"CLASS STRUGGLES
IN CHINA"
A MARXIST-LENINIST ANALYSIS OF
MAO-TSE TUNG,
BY W.B.BLAND.
REVISED VERSION
LONDON, 1997.
FOREWORD
Nearly thirty years ago, in January
1968, the 'Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Britain',
the predecessor of the 'Communist League',
published a report on 'The Situation in the People's Republic of China'.
The main features of the report
were its characterisation of the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution'
as counter-revolutionary, and 'The Thought of Mao Tse-tung' as reactionary
and revisionist.
While the 'Communist League'
fully endorses these main features of the MLOB report, further research
makes it clear that the class situation in post-1949 China was more complex
than was envisaged by the MLOB.
In fact, the following social
classes were operating in the People's Republic of China in the period
concerned, each striving to mould China along lines which would serve its
interests, and each represented by a grouping within the Communist Party.
1)
The working class,
represented by a Marxist-Leninist grouping within the Communist Party headed
by Kao Kang;
2)
The national bourgeoisie, a section
of the bourgeoisie engaged primarily in manufacturing and oppressed by
imperialism, represented by a revisionist grouping within the Communist
Party headed by Liu Shao-chi;
3)
The comprador bourgeoisie, a section
of the bourgeoisie engaged primarily in foreign trade and dependent upon
imperialism, represented by a revisionist grouping within the Communist
Party headed by Mao Tse-tung and Lin
Piao.
Some time after the 'Cultural
Revolution', the interests of that section of the comprador bourgeoisie
dependent upon United States imperialism diverged from the interests of
that section dependent upon Soviet imperialism (i.e.
the Soviet Union after the restoration of capitalism there following the
death of Stalin).
As a
result, Class 3 above split into:
3a)
The pro-US comprador bourgeoisie, headed by Mao Tse-tung;
and
3b)
the pro-Soviet comprador bourgeoisie, headed by Lin Piao.
'CLASS STRUGGLES IN CHINA' shows
how this class analysis makes sense of such otherwise inexplicable phenomena
as the 'Kao Kang Affair', the 'Hundred Flowers Affair', the 'Great Leap
Forward', the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution', the death of Lin
Piao in an air crash while defecting to the Soviet Union, and the post-Mao
economic reforms
TRANSLITERATION
NOTE
In June 1979 the Chinese authorities
introduced a new system (known as Pinjin)
of transliterating Chinese characters into English, replacing the system
-- known as the Wade-Giles system,
after its English Creator Thomas F. Wade (1818-95) and its English modifier
Herbert A. Giles (1845-1935).
In this book, the Wade-Giles
system -- which is more familiar to English speakers -- is used throughout,
with the exception that in the bibliographies the name and title used in
the original work is given, followed, where either of these are in Pinjin,
by the Wade-Giles version in brackets.
-
CLASS STRUGGLES
IN CHINA
INTRODUCTION
THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS
IN COLONIAL-TYPE COUNTRIES
THE AIM OF MARXIST-LENINISTS IS TO LEAD THE WORKING CLASS
IN EACH COUNTRY TO ACCOMPLISH SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONS WHICH WILL ESTABLISH
SOCIALIST, AND ULTIMATELY COMMUNIST, SOCIETIES.
The revolutionary process will differ somewhat in different
countries according to the specific conditions existing:
"The nationally peculiar and nationally specific features
in each separate country must unfailingly be taken into account . . . when
drawing up guiding directives for the working class movement of the country
concerned".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Notes on Contemporary Themes' (July
1927), in: 'Works', Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 337).
Thus, the revolutionary process in developed capitalist countries
will differ from that in colonial-type countries, that is, relatively
undeveloped countries which are dominated by one or another Great Power,
which is today usually an imperialist
(i.e., monopoly capitalist) country.
A revolution in a colonial-type country which brings about
the national liberation of that country is termed a national-democratic
revolution. A revolution in any country which brings about the political
power of the working class is termed a socialist revolution.
The Role of the National
Bourgeoisie
A key feature of the class structure of a colonial-type
country is that the native capitalist class -- where this exists -- consists
of two parts:
Firstly, the comprador capitalist
class or comprador bourgeoisie, which has close ties with
the landlord class and whose exploitation is based primarily upon foreign
trade, making them, like the landlord class, dependent upon the dominating
Great Power, and
Secondly, the national capitalist
class or national bourgeoisie, whose exploitation is based
primarily upon the ownership of industrial or commercial enterprises and
whose economic advancement is held back by the dominating Great Power.
Stalin pointed out in May 1925 to the students of the
Communist University of the Toilers of the East that the native bourgeoisie
in some colonial-type countries
"Is splitting up into two parts, a revolutionary part
(the national bourgeoisie -- Ed.) . . . and a compromising part (the comprador
bourgeoisie -- Ed.) . . . of which the first is continuing the revolutionary
struggle, whereas the second is entering into a bloc with imperialism".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'The Political Tasks of the University
of the Peoples of the East' (May 1925), in: 'Works, Volume 7; Moscow; 1954;
p. 147).
In other words, the national bourgeoisie of a colonial-type
country is a class objectively in favour of
the national-democratic revolution, but objectively opposed
to the socialist revolution.
It follows that the class forces which are objectively
in favour of the national-democratic revolution are wider
and stronger than the class forces which are objectively
in favour of the socialist revolution.
The Marxist-Leninist strategy for the revolutionary process
in a colonial-type country must be based on striving to mobilise the maximum
objectively possible forces for both the national-democratic and the socialist
revolutions:
"The Communist Party of each country must unfailingly
avail itself of even the smallest opportunity of gaining a mass ally for
the proletariat, even if a temporary, vacillating unstable and
unreliable ally'".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Notes on Contemporary Themes' (July
1927), in: 'Works', Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 337).
Thus, the Marxist-Leninist strategy of the revolutionary
process in colonial-type countries is to strive to carry through the process
in two stages: firstly, the
stage of national-democratic revolution and, secondly, the stage of socialist
revolution. In the first stage, Marxist-Leninists should strive to
ally themselves with the national bourgeoisie, to the extent
that this class remains genuinely revolutionary:
"Temporary cooperation is permissible, and in certain
circumstances even a temporary alliance, between the Communist Party and
the national-revolutionary movement, provided that the latter is a genuine
revolutionary movement, that it genuinely struggles against the ruling
power, and that its representatives do not hamper the Communists in their
work".
(6th Congress, Communist International: Theses on the
Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-colonial Countries (September
1928), in:
Jane Degras (Ed.): 'The Communist International: 1919-1943:
Documents Volume 2; London; 1971; p. 542).
Such co-operation, such an alliance, is temporary
because the aim of the Marxist-Leninists is to win for the working class
the leading role in the revolutionary process in order to carry this through,
with the minimum possible interruption, to the socialist
revolution. This leadership can only be won in struggle
with the national bourgeoisie:
"The proletariat pushes aside the national bourgeoisie,
consolidates its hegemony and assumes the lead of the vast masses of the
working people in town and country, in order to overcome the resistance
of the national bourgeoisie, secure the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic
revolution, and then gradually convert it into a socialist revolution."
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Questions of the Chinese Revolution'
(April 1927), in:
'Works', Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 225).
When it becomes clear that the working class is winning the
leadership of the national-democratic revolution, and so is attaining a
position to transform the revolution into a socialist revolution, then
the national bourgeoisie will inevitably desert
the revolution and go over to the counterrevolution, preferring
the retention of limited exploitation under colonial-type domination to
the ending of exploitation under socialism. This is what occurred in China
in the coup of CHIANG Kai-shek* in April 1927:
"In the first period of the Chinese revolution, . .
. the national bourgeoisie (not the compradors) sided with the revolution.
. .
Chiang Kai-shek's coup marks the desertion of the national
bourgeoisie from the revolution".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Questions of the Chinese Revolution'
(April 1927), in:
'Works' Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 226, 229).
CHAPTER ONE
THE NATIONAL ANTI-JAPANESE
FRONT IN CHINA (1935-45)
The Advent of Chinese
Revisionism (January-December 1935)
In January 1935, at an enlarged meeting of the Political
Bureau of the Communist Party of China held during the famous 'Long March'
at Tsunyi in Kweichow Province,
"A new Central Committee headed by Comrade MAO Tse-tung*"
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking;
1964; p. 155).
was established.
The change of leadership was quickly followed by a
change of policy.
In a report to a conference of Party activists held at
Wayaopao in Northern Shensi in December 1935, Mao Tse-tung declared that
the political situation in China had now fundamentally
changed:
"A great change has now taken place in the political
situation".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism';
(December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking;
1964; p. 153).
This new situation, asserted Mao, was that instead of a number
of imperialist powers sharing in the domination of semi-colonial China,
the armed forces of one imperialist
power -- Japan -- was now aiming to occupy
all China and to transform it into a Japanese colony:
"Today . . . the Japanese imperialists . . want to convert
the whole of China from a semi-colony shared by several imperialist powers
into a colony monopolised by Japan".
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid.; p. 154).
and in this new situation it
was possible to win back the national bourgeoisie to the anti-imperialist
struggle:
"It
is now possible . . for the national bourgeoisie to join the anti-Japanese
struggle".
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid.; p. 168).
"The task of the proletariat is to form a united front
with the national bourgeoisie against imperialism and the bureaucrat and
warlord governments, without overlooking its revolutionary quality".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On New Democracy' (January 1940), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 348-49).
Mao Tse-tung held that this united front against Japanese
imperialism should include not merely the urban national bourgeoisie, but
also the rural national bourgeoisie,
the rich peasants:
"The rich peasants . . . might make some contribution
to the anti-imperialist struggle of the peasant masses."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese
Communist Party' (December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking;
1965; p. 323).
Furthermore, in this new situation - according to Mao Tse-tung
-- it was possible to win to the anti-Japanese united front the
anti-Japanese (i.e., pro-American and pro-British) sections
of the landlord class and comprador bourgeoisie. The anti-Japanese
sections of the landlord class were called by the Communist Party of China
at this period the 'enlightened gentry'.
"China is a semi-colonial country for which many imperialist
powers are contending. When the struggle is directed against Japanese imperialism,
then the running dogs of the United States or Britain, obeying the varying
tones of their masters' commands, may engage in veiled or even open strife
with the Japanese imperialists and their running dogs. . . . We must turn
to good account all such fights, rifts and contradictions in the enemy
camp and turn them against our present main enemy."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism'
(December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 158-59).
"Different groups within this big bourgeoisie are backed
by different imperialist powers, so that when contradictions among these
powers becomes sharper and when the edge of the revolution is mainly directed
against a particular power, the big bourgeois groups dependent upon the
other powers may join the struggle against that particular imperialist
power to a certain extent and for a certain time. . . . The Chinese proletariat
may form a united front with these groups and should maintain it as far
as possible".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Introducing "The Communist"' (October
1939), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 289).
"A good many of the enlightened gentry who are middle
and small landlords and who have some capitalist colouration display some
enthusiasm for the war, and we should unite with them in the common fight
against Japan. .
Different sections of the comprador big bourgeoisie owe
allegiance to different imperialist powers, so that when the contradictions
among the latter become very acute and the revolution is directed mainly
against one particular imperialist power, it becomes possible for the sections
of the comprador class which serve other imperialist groupings to join
the current anti-imperialist front to a certain extent and for a certain
period".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese
Communist Party' (December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking;
1965; p. 319-20).
'The enlightened gentry . . . are the left-wing of the
landlord class. It is possible for . . . the enlightened gentry to join
us in the common fight against Japan".
(Mao Tse-tung: "Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese
United Front' (March 1940), in: 'Selected Works"', Volume 2; Peking; 1965;
p. 423, 424).
In other words, Mao Tse-tung called for the formation of
a national united front against Japanese imperialism:
"The task of the Party is to form a revolutionary national
united front."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism'
(December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 161).
"The Wayaopao meeting . . . decided on the tactics of
a national united front".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking;
1964; p. 153).
The Revisionist Character
of Mao's 'National United Front' Policy
But the question of whether China was dominated by a number
of imperialist powers or by one had nothing whatever to do with such questions
as the attitude of the national bourgeoisie to the struggle against imperialism.
The national bourgeoisie had deserted the revolution because
they felt that their own position as an exploiting class was threatened
by a continuation of the revolutionary process.
In other words, the new line being put forward
by Mao Tse-tung was a deviation from Marxist-Leninist
principles.
When someone claiming to be a Marxist-Leninist puts forward
a policy which deviates from Marxist-Leninist principles, Marxist-Leninists
call such a policy 'revisionist'.
MAO TSE-TUNG WAS, FROM 1935 TO HIS DEATH IN 1976, THE
MOST PROMINENT FIGURE IN CHINESE REVISIONISM.
To secure a national united front against Japanese imperialism,
THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS HAD TO CONVINCE ThE EXPLOITING
CLASSES WHICH THEY WISHED
TO RECRUIT TO THE FRONT THAT THEIR POSITION, AS EXPLOITERS
WOULD BE SECURE IF THEY SO PARTICIPATED.
They attempted to do this in several ways.
For example:
Firstly,
in February 1937 the Communist Party offered, if the Kuomintang would agree
to participate in a National United Front, to
place the Red Army and the Liberated Areas under the control of the Kuomintang
government. In these circumstances:
"The workers' and peasants' democratic government .
. . and the Red Army . . . will come under the direction
of the Central Government in Nanking and its Military
Council respectively".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking;
1964; p. 281).
Secondly, it replaced
the policy of confiscation of the landlords' land by one of ('not too great')
reductions in rent and interest:
"After 1936, in order to facilitate the formation of
a broad anti-Japanese national united front, the Chinese Communist Party
changed its policy for the country as a whole (from one of confiscating
the landlords' land -- Ed.) to one of reduction of rent and interest
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking;
1965; p. 77).
"This is not the time for a thoroughgoing agrarian revolution.
. . Our present policy should stipulate that landlords shall reduce rent
and interest . . . but the reductions should not be too great ".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Policy' (December 1940), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 446).
"The government's policy should be one of enforcing
the decree on rent reduction and adjusting the relative interests of the
landlords and the tenants."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Spread the Campaign to Reduce Rent .
. .' (October 1943), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; 1965; p. 131).
"The Communist Party has made a major concession in the
anti-Japanese war period by changing the policy of land to the tiller to
one of reducing rent and interest".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 298).
Thirdly, in putting
forward a programme of 'new democracy'
for the liberated areas, the Party assured anti-Japanese national capitalists
that in these areas they would be encouraged to
make profits and develop their enterprises:
"The people's republic will not expropriate private
property other than imperialist and feudal private property, and so far
from confiscating the national bourgeoisie's industrial and commercial
enterprises, it will encourage their development. We shall protect every
national capitalist who does not support the imperialists or the Chinese
traitors. . . . The labour laws of the people's republic . . . will not
prevent the national bourgeoisie from making profits or developing their
industrial and commercial enterprises."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism'
(December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 169).
"The new-democratic revolution . . . differs from a socialist
revolution in that it . . . does not destroy any section of capitalism
which is capable of contributing to the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese
Communist Party' (December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking;
1965; p. 327).
"Capitalists should be encouraged to come into our anti-Japanese
base areas and start enterprises here. . . Private enterprise should be
encouraged".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Policy' (December 1940), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 447).
"The sector of non-monopoly capitalism in our economy
should be given the opportunity to develop".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Postscript to "Rural Surveys"' (April
1941), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 15).
"Some people suspect that the Chinese Communists are opposed
to . . the growth of private capital and the protection of private property,
but they are mistaken. . . . It is the very task of the New Democracy we
advocate to guarantee that the people can develop freely such private capitalist
economy as will benefit and not 'dominate the livelihood of the people',
and to protect all appropriate forms of private property.
It is not domestic capitalism but foreign imperialism
and domestic feudalism which are superfluous in China today; indeed, we
have too little of capitalism.. .
Under the state system of New Democracy in China it will
be necessary in the interests of social progress to facilitate the development
of the private capitalist sector of the economy (provided it does not dominate
the livelihood of the people)".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 281, 283).
Fourthly, it assured
capitalists that the new democratic state would protect them against labour
indiscipline, as well as against demands for excessive wage increases or
excessive' reductions in working hours:
"There must not be excessive increases in wages or excessive
reductions in working hours. . . . The workers must observe labour discipline".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Policy' (December 1940), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 445).
Fifthly, it promised
anti-Japanese landlords, comprador capitalists and national capitalists,
through 'New Democracy', a share in the administration
of liberated areas:
"Our government . . . must be so transformed as to include
also the members of all other classes who are willing to take part in the
national revolution.
Our government represents . . . the whole nation".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism'
(December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 165,
168).
"The new-democratic republic . . . will consist of
. . . all those in the country who agree with the national and democratic
revolution; it will be the alliance of these classes in the national and
democratic revolution".
(Mao Tse-tung: The Tasks of the Chinese Communist
Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan' (May 1938), in: 'Selected Works',
Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 271).
"New-democratic constitutional government . . . is the
joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'New-democratic Constitutional Government'
(February 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 409).
"Concerning the organs of political power, the allocation
of places should be one-third for Communists, one-third for non-Party left
progressives, and one-third for the intermediate sections who are neither
left nor right. . . .
Our aim in allocating one-third of the places to the
intermediate sections is to win over the middle bourgeoisie (the national
bourgeoisie -- Ed.) and the enlightened gentry".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Question of Political Power in
the Anti-Japanese Base Areas' (March 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume
2; Peking; 1965; p. 418).
"The 'three-thirds system', under which the Communists
have only one-third of the places in the organs of political power . .
., must be carried out resolutely".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Policy' (December 1940), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 445).
"We propose the establishment, after the thorough defeat
of the Japanese aggressors, of a state system which we call New Democracy.
It is this kind of state system that truly meets the
demands . . . of the . . . national bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry
and other patriots".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 279).
Sixthly, it presented
the transition from the national-democratic to the socialist revolution
as a long-term process, taking several
decades:
"In the future the democratic revolution will undoubtedly
be transformed into a socialist revolution. . . . It may take quite a long
time. . . It is wrong to . . . expect the transition to take place soon."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism'
(December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 144).
"The Chinese revolution cannot avoid taking the two
steps, first of New Democracy, and then of socialism. Moreover, the first
step will need quite a long time".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On New Democracy' (January 1940), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 358).
"A new democratic state based on an alliance of the democratic
classes is different in principle from a socialist state under the dictatorship
of the proletariat. . . . For a long time to come there will exist a special
form of state and political power, a form that is distinguished from the
Russian system, . . . namely, the new democratic form of state and political
power based on the alliance of the democratic classes. . . . . . Our general
programme of New Democracy will remain unchanged . for several decades".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 284, 285).
In other words, it was implied that the transition to a socialist
revolution was not something which should follow the democratic stage of
the revolution with the minimum possible interruption, but a
distant prospect:
"Needless to say, private enterprise . . . will inevitably
continue to occupy a dominant position for a considerable time".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Our Economic Policy' (January 1934),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 144).
"In the future the democratic revolution will inevitably
be transformed into a socialist revolution. . . . It may take quite a long
time. . . . It is wrong to . . . expect the transition to take place soon".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism'
(December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 170).
"For a long time to come there will exist a special
form of state and political power, a form that is distinguished from the
Russian system but is perfectly necessary and reasonable for us, namely,
the new-democratic form of state. . . .
Our general programme of New Democracy will remain unchanged
. . . for several decades".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; op. cit.; p. 285).
But according to Marxist-Leninist principles, if the Communist
Party has won the leadership of the revolutionary process, the democratic
revolution should be transformed into the socialist revolution without
interruption:
"From the democratic revolution we shall at once, according
to the degree of our strength , . . , begin to pass over to the socialist
revolution. We stand for continuous revolution. We shall not stop half
way".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The Attitude of Social-Democracy
toward the Peasant Movement' (September 1905), in: 'Selected Works', Volume
3; London; 1946; p. 145).
"To attempt to raise an artificial Chinese wall between
the first and second revolutions, to separate them by anything else than
the degree of preparedness of the proletariat and the degree of unity with
the poor peasants, is monstrously to distort Marxism, to vulgarise it,
to put liberalism in its place".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The Proletarian Revolution and the
Renegade Kautsky' (November 1918), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 7; London;
1946; p. 191).
"Lenin himself maintained the point of view of uninterrupted
revolution".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'The Foundations of Leninism' (April/May
1924), in: 'Works', Volume 6; Moscow; 1953; p. 107).
The Changed Character of the
Kuomintang
By the late 1930s, the class character of the Chinese nationalist
party, the Kuomintang, had changed.
It had ceased to represent primarily the interests of the national bourgeoisie,
as it had earlier, and had come to represent primarily the interests of
the most reactionary section of the landlord class:
"At the extreme right (of the Kuomintang -- Ed.) was
the CC clique headed by CHEN Li-Fu* and his brother CHEN Kuo-fu*, traditionalists
and zealous anti-Communists who represented the landlord interest. They
stood closest to the Generalissimo (Chiang Kai-shek -- Ed.), controlled
appointments and promotions, and held the largest block of votes in the
Central Executive Committee. . . . Chen Li-fu was considered the Party
boss. .
By the 1930s the once revolutionary Kuomintang had lost
most of its idealism and had shifted to the right. . . . The loss of the
large eastern cities reduced the wealth and power of its businessmen and
Westernised components, leaving it more dependent on landlords, which tended
to transform it . . . . into a landlord party".
(Wesley H. Bagby: 'The Eagle-Dragon Alliance: America's
Relations with
China in World War II'; Newark (USA); 1992; p. 46, 47).
The Kuomintang Attitude
to Japanese Aggression
The initial attitude of the Kuomintang to Japanese aggression
against China:
"Was to trade space for time for survival until Japan,
in its imperial advance, might collide with another Great Power ('Collier's
Encyclopedia', Volume 6; New York; 1994; p. 328).
The Sian Incident
(December 1936)
In December 1936, troops of CHANG Hsueh-liang*, the warlord
known as 'the Young Marshal', having been ousted from their Manchurian
base by Japanese forces, arrested Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang President
of the Republic of China, at Sian and presented him with demands for the
formation of a united front against Japan.
(Hugh B. O'Neill: 'Companion to Chinese History'; New
York; 1987; p. 287).
Although:
"Chiang accepted the demands",
(Hugh B. O'Neill: ibid.; p. 287).
He failed to keep the agreement.
The Lukouchiao Incident
(July 1937)
In July 1937:
"The Japanese invading forces attacked the Chinese garrison
at Lukouchiao, some 10 kilometres south-west of Peking".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking;
1965; p. 21).
The incident fostered an:
"Ardent nation-wide anti-Japanese movement".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking;
1965; p. 21).
and this situation forced a change in the public policy of
the Kuomintang. It
"Compelled the Chinese authorities to begin changing
their policy of non-resistance, as pursued ever since . . . 1931".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'For the Mobilisation of all the Nation's
Forces for Victory in the War of Resistance' (August 1937), in: 'Selected
Works;, Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 23).
The Chinese War of Resistance
against Japan (1937-38)
The Lukouchiao Incident:
"Marked the beginning of the Chinese people's heroic
War of Resistance against Japan which lasted for eight years".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking;
1965; p. 21).
In July 1937, Chiang Kai-shek issued a:
"Statement recognising the legal status of the Communist
Party of China".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Urgent Tasks following the Establishment
of Kuomintang Communist Cooperation' (September 1937), in: 'Selected Works',
Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 37).
and agreeing to the formation of a:
"United front of the two parties".
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid.; p. 39).
But the change in the Kuomintang's policy towards Japanese
imperialism and to the Communist Party was only a nominal one. In fact:
"The Chiang Kai-shek government continued to parley
with the Japanese aggressors and even accepted the so-called peaceful settlement
they concluded with local authorities. .
Chiang never ceased his clandestine attempts to make
peace with Japan."
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking;
1965; p. 13, 14).
and continued to pursue:
"The reactionary policy of passively resisting Japan
but actively opposing the Communist Party".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking;
1965; p. 14).
It was not until August 1937:
"When the Japanese aggressors launched a major attack
on Shanghai and thus made it impossible for Chiang Kai-shek to maintain
his rule in south-eastern China, that he was compelled to embark on armed
resistance."
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking;
1965; p. 13-14).
After taking Peking and Tientsin in July 1937, in November
1937, the Japanese invaders captured Shanghai, and the Chinese capital
was moved from Nanking to Chungking. In December Japanese forces took Nanking
and Hangchow, and in October 1938 Canton and Hankow. (William
L. Langer (Ed.): 'An Encyclopedia of World History: Ancient, Medieval and
Modern: Chronologically Arranged'; London; 1972; p. 1,110).
By the end of 1938:
"Japanese armies controlled North and Central China,
the main coastal cities, and modern lines of communication."
('Encyclopedia Americana', Volume 6; Danbury (USA);
1992; p. 543).
The Outbreak of the Second
World War (September 1939)
On 1 September 1939:
"Germany attacked Poland. Britain and France replied
to this by declaring war on Germany in September 3".
('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945:
A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 22).
In March 1940, the Japanese occupation forces established:
"A puppet government under WANG Ching-wei* at Nanking".
(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.;p. 1,152).
The military policy of the Chinese Communist forces was based
on establishing base areas of resistance,
and:
"By the end of 1940, such 'resistance bases' were found
across the whole of occupied China's."
(Henry McAleavy: 'The Modern History of China'; London;
1967; p. 305).
The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality
Pact (April 1941)
In April 1941, the Soviet Union and Japan concluded a Neutrality
Pact, which:
"Ensured peace on the eastern border of the Soviet Union,
thus crushing the plot for a joint German, Italian
and Japanese attack on the Soviet Union".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking;
1965; p. 468).
The Entry of the Soviet
Union into the World War (June 1941)
On 22 June 1941:
"German forces invaded the Soviet Union without declaring
war".
('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945:
A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 49).
However, because of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact,
the Soviet Union did not immediately become the ally of China.
The Breach of the CPC-Kuomintang
United Front (1939-41)
In fact, the united front between the Kuomintang and the
CPC:
"Did not last much beyond 1938".
('Encyclopedia Americana', Volume 6; Danbury (USA); 1992;
p. 544).
For, in spite of it, in 1939-41 Kuomintang forces launched
two surprise attacks upon Communist armies:
"In the first campaign, from the winter of 1939 to the
spring of 1940, the Kuomintang troops in their surprise attacks captured
five county towns garrisoned by the 8th Route Army in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia
Border Region. . . . The second campaign was launched in January 1941.
. .
The Kuomintang troops in southern Anhwei actually did
catch these New Fourth Army units in a dragnet."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'A Comment on the Sessions of the Kuomintarig
Central Executive Committee and of the People's Political Council' (October
1943), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1956; p. 146).
It was not until May 1941 that Mao Tse-tung was able to report
that:
"The second anti-Communist onslaught has come to an
end".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Conclusions on the Repulse of the Second
Anti-Communist Onslaught' (May 1941), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking;
1965; p. 463).
The Entry of the USA into
the Second World War (December
1941)
In December 1941:
"Japanese sea and air forces launched a surprise attack
on the United States base at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii".
(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,153).
bringing the USA into the Second
World War.
The Division within US Imperialism
Although the USA and China were allies in 1941-45, the US
imperialists were not united in regard to the strategy which should be
adopted towards China.
One section
of the US imperialists, consisting primarily of those elements without
special economic connections with China, regarded the speediest
possible defeat of Japan as their first priority. This strategy
required:
1) the modernisation and democratisation of the Kuomintang
armed forces to transform it into an efficient fighting force;
2) the broadest possible national front of all social
forces in China opposed to Japanese imperialism, including the Communist
Party of China and its armed forces;
3) the maximum possible US aid to these forces.
The rival section of US imperialists, consisting primarily
of those elements with special economic connections with
China, regarded the Pacific theatre-of-war as of secondary importance and
held that no strategy should be adopted in
relation to that theatre which might jeopardise America's post-war imperialist
interests in the region, even if this should prolong the
war. This strategy required:
1) recognition that, although the modernisation and democratisation
of the Kuomintang armed forces might benefit the war effort against Japan,
it should not be pressed upon the Kuomintang since it would undermine the
power of this political party, which provided the bast available basis
for future US domination of the area;
2) recognition that the broadest possible national front,
which would include the forces of the Communist Party, would also undermine
Kuomintang power and so should not be pressed on the Kuomintang;
3) the confinement of US aid to the Kuomintang forces.
The first strategy was
espoused by such elements as General Joseph STILWELL*, appointed to serve
as Chiang's Chief of Staff.
The second strategy was
supported by such elements as General Claire CHENNAULT*, who led the 'American
Volunteer Group' (the 'Flying Tigers'), a group of planes and pilots which
had been sent to China in 1940, and Patrick HURLEY* , who was appointed
President Franklyn ROOSEVELT*'s personal representative in China in August
1944.
Thus, in an undated note in 1942, Stilwell summed up bluntly
the weaknesses of the Kuomintang's military forces:
"The Chinese army lies immobile and rotting, sprawled
all over China. Officers getting rich, men dying of
malnutrition, malaria, dysentery, cholera; the sick simply turned loose.
Ammunition and weapons being sold. Open traffic with the enemy on all 'fronts'.
Stupidity, ignorance, apathy in the general staff. . . . Personal loyalty
to CKS (Chiang Kai-shek -- Ed.) weighs more than ability and efficiency;
crookedness, cowardice go unpunished".
(Joseph W. Stilwell: Note (undated), in: Wesley M. Bagby:
op. cit.; p. 58).
Accordingly, he sought to reform and modernise them:
"China's huge, poorly equipped, fed and led armies were
structured more for domestic political control than international war.
With little respect for the complex politics of the Chinese military, Stilwell
urgently sought to modernise them for offensive action."
(Wesley M. Bagby: op. cit.; p. 67).
even though:
"Full acceptance of his proposals would have threatened
the survival of Chiang's regime".
(Wesley M. Bagby: ibid,; p. 67).
Naturally:
"Holding such opposite concepts, he and Chiang clashed
in a bitter and acrimonious feud. .
Stilwell's diary reflected his growing anger and frustration
in increasingly bitter denunciation: 'stupid little ass' (15/6/42), ignorant,
illiterate, superstitious, peasant son of a bitch' (summer 1942), 'nasty
little bastard' (6/1/43), 'grasping, bigoted, ungrateful little rattlesnake'
(18/6/43) . . ..
Stilwell's denunciations extended to the entire Chinese
government --'a gang of thugs'".
(Wesley M. Bagby: ibid.; p. 69-70).
Supporters of the Stilwell strategy were accused by its opponents
of being 'crypto-communists'. For example, although Stilwell was a right-wing
Republican, Hurley wrote later:
"The record of General Stilwell in China is irrevocably
coupled in history with the conspiracy to overthrow the Nationalist Government
of China and to set up in its place a Communist regime".
(Patrick J. Hurley, in: Don Lohbeck: 'Patrick J. Hurley';
Chicago; 1956; p. 305).
In October 1944, after strong representations from Chiang
Kai-shek, Roosevelt wrote to Chiang
"That he would remove Stilwell".
(Wesley M. Bagby: op. cit.; p. 149).
The victory of the Hurley/Chennault fraction of the US imperialists
was confirmed when Chiang Kai-shek said publicly,
in a speech on 1 January 1945, that he:
"Opposed the proposal for abolishing the Kuomintang
one-party dictatorship and for setting up a coalition government and a
joint supreme command".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking;
1965; p. 334).
And when Hurley -- appointed US Ambassador to China in November
1944 --declared in Washington on 2 April 1945:
"That the United States would cooperate with Chiang
Kai-shek only and not with the Chinese Communist Party".
(Patrick J. Hurley: Statement of 2 April 1945, in: Mao
Tse-tung: 'On the Danger of the Hurley Policy' (July
1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965;
p. 336).
The Third Anti-Communist Campaign
(March 1943)
The entry of the USA into the World War II did not check
the Kuomintang's unwillingness to participate -- other than nominally --
in the national united front against Japan proposed by the Communist Party
of China.
The third anti-Communist campaign:
" . began in March of this year (1943-- Ed.) and is still
going on".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'A Comment on the Sessions of the Kuomintang
Central Executive Committee and of the People's Political
Council' (October 1943), in: 'Selected Works', Volume
3; Peking; 1965; p. 146).
and in October 1944 Mao Tse-tung wrote:
"Chiang Kai-shek has already dispatched 775,000 troops
who are now engaged exclusively in encircling or attacking
the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the
people's guerillas in southern China."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Chiang Kai-shek's Speech on the Double
Tenth Festival' (October 1944), in: 'Selected Works',
Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 232).
And in April 1945 Mao warned the 7th National Congress of
the CPC that
"The chief ruling clique of the Kuomintang . . is now
stepping up preparations to unleash civil war as soon as the forces of
a certain allied country have cleared a considerable part of the Chinese
mainland of the Japanese aggressors."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government,' (April 1945),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 275).
The Yalta Conference
(February 1945)
In February 1945, the leaders of the Soviet Union, the
United States and Britain met at Yalta and signed a secret agreement (published
only in January 1946) that, on certain conditions,
"In two or three months after Germany has surrendered
and the war in Europe has terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into
the war against Japan."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 6; p. 7,732).
Soviet Denunciation of the
Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (April
1945)
In April 1945,
"The Soviet Union denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality
Pact. The situation, the Soviet Government declared, had changed: as an
ally of Germany, Japan was helping her in the war against the USSR; in
addition, she was at war with the USA and Britain, who were allies of the
USSR. In this situation, the neutrality pact had lost its meaning and could
no longer remain valid".
('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945:
A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 411).
The Surrender of Germany
(May 1945)
In May 1945:
"The Nazis capitulated".
('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945:
A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 392).
US Atom Bomb Attacks on Japan
(August 1945)
On 6 August 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb
on Hiroshima and another on Nagasaki on 9 August. ('Great Patriotic War
of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945: A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 415).
The Soviet Union enters
the Pacific War (August 1945)
On 8 August 1945:
"The Soviet government declared war on Japan"
('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945:
A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 417).
and:
"By nightfall of August 14 troops of the 2nd Far Eastern
Front had advanced 50-200 kilometres into Manchuria. .
In six days the Soviet troops thus inflicted a disastrous
defeat on the Kwangtung Army'.
('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945:
A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 422).
The End of the Pacific War
(August 1945)
On 14 August 1945, Japan surrendered, and the Second World
War came to an end. (William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,156).
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 1
CHANG Hsueh-liang, Chinese military officer (1898- ),
'the Young Marshal'; warlord of Manchuria.
CHEN Guofu = Pinyin form of CHIEN Kuo-fu.
CHEN Kuo-fu, Chinese politician (1892-1951); Director.
Kuomintang Organisation
Department (1926-32, 1944); Acting President, Control
Yuan (1928-36);
Governor, Kiangsu Province (1933-37); Director, Kuomintang
Personnel Department (1939-45); Chairman, Kuomintang
Central Finance Committee (1945); to USA (1950).
CHEN Lifu = Pinyin form of Chen Li-fu.
CHEN Li-fu, Chinese politician (1900-93); Secretary-General,
Kuomintang
(1929-31); Director, Kuomintang Investigation Department
(1928-38);
Director, Kuomintang Organisation Department (1938-39,
1944-48); Minister of Education (1938-44); Vice-President,
Legislative Yuan (1948-49); to USA (1950).
CHENNAULT, Claire L., American military officer (1893-1958);
military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek (1937-45); general (1942); Commander,
US Army Air Force in China (1942-45); Director, Chinese Air Transport Inc.
(1948-50); Director, Chinese Air Transport Ltd. (1955-59).
CHIANG Kai-shek, Chinese military officer and politician
(1887-1975); gangster in Shanghai (1916-17); joined Kuomintang (1918);
commandant, Whampoa Military Academy (1924); led Northern Expedition (1926);
State President (1928-49); President, 'Republic of China' (Taiwan) (1950-75).
HURLEY, Patrick, American lawyer, diplomat and military
officer (1883-1963); Secretary of War (1929-32); brigadier-general (1941);
President's personal representative to Kuomintang government (1941-42);
Minister to New Zealand (1942); Ambassador to China (1945).
MAO Tse-tung, Chinese revisionist politician (1893-1976);
Chairman, Chinese Soviet Republic (1934); married Chiang Ching (1939);
Chairman, People's Republic of China (1949-59); chairman, CPC (1949-76).
MAO Zedong = Pinyin form of Mao Tse-tung.
MARSHALL, George C., American military officer and politician
(1880-1959); Army Chief of Staff (1939-45); general of the army (1944);
US administration's 'mediator' in China (1945-47); Secretary of State (1947-49);
Secretary of Defence (1950-51).
ROOSEVELT, Franklyn D., American lawyer and politician
(1892-1945); state senator (1910-13); assistant secretary of the navy (1913-20);
Governor of New York (1929-33); President (1933-45).
STILLWELL, Joseph, American military officer (1893-1946);
military attache, Peking (1935-39); general (1942); commanding general,
US forces in China-Burma-India (1942-44); commanding general, US Ground
Forces (1945).
WANG Ching-wei, Chinese politician (1883-1944); Premier
(1925-27, 1932-35); chairman, Kuomintang (1932-38); Prime Minister of Japanese
puppet government in occupied China (1940-44); died in Japan (1944).
WANG Jingwei = Pinyin form of WANG Ching-wei. ZHANG Xueliang
= Pinyin form of CHANG Hsueh-liang.
CHAPTER
TWO: THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR (1945-49)
INTRODUCTION
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary
strategy required that, once Japan had been defeated, the revolutionary
process should proceed, with the minimum possible
interruption, to the national-democratic revolutionary struggle against
the remaining -- pro-American and pro-British -- landlords and comprador
bourgeoisie.
However, with the ending
of the Pacific War, the policy of the revisionist-led Communist Party of
China continued to be one of working for a
national united front with the Kuomintang and of willingness to make (weakening)
concessions to the Kuomintang in an effort to secure this.
Thus, when Japan surrendered
in August 1945, the Communist Party of China did not attempt to initiate
the next stage of the revolutionary process. On the contrary, it put forward
a policy of avoiding civil war except in self-defence:
"We don't want civil
war. However, if Chiang Kai-shek insists on forcing civil war on the Chinese
people, the only thing we can do is to take up arms and fight him in self-defence.
. . . This will be a civil war he forces on us."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The
Situation and Our Policy after the Victory in the War of Resistance against
Japan' (August 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p.
15).
The
Division within US Imperialism
The division within
the ranks of US imperialism described in Chapter Two continued
after the ending of the Pacific War.
One
section of the US imperialists, consisting primarily of
those elements without special
economic connections with China, aimed to bring about internal peace by
means of a compromise settlement between
the forces of the Kuomintang government and those of the Communist Party.
The
rival section of US imperialists, consisting primarily of
those elements with special economic connections with China, held that
no strategy should be adopted in relation to
China which might jeopardise America's future imperialist interests in
the region.
The first strategy
was espoused by the US Democratic administration around Roosevelt,
the second strategy
by the ultra-right Republican opposition, and especially by military officers
linked with it.
Clearly, the strategy
of the CPC dovetailed neatly with that of the
US civilian administration.
THE
CHINESE CIVIL WAR (1945-49)
US
Military Intervention in China (1945-47)
By July 1945-- that
is, before the Japanese surrender -- the US military were actively
intervening militarily in China in an effort to strengthen the military
position of the Kuomintang forces and to weaken the military position of
the forces of the Communist Party:
"A (US -- Ed.)
War Department directive of August 10 (1945-- Ed.) provided for the occupation
by American forces of key ports and communications centres in China, the
rapid transportation of Nationalist forces to key areas, and the turning
over of localities occupied by American forces only to agencies and forces
accredited by the Nationalist government.. . .
Immediately after
V-J day, American forces lifted three Nationalist armies by air to key
points of East and North China, including the three niost important cities
-- Shanghai, Nanking and Peking"
(Tsou Tang: 'America's
Failure in China: 1941-50'; Chicago; 1964; p.305-06, 308).
Thus, after Japan's surrender
in August 1945,
"The armed forces
of the United States . . . landed in China and stationed themselves at
Peking, Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin, . and other places. In addition, they
repeatedly invaded the Liberated Areas."
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 439).
Kuomintang-CPC
Peace Negotiations (1945)
In 1944, Roosevelt
had sent Vice-President Henry WALLACE* on a fact-finding mission to China,
and by July 1945 both:
"Roosevelt and Wallace
were bearing down hard on Chiang to come to terms with the Communists".
(Wesley M. Bagby:
op. cit.; p. 111).
As a result, in August
1945, Chiang Kai-shek invited Mao Tse-tung:
"To Chungking for
peace negotiations."
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 48).
and a delegation headed
by Mao Tse-tung:
"Arrived in Chungking
on August 28 and held negotiations with the Kuomintang for 43 days".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 49).
The Communist Party offered
very considerable concessions to the Kuomintang in an effort to secure
their acceptance of a national united front. Mao Tse-tung insisting:
"We are ready to
make concessions."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
the Chungking Negotiations' (October 1945), in:'Selected Works', Volume
4; Peking; 1961; p. 57).
For example:
Firstly,
the Party offered
"To reduce the anti-Japanese
troops under its command to . . twenty divisions and to take prompt action
to demobilise its anti-Japanese troops now distributed in the eight areas
of Kwangtung, Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, southern Anhwei, central Anhwei,
Hunan, Hupeh and Honan", (Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume
4; Peking; 1961; p. 61).
so surrendering
eight of its liberated areas -- in order to make the Kuomintang
'feel easy':
"Some comrades have
asked why we should concede eight Liberated Areas. It is a great pity to
concede these eight areas, but it is better to do so. . . . Why should
we concede those areas? Because otherwise the Kuomintang will not feel
easy. . . . Our concession on this point will help frustrate the Kuomintang's
plot for civil war'.
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
the Chungking Negotiations' (October 1945), in:
'Selected Works',
Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 56).
Secondly,
the Party agreed to the reoccupation of Manchuria
by Kuomintang troops without opposition. In December 1945,
the US government sent General George MARSHALL*, recently retired as Army
Chief of Staff, to China, ostensibly to 'mediate'
between the opposing forces.
Marshall proposed
that the Kuomintang forces should be allowed:
"To reoccupy Manchuria
without any interference from the Communists. In an extraordinary development,
CHOU En-lai* agreed".
(Lionel M. Chassin:
'The Communist Conquest of China: A History of the
Civil War: 1945-49';
London; 1966; p. 72).
Thirdly,
the Party continued its policy of rent and
interest reduction in place of that of confiscation of the
landlords' land:
"The present policy
of our Party is still to reduce rents, not to confiscate land".'
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Rent
Reduction and Production are Two Important Matters for the Defence of the
Liberated Areas' (November 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking;
1961; p. 72.)
"Reduce rent. . . .
All areas must launch movements in 1946 for the reduction of rent and interest
in their newly liberated areas."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Policy
for Work in the Liberated Areas for 1946' (December 1945), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 70).
However, these concessions
did not satisfy the Kuomintang which made the demand:
"To eliminate altogether
the people's army and the Liberated Areas."
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 60).
and
"Consequently no
agreement could be reached".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 60).
In fact, even during the
peace negotiations, the forces of the Kuomintang continued to attack the
forces of the Communist Party:
"The Kuomintang is
negotiating with us on the one hand and is vigorously attacking the Liberated
Areas on the other hand".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
the Chungking Negotiations' (October 1945), in:
'Selected Works',
Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 53).
The
Spurious 'Cease-fire' (January-June 1946)
However, in January 1946:
"Both sides agreed . .
. to an unconditional cease-fire based upon the status quo."
(E. R. Hooton: 'The
Greatest Tumult: The Chinese Civil War: 1936-49'; London; 1991; p. 29).
At the same time, the
Kuomintang government agreed to convene a:
"Political Consultative
Conference, agreed upon in principle by the Kuomintang and Yenan (the capital
of the Liberated Areas -- Ed.) in October 1945".
(Lionel M. Chassin:
ibid.; p. 71).
The conference:
"Adopted a series
of resolutions favourable to peace and democracy."
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 90).
but the:
"Political Consultative
Conference agreements were soon torn up by him (Chiang Kai-shek - Ed.)
one after another".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 95).
In fact, Chiang Kai-shek
used the truce:
"As a smoke-screen
behind which he made arrangements for a major war; at the very time the
cease-fire order was being transmitted, he ordered the Kuomintang troops
'to seize strategic points' and from then he moved up troops continuously
to attack the Liberated Areas". (Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works',
Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 92).
and by June 1946:
"Chiang Kai-shek
had massed 80% of his regular forces (which were about two million men)
at the front for attacks on the Liberated Areas; more than 540,000 of these
troops were transported directly by the warships and planes of the US armed
forces".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung:
'Selected Works', Volumne 4; Peking; 1961; p. 110).
The
Renewal of the Civil War (July 1946)
In July 1946:
"· . . when
the disposition of his troops had been completed, Chiang Kai-shek launched
a country-wide counter-revolutionary war . .
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 110-11).
against the armed forces
of the Communist Party of China. In Marshall's view:
"The Chinese Communist
Party had been sincerely desirous. . . of reaching an understanding with
the Nationalists; it was the Kuomintang government that had wrecked negotiations
with its incessant violations of the truce and continuation of its military
action".
(Lionel M. Chassin:
op. cit.; p. 94).
An important factor in
the Kuomintang attitude was US military aid:
"Americans trained
and equipped 20 Chinese divisions with modern weapons, began the training
and equipment of others, built up China's financial reserves."
(Wesley M. Bagby:
op. cit.; p. 222).
This resulted in:
". . the strengthening
of elements in the Kuomintang that opposed refprm".
(Wesley M. Bagby:
op. cit.; p. 222).
And so opposed to any
sharing of power with the Communist Party. In January 1947:
"The United States
officially abandoned its mediation efforts"
(William L. Langer
(Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,338).
which:
"Had ended in complete
failure",
(Lionel M. Chassin:
op. cit.; p. 95).
and open warfare:
"· . . now spread
across the whole of northern China".
(E. R. Hooton: op.
cit.; p. 39).
Although the civil war
was initiated by the Kuomintang, it acquired many characteristics of a
national-democratic revolutionary war, and was described
by the Party as a struggle for:
"· . . the
liberation of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto
of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' (October 1947), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 147).
Spontaneous
Land ReForm (1947-48)
Despite the efforts
of the Chinese revisionists to deter the peasants from undrertaking land
reform, a 'Directive on the Land Question' issued by the CC of the CPC
in May 1946 noted that in many areas the peasants
had spontaneously seized land from the landlords:
"In combatting Chinese
collaborators, settling accounts with landlords, and reducing rent and
interest, the people have seized land directly from the landlords, thus
realising the principle of 'land to the tiller'."
(Liu Shao-chi: 'Directive
on the Land Question' (May 1946), in: Liu Shao-chi: 'Selected Works', Volume
1; Oxford; 1984; p. 372).
Even though this campaign
had been initiated in contravention of the policy of the Communist Party,
the Party felt it tactically necessary to endorse
such action retrospectively:
"Our Party . . .
cannot but support the masses in their direct implementation of agrarian
reform".
(Liu Shao-chi: ibid.;
p. 373).
By February 1947, land
reform had been put into effect in about two-thirds of the territory of
each Liberated Area:
"In about two-thirds
of the territory in each Liberated Area, . the land problem has been solved
and the policy of land to the tillers has been carried out".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Greet
the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution' (February 1947), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 123).
The
New National United Front Policy in China (1945-49)
The Communist Party of
China maintained that the position of China in 1945-49 was essentially
the same as in 1941-45, except that US imperialism had taken the place
of Japanese imperialism:
"US imperialism and
its running dog Chiang Kai-shek have replaced Japanese imperialism and
its running dog Wang Ching-wei and adopted the policies of turning China
into a US colony".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Greet
the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution' (February 1947), in: Selected
Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 120).
"After the victorious
conclusion of the anti-fascist Second World War, US imperialism . . . stepped
into the shoes of . . . Japanese imperialism".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The
Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in: 'Selected Works',
Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 158).
In this new situation,
the Communist Party called again for the formation
of a new national united front, this time against US imperialism:
"Form a national
united front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang- Kai-shek government".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto
of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' (October 1947), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 150).
The
Breadth of the Anti-American National United Front
It would seem even at
first glance that this new proposed anti-American national united front
must be narrower than the earlier
anti-Japanese national united front.
In view of the Party's
reluctant endorsement of land reform, the term 'enlightened
gentry' was now redefined to mean landlords:
1) who favoured struggle
against United States imperialism and the Kuomintang government;
2) who were prepared
to collaborate with the Communist Party: and
3) who supported land
reform.
"The enlightened
gentry are individual landlords . . . with democratic leanings.
At the present stage,
what we require of them is that they favour the struggle against the United
States and Chiang Kai-shek, favour democracy (not be anti-Communist), and
favour land reform. If they can meet these requirements, we should unite
with them without exception."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry' (March
1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 209, 210).
In words, the Party presented
the 'enlightened gentry' as possible recruits to the new anti-American
national united front:
"These reactionary
policies of US imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek have forced all strata of
the Chinese people to unite for their own salvation. These strata include
. . . the enlightened gentry".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Greet
the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution' (February
1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 121).
"The strata of the
Chinese people . . . united for their own salvation include the . . . enlightened
gentry".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The
Chiang Kai-shek Government is besieged by the Whole People' (May 1947),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 136).
"The enlightened
gentry . . . constitute an element in the revolutionary united front. .
. . We should unite with them without exception".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry' (March
1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 210).
On these grounds, Mao
maintained in words that
"On the surface,
our revolutionary national united front appears to have narrowed in the
present period as compared with the period of the War of Resistance. As
a matter of fact, . . . our national united front has really broadened".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The
Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in:
'Selected Works',
Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 169-70).
But clearly few landlords
who would be willing to support the confiscation of their own land, so
that the Party's endorsement of land reform reduced in practice the number
of 'enlightened gentry' -- i.e., of landlords willing to take part in the
anti-American national united front -- to a negligible figure.
Furthermore, it would
hardly be possible to bring pro-American comprador capitalists into an
anti-American united front, while, in view of the long struggle of the
Chinese people against the Japanese occupiers, it would be
politically very difficult
for the Party to invite the remnants of pro-Japanese
comprador capitalists to join it.
Nevertheless, it was
envisaged not only that the national bourgeoisie could be won to the new
national united front, but that a policy of concessions to the pro-American
comprador capitalists could induce them to transfer their allegiance to
the anti-American national united front.
CPC
Concessions to the National Bourgeoisie
The Communist Party of
China continued to maintain that the national
bourgeoisie could be a participant in this anti-American
national united front:
"The reactionary
policies of US imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek have forced
all strata of the Chinese people to unite for their own salvation.
These strata include the
. · . national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Greet
the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution' (February
1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 121).
''The strata of the
Chinese people . . . united for their own salvation include
the . . . national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The
Chiang Kai-shek Government is besieged by the Whole People'
(May 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p.136).
"'Businessmen' means
all the national bourgeois who are persecuted and fettered. . . . The Chinese
revolution at the present stage is a revolution in which all these people
form a united front. . At
the present stage, . . . circumstances make it necessary and possible for
us to win over the majority of the national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened
Gentry' (March 1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p.
207, 209).
"The united front is
so broad that it includes . . . the national bourgeoisie".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Address
to the Preparatory Committee of the New Political Consultative
Conference' (June 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961;
p. 407).
"We must unite with
the national bourgeoisie in the common struggle".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
the People's Democratic Dictatorship' (June 1949), in: 'Selected Works',
Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 421).
However, since the national
bourgeoisie had previously deserted the national liberation movement because
of fear for their future, in order to bring them into the anti-American
national united front it was necessary for the Party to make concessions
to the national bourgeoisie which might assure them that their future as
exploiters would be secure if they supported the anti-American national
united front:
Firstly,
the Party renewed its former pledge that their enterprises would be protected
and encouraged to develop by the new-democratic state:
"Develop the industry
and commerce of the national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto
of the Chinese Liberation Army' (October 1947),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 150).
"The policy . . .
of protecting and encouraging the development of private industry and commerce
was correct and should be continued in the future".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy' (January 1948),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 183).
"There should be no
encroachment . . . upon the national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Speech
at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area' (April
1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 236).
"Protect the industrial,
commercial, agricultural and livestock enterprises of the national bourgeoisie.
All privately owned factories, shops, banks, warehouses, vessels, wharves,
farms, livestock farms and other enterprises will, without exception, be
protected against any encroachment".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Proclamation
of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' (April 1949), in: 'Selected Works',
Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 397).
"China must utilise
all the factors of urban and rural capitalism that are beneficial . . .
to the national economy."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
the People's Democratic Dictatorship' (June 1949), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 421).
Secondly,
it renewed its former pledge that political representatives of the national
bourgeoisie would be accorded a share in the
power of the new-democratic state:
"It is the . . .
new rich (i.e., bourgeois -- Ed.) peasants . . . all united together .
. . who conquer the country and should rule the country. .
The new-democratic
state power is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal state power of the
masses of the people. . . . The masses of the people include . . . the
national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy' (January 1948),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 182-83, 186-87).
Thirdly,
it renewed its former suggestion that there would be a long interval
between the victory of the national-democratic revolution and its transformation
into a socialist revolution:
"It will still be
necessary to permit the existence for a long time of a capitalist sector
of the economy. . . . This capitalist sector will still be an indispensable
part of the whole national economy."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The
Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in:
'Selected Works',
Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 168).
"There will be need,
for a fairly long time after the victory of the revolution, to make use
of the positive qualities of urban and rural private capitalism as far
as possible, in the interests of developing the national economy."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Report
to the 2nd Plenary Session of the 7th CC of the CPC' (March 1949), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking: 1961; p. 367).
CPC
Concessions to the Comprador Bourgeoisie
In its strategy of offering
concessions to the pro-US comprador bourgeoisie in an effort to draw it
into a national united front against US imperialism, the Communist Party
invented the new term of 'bureaucrat-capital',
defined as that section of comprador capital which was:
"The property of
the four big families of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V.
SOONG*, H. H. KUNG* and the Chen . . . brothers".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto
of the Chinese Liberation Army' (October 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume
4; Peking; 1961; p. 150).
It now became the policy
of the Communist Party that the new-democratic
state should confiscate, not comprador capital as a whole, but only that
section of it defined as 'bureaucrat-capital', together
with the capital of a few individual comprador capitalists who actively
resisted the anti-American national united front and who were classified
as war-criminals:
"Confiscate the property
of the four big families of Chiang Kai-shek, T.
V. Soong, H. H, Kung and the Chen . . . brothers, and the property of the
other chief war criminals".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto
of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' (October 1947), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 150).
"Confiscate monopoly
capital, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H.
H. Kung and Chen Li-fu, and turn it over to the new-democratic state. During
their twenty-year rule, the four big families, Chiang, Soong, Kung and
Chen, have piled up enormous fortunes, valued at ten to twenty thousand
million US dollars and monopolised the economic lifelines of the whole
country. . . . This capital is popularly known in China as bureaucrat capital.
This capitalist class, known as the bureaucrat-capitalist-class, is the
big bourgeoisie of China. .
The new-democratic
revolution aims at wiping out only . . . the bureaucrat-capitalist class".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The
Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in:
'Selected Works',
Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 167, 168).
Thus, in the above report
of December 1947, Mao:
"Delineated more
clearly those segments of private capital earmarked for expropriation.
These potential victims were described as owners of 'bureaucratic capital'.
(Wu Yuan-li: 'The
Economy of Communist China: An Introduction'; London; 1965; p. 10).
The 'war criminals' concerned
were:
"Forty-three war
criminals . . . who were listed by the Communist Party of China on December
25, 1948".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
Ordering the Reactionary Kuomintang Government . . to Arrest the Kuomintang
War Criminals: Statement by the Spokesman for the Communist Party of China'
(January 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 329).
The
Military Course of the Civil War (1946-49)
In the second half of
1946, Kuomintang forces:
"Made impressive
gains in North China and Manchuria, capturing 165 towns."
('New Encyclopaedia
Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p. 141).
which in March 1947:
"Culminated in the capture
of the Communist capital of Yenan".
(William L. Langer
(Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,338).
Not till November 1947
was a new capital of the Liberated Areas established at
"Shihkiachwang".
(Lionel N. Chassin:
op. cit.; p. 147).
During 1947, however:
"The strategic initiative
passed to the PLA. .
By the end of 1947,
. . . the Nationalists were widely spread and on the defensive".
('New Encyclopaedia
Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p, 141, 142).
and in December 1947 Mao
Tse-tung could tell the Central Commitee of the CPC:
"The Chinese people's
revolutionary war has now reached a turning point. . . . Beginning with
. . . July/September 1947, the People's Liberation Army went over to the
offensive on a national scale."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The
Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in:
'Selected Works',
Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 157).
During the second half
of 1948:
"The Communist armies
had gained . . . a numerical superiority and had captured such huge stocks
of rifles, artillery and armour that they were better equipped than the
Nationalists."
('New Encyclopaedia
Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p. 142).
and in September 1948
the Communist Party:
"Announced the formation
of a People's Governmnent for North China."
(Lionel N. Chassin:
op. cit.; p. 202).
1949 saw:
"The rapid decomposition
of the Nationalist armies".
(William L. Langer
(Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,339).
Tientsin and Peking falling
in January 1949, Nanking in April, Shanghai in May and Canton in October.
In April 1949, Mao
Tse-tung, as Chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Commission,
and CHU Teh*, as Commander-in-Chief of the PLA,
"Ordered the People's
Liberation Army to advance courageously, wipe out all reactionary Kuomintang
troops who dare to resist, arrest all incorrigible war criminals, liberate
the people of the whole country (Mao Tse-tung: Proclamation of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army".
(April 1949), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 397).
In July 1949, the Nationalists:
"Began to prepare
for withdrawal to the island of Formosa (Taiwan), which was completed by
December".
(William L. Langer
(Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,339).
while:
"The US government,
attempting to extricate itself from its entanglement with the collapsing
forces of the National Government, pursued a policy of non-involvement".
('New Encyclopaedia
Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p. 142-43).
The
Establishment of the People's Republic of China (October 1949)
In September 1949,
a 'Political Consultative Conference of the Chinese People' met in Peking:
"The 662 members
of this body represented not only the CPC, but such other anti-Kuomintang
bodies as the Democratic League, . . . regional democratic groups. . .
. There were also representatives of regional governments, of labour and
peasant unions, of commerce and industry, of religious and cultural interests,
of ethnic minorities, and of the overseas Chinese."
(Lionel N. Chassin:
op. cit.; p. 238).
The conference accomplished:
"Election of the
members of the central government; adoption of a
Common Programme'; designation of Peking as the official capital of
China; . . . adoption
of a national anthem . . .; and adoption of a national
flag. .
The 'Common Programme
was in fact the constitution of the new state."
(Lionel M. Chassin:
op. cit.; p. 238-39).
In October 1949,
"the People's Republic
of China was officially proclaimed at Peking
. . . . with Mao Tse-tung as Chairman . . . (i. e., State
President -- Ed.) and
Chou En-lai as premier and foreign minister".
(William L. Langer
(Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,339).
The Communist Party insisted
that the People's Republic was:
"Led by the Communist
Party of China."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Long
live the Great Unity of the Chinese People!' (September 1949), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 19).
The
Establishment of the 'Republic of China' (December 1949)
In December 1949, the
remnants of the Kuomintang forces headed by Chiang Kai-shek, having withdrawn
from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan, there:
"Established a Kuomintang
regime. . . . This regime continued to assert that it was the rightful
Chinese Government, in opposition to the
People's Republic of China."
('Europa World Year
Book: 1995', Volume 1; London; 1995; p. 833).
BIOGRAPHICAL
NOTES
CHOU En-lai, Chinese
revisionist politician (1898-1976); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1927-76);
deputy chairman, People's Revolutionary Military Council
(1949-54); member, Central People's Government Council (1949-54);
Minister of Foreign Affairs
(1949-58); Prime Minister (1949-76); deputy chairman,
CPC (1956-76); member, Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC (1956-76).
CHU Teh, Chinese military
officer and revisionist politician (1886-1976); commander, People's Liberation
Army (1931-54); marshal (1955); chairman, Standing
Committee of Nationaal People's Council (1949-76).
GONG, Xianxi = Pinyin
form of KUNG Hsiang-hsi.
KUNG, Hsiang-hsi (H.
H.'), Chinese financier and politician (1881-1967); Minister of Finance
(1933-44); Minister of Industries (1931); president, Executive Yuan (1938-39,
1944-48); to USA (1948).
SOONG, Tzu-wen ('T.
V.'), Chinese financier and politician (1894-1971); educated in USA; Minister
of Finance (1925-31); vice-president, Executive Yuan
(1932-33); chairman, Bank of China (1934-43); Minister of Foreign
Affairs (1942-45); chairman,
Executive Yuan (1945-47); governor of Kwangtung
(1947); to USA (1949).
WALLACE, Henry A.,
American agronomist, editor and politician (1888-1965); associate editor,
(1910-24), editor (1924-29), 'Wallace's Farmer'; editor, 'Wallace's Farmer
and Iowa Homestead' (1929-33); Secretary of Agriculture (1933-40); Vice-President
(1941-45); Secretary of Commerce (1945-46); editor, 'New Republic' (1946-47).
HOU Enlai = Pinyin
form of CHOU En-lai. ZHU De Pinyin form of CHU Teh.
CHAPTER
THREE : THE NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION (1949-53)
INTRODUCTION
In the years immediately
prior to 1949, as we have seen, the Communist Party of China had come to
represent the interests of a national united front.
But with the ending
of the civil war in China and the establishment of the People's Republic
of China in October 1949, THERE CEASED TO BE ANY COMMON INTERESTS BETWEEN
THE LANDLORD CLASS, THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE AND THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE
-- LET ALONE THE WORKING CLASS.
THERE CEASED, THEREFORE,
TO BE ANY BASIS FOR A NATIONAL UNITED FRONT BETWEEN THESE CLASSES. AND
THERE CEASED TO BE ANY POSSIBILITY OF THE CONTINUED UNITY OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY AS IT EXISTED IN 1949.
With the acceptance
by the Communist Party in the 1945-49 period of land reform -- i.e., the
confiscation and redistribution of the landlords? land (see pages 23-24)--
THERE HAD CEASED TO BE ANY GROUPING WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY REPRESENTING
THE INTETESTS OF THE LANDLORD CLASS.
THUS, AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA CAME TO
CONSIST OF THREE GROUPINGS REPRESENTING DIFFERENT CLASS INTERESTS:
FIRSTLY, A MARXIST-LENINIST
GROUPING REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE WORKING CLASS, HEADED BY KAO
KANG*;
SECONDLY, A REVISIONIST
GROUPING REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE, HEADED
BY LIU SHAO-CHI*; AND
THIRDLY, A REVISIONIST
GROUPING REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE, HEADED
BY MAO TSE-TUNG.
ALL THREE GROUPINGS
WITHIN THE PARTY WERE AGREED ON CARRYING FORWARD THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS
AGAINST THE LANDLORD CLASS, BUT THE THIRD GROUPING DIFFERED FROM THE FIRST
TWO IN SEEKING TO PROTECT, AS FAR AS WAS PRACTICABLE, THE INTERESTS OF
THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE.
THE THEORETICAL GROUND
FOR THIS PROTECTION HAD ALREADY BEEN LAID BY MAO'S REVISIONIST DICTUM THAT
THE NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION SHOULD BE DIRECTED NOT AGAINST THE COMPRADOR
BOURGEOISIE AS A WHOLE, BY ONLY AGAINST A SMALL SECTION OF IT LABELLED
'BUREAUCRAT-CAPITAL' AND 'WAR CRIMINALS' (see page 28).
THE
NATIONALISATION OF BUREAUCRAT-CAPITAL (1949-50)
In 1949-50, shortly
after the establishment of the People's Republic of China,
"The People's Government
confiscated all the enterprises operated by bureaucrat-capital. . . . These
enterprises, including the Japanese, German and Italian concerns in China
taken over by the Kuomintang government following the victory of the War
of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, were turned into . . . state-owned
enterprises".
(Liu Shao-chi: 'Political
Report of the CC of the CPC to the 8th National Congress of the Party'
(September 1956) (hereafter listed as 'Liu Shao-chi (1956)'; Peking; 1956;
p 12).
Comprador bourgeois other
than bureaucrat-capitalists and a few designated war criminals were treated
as national bourgeois:
"Those capitalists
who were independent of the Kuomintang monopolists retained their enterprises."(John
& Elsie Collier: 'China's Socialist Revolution'; London; 1973; p. 30).
THE
LAND REFORM (1950-1952)
In the summer of June
1950, THE PARTY PROCEEDED TO INITIATE A COUNTRYWIDE LAND REFORM WHICH WOULD
ELIMINATE LANDLORDS AS A CLASS.
"The Party turned
once again to land reform, abandoning the more moderate Anti-Japanese War
policy of rent and interest reduction."
(Suzanne Pepper: 'Civil
War in China: The Political Struggle: 1945-1949'; Berkeley. (USA); 1978;
p. 229).
In the discussions leading
up to the land reform, the national and comprador bourgeois groupings of
the Party successfully pressed for the reform to be applied
only to land held by the landlord class, with land held by rich
peasants (i.e., rural capitalists) exempted.
This was the main theme of several speeches by Mao Tse-tung in the spring
and early summer of 1950:
"If we touch only
the landlords and not the rich peasants, we can more effectively isolate
the landlords".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Request
for Opinions on the Tactics for dealing with Rich Peasants' (March 1950),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 24).
Thus, declared Mao, the
Party's policy:
"Should be one of
maintaining the rich peasant economy in order to facilitate the early rehabilitation
of rural production and the better to isolate the landlords."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Fight
for a Fundamental Turn for the Better in the Nation's Financial and Economic
Situation' (June 1950), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p.
29).
In June 1950, the Central
Committee of the Party presented the draft of an 'Agrarian Reform Law':
"To the 2nd Session
of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference. . . . After it had been discussed and endorsed by the session,
the Central People's Government Council approved the draft. On June 30
of the same year, Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central People's Government,
promulgated the 'Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China'."
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung:
'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 40).
The
Effect of the Land Reform
The land reform legislation
brought about:
"Far-reaching modifications
in the shape of society in the countryside".
(Jacques Guillermaz:
'The Chinese Communist Party in Power: 1949-1976'; Folkestone; 1976; p.
28-29).
It:
"Succeeded in redistributing
about 43% of China's cultivated land to about 60% of the rural population".
(Frederick C. Teiwes:
'Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime', in: Roderick MacFarquahar
& John K. Fairbank (Eds.): 'The Cambridge History of China', Volume
14: 'The People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China:
1949-1965' (hereafter listed as 'Fredrick C. Teiwes (1987)'); Cambridge;
1987; p. 87).
It had the effect of:
"Freeing millions
of peasants of the burden of paying rent to landlords. .
300 million poor peasants
had their plots of land enlarged and instead of being tenant farmers .
. became . . . owners of small independent holdings."
(Jacques Guillermaz:
op. cit.; p. 26).
In fact:
"The local landlord
gentry was destroyed".
(Franz Schurmann:
'Peasants', in: Franz Schurmann & Orville Schell (Eds.): 'Communist
China: Revolutionary Reconstruction and International Confrontation: 1949-1966';
Harmondsworth; 1977; p. 170).
in:
"One of the greatest
social revolutions of modern times."
(Franz Schurmann:
ibid.; p. 169).
and, in the rural areas:
"China became a country
of small owner-cultivators".
(Edward L. Wheelwright
& Bruce McFarlane: 'The Chinese Road to Socialism: Economics of the
Cultural Revolution'; Harmondsworth; 1973; p., 34).
However:
"Land belonging to
rich peasants was 'protected' (Article 6)".
(Jacques Guillermaz:
op. cit.; p. 26).
The land reform had been:
"completed by 1952".
(Edward L. Wheelwright
& Bruce McFarlane: op. cit.; p. 33).
CHINESE
INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR (1951-53)
In October 1950, Chinese
troops crossed the Yalu river in order to intervene in the Korean War on
the side of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, driving the invading
United States and South Korean troops back to the line of the 38th Parallel.
In May 1951, on US
initiative, negotiations began for an armistice. This was finally signed
in July 1953.
THE
'CAMPAIGN FOR THE ELIMINATION OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES'
(February
1951-Spring 1953)
With the aim of consolidating
the effects of the partial national-democratic revolution, a 'Campaign
for the Elimination of Counter-Revolutionaries' was initiated in February
1951.
The directives for
the campaign emphasised the need to mobilise:
"Mass participation
in the process of uncovering counter-revolutionaries".
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1987): : op. cit.; p. 91).
and 'Committees for the
Elimination of Counter-revolutionaries' were set up in schools, factories,
government bodies, etc.
The campaign:
"Ended in 1953".
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1987): op. cit.; p. 88).
It:
"Effectively destroyed
the old Kuomintang (KMT) power structure and enabled the CPC to extend
its power to villages throughout the land".
(Roderick MacFarquahar:
'The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: 1: Contradictions among the People:
1956-1957' (hereafter listed as'Roderick MacFarquahar (1974)'; London;
1974; p. 16).
CONCLUSION
The land reform of 1950-52
liquidated the Chinese landlord class, forming part of a
national-democratic revolution. But since this left untouched
most of the comprador bourgeoisie -- liquidating only a small part of this
class, namely the 'bureaucrat-capitalists' and a few individuals designated
as 'war criminals' -- it was an incomplete
national-democratic revolution.
BIOGRAPHICAL
NOTES 3
GAO Gang = Pinyin
form of KAO Kang
KAO Kang, Chinese Marxist-Leninist
politician (1902-55); Deputy Premier (1949-53); Vice-Chairman, Central
Revolutionary Military Council (1951-53); Chairman, State Planning Commission
(1952-53); arrested by revisionists (1954); and reportedly died in prison
(1955).
LIU Shaoqi = Pinyin
form of LIU Shao-chi.
LIU Shao-chi, Chinese
revisionist politician (1898-1969); general secretary, CPC (1949-59); Deputy
Premier (1949-67); President (1959-68); expelled from Party and imprisoned
(1968); died in prison (1969); 'rehabilitated' by revisionists (1980).
CHAPTER
FOUR: THE 'ANTIS' AFFAIRS (December 1951-June 1952)
THE
'THREE-ANTI CAMPAIGN' (December 1951 - January 1952)
In December 1951:
"The National Committee
of the PPCC (People's Political Consultative Conference -- Ed.) issued
a directive calling upon the PPCC in all local areas to mobilise the 'democratic
political parties' and 'people's organisations' in support of the 'three-anti'
movement. . . . .
The directive called
for a nation-wide 'anti-corruption, anti-waste and anti-bureaucratism struggle"'.
(Theodore H. &
Wen-hui Chen: 'The 'Three-Anti' and the 'Five-Anti' Movements in Communist
China', in: 'Pacific Affairs', Volume 26, No. 1 (March 1953); p 5).
The 'Three-Anti' campaign
was planned by the Marxist-Leninist grouping of the Party, headed by Kao
Kang:
"Kao Kang . . . planned
the Three-Anti campaign".
('New Encyclopaedia
Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p. 144).
"After careful preparation
and a trial run organised by Kao Kang in Manchuria".
(Jacques Guillermaz:
op. cit.; p. 22).
It:
"Had the seemingly
worthwhile stated objectives of eliminating bureaucracy, waste and corruption
in government."
(Robert Loh: 'Escape
from Red China'; London; 1963; p. 60).
and:
"Applied to civil
servants and cadres of all kinds.. .
The aims were to give
the new administration a new style of work and new ethics, to correct the
cadres inherited from the former regime, to save the new ones from the
temptations of power."
(Jacques Guillermaz:
op. cit.; p. 22).
In other words, it was
directed:
"Against malpractices
in government offices."
(John & Elsie
Collier: op. cit.; p. 35).
It had the active support
of the national bourgeois grouping of the Party, headed by Liu Shao~hi.
THE
'FIVE-ANTI CAMPAIGN' (January-June 1952)
IN THE COURSE OF THE 'THREE-ANTI
CAMPAIGN', THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS
GROUPING WITHIN THE
COMMUNIST PARTY, HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG, TOOK ADVANTAGE OF MAO'S PRESTIGE
TO TRANSFORM THE CAMPAIGN INTO A 'FIVE-ANTI CAMPAIGN' DIRECTED AGAINST
THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE AND ITS POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES.
In the period between
November 1951 and January 1952, Mao wrote a number of notes to the Central
Committee demanding such a transformation:
"Particular attention
must be paid to the fact that the corrosion of cadres by the bourgeoisie
results in serious cases of corruption".
(Mao Tse-tung: Directive
for CC, CPC (November 1951), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977;
p. 64).
"In all cities . .
. we should . . . wage a large-scale, resolute and thoroughgoing struggle
against those capitalists who are violating the law. . . . All our big
cities . . . should start the struggle against the 'five evils in the first
ten days of February. Please make prompt arrangements."
(Mao Tse-tung: Directive
for CC, CPC (January 1952), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977;
p. 65-66).
Thus, from January 1952,
the 'Three-Anti Campaign':
"Gave place to the
Five-Antis. This campaign was directed against bribes, fraud, tax evasion,
embezzlement of state property, and the illegal obtaining of state economic
secrets."
(Jacques Guillermaz:
op. cit.; p. 23).
The campaign was officially
said to be directed:
" . . at lawbreaking
capitalists".
(Frederick C. Teiwes:
(1987): op. cit.; p. 90).
but in fact its:
"Target was the national
bourgeoisie as a class".
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1987): op. cit.; p. 90).
In other words, the 'Five-Anti
Campaign':
"Was not therefore
aimed at civil servants or cadres, but at those who might corrupt them:
the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. The latter were to be discredited
politically . . ., while their economic influence on various state or provincial
bodies was to be destroyed. This campaign, known as the 'tiger hunt', with
its secret denunciations and public accusation meetings, was accompanied
by thousands of condemnations and caused hundreds of people to commit suicide
in the large towns.. . .
The 'national bourgeoisie'
was terror-stricken".
(Jacques Guillermaz:
ibid.; p. 23).
"While the target of
the 'three-anti' was the corrupt elements in the government and Party,
the 'five-anti' was directed against the 'bourgeoisie' -- merchants, industrialists
and business people in general. .
The launching of an
attack upon the bourgeoisie within three years of the establishment of
the new regime no doubt came as a shock to many.. . .
Accusations, public
trials, confessions, huge mass meetings and the like marked the campaign."
(Theodore H. &
Wen-hui Chen: op. cit.; p. 10, 12, 13).
Those accused in the campaign:
"Were forced to pay
large sums to the state in the form of fines, delinquent tax assessments
or returned stolen assets."
(Theodore H. &
Wen-hui Chen: op. cit.; p. 18).
Mao confirmed to representatives
of press and publishing circles in March 1957 that:
"The 'Five-Antis'
was for rectifying the capitalists".
(Mao Tse-tung: Talk
with Representatives of Press and Publishing Circles (March 1957), in:
Roderick MacFarquahar, Timothy Cheek & Eugene Wu (Eds.): 'The Secret
Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward'(hereaf
ter listed as 'Roderick MacFarquahar et al (Eds.) (1989))'; Cambridge (USA);
1989; p. 261).
And the campaign did inflict
severe damage on the national bourgeoisie:
"In the cities the
prestige of the bourgeoisie was gravely damaged by the Five Anti Campaign".
(Frederick C. Teiwes:
'Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms:
1950-1965'; Folkestone; 1979; p. 160).
However, as a result:
Firstly,
of opposition from the Marxist-Leninist grouping within the Party, which
considered an offensive against the national bourgeoisie premature at this
stage of the revolutionary process, and
Secondly,
of particularly intense opposition from the Party grouping representing
the interests of the national bourgeoisie, which was the target of the
campaign, the 'Five-Anti Campaign':
" . . came to an
end on June 13, 1952".
(Jacques Guillermaz:
op. cit.; p. 23).
CHAPTER
FIVE: PREPARATION OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN (November 1952-February
1954)
By the autumn of 1952,
the dominant grouping within the Communist Party was again a coalition
of the Marxist-Leninist grouping, headed by Kao Kang, and the national
bourgeois grouping, headed by Liu Shao-chi.
Both these groupings
had a common interest in planning economic
development so as to maximise industrial development -- a
programme which was resisted by the comprador bourgeois grouping, headed
by Mao Tse-tung, whose interests required the continuation of a colonial-type
of economy in China.
In November 1952,
"The State Planning
Commission was established. Kao was brought to Peking to become its first
chairman".
(Donald Klein &
Anne B. Clark: 'Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism: 1921-1965';
Cambridge (USA); 1971; p. 433).
Because of the dissension
within the Party over the principles of economic planning, there was considerable
difficulty in reaching agreement on the First Five-Year Plan, covering
the period 1953 to 1957, which was, in only:
"Finalised at the
National People's Congress in July 1955",
(Mark Selden (Ed.):
'The People's Republic of China: A Documentary History of Revolutionary
Change'; New York; 1979; p. 294).
"Retroactively incorporating
the 1953 and 1954 plans".
(Marc Blecher: 'China:
Politics, Economics and Society: Iconoclasm and Innovation in a Revolutionary
Socialist Country'; London; 1986; p. 54).
Because of the dominance
within the Party of a coalition of the Marxist-Leninist and national bourgeois
groupings during the period when the Plan was being drawn up, THE FIRST
FIVE-YEAR PLAN AS ADOPTED BROADLY FOLLOWED THE MARXIST-LENINIST PRINCIPLES
PRACTISED IN THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE PERIOD WHEN STALIN WAS GENERAL-SECRETARY
OF THE CPSU.
There was to be a
high decree of centralisation in economic planning:
"Planning was to
be highly centralised".
(Marc Blecher: ibid.;
p. 54).
Investment priority was
accorded to heavy industry:
"Investment priority
was given to heavy industry. .The new heavy industry was to take the form
of very large complexes concentrated in a few big cities."
(Marc Blecher: ibid.;
p. 54, 55).
"The 58% of total investment
China allocated to heavy industry actually exceeded the Soviet figure".
(Marc Selden (Ed.):
op. cit.; p. 56).
"The Soviet Union provided
credit and technical assistance for 156 major projects, in what was perhaps
the largest transfer of technology ever carried out by any country".
(Marc Blecher: ibid.;
p. 54).
While the management of
state industrial enterprises was based on:
"'one-man management"
along Soviet lines".
(Marc Blecher: ibid.;
p. 56).
Under the First Five-Year
Plan:
"Industrial output
grew faster than the very high target of 14.7% per year. . . . Heavy industrial
output nearly tripled, while light industry grew 70%. Railway freight volume
more than doubled". (Marc Blecher: ibid.; p. 56-57).
CHAPTER
SIX: The 'KAO KANG AFFAIR'
(December
1953 - March 1955)
INTRODUCTION
The Communist Party
of China had long recognised in words the Marxist-Leninist principle that
the revolutionary process in a colonial-type country like China would take
place in two successive stages --
the stage of national-democratic revolution and that of socialist revolution:
"The Chinese revolutionary
movement led by the Communist Party embraces two stages, i.e., , the democratic
and the socialist revolutions, which are two essentially different revolutionary
processes.
The second process
can be carried through only after the first has been completed".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The
Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party'
(December 1939), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 330-31).
With the defeat of the
Kuomintang forces on the mainland, and the liquidation of the bureaucrat-capitalist
and landlord classes, it was impossible to disguise the fact that the first
(national-democratic) stage of the revolutionary process had been suffiently
completed to enable it to go forward to its
second stage -- to the stage of socialist revolution:
"The task confronting
the Party now is to build China into a great socialist country as quickly
as possible".
(Liu Shao-chi (1956):
op. cit.; p. 6).
THE MARXIST-LENINIST GROUPING
WITHIN THE PARTY HEADED BY KAO KANG, WHICH REPRESENTED THE INTERESTS OF
THE WORKING CLASS, WAS INDEED EAGER TO GO FORWARD TO THE SOCIALIST STAGE
OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS.
HOWEVER, THE NATIONAL
BOURGEOIS GROUPING WITHIN THE PARTY HEADED BY LIU
SHAO-CHI, WHICH REPRESENTED
THE INTERESTS OF EXPLOITERS WHO WERE ENGAGED IN INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE (see
page 1), WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF INDUSTRY
AND COMMERCE, SINCE THIS WOULD DESTROY THEIR POSITION AS EXPLOITERS.
THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS
GROUPING WITHIN THE PARTY HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG, WHICH REPRESENTED EXPLOITERS
WHO WERE ENGAGED IN FOREIGN TRADE (see page 1), WAS SIMILARLY STRONGLY
OPPOSED TO THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF COMMERCE, SINCE THIS WOULD DESTROY
THEIR POSITION AS EXPLOITERS.
HOWEVER, IT WAS POLITICALLY
IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS PERIOD -- BEFORE THE 20th
CONGRESS OF THE CPSU
HAD MADE REVISIONISM 'RESPECTABLE' WITHIN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST
MOVEMENT -- FOR THE TWO BOURGEOIS GROUPINGS WITHIN THE CHINESE PARTY PUBLICLY
TO REPUDIATE THE AIM OF SOCIALISM WITHOUT STRIPPING THEMSELVES OF THEIR
FALSE 'SOCIALIST' MASKS.
THEREFORE, THE POLITICAL
REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE TWO CLASSES COLLABORATED TO EVOLVE A NEW REVISIONIST
THEORY WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CARRY FORWARD THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION
IN WORDS, WHILE HOLDING IT BACK
IN FACT.
CHINESE
PSEUDO-SOCIALISM
IN ESSENCE, THIS PSEUDO-SOCIALIST
THEORY ELABORATED BY THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS SIMPLY EQUATED CAPITALISM
WITH SOCIALISM.
Marxism-Leninism holds
that the transition from capitalism to socialism requires a violent revolution
and the establishment of the dictatorship of thel proletariat:
"Can such a radical
transformation of the old bourgeois order be achieved without a violent
revolution, without the dictatorship of the proletariat?
Obviously not".
(Josef V. Stalin:
'Concerning Questions of Leninism' (January 1926), in:
'Works', Volume 8;
Moscow; 1954; p. 25).
THUS, ACCORDING TO MARXIST-LENINIST
PRINCIPLES, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THE 'NEW-DEMOCRATIC'
STATE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE TRANSITION, FROM CAPITALISM
TO SOCIALISM REQUIRED THE VIOLENT EXPULSION OF THE NATIONALAL BOURGEOISIE
AND THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE FROM THE STATE APPARATUS AND THE ENDING OF
CO-EXISTENCE BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND OTHER PARTIES.
INSTEAD OF PURSUING
SUCH A POLICY, THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS SIMPLY DECLARED THAT, BECAUSE OF
THE EXTENT OF STATE INFLUENCE IN THE ECONOMY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC,
THIS ECONOMY WAS ONE OF STATE CAPITALISM:
"The present-day
capitalist economy in China is . . . a state-capitalist economy."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
State Capitalism' (July 1953), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking;
1977; p. 101).
AND THAT BECAUSE OF THE
EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE STATE, IT WAS A STATE-CAPITALIST
ECONOMY OF A NEW TYPE:
"The present-day
capitalist economy in China a capitalist ecoomy which for the most part
is under the control of the People's Government.. . .
It is . . . a state-capitalist
economy of a new type."
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid.;
p. 101).
WHICH HAD, 'TO A VERY
GREAT EXTENT', A SOCIALIST CHARACTER:
"This state-capitalist
economy of a new type takes on a socialist character to a very great extent."
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid,;
p. 101).
THUS, THIS STATE CAPITALISM
AND THIS NEW-DEMOCRATIC STATE ARE PRESENTED BY THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS
AS 'VEHICLES FOR THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM':
"The transformation
of capitalism into socialism is to be accomplished through state capitalism".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The
Only Road for the Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce' (September
1953), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 112).
"We can proceed with
our step-by-step socialist transformation by means of the existing machinery
of state".
(Liu Shao-chi: 'Report
on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China' (September
1954); Peking; 1962; p. 26).
THIS TRANSITION CAN, IN
THE CASE OF CHINA, BE GRADUAL:
"State capitalism
in various forms is to be put into practice gradually so as to attain socialist
ownership by the whole people".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China (June
1954), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 143).
CARRIED OUT OVER A RELATIVELY
LONG PERIOD OF TIME:
"The socialist transformation
of capitalist industry and commerce by the state will be gradually realised
over a relatively long period of time, through various forms of state capitalism".
(Liu Shao-chi: 'Report
on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China'; Peking; 1962;
p. 26).
"The period of transition
from capitalism to socialism . . . will cover roughly eighteen years".
(Mao Tse-tung: Preface
1 to 'Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside' (September 1955), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 235).
AND 'PEACEFUL':
"To achieve socialism
through state capitalism . . . is a peaceful means of transition".
(Liu Shao-chi (1956):
op. cit.; p. 24).
"Under conditions obtaining
in this country, the exploiting class will be completely eliminated by
peaceful means."
(Kuan Ta-tung: 'The
Socialist Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce in China';
Peking; 1960; p. 111).
Furthermore, Marxism-Leninism
defines the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as a state in
which the proletariat does not share political power with any other class
and in which the Communist Party does not share leadership with any other
party:
"The class of proletarians
. . . does not and cannot share power with other classes. .
The party of the proletariat,
the Party of the Communists. . . does not and cannot share leadership
with other parties".
(Josef V. Stalin:
'Concerning Questions of Leninism' (January 1926), in:
'Works', Volume 8;
Moscow; 1954; p. 27, 28).
BUT THE 'NEW-DEMOCRATIC'
STATE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WAS DEFINED AS 'A STATE OF THE
ENTIRE PEOPLE', i.e., ONE IN WHICH THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE AND THE COMPRADOR
BOURGEOISIE SHARE IN POLITICAL POWER:
"After the founding
of the People's Republic, . . . representatives of the national bourgeoisie
and its parties have been taking part in the organs of our state".
(Liu Shao-chi (1956):
op. cit.;p. 61).
"Our state is a people's
democratic dictatorship. . . . The aim of this dictatorship is to protect
all our people. . . . Who is to exercise this dictatorship? . . . The entire
people".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People' (February 1957),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 387).
FURTHERMORE, THE 'NEW-DEMOCRATIC'
STATE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WAS DEFINED AS A STATE IN WHICH
THE COMMUNIST PARTY SHARES LEADERSHIP WITH OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES:
"Which is better,
to have just one party or several? As we see it now, it's perhaps better
to have several parties . . . . It means long-term coexistence and mutual
supervision
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
the Ten Great Relationships' (April 1956), in:
'Selected Works',
Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 296),
"Why should the bourgeois
and petty-bourgeois democratic parties be allowed to exist side by side
with the party of the working class over a long period of time? Because
we have no reason for not adopting the policy of long-term coexistence
with all those political parties."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On
the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People' (February 1957),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 413).
ACCORDING TO THE CHINESE
REVISIONISTS, 'SOCIALISM' IN CHINA COULD BE ACHIEVED, NOT BY NATIONALISATION
OF THE PRINCIPAL MEANS OF PRODUCTION, BUT BY
THE FORMATION OF JOINT STATE-PRIVATE ENTERPRISES IN WHICH THE STATE INVESTS
AND TO WHICH IT ASSIGNS
PERSONNEL TO SHARE IN MANAGEMENT WITH THE CAPITALISTS:
"A joint state-private
enterprise is one in which the state invests and to which it assigns personnel
to share in management with the capitalists".
(Kuan Ta-tung: op.
cit.; p. 75).
ACCORDING TO ThE CHINESE
REVISIONISTS, IN THE COURSE OF THIS 'SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION' CAPITALISTS
WILL GRADUALLY BE 'REMOULDED' INTO WORKING PEOPLE:
"In the course of
bringing about the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and
commerce, . . . educational measures are adopted to remould the capitalists
gradually , . . into working people".
(Liu Shao-chi (1956):
op. cit.; p. 25).
THE PROBLEM OF ThE DICTATORSHIP
OF ThE PROLETARIAT WAS EASILY SOLVED BY THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS. THEY
SIMPLY DECLARED THAT THE NEW-DEMOCRATIC STATE, THE JOINT DICTATORSHIP OF
SEVERAL CLASSES, WAS THE DICTATORSHIP
OF THE PROLETARIAT. Even though:
"Representatives
of the national bourgeoisie and its parties have been taking part in the
organs of our state",
(Liu Shao-chi (1956):
ibid.; p. 61).
": . our state .
. . is a dictatorship of the proletariat in essence".
(Liu Shao-chi (1956):
op. cit.; p. 61).
"Our state organs are
organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat."
(Mao Tse-tung: Speech
at the 2nd Plenum of the 8th Central Commitee of
the CPC (November
1956),in: 'Seleted Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 338).
THE
CONTROVERSY OVER THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM (1952-54)
WITHIN THE PARTY, THE
WHOLE REVISIONIST CONCEPT OF :
'PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM IN COOPERATION WITH THE BOURGEOISIE'
WAS DENOUNCED BY THE MARXIST-LENINIST MINORITY WITHIN THE PARTY, HEADED
BY KAO KANG.
Kao Kang. the leader
of the Marxist-Leninist grouping within the Communist Party of China, came
from
"The industrialised
north-east . . · the only region where the functions of First Secretary
(Party) and military commander-in-chief were united in one person -- Kao
Kang".
(Jaap van Ginneken:
'The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao'; Harmondsworth; 1976;
p. 35).
He:
"Had established
both warm personal relations with Stalin. . . and
smooth working relations with Soviet officials in the North-east".
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1990): 'Politics at Mao's Court: Kao Kang and Party
Factionalism in the Early 1950s' (hereafter listed as 'Frederick C.
Teiwes (1990)'); New York;
1990; p. 47).
and Mao himself noted:
"Stalin was very fond
of Kao Kang. . . . Kao Kang sent Stalin a congratulatory
telegram every 15 August."
(Mao Tse-tung: Talk
at Chengtu Conference (March 1958), in: Stuart Schram (Ed.): 'Mao Tse-tung
Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters: 1956-71'; Harmondsworth;
1975; p. 100).
Shortly after Kao Kang's
arrival in Peking, in early 1953, the Marxist-Leninist grouping there was
strengthgened when another leading Marxist-Leninist JAO Shuh-chih*::
"Came to Peking to
head the Central Committee's organisation department".
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1990); op. cit.; p. 6).
The fact that:
"Mao gave a ringing
endorsement of peaceful transition";
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1990): ibid.; p. 61).
greatly strengthened the
hand of the revisionists, while that of the Marxist-Leninist minority was
weakened by the fact that they continued to observe the discipline of democratic
centralism, opposing the revisionist majority only within higher Party
organs.
Thus, contrary to later
charges by the revisionists, Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih:
"Never openly put
forward any programme against the Central Committee
of the Party".
(Frederick C. Teiwes:
'Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the
Decline of Party Norms: 1950-1965' (hereafter listed as 'Frederick C.
Teiwes (1979)'); Folkestone;
1979; p. 183, citing 'New China News Agency' .
"There are many reasons
to believe that little more than parallel action by the two men existed.
. . . Chinese scholars today report having. . . seen no material demonstrating
that Kao and Jao ever held talks concerning their 'anti-Party' activities.
. . . Kao Kang's former secretraries claim there was little connection
between Kao and Jao".
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1990: op. cit.; p. 46).
and:
"The 1955 conclusion,
that Kao and Jao formed an anti-Party 'clique or 'alliance is no longer
used in Party history accounts."
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1990: op. cit.; p. 12).
So, in the discussions
within the Party leadership:
"Kao Kang was the odd
man out. . . . While he said nothing, his silence was correctly perceived
as disagreement."
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1990): ibid,; 61).
Privately, however, Kao
was quite blunt.He is recorded as saying:
"'Have you ever read
'On the Opposition' by Stalin? . . . Didn't Bukharin also advocate a peaceful
entry into socialism?"'
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1990): ibid.; p. 61).
while:
"Oral sources . .
. picture Kao as favouring a comparatively rapid elimination of the national
bourgeoisie as a class and a quick transition to socialism, and a close
adherence to the Soviet model'. (Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): ibid.; p.
36).
THE
COUP AGAINST THE MARXIST-LENINIST GROUPING
(December
1853 - March 1955)
THE REVISIONISTS CHOSE
NOT TO FIGHT THE MARXIST-LENINIST GROUPING
OPENLY ON THE QUESTION
OF THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM, ON WHICH THEIR FLAGRANT DEVIATIONS
FROM MARXISM-LENINISM MIGHT HAVE EXPOSED THEM. INSTEAD, THEY
EMBARKED ON A PLOT TO LIQUIDATE THE GROUPING BY BRINGING AGAINST ITS
LEADERS FALSE CHARGES
OF 'FACTIONALISM' AND 'CONSPIRACY TO SEIZE POWER':
Mao's
'Warning' to Kao Kang (December 1953)
The biographer of Mao's
wife, CHIANG Ching* reports that Mao saw in the opposition of Kao and Jao
to his revisionist line an unacceptable challenge to his personal supremacy
in the state:
"In the deep winter
of 1953, Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih . . . challenged Mao's personal supremacy
over the state structure."
(Roxane Witke: 'Comrade
Chiang Ching'; London; 1977; p. 279).
So, at an Enlarged Politburo
meeting in December 1953,
"Mao, for the first
time, directly confronted Kao Kang".
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1990): op. cit.; p. 115).
He:
". . issued a 'serious
warning' to Kao and Jao and proposed a draft resolution on strengthening
Party unity."
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1990): ibid.; p. 120).
The
4th Plenum of the 7th CC (February 1954)
At the 4th Plenum of the
7th Central Committee in February 1954,
" . . the dominant
figure . · . was Liu Shao-chi".
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1979): op. cit.; p. 173).
who criticised 'some cadres'
(unnamed) who, he alleged:
"exaggerate the role
of the individual and emphasise individual prestige. . . . They even regard
the region or department under their leadership as their individual inheritance
or independent kingdom".
(Liu Shao-chi: Report
to 4th Plenum of 7th CC of CPC (February 1954), in:
(John Gittings:'The
Role of the Chinese Army' (hereafter listed as 'John Gittings (1969)');
Delhi; 1969; p. 274, citing: 'New China News Agency' (19 February 1954).
During and after the 4th
Plenum:
" . . Kao and Jao
were offered many opportunities for a fresh start."
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1990): op. cit.; p. 124).
but they declined to support
the revisionist theses:
" . . refusing to
admit any serious fault".
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1990): ibid,; p. 126).
Suspicions that Liu' s
remarks were directed at the grouping headed by Kao Kang were supported
by the fact that Kao:
"· . . made
his last major report in September 1953".
(Donald W. Klein &
Anne B. Clark: op. cit.; p. 433),
Howevere, no official
announcement of his fate was published at the time. Kao merely:
"· . . dropped
from sight".
(Donald W. Klein &
Anne B. Clark: ibid.; p. 410).
In fact, in February 1954
he was:
"· . . thrown
into prison",
('Who's Who in Communist
China', Volume 1; Hong Kong; 1969; p. 330).
where he died in 1955.
It was later announced
that Jao had suffered:
" . . expulsion from
the Party".
(Franz Schurmann:
'Ideology and Organisation in Communist China'; Berkeley (USA); 1968; p.
267).
The
National Conference of the CPC (March 1955)
The 'Kao Kang Affair'
was first made public at a National Conference of the CPC in March 1955:
"A resolution of the
Party's National Conference in March 1955 . . . . for the first time in
public discussed the 'Kao-Jao anti-Party alliance'".
(John Gittings (1969):
op cit.; p. 275).
The resolution adopted
by the conference claimed that Kao had:
"Made the North-east
area the independent kingdom of Kao Kang".
(National Conference
of CPC: Resolution on the Anti-Party Alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih
(March 1955), in: 'People's China' (15 April 1955); p. 4).
and that after he was
transferred to Peking in 1953:
"He even tried to
instigate Party members in the army to support his conspiracy against the
Central Committee of the Party".
(National Conference
of CPC: Resolution on the Anti-Party Alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih
(March 1955), in: 'People's China' (15 April 1955); p. 4).
The resolution alleged
that, after a warning had been given to him at the 4th Plenum of the CC
in February 1954:
"Kao Kang not only
did not admit his guilt to the Party, but committed suicide as an ultimate
expression of his betrayal of the Party".
(National Conference
of CPC: Resolution on the Anti-Party Alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih
(March 1955), in: 'People's China' (15 April 1955); p. 4).
The resolution similarly
alleged that after Jao Shu-shih's transfer to Peking in the summer of 1952,
he:
"Attempted to start
a struggle on Kao's behalf".
(John Gittings (1969):
op. cit.; p. 275).
In his opening address
to the conference, Mao said:
"The criminal aim
of this anti-Party alliance was to split our Party and seize power in the
Party and the state by conspiratorial means".
(Mao Tse-tung: Opening
Speech at the National Conference of the CPC (March 1955), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 155).
In his concluding speech
to the conference, Mao Tse-tung replied to those who pointed out that there
was no documentary evidence of factional activity involving Kao and Jao:
"About the doubts
expressed by some comrades to the effect that since we have no written
agreement, perhaps there wasn't any alliance after all. . .,,. It is wrong
to say that no alliance can exist without written agreeent."
(Mao Tse-tung: Concluding
Speech at the National Conference of the CPC (March 1955), in: 'Selected
Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 162).
Along with Kao and Jao:
"Seven other men
were also swept out of the Party for their part in the 'anti-Party bloc'.
. . . Even if Kao and Jao had not been involved, the seven were so significant
themselves that their purge alone would have constituted a major debacle
within the CPC ranks".
(Donald W. Klein &
Anne B. Clark: op. cit.; p. 410).
"Kao's fall was accompanied
by the purge of virtually all the key Party leaders in the North-East Region."
('New Enclopaedia
Britannica', Volume 5; Chicago; 1994; p. 113).
With regard to the allegation
of the revisionists that Kao 'committed suicide', one may note that, according
to a 'Red Guard' pamphlet entitled 'Down with Liu Shao-chi' published in
1967 during the 'Cultural Revolution':
". Kao was 'put to
death"' not long after the (1955 -- Ed.) conference".
(Frederick C. Teiwes
(1979): op. cit.; p. 654).
The
5th Plenum of the 8th CC (April 1955)
At the 5th Plenum of
the CC in April 1955, a resolution on the 'Kao-Jao anti-Party bloc':
"Was based on a report
made by the Party Secretary-General TENG Hsiao-ping*".
(Donald W. Klein &
Anne B. Clark: op. cit.; p. 410).
The
8th National Congress of the CPC (September 1956)
In his Political Report
to the 8th National Congress of the CPC, Liu Shao-chi referred to:
"The anti-Party bloc
of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, who tried to seize the leadership of the
state and Party by conspiratorial means."
(Liu Shao-chi (1956):
op. cit.; p. 96).
The
2nd Plenum of the 8th CC (November 1956)
By November 1956, Mao
Tse-tung was suggesting that Kao Kang had been a Soviet agent:
"Are there such people
in our country who provide foreigners with information
behind the back of the Central Committee? I think there are.
Kao Kang is a case in
point".
(Mao Tse-tung: Speech
at 2nd Plenum of the 8th CC of the CPC' (November 1956),
in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 340).
CONCLUSION
The above interpretation
of the 'Kao Kang Affair' -- that it was a frame-up engineered by Mao Tse-tung
to eliminate progreessive opponents of Mao --was fundamentally accepted
by Soviet revisionist historians. However, not unnaturally, the political
point at issue is presented as Kao's pro-Soviet sympathies
rather than his loyalty to Marxist-Leninist revolutionary principles:
"Beginning in 1953,
Mao Tse-tung began the gradual elimination of all those who did not share
his nationalist, anti-Soviet line. .
The struggle between
the internationalist Marxist-Leninists and the Maoists . . . intensified
at the beginning of the 1950s. The alarm was the arrest and death in prison
in 1955 of Kao Kang. . . . The various criminal charges brought against
him were completely unfounded".
(Oleg B. Borisov &
Boris T. Koloskov: 'Soviet-Chinese Relations: 1945-1970'; Bloomington (USA);
1975; p. 126).
BIOGRAPHICAL
NOTES 4
CHIANG Ching, Chinese
actress and revisionist politician (1914-91); married Mao Tse-tung (1939);
in charge of 'proletarianisation' of Peking Opera and Ballet (1963-65);
deputy director, Cultural Revolution Group (1966-68); arrested (1976);
expelled from CPC (1977); tried for counterrevolutionary activity (1980-81);
given suspended death sentencve (1981); death sentence commuted to life
imprisonment (1983); released from prison to house arrest (1984); died
under house arrest, allegedly by suicide (1991).
JAO Shu-shih, Chinese
Marxist-Leninist politician (1903-75); 1st secretary, East China Bureau,
CPC, and 1st secretary, Shanghai Municipal Committee, CPC (1949-52); member,
Central People's Government Council (1949-53); member, People's Revolutionary
Military Council (1949-54); Political Commissar, East China Military Region
(1950-54); Chairman, East China Military and Administrative Committee/East
China Administrative Committee (1950-65); Director, Organisation Department,
CC, CPC (1952-53); member, State Planning Commission (1952-54); arrested
by revisionists (1955); expelled from CPC by revisionists (1955).
JIANG Qing = Pinyin
form of CHIANG Ching.
RAO Shushi = Pinyin
form of JAO Shu-shih.
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