"COMPASS"
COMMUNIST LEAGUE
January 1995, No. 116
TABLE CONTENTS:"MORE ON THE FIFTH COLUMN
IN THE STALIN SOCIETY"
-Introduction By Alliance -
June 2002
-ADOLFO OLAECHEA AND DIMITROV
-THE KENNAS AND DIMITROV
-THE DISSOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST
INTERNATIONALMAO -- DEFENDER OF STALIN?
-THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS IN
COLONIAL-TYPE COUNTRIES
-MAOIST 'PEACEFUL TRANSITION
TO SOCIALISM'
-MAO -- DEFENDER OF THE DICTATORSHIP
OF THE PROLETARIAT?
-MAOIST 'SOCIALISM'
-FUNDAMENTALIST AND MODERNIST
MAOISM
-OLAECHEA AND THE PARTY
-THE TACTICS OF BROAD FRONT
WORK
-THE DEGENERATION OF THE STALIN
SOCIETY
-TO
SUM UP
PART TWO:
THE KENNAS AND TROTSKYISM
- THE KENNAS AND THE SPANISH
CIVIL WAR
-DIFFERENCES ON SPANISH POLICY
IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CPSU
-THE 'BLACK NATION' IN AMERICA
CONCLUSION
Brief Introduction:
The Stalin Society was formed on the initiative
of Bill Bland, when he circulated a note suggesting that this would
be a timely step; coming upon the open embrace of capital by Gorbachev.
With this, the revisionist "official" soviet parties were manifestly crumbling.
His intent was an open broad front organisation
- open to all who call themselves Marxist-Leninists. Given the later development
of the hijacking of the society for sectarian ends, he and the CL were
forced to write this critique.
It is noteworthy that subsequently, in order to
further enable themselves to 'safely' and 'constitutionally' expel
Bill Bland for his insistence on an open and non-sectarian conduct
and debate within the society, the hijackers led by the husband and wife
team of the Majids - cancelled all overseas subscriptions.
It should not be thought that the contents of this
exposure of the manoeuvres of the Stalin Society are of purely historic
interest. The critique contained here-in, centres on two aspects
that the world-wide Marxist-Leninist movement is still coming to grips
with.
One is the content of Maoism;
The second is the nature and development of the
revisionist blocs inside the USSR and the Comintern.
It is for these reasons that at this stage Alliance
feels it - once more a timely - exposure.
Alliance Marxist-Leninist (North America); June
2002.
MORE ON THE FIFTH COLUMN IN
THE STALIN SOCIETY
AT TWO OF ITS MEETINGS THIS AUTUMN, THE STALIN SOCIETY
HAS HEARD TWO CONSECUTIVE TALKS - BY ADOLFO OLAECHEA AND HARRY POWELL RESPECTIVELY
-- IN DEFENCE OF MAOISM.
ADOLFO OLAECHEA AND DIMITROV
In September, Adolfo Olaechea of the Committee Sol Peru,
speaking to the Society on fascism, assessed Dimitrov as a:
" . . . proletarian leader",
(Adolfo Olaechea: 'Fascism: The Old and the New, and the Revolutionary
Tasks of the Proletariat'; 1994; p. 12).
As:
"the guide of the class",
(Adolfo Olaechea: ibid,; p. 12).
and implied that those who criticised the role of Dimitrov
-- such as the Communist League -- formed a:
". . . detachment of the bourgeoisie within the ranks of the proletariat".
(Adolfo Olaechea: ibid.; p. 12).
But the question of whether Dimitrov was, or was
not, a Marxist-Leninist is not 'a matter of opinion'. It is determined
by objective facts and Marxist-Leninist analysis of those facts.
Genuine Marxist-Leninists accept the classical formula
that socialism cannot be established in a modern capitalist country
through parliament, but only by means of a revolution:
"The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery,
and wield it for its own purposes".
(Friedrich Engels: Preface to the English Edition of 1888: Karl Marx
& Friedrich Engels: 'Manifesto of the Communist Party', in: Karl Marx:
'Selected Works', Volume 1; London; 1943; p. 203).
"The substitution of the proletarian state for the bourgeois state is
impossible without a violent revolution".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The State and Revolution: The Marxist Doctrine
of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution;' (August
1917), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 7; London; 1946; p. 21).
"Can such a radical transformation of the old bourgeois order be achieved
without a violent revolution, without the dictatorship of the proletariat?
Obviously not. To think that such a revolution can be carried out peacefully,
within the framework of bourgeois democracy . . ., means that one has either
gone out of one's mind and lost normal human understanding, or has grossly
and openly repudiated the proletarian revolution".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Concerning Questions of Leninism' (January 1926),
in: 'Works', Volume 8; Moscow; 1954; p. 25).
HERE, THEN, LIES A DECISIVE LINE OF DEMARCATION
BETWEEN GENUINE AND SPURIOUS MARXISM-LENINISM.
We call the latter 'revisionism' because its proponents
have 'revised' Marxism-Leninism so as to remove its essential revolutionary
core, so as to make it serve as a means to deceive the working class, so
as to transform it into an ideology serving the interests of the capitalist
class.
Where does Dimitrov stand in relation to this demarcation
line?
In March 1946, ten years before Nikita Khrushchev
put forward the revisionist concept of the peaceful, parliamentary transition
to socialism at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, we find Dimitrov saying:
"In certain conditions, socialism may be attained without an uprising.
These conditions now exist".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The Young Workers' League must be a School of
Socialism,' (Mar h 1946) in 'Selected Works' Volume 2 Sofia 1967; p. 195).
Thus, reality demands that we characterise Dimitrov as one of the pioneers
of open revisionism in the international communist movement.
In September 1994, members of the Stalin Society Ivor
and Florence Kenna published an open letter criticising our characterisation
of Dimitrov as a revisionist as a:
" . . . libel".
(Ivor & Florence Kenna: 'An Open Letter to the Communist League'
(September 1994).
But a libel is a defamatory statement which is untrue,
and we have seen above that, on the basis of the facts, Dimitrov was undoubtedly
a pioneer of modern revisionism. We are sorry that the Kennas should have
been unpleasantly:
" . . . surprised".
(Ivor & Florence Kenna: ibid.).
by this fact, but a revolutionary movement can be
built only on the basis of truth, so that truth is sacred and should not
be distorted for any reasou - not even to spare the Kennas a shock to their
prejudices!
In their Open Letter, the Kennas object to a recent
statement by our member Bill Bland to the effect
"that Stalin was in a minority on the Central Committee of the CPSU
in the years before his death in 1953".
(Ivor & Florence Kenna: ibid.).
and to a statement in our journal 'Compass':
"that the Communist International was revisionist-led".
(Ivor & Florence Kenna: ibid.).
in its later years.
But if Stalin and the other Marxist-Leninists were
not in a minority in the leadership of the Communist International
and the Soviet Communist Party in the years before his death, it is necessary
to find alternative coherent explanations for facts such as the
following:
1) that Stalin's previously frequent contributions to debates in the
Communist International ceased in 1927;
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Works', Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. x).
2) that publication of Stalin's 'Works' in the Soviet Union ceased
in 1949 -- four years before his death -- with Volume 13 (covering
the period to January 1934), whereas 16 volumes had originally been announced
by the Central Committee of the CPSU;
(Preface to the Works of J. V. Stalin, in: 'Works', Volume 1; Moscow;
1952; p. xiii-xiv).
3) that Stalin was demoted in October 1952, well before his death,
from the leading post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of
the CPSU to that of one of several secretaries:
"After the 11th Party Congress, on April 3 1922 the Plenum of the Central
Committee, on V. I. Lenin's motion, elected Stalin as the Secretary-General
of the Central Committee of the Party; Stalin served in this post until
October 1952, and from then until the end of his life he was Secretary
of the Central Committee".
('Entsiklopedichesky Slovar' (Encyclopaedic Dictionary), Volume 3;
Moscow; 1955; p. 310).
That Stalin was in a minority in the leadership of the
CPSU and the Comintern does not necessarily imply, as the Kennas allege:
". . . either that the . . . policies of the CPSU were revisionist
or that they were imposed by Stalin in defiance of Party discipline".
(Ivor & Flo Kenna: ibid.).
It implies merely that the majority of the leaders were
either concealed revisionist conspirators or people who could from time
to time be persuaded to support revisionist policies.
It implies that revisionists in leading positions
in the CPSU and the Comintern were able, from time to time, to divert the
policy of these bodies, against Stalin's opposition, from correct Marxist-Leninist
principles.
Let us take, for reasons of space, just one example:
the character of the Second World War at its inception.
According to Stalin, the Second World War was, from
its inception, an anti-fascist war of liberation on the part of- the democratic
capitalist powers:
"The Second World War against the Axis powers, unlike the First World
War, assumed from the very outset the character of an anti-fascist war,
a war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was to restore democratic
liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the Axis
powers could only augment -- and really did augment -- the anti-fascist
and liberating character of the Second World War".
(Josef V. Stalin: Speech at Election Meeting (February 1946), in: 'Works',
Volume 16; London; 1986; p. 72).
However, after the Second World War broke out on 3 September
1939, it was almost two months before the Communist International, in an
article entitled 'The War and The Working Class' signed by Georgi Dimitrov,
published an analysis of the character of the war. This time delay gives
some indication of the intensity of the internal ideological struggle that
raged on this issue. However, the CI rejected Stalin's analysis of the
war, which it assessed as:
". . . on the part of both sides, an imperialist, unjust war".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: 'The War and the Working' (November 1939), in:
Jane Degras (Ed.): 'The Communist International: 1919-1943: Documents",
Volume 3; London; 1965; p. 449).
As:
" . a direct continuation of the struggle between the imperialist Powers
for a new repartition of the earth".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: ibid.; p. 449).
Whereas in Stalin's view the war was objectively a just,
anti-fascist war on the part of the democratic imperialist powers, in Dimitrov's
view this was mere false propaganda and the war was, in fact, one
which the working classes of all countries should oppose:
"Now the ruling classes of Britain and France, who . . . are pursuing
imperialist aims. . . . put forward the slogan of 'Anti-Fascist' war, and
proclaim that their war against Germany is a 'War of Democracy against
Fascism', a war against 'Hitlerism', a war for the freedom of nations.
For the working class there is only one true stand, namely, irreconcilable,
courageous struggle against the imperialist war, primarily in their own
country. . . .
Now the mobilisation of the widest masses for the struggle against
the war already being waged, and for bringing the war to an end, is the
first task of the moment. . . .
The communists can have no united front whatsoever with those in a
common front with the imperialists and support the criminal anti-popular
war. . . .
In the period preceding the war, the Communists strove to bring about
united working-class action by agreements between the Communist and social-democratic
parties. Now such an agreement is no longer thinkable.
The working class is called upon to put an end to the war".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: ibid.; p. 453, 454-55, 456).
Indeed, Dimitrov characterised the democratic imperialist
powers, Britain and France, as greater warmongers than the Fascist powers:
"Previously, the above-mentioned European States were divided into
aggressor and non-aggressor Powers. . . . This difference has disappeared.
What is more it is the British and French imperialists who now come forward
as the most zealous supporters of the continuation and further incitement
of war".
(Georgi M. Dimitrov: ibid.; p. 450-51).
A similar characterisation of the first period of the
Second World War to that made by Dimitrov was made by leadership of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Soviet Premier and Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Molotov told the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 31 October 1939:
"Germany is in the position of a state which is striving for the earliest
ending of the war and for peace, while Britain and France . . . are in
favour of continuing the war and are opposed to the conclusion of peace.
. . .
The ruling circles of Great Britain and France have been lately attempting
to depict themselves as champions of the democratic rights of nations against
Hitlerism. . . . It is . . . not only senseless but criminal to wage such
a war for the 'destruction of Hitlerism', camouflaged as a fight for 'democracy'.
. . .
The present war in Europe . . . is not a fight for democracy.
The imperialist character of this war obvious. . . . One can see from
all this who is interested in this war. Certainly not the working class".
(Vyacheslav M. Molotov: Statement on Soviet Foreign Policy to USSR
Supreme Soviet (October 1939), in: 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume
3; p. 3.780).
This example demonstrates that there were times when
Stalin was in a minority on important questions, and was only able to win
majority support for his views after some years of ideological struggle.
It would be strange if the Kennas -- members of the
Stalin Society -were to claim that in this instance Stalin was grossly
mistaken and the revisionist Dimitrov was correct. But if Stalin was correct
in his analysis of the first period of the Second World War, then Dimitrov's
line was one which objectively held back the progressive war effort of
the democratic imperialist powers and so assisted the war effort of Nazi
Germany.
In any case, it demonstrates beyond doubt that
there were times when Stalin was in a minority in the leadership of the
CPSU and the Comintern.
THE DISSOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL
Kamal Majid has maintained, at several meetings of the
Stalin Society, that there were no significant differences between the
leadership of the Communist International and Stalin, who, he insists,
was effectively 'the leader of the Communist International.
It is true that, at the last Congress of the Comintern
in August 1935, Stalin was elected one of 45 members of the Executive Committee;
but he was not elected one of the seven members of the Secretariat, which
was dominated by revisionists. (Its other members included the revisionists:
Georgi Dimitrov (General Secretary) (Bulgaria), Otto Kuusinen (Finland),
Dmitry Manuilsky (USSR), Andre Marty (France), Wilhelm Pieck (Germany),
Palmiro Togliatti (Italy).
In an effort to support his view, Majid cites the
fact that Stalin endorsed the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943:
"The dissolution of the Communist International is proper and timely".
(Josef V. Stalin: Answer to Reuter's Correspondent (May 1943), in:
'Works', Volume 15; London; 1984; p. 131).
In fact, Stalin's statement on the dissolution of
the Comintern demonstrates well the differences between himself and the
revisionist leadership of the Comintern.
It is important to contrast the reasons given by
the revisionist leadership of the CI for initiating its dissolution with
the reasons given by Stalin for supporting the dissolution.
The revisionist leadership gave two 'reasons' for
the dissolution:
firstly, that the world situation was
now too complicated for an international centre to be able to function,
and such a centre has become a drag on the development of the national
parties:
"Long before the war, it became more and more clear that, with the
inncreasing complications in the internal and international relations of
the various countries, any sort of international centre would encounter
insuperable obstacles in solving the problems facing the movement . .
. The organisational form . . . of the Communist International . . . has
. . . become a drag on the further strengthening of the national working-class
parties".
(Resolution of the ECCI Presidium recommending the Dissolution of the
Communist International (May 1943), in: Jane Degras (Ed.): op. cit., Volume
3; p. 477).
secondly, that the political maturity
of the national parties and their leaders had made an international centre
unnecessary. The decision had been made, declared the Presidium of the
ECCI:
". . . taking into account the growth and political maturity of the
communist parties and their leading cadres in the separate countries".
(Resolution of the ECCI Presidium recommending the Dissolution of the
Communist International (May 1943), in: Jane Degras (Ed.): ibid., Volume
3; p. 479).
Stalin could not but reject this obviously false analysis.
At the same time, as a profound Marxist-Leninist he could not oppose
the dissolution of the Communist International because it was revisionist-led
and so no, longer served the interests of the world's working class.
But, as a profound Marxist-Leninist, he supported the dissolution of the
Comintern in order that he might take the initiative in replacing it
by a new organisation that would be led by Marxist-Leninists.
However, as a loyal Marxist-Leninist Stalin was bound
by the principles of democratic centralism, and could not directly express
the real reasons for his support of the dissolution of the Communist International.
In his reply, therefore, Stalin gave four reasons
for his support of the dissolution of the Communist International, but
these boil down to one. The dissolution, he said,
". . . will result in a further strengthening of the United Front of
the Allies and other united nations in their fight for victory over Hitlerite
tyranny".
(Josef V. Stalin: Answer to Reuter's Correspondent (May 1943), in:
'Works', Volume 15; London; 1984; p. 132).
Stalin was obviously saying that the dissolution was
a concession to the Western, imperialist powers. But we know that
Stalin clearly held that concessions to imperialism which were contrary
to the interests of the world working class would constitute impermissible
opportunism:
"STALIN: America demands that we renounce in principle the policy of
supporting the emancipation movement in other countries, and says that
if we made this concession everything would go smoothly. Well, what do
you say, comrades? Perhaps we should make this concession?
CHORUS OF SHOUTS: No! . .
STALIN: We cannot agree to these or similar concessions without being
false to ourselves". (Josef V. Stalin: Report to the Active of the Moscow
Organisation of the CPSUM (April 1928), in: 'Works', Volume 11; Moscow;
1954; p. 59. 60).
Thus, in approving the dissolution of the Communist
International, Stalin was clearly, if obliquely, expressing the view
that this organisation no longer served the interests of the world working
class so that its dissolution, while a concession to imperialism, was not
an opportunist concession.
Perhaps one may argue that Stalin should not have
accepted Party discipline on such an important question, should have made
his views known directly. But a Marxist-Leninist in a party which claims
to be Marxist-Leninist is justified in breaching the discipline of that
party only when he is satisfied not merely that the majority view on a
question of principle is wrong, but that there is negligible chance
of correcting the situation.
In the case of the decision to abolish the Communist
International, the Marxist-Leninists in the CPSU were able to correct the
situation by initiating, only three years later in 1946, the formation
of a new International -- the Communist Information Bureau or 'Cominform'
under new Marxist-Leninist leadership -- which proceeded to expose and
fight revisionism, notably in such countries as France, Italy and Yugoslavia.
Thus, Stalin dissociated himself in action from the
revisionist views both that the situation was now too complicated for an
international Marxist-Leninist organisation to operate, and that such an
organisation was unnecessary because of the 'political maturity' of the
national parties.
MAO -- DEFENDER OF STALIN?
In his talk to the Stalin Society in October, Adolfo
Olaechea stated that:
"The Communist Party of China under his (Mao's -- Ed.) personal leadership
was the most staunch defender of the historical role of Comrade Stalin".
(Adolfo Olaechea: op. cit.; p. 18).
In fact, after the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February
1956 the Communist Party of China's assessment of Stalin was little different
from that of Soviet revisionist leader Nikita Khrushchev:
"Stalin erroneously exaggerated his own role and counter-posed his
individual authority to the collective leadership, and as a result certain
of his actions were opposed to certain fundamental Marxist-Leninist concepts.
. . .
When any leader of the Party or the state places himself over and above
the Party and the masses, . . . he ceases to have an all-round, penetrating
insight into the affairs of the state. As long as this was the case, .
. . Stalin could not avoid making unrealistic and erroneous decisions on
certain matters. . . . During the latter part of his life, Stalin took
more and more pleasure in this cult of the individual and violated the
Party's system of democratic centralism and the principle of combining
collective leadership with individual responsibility. As a result, . .
. he gave certain wrong advice on the international communist movement
and, in particular, made a wrong decision on the question of Yugoslavia.
On these issues, Stalin fell victim to subjectivism and one-sidedness,
and divorced himself from objective reality and from the masses.
The Chinese Communist Party congratulates the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union on its great achievements in this historic struggle against
the cult of the individual".
('On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat'
(April 1956), in: 'Renmin Ribao' (People's Daily)', in: John Gittings:
'Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the
Recent Polemics: 1963-1967"; London; 1968; p. 291-92, 293).
"Stalin made some serious mistakes in regard to the domestic and foreign
policies of the Soviet Union. His arbitrary method of work impaired . .
. the principle of democratic centralism . . . and disrupted part of the
socialist legal system. Because in many fields of work Stalin estranged
himself from the masses . . . and made personal, arbitrary decisions concerning
many important policies, it was inevitable that he should have made grave
mistakes. . . . He wronged many local communists and honest citizens, and
this caused serious losses. . . . Sometimes he even intervened mistakenly,
with many grave consequences, in the internal affairs of certain brother
countries and parties. . . .
Some of the mistakes made by Stalin during the latter years of his
life became serious, nationwide and persistent, and were not corrected
in time. . . .
Stalin's mistakes did harm to the Soviet Union which could have been
avoided. . . .
Stalin . . . committed the serious mistake of violating socialist democracy.
. . .
Stalin displayed certain great-nation chauvinist tendencies in relations
with brother parties and countries".
('More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat'
(December 1956), in: 'Renmin Ribao' (People's Daily), in: John Gittings:
ibid.; p. 298, 300, 301, 302, 303).
And in April 1956 Mao himself wrote:
"Stalin's mistakes amounted to . . . 30% of the whole. Stalin did a
number of wrong things in connection with China. The Left adventurism pursued
by Wang Ming in the latter part of . . . the Second Revolutionary Civil
War period and his Right opportunism in the early days of the War of Resistance
against Japan can both be traced to Stalin".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Ten Major Relationships' (April 1956), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 304).
It will be seen that the Communist Party of China's
assessment of Stalin was incorrect and basically little different from
that put forward by the Soviet revisionists.
Olaechea's statement that:
"The Communist Party of China under his (Mao's -- Ed.) personal leadership
was the most staunch defender of the historical role of Comrade Stalin"
(Adolfo Olaechea: op. cit.; p. 18).
is clearly false.
THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS IN COLONIAL-TYPE COUNTRIES
Mao Tse-tung agrees with Lenin and Stalin that in a
colonial-type country such as China, the revolutionary process has to pass
through two successive stages: the stage of democratic revolution
and the stage of socialist revolution:
"The Chinese revolutionary movement . . . embraces two stages, i.e.,
the democratic and the socialist revolutions. The second process can be
carried through only after the first has been completed".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party'
(December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 330).
In November 1994, Harry Powell addressed the Stalin
Society on 'Mao Tsetung -- Revisionist or Revolutionary?'. He told the
Society that our member Bill Bland in his paper entitled 'The Revolutionary
Process in Colonial-Type Countries' read to the Marxist-Leninist seminar
in London in July 1993 had 'agreed with Trotsky in rejecting the two-stage
theory of the revolutionary process in colonial-type countries'.
This allegation is quite false.
Bill Bland said:
"Trotskyism …… rejects as ‘counter-revolutionary opportunism’
the Marxist-Leninist strategy of stages in the revolutionary process
in colonial-type countries".
(Bill Bland: 'The Revolutionary Process in Colonial-Type Countries'
London; 1993; p.5)
MAOIST 'PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM'
But in regard to the second stage of the revolutionary
process, Mao Tse-tung deviates from Lenin and Stalin. The latter insist
that the socialist stage of the revolutionary process involves a fierce
class struggle against the bourgeoisie:
"The substitution of the proletarian state for the bourgeois state
is impossible without a violent revolution".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The State and Revolution: The Marxist Doctrine
of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution' (August/September
1917), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 7; London; 1946; p. 21).
"Can the capitalists be ousted without a fierce class struggle?
No, they cannot. . . .
There have been no cases in history where the dying bourgeoisie has
not exerted all its remaining strength to preserve its existence".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'The Right Deviation in the CPSU (b)' (April 1929),
in: 'Works', Volume 12; Moscow; 1955; p. 34, 40).
While Lenin and Stalin present the second (socialist)
stage of the revolutionary process as one of struggle against the national
bourgeoisie, Mao Tse-tung maintains that the contradiction between the
working class and the national bourgeoisie in China is a contradiction
'among the people' which can be 'resolved peacefully' because
the Chinese national capitalists are willing to accept socialist transformation':
"In our country the contradiction between the working class and the
national bourgeoisie comes under the category of contradictions among the
people. . . . In the period of the socialist revolution, exploitation of
the working class for profit constitutes one side of the character of the
national bourgeoisie, while . . . its willingness to accept socialist transformation
constitutes the other. . . . The contradiction between the national bourgeoisie
and the working class is one between exploiter and exploited. . . . But
in the concrete conditions of China, this antagonistic contradiction between
the two classes, if properly handled can . . . be resolved by peaceful
methods".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the
People' (February 1957) in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p.
386).
Mao goes on to explain that by the 'correct handling'
of the contradiction -- handling which can bring about its 'peaceful resolution'
-he means the:
"ideological remoulding"
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid.; p. 403).
of the national bourgeoisie.
But this conception of the bourgeoisie being 'ideologically
remoulded' into 'willingness to accept socialism' and so refraining from
class struggle against it is clearly analogous to the thesis of the revisionist
Nikolay Bukharin of the Russian capitalists 'growing into socialism'. On
this conception Stalin comments:
Lenin and Stalin maintain that the construction of socialism
is impossible without the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat:
"The transition from capitalism to communism will certainly create
a great variety and abundance of political forms, but in essence there
will inevitably be only one: the dictatorship of the proletariat".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The State and Revolution: The Marxist Doctrine
of the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution' (August
1917), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 7; London; 1946; p. 34).
"The revolution will be unable to crush the resistance of the bourgeoisie,
to maintain its victory and to push forward too the final victory of socialism
unless . . . it creates a special organ in the form of the dictatorship
of the proletariat as its principal mainstay".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'The Foundations of Leninism' (April/May 1924), in:
'Works', Volume 6; Moscow; 1953; p. 112).
Olaechea states:
"The Communist Party of China under his (Mao's -- Ed.) personal leadership
was the most staunch defender of . . . the dictatorship of the proletariat".
(Adolfo Olaechea: op. cit.; p. 18).
This claim is false.
Mao Tse-tung insists that the goal for progressive
people in all colonial-type countries should be the establishment, not
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but of the joint dictatorship
of several anti-imperialist classes, including the national bourgeoisie:
"The new-democratic revolution . . . is developing in all other colonial
and semi-colonial countries as well as in China. . . . Politically, it
strives for the joint dictatorship of the revolutionary classes".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party
(December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2;
Peking; 1965; p.
Mao calls the national bourgeoisie of a colonial-type
country the 'middle bourgeoisie':
"The middle bourgeoisie constitutes the national bourgeoisie as distinct
from the comprador class".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United
Front' (March 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking' 1865; p. 423).
-- the comprador class being that section of the bourgeoisie
closely linked and dependent upon foreign imperialism.
The classes said to share power in this 'new-democratic'
joint dictatorship include the national bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie
and even that section of the landlord class which is willing to participate
in the new democratic state (i. e., that section which Mao calls 'the
enlightened gentry'):
"Places in the organs of political power should be allocated as follows:
one-third to . . . the proletariat and the poor peasantry; one third to
. . . the petty-bourgeoisie, and the remaining one-third to . . the middle
bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United
Front' (March 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking' 1865; p. 427).
This 'new-democratic republic' thus admittedly differs
from the dictatorship of the proletariat:
"The new-democratic republic will be . . . different from the socialist
republic of the Soviet type under the dictatorship of the proletariat".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On New Democracy' (January 1940), in: 'Selected Works',
Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 350).
It is characterised as 'a state of the whole people':
"Our state is a people's democratic dictatorship. . . . . The aim of
this dictatorship is to protect all our people".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the
People' (February 1957) in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p.
387).
Far from suppressing the Chinese bourgeoisie, the 'new-democratic
republic' will permit its political parties to exist over a long period
of time:
"Why should the bourgeois and petty bourgeois democratic parties be
allowed to exist . . . over a long period of time? . . . Because it is
. . the policy of the Communist Party".
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid,.; p. 413).
and will permit the Chinese bourgeoisie freely to express
its ideoology:
"It is inevitable that the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie will give
expression to their own ideologies. It is inevitable that they will stubbornly
assert themselves on political and ideological questions by every possible
means. You cannot expect them, to do otherwise. We should not use the method
of suppression and prevent them from expressing themselves, but should
allow them to do so".
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid.; p. 411).
Indeed, Mao demands that the Communist Party, in this
'people's democratic dictatorship', should adopt a policy of 'free competition'
in all fields, including that of political ideology:
"What should our policy be towards non-Marxist ideas? . . . Will it
do to ban such ideas and deny them any opportunity for expression? Certainly
not. . . .
Literally, the two slogans -- let a hundred flowers blossom and let
a hundred schools of thought contend -- have no class character: the proletariat
can turn them to account, and so can the bourgeoisie".
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid.; p. 410, 412).
Far from suppressing the Chinese bourgeoisie, the 'new-democratic
state' will permit its political parties to exist over a long period of
time:
"Why should the bourgeois and petty bourgeois democratic parties be
allowed to exist . . . over a long period of time? . . . Because it is
the policy of the Communist Party to exist side by side with the democratic
parties for a long time to come".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the
People' (February 1957) in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p.
413).
Certainly, Mao speaks of the importance of:
"the leadership of the Communist Party".
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid.; p. 412).
but in the new-democratic republic this leadership is
to be shared with the bourgeois parties on the basis of 'mutual supervision':
"Mutual supervision . . . means that the Communist Party can exercise
supervision over the democratic parties, and vice versa. Why should the
democratic parties be allowed to exercise supervision over the Communist
Party? . . . Supervision over the Communist Party is mainly exercised by
the working people and the Party membership. But it augments the benefit
to us to have supervision by the democratic parties too".
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid.; p. 414).
MAOIST 'SOCIALISM'
The Chinese revisionists' conception of 'socialism'
is one in which only the enterprises of the comprador capitalists
are nationalised, while 'those of the national capitalists are gradually
and peacefully transformed into ‘socialist' enterprises in alliance with
the national bourgeoisie, through state capitalism, using the machinery
of the 'new-democratic state'':
" In our country . . . . . we can proceed with our step by step socialist
transformation by means of the existing machinery of state. . . . . We
have in our country a relationship of alliance between the working class
and the national bourgeoisie. . . .
The socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce by
the state will be gradually realised over a relatively long period of time,
through various forms of state capitalism. . . .
The aim can be achieved through peaceful struggle".
(Liu Shao-chi: Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic
of China at the First National People's Congress of the PRC (September
1954); Peking; 1962; p. 27).
"Under the conditions existing in our country, the use of peaceful means,
i.e., the method of persuasion and education, can change capitalist ownership
into socialist ownership".
(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at Supreme State Conference (January 1956), in:
Kuan Ta-tung: 'The Socialist Transformation of Capitalist Industry and
Commerce in China'; Peking; 1960; p 40-41).
The method of transforming the enterprises of the Chinese
national capitalists into 'socialist' enterprises was through the formation
of joint state-private enterprises:
"The advanced form of state capitalism in China is called a joint state-private
enterprise. This is the principal way through which the transformation
of capitalist industry and commerce into socialist enterprises is being
effected.
A joint state-private enterprise is one in which the state invests
and to which it assigns personnel to share in management with the capitalists.
. . .
A fixed rate of interest was paid by the state for the total investment
of the capitalists in the joint state-private enterprises.
The interest was fixed at 5% per annum".
(Kuan Ta-tung: ibid,; p. 75, 84., 86-87).
The Chinese national capitalists not only had no objection
to this form of socialist transformation, they welcomed it:
"Why were there increasing numbers of capitalists who petitioned of
their own free will to have their enterprises changed over to joint state-private
operation? . . . The statistics of 64 factories in various parts of China
which had gone over to joint operation earlier than others revealed that
their profits were increasing. Taking their profit in 1950 as 100, it was
. . . 306 in 1953. . . . The capitalists paraded with the beating of cymbals
and drums, while sending in their petitions for the change-over of their
enterprises".
(Kuan Ta-tung: ibid.; p. 78-79, 84).
The completion in 1956 of this programme of formation
of joint-state private enterprises was later portrayed by the Chinese revisionists
as 'the completion of the socialist revolution':
while the new-democratic state (previously defined as
the state of 'a class alliance which included the national bourgeoisie')
was now portrayed as a state of 'the dictatorship of the proletariat',
as 'socialist state power':
"The dictatorship of the proletariat in our country rests on firm foundations
and our socialist state power is unshakeable".
(Chou En-lai: op. cit.; p. 28).
But behind this false facade of 'socialism', as Mao
himself admits, the reality was that the Chinese national bourgeoisie continued
to exploit the working class: 15
Most systems of religious belief are based on writings
regarded as ‘sacred', and most of these were written long ago. But as man's
knowledge of the universe increases, it is discovered that these ancient
writings appear to conflict with fact.
In this situation, some people realise that their
religious belief was mere superstition and become atheists. Of those who
retain their religious belief, some insist that the writings, being sacred,
are infallibly true, so that their appearance of falsity must be a mere
illusion: we call such people fundamentalists; others admit that
the writings cannot be accepted as literal truth, but can be accepted as
allegorical truth: we call such people modernists.
Maoism has its fundamentalists and its modernists.
As history made Maoism untenable except to those
whose prejudices overrode their reason, genuine materialists came to realise
that Maoism was merely a brand of revisionism. Among other Maoists, Fundamentalist
and Modernist trends appeared.
Adolfo Olaechea belongs to the Fundamentalist
wing of Maoism. Like the well-meaning young people of twenty-five years
ago who could be seen on demonstrations waving Mao's 'Little Red Book'
like a holy symbol, Olaechea still insists that:
"Maoism is the Marxism-Leninism, of our era".
(Adolfo Olaechea: op. cit.; p. 30).
And whereas, as we have seen, the facts show that Maoism
itself is a form of revisionism serving the interests of national bourgeoisies
in colonial-type countries, the Maoist fundamentalist Olaechea clings to
the illusion that:
". . . THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA, LED BY CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG,
UNMASKED AND SMASHED MODERN REVISIONISM",
(Adolfo Olaechea: op. cit.; p. 16).
Harry Powell, who spoke at the November meeting
of the Stalin Society, is on the other hand a Modernist Maoist.
Powell made no bones about admitting that Dimitrov
had been a thorough-going revisionist and even admitted that Mao had been
a revisionist 'to some extent'.
This view of Mao was expressed in May 1981 in a joint
'Defence of Mao' put forward by three German organisations.
Their declaration agreed that the writings of Mao Tse-tung:
". . . prior to 1966 do not make clear that the transition from the
democratic revolution to the socialist revolution must be politically in
line with the transition from the dictatorship of all anti-imperialist
and anti-feudal classes and forces to the dictatorship of the proletariat.
It is clear … that he even regarded as possible the construction of socialism
in political alliance with the bourgeoisie. All these views are incompatible
with the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and in fact they represent support
for the Khrushchevite revisionists in establishing the idea of class collaboration
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the international communist
movement. . . . . . .
Mao Tse-tung upheld various seriously revisionist positions".
(JOINT DECLARATION OF 'ROTE FAHNE' (Red Flag), 'WESTBERLINER KOMMUNIST'
(The West Berlin Communist) and 'GEGEN DIE STROMUNG' (Against the Current),
in: 'Compass', No. 114 (July 1994); p. 4, 10).
Despite these severe strictures, the German organisations,
like Harry Powell, seek to defend Mao as a 'Marxist-Leninist' by suggesting
that the 'Cultural Revolution' which he initiated in the 1960s 'seems to
have been an attempt to correct some of his errors':
"To make a correct evaluation of Mao Tse-tung, it is essential to analyse
his role in the Cultural Revolution and his struggle with Teng Hsaio-ping
before his death. It seems that Mao Tse-tung recognised some of his errors
in this period and tried to correct them".
(JOINT DECLARATION: ibid.; p. 10).
Certainly the 'Cultural Revolution' was fought out under
anti-revisionist slogans:
"The official explanation of the cultural revolution is that it was
the final battle in a long-term struggle between two lines: the correct
Maoist line and the revisionist line upheld by 'China's Khrushchev', .
. . . Liu Shao-chi".
(Roderick Macfarquahar: 'The Origins of the Cultural Revolution', Volume
1; London; 1974; p. 2).
However, the true character of the 'Cultural Revolution'
has been brilliantly analysed by the Albanian Marxist-Leninist Enver
Hoxha:
"The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was neither a revolution,
nor great, nor cultural, and, in particular, not in the least proletarian".
(Enver Hoxha: 'Imperialism and the Revolution' (April 1978), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 5; Tirana; 1985; p. 655).
According to Hoxha, it was a struggle between two revisionist
factions within the Chinese Communist Party -- headed respectively by Mao
Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi:
"The Chinese 'Cultural Revolution' was a factional fight between the
group of Mao and that of Liu Shao-chi. Neither the working class . . .
nor the peasantry . . . took part in it".
(Enver Hoxha: 'The Chinese Strategy is suffering Fiasco' (December
1976), in: 'Reflections on China', Volume 2; Tirana; p. 391).
At the time of the onset of the 'Cultural Revolution',
the leadership of the the Communist Party of China was pursuing an anti-imperialist
political line, directed in particular against US imperialism:
"US imperialism is the chief bulwark of world reaction and an international
gendarme..
The international proletariat must and can . . . establish the broadest
united front against the US imperialists and their lackeys".
(Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Letter in Reply
to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union of March 30, 1963 (June 1963), in: 'A Proposal concerning the General
Line of the International Communist Movement'; Peking; 1963; p. 12).
In 1966, the Party and state machinery of China were
dominated by the anti-American faction headed by Liu Shao-chi:
"The Party had slipped from his (Mao's -- Ed.) grasp. Everything there
was in the grip of the General Office, which Liu Shao-chi had firmly in
his grasp".
(Enver Hoxha: 'What is the General Office in China?' (September 1977),
in: op. cit.; p. 621).
However, the faction headed by Mao, which had become:
"the pro-American faction",
(Enver Hoxha: 'It seems that the Pro-American Faction will triumph'
(January 1977), in: op. cit.; p. 400).
". . . wanted to establish links with the Americans. . . . . This
is how the 'Cultural Revolution' began".
(Enver Hoxha: 'Chinese Puzzle, Maoist Confusion' (February 1976), in:
ibid.; p, 225).
In these circumstances:
" . . . Mao was left with only one course: he had to seize power again.
In order to do this, he had to rely on the 'romantic' youth who 'worshipped'
Mao, and on Lin Piao, whom he made his deputy -- that is, he had to rely
on the army".
(Enver Hoxha: 'Neither the Party nor the State of the Proletariat are
operating in China' (June 1970), in: ibid.; p. 254-55).
In the course of this 'Cultural Revolution':
"the Party was liquidated".
(Enver Hoxha: 'The Chinese are not propagating the Correct Line of
our Party' (January 1976), in: ibid.; p. 209).
Thus, in no way can the 'Cultural Revolution' be
considered as an attempt by Mao to correct his revisionist mistakes. It
was a factional struggle between the anti-US faction within the Party headed
by Liu Shao-chi and the pro-US faction headed by Mao Tse-tung. The victory
of the latter was followed by Nixon's visit to China, Chinese support for
the Shah of Iran and the US backed FNLA/UNITA in Angola, the Chinese loan
to the Chilean junta of Pinochet, etc.
So, if we judge Maoism on the basis of facts and
not on that of mere prejudice and wishful thinking, it is clear that MAOISM
IS A BRAND OF REVISIONISM DESIGNED TO SERVE THE NATIONAL CAPITALISTS OF
COLONIAL-TYPE COUNTRIES BY CHECKING THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS AT THE STAGE
OF NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION AND PREVENTING IT FROM GOING FORWARD
TO THE STAGE OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTION.
Olaechea calls for the reconstitution of a genuine Communist
Party in each country:
"The question is to reorganise and reconstitute it (the Communist Party
--Ed.)".
(Adolfo Olaechia: op. cit.; p. 31).
He admits that the old international communist movement
was split or liquidated by revisionists:
"The revisionists . . . ended by splitting or liquidating a great portion
of the workers' movement. . . .
Many Communist Parties have been divided, politically and organisationally
disarmed, by revisionism".
(Adolfo Olaechia: op. cit.; p. 15, 26).
Even in China, admits Olaechea:
"The revisionist clique of Teng Hsaio-ping … sold .. the country to
foreign monopoly capital". (Adolfo Olaechia: op. cit.; p. 20).
One might, therefore, suppose that Olaechea would agree
with what has been the aim of the Communist League since its foundation,
namely:
". . . to establish in Britain a Marxist-Leninist Party of the working
class free of all revisionist trends".
(Communist League: Aims).
Nothing of the sort!
Such an aim, he declares, is as futile as a search
for the Holy Grail!
"There are some people who say: 'We must forge a Party free of any
opportunist or revisionist tendencies.’ These gentlemen would be better
served in seeking the Holy Grail. In our world, things of such purity do
not exist and cannot exist".
(Adolfo Olaechea: op. cit.; p. 31-32).
Why, in Olaechea's opinion, can a Party free of revisionism
not exist?
Because, he says:
" . . . as soon as a form of revisionism or opportunist trend is overcome,
the same tendencies reappear under new guises".
(Adolfo Olaechea: op. cit.; p. 32).
We can certainly agree that if a Marxist-Leninist Party
has been formed which is initially free of opportunist and revisionist
trends, the struggle against opportunist and revisionist elements must
be continued in such a way that the Party is purged of such elements:
"The Party becomes strong by purging itself of opportunist elements".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'The Foundations of Leninism' (April/May 1924), in:
'Works’, Volume 6; Moscow; 1953; p. 193).
But since Olaechea denies the possibility of creating
a Marxist-Leninist Party which is even initially free of opportunist
or revisionist trends, he sees it as a party which includes opportunists
and revisionists, and in which genuine Marxist-Leninists carry on a
struggle against opportunism and revisionism within the Party. Indeed,
he goes so far as to say that this internal struggle is essential to
the Party's development:
"This principle applies even to the most Bolshevik-like Communist Party,
where the two-line struggle is precisely the motor that impels its development
and . . . without which it would come to an end".
(Adolfo Olaechea: op. cit.; p. 32).
What do Lenin and Stalin say about allowing opportunists
and revisionists into the Party?
"Bolshevism would not have defeated the bourgeoisie in 1917-19 if before
that, in 1903-17, it had not learned to defeat the Mensheviks. i.e., the
opportunists, . . . and ruthlessly expel them from the party of the proletarian
vanguard".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The Constituent Assembly Elections and the Dictatorship
of the Proletariat' (December 1919), in: 'Collected Works', Volume 30;
Moscow; 1974; p. 275).
"Petty-bourgeois groups penetrate into the Party and introduce into
it the spirit of hesitancy and opportunism. . . . To fight imperialism
with such 'allies' in one's rear means to put oneself in the position of
being caught between two fires, from the front and from the rear. Therefore,
ruthless struggle against such elements, their expulsion from the Party,
is a pre-requisite for the successful struggle against imperialism.
The theory of 'defeating' opportunist elements by ideological struggle
within the Party, the theory of 'overcoming' these elements within the
confines of a single party, is a rotten and dangerous theory. . . . Our
Party . . . could not have emerged victorious from the civil war if it
had had within its ranks people like Martov and Dan, Potresov and Axelrod".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'The Foundations of Leninism' (April/May 1924), in:
'Works', Volume 6'; Moscow; 1953; p. 192).
Whatever monstrosity might emerge from Olaechea's proposals,
it can clearly be nothing remotely resembling a Marxist-Leninist Party.
THE TACTICS OF BROAD FRONT WORK
A broad front is an organisation of people who agree
to campaign on the objective of the broad front, in spite of differences
they may have on other questions.
The Stalin Society is a broad front organisation of people who agree
that Stalin was a great Marxist-Leninist and who agree to campaign in
defence of Stalin in spite of differences they may have on other questions.
Members of a broad front who genuinely support its
aims naturally work to expand its membership and influence as widely as
possible. On the other hand, fifth columnists within the broad front, who
wish to sabotage its aims, generally act under the cloak of pseudo-leftism,
striving to erect sectarian barriers within the front on questions other
than those embodied in the aims of the broad front.
Over two years ago, Kamal Majid, husband of the present
Secretary of the Stalin Society, Cathie Majid -- speaking at a conference
in the name of the Stalin Society -- said:
"The Stalin Society is open to everyone. But of course we don't expect
you to come in without criticising yourselves. . . . Trotskyists, Khrushchevites
or Brezhnevites . . . have to criticise themselves first. They have to
criticise their past, and then we will accept them as . . . members of
the Stalin Society".
(Kamal Majid: Statement in Name of Stalin Society at International
Marxist Convention, May 1992).
This declaration, like so many of the Majids' utterances,
is devoid of any truth. At no time has it been the policy of the Stalin
Society that people who wish to join the Society must undertake a criticism
of their past before they can be accepted as members.
What is the effect of Majid's false statement?
Most people who now support Stalin, or who will come
to support him in the future, have in the past accepted some of the bourgeois,
Trotskyist or revisionist slanders about Stalin. Neither the Stalin Society,
nor the Marxist-Leninist movement, can be built only from people who have
never for a moment been misled by such slanders. To claim, even though
falsely, that such people must pass a 'purification' test in a manner acceptable
to the Majidist fifth column, is to seek to place barriers between the
Stalin Society and tens of thousands of honest potential members.
Yet at meeting after meeting of the Stalin Society
the Chairman, the Maoist Wilf Dixon, has permitted Kamal Majid to attack
the New Communist Party as 'traitors'.
In May of this year, the General Secretary of the
New Communist Party. Eric Trevett, wrote in the party's paper:
"I accepted the critique of Stalin in the 20th Congress resolution.
Now I no longer think endorsement of that resolution justifiable".
(Eric Trevett: Stastement in 'New Worker', 27 May 1994).
The New Communist Party is one of the largest of organisations
calling itself Marxist-Leninist, and all who genuinely support the aims
of the Stalin Society cannot but welcome this statement. But at the next
meeting of the Stalin Society, Kamal Majid declared that this statement
made it necessary to attack the New Communist Party harder than ever!
It is clear that the Majidist attacks on the New
Communist Party at meetings of the Stalin Society have no relation whatever
to the aims of the Society.
The Majids are no young inexperienced novices to
the revolutionary movement, and it is clear that in attacking the New Communist
Party, they are indulging in conscious sabotage of the Society.
The Majidists' campaign of disruption is, naturally,
fully supported by the Maoist speakers invited by the Committee to give
talks at the September and November meetings of the Stalin Society. Adolfo
Olaechea said:
"There are some who, 38 years after the 20th Congress, realise that
they ‘can no longer continue upholding it’. That is good but hardly
sufficient. . . .
Such people ought to sit in the dock while the proletariat faces them
with all their failures. They must liquidate all their conduct, all their
line".
(Adolfo Olaechea: op. cit.; p. 28).
In their Open Letter on 'The Stalin Society Dispute',
Ted Talbot and Harry Powell dismiss the case against the Majidist disruptors
as, for the most part:
"trivial";
(Ted Talbot & Harry Powell: 'The Stalin Society Dispute'; p. 1).
and based on:
". . . personal animosities".
(Ted Talbot & Harry Powell: 'The Stalin Society Dispute'; p. 1).
They accuse our member Bill Bland of:
" . . . an amazingly opportunist statement".
(Ted Talbot & Harry Powell: 'The Stalin Society Dispute'; p. 2).
when he says:
"The point is not whether these statements (the attacks on the New
Communist Party -- Ed.) are true or false".
(Bill Bland: 'The Situation in the Stalin Society' (January 1994);l
p. 3).
Although Talbot and Powell cease their quotation at
this point, Bill Bland goes on to say :
"The point is that, even if true, in the context of the Stalin Society,
. . . these statements are divisive and disruptive. They weaken and
hinder the development of the Stalin Society".
(Bill Bland: ibid.; p. 3).
Tony Clark, in an undated Open Letter to members of
the Stalin Society declares that this policy seeks:
" . . . to place certain organisations and their leaders above criticism".
(Tony Clark: Open Letter to Members of the Stalin Society; p. 1).
and that the policy:
"is rooted in opportunism".
(Tony Clark: Open Letter to Members of the Stalin Society; p. 2).
In fact, nothing could be further from the truth than
that we wish to place any organisation or individual 'above criticism'.
We merely maintain that it is wrong and disruptive
to permit attacks on members, or potential members, at meetings of the
Stalin Society on questions unrelated to the aims of the Society.
It needs no advanced level of Marxism-Leninism to
understand that the same statement may be tactically correct in one
set of circumstances, but wrong and counter-productive in another set of
circumstances.
For example, no one was a more consistent opponent
of the treachery of social-democracy than Lenin. At the beginning of 1922,
the Communist International, led by Lenin, was striving to organise a conference
of the three Internationals:
". . . for the sake of achieving possible practical unity of direct
action on the part of the masses".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: Letter to N. I. Bukharin and G. Y. Zinoviev (February
1922),in: 'Collected Works', Volume 42; Moscow; 1969; p. 394).
The fifth columnist Grigory Zinoviev, who later
confessed to treason against the Soviet state and was executed, wrote a
draft resolution on the proposed conference which called social-democratic
leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals 'accomplices of
the world bourgeoisie'. While this characterisation was undoubtedly true,
Lenin objected to it in the resolution concerned on tactical grounds:
"My chief amendment is aimed at deleting the passage which calls the
leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals 'accomplices of
the world bourgeoisie'. You might as well call a man a jackass. It is absolutely
unreasonable to risk wrecking an affair of tremendous practical importance
for the sake of giving oneself the extra pleasure of scolding scoundrels".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: Letter to Members of the Politbureau of the CC,
RCB (b) (23 February 1922), in: 'Collected Works', Volume 42; Moscow; 1969;p.
400-01).
Again, Marxist-Leninists accept that, as a general principle,
it is correct to expose the reactionary role of religion. But an aspiring
Marxist-Leninist who intrudes into a Catholic Church during mass shouting:
'Down with the Pope!' is not acting in accordance with correct Marxist-Leninist
tactics.
In Lenin's words, during a strike:
" . . . atheist propaganda in such circumstances may be both unnecessary
and harmful -- not from the philistine fear of scaring away the backward
sections. . . . but out of consideration for the real progress of the class
struggle, which in the conditions of modern capitalist society will convert
Christian workers to Social-Democracy (i.e., Communism -- Ed.) and to atheism
a hundred times better than bald atheist propaganda. To preach atheism
at such a moment and in such circumstances would only be playing into
the hands of the priest and the priests, who desire nothing better
than that the division of the workers according to their participation
in the strike movement should be replaced by their division according to
their belief in God".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The Attitude of the Workers' Party to Religion'
(May 1909), in: 'Collected Works', Volume 15; Moscow; 1963; p. 40).
Perhaps Clark, Talbot and Powell maintain that Lenin
was an opportunist?
It is true that Marxist-Leninist principles call
for full self-criticism and analysis of a party's mistakes:
"The attitude of a political party toward its own mistakes is one of
the most important and surest criteria of the seriousness of the party
and of how it fulfils in practice its obligations toward its class
and toward the toiling masses. To admit a mistake openly, to disclose
its reasons, to analyse the conditions which gave rise to it, to study
attentively the means of correcting it -- these are the signs of a serious
party".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: "'Left-Wing' Communism: An Infantile Disorder',
((May 1920), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 10;London; 1946; p. 98).
Ivan and Florence Kenna, of the Finsbury Communist Association,
are welcome members of the Stalin Society. We have not the slightest reason
to question the sincerity of their support for Stalin. It is no secret
that the Communist League has had in the past differences with the FCA
-- for example, on the role of Mao Tse-tung. It should be easy for them
to see how tactically incorrect and disruptive it would be for us to attack
them at Stalin Society meetings as 'traitors'!
Indeed, Ivor Kenna has, at a recent meeting of the
Stalin Society, condemned the practice of attacking the New Communist Party
at meetings of the Society. But then, apparently horrified at the prospect
of finding himself acting in concert with the Communist League against
Majidism, he wrote an open letter to fair-minded supporters of the NCP
begging them to get him off the hook by persuading the Party’s leadership
to issue a statement that might be acceptable to the Majidists!
But how the NCP deals with mistakes is a matter
for the NCP and its members; it is in no way a matter for the Stalin
Society, and those who insist on making it one are clearly bent on raising
sectarian barriers against members and potential members of the Stalin
Society, are clearly bent or sabotaging the broad front principles on
which the Stalin Society is based.
THE DEGENERATION OF THE STALIN SOCIETY
The Stalin Society is not a mere discussion group. As
even the Majidists admit, it aims to play a positive role in the formation
of a unified Marxist-Leninist Party in Britain:
"As a non-party organisation, the Stalin Society is proud of its record
in working for communist unity".
(C. & K. Majid: 'Communist Unity'; 1994; p. 25).
But genuine Marxist-Leninists understand that real communist
unity cannot be brought about by the mechanical unification of all organisations
calling themselves 'Marxist-Leninist'. It is first necessary to differentiate
between genuine and spurious Marxist-Leninists. As Lenin said nearly a
hundred years ago:
"Unity . . . cannot be brought about by, let us say, a meeting of representatives
passing a resolution. . . . In the first place, it is necessary to bring
about the unity of ideas which will remove the differences of opinion and
confusion that -- we will be frank reign . . . at the present time, . .
.
Before we can unite and in order that we may unite, we must first of
all firmly and definitely draw the lines of demarcation. . Otherwise our
unity will be merely a fictitious unity, which will conceal the prevailing
confusion and prevent its complete elimination".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: Declaration of the Editorial Board of 'Iskra' (September
1900), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; London; 1944; p. 6).
The official leaflets of the Stalin Society proclaim
that:
" . . the Society provides a platform to individuals and organisations
of different opinions on all aspects of communist activities. Some
ten organisations or parties have members in the Stalin Society". (our
emphasis -- CL).
Thus the Stalin Society makes it clear that it recognises
no questions as taboo.
How, then, should the Stalin Society deal with questions
on which there are known to be disagreements among its members.
Clearly, correct broad front tactics require that
the Society maintain a neutral position on such questions until such
time as it may adopt a position on them. This neutrality requires that,
when such questions are placed on the agenda of a meeting, speakers
are invited from each camp to put forward their rival views on equal terms.
Obviously, where opposing views are held on a question,
one at least must be wrong. If the above principle had been adhered to,
the Society could have played a useful role in enabling its members to
differentiate,on the basis of facts and analysis of the facts, between
a correct and an incorrect line. In this way, the Society could have played
a positive role in the process of building a unified Marxist-Leninist Party.
This was the policy of the Committee of the Society
until it fell victim to Majidist contamination.
It was well-known to the Committee that a number
of members regarded Maoism as a form of revisionism, essentially
no different from the revisionism of Khrushchev except that it is designed
to serve the interests of capitalist classes in colonial-type countries.
Yet, as we have said, in the autumn of 1994 the Committee
invited two successive speakers -- Adolfo Olaechea and Harry Powell --
to address the Society in support of Maoism.
That this was not accidental is shown by Cathie Majid's
attack or Communist League member Bill Bland at the last meeting for having
written an article characterising Maoism as a form of revisionism. This,
she asserted. 'spread confusion'. Since, in the opinion of the Secretary,
criticism of Maoism 'spreads confusion', the implication of her statement
is that support of Maoism -- such as that given by the two last speakers
- bring about 'clarification'.
It is a matter of regret that the Chairman of the
Society, Wilf Dixon, himself a long-standing Maoist, has failed to observe
the principle of neutrality on questions on which there is known to be
disagreement, but has made himself a tool of the Majidist disruptors. Indeed,
at a recent meeting of the Society he went so far as personally to remove
from the literature table, in flagrant violation of Society policy, literature
of the Communist League.
Some critics of Majidism have referred to it as an
'ultra-left' trend. We do not think this term is accurate. The prefix 'ultra-'
means 'beyond', so that the term 'ultra-left' implies an ideology to the
left of Marxism-Leninism. But there is no ideology to the left of, i.e.,
more revolutionary than, Marxism-Leninism. Majidism, like Trotskyism, uses
phraseology that sounds 'left-wing', but its effect is to serve
the right. It is for this reason that we call Majidism 'pseudo-left'.
For example, at the last meeting of the Stalin Society
Kamal Majid came out with the slogan that progressive people should make
it their primary aim in the next period to prevent the election of a
Labour government. But in present circumstances, working to prevent
the election of a Labour government can only mean, in practice, working
to bring about the election of Conservative government. So, having
devoted their energies to disrupting the movement to build a genuine left-wing
alternative to the Labour Party, namely a Marxist-Leninist Party, the Majidites
put forward a policy which actually helps to secure the return of
another Conservative government. This is why we call Majidism 'pseudo-
leftist'.
In a second Open Letter of December 1994, this time
addressed personally to our member Bill Bland, the Kennas imply that the
Communist League is, or has been, sympathetic to Trotskyism:
"We cannot recall your ever attacking Trotskyism. Please let us know
your attitude to Trotskyism".
(Ivor & Florence Kenna: Open Letter to Bill Bland (December 1994).
Since its foundation, the Communist League has always
agreed with Stalin:
" . . . present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend in the working
class, but a gang without principles and without ideals, a gang of wreckers,
diversionists, intelligence service agents, spies, assassins, a gang of
sworn enemies of the working class".
(Josef V. Stalin: Report and Speech in Reply to Debate at the Plenum
of the Central Committee of the CPSU (March 1937), in: 'Works', Volume
14; London; 1978; p. 252).
Over the years, the Communist League has published numerous
analyses of Trotskyism along these lines. For example, in 'The Revolutionary
Process in Colonial-Type Countries', read at a Marxist-Leninist Seminar
last year we said:
"Trotskyism is a type of revisionism".
('The Revolutionary Process in Colonial-Type Countries' (July 1993);
p. 5).
But whereas the Communist League opposes and criticises
all forms of revisionism, the Kennas were for a long time fervent
supporters of Maoism, that is, of Chinese revisionism.
Furthermore, while the Communist League was among
a number of organisations which supported moves to bar Trotskyists from
participation in conferences organised by Open Polemic on the grounds that
they played merely a negative and disruptive role, Ivor Kenna opposed
the exclusion of Trotskyists and even offered himself as Chairman:
In their second Open Letter, the Kennas draw the conclusion
that, because the Communist League is critical of the People's Front policy
as expressed by Dimitrov in relation to France, we must be critical of
the People's Front policy as it was applied in Spain:
"You are a critic of the People's Front approach of Comrade Dimitrov
which, you maintain, involves an alliance between the working class and
the liberal bourgeoisie and therefore amounts to class collaboration".
(Ivor & Florence Kenna: Open Letter to Bill Bland (December 1994).
In a developed capitalist country, the interests of
the capitalist class and of the working class are directly opposed, so
that to work for class collaboration here necessarily involves betraying
the interests of the working class to those of the capitalist class.
But in a colonial-type country, the native capitalist
class is divided into two sections: the comprador capitalist class, which
is dependent upon foreign imperialism, and the national capitalists, whose
development is being held back by feudalism and foreign imperialism.
In the first stage of the revolutionary process in
a colonial-type country, therefore -- that is, in the stage of national-democratic
revolution -- the working class and the national bourgeoisie have a common
interest in carrying forward the national-democratic revolution, which
is directed against foreign imperialism and feudalism. Here, then, 'class
collaboration' in the national-democratic revolution is not merely permissible,
it is essential.
Spain in the 1930s, like China in the 1940s, was
a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country in which the first historical task
before the working class was to carry out the national-democratic revolution.
The journal 'Communist International' wrote in June 1931:
"Spain is faced with the problem of a bourgeois-democratic revolution.
Only after this phase has been passed will Spain come to a proletarian
revolution".
('The Spanish Communist Party and the Revolutionary Situation' in:
'Communist International', Volume 8, Nos. 11-12 (15 June 1931); p. 325).
and in the report of the Soviet delegation to the Executive
Committee of the Communist International to the 18th Congress of the CPSU
in March 1939, Dmitry Manuilsky described the Spanish Civil War as:
"the national revolutionary war of the heroic Spanish people".
(Dmitry Z. Manuilsky: Report of the Soviet Delegation of the CPSU (b)
in the Executive Committee of the Communist International to the 18th Congress
of the CPSU (b) (March 1939), in: 'The Land of Socialism today and tomorrow';
Moscow; 1939; p. 67).
The Communist League has always accepted this as a correct
Marxist-Leninist analysis of the position of the revolutionary process
in Spain in the 1930s.
When, therefore, the Kennas ask:
"Please let us know whether you consider 1) that the Communist Party
of Spain was right to support the Republican Government or 2) that the
POUM was right in its attempt to overthrow that government".
(Ivor & Florence Kenna: Open Letter to Bill Bland (December 1994).
it clearly follows that our answers are: 1) yes; and
2) no.
DIFFERENCES ON SPANISH POLICY WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CPSU
Incidentally, nothing shows more clearly the divisions
in the leadership of the CPSU -- the existence of which the Kennas deny
-- than the contrast between Stalin's policy towards the Spanish Republican
government and that of the Soviet Foreign Office, which was headed by Maksim
Litvinov, at this time People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs:
"Narkomindel (the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs -- Ed.),
as the Soviet Foreign Office, was called, was an organisation largely created
by Litvinov. He recruited its staff and designed its system. . .
The Narkomindel, and many of the principal posts abroad, were already
(1930 -- Ed.) filled with his friends and nominees".
(John Carswell: 'The Exile: A Life of Ivy Litvinov'; London; 1983;
p. 109, 126).
But Litvinov was well known to be a revisionist.
The American journalist Alexander Werth says that he:
" . . . was temperamentally a 'Westerner'.
(Alexander Werth: 'Russia at War: 1941-1945'; London; 1964; p. 22).
while the Soviet Ambassador to London, Ivan Maisky,
was:
" . . . a 'Litvinov man' at heart".
(Alexander Werth: ibid.; p. 29).
In February 1941, Stalin took the initiative in bringing
about the removal of:
" . . . Litvinov . . . from the Party Central Committee -- according
to the official announcement because of 'non-fulfilment of his obligations"'.
(Vojtech Mastny: 'The Cassandra in the Kremlin Commissariat: Maksim
Litvinov and the Cold War', (January 1976); p. 367 . in: 'Foreign Affairs',
Volume 54., No. 2).
Litvinov's biographer John Carswell says that:
". . . this humiliation (his removal from the Central Committee -Ed.)
. . was an important stage in Maksim's disillusionment with the ‘reality'
which the revolution claimed to have created". (John Carswell: op. cit.;
p. 149).
At any rate, by the mid-1940s Litvinov had become notorious
for expressing revisionist views in interviews with foreign press correspondents.
For example, in 1945, Litvinov openly sympathised with the Western Powers
in the 'cold war', as the American journalist Edgar Snow recounts:
"Soon after my arrival in Moscow in June (1945 -- Ed.), I met Max Litvinov
at a diplomatic reception. Were things better or worse, I asked, than when
I had last spoken to him, before Yalta?
'Worse', said he promptly. 'Why did you Americans wait till right now
to begin opposing us in the Balkans and Eastern Europe? You should have
done this years ago. Now it's too late". (Edgar Snow: 'Journey to the Beginning';
London; 1959; p. 357).
And in 1946, he told Richard Hottelot, the Moscow correspondent
of the Columbia Broadcasting System:
"If the West were to give in and grant all Moscow's demands, . . .
it would be faced, after a more or less short time, with the next series
of demands".
(Richard C. Hootelet: 'Washington Post', 21 January 1952; p. 1).
"Towards the end of his long and distinguished career in the Soviet
diplomatic service, Maksim Litvinov tantalised his foreign interlocutors
with increeasingly candid expressions of dissent from his employers' official
line. There are several such incidents on record from May 1943 to February
1947".
(Vojtech Mastny: op. cit.; p. 266).
"Behind the scenes he (Litvinov -- Ed.) continued to be the principal
advocate of a 'Western' alternative to Stalin's 'two-camp' view".
(Alexander Dallin: 'Allied Leadership in the Second World War: Stalin',
in: 'Survey', Volume 21, Nos. 1/2 (Winter/Spring 1975); p. 15).
"Maksim (Litvinov -- Ed.) . . . followed the development of Soviet foreign
policy with increasing disapproval. Much of his time was taken up in elaborating
a long memorandum to Stalin which analysed and commented on what he called
'Molotov's errors"'.
(John Carswell: op. cit.; p. 161).
The Spanish Civil War broke out on 17 July 1936, when
the army garrisons in Morocco began a revolt against the Republican government.
The fact that the Executive Committee of the Comintern made no analysis
of the war until 18 September, two months later, strongly suggests that,
as with the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, there were disagreements
at the highest level of the Soviet Communist Party and the Comintern as
to the policy that should be pursued towards it:
"It was not until September 18, 1936 that the Secretariat of ECCI .
. set out to define the attitude of the Comintern to the Spanish War, now
just two months old".
(Edward H. Carr: 'The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War' London;
1984; p. 20).
and even then no statement of policy was issued:
"There does not appear to have been a Comintern statement on the outbreak
of the Spsnish civil war in July 1936".
(Jane Degras (Ed.): 'The Communist International: 1919-1943: Documents',
Volume 3; London; 1975; p. 392).
However, the revisionist-led Soviet People's Commissariat
for Foreign Affairs quickly lined up on the Spanish question, not with
the Spanish people but with the Western imperialist powers:
"The idea of 'non-intervention' in Spanish affairs . . . was born in
the depths of the British Foreign Office immediately after the start of
Franco's rebellion".
(Ivan Maisky: 'Spanish Notebooks'; London; 1966; p. 27).
and already on 5 August 1936, the Soviet People's Commissariat
for Foreign Affairs was informing the French Charge d'Affaires in Moscow:
"The Government of the USSR subscribes to the principle of non-intervention
in the internal affairs of Spain and is ready to take part in the proposed
agreement".
(Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs: Note to French Charge
d'Affaires in Moscow (5 August 1936),in: Jane Degras (Ed.): 'Soviet Documents
on Foreign Policy', Volume 3; London; 1953; p. 203).
and on 23 August 1936, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Affairs issued a decree banning:
"direct or indirect exportation, re-exportation and transit, to a destination
in Spain . . . of all arms, munitions and material of war, as well as all
aircraft, assembled or dismantled, and all vessels of war".
(Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs: Note to French Charge
d'Affaires in Moscow (23 August 1936),in: Jane Degras (Ed.): 'Soviet Documents
on Foreign Policy', Volume 3; London; 1953; p. 204-05).
The 'non-intervention’ committee was, of course, a hollow
farce:
"The hollowness of the non-intervention agreement was quickly shown
up. The meetings of the non-intervention committee soon degenerated into
farce".
(Edward H. Carr: op. cit.; p. 23).
Even the Soviet revisionists themselves spoke of:
"the farce of non-intervention",
(Maksim Litvinov: Speech at Extraordinary 8th Congress of Soviets (November
1936), in: 'Against Aggression: Speeches'; London; 1939; p. 66).
which aided the fascist aggressors:
"By adopting a policy of non-intervention, . . . the British, French
and American governments contributed to the victory of fascism in Spain".
('Great Soviet Encyclopedia', Volume 31; New York; 1982; p. 176).
Nevertheless, the Soviet government continued its participation
in the ‘non-intervention' committee until March 1939, long after it had
ceased to function even nominally -- indeed, after Britain and France had
officially recognised the Franco government and broken off diplomatic relations
with the Republican government:
"On 27 February 1939 Britain and France officially recognised Franco
and broke off diplomatic relations with the Republican government. . .
.
On 4 March 1939 the TASS agency published the following statement:
'In connection with the fact that the London Committee for 'Non-Intervention'
has long since ceased to function and has lost its reason for existing,
the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decided on 1 March to recall
their representatives from the Committee for 'Non-Intervention"'.
(Ivan Maisky: op. cit.; p. 199, 203).
Stalin's position on the Spanish Civil War was very
different from that of the Soviet revisionists. In a letter to the Spanish
Prime Minister, Largo Caballero, in December 1936, signed jointly by himself,
Vyacheslav Molotov, and Kliment Voroshilov, he said:
"We have thought and still think it our duty, to the extent of the
possibilities open to us, to help the Spanish Government, which is directing
the struggle of all the workers and of the entire Spanish democracy against
the 'military and fascist clique which is nothing but an instrument of
the international forces of reaction'.
(Josef V. Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov & Kliment Voroshilov: Letterto
Spanish Prime Minister, Largo Caballero (21 December 1936), in: Jane Degras
(Ed.): 'Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy', Volume 3; London; 1953; p.
230).
But Stalin's position differed from that of the revisionists
not merely in words, but in deeds. It was on Stalin's initiative
that, shortly after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, Stalin utilised
the Soviet security forces to send military aid to the Spanish government.
Walter Krivitsky, then Chief of Military Security in Western Europe but
who later defected to the West, describes how:
" . . . on September 14 (1936 -- Ed.), obedient to Stalin's order,
Yagoda (Genrikh Yagoda, then People's Commissar for Internal Affairs -Ed.)
called an emergency conference at his headquarters at the Lubianka in Moscow.
. . .
The major question of organising the arms shipments
to Spain was solved by the Lubianka conference with a decision to push
the task simultaneously from Russia and from abroad. The foreign end was
assigned to me.
The domestic phase of the undertaking was handled
by Yagoda himself".
(Walter G. Krivitsky: op. cit.; p. 94, 95).
"Stalin's decision to intervene . . . was taken at almost precisely
the same time that the Soviet Union signed the non-intervention agreement".
(Stanley G. Payne: op. cit.; p. 267-68).
"Two days later a special courier . . . brought me instructions from
Moscow. 'Extend your operations immediately to cover Spanish Civil War.
Mobilise all available agents and facilities for prompt creation of a system
to purchase and transport arms to Spain"'.
(Walter Krivitsky: op. cit.; p. 100).
The regular Soviet military aid which ensued was indispensable
in enabling the defenders of Madrid to defend the capital for two-and-a-half
years:
"The arrival of Russian aid at the end of October (1936 -- Ed.) enabled
the Loyalists to stop Franco's offensive against Madrid".
(David T. Cattell: 'Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War'; Berkeley
(USA); 1957; p. 57).
"Without the contribution of Russian material, Republican resistance
could not have continued beyond 1936. . .
Shipments followed each other . . . at the rate of thirty to forty
ships of varying tonnages per month".
(Pierre Broue & Emile Temime: op. cit.; p. 366, 369).
The decision to send Soviet military aid to Spain, while
in accordance with international law, was contrary to the Non-Intervention
Treaty, to which the Soviet government was a signatory:
"Stalin . . . kept within the provision of international law which
allowed for the supplying of arms to the legitimate government in a civil
war, though in doing so he violated the Non-Intervention Pact".
(David T. Cattell: 'Communism and the Spanish Civil War' (hereafter
listed as 'David T. Cattell (1965)'); New York; 1965; p. 73).
For this reason:
". . . the decision (to send arms to Spain -- Ed.) . . . was not divulged
to Narkomindel (the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs -Ed.) or
other Soviet departments, or to the Comintern".
(Edward H. Carr: op. cit.; p. 25).
"This decision . . . had to remain as discreet as possible".
(Pierre Broue & Emile Temime: op. cit.; p. 241, 366, 369).
Stalin:
". . . doubly cautioned his commissars that Soviet aid to Spain must
be unofficial and handled covertly. . . .
It was absolutely necessary that no sign should appear of any official
government participation in the (arms -- Ed.) traffic (to Spain -- Ed.)".
(Walter Krivitsky: op. cit.; p. 93, 102).
And, in fact:
If the Kennas still remain unconvinced that there were
times when Stalin was opposed to the policy of the Soviet government and/or
the Comintern, we direct them across the Atlantic.
Stalin, the principal founder of the Marxist-Leninist
theory of the nation, speaks of a single American nation:
"One section of the English emigrated from England to a new territory,
America, and there . . . came to form the new American nation. . . .
England and America . . . constitute two different nations. But the
Americans themselves would not deserve to be called a nation were not the
different parts of America bound together into an economic whole".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Marxism and the National Question' (January 1913),
in: 'Works', Volume 2; Moscow; 1953; p. 305).
In contrast, a resolution of the Political Secretariat
of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, dated October
1930, speaks of the predominantly black population of certain Southern
states of America as constituting a separate nation with the right of self-determination:
"The Negro question in the United States must be viewed . . . as the
question of an oppressed nation. . . .
The Negro zone of the South. . . . the Black Belt, . . . is not, either
economically or politically, such an integral part of the whole United
States as any other part of the country. . . .
The right of self-determination of the Negroes as the main slogan of
the Communist Party in the Black Belt is appropriate. . . .
It is necessary wherever possible to bring together into one governmental
unit all districts of the South where the majority of the settled population
consists of Negroes. Within the limits of this state there will, of course,
remain a fairly significant white minority which must submit to the right
of self-determination of the Negro majority.
This means complete and unlimited right of the Negro majority to exercise
governmental authority in the entire territory of the Black Belt".
(Political Secretariat of the ECCI: Resolution on the Negro Question
in the United States (October 1930), in: Jane Degras (Ed.): 'The Communist
International: 1919-1943: Documents', Volume 3; London; 1965; p. 125, 129,
130-31).
This is a clear deviation from a Marxist-Leninist position
to one based on racism.
CONCLUSION
THE QUESTION OF IN WHICH CASES THE REVISIONISTS SUCCEEDED IN DIVERTING
THE CPSU AND THE COMINTERN FROM THE PATH OF MARXISM-LENINISM IS AN IMPORTANT
ONE FOR THOSE CONCERNED IN REBUILDING NEW REVOLUTIONARY PARTIES.
IT IS A QUESTION WHICH COULD USEFULLY BE DISCUSSED CONSTRUCTIVELY IN
DETAIL WITHIN THE FORUM OF THE STALIN SOCIETY WHEN ITS MEMBERS HAVE TAKE
STEPS TO REVERSE ITS PRESENT CORRUPTION AND DEGENERATION, UNDER THE CONTAMINATION
OF MAJIDISM, INTO A ONE-SIDED PROPAGANDA INSTRUMENT FOR THE DISSEMINATION
OF REVISIONISM.
PUBLISHED BY: THE COMMUNIST LEAGUE, ILFORD ESSEX.