Part Four:
"CLASS STRUGGLES IN CHINA"
A MARXIST-LENINIST ANALYSIS OF MAO-TSE TUNG,
BY W.B.BLAND
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN : THE RESURGENCE
OF ThE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE (April 1973 - March 1976)
Introduction
ENGAGED IN A LIFE-AND-DEATH STRUGGLE
AGAINST THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRO-SOVIET
COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY
LIN PIAO,
ONE SECTION OF ThE
POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRO-AMERICAN
COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE - THAT
HEADED BY CHOU EN-LAI -- SOUGHT A WORKING ALLIANCE WITH THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE,
NOW HEADED BY TENG HSIAO-PING.
Chou:
". . asserted himself strongly
in 1972."
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
192).
IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE
POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE WERE ABLE TO
RECOVER SOME OF THE POSITIONS THEY HAD LOST DURING THE 'CULTURAL
REVOLUTION'.
Since Chou brought:
"back into office many people
who had been disgraced between 1966 and 1969".
(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 192).
The Resurgence of the Poltical
Representatives of the National Bourgeoisie (November
1971 - Autumn 1975)
After the 'Lin Piao Affair', Teng
Hsiao-ping:
"wrote twice to Mao, in November
1971 and August 1972, asking to be allowed to work once more for the Party
and nation."
(Roderick MacFarquahar:
'The Successor to Mao and the End of Maoism', (hereafter listed
as 'Roderick MacFarquahar (1991)'), in: Roderick
Macfarquahar & John K. Fairbank (Eds.) (1991): op. cit.; p. 338).
In April 1973, Teng Hsiao-ping:
"returned to public life .
. . with his former title as a Deputy Premier, and was
elected to the Communist Party Central Committee" .
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives,
Volume 20; p. 26,786).
at the 10th Congress of the CPC
in August 1973.
As has been said, the National
People's Congress in January 1973
"approved . . . a new State
Council, headed by Mr. Chou En-lai".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 21; p. 26,968).
as Prime Minister, and with only
one military officer:
"among the 12 Deputy Premiers."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 21; p. 26,969).
The new government:
"included representatives
of different . . . political tendencies".
('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,969.
Only one Deputy Premier -- Chang
Chun-chiao -- was:
"Associated with the . . . 'Shanghai
group' . . . None of the other members of this group -- Mr.
Wang Hung-wen, Mme. Chiang Ching and Mr. Yao Wen-yuan -- received
a ministerial post".
('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,969.
From January 1974 onwards,
"Teng Hsiao-ping . . . played
an increasingly prominent role in public life".
('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 20; p. 26,786).
In April 1974, for example:
"he led the Chinese delegation
to the special session of the UN General Assembly on raw materials and
development".
('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 20; p. 26,786).
In January 1975, Teng was:
"appointed Chief of Staff.
. . . The post of Chief of Staff had been vacant since 1971, when
General Huang Yung-sheng disappeared from the political scene
at the same time as Marshal Lin Piao". ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 21; p. 26,969).
The 2nd Plenum of the 10th CC, in
January 1975:
"elected Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping
as one of its vice-chairmen and as a member of the Standing Committee of
its Political Bureau".
('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,965).
and in February 1975, Teng Hsiao-ping
was:
"appointed a vice-chairman
of the Communist Party's military affairs commission
('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,668).
By these appointments, Teng assumed:
"day-to-day control of both
Party and govement".
(Roderick MacFarquahar
(1991): op. cit.; p. 351),
Furthermore, during the summer
and autumn of 1975,
"a large number of political
leaders who had been denounced as 'revisionists' during the Cultural Revolution
were rehabilitated".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 22; p. 27,669).
For example, in July 1975:
Chou En-lai's policy of promoting
a working alliance with the political representatives of the national
bourgeoisie met with strong:
"opposition from former
activists of the Cultural Revolution period".
('Keesing 's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,669).
and they:
"prepared to denounce their
most formidable opponent, Premier Chou En-lai himself".
(Roderick MacFarquahar
(1991): op. cit.;p. 343).
In January 1974 a campaign
was initiated under the slogan:
"Criticise Lin, criticise CONFUCIUS*".
('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 20; p. 26,785).
The group around Mao strove to transform
this campaign into:
"a political campaign to destroy
the authority and reputation of Chou En-lai".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.;
p. 193).
"Under cover of the campaign
to resist the teachings of Confucius, the Gang of Four became more and
more audacious in saying things that could only have been meant to
apply to Chou En-lai".
(Dick Wilson: 'Chou:
The Story of Zhou Enlai: 1898-1976'; London; 1984; p. 286).
Organised by Chiang Ching and Wang
Hung-wen:
"Teams of writers from Peking's
two best-known universities, Peking University and Tsinghua, wrote articles
to criticise Confucius and the Duke of Chou, a ruler of the 12th
century BC whom Confucius had held up as a model".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.;
p. 195).
In August 1974, the
'People's Daily' published an article which quoted Confucius as saying:
'Revive states that have been
extinguished, restore families whose line of succession has been
broken, and call to office those who have retired to obscurity'. This was
an oblique but unmistakable critique of Chou's rehabilitation of senior
cadres, particularly clear to those who knew that the passage referred
to the actions of Chou's namesake, the great statesman of the 12th century
BC, the Duke of Chou".
(Roderick MacFarquahar
(1991): op. cit.; p. 345).
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES --11
CONFUCIUS -- Anglicised form
of KUNG Fu Tzu.
KUNG Fu Tzu, Chinese reactionary
philosopher (551 - 479 B.C.); ran school of philosophy extolling
propriety and rites.
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN : THE FIRST
'TIEN AN MEN SQUARE INCIDENT' (September 1975 - March 1976)
The 'Three Directives' (September
1975)
In September 1975, Teng Hsiao-ping,
on behalf of the national bourgeoisie, launched a campaign in support of
three directives which he attributed to Mao Tse-tung, namely:
In January 1976, a New Year
editorial in 'People's Daily', 'Red Flag' and 'Liberation Army Daily' cited
a new directive attributed to Mao Tse-tung:
"Class struggle is the key link,
and everything else hinges on it."
('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,671).
This slogan:
"constituted a repudiation
of the 'three-point directive' popularised by Mr.Teng Hsiao-ping".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 22; p. 27,671).
and initiated:
On 8 January 1976, Chou En-lai
died. ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 22; p. 27,589).
On 15 January 1975, Teng:
"Delivered the official eulogy
at Mr. Chou En-lai's funeral".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 22; p. 27,672).
Chou's death:
On 3 February 1976, the Politburo
of the CC of the CPC:
"issued a directive .
. . naming HUA (Kuo-feng -- Ed.)* as 'acting premier'".
(Wang Ting: 'Chairman
Hua: Leader of the Chinese Communists'; London; 1980; p.101).
Hua 's nomination took place because
the political representatives of the pro-US compradors -- the grouping
around Chiang Ching -
"refused to serve under Mr.
Teng."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 22; p. 27,671).
Hua Kuo-feng was:
" widely regarded as politically
'neutral' in terms of the two major factional groupings within the
elite. . .
In Peking he successfully steered
a course between the rival factions and could not be clearly identified
with either. The image he presented was that of the diligent, moderate,
modest and loyal follower of Mao".
(John Gardner: 'Chinese
Politics and the Succession to Mao'; London; 1982; p. 119).
In other words, he was:
" a compromise candidate",
('New Encyclopaedia Britannica',
Volume 16; Chicago; 1994; p. 152-53).
who:
" was acceptable to the veterans
(the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie
-- Ed.) and posed no direct threat to the Gang of Four
(the political representatives of the pro-US compradors -Ed.)",
(Liao Kuang-sheng: 'Factional
Politics after the Cultural Revolution: The Gang of Four and "Old Revolutionaries"'
(hereafter listed as 'Liao Kuangsheng (1977'), in: Steve S.
K. Chin (Ed.): 'The Gang of Four: First Essays after
the Fall'; Hong Kong; 1977; p. 137).
who, although a firm Maoist,
was not linked with the grouping around Chiang Ching -- now becoming widely
known as 'the Gang of Four'. He was, in fact:
"The only member of the
Politburo Standing Committee who was neither a member of the gang nor a
supporter of Teng 's".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
207).
Already in the autumn of 1975, Chiang
Ching:
"Had begun sniping at the timidity
with which the rising Hua Kuo-feng . . . sought to pursue their shared
goals".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 360).
and after his appointment as acting
premier:
At the beginning of April 1976,
"People began to place wreaths,
posters and poems in memory of Mr. Chou En-lai on the Monument
to the People's Heroes in Tien An Men Square . . . in preparation for Ching
Ming, the festival when the Chinese honour the dead".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 22; p. 27,805).
"Column after column,
dozens of units, thousands of people, marched to the square to place their
wreaths, declaim their tributes, and read those of others. On the
festival day, 4 April (1976-- Ed.), a Sunday holiday, an estimated two
million people visited the square
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 361).
However, the demonstrations:
"were regarded as a display
of popular support for Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping, . . . who was under attack
as a 'capitalist-roader'.
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 22; p. 27,805).
Indeed:
"the slogans used during
these demonstrations gave clear indications of the thrust of the movement:
'Down with the Empress Dowager!' 'Down with Indira Gandhi!' (both
directed against Chiang Ching). . . . 'Teng
Hsiao-ping shall direct the work of the Party Centre!"'.
(Jurgen Domes 'The "Gang of
Four" and Hua Kuo-feng: Analysis of Political Events in 1975-76' (hereafter
listed as 'Jurgen Domes (1977)', in: 'China Quarterly', No. 71 (September
1977); p. 490).
On the morning of 5 April:
"When the crowds returned to
examine the wreaths . . ., they found that they had all been removed during
the night, whereupon rioting broke out which continued throughout
the day."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 22; p. 27,805).
When the crowds refused to disperse:
"Militia contingents, numbering
tens of thousands, . . . were sent in. In the ensuing action, heavy casualties
were inflicted on both the demonstrators and innocent bystanders".
(Wang Ting: op. cit.; p. 105).
The media controlled by 'Gang of
Four' denounced the demonstrations as:
"counter-revolutionary in nature."
(Jurgen Domes (1977):
op. cit.; p 490, citing 'New China News Agency' (7 April 1976).
and singled out Teng:
"as the 'chief culprit of the
Tien An Men incident."
(Wang Ting: op. cit.; p. 10).
On 7 April 1976, the Politburo of
the CC of the CPC:
"on the proposal of our great
leader Chairman Mao'',
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 22; p. 27,806).
confirmed the appointment of Hua
Kuo-feng as:
"First Vice-Chairman of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Premier of the State
Council of the People's Republic of China".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 22; p. 27,806).
Another resolution, also made:
"On the proposal of our great
leader Chairman Mao";
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 22; p. 27,806)
"dismissed Mr. Teng from all
his government and Party posts".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 22; p. 27,805).
In other words, the comprador bourgeois
political grouping:
"were able to use the demonstrations
. . as a pretext for securing the dismissal of Teng Hsiao-ping
from his positions in the Party, state and army. But they were
still not able to obtain any promotions for themselves.
Instead, the chief beneficiary of the Tien An Men incident was Hua Kuo-feng".
(Harry Harding: 'China's
Second Revolution: Reform after Mao' (hereafter listed as 'Harry Harding
(1987)'; Washington; 1987; p. 51).
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES --12
HUA Guofeng = Pinyin form of
HUA Kuo-feng.
HUA Kuo-feng, Chinese revisionist
politician (1921- ); secretary, Hsiangyin
County CPC, Hunan Province
(1949-51); secretary, Hsiangtan County CPC,
Hunan Province (1951-56);
head, irrigation project, Shaoshan (1956-66);
Deputy Governor, Hunan Province
(1958-59); secretary, CPC, Hunan Province
(1959-66); Deputy
Chairman, Revolutionary Committee, Hunan Province
(1966-70); Acting
Chairman, Revolutionary Committee, Hunan Province
(1970-74); 1st secretary,
CPC, Hunan Province (l97O~71); to Peking
(1971); political
commissar, Canton Military Region (1972-74);
1st
Political Commissar,
Hunan Military District (1973-74);
member,
Politburo, CC, CPC
(1973-82); Acting Premier (1976-80); 1st Deputy
Chairman, CC, CPC (1976);
Deputy Premier and Minister of Public Security
(1975-77); Acting Premier
(1976); Premier (1976-8); Chairman, CC, CPC
(1976-81); Chairman, CPC
Military Commission (1976-81); member, Standing
Committee, Politburo,
CC, CPC (1981-82); Deputy Chairman, CC, CPC (1981-
82).
CHAPTER NINETEEN: THE COUP
AGAINST THE 'GANG OF FOUR' (September - December 1976)
The Death of Mao Tse-tung
(September 1976)
On 9 September 1976, Mao Tse-tung
died.
Among the foreign tributes,
US President Gerald Ford described him as a man who had
"had the vision and imagination
to open the doors so the United States and the People's Republic of China
could do things in a new era."
('Keesing' s Contemporary Archives',
Volume 22; p. 28,054),
From 11 to 17 September:
"Mao's body lay in state . .
. in the Great Hall of the People in Peking. . .
The mourning period ended on Sept. 18 with a mass meeting in Tien
An Men Square, where the Prime Minister Mr. Hua Kuo-feng, delivered the
funeral oration."
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 22; p. 28,053).
In October 1976, it was announced:
Mao's death:
"brought to a head the conflict
. . . inside the Chinese Communist Party".
('Keesing' s Contemporary Archives',
Volume 23; p. 28,205).
After Mao's death:
"the Gang stepped up their campaign
against him (Hua Kuo-feng-- Ed.)".
(Roderick MacFarquahar &
John K. Fairbank (Eds.): 'The Cambridge History of China',
Volume 15: 'The People's Republic', Part 2: 'Revolutions
within the Chinese Revolution: 1966-1982'; Cambridge; 1991; p. 360).
They:
"made it quite clear that they
were not prepared to accept Hua as Mao's successor".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
215).
and demanded:
"That Chiang Ching should become
Chairman".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
216).
Indeed:
"from 12 September, the Gang
promoted a write-in campaign to pressure the Politburo to appoint Chiang
Ching Chairman in Mao's place. Pictures published on the occasion
of the obsequies for the late Chairman were designed to accustom the public
to the idea of Chiang Ching emerging as his successor."
(Roderick MacFarquahar &
John K. Fairbank (Eds.): 'The Cambridge History of China',
Volume 15: 'The People's Republic', Part 2: 'Revolutions
within the Chinese Revolution: 1966-1982'; Cambridge; 1991; p. 368).
These developments caused
the comprador bourgeois grouping around Hua Kuofeng to:
"come round to the view that
only their (the grouping's around Chiang Ching -- Ed.) arrest could stop
them from continuing to fight for total political power
(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 216).
Thus, the grouping around
Hua entered into a temporary tactical alliance
with the national bourgeois grouping headed by Teng Hsiao-ping to
achieve the aim of liquidating the grouping headed by Chiang Ching.
The plan formulated by this alliance
provided:
"for a limited purge of the
Politburo under the direction of its senior member (Hua) and with the backing
of a majority within it. It guaranteed that the army .
. . remained united and available to act against
the militia units which suppor,,ters of the gang had been arming in Shanghai
and a few other large cities."
(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 216).
Aware of the moves to stage a coup
against her:
"Chiang Ching tried unsuccessfully
to seize power with the help of three members of the CPC's Politburo".
('The Europa World Year Book:
1997', Volume 1; London; 1997; p. 858).
But in comparison with the leaders
of the other groupings:
"The backgrounds of the Gang
of Four . . . were both narrow and shallow. By 'narrow' I mean that
their career experience had been highly specialised, giving them a potential
political base in only one functional area, that of culture and propaganda.
. . . The background experience of the Four was for the most
part confined to relatively few ranks of the bureaucratic hierarchy.
. . . Before 1966, they were relatively low-ranking
officials; and not until the Cultural Revolution did they become
nationally prominent, and not until the 9th Congress (in April 1969--
Ed.) was their position at the summit of Chinese politics officially confirmed".
(Lowell Dittmer: 'The
Backgrounds of the Gang of Four', in: Steve S. K. Chin (Ed.): op.
cit.; p. 6).
Indeed, the primary base of the
'Gang of Four':
"was the Chairman, Mao Tse-tung.
. . In their primary reliance on the Chairman as a base of support,
the Four played a role similar to what historians of European court politics
have termed the 'favourite': the royal adviser whose place in court depends
on the favour of the crown".
(Lowell (Dittmer: ibid.; p.
7).
In fact, by 1976:
On 7 October 1976, Hua Kuo-feng:
The death of Mao
in September 1976 removed the keystone of the narrow power structure of
the 'Gang of Four' and opened the door to a coup against them by
a temporary alliance of the national bourgeois grouping within the Party,
headed by Teng Hsiao-ping, and the comprador bourgeois grouping
headed by Hua Kuo-feng.
And the narrower
power base of the 'Gang of Four' meant that
this alliance was decidedly stronger than the 'Gang'.
In the period preceding Mao's
death:
"Teng moved about from place
to place and . . . actively encouraged those who visited him .
. to make plans to overthrow the gang".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
213).
By mid-October 1976:
"Hua had won control over the
press".
(Roxane Witke: op. cit.; p.
470).
Final decisions to launch the coup
against the 'Gang of Four':
"Were taken at a Politburo meeting,
from which the gang were excluded and of which they remained in ignorance,
held at a military headquarters on 5 October".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
216).
On the evening of 6 October 1976,
Chang Chun-chiao, Wang Hung-wen and Yao
Wen-yuan were arrested by troops. Chiang Ching and Mao Yuan-hsin
were arrested in their homes at about the same time.
On 9 October 1976, Shanghai supporters
of the 'Gang of Four':
"Mobilised 30,000 of the militia
. . • and issued them with arms and ammunition".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives';
Volume 23; p. 28,207).
Then, at a meeting of the Shanghai
Party Committee on 12 October,
"Some of the leadership proposed
that the militia should occupy key positions and a general strike be called,
but the meeting failed to agree on any action".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archivest1
Volume 23; p. 28,207).
In Peking,
"There was some sporadic street
fighting, but it ended in about a week. In other parts of the
country, clashes between regular and militia units continued for over a
year."
(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 216).
Posters:
"Denouncing the 'gang of four'
by name appeared on Oct. 15 in Peking and Tsinghua universities".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 23; p. 28,207).
and, on 21 October 1976,
"fifteen days after the event,
widespread rumours that the gang had been arrested were officially confirmed".
(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 218).
The:
"Propaganda campaign against
the 'gang of four' was developed throughout November and December".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 23; p. 28,208).
The trial of the 'Gang of Four',
however, did not begin until January 1981, nearly five years later,
after the ground had been prepared to include the organising of the
'Cultural Revolution' among the crimes with which they could be charged.
CHAPTER TWENTY : THE SECOND
RESURGENCE OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOIS GROUPING (October 1976 - October 1987)
Introduction
HAVING UTILISED THE COMPRADOR
BOURGEOIS GROUPING AROUND HUA KUO-FENG TO LIQUIDATE THE 'GANG OF
FOUR', THE NATIONAL BOURGEOIS GROUPING, HEADED BY TENG TSIA-PING,
NOW EMBARKED ON A CUNNING STRATEGY TO LIQUIDATE THE GROUPING
AROUND HUA.
The long-term programme of the
grouping around Teng was, of course:
"to get the Party to repudiate
the . . . Cultural Revolution, to substitute development for class warfare
as the highest order of business, and to allow bold experiment."
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
228).
notably in the field of economic
and foreign affairs.
Naturally, as a representative
of the pro-American comprador bourgeoisie, Hua Kuo-feng
"resisted Teng's programme".
(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 228).
He:
"had no intention of modifying
either the 'revolutionary line' or its underlying theory of 'continuing
the revolution under the proletarian dictatorship' that had been
implemented in Mao's later years".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): 'Deng
Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping): Chronicle of an Empire'; Boulder (USA); 1994;
p. 18).
and at this time Hua Kuo-feng:
"commanded the leading role
on the historical stage of China".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): ibid.;
p. 41).
THE STRATEGY OF THE GROUPING
AROUND TENG WAS, THEREFORE, TO WORK, IN NO MATTER WHAT
UNPRINCIPLED WAY, TO END THE DOMINANCE OF THE PARTY GROUPING
HEADED BY HUA KUO-FENG:
FIRSTLY,
BY HYPOCRITICALLY PLEDGING LOYALTY TO HUA KUO-FENG AND 'MAO TSETUNG
THOUGHT' IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE 'REHABILITATION' BY
A PARTY MACHINERY DOMINATED BY THE HUA GROUPING;
SECONDLY,
BY FORMING A TEMPORARY WORKING ALLIANCE
(THE 'SO-CALLED 'DEMOCRACY WALL' MOVEMENT)
WITH ELEMENTS WHICH WISHED TO ESTABLISH FORTHWITH 'PARLIAMENTARY
DEMOCRACY' IN CHINA AGAINST THE PARTY GROUPING HEADED BY HUA KUO-FENG;
THIRDLY,
BY PRETENDING TO SUPPORT THE PRO-AMERICAN, ANTI-SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
OF THE GROUPING HEADED BY HUA KUO-FENG;
FOURTHLY,
BY WORKING FOR A RE-DEFINITION OF 'MAO TSE-TUNG THOUGHT' WHICH WOULD LIMIT
IT TO PRINCIPLES ACCEPTABLE TO THE NATIONAL BOURGEOIS GROUPING OF THE PARTY;
AND
FIFTHLY,
BY HYPOCRITICALLY SUPPORTING HUA's TOTALLY UNREALISTIC ECONOMIC PROGRAMME
OF 1978-79 (KNOWN AS THE 'GREAT LEAP OUTWARD'), SO THAT
ITS INEVITABLE FAILURE COULD BE USED AS A WEAPON AGAINST THE GROUPING AROUND
HUA.
The Campaign against the 'Gang
of Four' (October 1976 - December 1977)
In October 1976:
"Posters denouncing 'the gang
of four' by name appeared in Peking and Tsinghua universities. . .
The press meanwhile published a series of articles denouncing the
'gang of four' without naming them".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 23; p. 28,207).
Throughout 1977:
"The propaganda
campaign against the 'gang of four' was developed".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 23; p. 28,208).
and:
"resulted in changes in the
leadership of many of the provincial Communist Parties, new first secretaries
being appointed in 10 provinces".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 23; p. 28,718).
During late 1978 and the first half
of 1978, mass meetings took place:
"at which supporters of the
'gang of four;' were denounced and in some cases arrested".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 24; p. 29,191).
The 'Two Whatevers' (October
1976 - February 1977)
On 10 October
1976, only four days after the arrest of the 'Gang of
Four', the Party grouping around Hua decided to publish:
"The 'Complete Works of Mao
Tse-tung' and . . . Volume 5 of the 'Selected Works'. For the second
enterprise, Hua Kuo-feng himself wrote an article entitled 'Continue the
Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to the End:
A Study of Volume 5 of the "Selected Works" of Mao Tse-tung"'.
(Ruan Ming (Juan Hing):
op. cit.; p. 18, citing 'Peking Review' (6 May 1977).
In February 1977, the Party grouping
around Hua Kuo-feng proclaimed a principle of Maoist fundamentalism
which crystallised their programme and became known as the 'Two Whatevers',
namely:
"Whatever policies Chairman
Mao decided, we shall resolutely defend; whatever instructions he issued,
we shall steadfastly obey".
(Hua Kuo-feng: Statement
of Policy (February 1977), in: Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): ibid.; p. 20).
The aim of the policy:
"Was to head off questioning
of the actions of the later Mao''.
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 372).
The Central Work Conference (March
1977)
At a Central Work Conference
in March 1977, Hua at first:
"Reaffirmed the 'two whatevers',
repeated formulas from the Cultural Revolution, maintained that the
Tien An Men incident was counter-revolutionary, and asserted that the campaign
against Teng . . . had been correct."
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 373).
Indeed, he denounced the demand
for the return of Teng Hsiao-ping as equivalent to a call for the rehabilitation
of the 'Gang of Four':
"Under cover of calling for
the return of Teng Hsiao-ping, they want to . . . . rehabilitate
the 'Gang of Four'".
(Hua Kuo-feng: Speech
at Central Work Conference (March 1977), in: Ruan Ming (Juan Ming):
op. cit.; p. 22).
However, under pressure from Teng's
supporters, he later:
"gave way."
(John Gardner: op. cit.;
p. 125).
to some extent, telling the conference:
"That Teng had nothing to do
with the Tien An Men Incident and that the Central Committee would give
him an opportunity to work again."
(John Gardner: ibid.; p. 125).
The Rehabilitation of
Teng Hsiao-ping (October 1976 - December 1978)
On 10 October 1976, only
four days after the arrest of the 'Gang of Four' Teng wrote to Hua,
praised him:
"as a man of 'wisdom' .
. . and added that 'he put body and soul behind Hua Kuo-feng as leader
of the Party and nation."
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op.
cit.; p. 40).
This letter:
"has never been released",
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 374).
but is known to have indicated Teng'
s:
"willingness to support Hua
Kuo-feng's continued leadership of the Party, . . . That could be
why the letter was not included in Teng's 'Selected Works"'.
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
ibid.; p. 375).
In January 1977, big-character
posters appeared which:
"Called for a reversal
of the verdicts on the Tien An Men incident and the rehabilitation of Teng
Hsiao-ping".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op.
cit.; p. 20).
and in the same month, the propaganda
campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping was:
"officially ended".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 23; p. 28,717).
In a second letter to Hua
in April 1977, Teng expressed:
"First of all his joy and gratitude
for Hua's proposals in March to the Central Committee. He next admitted
that during his time at the State Council in 1975, .
. he had committed mistakes and had willingly accepted instructions
and criticism from Chairman Mao".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op.
cit.; p. 39).
The way in which:
"Teng's letters to Hua of October
1976 and April 1977 are covered in his 'Selected Works'
(the first is only referred to and the account of the second is incomplete)
suggests that Teng himself feels that he has something to hide".
(Richard Evans: op, cit.; p.
239).
Finally, in his April letter to
Hua, Teng re-defined 'Mao Tse-tung Thought'
in terms which would make it acceptable to the national bourgeois grouping
of the Party, saying:
"We should use genuine Mao Tse-tung
thought taken as an integral whole . . guiding our Party, our Army
and our people".
(Teng Hsiao-ping:
Letter to Hua Kuo-feng (April 1977), in: 'The "Two Whatevers"
do not accord with Marxism' (May 1977), in: 'Selected Works
(1975-1982)'; Peking; 1984; p. 39),
The 3rd Plenum of the
10th CC (July 1977)
The tactics adopted by
the group around Teng, despite their unprincipled character,
"Enabled Teng Hsiao-ping to
attend the 10th CC's 3rd Plenum (in July 1977 -- Ed.)".
(Rodrerick MacFarquhar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 375).
where he paid hypocritical tributes
to Hua's political wisdom, declaring:
"That Hua Kuo-feng possessed
the historical attributes that made him worthy of his role as leader".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op.
cit.; p. 40).
As a result, at the Plenum Teng
was:
"reinstated in all his offices:
Party vice-chairman and member of the Politburo Standing Committee;
vice-chairman of the MAC (Military Affairs Commission -- Ed.); vice-premier;
and PLA chief of staff".
(Roderick MacFarquhar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 375).
Thus, from July 1977,
"Teng was directly responsible
for education, science and technology, military affairs and foreign affairs."
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
225).
At the Plenum, Teng:
"Repeated his advocacy of an
integrated view of Mao Tse-tung Thought, but was discreet enough
not to attack the 'two whatevers' frontally at this time. .
. Instead, he promoted an old slogan which was to become the essence
of Teng Hsiao-ping's post-Mao policies:
'Seek truth from facts'".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 375).
In addition, at the Plenum:
"the 'Gang of Four' were expelled
from all posts both inside and outside the Party and, for good measure,
to their long list of crimes was added the accusation that they had 'feverishly
attacked and fabricated accusations against Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping"'.
(John Gardner: op. cit.; p.
125).
The 11th National Congress
of the CPC (August 1977)
In August 1977, the 11th
National Congress of the CPC:
"was held in secret".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archivest,
Volume 23; p. 28,720).
"On the basis of the compromise
cemented at the plenum".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 375).
between the groupings headed respectively
by Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping. In a weaker position than at the Central
Work Conference in March, now:
"It was Hua's turn to be discreet,
not reasserting the 'two whatevers', or repeating his estimation of the
Tien An Men incident as counter-revolutionary. . .
. Instead, he opened with a long and effusive eulogy
of the late Chairman, went on to reaffirm the necessity for, and success
of, the Cultural Revolution, the correctness of the line of the 10th Congress,
. . . and the need to persist with class struggle and continue the
revolution under the proletarian dictatorship".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
ibid.; p. 375).
Presenting the report of the Central
Committee, Hua alleged that:
"'the gang of four' had 'colluded
with the Lin Piao anti-Party clique' during the Cultural Revolution.
. . .
After Mr. Chou En-lai's death,
they had brought false charges against Mr. Teng. . .
After Chairman Mao's death,
they had . . . distributed arms and ammunition
in Shanghai. . .
The smashing of the 'gang of
four' marks the triumphant conclusion of our first Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution.
We must carry through
the great struggle to expose and criticise the 'gang of four' through to
the end".
('Keesing 's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 23; p. 28,720, 29,721).
In his report, Hua:
"Invoked the late Chairman's
invocation of the Great Leap Forward, by insisting that China must carry
out the general line of ...'achieving greater, faster, better and more
economical results in "building socialism"".
(John Gardner: op. cit.; p.
126).
The congress endorsed Mao's policy
of:
"Continuing the revolution under
the dictatorship of the proletariat."
(11th National Congress of CPC:
Resolution on the Political Report (August 1977), in:
'Peking Review', Volume 20, No. 35 (26 August 1977); p. 58).
In elections to the Central Committee:
"Nearly 80 of the former full
members known to be still alive were not re-elected. .
The new members included . .
. General Lo Jui-ching".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 23; p. 28,722).
At the congress, Teng was elected
a Deputy Chairman of the Party, but:
"Succeeded in reinforcing neither
his power nor his influence at this congress".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op.
cit.; p. 41).
Teng emerged:
"At the Congress as the CPC's
third-ranking leader. . Teng's brief closing speech was
the only other address to be accorded publicity. He referred to Hua
as 'our wise leader', but did not emulate his wisdom by praising
the Cultural Revolution. . . . But he too had to compromise
and express support for the current line to 'grasp the key link of class
struggle' and 'continue the revolution under the dictatorship of
the proletariat."
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 375-76).
The Pro-US, Anti-Soviet Foreign
Policy of the Hua Leadership (August 1977 - September 1980)
On the international situation,
as has been said, the Hua leadership followed the line appropriate for
the pro-US comprador bourgeoisie. In his report to the 11th National
Congress of the Party in August 1977, Hua declared that:
"The Soviet Union and the United
States are the source of a new world war, and Soviet social-imperialism
in particular presents the greatest danger".
(Hua Kuo-feng: Report to 11th
National Congress of CPC (August 1977), in: 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 23; p. 28,720).
From this time on, until the eclipse
to the grouping headed by Hu Kuo-feng, this view formed the basis of China's
foreign policy. In particular, it was embodied in the 'Three
Worlds Theory', which:
"According to Chinese sources
. . . was first formulated by Chairman Mao . . . in February 1974".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 25; p. 29,392).
The theory became prominent
in the summer of 1977:
"Chinese foreign policy
statements in 1977-78 were dominated by the 'Three Worlds' theory".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 25; p. 29,392).
It rejected:
"the earlier conception of the
world as divided into the developed capitalist countries, the 'socialist
camp' and the developing countries."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 25; p. 29,392).
In November 1977, the theory was
developed in a long article in the 'People's Daily' in November
1977, entitled 'Chairman Mao's Theory of Differentiation of the Three Worlds
is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism':
"Of the two imperialist
super-powers, the Soviet Union is the more ferocious, the more reckless,
the more treacherous, and the more dangerous source of world war.
.
Soviet social-imperialism
. . . is the more aggresssive and adventurous."
('Chairman Mao's Theory of Differentiation
of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism'
(November 1977), in: 'Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 25; p. 29,392).
In December 1978, a joint Sino-US
statemnent announced that:
"The People's Republic of China
and the USA have agreed to recognise each other and to establish
diplomatic relations as of Jan. 1, 1979".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 25; p. 29,534).
At the same time, the US government
announced its intention of:
"Terminating the mutual assistance
treaty . . . (between the USA and Taiwan -- Ed.) and would withdraw
its military personnel from Taiwan within four months".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p. 31,619).
In 1978 there was:
"A major increase in US exports
to China, which totalled $653 million in the first 11 months of the year".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 25; p. 29,537).
In February 1979, the Chinese government:
". . launched a punitive war
against Vietnam.". . .
The CARTER* administration viewed
this war as an important element of the anti-Soviet strategy the United
States and China had in common.. . .
The war . . lasted exactly one
month".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op.
cit.; p. 51, 54).
In January 1980, the US Defence
Department announced:
"That it was now prepared to
sell military equipment . . . to China".
('Keesing' s Contemporary Archives'
Volume 26; p. 30,387).
In February 1980, a trade ageement
with the USA:
"granting China most-favoured
nation status . . entered into force."
('Contemporary Archives', Volume
26; p. 30,387).
The 'Great Leap Outward' (February
1978 - early 1979)
At the National People's Council
in February/March 1978:
"Chairman Hua Kuo-feng launched
a 'Great Leap Outward' to promote high-speed industrial growth by developing
China's oil reserves and exporting them in return for advanced technology".
(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou Hsiao-chuang):
'Industry and the Urban Economy (herafter listed as 'Zhou Xiaoshuang
(Chou Hsiao-chuang) (1995)', in: Robert Benewick &
Paul Wingrove (Eds.): 'China in the 1990s'; Basingstoke; 1995; p.
146).
"The plan target for steel
output in 1985 was 60 million tons (1977: 23.7 m. tons); for oil,
350 million tons (1977: 93.6 m. tons). . . . Hua called for the construction
of 120 major projects, 14 major heavy industrial bases, and capital
investment equivalent to that expended in the previous 28 years."
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 377).
It called for:
"ten new oilfields".
(Dwight H. Perkins:
'China's Economic Policy and Performance' in: Roderick MacFarquahar
& John K. Fairbank (Eds.): 'The Cambridge History of China:
Volume 15: The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within
the Chinese Revolution: 1966-1982'; Cambridge; 1991; p. 496).
By the autumn of 1978, however,
Hua's ten-year development plan had:
"Been shown to be the stuff
of dreams. It had stipulated a more than fourfold increase in oil production,
but from fields which remained to be discovered, and a twofold increase
in steel production, which could only be achieved by importing equipment
on a scale far beyond China's means."
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
237).
"When the excessively optimistic
estimates of oil reserves were revised downwards in 1978, the plan collapsed".
(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou Hsiao-chuang):
op. cit.; p. 146).
"Hua had mimicked Mao's grandiose
visions. Instead of covering himself with glory, he had pointed China towards
another economic disaster."
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 377).
As a result:
"Hua's ten-year plan was shelved
in early 1979, only a year after it had been announced". (Harry Harding
(1987): op. cit.; p. 56).
The fiasco of the 'Great Leap Outward'
was followed by a programme of retrenchment, agreed upon at:
"a three-week work conference
which . . . substituted a strategy of 'readjustment,
restructuring, consolidation and improvement."
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
237).
The Debate on the Criterion of
Truth (May - November 1978)
In May 1978,
an article was published entitled 'Practice is the Sole Criterion
of Truth',
"written under the tutelage
of HU Yao-pang*"
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): ibid.;
p. 31).
who had headed the Propaganda Department
of the Party since December 1977. This
"became a second rallying cry
for the Teng forces".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 378).
and:
"the spark that lit a prairie
fire of nationwide debate".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
ibid.; p. 378).
from May to November 1978:
"Over the criterion of
truth'''.
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op.
cit.; p. 32).
In June 1978, at an All-Army
Conference on Political Work, Teng came out in support of Hu Yao-pang's
formulation, saying:
"Seeking truth from facts,
. . . proceeding from reality, and integrating theory
with practice, form the fundamental principle of 'Mao Tse-tung Thought"'.
(Teng Hsiao-ping:
Speech at All-Army Conference on Political Work (June 1978).
in: 'Selected Works'; Peking; 1984; p. 132).
Teng's Criticism of the 'Two
Whatevers' (September-November 1978)
In September 1978, Teng:
"first criticised the 'two whatevers'
to an audience outside the inner circle".
(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 229).
Now,
"Conferences in ten provinces
. . . supported his position. By November, leading officials in all provinces
and military regions had thrown their weight on Teng's side".
(Rodrerick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 379).
The 'Democracy Wall' Movement
(November - December 1978)
In November 1978, the national
bourgeois grouping of the Party, headed by Teng Hsiao-ping, formed
a temporary coalition with elements, mainly
non-Party, calling for multi-Party parliamentary democracy',
whose programme was featured on 'Democracy Wall' at Hsitan, near Tien An
Men Square in Peking.
At this time:
"a powerful coalition emerged,
consisting of the 'Democracy Wall' movement and the democratic reform forces
in the Party".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op.
cit.; p. 45).
The debate over the criterion of
truth:
"lit the fire under the democratic
movement of the Hsitan Democracy Wall".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): ibid.;
p. 44).
Big-character posters:
"flourished at ilsitan in greater
and greater numbers".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): ibid.;
p. 46).
And by the end of 1978 the 'Democracy
Wall' movement had:
"swept Peking".
(Harry Harding (1987): op. cit.;
p. 61).
The Central Work Conference
(November 1978)
In November 1978.
just prior to the 3rd Plenum of the 11th CC, a Central Work Conference
was held, and:
"Under the influence of the
Democracy Wall, . . . completely deviated from the route mapped out by
Hua Kuo-feng. . . . The delegates debated topics proposed on
Demoracy Wall: the 1976 Tien An Men incident, the 1969 Lushan Conference
and the purging of Peng Teh-huai and,. . . finally, the issue of
Liu Shao-chi".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op.
cit.; p. 47).
In fact, the conference became:
"a full-scale debate on the
. . Cultural Revolution."
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 379-80).
with Teng proposing:
"To 'evaluate' Mao Tse-tung
as a revolutionary leader and the Cultural Revolution itself".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
230).p. 230).
During the conference,
"One important decision, to
reverse the verdict on the Tien An Men incident of April 1976, was
announced -- by the Peking Party Committee."
(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 230).
The incident was now declared to
have been:
"completely revolutionary".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 26; p. 30,487).
Three days later, it was announced
that:
"Investigations by the Peking
Municipal Security Bureau had shown that none of the 388 people arrested
in connection with the demonstration was a 'counter-revolutionary',
and that all had been rehabilitated".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 26; p. 30,487).
The 3rd Plenum of the 11th CC
(December 1978)
An important development
at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th CC, in December 1978,
"was the entry of a group of
victims into the Politburo, large enough to tip the balance of the leadership
in Teng's favour".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 380).
At the 3rd Plenum,
"it was the close alliance of
the democratic reform forces within the Party and the people's democratic
movement that would enable the victory over the 'two whatevers"'.
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op.
c it.; p. 44).
At the 3rd Plenum:
". . the Tien An Men Square
demonstrations (of 1976-- Ed.) were recognised as 'entirely revolutionary
actions'".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 26; p 30,488).
and:
"the 'two whatevers' were rejected.
Class struggle was no longer to be the 'key link'; the four modernisations
were to take precedence. The theory of 'continuing the revolution
under the proletarian dictatorship' was abandoned".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 381).
In other words:
"the 3rd Plenum rejected Hua's
programme".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
ibid.; p. 381).
and accepted that of Teng Hsiao-ping.
An official history of the CPC:
"published in August 1991, states
that Teng Hsiao-ping became the 'kernel' of the Party's leadership".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
231).
at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th CC.
Teng as 'Paramount
Leader' (July 1983 - October 1987)
In July 1983:
'Selected Works of Teng Hsiao-ping
. . was published in an edition of 12.21 million copies." ('Keesing' 5
Record of World Events', Volume 29; p. 32,505),
And the 13th National Congress
of the CPC in October 1987:
"semi-formally recognised Teng
as the 'paramount leader"'.
(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.;
p. 107).
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES --13
CARTER, James R.
('Jimmy'), American farmer and politician (1924- ); farmer (1953-77);
senator, Georgia (1963-67); Governor, Georgia
(1971-75); President (1977-81).
HU Yaobang = Pinyin form, of
HU Yao-pang.
HU Yao-pang,
Chinese revisionist politician (1915-89); Director,
North Szechuan People's Administrative Bureau (1950-52);
Secretary, New Democratic Youth League (1952-57); member, Executive
Committee, All-China Federation of Trade Unions (1953-57); Deputy
Chairman, World Federation of Democratic Youth (1953-59);
1st Secretary, Communist Youth League (1957-67); Director,
Organisation Dept., CC, CPC (1977-78); Director
Propaganda Dept., CC, CPC (1977-80);member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1978-89);
Secretary-General. CPC (1980-87); member, Standing Committee, Politburo,
CC, CPC (1980-87); Chairman, CC, CPC (1981-82).
CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE : THE OUSTING
OF HUA KUO-FENG
(December 1978 - June 1981)
Introduction
HAVING GAINED THE
DOMINANT POSITION WITHIN THE PARTY, THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY TENG HSIAO-PING,
PROCEEDED TO OUST FROM LEADING POSITIONS THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY HUA KUA-FENG.
The 'Rehabilitation' of Peng
Teh-huai and Peng Chen (December 1978)
In December 1978, the 'rehabilitation'
was announced of:
"Peng Teh-huai, who had survived
in prison almost until it (the 'Cultural Revolution' - Ed.) was over and,
among the living, Peng Chen".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
231).
In the same month, a memorial meeting
in honour of Peng Teh-huai was held. At this:
"Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping delivered
the oration."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 26; p. 30,488),
The Restoration of Property
to the National Bourgeoisie (January 1979)
At a meeting in January 1979,
General ULANFU*, a member of the Politburo of the CC of the CPC and a deputy
chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, himself a 'rehabilitated'
victim of the 'Cultural Revolution', recalled that during the 'Cultural
Revolution':
"the former capitalists' bank
deposits and other property had been confiscated, although they were protected
by the Constitution; their salaries had been reduced; their houses had
been taken over; and most of those holding administrative posts had been
transferred to manual labour."
(Ulanfu: Statement
of January 1979, in: 'Keesing's
Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p. 30,489).
Ulanfu continued:
"The Central Committee has now
decided that all confiscated bank deposits should be returned to the owners,
along with the interest due; that houses and other confiscated property
should be restored; and that industrialists and other businessmen
whose salaries had been cut should be paid their original salaries,
together with arrears due to them. Such people should be employed in posts
where they could use their specialised skills; they should receive
arrears of interest on their shares, payment of which
had been stopped in 1966, and their children should not be discriminated
against in any way."
(Ulanfu: Statement
of January 1979, in: 'Keesing's
Contemporary Archives', Volume 26; p. 30,489).
The Re-defining of 'Mao Tse-tung
Thought' (March 1979)
At a meeting of Party theoretical
workers in March 1979, Teng Hsiao-ping re-defined 'Mao Tse-tung Thought'
in a way which would make it acceptable to the national bourgeoisie,
as:
"the crystalisation of the experience
of the Chinese people's revolutionary struggle over half a century".
(Teng Hsiao-ping: Statement
of March 1979, in: Richard Evans: op. cit.; p. 236).
The Suppression of the 'Democracy
Wall Movement' (December 1979 - January 1980)
The political representatives
of the national bourgeoisie, headed by Teng Hsiao-ping, did not at this
time favour the principal aim featured on the 'Democracy Wall',
that is, to establish multi-party 'parliamentary democracy since this would
completely expose their false facade of being Marxist-Leninists:
Thus, having successfully utilised
the 'Democracy Wall' movement to assist in the overthow of the pro-US
comprador grouping headed by Hua Kuofeng, the now dominant
Party grouping around Teng moved to suppress the movement.
In December 1979,
"the 'Democracy Wall' at Hsitan
was . . . scrubbed clean".
(John Gardner: op. cit.; p.
167).
and:
"the Peking authorities forbade
the display of posters except at a designated site in Yuetan Park or at
the author's place of work, required their authors to register their
names, addresses and places of work, and stated that . . .
authors would be held responsible for their contents".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 26; p. 30,496).
The new site was, in fact, merely:
"a small enclosed park, where
signed posters could be put up under the watchful eye of the police".
(John Gardner: op. cit.; p.
167).
In January 1980, Teng Hsiao-ping:
"proposed the removal from the
Constitution of Article 45 .. . .
-- the right 'to
speak out freely, air one's views fully, write big character posters and
hold great debates"'.
(David S. G. Goodman:
'Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping) and the Chinese Revolution: A Political
Biography'; London; 1994; p. 97).
The 5th Plenum of the 11th
CC (February 1980)
At the 5th Plenum of the 11th
CC, in February 1980, Hu Yao-pang was promoted:
"to the newly-revived office
of General Secretary".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 26; p. 30,485).
of the CPC, and, since:
"Hua's four principal supporters
in the Politburo . . . had been voted off that body", (Richard Evans: op.
cit.; p. 237).
Hu Yao-pang was:
"at the head of a secretariat
which consisted almost entirely of men on whose loyalty Teng could rely".
(Richard Evans: ibid.; p. 237).
The new
"Party Secretariat, headed
by Hu Yao-pang, . . . gradually assumed the responsibility for national
policy-making that had previously rested in the Politburo under Hua's chairmanship".
(Harry Harding (1987): op. cit.;
p. 63).
At this Plenum, Teng's proposal
(previous paragraph) to limit democracy was approved, and at the 1980 session
of the NPC:
"the clause in the state constitution...
was shorn of..,, the right to engage in great debates and to put up big-character
posters".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 185).
The Rehabilitation of Liu Shao-chi
(February 1980)
It was also at the February 1980
Plenum that:
"Liu Shao-chi was posthumously
rehabilitated",
(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.;
p. 96).
and in January 1982:
"the first volume was published
. . . of the 'Selected Works' of Liu Shao-chi. .
His writings were described
by the 'New China News Agency' in January 1982 as 'an important treasure-house
of theory."
('Keesing' s Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p,. 31,815).
The Eclipse of Hua Kuo-feng (February
1980)
By February 1980:
"Hua was now isolated",
(Richard Evans: op. cit,; p.
237).
on the Politburo, and:
"became a figurehead".
(Edwin P-w. Leung: op. cit.;
p. 169).
He had:
"watched helplessly as an 'anti-whatever'
coalition was inexorably built up within the top leadership".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 386).
The Politburo Conference
(August 1980)
At a Politburo conference in
August 1980:
"The top leadership agreed that
Hua should be replaced as premier by CHAO Tzu-yang*".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
ibid.; p. 387).
In other words:
"Hua was forced to resign as
Premier. In name, Hua stayed on as Chairman of the Central Committee and
the military commission until June 1981. But it was only in name".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
237-38).
And Chao Tzu-yang:
"Was elected Prime Minister".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,941).
At the end of 1980 and in the first
months of 1981:
"the Communist Party leadership
passed through a serious crisis".
(Contemporary Archives', Volume
27; p. 30,943).
The Enlarged Politburo
Meeting (November/December 1980)
At an Enlarged Politburo meeting
in November/December 1980:
"Hua was severely criticised.
. Many Politburo members attacked him for committing 'grave
mistakes in political and economic policy since Mao's death. These
included showing an 'unclear attitude' on questions of 'rehabilitation'.
It was said that he had deliberatejy delayed the return to power of Teng
Hsiao-ping . . . and had opposed the posthumous rehabilitation of
Peng Teh-huai. . . . Ideologically, he had advanced the 'two
whatevers' slogan and had been reluctant to support the alternative advanced
by Teng that 'practice is the sole criterion of truth'. . .
Furthermore, he had fostered his own personality cult. . .
The Politburo . . . considered him unfit for the high offices he held,
and Hua offered to resign. It was agreed that his resignation should
be offered to the 6th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, and that
that body should be asked to appoint Hu Yao-pang as Party Chairman
and Teng as Chairman of the Military Commission. In the interim, Hu and
Teng would assume these responsibilities informally".
(John Gardner: op. cit.;
p. 184).
The Enlarged Politburo meeting of
November/December 1980 agreed that Hua lacked
"the political and organisational
ability to be the chairman of the Party".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 388).
Humiliated, Hua:
"asked to be relieved of his
Party posts".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
238).
However, it was agreed to appoint
him:
"as a Vice-Chairman of the Central
Committee."
(John Gardner: op. cit.;
p. 184).
-- a very minor post.
Thus, the Enlarged Politburo
Meeting of November/December 1980:
"effectively completed the conversion
of all the powers of Hua Ko-feng to Hu Yao-pang and Teng Hsiao-ping."
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op.
cit.; p. 95).
The 6th Plenum of the 11th
CC (June 1981)
The 6th Plenum of the 11th CC
was postponed. It eventually met in June 1981, but:
"had nothing left to do but
to formalise this transfer after the fact".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): ibid.;
p. 95).
The Plenum:
"accepted Mr. Hua Kuo-feng's
resignation from the post of Chairman of the Party . . . and
replaced him by Mr. Hu Yao-pang. . Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping succeeded
Mr. Hua as chairman of the Party's military commission. . . . No
new General Secretary was elected".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p. 31,317).
It was now charged that Hua had:
"promoted the erroneous 'two
whatevers' policy. . . . He procrastinated and
obstructed the work of reinstating veteran cadres in their posts and redressing
the injustices left over from the past (including the case of the Tien
An Men Square incident of 1976)".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p. 31,318).
and that the 11th National Congress
of the CPC in August 1977 had:
"owing to the influence of Comrade
Hua Kuo-feng's mistakes reaffirmed the erroneous theories, policies
and slogans of the Cultural Revolution instead uf correcting them.
. . . Obviously under his leadership it is impossible to correct
'left' errors within the Party". ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume
28; p. 31,318).
Although Hua retained his titles:
"Until the end of June 1981,
at which point he would be demoted to a vice-chairmanship of the Party,
his jobs were immediately taken over: the Party chairmanship
by Hu Yao-pang, and the MAC chairmanship by Teng himself".
(Roderick MacFarquahar (1991):
op. cit.; p. 388).
Hua:
"remained vice-chairman of the
Party until September 1982".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
238).
At the 12th National Congress of
the CPC in September 1982, Hua was:
"then dismissed from the Politburo".
(Harry Harding (1987): op. cit.;
p. 64).
He then:
"disappeared from sight and
his name ceased to appear in the press".
(Richard Evans: op. cit.; p.
238).
BIOGRAPHICAL
NOTES - 13
CHAO Tzu-yang, Chinese revisionist
politician (1919- ); General Secretary,
South China Sub-bureau1
CPC (1951-54); Deputy Secretary, Kwangtung
Province CPC (1955-57);
2nd Secretary, Kwangtung Province CPC (1962-65);
Secretary, Central-South
Bureau, CPC (1964-67); 1st Secretary, Kwangtung
Province CPC (1965-67,
1974-75); Secretary, Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region CPC (1971-72);
1st Secretary, Szechuan Province CPC (1976-80);
member, Politburo,
CC, CPC (1979-80); Premier (1980); member, Standing
Committee, Politburo,
CC, CPC 1980-89); Premier (198O-87); Deputy
Chairman, CC, CPC
(1981-82); Acting General Secretary, CPC (1987);
General Secretary,
CPC (1987-89); Deputy Chairman, Central Military
Commission (1988); dismissed
from all posts (1989).
ULANFU, Mongolian
revisionist military officer and politician (1906-88);
Chairman, Inner
Mongolian Region People's Government (1947-55); Deputy
Chairman, Suiyuan Military and
Administrative Council (1949-52); member,
People's Government
Council (1949-54); secretary, Inner
Mongolia
Autonomous Region CPC
(1949-55);Governor, Suiyuan Province (1952-54);
member, National
Defence Council (1954-66); commander, Inner Mongolia
Military Region, PLA (1954-67);
Deputy Premier (1954-67); general (1955);
1st Secretary,
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee (1955-57);
2nd Secretary,
North China Bureau, CPC (1965-67); member, Politburo, CC,
CPC (1977-85); Deputy
President, PRC (1983-88).
ULANHU = Pinyin form of ULANFU.
ZHAO Ziyang = Pinyin form of
CHAO Tzu-yang.
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