former provincial assemblies acting as electoral colleges. Following these elections, a Moslem League parliamentary group for the provincial assembly was formed, which claimed 245 members out of a House of 310. In April this parliamentary group threw down a challenge to the "Karachi" clique by adopting a resolution to, the effect that only a member of the Moslem League would be acceptable as Chief Minister (Khan Sahib being an Independent). The "Karachi" cliqu'e were prepared for the challenge.
            Two days later the Governor confirmed the appointment of Khan Sahib as Chief Minister and the latter had, in the meantime, announced the formation of a new political party to be known as the Republican Party. It was made clear that the new party had the full personal backing of President Mirza (of whom Khan Sahib was a personal friend) and within days a majority of Moslem League members both of the National Assembly and of the West Pakistan legislative assembly had deserted the Moslem League and joined the Republican Party.
            The Republican Party was thus created as the open parliamentary party of the "Karachi" clique. It was a purely parliamentary machine, with the vaguest of programmes, and it was distinguished from the Moslem League only by the fact that it was controlled by the "Karachi" clique, while the latter had been controlled by the "Punjabi" clique.

            As a result of the defection of his Moslem League Ministers to the Republican Party, by September 1956, Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali was left as the only member of the Cabinet remaining in the Moslem League. On September 8th, 1956, finding this position untenable, he resigned both as Prime Minister and from the Moslem League.
            Meanwhile, the leaders of the Republican Party had reached agreement with the leaders of the Awami League that, if the latter would join them in a coalition government, they would support the enactment of legislation to establish joint electoral rolls throughout the country - this question having been left unresolved in the Constitution Act of February 1956.

            On September 10th, 1956, therefore, President Mirza invited Suhrawardy, leader of the Awami League, to form a government, and a coalition government of 5 Republicans and 4 Awami League members came to office, with Suhrawardy as Prime Minister.

            For tactical reasons, the electorate issue was dealt with in two stages.
            First, in September 1956, the National Assembly adopted the Electorate Bill, providing for joint electoral rolls in East Pakistan and separate religious electoral rolls in West Pakistan. Then, in April 1957, it adopted the Electorate Amendment Bill, abolishing separte electorates in West Paki'stan and establishing joint electorat rolls througout the country.
        On other issues, such as foreign policy, the Awami League Ministers were compelled either to follow the policy of the dominant Republican Party (that is, of the "Karachi" clique) or resign. They chose the former course, and Suhrawardy became a skilled exponent of the "necessity" for Pakistan to maintain and develop its dependence on US imperialism.

            In October 1956, therefore, President Mirza went to Dacca where:

            The programme of the National Awami Party included the following points:

            From the viewpoint of practical politics, the key point in the policy of the N.A.P. was that of working for the dismemberment of West Pakistan.

            In face of the situation created by the breaking away of a section of their party to form the National Awami Party, the leaders of the Awami League approached the leaders of the Krishak Sramik Party with the proposal that a new "united front" should be established between the two parties. To counter this move, the representatives of the "Karachi" clique offered a deal to the K.S.P. leadership to the effect that, if the Awami League's proposal were rejected, the K.S.P. would be invited to participate in a coalition government at the Centre. The result of these manoeuvres was that the K.S.P. also split: one section, headed by Azizul Huq and Yusuf Ali Chaudhur, favoured a "united front" with the Awami League, the other section, headed by Hamidul Huq Chaudhury, favoured coming to terms with the "Karachi" clique in order to gain the opportunity of participating in the central government.

            In September 1957, following the agreement to "work together" between the leaders of the Republican Party and those of the National Awami Party, the West Pakistan legislative assembly adopted a resolution in favour of the dismemberment of West Pakistan into four separate provinces. The resolution was moved by those representatives who were now members of the National Awami Party and supported by most of the Republican Party members.

            Even Tariq Ali, a trotskyite supporter of the National Awami Party, is compelled to admit:

            The need to have the provincial budget approved by the assembly, made it necessary to summon the provincial assembly on May 22nd, 1956. Speaker Abdul Hakim (another member of the K. S. P.) saved the day by adjourning the House without permitting the budget to be presented. On May 26th, on the advice of Governor Fazlul Huq, Mirza (now President) imposed Governor's rule on the province. On June Ist, having himself authorised provincial expenditure for three months, he revoked Governor's Rule, and reinstated the Sarkar Ministry.

        The next meeting of the provincial legislative assembly was fixed for August 13th, 1956. Four hours before the session was due to begin, Governor Fazlul Huq prorogued it. The Sarkar Ministry finally resigned and Governor's Rule was once more imposed on the province.

            In September, 1956, after a demonstration had been fired upon by the Dacca police, killing four people, and a general strike had been called in protest, Ataur Rahman Khan of the Awami League was invited to form a provincial government. This was a coalition government which included Ministers from Ganatantri Dal and the Pakistan National Congress, and - with intermittent periods of Governor's Rule and two unsuccessful attempts to reinstate the Sarkar Ministry - it continued in office until the military coup of October 1958.

            The Republican Party (which had brought about the downfall of the Suhrawardy government ostensibly on the grounds that its Awami League Ministers had failed to put into effect the resolution of the West Pakistan provincial legislature recommending dismemberment of  "One Unit") now entered into an agreement with the Moslem League to form a coalition government with it on the understanding that the question of "One Unit" could be postponed indefinitely, and that the Republicans would support legislation to establish separate religious electoral rolls.
            In December 1957 ex-Prime Minister Chundrigar revealed that:

            The new government was composed initially of 7 Republicans, 1 Minister from the K.S.P., and 1 Independent.

            Suspecting that the new government would proceed to dismember West Pakistan, the Moslem League - still dominated by the "Punjabi" landlord clique and strengthened by some defections from the Republican Party, -- on this issue - now organised a para-military force of some 60,000, the National Guard which began to parade the streets of the cities armed and uniformed.
            But the plans of the "Karachi" clique to establish a military dictatorship were now reaching their final phase.
            In March 1958 President Mirza warned:

            On September 20th, 1958 the Speaker of the East Pakistan legislative assembly, Abdul Hakim, a member of the Krishak Sramik Party, named several Awami League members for disorderly conduct, whereupon fighting broke out in the chamber and the Speaker was forced to leave. The Deputy Speaker, a defector from the K.S.P., then permitted a motion to be carried declaring the Speaker to be of unsound mind. On September 23rd, opposition members attacked the Deputy Speaker when he attempted to take the chair, and he was fatally injured. Several opposition members, including former Chief Minister Sarkar, were arrested. The provincial budget was passed in the absence of the opposition, and the assembly adjourned.
            In the same month, September 1958, the government imposed a ban on all private para-military organisations, pre-censorship of all newspapers and periodicals, a ban on meetings of more than 5 persons, and the death penalty for a whole range of offences, including the publication of material "calculated to provoke feelings of enmity".
            The Working Committee of the Moslem League replied on September 28th by adopting a resolution accusing the government of trying to create lawlessness and bloodshed as a pretext for postponitig the elections, and declared that it was the duty of the people and the Moslem League to overthrow any government bent on introducing despotism, "if need be, by extra-constitutional means".
            On the pretext of strengthening the government to meet the "threatening situation", Noon brought into the Cabinet 8 Ministers from the Awami League, a further member from the Republican Party, and a further member of the Krishak Sramik Party - so creating 26 Ministers out of a House of 80. When these Awami League members were allotted minor portfolios, however, they resigned in protest five days after joining the government.

"decided to step aside and hand over all powers to General Ayub Khan".
("Pakistan Times", October 28th, 1958),

 The "Karachi" landlord /comprador bourgeois clique had established its military dictatorship.

SECOND PHASE: MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

            As a result of this pressure, in May 1959 President Ayub Khan proposed Indo-Pakistani cooperation for "the defence"_of the sub-continent. In September 1959 he met Indian Prime Minister Jawaharwel Nehru in Delhi, and paid public tribute to the latter's "outstanding personality". In October 1959 an Indo-Pakistani Ministerial conference settled the principal outstanding border disputes in relation to the East Pakistan border with India, and in January 1960 a further Ministerial conference performed the same task in relation to the West Pakistan border.
            In September 1960 Prime Minister Nehru visited Pakistan to sign the Indus Waters Treaty, agreed after nine years of negotiation through the "mediation" of the US-controlled World Bank.
            The Indus Waters settlement had the added effect of removing the basis of  one of Pakistan's complaints about Indian occupation of part of Kashmir.

            The Hindu Maharajah of Kashmir, Sir Hari Singh, had in October 1947 acceded to India, although the Kashmiri population was predominantly Moslem. Pakistani troops then entered Kashmir and during 1948 fighting occurred between Indian and Pakistani forces, ending in a cease-fire in July 1949 -- after the question had been referred to the Security Council of the United Nations. Since then the northern and western half of Kashmir had been occupied and administered by Pakistan,, and was known as Azad (Free) Kashmir, the remainder by India.

            India had repudiated her original pledge that the dispute should be settled by a plebiscite of the population of Kashmir, and in January 1957 had formally incorporated that part of Kashmir under its administration into the Indian State. In November 1962 US Assistant Secretary of State Averell Harriman emphasised, in talks with Nehru and Ayub Khan, the importance with which the US government regarded attempts to solve the Kashmir question. However, Ministerial talks between India and Pakistan which followed between December 1962 and May 1963 failed to make any progress.
            Following the death of Nehru in May 1964, Ayub Khan made a fervent broadcast appeal in June for friendship between the two States. In October 1964 Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri visited Pakistan for talks with President Ayub Khan.
        But the Kashmir dispute remained a continuing source of antagonism between the two States.

"The entire diplomatic thinking in the State Department was dominated by the overriding consideration that India had to be built up as a bulwark against China and entitled to all the material assistance and moral support from America to equip her for the leadership of Asia."
(Mushtaq Ahmad: ibid; p.234).

"Should we find that membership of these pacts is no longer in the national interest of Pakistan., we shall not hesitate for a moment to get out of them."

        Faced with the threat of war with an India armed with the latest US weapons, the Pakistan government welcomed the opportunity of rapprochement with China - not as an alternative to its alliance with the USA imperialists, but as a means of strengthening their bargaining position within it.

        In September 1963 Pakistan signed a trade agreement with China.

        In the same month US Assistant Secretary of State George Ball visited Pakistan for talks with President Ayub Khan. According to an inspired leak from the US State Department, Ball told Ayub that any close relationship between Pakistan and China would nullify the sense of any alliance between Pakistan and the United States.

            In February 1964 Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi visited Pakistan and signed a communique affirming China's support for Pakistan's viewpoint on the Kashmir issue, namely that the future of Kashmir should be settled by a free plebiscite of the Kashmiri people.
            In February 1965 the Chinese government granted Pakistan an interest-free loan of US $ 60 million. In March 1965 President Ayub Khan visited Peking and signed a cultural agreement, while in April Prime Minister Chou En-lai again visited Pakistan for talks with Ayub Khan.
            In March 1966 Chinese President Liu Shao-chi visited Pakistan, accompanied by Foreign Minister Chen Yi. A joint communique reaffirmed China's support for Pakistan's viewpoint on the Kashmir issue, and Pakistan's support for the admission of China to the United Nations.
            On March 23rd, 1966 Chinese-built T29 tanks and MIG-19 fighter planes took part in the Republic Day parade in Karachi alongside US-built equipment.
            In June 1966 Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai paid a further visit to Pakistan for talks with Ayub. In the same month a Sino-Pakistani scientific and cultural agreement was signed, followed by trade agreements in July and August, and an agreement on.maritime transport between the two countries in October.

            That the policy of the Ayub military dictatorship in fostering closer relations with China was to try to pressure the US imperialists into more favourable treatment, and not a change in the basis of Pakistan's dependence upon US imperialism, is shown by the official statement issued after the visit of US Assistant Secretary of State Ball to Pakistan in September 1963:

For investment in the public sector:
East Pakistan: 1,251 m. rupees (44.8%)
West Pakistan: 1,539 m. rupees ( 55.2%.)

For exports to foreign countries:
East Pakistan: 1,260 m. rupees (59.5%)
West Pakistan:857 m.rupees (40.5%)

            The Commission recommended compulsory acquisition by the State, in return for "fair compensation" amounting to 80 million rupees, of all landholdings in excess of 500 acres of irrigated land or 1,000 acres of non-irrigated land. This land was to be sold to peasants, with existing tenants having the first option to purchase.
            The State acquired under this "land reform" 2.2 million acres of land. Of this, however, only 0.6 million acres was assessed as "cultivable land"; 1.2 million acres was classed as "cultivable waste" (in India 15% of land classed as "cultivable waste" is accounted cultivable, but no comparable estimate is available for Pakistan); and 0.4 million acres as "unfit for cultivation". After the "land reform" some 6,000 landlords retained 7.4 million acres of land (i.e., three times the amount of land taken from them). The land assumed by the State was resold to 150,000 pcasants.
            As Mushtaq Ahmad comments:

"The disposition of boycott which is crystallising in the political circles of East Pakistan. ... This is a dangerous situation and threatens to force a gulf between the East and the West."'
(Editorial, "Pakistan Times", July 24th, 1962).

"We are not working on a party level, but we are all united for the cause of the democratisation of the Constitution."
(H.S.Suhrawardy: Address at Mymensingh, October 27th, 1962).

            With the death of Suhrawardy, its leading figure, in December 1963, the NDF ceased to play a significant role.

            The government followed the ordinances of January 1963 with concessions to the opposition designed to give support to the view that fundamental reforms could be effected constitutionally. In March 1963 it sponsored the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill, which sought to win the support of the conservative mullahs by renaming the state "The Islamic Republic of Pakistan", and to placate the opposition by making fundamental rights justifiable in the courts (except for 21 laws adopted by the Martial Law Administration!). This measure was successful in persuading Khwaia Nazimuddin to instruct the Council League Members of the National Assembly to vote with the government on the Bill. The dictatorship also sought to soften the hostility of the East Pakistan national bourgeoisie by supporting, in April 1963, an opposition motion to set up a Parity Committee with the official aim (which was never put into effect) of removing West/East disparity in the services, and by making Dacca, in East Pakistan, a "subsidiary capital" of Pakistan.

            The revival of the National Awami Party and the release from prison in November 1962 of its leader Maulana Bhashani, provided the military dictatorship with a political arm the objection function of which was to mobilise "left" support for it.

            By participating in the COP, the leaders of the Awami League placed themselves in the contradictory position of, on the one hand, denouncing "Basic Democracy" as the completely undemocratic machinery of the military dictatorship and, on the other hand, suggesting, by their participation in this machinery, that it could be used to bring about fundamental constitutional changes.
            That the COP election campaign was not a serious one is shown by the adoption as Presidential candidate of Miss Fatima Jinnah the sister of the late Mohammad Ali Jinnah, knowing that the prospect of a woman as president would be repugnant to moslem public opinion.
            The COP adopted a 9-point programme limited to aspects of the restoration of "parliamentary democracy" and ignoring questions of foreign policy.
            The "elections" for, the Electoral College of "Basic Democrats" took place in October-November 1964, and the Presidential election in January 1965.
            Although nominally a part of the Combined Opposition Party, the leaders of the National Awami Party took no active part in the election campaign:

            In the indirect elections for the National Assembly, held in March 1965, and in those for the Provincial Assemblies, held in May, the Conventionist Moslem League won large majorities.
             The Combined Opposition Party then disintegrated.

            In May 1965 Pakistan Foreign Minister Bhutto signed in London a SEATO, communique which gave full support to the US aggression in Vietnam. The Ayub regime judged that this support (which contrasted sharply with the official Indian criticism of the role of US imperialism in Vietnam) would be sufficient to ensure at least a benevolent neutrality on the part of Washington towards Pakistan in the event of war with India. The revisionist leaders of the Soviet Union had long been collaborating with the US imperialists, and in April 1965 President Ayub Khan and Foreign Minister Bhutto paid an official visit to the USSR, during which agreements were signed on trade, economic cooperation and cultural exchange. Furthermore,, the predominantly Moslem population of Indian-occupied Kashmir were clearly hostile to their Indian rulers.

            Taking all these points into consideration, the "Karachi" clique judged that there could hardly be a more favourable moment for an attempt to "solve the Kashmir question" in what appeared to be the only possible way in which it could be settled to the advantage of Pakistan - by force.
            After a "trial run" in the Rann (desert) of Kutch on the West Pakistan border in April, in August 1965 the Special Forces (with officers trained at Fort Bragg, North Carolina) entered the Indian-occupied zone of Kashmir and commenced a guerilla type warfare against the Indian forces. It was then announced in Karachi that a revolution had broken out in Kashmir, and regular Pakistani troops went in "to assist the revolutionary forces". Heavy fighting then began between Pakistani and Indian troops, and a state of emergency wa declared in Pakistan.

            The calculations of the "Karachi" cliaue had however, been seriously at fault. The Kashmiri people showed no more enthusiasm for their Pakistani "liberators" than for their Indian oppressors. The pro-US imperialist revisionist clique in the Soviet Union, headed by Khrushchov, had been overthrown in the coup of October 1964, and the new Brezhnev-Kosygin clique was bent on reorientating Soviet foreign policy in the direction of building up an anti-US imperialist bloc in which, it was planned, India would play an important role. Furtherrmpe, as a result of the activity of the CIA, the US imperialists were already looking forward to the counter-revolutionary "cultural revolution" of 1966-68 in China, which was aimed at ousting Marxist-Leninists from leading positions, establishing a military dictatorship on behalf of the national capitalists, and reorientating People's China into rapprochement with Washington. (See "Report of the C.C. of the MLOB on 'Centrist' Revisionism", in RED FRONT, March 1970). [NB: EDITORS"S NOTE: This has NOT been web-published as of yet, although a later book on the  same theme is on the pages of Alliance - See index pages under China].

            The Indo-Pakistani war of September 1965 thus came at a most inconvenient time for both the US and Soviet imperialists at a time when the process of building up new world-wide military blocs on the part of each of these Powers was just beginning. Thus, the US imperialists cut off "aid" to both India and Pakistan, while they and the Soviet imperialists acted together to stop the war.

            As a result of thee action of these Powers, a cease-fire was imposed, and the leaders of the two countries involved were summoned in January 1966 to a conference at Tashkent, capital of the Soviet republic of Uzbekistan, where Soviet Premier Alexei Nikoyevich Kosygin "mediated" an agreement under which both sides were to withdraw their forces to the lines of August 1965..
            The failure of the Ayub regime to "settle" the Kashmir question satisfactorily was attacked by most of the opposition parties (except the National Awami Party) as a "sell-out". On January 22nd, 1966, Miss Jinnah declared:

            US-Pakistani relations now returned to "normal". In December 1965 President Ayub Khan visited the United States and made due apologies for his naughtiness, and in June 1966 the US imperialists resumed economic "aid" and the sale of arms to Pakistan. In December 1967 US President Lyndon Johnson visited Pakistan for talks with Ayub, followed in January 1968 by President Tito of US-dominated Yugoslavia. In August 1969 US President Richard Nixon visited Pakistan for talks with Ayub's successor as President, General Yahya Khan.

"As far as the problems of international security and military defence are concerned, ... the U.S. has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it assumed by, the Asian nations themselves."

            In 1967 the $60 million loan granted to Pakistan by China in February 1965 was increased to nearly $ 67 million.
            In Septem ber 1968 a highway connecting the Chinese province of Sinkiang with West Pakistan was opened, followed by a second all-weather road, the Karakoram highway, in February 1971.
            In December 1968 an agreement on economic and cultural cooperation between China and Pakistan was signed, providing for a further interest-free loan to Pakistan of Pounds Sterling PS17.6 million.
            In November 1970 President Yahya Khan paid an official visit to China, during which an agreement between the two countries on economic and cultural cooperation was signed.
            In the new situation of developing Sino-U.S. rapprochement, there was now only one Power in relation to which the threat of closer relations could be used by the Ayub regime as a means of pressure on Washington - the Soviet Union. In September /October 1967 President Ayub Khan paid an official visit to the U.S.S.R., and in April 1968 Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin paid an official visit to Pakistan.
            As a result of these exchanges, in May 1968 Pakistan Foreign Minister Arshad Hussain told the National Assembly that, the Pakistan government had served notice on the U.S. government to close its aerial espionage base at Peshawar (from which Gary Powers had taken off in his ill-fated U2 in May 1960). Following this gesture towards the Soviet government, a Pakistan military mission headed by General Yahya Khan, commander-in-chief of the army (and soon to replace Ayub as President) visited Moscow and signed an agreement for the supply of limited quantities of Soviet arms to Pakistan.

            The process of formation of the PDM led, however, to a further split in the Awami League. While the main forces of the party stood firm on the six-point programme and the principle of extra constitutional mass action put forward by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, a minority, headed by Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, favoured modifying the six-points to make them acceptable to the other opposition parties and joining with these in seeking to work within the framework of "Basic Democracy". This minority broke away from the Awami League proper to join the PDM.

            The main points in the Pakistan Democratic Movement's 8-point programme related to the restoration of "parliamentary democracy", but it made some attempt to win support in East Pakistan away from the Awami League by calling for limited autonomy for the province and for parity between the wings in the civil service and armed forces.
            The National Awami Party, that "leftist" front for the military dictatorship, attacked the Pakistan Democratic Movement as:

            The People's Party was thus a political party which objectively represented the interests of the West Pakistan national capitalists but which directed its appeal also towards the petty bourgeoisie and working class.

Manoeuvre 1: To draw the Awami League and the "right" National Awami Party (the leadership of which could transform the spontaneous popular upsurge into an organised revolutionary national-democratic movement) into a "united front" with the constitutional opposition parties:

1) Repeal of the University Ordinances (banning students from political activity);
2) Restoration of "parliamentary democracy" and direct elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage.
3) Freedom of the press from state censorship;
4) Full autonomy for East Pakistan;
5) Establishment of a sub-federation for West Pakistan, giving full autonomy to North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan;
6) Nationalisation of the banks, insurance companies and large industrial firms;
7) Immediate ending of the state of emergency, restoration of the right to strike;
8) Release of all political prisoners and abandonment of the "Agartala Conspiracy Case", and
9) An independent foreign policy, including withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO.

 Manoeuvre 2: To utilise "leftist" political leaders to divert the mass movement from the objective of overthrowing the military dictatorship of the "Karachi" clique.

1) The "left" National Awami Party, headed by Maulana Bhashani;
2) The "East Pakistan Students' Union (leftist)", formed as a breakaway organisation from the East Pakistan Students' Union in 1965 and headed by Maoist Rashed Khan Menon: it was this organisation which invited Tariq Ali to come to Pakistan to "lead the movement";
3) The "East Pakistan Workers' Federation" (EPWF), a "leftist" breakaway organisation from the East Pakistan Federation of Labour, headed by Siraju Hossan (who had been released from prison in December 1967).
4) a section of the student movement in West Pakistan, most influential in Rawalpindi, headed by Raja Anwar.

"Throughout Pakistan the fires still raged, but the student movement made no effort to coordinate, to set up a province-wide organisation. ....
Not a single comprehensive programme containing the demands of the students, movement of West Pakistan ever appeared ....
It seemed that since the chief object of hatred was Ayub, and since his removal had become the main demand, the students felt that there was no need for ideological clarity on their part. ..
Their (i.e., the West Pakistan students' ... Ed.) main demand now became that Ayub should quit. They were unclear as to the alternative, and preferred not to talk about it." (Tariq Ali: "Pakistan- Military Rule or People's Power?" London; 1970; p.196).

"The Left (i.e., the "leftist" leaders of the student movement in East Pakistan Ed.) argued that this struggle (i.e., the national-democratic struggle Ed.) ... must be viewed as part of the struggle for socialism. The Right (i.e., those who did not support the above "leftist" line -- Ed.) argued that this was the first stage .... The right-wing argument was a typical Menshevik /social -democratic analysis of the situation. It could only lead to right-wing deviations. ....
The E.P.S.U. (leftists) were forced to struggle against the political position of ... the E.P.S.U. .. ...
In East Pakistan ... a Student Action Committee had been established and its leaders had adopted an eleven-point programme of demands which was anti-capitalist in content."
(Tariq Ali; Ibid. p.180,181-, 197).

Manoeuvre 3: To make such concessions to the Democratic Action Committee as would enable the constitutional opposition leaders to press the genuine extra-constitutional leaders represented on the Committee into acceptance of negotiations with the military dictatorship.

            On February Ist, 1969 President Ayub Khan, in a broadcast, invited "responsible political leaders" to meet him for talks on the country's future.
            The Democratic Action Committee replied that they were willing to meet the President if some preliminary concessions to their demands were made as a gesture of good faith.
            On February 12th censorship of the press was abolished. On February 14th, it was announced that the state of emergency in force since 1965 would end on February 17th, and that all persons detained under the emergency regulations would be released. On February 20th the urban curfew was ended. On February 21st Ayub announced that he would not contest the next Presidential "election". On February 22nd the "Agartala conspiracy case" was dropped, and all the defendants, including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, were released.
            This series of concessions had barely commenced when, on February 16th, the D.A.C. accepted Ayub's invitation for talks. After a preliminary meeting a Round Table Conference with the President was fixed to open on March 10th.
 

Manoeuvre 4: To organise, with the objective assistance of the "leftist" political leaders, widespread acts of terrorism unchecked by the state, in order to frighten the national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie into accepting a compromise settlement at the Round Table Conference which would save the political power of the "Karachi" clique under Martial Law, at the cost of replacing Ayub Khan as President by the commander -in -chief of the army and the promise to restore "parliamentary democracy"

"The pro-Peking N.A.P. had remained aloof from the struggle in West Pakistan for a whole month. ....
The Left faction of the N.A.P. in West Pakistan contained all the pro-Peking Communists in West Pakistan and many of these were in leading positions in the party. Their attitude towards the upsurge was initially one of hostility."
(Tariq Ali: "Pakistan, Military Rule or People's Power?" London; p. 174, 192).

"Only Bhashani was able to keep up with the rapidly developing radical consciousness. ....
    Maulana Bhashani called a funeral meeting on Sunday, February 16th, 1969. It was at this meeting that the eighty-six year old peasant leader ended his oration with the call "Bangla Jago, agun jelo' (Bengalis awake and light the fires). No sooner had the Maulana said these words than smoke was seen rising from the city centre. ...
    The leadership of the left N.A.P. was meeting at a house in Eskaton. The old Maulana was pacing up and down in the garden, ... weeping as he heard the sound of machine-gun fire - the other 'leaders' were debating how to escape if the army should raid the house. At one stage, workers ran to the house and asked Bhashani for guns to use against the army, but .... none were made available. ....
    At this crucial moment, Maulana Bhashani left his political base in East Pakistan and embarked on a tour of the western province. In West Pakistan he visited three cities and made extremely inflammatory speeches, which caused his enemies to say that he was acting in league with the army and deliberately exacerbating the situation to provide an excuse for Martial Law. ......
    The army had quite clearly made up its mind to 'save the nation' once again. ... They obviously used some of Bhashani's statements to scare the West Pakistani middle class".
(Tariq Ali: ibid. p.176,207,208,214).
  The military dictatorship gave the "leftist" leaders every assistance in their

"The students .... virtually controlled Dacca.....
Numerous acts of violence occurred in the towns. ....
The state of anarchy was most intense in the villages. ....
The provincial and local authorities .... made little attempt to maintain order.
... Police patrols in Dacca were, on March 19th reported to have been completely absent from the streets of the city for a whole fortnight, and village police .... were said to be remaining in their barracks in many parts of the province. ....
Leaders of the Opposition political parties alleged that the authorities were permitting and even encouraging the disorders to provide a pretext for imposing martial law." ("Keesings Contemporary Archives", p.23354-55).

".. . the acceptance of this demand would have spelled the liquidation of Pakistan. I have always told you that Pakistan's salvation, lay in a strong Centre. I accepted the parliamentary system because in this way also there was a possibility of preserving a strong Centre. ...
It is impossible for me to preside over the destruction or our country."

Speaking of the "fast deteriorating situation in the country", Ayub declared:

"The situation is no longer under the control of the Government. ...
Every problem of the country is being decided in the streets. Except for the armed forces there is no constitutional and effective way to meet the situation. The whole nation demands that General Yahya Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, should fulfil his constitutional responsibilities. ...
In view of this, I have decided to relinquish today the office of President."

"My sole aim in imposing martial law is to protect the lives, liberty and property of the people and to put the Administration back on the rails, ...
I have no ambition other than the creation of conditions conducive to the establishment of a constitutional govepnment. It is my firm belief that a sound, clean and honest Administration is a prerequisite for the smooth transfer of power to the representatives of the people elected freely and impartially on the basis of adult franchise. It will be the task of these elected representatives to give the country a workable Constitution."

            The Awami League had meanwhile withdrawn from the Democratic Action Committee in protest against the betrayal of the agreement upon which it had entered the Committee, and on the evening of the day on which Martial Law was declared, the Committee dissolved itself on the grounds that  ".... its basic objectives have been achieved".
            Simultaneously, the "leftist" leaders - their "basic objectives" having also been achieved - immediately called off their campaign of incitement.
            On March 31st 1969, General Yahya Khan assumed the post of President.
            In the "Black Dwarf" of April 18th, 1969, Tariq Ali wrote:

"The struggle has been victorious".

Preparations for the Restoration of "Parliamentary Democracy"

            In the same month the Industrial Relations Ordinance restored freedom of trade union association for workers and the right to strike.
            The restricted nature of the "political activity" to be permitted was revealed in a regulation issued in December 1969: in this rules were laid down for the conduct of political parties, and its most important provision read:

"No political party shall propagate opinions or act in a manner prejudicial to the ideology, integrity or security of Pakistan".

            In August 1970 President Yahya Khan postponed the General election for two months, until December 7th, 1970.

The 1970 General Election

            The only party which could theoretically win a majority of seats in the National Assembly was the Awami League, but the opponents of the Awami League needed to obtain only 12 out of the 162 seats in Sast Pakistan to prevent this.
            It was calculated that, when the Awami League was challenged by the Conventionist Moslem League, the Pakistan Democratic Party (representing the "Bengali" landlord /comprador bourgeois clique), and various religious parties - with women voting for the first time -  [the "Karachi" clique anticipated that these would poll well in East Pakistan] there could be no reasonable doubt that 12 of the 519 candidates standing against the Awami League would be elected.
            The result of the General Election was, however, not as the "Karachi" clique, had expected.
            The "President's Party", the Conventionist Moslem League, won only 2 seats in the whole country, none at all in East Pakistan. The Pakistan Democratic Party won one seat only, in East Pakistan, where its leader, Nurul Amin, was elected. The religious parties won no seats whatever in East Pakistan. The result was that the Awami League won 160 seats out of the 162 seats in East Pakistan.
            In West Pakistan, the People's Party did somewhat better than had been anticipated. It won a majority in the Punjab and in Sind, but its total was only 87 out of a total of 313 seats in the Assembly.

            The shock of the election for the "Karachi" clique was that the Awami League, with 162 seats in a House of 313, had an absolute majority in the National Assembly and so, constitutionally, could frame a new Constitution along the lines of the six-point programme - that is, along lines unacceptable in principle both to the ruling "Karachi" clique and to the national capitalists of West Pakistan.

            The events which followed demonstrated the Marxist-Leninist truth that "parliamentary democracy" is never anything more than a false facade hiding the real face of the State as an apparatus of coercion.

Preparations for the Military Attack upon East Pakistan

            At a press conference on February 24th, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman said that the opponents of the Awami, League were concerned, not with maintaining the territorial integilty of Pakistan, which was not at issue, but with maintaining the semi-colonial status of East Pakistan, so that it could continue to be exploited by vested interests in the West. These "dark, conspiratorial forces", he warned, were now engaged in "a last, desperate bid" to frustrate the adoption of a Constitution by the elected represeritatives of the people, and it was this attack on democracy which was threatening the territorial integrity of Pakistan and destroying the last opportunity for the peoples of Pakistan to live together within one State.
            On March Ist, 1971 President Yahya Khan postponed indefinitely the session of the new National-Assembly, which was due to open on March 3rd, on the grounds that, without the participation of the People's Party, the Assem bly could not be "representative".
            On the following day, a general strike began in East Pakistan, called by the Awami League and embracing all sections of workers.
            On March 6th, President Yahya Khan declared in a broadcast:

"Let me make it absolutely clear that, no matter what happens, as long as I am in command of the Pakistan armed forces and Head of State, I will ensure the complete and absolute integrity of Pakistan".

"Operation Genocide"

"Troops had occupied the university ... arid were busy killing off students still in hiding".

"Fires were burning all over the city".

"... a continuing reign of terror in the East Wing conducted by some 70,000 West Pakistan troops statioined there. The army has been given a free hand to deal with 'secessionists'. Any Hindu or member of the Awami League is said to fall under this heading. ...
The mission found towns with only 10% of the population remaining. The rest had been killed, dispersed to India or fled to villages. Troops had shelled and destroyed public buildings. Bazaars and commercial life were at a standstill."
("The Guardian"; June 28th, 1971; p.3).

"In East Pakistan there is bound to be continuing repression, using the most brutal methods, simply because this is the only way in which a few thousand troops can maintain power over 70 million hostile people."
(R. Prentice: "The Repression in Bengal", in "Sunday Times"; July 11th, 1971; P. 10).

"a regime of paid informers, bigots and thugs answerable to no one and apparently above whatever law is left in East Pakistan".
(M.Sayle: "A Regime of Thugs and Bigots", in "Sunday Times'", July 11th,1971; p.13),
  and declared:

"There is an atmosphere of terror in East Pakistan. ...
    There are now, according to the military authorities, 5,000 razakars (i.e., special constables - Ed,) in East Pakistan, .. They are paid three rupees a day (about 25p at the official rate) and receive seven days' training. .., Their work consists of  'security checks' - guiding the West Pakistan troops to the homes of supporters of the Awami League. ....
    These people are, in fact, representatives of the political parties which were routed at the last elections, with an admixture of men with criminal records and bigoted Muslims who have been persauded that strong-arm methods are needed to protect their religion - a mixture strangely reminiscent of the Orange Lodges, "B Specials", and political terrorists of Northern Ireland. ....
    A military directive states that complaints against razakars are to be investigated by the military authorities. ....
    It is clear that only a very brave or very foolish refugee would even try to return as things are."
(M. Sayle, ibid.- p.11,13).

The Democratic-Republic of Bangladesh

            On March 28th, a clandestine radio broadcast an Order of the Day by the Commander -in- Chief of the Liberation Army of Bangladesh (called at first the Mukhti Fauz, later the Mukhti Bahini, Major Zia Khan, in which he declared:

"I order the freedom fighters of Bangladesh to continue the struggle till ultimate victory",

and asked for international recognition of the Republic.

The Attitude of Foreign Powers

" ... useful work in upholding the unification of Pakistan and in preventing it from moving towards a split. We believe that, through the wise consultations and efforts of Your Excellency..... the situation in Pakistan will certainly be returned to normal. ....
The Chinese government holds that what is happening in Pakistan at present is purely the internal affair of Pakistan".

            In West Bengal, India, one section of the maoist "Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)", headed by Ashim Chatterjee, called for guerilla attacks upon the liberation army of Bangladesh, while another section of the party, headed by Charu Mazumdar, advocated neutrality.
            The maoist "Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist)", loyal to its Chinese backers, obediently supported the Peking counter-revolutionary line, while the maoist "Irish Communist Organisation", citing an article from "Peking Review", declared:

"The only meaning to be got from the article is that the people of Pakistan are standing  against foreign subversives who are trying to break up the territorial state of Pakistan. But it is clear that the actual situation is nothing remotely like this. . . . .
The 'Peking Review' article bears no resemblance to the facts. It repeats the propaganda of the West Pakistan Government, which is attempting to hide the fact that it is trying to establish a naked dictatorship over the Bengalis."
("Irish Communist". June 1971, P.5,8).

"Particular difficulties are posed for the various Maoist parties and groups in England, The Communist Party of China has given them no lead (Sic!). So are they to affirm solidarity of the British working class for Pakistan based on 'the traditional friendship of the British and Pakistani peoples' or for East Bengal based on 'the traditional friendship of the British and Bengali peoples" ?"
("Finsbury Communist", July 1971; p.3).

'The English 'left' knows damn well that the working class is not interested in international solidarity".
(Ibid.; p.4)..

"What of People's China? Why the support of butcher Yahya Khan? Why the failure to support Bangladesh, and the people's liberation fight? Some so-called Maoists in this country try to condemn the Bengali people's struggle or belittle it. This is ludicrous opportunism. ....
In fact, People's China has OFFICIALLY condemned Bangladesh, supported a 'united Pakistan', complimented Yahya Khan on his action, and allowed Pakistan to overfly Chinese territory with troop planes.
    This is a tragic error. ....
This is a set-back for all revolutionaries who look to Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party Of China for world leadership."
( "Worker's Broadsheet"; April /May 1971; p.10).

"This House records its profound conviction that the historic upsurge will triumph of the 75 million people of East Bengal will tiumph. The Hoosue wishes to assure them that their struggle and sacrifices will receive the whole hearted sympathy and support of the people of India".
(Text of Resolution of the Indian Parliament, March 31st, 1971, cited in;
L.M. Singhvi (Ed.) "Bangla Desh", Part 2; Delhi: 1971; p.103-104).

The Indian Intervention

"The ideal solution in the opinion of some Indians would be to have Bangladesh independent but bourgeois, and deeply dependent on India for trade and defence." ("'The Observer"; August 8th; 1971: p.5).

National-Democratic Revolution in East Pakistan

            In March 1972 the new government announced a land reform directed at "eradicating the curse of feudalism". Ceilings for land ownership were reduced by 70%, the excess to be made available to poor and landless peasants.
            The remains of the artificial state of Pakistan was however, faced immediately with internal dissension from the national bourgeoisies of North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, who are supported by the Soviet imperialists. In April 1972 martial law was abolished, and a new constitution brought into force giving measures of autonomy to these areas.

"Parliamentary Democracy" in_Bangla Desh

The_Revolutionary Process in Pakistan

"A nation is a historically constituted stable community of people formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture."
(J.V.Stalin: "Marxism and the National Question", in: "Works", Vol.2; Moscow;1953, p.307).

"A nation is .... a historical  category belonging to a definite epoch,  the epoch of rising capitalism".
Stalin: ibid, p 31.

"The nations which had been pushed into the background and had now awakened to independent life, could no longer form themselves into independent national states; they encountered on their path the very powerful resistance of the ruling strata of the dominant nations, which had long ago assumed control of the state."
(J.V. Stalin. ibid.p.315).

"Thus arose the circumstances which impelled the young nations .... on to the path of struggle.
    The struggle began and flared up, to be sure, not between nations as a whole but between the ruling classes of the dominant nations and those that had been pushed into the background. ...
    The bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation, repressed on every hand, is naturally stirred into movement, ...
    Thus the national movement begins.
    The strength of the national movement is determined by the degree to which the wide strata of the nation, the proletariat and the peasantry, participate in it."
(J.V. Stalin: ibid.,. p.315, 317).

"Today India is spoken of as a single whole. But there can scarcely be any doubt that in the event of a revolutionary ueheaval in India (N.B.: Stalin is speaking of India under British colonial rule - Ed.), scores of hitherto unknown nationalities, having their own separate languages and separate cultures, will appear on the scene."
(J.V. Stalin: "The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East", May 1925 in "Works", Vol. 7; Moscow; 1954; p.141).

"Every section of the Indian people which has a continuous territory as its homeland, common historical tradition, common language, culture and psychological make-up and common economic life would be recognised as a distinct nationality with the right to exist as an autonomous state within the free Indian union or federation, and will have the right to secede from it if it may so desire. This means that the territories which are homelands of such nationalities and which today are split by artificial boundaries of the present British provinces and of the so-called 'Indian states', would be reunited and restored to them in Free India. Thus Free India of tomorrow would be a federation or union of autonomous states of the various nationalities such as Pathans, ... Punjabis, ... Sindhis, Bengalis; .... etc."
("On Pakistan and National Unity": Resolution adopted by the enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India, September 1942).

"Can the diversified assembly of races and religions, with the barriers and divisions of caste, of language and other differences, and with the widely varying range of social and cultural levels, inhabiting the vast  sub-continental expanse of India, be considered a 'nation '?"
(R.P.Dutt: "A Guide to the Problem of India"; London; 1942 p.80),

"In the modern period the reality of the Indian nation can in practice no longer be denied."
(R.P. Dutt: ibid.p.99).

"Our first formulation is that the Bengalis form a nation and so should be given the right to self-determination. ... It is correct to say that the Bengalis are a nation and Bengal should have its own separate state."
(C. Adhikari: "Pakistan and National Unity", published by theCommunist Party of India, 1943).

The formation of Marxist-Leninist Parties of the working class in Pakistan and in India is thus an urgent necessity for the working class.

Central Committee, Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Britain;
Reprinted 2001 by Alliance.

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