"CLASS STRUGGLES
IN CHINA"

A MARXIST-LENINIST ANALYSIS OF
MAO-TSE TUNG,
BY W.B.BLAND.
REVISED VERSION
LONDON, 1997.

FOREWORD

Nearly thirty years ago, in January 1968, the 'Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Britain', the predecessor of the 'Communist League', published a report on 'The Situation in the People's Republic of China'.

The main features of the report were its characterisation of the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' as counter-revolutionary, and 'The Thought of Mao Tse-tung' as reactionary and revisionist.

While the 'Communist League' fully endorses these main features of the MLOB report, further research makes it clear that the class situation in post-1949 China was more complex than was envisaged by the MLOB.

In fact, the following social classes were operating in the People's Republic of China in the period concerned, each striving to mould China along lines which would serve its interests, and each represented by a grouping within the Communist Party.

1) The working class, represented by a Marxist-Leninist grouping within the Communist Party headed by Kao Kang;

2) The national bourgeoisie, a section of the bourgeoisie engaged primarily in manufacturing and oppressed by imperialism, represented by a revisionist grouping within the Communist Party headed by Liu Shao-chi;

3) The comprador bourgeoisie, a section of the bourgeoisie engaged primarily in foreign trade and dependent upon imperialism, represented by a revisionist grouping within the Communist Party headed by Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao.

Some time after the 'Cultural Revolution', the interests of that section of the comprador bourgeoisie dependent upon United States imperialism diverged from the interests of that section dependent upon Soviet imperialism (i.e. the Soviet Union after the restoration of capitalism there following the death of Stalin).

As a result, Class 3 above split into:

3a) The pro-US comprador bourgeoisie, headed by Mao Tse-tung;

and

3b) the pro-Soviet comprador bourgeoisie, headed by Lin Piao.

'CLASS STRUGGLES IN CHINA' shows how this class analysis makes sense of such otherwise inexplicable phenomena as the 'Kao Kang Affair', the 'Hundred Flowers Affair', the 'Great Leap Forward', the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution', the death of Lin Piao in an air crash while defecting to the Soviet Union, and the post-Mao economic reforms

TRANSLITERATION NOTE

In June 1979 the Chinese authorities introduced a new system (known as Pinjin) of transliterating Chinese characters into English, replacing the system -- known as the Wade-Giles system, after its English Creator Thomas F. Wade (1818-95) and its English modifier Herbert A. Giles (1845-1935).

In this book, the Wade-Giles system -- which is more familiar to English speakers -- is used throughout, with the exception that in the bibliographies the name and title used in the original work is given, followed, where either of these are in Pinjin, by the Wade-Giles version in brackets.


           CLASS STRUGGLES
                    IN CHINA
INTRODUCTION
THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS IN COLONIAL-TYPE COUNTRIES

THE AIM OF MARXIST-LENINISTS IS TO LEAD THE WORKING CLASS IN EACH COUNTRY TO ACCOMPLISH SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONS WHICH WILL ESTABLISH SOCIALIST, AND ULTIMATELY COMMUNIST, SOCIETIES.

The revolutionary process will differ somewhat in different countries according to the specific conditions existing:

"The nationally peculiar and nationally specific features in each separate country must unfailingly be taken into account . . . when drawing up guiding directives for the working class movement of the country concerned".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Notes on Contemporary Themes' (July 1927), in: 'Works', Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 337).
Thus, the revolutionary process in developed capitalist countries will differ from that in colonial-type countries, that is, relatively undeveloped countries which are dominated by one or another Great Power, which is today usually an imperialist (i.e., monopoly capitalist) country.

A revolution in a colonial-type country which brings about the national liberation of that country is termed a national-democratic revolution. A revolution in any country which brings about the political power of the working class is termed a socialist revolution.

The Role of the National Bourgeoisie

A key feature of the class structure of a colonial-type country is that the native capitalist class -- where this exists -- consists of two parts:

Firstly, the comprador capitalist class or comprador bourgeoisie, which has close ties with the landlord class and whose exploitation is based primarily upon foreign trade, making them, like the landlord class, dependent upon the dominating Great Power, and

Secondly, the national capitalist class or national bourgeoisie, whose exploitation is based primarily upon the ownership of industrial or commercial enterprises and whose economic advancement is held back by the dominating Great Power.

Stalin pointed out in May 1925 to the students of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East that the native bourgeoisie in some colonial-type countries

"Is splitting up into two parts, a revolutionary part (the national bourgeoisie -- Ed.) . . . and a compromising part (the comprador bourgeoisie -- Ed.) . . . of which the first is continuing the revolutionary struggle, whereas the second is entering into a bloc with imperialism".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East' (May 1925), in: 'Works, Volume 7; Moscow; 1954; p. 147).
In other words, the national bourgeoisie of a colonial-type country is a class objectively in favour of the national-democratic revolution, but objectively opposed to the socialist revolution.

It follows that the class forces which are objectively in favour of the national-democratic revolution are wider and stronger than the class forces which are objectively in favour of the socialist revolution.

The Marxist-Leninist strategy for the revolutionary process in a colonial-type country must be based on striving to mobilise the maximum objectively possible forces for both the national-democratic and the socialist revolutions:

"The Communist Party of each country must unfailingly avail itself of even the smallest opportunity of gaining a mass ally for the proletariat, even if a temporary, vacillating unstable and unreliable ally'".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Notes on Contemporary Themes' (July 1927), in: 'Works', Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 337).
Thus, the Marxist-Leninist strategy of the revolutionary process in colonial-type countries is to strive to carry through the process in two stages: firstly, the stage of national-democratic revolution and, secondly, the stage of socialist revolution. In the first stage, Marxist-Leninists should strive to ally themselves with the national bourgeoisie, to the extent that this class remains genuinely revolutionary: "Temporary cooperation is permissible, and in certain circumstances even a temporary alliance, between the Communist Party and the national-revolutionary movement, provided that the latter is a genuine revolutionary movement, that it genuinely struggles against the ruling power, and that its representatives do not hamper the Communists in their work".
(6th Congress, Communist International: Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-colonial Countries (September 1928), in:
Jane Degras (Ed.): 'The Communist International: 1919-1943: Documents Volume 2; London; 1971; p. 542).
Such co-operation, such an alliance, is temporary because the aim of the Marxist-Leninists is to win for the working class the leading role in the revolutionary process in order to carry this through, with the minimum possible interruption, to the socialist revolution. This leadership can only be won in struggle with the national bourgeoisie: "The proletariat pushes aside the national bourgeoisie, consolidates its hegemony and assumes the lead of the vast masses of the working people in town and country, in order to overcome the resistance of the national bourgeoisie, secure the complete victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and then gradually convert it into a socialist revolution."
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Questions of the Chinese Revolution' (April 1927), in:
'Works', Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 225).
When it becomes clear that the working class is winning the leadership of the national-democratic revolution, and so is attaining a position to transform the revolution into a socialist revolution, then the national bourgeoisie will inevitably desert the revolution and go over to the counterrevolution, preferring the retention of limited exploitation under colonial-type domination to the ending of exploitation under socialism. This is what occurred in China in the coup of CHIANG Kai-shek* in April 1927: "In the first period of the Chinese revolution, . . . the national bourgeoisie (not the compradors) sided with the revolution. . .
Chiang Kai-shek's coup marks the desertion of the national bourgeoisie from the revolution".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Questions of the Chinese Revolution' (April 1927), in:
'Works' Volume 9; Moscow; 1954; p. 226, 229).


CHAPTER ONE
THE NATIONAL ANTI-JAPANESE FRONT IN CHINA (1935-45)
The Advent of Chinese Revisionism (January-December 1935)

In January 1935, at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China held during the famous 'Long March' at Tsunyi in Kweichow Province,

"A new Central Committee headed by Comrade MAO Tse-tung*"
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 155).
was established.

The change of leadership was quickly followed by a change of policy.

In a report to a conference of Party activists held at Wayaopao in Northern Shensi in December 1935, Mao Tse-tung declared that the political situation in China had now fundamentally changed:

This new situation, asserted Mao, was that instead of a number of imperialist powers sharing in the domination of semi-colonial China, the armed forces of one imperialist power -- Japan -- was now aiming to occupy all China and to transform it into a Japanese colony: "Today . . . the Japanese imperialists . . want to convert the whole of China from a semi-colony shared by several imperialist powers into a colony monopolised by Japan".
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid.; p. 154).
and in this new situation it was possible to win back the national bourgeoisie to the anti-imperialist struggle: "It is now possible . . for the national bourgeoisie to join the anti-Japanese struggle".
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid.; p. 168).
"The task of the proletariat is to form a united front with the national bourgeoisie against imperialism and the bureaucrat and warlord governments, without overlooking its revolutionary quality".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On New Democracy' (January 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 348-49).
Mao Tse-tung held that this united front against Japanese imperialism should include not merely the urban national bourgeoisie, but also the rural national bourgeoisie, the rich peasants: "The rich peasants . . . might make some contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle of the peasant masses."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party' (December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 323).
Furthermore, in this new situation - according to Mao Tse-tung -- it was possible to win to the anti-Japanese united front the anti-Japanese (i.e., pro-American and pro-British) sections of the landlord class and comprador bourgeoisie. The anti-Japanese sections of the landlord class were called by the Communist Party of China at this period the 'enlightened gentry'. "China is a semi-colonial country for which many imperialist powers are contending. When the struggle is directed against Japanese imperialism, then the running dogs of the United States or Britain, obeying the varying tones of their masters' commands, may engage in veiled or even open strife with the Japanese imperialists and their running dogs. . . . We must turn to good account all such fights, rifts and contradictions in the enemy camp and turn them against our present main enemy."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 158-59).

"Different groups within this big bourgeoisie are backed by different imperialist powers, so that when contradictions among these powers becomes sharper and when the edge of the revolution is mainly directed against a particular power, the big bourgeois groups dependent upon the other powers may join the struggle against that particular imperialist power to a certain extent and for a certain time. . . . The Chinese proletariat may form a united front with these groups and should maintain it as far as possible".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Introducing "The Communist"' (October 1939), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 289).

"A good many of the enlightened gentry who are middle and small landlords and who have some capitalist colouration display some enthusiasm for the war, and we should unite with them in the common fight against Japan. .
Different sections of the comprador big bourgeoisie owe allegiance to different imperialist powers, so that when the contradictions among the latter become very acute and the revolution is directed mainly against one particular imperialist power, it becomes possible for the sections of the comprador class which serve other imperialist groupings to join the current anti-imperialist front to a certain extent and for a certain period".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party' (December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 319-20).

'The enlightened gentry . . . are the left-wing of the landlord class. It is possible for . . . the enlightened gentry to join us in the common fight against Japan".
(Mao Tse-tung: "Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front' (March 1940), in: 'Selected Works"', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 423, 424).

In other words, Mao Tse-tung called for the formation of a national united front against Japanese imperialism: "The task of the Party is to form a revolutionary national united front."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 161).
"The Wayaopao meeting . . . decided on the tactics of a national united front".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 153).

The Revisionist Character of Mao's 'National United Front' Policy

But the question of whether China was dominated by a number of imperialist powers or by one had nothing whatever to do with such questions as the attitude of the national bourgeoisie to the struggle against imperialism. The national bourgeoisie had deserted the revolution because they felt that their own position as an exploiting class was threatened by a continuation of the revolutionary process.

In other words, the new line being put forward by Mao Tse-tung was a deviation from Marxist-Leninist principles.

When someone claiming to be a Marxist-Leninist puts forward a policy which deviates from Marxist-Leninist principles, Marxist-Leninists call such a policy 'revisionist'.

MAO TSE-TUNG WAS, FROM 1935 TO HIS DEATH IN 1976, THE MOST PROMINENT FIGURE IN CHINESE REVISIONISM.

To secure a national united front against Japanese imperialism, THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS HAD TO CONVINCE ThE EXPLOITING CLASSES WHICH THEY WISHED
TO RECRUIT TO THE FRONT THAT THEIR POSITION, AS EXPLOITERS WOULD BE SECURE IF THEY SO PARTICIPATED.
They attempted to do this in several ways.

For example:

Firstly, in February 1937 the Communist Party offered, if the Kuomintang would agree to participate in a National United Front, to place the Red Army and the Liberated Areas under the control of the Kuomintang government. In these circumstances:

"The workers' and peasants' democratic government . . . and the Red Army . . . will come under the direction of the Central Government in Nanking and its Military Council respectively".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 281).
Secondly, it replaced the policy of confiscation of the landlords' land by one of ('not too great') reductions in rent and interest: "After 1936, in order to facilitate the formation of a broad anti-Japanese national united front, the Chinese Communist Party changed its policy for the country as a whole (from one of confiscating the landlords' land -- Ed.) to one of reduction of rent and interest
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 77).

"This is not the time for a thoroughgoing agrarian revolution. . . Our present policy should stipulate that landlords shall reduce rent and interest . . . but the reductions should not be too great ".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Policy' (December 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 446).

"The government's policy should be one of enforcing the decree on rent reduction and adjusting the relative interests of the landlords and the tenants."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Spread the Campaign to Reduce Rent . . .' (October 1943), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; 1965; p. 131).

"The Communist Party has made a major concession in the anti-Japanese war period by changing the policy of land to the tiller to one of reducing rent and interest".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 298).

Thirdly, in putting forward a programme of 'new democracy' for the liberated areas, the Party assured anti-Japanese national capitalists that in these areas they would be encouraged to make profits and develop their enterprises: "The people's republic will not expropriate private property other than imperialist and feudal private property, and so far from confiscating the national bourgeoisie's industrial and commercial enterprises, it will encourage their development. We shall protect every national capitalist who does not support the imperialists or the Chinese traitors. . . . The labour laws of the people's republic . . . will not prevent the national bourgeoisie from making profits or developing their industrial and commercial enterprises."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 169).

"The new-democratic revolution . . . differs from a socialist revolution in that it . . . does not destroy any section of capitalism which is capable of contributing to the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party' (December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 327).

"Capitalists should be encouraged to come into our anti-Japanese base areas and start enterprises here. . . Private enterprise should be encouraged".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Policy' (December 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 447).

"The sector of non-monopoly capitalism in our economy should be given the opportunity to develop".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Postscript to "Rural Surveys"' (April 1941), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 15).

"Some people suspect that the Chinese Communists are opposed to . . the growth of private capital and the protection of private property, but they are mistaken. . . . It is the very task of the New Democracy we advocate to guarantee that the people can develop freely such private capitalist economy as will benefit and not 'dominate the livelihood of the people', and to protect all appropriate forms of private property.
It is not domestic capitalism but foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism which are superfluous in China today; indeed, we have too little of capitalism.. . 
Under the state system of New Democracy in China it will be necessary in the interests of social progress to facilitate the development of the private capitalist sector of the economy (provided it does not dominate the livelihood of the people)".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 281, 283).

Fourthly, it assured capitalists that the new democratic state would protect them against labour indiscipline, as well as against demands for excessive wage increases or excessive' reductions in working hours: "There must not be excessive increases in wages or excessive reductions in working hours. . . . The workers must observe labour discipline".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Policy' (December 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 445).
Fifthly, it promised anti-Japanese landlords, comprador capitalists and national capitalists, through 'New Democracy', a share in the administration of liberated areas: "Our government . . . must be so transformed as to include also the members of all other classes who are willing to take part in the national revolution.
Our government represents . . . the whole nation".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 165, 168).

"The new-democratic republic . . . will consist of . . . all those in the country who agree with the national and democratic revolution; it will be the alliance of these classes in the national and democratic revolution".
(Mao Tse-tung: The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the Period of Resistance to Japan' (May 1938), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 271).

"New-democratic constitutional government . . . is the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'New-democratic Constitutional Government' (February 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 409).

"Concerning the organs of political power, the allocation of places should be one-third for Communists, one-third for non-Party left progressives, and one-third for the intermediate sections who are neither left nor right. . . .
Our aim in allocating one-third of the places to the intermediate sections is to win over the middle bourgeoisie (the national bourgeoisie -- Ed.) and the enlightened gentry".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Question of Political Power in the Anti-Japanese Base Areas' (March 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 418).

"The 'three-thirds system', under which the Communists have only one-third of the places in the organs of political power . . ., must be carried out resolutely".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Policy' (December 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 445).

"We propose the establishment, after the thorough defeat of the Japanese aggressors, of a state system which we call New Democracy.
It is this kind of state system that truly meets the demands . . . of the . . . national bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and other patriots".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 279).
Sixthly, it presented the transition from the national-democratic to the socialist revolution as a long-term process, taking several decades: "In the future the democratic revolution will undoubtedly be transformed into a socialist revolution. . . . It may take quite a long time. . . It is wrong to . . . expect the transition to take place soon."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 144).
"The Chinese revolution cannot avoid taking the two steps, first of New Democracy, and then of socialism. Moreover, the first step will need quite a long time".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On New Democracy' (January 1940), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 358).

"A new democratic state based on an alliance of the democratic classes is different in principle from a socialist state under the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . For a long time to come there will exist a special form of state and political power, a form that is distinguished from the Russian system, . . . namely, the new democratic form of state and political power based on the alliance of the democratic classes. . . . . . Our general programme of New Democracy will remain unchanged . for several decades".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 284, 285).

In other words, it was implied that the transition to a socialist revolution was not something which should follow the democratic stage of the revolution with the minimum possible interruption, but a distant prospect: "Needless to say, private enterprise . . . will inevitably continue to occupy a dominant position for a considerable time".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Our Economic Policy' (January 1934), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 144).

"In the future the democratic revolution will inevitably be transformed into a socialist revolution. . . . It may take quite a long time. . . . It is wrong to . . . expect the transition to take place soon".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Tactics against Japanese Imperialism' (December 1935), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Peking; 1964; p. 170).

"For a long time to come there will exist a special form of state and political power, a form that is distinguished from the Russian system but is perfectly necessary and reasonable for us, namely, the new-democratic form of state. . . .
Our general programme of New Democracy will remain unchanged . . . for several decades".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; op. cit.; p. 285).
But according to Marxist-Leninist principles, if the Communist Party has won the leadership of the revolutionary process, the democratic revolution should be transformed into the socialist revolution without interruption: "From the democratic revolution we shall at once, according to the degree of our strength , . . , begin to pass over to the socialist revolution. We stand for continuous revolution. We shall not stop half way".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The Attitude of Social-Democracy toward the Peasant Movement' (September 1905), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; London; 1946; p. 145).

"To attempt to raise an artificial Chinese wall between the first and second revolutions, to separate them by anything else than the degree of preparedness of the proletariat and the degree of unity with the poor peasants, is monstrously to distort Marxism, to vulgarise it, to put liberalism in its place".
(Vladimir I. Lenin: 'The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky' (November 1918), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 7; London; 1946; p. 191).

"Lenin himself maintained the point of view of uninterrupted revolution".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'The Foundations of Leninism' (April/May 1924), in: 'Works', Volume 6; Moscow; 1953; p. 107).

The Changed Character of the Kuomintang

By the late 1930s, the class character of the Chinese nationalist party, the Kuomintang, had changed. It had ceased to represent primarily the interests of the national bourgeoisie, as it had earlier, and had come to represent primarily the interests of the most reactionary section of the landlord class: "At the extreme right (of the Kuomintang -- Ed.) was the CC clique headed by CHEN Li-Fu* and his brother CHEN Kuo-fu*, traditionalists and zealous anti-Communists who represented the landlord interest. They stood closest to the Generalissimo (Chiang Kai-shek -- Ed.), controlled appointments and promotions, and held the largest block of votes in the Central Executive Committee. . . . Chen Li-fu was considered the Party boss. .
By the 1930s the once revolutionary Kuomintang had lost most of its idealism and had shifted to the right. . . . The loss of the large eastern cities reduced the wealth and power of its businessmen and Westernised components, leaving it more dependent on landlords, which tended to transform it . . . . into a landlord party".
(Wesley H. Bagby: 'The Eagle-Dragon Alliance: America's Relations with
China in World War II'; Newark (USA); 1992; p. 46, 47).
The Kuomintang Attitude to Japanese Aggression The initial attitude of the Kuomintang to Japanese aggression against China: "Was to trade space for time for survival until Japan, in its imperial advance, might collide with another Great Power ('Collier's Encyclopedia', Volume 6; New York; 1994; p. 328).
  The Sian Incident (December 1936)
In December 1936, troops of CHANG Hsueh-liang*, the warlord known as 'the Young Marshal', having been ousted from their Manchurian base by Japanese forces, arrested Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang President of the Republic of China, at Sian and presented him with demands for the formation of a united front against Japan.
(Hugh B. O'Neill: 'Companion to Chinese History'; New York; 1987; p. 287).

Although:

"Chiang accepted the demands",
(Hugh B. O'Neill: ibid.; p. 287).
He failed to keep the agreement. The Lukouchiao Incident (July 1937) In July 1937: "The Japanese invading forces attacked the Chinese garrison at Lukouchiao, some 10 kilometres south-west of Peking".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 21).
The incident fostered an: "Ardent nation-wide anti-Japanese movement".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 21).
and this situation forced a change in the public policy of the Kuomintang. It "Compelled the Chinese authorities to begin changing their policy of non-resistance, as pursued ever since . . . 1931".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'For the Mobilisation of all the Nation's Forces for Victory in the War of Resistance' (August 1937), in: 'Selected Works;, Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 23).
  The Chinese War of Resistance against Japan (1937-38)
The Lukouchiao Incident: "Marked the beginning of the Chinese people's heroic War of Resistance against Japan which lasted for eight years".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 21).
In July 1937, Chiang Kai-shek issued a: and agreeing to the formation of a: But the change in the Kuomintang's policy towards Japanese imperialism and to the Communist Party was only a nominal one. In fact: "The Chiang Kai-shek government continued to parley with the Japanese aggressors and even accepted the so-called peaceful settlement they concluded with local authorities. .
Chiang never ceased his clandestine attempts to make peace with Japan."
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 13, 14).
and continued to pursue: "The reactionary policy of passively resisting Japan but actively opposing the Communist Party".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 14).
It was not until August 1937: After taking Peking and Tientsin in July 1937, in November 1937, the Japanese invaders captured Shanghai, and the Chinese capital was moved from Nanking to Chungking. In December Japanese forces took Nanking and Hangchow, and in October 1938 Canton and Hankow. (William L. Langer (Ed.): 'An Encyclopedia of World History: Ancient, Medieval and Modern: Chronologically Arranged'; London; 1972; p. 1,110).

By the end of 1938:

"Japanese armies controlled North and Central China, the main coastal cities, and modern lines of communication."
('Encyclopedia Americana', Volume 6; Danbury (USA); 1992; p. 543).
  The Outbreak of the Second World War (September 1939)
On 1 September 1939: "Germany attacked Poland. Britain and France replied to this by declaring war on Germany in September 3".
('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945: A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 22).
In March 1940, the Japanese occupation forces established: "A puppet government under WANG Ching-wei* at Nanking".
(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.;p. 1,152).
The military policy of the Chinese Communist forces was based on establishing base areas of resistance, and: "By the end of 1940, such 'resistance bases' were found across the whole of occupied China's."
(Henry McAleavy: 'The Modern History of China'; London; 1967; p. 305).

The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (April 1941)

In April 1941, the Soviet Union and Japan concluded a Neutrality Pact, which: "Ensured peace on the eastern border of the Soviet Union, thus crushing the plot for a joint German, Italian and Japanese attack on the Soviet Union".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 468).
  The Entry of the Soviet Union into the World War (June 1941)
On 22 June 1941: However, because of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, the Soviet Union did not immediately become the ally of China. The Breach of the CPC-Kuomintang United Front (1939-41) In fact, the united front between the Kuomintang and the CPC: "Did not last much beyond 1938".
('Encyclopedia Americana', Volume 6; Danbury (USA); 1992; p. 544).
For, in spite of it, in 1939-41 Kuomintang forces launched two surprise attacks upon Communist armies: "In the first campaign, from the winter of 1939 to the spring of 1940, the Kuomintang troops in their surprise attacks captured five county towns garrisoned by the 8th Route Army in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region. . . . The second campaign was launched in January 1941. . .
The Kuomintang troops in southern Anhwei actually did catch these New Fourth Army units in a dragnet."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'A Comment on the Sessions of the Kuomintarig Central Executive Committee and of the People's Political Council' (October 1943), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1956; p. 146).
It was not until May 1941 that Mao Tse-tung was able to report that: "The second anti-Communist onslaught has come to an end".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Conclusions on the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught' (May 1941), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 463).
  The Entry of the USA into the Second World War (December 1941)
In December 1941: "Japanese sea and air forces launched a surprise attack on the United States base at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii".
(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,153).
bringing the USA into the Second World War. The Division within US Imperialism Although the USA and China were allies in 1941-45, the US imperialists were not united in regard to the strategy which should be adopted towards China.

One section of the US imperialists, consisting primarily of those elements without special economic connections with China, regarded the speediest possible defeat of Japan as their first priority. This strategy required:

The rival section of US imperialists, consisting primarily of those elements with special economic connections with China, regarded the Pacific theatre-of-war as of secondary importance and held that no strategy should be adopted in relation to that theatre which might jeopardise America's post-war imperialist interests in the region, even if this should prolong the war. This strategy required: The first strategy was espoused by such elements as General Joseph STILWELL*, appointed to serve as Chiang's Chief of Staff.
The second strategy was supported by such elements as General Claire CHENNAULT*, who led the 'American Volunteer Group' (the 'Flying Tigers'), a group of planes and pilots which had been sent to China in 1940, and Patrick HURLEY* , who was appointed President Franklyn ROOSEVELT*'s personal representative in China in August 1944.

Thus, in an undated note in 1942, Stilwell summed up bluntly the weaknesses of the Kuomintang's military forces:

Accordingly, he sought to reform and modernise them: "China's huge, poorly equipped, fed and led armies were structured more for domestic political control than international war. With little respect for the complex politics of the Chinese military, Stilwell urgently sought to modernise them for offensive action."
(Wesley M. Bagby: op. cit.; p. 67).
even though: "Full acceptance of his proposals would have threatened the survival of Chiang's regime".
(Wesley M. Bagby: ibid,; p. 67).
Naturally: "Holding such opposite concepts, he and Chiang clashed in a bitter and acrimonious feud. .
Stilwell's diary reflected his growing anger and frustration in increasingly bitter denunciation: 'stupid little ass' (15/6/42), ignorant, illiterate, superstitious, peasant son of a bitch' (summer 1942), 'nasty little bastard' (6/1/43), 'grasping, bigoted, ungrateful little rattlesnake' (18/6/43) . . ..
Stilwell's denunciations extended to the entire Chinese government --'a gang of thugs'".
(Wesley M. Bagby: ibid.; p. 69-70).
Supporters of the Stilwell strategy were accused by its opponents of being 'crypto-communists'. For example, although Stilwell was a right-wing Republican, Hurley wrote later: "The record of General Stilwell in China is irrevocably coupled in history with the conspiracy to overthrow the Nationalist Government of China and to set up in its place a Communist regime".
(Patrick J. Hurley, in: Don Lohbeck: 'Patrick J. Hurley'; Chicago; 1956; p. 305).
In October 1944, after strong representations from Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt wrote to Chiang "That he would remove Stilwell".
(Wesley M. Bagby: op. cit.; p. 149).
The victory of the Hurley/Chennault fraction of the US imperialists was confirmed when Chiang Kai-shek said publicly, in a speech on 1 January 1945, that he: "Opposed the proposal for abolishing the Kuomintang one-party dictatorship and for setting up a coalition government and a joint supreme command".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 334).
And when Hurley -- appointed US Ambassador to China in November 1944 --declared in Washington on 2 April 1945: "That the United States would cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek only and not with the Chinese Communist Party".
(Patrick J. Hurley: Statement of 2 April 1945, in: Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Danger of the Hurley Policy' (July 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 336).

The Third Anti-Communist Campaign (March 1943)

The entry of the USA into the World War II did not check the Kuomintang's unwillingness to participate -- other than nominally -- in the national united front against Japan proposed by the Communist Party of China.

The third anti-Communist campaign:

and in October 1944 Mao Tse-tung wrote: And in April 1945 Mao warned the 7th National Congress of the CPC that "The chief ruling clique of the Kuomintang . . is now stepping up preparations to unleash civil war as soon as the forces of a certain allied country have cleared a considerable part of the Chinese mainland of the Japanese aggressors."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Coalition Government,' (April 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 3; Peking; 1965; p. 275).
The Yalta Conference (February 1945)

In February 1945, the leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain met at Yalta and signed a secret agreement (published only in January 1946) that, on certain conditions,

"In two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 6; p. 7,732).
Soviet Denunciation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (April 1945) In April 1945, "The Soviet Union denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. The situation, the Soviet Government declared, had changed: as an ally of Germany, Japan was helping her in the war against the USSR; in addition, she was at war with the USA and Britain, who were allies of the USSR. In this situation, the neutrality pact had lost its meaning and could no longer remain valid".
('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945: A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 411). The Surrender of Germany (May 1945)
In May 1945: "The Nazis capitulated".
('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945: A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 392).
US Atom Bomb Attacks on Japan (August 1945)
On 6 August 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima and another on Nagasaki on 9 August. ('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945: A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 415). The Soviet Union enters the Pacific War (August 1945) On 8 August 1945: "The Soviet government declared war on Japan"
('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945: A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 417).
and: "By nightfall of August 14 troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front had advanced 50-200 kilometres into Manchuria. .
In six days the Soviet troops thus inflicted a disastrous defeat on the Kwangtung Army'.
('Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: 1941-1945: A General Outline'; Moscow; 1974; p. 422).

The End of the Pacific War (August 1945)

On 14 August 1945, Japan surrendered, and the Second World War came to an end. (William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,156).


BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 1
CHANG Hsueh-liang, Chinese military officer (1898- ), 'the Young Marshal'; warlord of Manchuria.

CHEN Guofu = Pinyin form of CHIEN Kuo-fu.

CHEN Kuo-fu, Chinese politician (1892-1951); Director. Kuomintang Organisation
Department (1926-32, 1944); Acting President, Control Yuan (1928-36);

Governor, Kiangsu Province (1933-37); Director, Kuomintang Personnel Department (1939-45); Chairman, Kuomintang Central Finance Committee (1945); to USA (1950).
 

CHEN Lifu = Pinyin form of Chen Li-fu.

CHEN Li-fu, Chinese politician (1900-93); Secretary-General, Kuomintang
(1929-31); Director, Kuomintang Investigation Department (1928-38);
Director, Kuomintang Organisation Department (1938-39, 1944-48); Minister of Education (1938-44); Vice-President, Legislative Yuan (1948-49); to USA (1950).
 

CHENNAULT, Claire L., American military officer (1893-1958); military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek (1937-45); general (1942); Commander, US Army Air Force in China (1942-45); Director, Chinese Air Transport Inc. (1948-50); Director, Chinese Air Transport Ltd. (1955-59).

CHIANG Kai-shek, Chinese military officer and politician (1887-1975); gangster in Shanghai (1916-17); joined Kuomintang (1918); commandant, Whampoa Military Academy (1924); led Northern Expedition (1926); State President (1928-49); President, 'Republic of China' (Taiwan) (1950-75).

HURLEY, Patrick, American lawyer, diplomat and military officer (1883-1963); Secretary of War (1929-32); brigadier-general (1941); President's personal representative to Kuomintang government (1941-42); Minister to New Zealand (1942); Ambassador to China (1945).

MAO Tse-tung, Chinese revisionist politician (1893-1976); Chairman, Chinese Soviet Republic (1934); married Chiang Ching (1939); Chairman, People's Republic of China (1949-59); chairman, CPC (1949-76).

MAO Zedong = Pinyin form of Mao Tse-tung.

MARSHALL, George C., American military officer and politician (1880-1959); Army Chief of Staff (1939-45); general of the army (1944); US administration's 'mediator' in China (1945-47); Secretary of State (1947-49); Secretary of Defence (1950-51).

ROOSEVELT, Franklyn D., American lawyer and politician (1892-1945); state senator (1910-13); assistant secretary of the navy (1913-20); Governor of New York (1929-33); President (1933-45).

STILLWELL, Joseph, American military officer (1893-1946); military attache, Peking (1935-39); general (1942); commanding general, US forces in China-Burma-India (1942-44); commanding general, US Ground Forces (1945).

WANG Ching-wei, Chinese politician (1883-1944); Premier (1925-27, 1932-35); chairman, Kuomintang (1932-38); Prime Minister of Japanese puppet government in occupied China (1940-44); died in Japan (1944).

WANG Jingwei = Pinyin form of WANG Ching-wei. ZHANG Xueliang = Pinyin form of CHANG Hsueh-liang.
 



CHAPTER TWO: THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR (1945-49)

INTRODUCTION

Marxist-Leninist revolutionary strategy required that, once Japan had been defeated, the revolutionary process should proceed, with the minimum possible interruption, to the national-democratic revolutionary struggle against the remaining -- pro-American and pro-British -- landlords and comprador bourgeoisie.

However, with the ending of the Pacific War, the policy of the revisionist-led Communist Party of China continued to be one of working for a national united front with the Kuomintang and of willingness to make (weakening) concessions to the Kuomintang in an effort to secure this.

Thus, when Japan surrendered in August 1945, the Communist Party of China did not attempt to initiate the next stage of the revolutionary process. On the contrary, it put forward a policy of avoiding civil war except in self-defence:

"We don't want civil war. However, if Chiang Kai-shek insists on forcing civil war on the Chinese people, the only thing we can do is to take up arms and fight him in self-defence. . . . This will be a civil war he forces on us."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Situation and Our Policy after the Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan' (August 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 15).
 
The Division within US Imperialism

The division within the ranks of US imperialism described in Chapter Two continued after the ending of the Pacific War.

One section of the US imperialists, consisting primarily of those elements without special economic connections with China, aimed to bring about internal peace by means of a compromise settlement between the forces of the Kuomintang government and those of the Communist Party.

The rival section of US imperialists, consisting primarily of those elements with special economic connections with China, held that no strategy should be adopted in relation to China which might jeopardise America's future imperialist interests in the region.

The first strategy was espoused by the US Democratic administration around Roosevelt,
the second strategy by the ultra-right Republican opposition, and especially by military officers linked with it.

Clearly, the strategy of the CPC dovetailed neatly with that of the US civilian administration.

THE CHINESE CIVIL WAR (1945-49)
US Military Intervention in China (1945-47)

By July 1945-- that is, before the Japanese surrender -- the US military were actively intervening militarily in China in an effort to strengthen the military position of the Kuomintang forces and to weaken the military position of the forces of the Communist Party:
 

"A (US -- Ed.) War Department directive of August 10 (1945-- Ed.) provided for the occupation by American forces of key ports and communications centres in China, the rapid transportation of Nationalist forces to key areas, and the turning over of localities occupied by American forces only to agencies and forces accredited by the Nationalist government.. . .
Immediately after V-J day, American forces lifted three Nationalist armies by air to key points of East and North China, including the three niost important cities -- Shanghai, Nanking and Peking"
(Tsou Tang: 'America's Failure in China: 1941-50'; Chicago; 1964; p.305-06, 308).
 
Thus, after Japan's surrender in August 1945, "The armed forces of the United States . . . landed in China and stationed themselves at Peking, Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin, . and other places. In addition, they repeatedly invaded the Liberated Areas."
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 439).
 
Kuomintang-CPC Peace Negotiations (1945)

In 1944, Roosevelt had sent Vice-President Henry WALLACE* on a fact-finding mission to China, and by July 1945 both:

"Roosevelt and Wallace were bearing down hard on Chiang to come to terms with the Communists".
(Wesley M. Bagby: op. cit.; p. 111).
 
As a result, in August 1945, Chiang Kai-shek invited Mao Tse-tung:
  "To Chungking for peace negotiations."
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 48).
and a delegation headed by Mao Tse-tung:
  "Arrived in Chungking on August 28 and held negotiations with the Kuomintang for 43 days".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 49).
 
The Communist Party offered very considerable concessions to the Kuomintang in an effort to secure their acceptance of a national united front. Mao Tse-tung insisting:
  "We are ready to make concessions."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Chungking Negotiations' (October 1945), in:'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 57).
 
For example:

Firstly, the Party offered

"To reduce the anti-Japanese troops under its command to . . twenty divisions and to take prompt action to demobilise its anti-Japanese troops now distributed in the eight areas of Kwangtung, Chekiang, southern Kiangsu, southern Anhwei, central Anhwei, Hunan, Hupeh and Honan", (Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 61).
 
so surrendering eight of its liberated areas -- in order to make the Kuomintang 'feel easy':
  "Some comrades have asked why we should concede eight Liberated Areas. It is a great pity to concede these eight areas, but it is better to do so. . . . Why should we concede those areas? Because otherwise the Kuomintang will not feel easy. . . . Our concession on this point will help frustrate the Kuomintang's plot for civil war'.
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Chungking Negotiations' (October 1945), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 56).
 
Secondly, the Party agreed to the reoccupation of Manchuria by Kuomintang troops without opposition. In December 1945, the US government sent General George MARSHALL*, recently retired as Army Chief of Staff, to China, ostensibly to 'mediate' between the opposing forces.
Marshall proposed that the Kuomintang forces should be allowed: "To reoccupy Manchuria without any interference from the Communists. In an extraordinary development, CHOU En-lai* agreed".
(Lionel M. Chassin: 'The Communist Conquest of China: A History of the
Civil War: 1945-49'; London; 1966; p. 72).
 
Thirdly, the Party continued its policy of rent and interest reduction in place of that of confiscation of the landlords' land:
  "The present policy of our Party is still to reduce rents, not to confiscate land".'
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Rent Reduction and Production are Two Important Matters for the Defence of the Liberated Areas' (November 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 72.)

"Reduce rent. . . . All areas must launch movements in 1946 for the reduction of rent and interest in their newly liberated areas."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Policy for Work in the Liberated Areas for 1946' (December 1945), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 70).
 

However, these concessions did not satisfy the Kuomintang which made the demand:
  "To eliminate altogether the people's army and the Liberated Areas."
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 60).
and "Consequently no agreement could be reached".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 60).
 
In fact, even during the peace negotiations, the forces of the Kuomintang continued to attack the forces of the Communist Party:
  "The Kuomintang is negotiating with us on the one hand and is vigorously attacking the Liberated Areas on the other hand".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Chungking Negotiations' (October 1945), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 53).
  The Spurious 'Cease-fire' (January-June 1946)  
However, in January 1946:   "Both sides agreed . . . to an unconditional cease-fire based upon the status quo."
(E. R. Hooton: 'The Greatest Tumult: The Chinese Civil War: 1936-49'; London; 1991; p. 29).  
At the same time, the Kuomintang government agreed to convene a: "Political Consultative Conference, agreed upon in principle by the Kuomintang and Yenan (the capital of the Liberated Areas -- Ed.) in October 1945".
(Lionel M. Chassin: ibid.; p. 71).
 
The conference:
  "Adopted a series of resolutions favourable to peace and democracy."
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 90).
 
but the: "Political Consultative Conference agreements were soon torn up by him (Chiang Kai-shek - Ed.) one after another".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 95).
In fact, Chiang Kai-shek used the truce: "As a smoke-screen behind which he made arrangements for a major war; at the very time the cease-fire order was being transmitted, he ordered the Kuomintang troops 'to seize strategic points' and from then he moved up troops continuously to attack the Liberated Areas". (Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 92).
 
and by June 1946: "Chiang Kai-shek had massed 80% of his regular forces (which were about two million men) at the front for attacks on the Liberated Areas; more than 540,000 of these troops were transported directly by the warships and planes of the US armed forces".
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volumne 4; Peking; 1961; p. 110).
  The Renewal of the Civil War (July 1946)
 
In July 1946: "· . . when the disposition of his troops had been completed, Chiang Kai-shek launched a country-wide counter-revolutionary war . .
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 110-11).
against the armed forces of the Communist Party of China. In Marshall's view: "The Chinese Communist Party had been sincerely desirous. . . of reaching an understanding with the Nationalists; it was the Kuomintang government that had wrecked negotiations with its incessant violations of the truce and continuation of its military action".
(Lionel M. Chassin: op. cit.; p. 94).
 
An important factor in the Kuomintang attitude was US military aid:
  "Americans trained and equipped 20 Chinese divisions with modern weapons, began the training and equipment of others, built up China's financial reserves."
(Wesley M. Bagby: op. cit.; p. 222).
 
This resulted in:  ". . the strengthening of elements in the Kuomintang that opposed refprm".
(Wesley M. Bagby: op. cit.; p. 222).
 
And so opposed to any sharing of power with the Communist Party. In January 1947: "The United States officially abandoned its mediation efforts"
(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,338).
which:   "Had ended in complete failure",
(Lionel M. Chassin: op. cit.; p. 95).
and open warfare:   "· . . now spread across the whole of northern China".
(E. R. Hooton: op. cit.; p. 39).
Although the civil war was initiated by the Kuomintang, it acquired many characteristics of a national-democratic revolutionary war, and was described by the Party as a struggle for:
  "· . . the liberation of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' (October 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 147).
  Spontaneous Land ReForm (1947-48)
Despite the efforts of the Chinese revisionists to deter the peasants from undrertaking land reform, a 'Directive on the Land Question' issued by the CC of the CPC in May 1946 noted that in many areas the peasants had spontaneously seized land from the landlords:
  "In combatting Chinese collaborators, settling accounts with landlords, and reducing rent and interest, the people have seized land directly from the landlords, thus realising the principle of 'land to the tiller'."
(Liu Shao-chi: 'Directive on the Land Question' (May 1946), in: Liu Shao-chi: 'Selected Works', Volume 1; Oxford; 1984; p. 372).
 
Even though this campaign had been initiated in contravention of the policy of the Communist Party, the Party felt it tactically necessary to endorse such action retrospectively:
  "Our Party . . . cannot but support the masses in their direct implementation of agrarian reform".
(Liu Shao-chi: ibid.; p. 373).
 
By February 1947, land reform had been put into effect in about two-thirds of the territory of each Liberated Area:
  "In about two-thirds of the territory in each Liberated Area, . the land problem has been solved and the policy of land to the tillers has been carried out".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution' (February 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 123).
  The New National United Front Policy in China (1945-49)
 
The Communist Party of China maintained that the position of China in 1945-49 was essentially the same as in 1941-45, except that US imperialism had taken the place of Japanese imperialism: "US imperialism and its running dog Chiang Kai-shek have replaced Japanese imperialism and its running dog Wang Ching-wei and adopted the policies of turning China into a US colony".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution' (February 1947), in: Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 120).

"After the victorious conclusion of the anti-fascist Second World War, US imperialism . . . stepped into the shoes of . . . Japanese imperialism".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 158).

In this new situation, the Communist Party called again for the formation of a new national united front, this time against US imperialism:
  "Form a national united front; overthrow the dictatorial Chiang- Kai-shek government".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' (October 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 150).
  The Breadth of the Anti-American National United Front
It would seem even at first glance that this new proposed anti-American national united front must be narrower than the earlier anti-Japanese national united front.

In view of the Party's reluctant endorsement of land reform, the term 'enlightened gentry' was now redefined to mean landlords:

1) who favoured struggle against United States imperialism and the Kuomintang government;
2) who were prepared to collaborate with the Communist Party: and
3) who supported land reform.
 
"The enlightened gentry are individual landlords . . . with democratic leanings.
At the present stage, what we require of them is that they favour the struggle against the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, favour democracy (not be anti-Communist), and favour land reform. If they can meet these requirements, we should unite with them without exception."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry' (March 1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 209, 210).
 
In words, the Party presented the 'enlightened gentry' as possible recruits to the new anti-American national united front: "These reactionary policies of US imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek have forced all strata of the Chinese people to unite for their own salvation. These strata include . . . the enlightened gentry".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution' (February 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 121).

"The strata of the Chinese people . . . united for their own salvation include the . . . enlightened gentry".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chiang Kai-shek Government is besieged by the Whole People' (May 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 136).
 

"The enlightened gentry . . . constitute an element in the revolutionary united front. . . . We should unite with them without exception".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry' (March 1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 210).
 
On these grounds, Mao maintained in words that
  "On the surface, our revolutionary national united front appears to have narrowed in the present period as compared with the period of the War of Resistance. As a matter of fact, . . . our national united front has really broadened".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 169-70).
 
But clearly few landlords who would be willing to support the confiscation of their own land, so that the Party's endorsement of land reform reduced in practice the number of 'enlightened gentry' -- i.e., of landlords willing to take part in the anti-American national united front -- to a negligible figure.

Furthermore, it would hardly be possible to bring pro-American comprador capitalists into an anti-American united front, while, in view of the long struggle of the Chinese people against the Japanese occupiers, it would be politically very difficult for the Party to invite the remnants of pro-Japanese comprador capitalists to join it.

Nevertheless, it was envisaged not only that the national bourgeoisie could be won to the new national united front, but that a policy of concessions to the pro-American comprador capitalists could induce them to transfer their allegiance to the anti-American national united front.
 

CPC Concessions to the National Bourgeoisie The Communist Party of China continued to maintain that the national bourgeoisie could be a participant in this anti-American national united front: "The reactionary policies of US imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek have forced all strata of the Chinese people to unite for their own salvation. These strata include the . · . national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Greet the New High Tide of the Chinese Revolution' (February 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 121).

''The strata of the Chinese people . . . united for their own salvation include the . . . national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chiang Kai-shek Government is besieged by the Whole People' (May 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p.136).

"'Businessmen' means all the national bourgeois who are persecuted and fettered. . . . The Chinese revolution at the present stage is a revolution in which all these people form a united front. . At the present stage, . . . circumstances make it necessary and possible for us to win over the majority of the national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry' (March 1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 207, 209).

"The united front is so broad that it includes . . . the national bourgeoisie".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Address to the Preparatory Committee of the New Political Consultative Conference' (June 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 407).

  "We must unite with the national bourgeoisie in the common struggle".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship' (June 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 421).
 
However, since the national bourgeoisie had previously deserted the national liberation movement because of fear for their future, in order to bring them into the anti-American national united front it was necessary for the Party to make concessions to the national bourgeoisie which might assure them that their future as exploiters would be secure if they supported the anti-American national united front:

Firstly, the Party renewed its former pledge that their enterprises would be protected and encouraged to develop by the new-democratic state:

"Develop the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto of the Chinese Liberation Army' (October 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 150).
"The policy . . . of protecting and encouraging the development of private industry and commerce was correct and should be continued in the future".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy' (January 1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 183).

"There should be no encroachment . . . upon the national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area' (April 1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 236).

"Protect the industrial, commercial, agricultural and livestock enterprises of the national bourgeoisie. All privately owned factories, shops, banks, warehouses, vessels, wharves, farms, livestock farms and other enterprises will, without exception, be protected against any encroachment".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Proclamation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' (April 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 397).

"China must utilise all the factors of urban and rural capitalism that are beneficial . . . to the national economy."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship' (June 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 421).
 

Secondly, it renewed its former pledge that political representatives of the national bourgeoisie would be accorded a share in the power of the new-democratic state:
  "It is the . . . new rich (i.e., bourgeois -- Ed.) peasants . . . all united together . . . who conquer the country and should rule the country. .
The new-democratic state power is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal state power of the masses of the people. . . . The masses of the people include . . . the national bourgeoisie."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy' (January 1948), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 182-83, 186-87).
 
Thirdly, it renewed its former suggestion that there would be a long interval between the victory of the national-democratic revolution and its transformation into a socialist revolution:
  "It will still be necessary to permit the existence for a long time of a capitalist sector of the economy. . . . This capitalist sector will still be an indispensable part of the whole national economy."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 168).

"There will be need, for a fairly long time after the victory of the revolution, to make use of the positive qualities of urban and rural private capitalism as far as possible, in the interests of developing the national economy."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Report to the 2nd Plenary Session of the 7th CC of the CPC' (March 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking: 1961; p. 367).

 
CPC Concessions to the Comprador Bourgeoisie
 
In its strategy of offering concessions to the pro-US comprador bourgeoisie in an effort to draw it into a national united front against US imperialism, the Communist Party invented the new term of 'bureaucrat-capital', defined as that section of comprador capital which was: "The property of the four big families of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. SOONG*, H. H. KUNG* and the Chen . . . brothers".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto of the Chinese Liberation Army' (October 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 150).
 
It now became the policy of the Communist Party that the new-democratic state should confiscate, not comprador capital as a whole, but only that section of it defined as 'bureaucrat-capital', together with the capital of a few individual comprador capitalists who actively resisted the anti-American national united front and who were classified as war-criminals:
  "Confiscate the property of the four big families of Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H, Kung and the Chen . . . brothers, and the property of the other chief war criminals".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Manifesto of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' (October 1947), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 150).

"Confiscate monopoly capital, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and Chen Li-fu, and turn it over to the new-democratic state. During their twenty-year rule, the four big families, Chiang, Soong, Kung and Chen, have piled up enormous fortunes, valued at ten to twenty thousand million US dollars and monopolised the economic lifelines of the whole country. . . . This capital is popularly known in China as bureaucrat capital. This capitalist class, known as the bureaucrat-capitalist-class, is the big bourgeoisie of China. .
The new-democratic revolution aims at wiping out only . . . the bureaucrat-capitalist class".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 167, 168).
 

Thus, in the above report of December 1947, Mao: "Delineated more clearly those segments of private capital earmarked for expropriation. These potential victims were described as owners of 'bureaucratic capital'.
(Wu Yuan-li: 'The Economy of Communist China: An Introduction'; London; 1965; p. 10).
 
The 'war criminals' concerned were: "Forty-three war criminals . . . who were listed by the Communist Party of China on December 25, 1948".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On Ordering the Reactionary Kuomintang Government . . to Arrest the Kuomintang War Criminals: Statement by the Spokesman for the Communist Party of China' (January 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 329).
  The Military Course of the Civil War (1946-49)
 
In the second half of 1946, Kuomintang forces:
  "Made impressive gains in North China and Manchuria, capturing 165 towns."
('New Encyclopaedia Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p. 141).
 
which in March 1947:   "Culminated in the capture of the Communist capital of Yenan".
(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,338).  
Not till November 1947 was a new capital of the Liberated Areas established at "Shihkiachwang".
(Lionel N. Chassin: op. cit.; p. 147).
During 1947, however: "The strategic initiative passed to the PLA. .
By the end of 1947, . . . the Nationalists were widely spread and on the defensive".
('New Encyclopaedia Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p, 141, 142).
 
and in December 1947 Mao Tse-tung could tell the Central Commitee of the CPC:
  "The Chinese people's revolutionary war has now reached a turning point. . . . Beginning with . . . July/September 1947, the People's Liberation Army went over to the offensive on a national scale."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 1947), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 157).
 
During the second half of 1948: "The Communist armies had gained . . . a numerical superiority and had captured such huge stocks of rifles, artillery and armour that they were better equipped than the Nationalists."
('New Encyclopaedia Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p. 142).
 
and in September 1948 the Communist Party: "Announced the formation of a People's Governmnent for North China."
(Lionel N. Chassin: op. cit.; p. 202).
 
1949 saw: "The rapid decomposition of the Nationalist armies".
(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,339).
 
Tientsin and Peking falling in January 1949, Nanking in April, Shanghai in May and Canton in October.

In April 1949, Mao Tse-tung, as Chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Commission, and CHU Teh*, as Commander-in-Chief of the PLA,

"Ordered the People's Liberation Army to advance courageously, wipe out all reactionary Kuomintang troops who dare to resist, arrest all incorrigible war criminals, liberate the people of the whole country (Mao Tse-tung: Proclamation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army".
(April 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 4; Peking; 1961; p. 397).
 
In July 1949, the Nationalists: "Began to prepare for withdrawal to the island of Formosa (Taiwan), which was completed by December".
(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,339).
while: "The US government, attempting to extricate itself from its entanglement with the collapsing forces of the National Government, pursued a policy of non-involvement".
('New Encyclopaedia Britannica', Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p. 142-43).
 
The Establishment of the People's Republic of China (October 1949)

In September 1949, a 'Political Consultative Conference of the Chinese People' met in Peking:
 

"The 662 members of this body represented not only the CPC, but such other anti-Kuomintang bodies as the Democratic League, . . . regional democratic groups. . . . There were also representatives of regional governments, of labour and peasant unions, of commerce and industry, of religious and cultural interests, of ethnic minorities, and of the overseas Chinese."
(Lionel N. Chassin: op. cit.; p. 238).
The conference accomplished:
  "Election of the members of the central government; adoption of a Common Programme'; designation of Peking as the official capital of China; . . . adoption of a national anthem . . .; and adoption of a national flag. .
The 'Common Programme was in fact the constitution of the new state."
(Lionel M. Chassin: op. cit.; p. 238-39).
 
In October 1949, "the People's Republic of China was officially proclaimed at Peking . . . . with Mao Tse-tung as Chairman . . . (i. e., State President -- Ed.) and Chou En-lai as premier and foreign minister".
(William L. Langer (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 1,339).
 
The Communist Party insisted that the People's Republic was: "Led by the Communist Party of China."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Long live the Great Unity of the Chinese People!' (September 1949), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 19).
 
The Establishment of the 'Republic of China' (December 1949)

In December 1949, the remnants of the Kuomintang forces headed by Chiang Kai-shek, having withdrawn from the Chinese mainland to Taiwan, there:

"Established a Kuomintang regime. . . . This regime continued to assert that it was the rightful Chinese Government, in opposition to the People's Republic of China."
('Europa World Year Book: 1995', Volume 1; London; 1995; p. 833).



BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
CHOU En-lai, Chinese revisionist politician (1898-1976); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1927-76); deputy chairman, People's Revolutionary Military Council (1949-54); member, Central People's Government Council (1949-54); Minister of Foreign Affairs (1949-58); Prime Minister (1949-76); deputy chairman, CPC (1956-76); member, Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC (1956-76).

CHU Teh, Chinese military officer and revisionist politician (1886-1976); commander, People's Liberation Army (1931-54); marshal (1955); chairman, Standing Committee of Nationaal People's Council (1949-76).

GONG, Xianxi = Pinyin form of KUNG Hsiang-hsi.

KUNG, Hsiang-hsi (H. H.'), Chinese financier and politician (1881-1967); Minister of Finance (1933-44); Minister of Industries (1931); president, Executive Yuan (1938-39, 1944-48); to USA (1948).

SOONG, Tzu-wen ('T. V.'), Chinese financier and politician (1894-1971); educated in USA; Minister of Finance (1925-31); vice-president, Executive Yuan (1932-33); chairman, Bank of China (1934-43); Minister of Foreign Affairs (1942-45); chairman, Executive Yuan (1945-47); governor of Kwangtung (1947); to USA (1949).

WALLACE, Henry A., American agronomist, editor and politician (1888-1965); associate editor, (1910-24), editor (1924-29), 'Wallace's Farmer'; editor, 'Wallace's Farmer and Iowa Homestead' (1929-33); Secretary of Agriculture (1933-40); Vice-President (1941-45); Secretary of Commerce (1945-46); editor, 'New Republic' (1946-47).

HOU Enlai = Pinyin form of CHOU En-lai. ZHU De Pinyin form of CHU Teh.



CHAPTER THREE : THE NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION (1949-53)
INTRODUCTION

In the years immediately prior to 1949, as we have seen, the Communist Party of China had come to represent the interests of a national united front.

But with the ending of the civil war in China and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, THERE CEASED TO BE ANY COMMON INTERESTS BETWEEN THE LANDLORD CLASS, THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE AND THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE -- LET ALONE THE WORKING CLASS.

THERE CEASED, THEREFORE, TO BE ANY BASIS FOR A NATIONAL UNITED FRONT BETWEEN THESE CLASSES. AND THERE CEASED TO BE ANY POSSIBILITY OF THE CONTINUED UNITY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AS IT EXISTED IN 1949.

With the acceptance by the Communist Party in the 1945-49 period of land reform -- i.e., the confiscation and redistribution of the landlords? land (see pages 23-24)-- THERE HAD CEASED TO BE ANY GROUPING WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY REPRESENTING THE INTETESTS OF THE LANDLORD CLASS.

THUS, AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA CAME TO CONSIST OF THREE GROUPINGS REPRESENTING DIFFERENT CLASS INTERESTS:

FIRSTLY, A MARXIST-LENINIST GROUPING REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE WORKING CLASS, HEADED BY KAO KANG*;

SECONDLY, A REVISIONIST GROUPING REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY LIU SHAO-CHI*; AND

THIRDLY, A REVISIONIST GROUPING REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG.

ALL THREE GROUPINGS WITHIN THE PARTY WERE AGREED ON CARRYING FORWARD THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS AGAINST THE LANDLORD CLASS, BUT THE THIRD GROUPING DIFFERED FROM THE FIRST TWO IN SEEKING TO PROTECT, AS FAR AS WAS PRACTICABLE, THE INTERESTS OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE.

THE THEORETICAL GROUND FOR THIS PROTECTION HAD ALREADY BEEN LAID BY MAO'S REVISIONIST DICTUM THAT THE NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION SHOULD BE DIRECTED NOT AGAINST THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE AS A WHOLE, BY ONLY AGAINST A SMALL SECTION OF IT LABELLED 'BUREAUCRAT-CAPITAL' AND 'WAR CRIMINALS' (see page 28).

THE NATIONALISATION OF BUREAUCRAT-CAPITAL (1949-50)

In 1949-50, shortly after the establishment of the People's Republic of China,

"The People's Government confiscated all the enterprises operated by bureaucrat-capital. . . . These enterprises, including the Japanese, German and Italian concerns in China taken over by the Kuomintang government following the victory of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, were turned into . . . state-owned enterprises".
(Liu Shao-chi: 'Political Report of the CC of the CPC to the 8th National Congress of the Party' (September 1956) (hereafter listed as 'Liu Shao-chi (1956)'; Peking; 1956; p 12).
Comprador bourgeois other than bureaucrat-capitalists and a few designated war criminals were treated as national bourgeois: In the summer of June 1950, THE PARTY PROCEEDED TO INITIATE A COUNTRYWIDE LAND REFORM WHICH WOULD ELIMINATE LANDLORDS AS A CLASS. "The Party turned once again to land reform, abandoning the more moderate Anti-Japanese War policy of rent and interest reduction."
(Suzanne Pepper: 'Civil War in China: The Political Struggle: 1945-1949'; Berkeley. (USA); 1978; p. 229).
In the discussions leading up to the land reform, the national and comprador bourgeois groupings of the Party successfully pressed for the reform to be applied only to land held by the landlord class, with land held by rich peasants (i.e., rural capitalists) exempted. This was the main theme of several speeches by Mao Tse-tung in the spring and early summer of 1950: Thus, declared Mao, the Party's policy: In June 1950, the Central Committee of the Party presented the draft of an 'Agrarian Reform Law': "To the 2nd Session of the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. . . . After it had been discussed and endorsed by the session, the Central People's Government Council approved the draft. On June 30 of the same year, Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central People's Government, promulgated the 'Agrarian Reform Law of the People's Republic of China'."
(Note to: Mao Tse-tung: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 40).
  The Effect of the Land Reform
The land reform legislation brought about: It: "Succeeded in redistributing about 43% of China's cultivated land to about 60% of the rural population".
(Frederick C. Teiwes: 'Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime', in: Roderick MacFarquahar & John K. Fairbank (Eds.): 'The Cambridge History of China', Volume 14: 'The People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China: 1949-1965' (hereafter listed as 'Fredrick C. Teiwes (1987)'); Cambridge; 1987; p. 87).
It had the effect of: "Freeing millions of peasants of the burden of paying rent to landlords. .
300 million poor peasants had their plots of land enlarged and instead of being tenant farmers . . became . . . owners of small independent holdings."
(Jacques Guillermaz: op. cit.; p. 26).
In fact: in: and, in the rural areas: However: The land reform had been: "completed by 1952".
(Edward L. Wheelwright & Bruce McFarlane: op. cit.; p. 33).
CHINESE INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR (1951-53)
In October 1950, Chinese troops crossed the Yalu river in order to intervene in the Korean War on the side of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, driving the invading United States and South Korean troops back to the line of the 38th Parallel.

In May 1951, on US initiative, negotiations began for an armistice. This was finally signed in July 1953.

THE 'CAMPAIGN FOR THE ELIMINATION OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARIES'
(February 1951-Spring 1953)

With the aim of consolidating the effects of the partial national-democratic revolution, a 'Campaign for the Elimination of Counter-Revolutionaries' was initiated in February 1951.

The directives for the campaign emphasised the need to mobilise:

"Mass participation in the process of uncovering counter-revolutionaries".
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1987): : op. cit.; p. 91).
and 'Committees for the Elimination of Counter-revolutionaries' were set up in schools, factories, government bodies, etc.

The campaign:

It: "Effectively destroyed the old Kuomintang (KMT) power structure and enabled the CPC to extend its power to villages throughout the land".
(Roderick MacFarquahar: 'The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: 1: Contradictions among the People: 1956-1957' (hereafter listed as'Roderick MacFarquahar (1974)'; London; 1974; p. 16). CONCLUSION
The land reform of 1950-52 liquidated the Chinese landlord class, forming part of a national-democratic revolution. But since this left untouched most of the comprador bourgeoisie -- liquidating only a small part of this class, namely the 'bureaucrat-capitalists' and a few individuals designated as 'war criminals' -- it was an incomplete national-democratic revolution.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 3
GAO Gang = Pinyin form of KAO Kang

KAO Kang, Chinese Marxist-Leninist politician (1902-55); Deputy Premier (1949-53); Vice-Chairman, Central Revolutionary Military Council (1951-53); Chairman, State Planning Commission (1952-53); arrested by revisionists (1954); and reportedly died in prison (1955).

LIU Shaoqi = Pinyin form of LIU Shao-chi.

LIU Shao-chi, Chinese revisionist politician (1898-1969); general secretary, CPC (1949-59); Deputy Premier (1949-67); President (1959-68); expelled from Party and imprisoned (1968); died in prison (1969); 'rehabilitated' by revisionists (1980).
 



CHAPTER FOUR: THE 'ANTIS' AFFAIRS (December 1951-June 1952)
THE 'THREE-ANTI CAMPAIGN' (December 1951 - January 1952)
In December 1951: The 'Three-Anti' campaign was planned by the Marxist-Leninist grouping of the Party, headed by Kao Kang: "After careful preparation and a trial run organised by Kao Kang in Manchuria".
(Jacques Guillermaz: op. cit.; p. 22).
It: "Had the seemingly worthwhile stated objectives of eliminating bureaucracy, waste and corruption in government."
(Robert Loh: 'Escape from Red China'; London; 1963; p. 60).
and: "Applied to civil servants and cadres of all kinds.. .
The aims were to give the new administration a new style of work and new ethics, to correct the cadres inherited from the former regime, to save the new ones from the temptations of power."
(Jacques Guillermaz: op. cit.; p. 22).
In other words, it was directed: It had the active support of the national bourgeois grouping of the Party, headed by Liu Shao~hi. THE 'FIVE-ANTI CAMPAIGN' (January-June 1952) IN THE COURSE OF THE 'THREE-ANTI CAMPAIGN', THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS
GROUPING WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY, HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG, TOOK ADVANTAGE OF MAO'S PRESTIGE TO TRANSFORM THE CAMPAIGN INTO A 'FIVE-ANTI CAMPAIGN' DIRECTED AGAINST THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE AND ITS POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES.

In the period between November 1951 and January 1952, Mao wrote a number of notes to the Central Committee demanding such a transformation:

"Particular attention must be paid to the fact that the corrosion of cadres by the bourgeoisie results in serious cases of corruption".
(Mao Tse-tung: Directive for CC, CPC (November 1951), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 64).

"In all cities . . . we should . . . wage a large-scale, resolute and thoroughgoing struggle against those capitalists who are violating the law. . . . All our big cities . . . should start the struggle against the 'five evils in the first ten days of February. Please make prompt arrangements."
(Mao Tse-tung: Directive for CC, CPC (January 1952), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 65-66).

Thus, from January 1952, the 'Three-Anti Campaign': "Gave place to the Five-Antis. This campaign was directed against bribes, fraud, tax evasion, embezzlement of state property, and the illegal obtaining of state economic secrets."
(Jacques Guillermaz: op. cit.; p. 23).
The campaign was officially said to be directed: but in fact its: In other words, the 'Five-Anti Campaign': "Was not therefore aimed at civil servants or cadres, but at those who might corrupt them: the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. The latter were to be discredited politically . . ., while their economic influence on various state or provincial bodies was to be destroyed. This campaign, known as the 'tiger hunt', with its secret denunciations and public accusation meetings, was accompanied by thousands of condemnations and caused hundreds of people to commit suicide in the large towns.. . .
The 'national bourgeoisie' was terror-stricken".
(Jacques Guillermaz: ibid.; p. 23).

"While the target of the 'three-anti' was the corrupt elements in the government and Party, the 'five-anti' was directed against the 'bourgeoisie' -- merchants, industrialists and business people in general. .
The launching of an attack upon the bourgeoisie within three years of the establishment of the new regime no doubt came as a shock to many.. . .
Accusations, public trials, confessions, huge mass meetings and the like marked the campaign."
(Theodore H. & Wen-hui Chen: op. cit.; p. 10, 12, 13).

Those accused in the campaign: "Were forced to pay large sums to the state in the form of fines, delinquent tax assessments or returned stolen assets."
(Theodore H. & Wen-hui Chen: op. cit.; p. 18).
Mao confirmed to representatives of press and publishing circles in March 1957 that: And the campaign did inflict severe damage on the national bourgeoisie: "In the cities the prestige of the bourgeoisie was gravely damaged by the Five Anti Campaign".
(Frederick C. Teiwes: 'Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms: 1950-1965'; Folkestone; 1979; p. 160).
However, as a result:
Firstly, of opposition from the Marxist-Leninist grouping within the Party, which considered an offensive against the national bourgeoisie premature at this stage of the revolutionary process, and

Secondly, of particularly intense opposition from the Party grouping representing the interests of the national bourgeoisie, which was the target of the campaign, the 'Five-Anti Campaign':

" . . came to an end on June 13, 1952".
(Jacques Guillermaz: op. cit.; p. 23).


By the autumn of 1952, the dominant grouping within the Communist Party was again a coalition of the Marxist-Leninist grouping, headed by Kao Kang, and the national bourgeois grouping, headed by Liu Shao-chi.

Both these groupings had a common interest in planning economic development so as to maximise industrial development -- a programme which was resisted by the comprador bourgeois grouping, headed by Mao Tse-tung, whose interests required the continuation of a colonial-type of economy in China.

In November 1952,

"The State Planning Commission was established. Kao was brought to Peking to become its first chairman".
(Donald Klein & Anne B. Clark: 'Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism: 1921-1965'; Cambridge (USA); 1971; p. 433).
Because of the dissension within the Party over the principles of economic planning, there was considerable difficulty in reaching agreement on the First Five-Year Plan, covering the period 1953 to 1957, which was, in only: "Finalised at the National People's Congress in July 1955",
(Mark Selden (Ed.): 'The People's Republic of China: A Documentary History of Revolutionary Change'; New York; 1979; p. 294).

"Retroactively incorporating the 1953 and 1954 plans".
(Marc Blecher: 'China: Politics, Economics and Society: Iconoclasm and Innovation in a Revolutionary Socialist Country'; London; 1986; p. 54).

Because of the dominance within the Party of a coalition of the Marxist-Leninist and national bourgeois groupings during the period when the Plan was being drawn up, THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN AS ADOPTED BROADLY FOLLOWED THE MARXIST-LENINIST PRINCIPLES PRACTISED IN THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE PERIOD WHEN STALIN WAS GENERAL-SECRETARY OF THE CPSU.

There was to be a high decree of centralisation in economic planning:

"Planning was to be highly centralised".
(Marc Blecher: ibid.; p. 54).
Investment priority was accorded to heavy industry: "Investment priority was given to heavy industry. .The new heavy industry was to take the form of very large complexes concentrated in a few big cities."
(Marc Blecher: ibid.; p. 54, 55).

"The 58% of total investment China allocated to heavy industry actually exceeded the Soviet figure".
(Marc Selden (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 56).

"The Soviet Union provided credit and technical assistance for 156 major projects, in what was perhaps the largest transfer of technology ever carried out by any country".
(Marc Blecher: ibid.; p. 54).

While the management of state industrial enterprises was based on: Under the First Five-Year Plan:

"Industrial output grew faster than the very high target of 14.7% per year. . . . Heavy industrial output nearly tripled, while light industry grew 70%. Railway freight volume more than doubled". (Marc Blecher: ibid.; p. 56-57).



CHAPTER SIX: The 'KAO KANG AFFAIR'
(December 1953 - March 1955)
INTRODUCTION

The Communist Party of China had long recognised in words the Marxist-Leninist principle that the revolutionary process in a colonial-type country like China would take place in two successive stages -- the stage of national-democratic revolution and that of socialist revolution:

"The Chinese revolutionary movement led by the Communist Party embraces two stages, i.e., , the democratic and the socialist revolutions, which are two essentially different revolutionary processes.
The second process can be carried through only after the first has been completed".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party'
(December 1939), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 2; Peking; 1965; p. 330-31).
With the defeat of the Kuomintang forces on the mainland, and the liquidation of the bureaucrat-capitalist and landlord classes, it was impossible to disguise the fact that the first (national-democratic) stage of the revolutionary process had been suffiently completed to enable it to go forward to its second stage -- to the stage of socialist revolution: "The task confronting the Party now is to build China into a great socialist country as quickly as possible".
(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 6).
THE MARXIST-LENINIST GROUPING WITHIN THE PARTY HEADED BY KAO KANG, WHICH REPRESENTED THE INTERESTS OF THE WORKING CLASS, WAS INDEED EAGER TO GO FORWARD TO THE SOCIALIST STAGE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS.

HOWEVER, THE NATIONAL BOURGEOIS GROUPING WITHIN THE PARTY HEADED BY LIU
SHAO-CHI, WHICH REPRESENTED THE INTERESTS OF EXPLOITERS WHO WERE ENGAGED IN INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE (see page 1), WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE, SINCE THIS WOULD DESTROY THEIR POSITION AS EXPLOITERS.

THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS GROUPING WITHIN THE PARTY HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG, WHICH REPRESENTED EXPLOITERS WHO WERE ENGAGED IN FOREIGN TRADE (see page 1), WAS SIMILARLY STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF COMMERCE, SINCE THIS WOULD DESTROY THEIR POSITION AS EXPLOITERS.

HOWEVER, IT WAS POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS PERIOD -- BEFORE THE 20th
CONGRESS OF THE CPSU HAD MADE REVISIONISM 'RESPECTABLE' WITHIN THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT -- FOR THE TWO BOURGEOIS GROUPINGS WITHIN THE CHINESE PARTY PUBLICLY TO REPUDIATE THE AIM OF SOCIALISM WITHOUT STRIPPING THEMSELVES OF THEIR FALSE 'SOCIALIST' MASKS.

THEREFORE, THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE TWO CLASSES COLLABORATED TO EVOLVE A NEW REVISIONIST THEORY WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CARRY FORWARD THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN WORDS, WHILE HOLDING IT BACK IN FACT.

CHINESE PSEUDO-SOCIALISM
IN ESSENCE, THIS PSEUDO-SOCIALIST THEORY ELABORATED BY THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS SIMPLY EQUATED CAPITALISM WITH SOCIALISM.
Marxism-Leninism holds that the transition from capitalism to socialism requires a violent revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of thel proletariat: "Can such a radical transformation of the old bourgeois order be achieved without a violent revolution, without the dictatorship of the proletariat?
Obviously not".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Concerning Questions of Leninism' (January 1926), in:
'Works', Volume 8; Moscow; 1954; p. 25).
THUS, ACCORDING TO MARXIST-LENINIST PRINCIPLES, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THE 'NEW-DEMOCRATIC' STATE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE TRANSITION, FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM REQUIRED THE VIOLENT EXPULSION OF THE NATIONALAL BOURGEOISIE AND THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE FROM THE STATE APPARATUS AND THE ENDING OF CO-EXISTENCE BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND OTHER PARTIES.

INSTEAD OF PURSUING SUCH A POLICY, THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS SIMPLY DECLARED THAT, BECAUSE OF THE EXTENT OF STATE INFLUENCE IN THE ECONOMY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, THIS ECONOMY WAS ONE OF STATE CAPITALISM:

"The present-day capitalist economy in China is . . . a state-capitalist economy."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On State Capitalism' (July 1953), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 101).
AND THAT BECAUSE OF THE EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE STATE, IT WAS A STATE-CAPITALIST ECONOMY OF A NEW TYPE: "The present-day capitalist economy in China a capitalist ecoomy which for the most part is under the control of the People's Government.. . .
It is . . . a state-capitalist economy of a new type."
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid.; p. 101).
WHICH HAD, 'TO A VERY GREAT EXTENT', A SOCIALIST CHARACTER: "This state-capitalist economy of a new type takes on a socialist character to a very great extent."
(Mao Tse-tung: ibid,; p. 101).
THUS, THIS STATE CAPITALISM AND THIS NEW-DEMOCRATIC STATE ARE PRESENTED BY THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS AS 'VEHICLES FOR THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM': "We can proceed with our step-by-step socialist transformation by means of the existing machinery of state".
(Liu Shao-chi: 'Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China' (September 1954); Peking; 1962; p. 26).
THIS TRANSITION CAN, IN THE CASE OF CHINA, BE GRADUAL: "State capitalism in various forms is to be put into practice gradually so as to attain socialist ownership by the whole people".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China (June 1954), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 143).
CARRIED OUT OVER A RELATIVELY LONG PERIOD OF TIME: "The socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce by the state will be gradually realised over a relatively long period of time, through various forms of state capitalism".
(Liu Shao-chi: 'Report on the Draft Constitution of the People's Republic of China'; Peking; 1962; p. 26).

"The period of transition from capitalism to socialism . . . will cover roughly eighteen years".
(Mao Tse-tung: Preface 1 to 'Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside' (September 1955), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 235).

AND 'PEACEFUL': "To achieve socialism through state capitalism . . . is a peaceful means of transition".
(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 24).

"Under conditions obtaining in this country, the exploiting class will be completely eliminated by peaceful means."
(Kuan Ta-tung: 'The Socialist Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce in China'; Peking; 1960; p. 111).

Furthermore, Marxism-Leninism defines the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as a state in which the proletariat does not share political power with any other class and in which the Communist Party does not share leadership with any other party: "The class of proletarians . . . does not and cannot share power with other classes. .
The party of the proletariat, the Party of the Communists. . . does not and cannot share leadership with other parties".
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Concerning Questions of Leninism' (January 1926), in:
'Works', Volume 8; Moscow; 1954; p. 27, 28).
BUT THE 'NEW-DEMOCRATIC' STATE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WAS DEFINED AS 'A STATE OF THE ENTIRE PEOPLE', i.e., ONE IN WHICH THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE AND THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE SHARE IN POLITICAL POWER: "After the founding of the People's Republic, . . . representatives of the national bourgeoisie and its parties have been taking part in the organs of our state".
(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.;p. 61).

"Our state is a people's democratic dictatorship. . . . The aim of this dictatorship is to protect all our people. . . . Who is to exercise this dictatorship? . . . The entire people".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People' (February 1957), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 387).

FURTHERMORE, THE 'NEW-DEMOCRATIC' STATE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WAS DEFINED AS A STATE IN WHICH THE COMMUNIST PARTY SHARES LEADERSHIP WITH OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES: "Which is better, to have just one party or several? As we see it now, it's perhaps better to have several parties . . . . It means long-term coexistence and mutual supervision
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Ten Great Relationships' (April 1956), in:
'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 296),

"Why should the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democratic parties be allowed to exist side by side with the party of the working class over a long period of time? Because we have no reason for not adopting the policy of long-term coexistence with all those political parties."
(Mao Tse-tung: 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People' (February 1957), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 413).

ACCORDING TO THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS, 'SOCIALISM' IN CHINA COULD BE ACHIEVED, NOT BY NATIONALISATION OF THE PRINCIPAL MEANS OF PRODUCTION, BUT  BY THE FORMATION OF JOINT STATE-PRIVATE ENTERPRISES IN WHICH THE STATE INVESTS AND TO WHICH IT ASSIGNS PERSONNEL TO SHARE IN MANAGEMENT WITH THE CAPITALISTS: "A joint state-private enterprise is one in which the state invests and to which it assigns personnel to share in management with the capitalists".
(Kuan Ta-tung: op. cit.; p. 75).
ACCORDING TO ThE CHINESE REVISIONISTS, IN THE COURSE OF THIS 'SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION' CAPITALISTS WILL GRADUALLY BE 'REMOULDED' INTO WORKING PEOPLE: "In the course of bringing about the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, . . . educational measures are adopted to remould the capitalists gradually , . . into working people".
(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 25).
THE PROBLEM OF ThE DICTATORSHIP OF ThE PROLETARIAT WAS EASILY SOLVED BY THE CHINESE REVISIONISTS. THEY SIMPLY DECLARED THAT THE NEW-DEMOCRATIC STATE, THE JOINT DICTATORSHIP OF SEVERAL CLASSES, WAS THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT. Even though: "Representatives of the national bourgeoisie and its parties have been taking part in the organs of our state",
(Liu Shao-chi (1956): ibid.; p. 61).
": . our state . . . is a dictatorship of the proletariat in essence".
(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 61).

"Our state organs are organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat."
(Mao Tse-tung: Speech at the 2nd Plenum of the 8th Central Commitee of
the CPC (November 1956),in: 'Seleted Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 338).
 

THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM (1952-54)
WITHIN THE PARTY, THE WHOLE REVISIONIST CONCEPT OF :
    'PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM IN COOPERATION WITH THE BOURGEOISIE' WAS DENOUNCED BY THE MARXIST-LENINIST MINORITY WITHIN THE PARTY, HEADED BY KAO KANG.

Kao Kang. the leader of the Marxist-Leninist grouping within the Communist Party of China, came from

"The industrialised north-east . . · the only region where the functions of First Secretary (Party) and military commander-in-chief were united in one person -- Kao Kang".
(Jaap van Ginneken: 'The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao'; Harmondsworth; 1976;  p. 35).
He: "Had established both warm personal relations with Stalin. . .  and smooth working relations with Soviet officials in the North-east".
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): 'Politics at Mao's Court: Kao Kang and Party Factionalism in the Early 1950s' (hereafter listed as 'Frederick C. Teiwes (1990)'); New York; 1990; p. 47).
and Mao himself noted: Shortly after Kao Kang's arrival in Peking, in early 1953, the Marxist-Leninist grouping there was strengthgened when another leading Marxist-Leninist JAO Shuh-chih*:: "Came to Peking to head the Central Committee's organisation department".
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990); op. cit.; p. 6).
The fact that: greatly strengthened the hand of the revisionists, while that of the Marxist-Leninist minority was weakened by the fact that they continued to observe the discipline of democratic centralism, opposing the revisionist majority only within higher Party organs.

Thus, contrary to later charges by the revisionists, Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih:

"Never openly put forward any programme against the Central Committee of the Party".
(Frederick C. Teiwes: 'Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms: 1950-1965' (hereafter listed as 'Frederick C. Teiwes (1979)'); Folkestone; 1979; p. 183, citing 'New China News Agency' .

"There are many reasons to believe that little more than parallel action by the two men existed. . . . Chinese scholars today report having. . . seen no material demonstrating that Kao and Jao ever held talks concerning their 'anti-Party' activities. . . . Kao Kang's former secretraries claim there was little connection between Kao and Jao".
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990: op. cit.; p. 46).

and: So, in the discussions within the Party leadership:

"Kao Kang was the odd man out. . . . While he said nothing, his silence was correctly perceived as disagreement."
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): ibid,; 61).

Privately, however, Kao was quite blunt.He is recorded as saying: "'Have you ever read 'On the Opposition' by Stalin? . . . Didn't Bukharin also advocate a peaceful entry into socialism?"'
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): ibid.; p. 61).
while: "Oral sources . . . picture Kao as favouring a comparatively rapid elimination of the national bourgeoisie as a class and a quick transition to socialism, and a close adherence to the Soviet model'. (Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): ibid.; p. 36).
THE COUP AGAINST THE MARXIST-LENINIST GROUPING
(December 1853 - March 1955)

THE REVISIONISTS CHOSE NOT TO FIGHT THE MARXIST-LENINIST GROUPING
OPENLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM, ON WHICH THEIR FLAGRANT DEVIATIONS FROM MARXISM-LENINISM MIGHT HAVE EXPOSED THEM. INSTEAD, THEY EMBARKED ON A PLOT TO LIQUIDATE THE GROUPING BY BRINGING AGAINST ITS LEADERS FALSE CHARGES OF 'FACTIONALISM' AND 'CONSPIRACY TO SEIZE POWER':

Mao's 'Warning' to Kao Kang (December 1953) The biographer of Mao's wife, CHIANG Ching* reports that Mao saw in the opposition of Kao and Jao to his revisionist line an unacceptable challenge to his personal supremacy in the state: "In the deep winter of 1953, Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih . . . challenged Mao's personal supremacy over the state structure."
(Roxane Witke: 'Comrade Chiang Ching'; London; 1977; p. 279).
So, at an Enlarged Politburo meeting in December 1953, "Mao, for the first time, directly confronted Kao Kang".
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): op. cit.; p. 115).
He: ". . issued a 'serious warning' to Kao and Jao and proposed a draft resolution on strengthening Party unity."
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): ibid.; p. 120).
  The 4th Plenum of the 7th CC (February 1954)
At the 4th Plenum of the 7th Central Committee in February 1954, " . . the dominant figure . · . was Liu Shao-chi".
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1979): op. cit.; p. 173).
who criticised 'some cadres' (unnamed) who, he alleged: During and after the 4th Plenum: " . . Kao and Jao were offered many opportunities for a fresh start."
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): op. cit.; p. 124).
but they declined to support the revisionist theses: " . . refusing to admit any serious fault".
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1990): ibid,; p. 126).
Suspicions that Liu' s remarks were directed at the grouping headed by Kao Kang were supported by the fact that Kao: "· . . made his last major report in September 1953".
(Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark: op. cit.; p. 433),
Howevere, no official announcement of his fate was published at the time. Kao merely: "· . . dropped from sight".
(Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark: ibid.; p. 410).
In fact, in February 1954 he was: "· . . thrown into prison",
('Who's Who in Communist China', Volume 1; Hong Kong; 1969; p. 330).
where he died in 1955.

It was later announced that Jao had suffered:

" . . expulsion from the Party".
(Franz Schurmann: 'Ideology and Organisation in Communist China'; Berkeley (USA); 1968; p. 267).
The National Conference of the CPC (March 1955) The 'Kao Kang Affair' was first made public at a National Conference of the CPC in March 1955: The resolution adopted by the conference claimed that Kao had: and that after he was transferred to Peking in 1953: "He even tried to instigate Party members in the army to support his conspiracy against the Central Committee of the Party".
(National Conference of CPC: Resolution on the Anti-Party Alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih (March 1955), in: 'People's China' (15 April 1955); p. 4).
The resolution alleged that, after a warning had been given to him at the 4th Plenum of the CC in February 1954: "Kao Kang not only did not admit his guilt to the Party, but committed suicide as an ultimate expression of his betrayal of the Party".
(National Conference of CPC: Resolution on the Anti-Party Alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih (March 1955), in: 'People's China' (15 April 1955); p. 4).
The resolution similarly alleged that after Jao Shu-shih's transfer to Peking in the summer of 1952, he: In his opening address to the conference, Mao said: "The criminal aim of this anti-Party alliance was to split our Party and seize power in the Party and the state by conspiratorial means".
(Mao Tse-tung: Opening Speech at the National Conference of the CPC (March 1955), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 155).
In his concluding speech to the conference, Mao Tse-tung replied to those who pointed out that there was no documentary evidence of factional activity involving Kao and Jao: "About the doubts expressed by some comrades to the effect that since we have no written agreement, perhaps there wasn't any alliance after all. . .,,. It is wrong to say that no alliance can exist without written agreeent."
(Mao Tse-tung: Concluding Speech at the National Conference of the CPC (March 1955), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 5; Peking; 1977; p. 162).
Along with Kao and Jao: "Seven other men were also swept out of the Party for their part in the 'anti-Party bloc'. . . . Even if Kao and Jao had not been involved, the seven were so significant themselves that their purge alone would have constituted a major debacle within the CPC ranks".
(Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark: op. cit.; p. 410).

"Kao's fall was accompanied by the purge of virtually all the key Party leaders in the North-East Region."
('New Enclopaedia Britannica', Volume 5; Chicago; 1994; p. 113).

With regard to the allegation of the revisionists that Kao 'committed suicide', one may note that, according to a 'Red Guard' pamphlet entitled 'Down with Liu Shao-chi' published in 1967 during the 'Cultural Revolution': ". Kao was 'put to death"' not long after the (1955 -- Ed.) conference".
(Frederick C. Teiwes (1979): op. cit.; p. 654).
The 5th Plenum of the 8th CC (April 1955)

At the 5th Plenum of the CC in April 1955, a resolution on the 'Kao-Jao anti-Party bloc':

"Was based on a report made by the Party Secretary-General TENG Hsiao-ping*".
(Donald W. Klein & Anne B. Clark: op. cit.; p. 410).
The 8th National Congress of the CPC (September 1956) In his Political Report to the 8th National Congress of the CPC, Liu Shao-chi referred to: "The anti-Party bloc of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, who tried to seize the leadership of the state and Party by conspiratorial means."
(Liu Shao-chi (1956): op. cit.; p. 96).

The 2nd Plenum of the 8th CC (November 1956)

By November 1956, Mao Tse-tung was suggesting that Kao Kang had been a Soviet agent:
CONCLUSION

The above interpretation of the 'Kao Kang Affair' -- that it was a frame-up engineered by Mao Tse-tung to eliminate progreessive opponents of Mao --was fundamentally accepted by Soviet revisionist historians. However, not unnaturally, the political point at issue is presented as Kao's pro-Soviet sympathies rather than his loyalty to Marxist-Leninist revolutionary principles:

"Beginning in 1953, Mao Tse-tung began the gradual elimination of all those who did not share his nationalist, anti-Soviet line. .
The struggle between the internationalist Marxist-Leninists and the Maoists . . . intensified at the beginning of the 1950s. The alarm was the arrest and death in prison in 1955 of Kao Kang. . . . The various criminal charges brought against him were completely unfounded".
(Oleg B. Borisov & Boris T. Koloskov: 'Soviet-Chinese Relations: 1945-1970'; Bloomington (USA); 1975; p. 126).
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 4
CHIANG Ching, Chinese actress and revisionist politician (1914-91); married Mao Tse-tung (1939); in charge of 'proletarianisation' of Peking Opera and Ballet (1963-65); deputy director, Cultural Revolution Group (1966-68); arrested (1976); expelled from CPC (1977); tried for counterrevolutionary activity (1980-81); given suspended death sentencve (1981); death sentence commuted to life imprisonment (1983); released from prison to house arrest (1984); died under house arrest, allegedly by suicide (1991).

JAO Shu-shih, Chinese Marxist-Leninist politician (1903-75); 1st secretary, East China Bureau, CPC, and 1st secretary, Shanghai Municipal Committee, CPC (1949-52); member, Central People's Government Council (1949-53); member, People's Revolutionary Military Council (1949-54); Political Commissar, East China Military Region (1950-54); Chairman, East China Military and Administrative Committee/East China Administrative Committee (1950-65); Director, Organisation Department, CC, CPC (1952-53); member, State Planning Commission (1952-54); arrested by revisionists (1955); expelled from CPC by revisionists (1955).

JIANG Qing = Pinyin form of CHIANG Ching.

RAO Shushi = Pinyin form of JAO Shu-shih.






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