Part Five:
"CLASS STRUGGLES IN CHINA"
A MARXIST-LENINIST ANALYSIS OF MAO-TSE TUNG,
BY W.B.BLAND
CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO: THE TRIAL
OF THE 'GANG OF FOUR' (November 1980 - January 1981)
Introduction
ALTHOUGH THE 'GANG OF FOUR' HAD
BEEN ARRESTED IN OCTOBER 1976 (page 167),
IT WAS NOT UNTIL FOUR YEARS
LATER - AFTER THE NATIONAL BOURGEOIS
PARTY GROUPING AROUND TENG HSIAO-PING HAD SECURED DOMINANCE AND THE COMPRADOR
PARTY GROUPING AROUND HUA KUO-FENG HAD BEEN OUSTED -
THAT THEY WERE PUT ON TRIAL.
THIS DELAY ENABLED CHARGES OF
FOMENTING THE 'CULTURAL REVOLUTION' IN
1966-69 TO BE INCLUDED IN THE
INDICTMENT.
The Trial (November 1980 -
January 1981)
In November 1980,
the 'Gang of Four' (Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching, Wang Hung-wen and Yao
Wen-yuan), together with:
"six political and military
associates of the late Marshal Lin Piao, appeared before a special court
on charges of counter-revolutionary activities".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,833).
The other defendants included Chen
Po-ta and General Huang Yung-cheng:
"Chen Po-ta had been under arrest
since October 1970, the five officers since September 1971".
('Keesing' s Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,836).
However,
"What was really on trial .
. was . . the twenty-year rule of Mao."
(Wu Tien-wei: op. cit.;
p. 206),
Chiang Ching's main crimes:
"As laid out in the indictment,
were her attempt to poison Mao's mind against Chou En-lai and Teng Tsiao-ping,
her involvement in the framing of Liu Shao-chi and her arch-rival,
his wife Wang Kuang-mei, her role as kingpin of the Gang of Four, purporting
to serve as a direct channel to Mao, . . . her
ordering of illegal house searches and the destruction of compromising
material about herself; and her persecution of old friends and acquaintances,
right down to her former housemaid".
(David Bonavia:
'Verdict in Peking: The Trial of the Gang of Four';
London; 1984; p. 45).
Among the 48 specific charges listed
in the indictment were those of:
"Bringing false charges against
Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Lu Ting-yi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Marshal Chu Teh,
Marshal Peng Teh-huai, . . General Lo Jui-ching and others;
plotting a military coup in 1970-71; plotting a rebellion in Shanghai in
1976."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,833-34).
The indictment gave further information
concerning the 'Lin Piao Affair', charging that Lin Piao had planned:
"To launch a pincer attack from
north and south in alliance with the Soviet Union, should fighting be necessary".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,834).
Most of the defendants admitted
the charges, wholly or partially. Yao Wen-yuan:
"Although insisting that he
had committed 'mistakes' rather than 'crimes' , was generally cooperative.
. . .
Wang Hung-wen, a pathetic shadow
of his former self, confirmed his guilt and implicated his colleagues.
Chang Chun-chiao, evidently
convinced that he had nothing to lose, treated the court with open contempt,
refusing to say a word".
(John Gardner: op. cit.; p.
179).
But Chiang Ching:
"unlike the other accused, vigorously
defended herself".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,835).
In a two-hour speech in her defence
on 24 December:
"She maintained that during
the Cultural Revolution she had acted on behalf of Chairman Mao or in accordance
with his instructions, and declared that 'arresting me and bringing
me to trial is a defamation of Chairman Mao Tse-tung"'.
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,835).
Later in the proceedings:
"She challenged the court to
have her publicly executed in Tien An Men Square, and was forcibly ejected
from the court".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,835).
In January 1981, the court found:
"All the accused guilty".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,836).
and the following sentences were
passed:
"Chiang Ching and Chang Chun-chiao:
death with a two-year reprieve;
Wang Hung-wen: life imprisonment;
The other defendants: imprisonment
for between 10 and 20 years."
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,836).
When the sentences were read out,
Chiang Ching:
"shouted protests and was removed
from the court".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,836).
Trials of alleged supporters of
the 'Gang of Four':
"for crimes committed during
the Cultural Revolution continued during the later months of 1982 and the
early months of 1983, most of the accused being sentenced to over 10 years'
imprisonment".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 29; p. 30,505).
Postscript
In January 1983:
"The death sentences, suspended
for two years, which had been passed on Jan. 25 1981 on Miss Chiang
Ching (Chairman Mao's widow) and Mr. Chang Chun-chiao, a former Deputy
Premier, . . were commuted to life imprisonment
by the Supreme People's Court", ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume
29; p. 32,505).
and journalists were officially
informed:
"that of the 10 'counter-revolutionaries'
tried in 1980-81, Mr. Chen Po-ta and the five officers had already been
released on health grounds, leaving only the 'gang of four' . . . still
in prison."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 29; p. 32,505).
In 1984, Chiang Ching was released
from prison to house imprisonment in a:
"Peking villa".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 37; p. 38,290).
And in June 1991, the death by suicide
of Chiang Ching:
"was officially confirmed".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 37; p. 38,290).
to have taken place in May. In August
1992, Wang Hung-wen:
"died . . . while serving a
life sentence imposed in 1981 for his role as a member of the so-called
'Gang of Four"'.
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 38; p. 39,051).
and finally, in October 1996:
"the authorities announced
that Yao Wen-yuan, 64, sole surviving member of the 'Gang of Four',
. . had been released after serving a 20-year prison term".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 42; p. 41,321).
CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE : THE REASSESSMENT
OF MAO TSE-TUNG (January 1978 - September 1982)
Introduction
WITH THE DOMINANCE OF THE NATIONAL
BOURGEOIS PARTY GROUPING AROUND TENG HSIAO-PING AND THE OUSTING OF THE
COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS GROUPING AROUND HUA KUO-FENG -
THE WAY WAS OPEN
TO REASSESS THE ROLE OF MAO TSE-TUNG IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO THE NATIONAL
BOURGEOISIE.
The Reassessment of Mao Tse-tung
(January 1978 - December 1980)
Although the Party
leadership continued to pay lip-service to Mao Tsetung,
"from January (1978-- Ed.) onwards,
the 'People's Daily' gradually abandoned its practice of printing a quotation
from Chairman Mao on its front page, and in March the press stopped
printing all quotations from him in bold type - both practices having originated
during the Cultural Revolution."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 24; p. 29,190).
From June 1978 onwards:
"the press repeatedly . . .
emphasised that Chairman Mao must not be regarded as an infallible genius
and that his thought must be reinterpreted. . .
. The campaign . . . represented a
further development of the tendency to play down the personality cult of
Chairman Mao which had become apparent in the early months of the year.
.
On Oct. 27 the 'People's
Daily' attacked the 'Little Red Book' of 'Quotations from Chairman
Mao Tse-tung' . . . saying that it 'turned Mao Tse-tung thought into
a mechanical sum total of fragmentary statements."
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 26; p. 30,486).
In an interview with a Japanese
delegation in November 1978, Teng Hsiao-ping, referring to the Political
Bureau resolutions of April 1976 appointing Hua Prime Minister and removing
Teng from all his posts:
"said that when the two resolutions
had been adopted, Chairman Mao had been so ill that he could hardly speak
and was unable to make judgments. Only one member of the 'gang of
four' (apparently his wife Chiang Ching) had been allowed to see him,
and the 'gang' had 'disposed of matters as if they had his approval"'.
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 26; p. 30,488).
In March 1979, Teng told a meeting
of Party theoretical workers:
"Comrade Mao, like any other
man, had his defects and made errors".
(Teng Hsiao-ping:
Statement of March 1979, in: Richard Evans: op. cit.;
p. 235).
In September 1979:
"The large hoardings in Peking
displaying quotations from Chairman Mao were painted over . . . and used
for advertisements".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 26; p. 30,494).
During the autumn of 1980,
"the Chinese press adopted a
highly critical attitude towards Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and especially
towards the personality cult surrounding him. . . . Unlike in previous
years, the fourth anniversary of his death on Sept. 9 was completely ignored
by the press".
('Keesing 's Contemorary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,942).
In December 1980, the 'People's
Daily':
"strongly criticised Chairman
Mao . . . for having 'personally initiated and led' the Cultural Revolution".
('Keesing's Contemorary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,944).
The 6th Plenum of the 11th CC
(June 1981)
In June 1981,
the 6th Plenum of the 11th CC adopted a resolution 'On
Questions of Party History',
which summarised the view of the now dominant national bourgeois
grouping of the Party, headed by Teng Hsiao-ping,
on the role of Mao Tse-tung.
The resolution had been drafted:
"Under the supervision of Teng
and Hu Yao-pang".
(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.;
p. 96).
It:
"marked the Party's formal acceptance
of Teng's political and economic programme. It repudiated the
Cultural Revolution and the ideological tenets connected with the later
years of Mao Tse-tung. It called for a reform of the economy."
(Harry Harding (1987): op. cit.;
p. 64-65).
It declared that, during the 'Great
Leap Forward',
"'Left' errors, characterised
by excessive targets, the issuing of arbitary directions, boastfulness
and the stirring up of a 'communist wind', spread unchecked throughout
the country. This was due . . . to the fact that Comrade Mao
Tse-tung and many leading comrades . overestimated the role
of man's subjective will and efforts. . . . The Great
Leap Forward and the movement for rural people's communes
were initiated without careful investigation and study and
without prior experimentation."
(CC, CPC: Resolution 'On
Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review',
Volume 24, No. 27 (6 July 1981); p, 19).
It blamed the 'Great Leap Forward'
for the economic crisis of 1959-61, saying:
"It was mainly due to the efforts
of the great leap forward and of the struggle against 'Right opportunism'
. . . that our economy encountered serious difficulties between
1959 and 1961, which caused serious losses to our country and people".
(CC, CPC: Resolution
'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review',
Volume 24, No. 27 (6 July 1981); p. 19).
It alleged that Mao:
"erred in initiating criticism
of Comrade Peng Teh-huai and then in launching a Party-wide struggle against
'Right opportunism'. The resolution . . concerning
the so-called anti-Party group of Peng Tehhuai . . was entirely
wrong".
(CC, CPC: Resolution
'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review',
Volume 24, No., 27 (6 July 1981); p. 19).
It charged that:
"the Political Bureau of the
Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrongly assessed the nature
of the Tien An Men incident, and dismissed Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping
from all his posts".
(CC, CPC: Resolution
'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review',
Volume 24, No., 27 (6 July 1981); p. 23).
and that at the 10th Plenum of the
CC in September 1962, Mao:
"Widened and absolutised the
class struggle . . . and carried forward the viewpoint .
. . that the contradiction between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie remained the principal contradiction in our society.
As a result, .
. . early in 1965 the erroneous thesis was advanced that the main
target of the movement should be 'those Party persons in power taking
the capitalist road"'.
(CC, CPC: Resolution
'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review',
Volume 24, No. 27 (6 July 1981); p. 19-20).
The resolution declared during the
period 1956-66, Mao's:
"theoretical and practical mistakes
concerning class struggle in a socialist society became increasingly
serious, his personal arbitrariness gradually undermined democratic centralism
in Party life and the personality cult grew graver and graver.
. . Careerists like Lin Piao, Chiang Ching and Kang Sheng,
harbouring ulterior motives, made use of these errors and inflated them.
This led to the inauguration of the 'Cultural Revolution"'.
(CC, CPC: Resolution
'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review',
Volume 24, No. 27 (6 July 1981); p. 20).
In particular, it condemned the
'Cultural Revolution':
"The 'Cultural Revolution
. . . was responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest
losses suffered by the Perty, the state and the people since the founding
of the People's Republic. It was initiated and led by Comrade Mao Tse-tung".
(CC, CPC: Resolution
'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review',
Volume 24, No. 27 (6 July 1981); p. 20).
The 9th National Congress of the
Party:
"legitimised the erroneous theories
and practices of the 'Cultural Revolution', and so reinforced
the positions of Lin Piao, Chiang Ching, Kang Sheng and others in
the Central Committee."
(CC, CPC: Resolution
'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review',
Volume 24, No. 27 (6 July 1981); p. 22).
The 10th National Congress of the
Party:
"Perpetuated the 'left' errors
of the 9th Congress. Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan and Wang
Hung-wen formed a gang of four inside the Political Bureau".
(CC, CPC: Resolution
'On Questions of Party History' (June 1981), in: 'Peking Review',
Volume 24, No. 27 (6 July 1981); p. 22).
The 12th National Congress of
the CPC (September 1982)
Among the changes
in the Party Constitution adopted by the 12th National Congress of the
CPC in September 1982:
"Were the deletion of numerous
references to Chairman Mao and of all favourable references to the
Cultural Revolution and to 'continuous revolution'".
'Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p. 31,819).
CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR THE
'ECONOMIC REFORMS' (summer 1978 - August 1993)
Introduction
HAVING DEFEATED
THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMPRADOR
BOURGEOISIE, HEADED
BY HUA KUO-FENG, THE MAJORITY OF THE POLITICAL
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL
BOURGEOISIE, HEADED BY TENG HSIAO-PING, CAME TO THE CONCLUSION --
LIKE THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES
OF MANY OTHER NATIONAL
BOURGEOISIES OF COLONIAL-TYPE
COUNTRIES --
THAT THEIR INTERESTS WOULD
NOW BEST BE SERVED BY ABANDONING THE AIM OF ESTABLISHING A NATIONALLY
INDEPENDENT CAPITALISM AND SEEKING A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WITH
THE REMNANTS OF THE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE FOR ThE ESTABLISHMENT
OF A COLONIAL-TYPE CAPITALIST
SYSTEM DEPENDENT UPON IMPERIALISM.
IN OTHER WORDS, THE
CHINESE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE TRANSFORMED ITSELF, FOR THE MOST PART, INTO
A COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE.
FURTHERMORE, IT THREW OFF,
IN THE MAIN, ITS PSEUDO-SOCIALIST MASK AND
EMBARKED ON A PROGRAMME OF ECONOMIC
REFORMS WHICH WOULD ABOLISH CENTRALISED ECONOMIC PLANNING IN FAVOUR OF
AN ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY IN WHICH PRODUCTION WAS DETERMINED BY PROFIT.
Thus, in the summer of 1978:
"the Government abandoned .
. . its previous policy of relying on its own resources". ('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 27; p. 30,765).
and began to seek foreign
loans and investments.
The policy changes:
"Aimed at increasing the integration
of the Chinese economy into the international economy".
(Kuchiro Fukasaku, David
Wall & Wu Mingyuan: 'China's Long March to an Open Economy';
Paris; 1994; p. 24).
and were known as 'Opening
Up'.
Special Economic Zones
At first,
"a cordon sanitaire was erected
around foreign investments, with the establishment in 1980 of four Special
Economic Zones in the south, offering tax and other incentives."
(Economist Intelligence Unit:
'Country Profile: China: 1995-96'; p. 14).
The original inspiration for these
Special Economic Zones:
"was the export processing zones
(EPZs) of East and South-east Asia".
(Kuchiro Fukasaku, David Wall
& Wu Mingyuan: op. cit.; p. 47).
The SEZs:
"offer incentives to foreign
business that include favourable tax rates, reduced tariffs, ease of entry
and exit for personnel, and a relatively free hand in managerial practices."
('China Business: The Portable
Encyclopedia for doing Business with China'; San Rafael (USA); 1994;
p 17).
Later:
"such privileges were .
. . extended across most of the country".
(Economist Intelligence Unit:
'Country Profile: China: 1995-96'; p. 14).
By 1987:
"the areas open to foreign investors
included nearly 30% of China's population, and generated over 60% of the
country's industrial output".
(John Thoburn & Jude
Howell: 'Trade and Development: The Political Economy
of China's Open Policy', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove
(Eds.): op. cit.; p. 17).
In April 1990:
"The Chinese government declared
the opening of the Putung area of Shanghai as a Special Economic Zone for
foreign investment. The government has offered a package of preferential
treatment to foreign investors in this newly established zone similar to
those provided in other Special Economic Zones".
(Dong Shizhong, Danian
Zhang & Milton R. Larson (Tung Shih-chung, Danian Chang & Milton
R. Larson): 'Trade and Investment Opportunities in China: The
Current Commercial and Legal Framework'; Westport (USA); 1992;
p. 18).
Thus:
"by the 1990s . . . localities
were competing with each other to offer foreign investors the most attractive
terms. By the end of 1994, there were 206,096 registered enterprises with
foreign capital in China, with a total capital of $382.54 bn., of
which $196.3 bn. was provided by foreign partners."
(Economist Intelligence Unit:
'Country Profile: China: 1995-96'; p. 14).
International Loans
In April/May 1981,
China joined the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
('Keesing's Contemprary Archives',
Volume 26; p. 30,334).
In June 1982, it was announced
that:
"The International Development
Association (IDA -- the World Bank Affiliate) was granting China an interest-free
credit of . . . $60 million -- to assist a project for drainage
and irrigation."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 29; p. 32,508).
In November 1982, the World Bank
announced:
"That it had granted China a
20-year loan of $124 million to help finance the modernisation and expansion
of facilities at the ports of Canton, Shanghai and Tientsin. The IDA at
the same time granted China an interest-free credit of . . . $75~4
million for the development of agricultural education and research".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 29; p. 32,508).
In May 1991:
"the Asian Developnent Bank
(ADB) resumed lending to China approving a $70 million loan to finance
the building of a bridge in Shanghai''.
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 37; p. 38,190).
Foreign Loans and Investment
In the summer of 1978,
"the Government . . . decided
to seek loans from foreign banks and to accept loans from foreign governments".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,765).
as well as to open the door to foreign
investment. Virtually non-existent in 1978,
"the cumulative total of foreign
investment in China reached $20 billion by 1990. In mid-1980s, the country
became the largest borrower from the World Bank; by 1989 Peking had
overtaken New Delhi in becoming the world's largest recipient of
official bilateral and multilateral aid, receiving almost $2.2 billion
a year."
(Rosemary Foot: 'China's Foreign
Policy in the Post-1989 Era', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.):
op. cit.; p. 236).
Such investment was encouraged by
preferential treatment:
"The Chinese government has
granted significant preferential treatment to foreign investors that is
not enjoyed by domestic enterprises in order to attract foreign capital".
(Dong Shizhong, Danian
Zhang & Milton R. Larson (Tung Shih-chung, Danian Chang & Milton
R. Larson): op. cit.; p. 152).
As a result, by the early 1990s
China:
"was the largest recipient of
foreign direct investment in the developing world".
(Economist Intelligence Unit:
'Country Profile: China: 1995-96; p. 14).
Of total foreign direct investment
in China of $33 billion in 1989,
63% came from Hong Kong;
11% came from the USA;
7.5% came from Japan;
2% came from Taiwan."
(K. K. Seo: 'Economic
Reform and Foreign Direct Investment in China before and after the Tien
An Men Square Tragedy', in: Lane Kelley & Oded Shenkar
(Eds.): 'International Business in China';
London; 1993; p. 122).
Foreign Indebtedness
At the end of 1995,
"China's foreign debt .
. stood at $106.59 bn., up by $13.78 bn. or 14.8% compared with the end
of 1994".
(Economist Intelligence Unit:
'Country Report: China: 2nd Quarter, 1996'; p 42).
The World Bank:
"expects China's debt service
will be over $10 bn. annually by 2000".
(Economist Intelligence Unit:
'Country Report: China: 2nd Quarter, 1996'; p 42).
Joint Ventures
Some foreign
investment in China took the form of 'joint ventures' with Chinese
companies. These also received preferential treatment.
In July 1979:
"a law on joint ventures was
adopted by the National People's Congress . . . and came into force a week
later.
The law stated that foreign
companies were permitted to form joint ventures with Chinese companies,
and that the Government protected the resources invested by the foreign
participant and the profits due to him. . . .
A joint venture equipped with
up-to-date technology might apply for a reduction of or exemption
from tax for the first two or three profitmaking years.
. . . A foreign participant's share of the profit and the earnings
of a foreign employee of a joint venture might be
remitted abroad".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,766).
In December 1980,
"a Chinese spokesman stated
. . . that over 300 agreements on joint ventures with foreign firms had
been signed in the past year".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,766).
In February 1984, it was announced
that:
"1) joint ventures in most fields
would be exempted from paying import tax and industrial and commercial
consolidated tax on a range of imported goods, especially advanced technology;
2) such companies would
be allowed to sell part of their output in China and to collect
foreign exchange . . . in order to help achieve a favourable
foreign exchange balance; and 3) foreign nationals working in China would
be able to remit over half of their income." ('Keesing 's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 30; p. 32,982).
In May 1984:
"the largest ever Sino-foreign
joint venture was formally signed . . . by the China National
Coal Development Corporation and the US company Occidental Petroleum,
to develop an open-cast mine with a capacity of 15 million tons of coal
per year".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 30; p. 32,982).
At a symposium on joint ventures
held in Hong Kong in November 1984, a Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic
Relations announced
"foreign investment concessions
including tax reductions for 'technology intensive' projects,
for projects involving foreign investment of more than $30 million, and
for projects in energy, transport and the construction of harbours".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 31; p. 33,925).
In April 1985, an official
of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade stated that:
"In 1984 foreign investment
in joint ventures was $1,067 million and that since 1979 more than 930
joint ventures had been established".
('Keesing's5 Contemporary Archives',
Volume 31; p. 33,925).:
In April 1990:
"The Chinese Equity Joint Venture
Law was amended . . . to improve the investment environment
in China. .
A significant provision protecting
foreign interests from nationalisation or expropriation was added".
(Dong Shizhong, Danian
Zhang & Milton R. Larson (Tung Shih-chung, Danian Chang & Milton
R. Larson): op. cit.; p. 165).
Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises
Since 1979,
"Foreign investors have
been allowed to establish wholly foreign-owned enterprises in China".
(Dong Shizhong, Danian
Zhang & Milton R. Larson (Tung Shih-chung, Danian Chang & Milton
R. Larson): ibid.; p. 166).
"The 'Law on Wholly Foreign-owned
Enterprises' was enacted in April 1986."
(Dong Shizhong, Danian Zhang
& Milton R. Larson (Tung Shih-chung, Danian Chang & Milton R. Larson):
ibid.; p. 166).
In this law:
"Article 4 specifies that 'the
investment made by foreign investors in China, their rights and legal rights
and interests, shall be protected by Chinese law'.
Article 19 allows for the remittance
of legitimate income after taxes are paid.
Article 5 stipulates that, except
under special circumstances, the state shall not nationalise or expropriate
foreign enterprises.
Should it be necessary to take
such measures, legal procedure must be followed and appropriate compensations
must be paid".
(Dong Shizhong, Danian Zhang
& Milton R. Larson (Tung Shih-chung, Danian Chang & Milton R. Larson):
ibid.; p. 169).
201
Enterprise Autonomy
A key feature of the 'economic
reforms' introduced in December 1978 was the abolition of centralised economic
planning, a process euphemistically called:
"decentralisation".
(Kuchiro Fukasaku, David
Wall & Wu Mingyuan: op. cit.; p. 24).
Under this system, production units:
"are no longer rigidly tied
to the planning system".
(Kuchiro Fukasaku, David
Wall & Wu Mingyuan: ibid.; p. 25).
The regulation of production by
centralised economic planning was replaced by regulation:
"Through the market",
(Zhou Xiao-shuang
(Chou Hsiao-shuang): 'Industry and the
Urban Economy1, in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.;
p. 145).
through:
"Reliance on market forces".
(Kuchiro Fukasaku, David Wall
& Wu Mingyuan: op. cit.; p. 24).
In September 1980, the State Council
approved:
"A report by the State Economic
Council on self-management by enterprises. Under this system,
. . . instead of paying over all its profits to the state,
the enterprise would pay a part of its profits as a tax and would retain
the remainder. It would arrange its own production plan according
to market demand".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,768).
In January 1981, the 'New China
News Agency' reported that:
"Over 4,000 enterprises had
been given enlarged powers of selfmanagement in 1979,
and that the number had increased in 1980 to over 6,000".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,768).
State controlled prices were replaced
by prices determined by supply and demand, by the market, The 3rd
Plenum of the 14th CC of the CPC in November 1993 decided that:
"Market pricing would be extended
from goods markets (where, currently, some 90% of prices were set by market
forces) to sectors such as labour, property and financial services."
('Keesing's Recortd of World
Events', Volume 39; p. 39,735).
At the 13th National Congress of
the CPC in October 1987, Prime Minister Chao Tzu-yang:
"Highlighted the role of the
market as a legitimate mechanism for the determination of prices and distribution.
. . The system of rigid centralised planning . . . threatened to
impede the development of the country's productive forces. It was essential
that it be replaced. In practice, this involved the encouragement of market
forces as the arbiter of relationships between individual enterprises
and between enterprises and the state, as well as the implementation of
managerial autonomy so that individual concerns could assume sole responsibility
for profits and losses".
(Chao Tzu-yuan: Report
of the CC to the 13th National Congress of the CPC (October 1987),
in: 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 33; p. 35,577).
In place of the financing of the
construction of new enterprises by means of state grants, in November 1979
the State Council decided:
"That experiments should be
made in financing capital construction by means of bank loans instead of
state grants."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archivest,
Volume 27; p. 30,768).
At the end of 1981:
"Central government allowed
most enterprises to shift to a new profit-retention method . .
. where each enterprise negotiated a 'base figure' of profits which
it was required to deliver to the state, and retained a high proportion
of all profits above this figure."
(Zhou Xiao-shuang (Chou Hsiao-shuang):
op. cit.; p. 148).
The remaining profits were:
"Retained by the enterprise.
. . . After paying tax, enterprises would assume
full responsibility for their profits or losses, and no funds would
be allocated to them by the state."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 29; p. 32,508).
In 1986, the government:
"Endorsed the principles that:
enterprises that are not profit-making
should declare bankruptcy".
(Joe C. B. Leung:
'Social Welfare Reforms', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.):
op. cit.; p. 220).
From late 1986:
"management responsibility systems
were introduced. . . .
The right to manage the means
of production meant responsibility for both profits and losses.
. . .
By the end of 1987 75% of all
state-owned industrial enterprises were using it."
(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou Hsiao-shuang):
'Industry and the Urban Economy in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove
(Eds.): op. cit.; p. 151).
In October 1994, it was announced
that:
"Bankruptcy procedures would
be streamlined to enable more effective liquidation of loss-making enterprises.
According to official estimates, approximately one-third of China's 11,000
large and medium-sized companies were losing money".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 40; p. 40,230).
'Price Reform'
In 1986, the government introduced
a programme of:
"price reform by . . . freeing
all prices within a short period of time."
(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou
Hsiao-chuang): 'Industry and the Urban Economy in: Robert Benewick
& Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 150).
The 3rd Plenum of the 14th
CC in November 1993 decided that:
In November 1984, the State Economic
Control Administration:
"Relaxed the foreign exchange
controls for foreign enterprises and joint ventures in order to accelerate
the introduction of foreign capital and advanced technology."
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 31; p. 33,926).
Exchange Rates
In January 1994, the People's Bank
decided that in future:
"The official exchange value
of the yuan was to be determined by its average market rate."
('Keesing 's Record of World
Events', Volume 40; p. 39,816).
Economic Growth
Following the 'economic reforms':
"Gross domestic product (GDP)
increased by 10% per year in real terms in the 1980s",
(Kuchiro Fukasaku, David Wall
& Wu Mingyuan: op. cit.; p. 11).
And in the 1990s:
As a result of the economic
reforms', there was:
"a major expansion in China's
exports."
(John Thoburn & Jude Howell:
'Trade and Development: The Political Economy of
China's Open Policy', in: Robert Benewick & Paul
Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; ; p. 177).
In fact:
"In the period 1978-87, the
share of foreign trade in China's gross total national product . . . increased
from 10.25% to 29.7%",
(Lowell Dittmer (1989): op.
cit; p 13).
so that by 1992, China had become:
From 1978 onwards:
"The non-state sector . . .
expanded rapidly".
(Zhou Xiaosshuang (Chou
Hsiao-shuang): 'Industry and the Urban Economy', in: Robert Benewick
& Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 149).
This:
"Revival of small private businesses
. . represented a major change of policy".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,769).
In August 1980, the 'New China News
Agency' reported:
"That the Bank of China had
recently made its first loans to private businesses since 1956; that
the Peking municipality had decided to make loans to small businesses .
. . and that there were now over 900 family businesses in 48 trades
in Peking. Private shops also began to reopen in the summer
of 1980 in Shanghai".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives;',
Volume 27; p. 30,769),
In March 1984, figures released
by the State Council showed:
"That there had been widespread
growth in 'controlled capitalism' or private commerce. . .
Of the new businesses,
80 were privately owned: food stores and restaurants in
the private sector outnumbered state-run enterprises by two to one,
while there were as many privately owned retail stores as state-owned ones.
. . In 1983 the number of private enterprises more than doubled to
5.8 million . . . employing over 7.5 million people (compared
with 3.2 million the previous year.'
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 30; p. 32,981).
Private enterprises:
"Were granted formal legal status
when the Chinese Constitution was amended on April 12, 1988
and the 'Regulations on Private Enterprises' were adopted on June 25,
1988. . . . An individually owned enterprise with more than eight
employees by definition becomes a private enterprise. A private enterprise
can be establshed in one of three legal forms: proprietorship, partnership
or company with limited liability."
(Dong Shizhong,
Danian Zhang & Milton R. Larson (Tung Shih-chung,
Danian Chang & Milton R. Larson): op. cit.; p. 31).
By 1994:
"The state sector of the economy
only produced a little over half of the output value of industrial production,
compared to close on 80% in 1978".
(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.;
p. 90).
Removal of Subsidies
To keep many of the ailing state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) afloat:
"The central government has
subsidised them, both directly and indirectly. . . The
government dares not throw thousands of workers on to the streets by cutting
off the subsidies".
(Economist Intelligence Unit:
'Country Profile: China: 1995-96'; p. 15).
The subsidy programme has added
to the growing central government budget deficit, the budget report in
March 1991 revealing:
"A record deficit for 1990 of
15,000 million yuan."
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 37; p. 38,096).
In May 1985:
"Food prices in Peking (the
Chinese capital) rose dramatically when subsidies on many items were removed".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 31; p. 33,721).
In 1991:
"As part of its bid to join
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), China eliminated export
subsidies".
('China Business: The
Portable Encyclopedia for doing Business with China'; op. cit.; p. 18).
The 'Financial Times' of 12 March
1991 reported that as:
"A first step towards removing
food subsidies, a pilot project to replace state subsidised grain with
a free market was to begin on April 1. . . Grain prices were expected
to treble".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 37; p. 38,097).
Inflation
The chief engine:
"Of China's economic growth
in the 1990s was the explosive expansion of 'new' consumer industries,
e.g., colour television sets, refrigerators, washing machines",
(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou
Hsiao-shuang): 'Industry and the Urban Economy in: Robert Benewick
& Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 152).
and to establish and sustain:
"These 'new' industries . .
demanded massive bank credit".
(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou
Hsiao-shuang): 'Industry and the Urban Economy in: Robert Benewick &
Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 152).
During 1984:
"bank loans rose by 29%".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 31; p. 33,721).
and from mid-1986:
"Credits expanded at growth
rates of 20-25% per annum, which greatly exceeded the growth of industrial
production".
(K. K. Seo: 'Economic
Reform and Foreign Direct Investment in China before and after the Tien
An Men Square Tragedy', in: Lane Kelley & Oded Shenkar (Eds.):
op. cit.; p. 116).
This process:
"Led in the final quarter of
1984 to a massive inflationary boost to the economy as enterprises took
advantage of their new-found freedoms".
(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.;
p. 103).
By July 1988, it had become clear:
"That China was heading for
an inflationary crisis. Prices soared, goods were stockpiled and
there was a run on the banks".
(David S. G. Goodman: ibid.;
p. 107).
Thus, 'price reform':
"Has been, by and large, a euphemism
for increasing prices."
(Economic Intelligence
Unit: 'Country Profile: China: 1995-96'; p. 15).
In consequence, the 3rd Plenum of
the 13th CC in September 1988 decided:
"To impose an austerity policy
over the next two years".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 35; p. 37,002).
based on an:
"Abrupt credit squeeze."
('China Business:
The Portable Encyclopedia for doing Business with China'; op. cit.;
p.23).
As a result, by September 1989:
"Price increases fell to zero
and inflation had been controlled".
(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou Hsiao-shuang):
'Industry and the Urban Economy' in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove
(Eds.): op. cit.; p. 152).
Stock Exchanges
Following the opening of the Shanghai
Stock Exchange in December 1990, in July 1991:
With the 'reforms', which
amounted in reality to the establishment of an unplanned capitalist
society, came the social evils traditionally associated with such
a society:
"Social concerns such as poverty,
family breakdown, rural migrants, school drop-outs, unemployment,
prostitution, drug addiction, juvenile delinquency, the care of abandoned
children, the elderly, the physically disabled and the mentally ill have
become more critical."
(Joe C. B. Leung:
'Social Welfare Reforms', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.):
op. cit. p. 217).
"Escalating inflation, unemployment,
crime, corruption and social disintegration . . wreaked added
hardship on the populace, triggering popular discontent".
('Chinese Business: The
Portable Encyclopedia for doing Business with China'; op. cit.; ; p
23).
As early as 1978:
"The Chinese press admitted
for the first time the existence of an unemployment problem".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,768).
In October 1979, the Deputy Chairman
of the State Planning Commission:
"Told visiting Japanese businessmen
. . . that there were 10 million unemployed, but some unofficial
estimates put the number as high as 20 million. . Unemployment led
to a sharp increase in legal and illegal immigration".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 27; p. 30,768, 30,769).
As early as July 1983, the Secretary
of the Party's Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline stated:
"That economic crimes, including
smuggling, tax evasion, illicit trading in foreign exchange, speculation,
fraud, embezzlement and bribery, had reached an unprecedented level, and
that, up to the end of April (1983-- Ed.) over 30,000 offenders had
been sentenced and 8,500 expelled from the Party".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 29; p. 32,506).
In October 1989:
"The State Council ordered
a probe into economic crime in government departments and state-run
enterprises. .
The 'People's Daily' reported
on Feb. 17, 1989 that 9,729 cases of corruption and 1,930 cases of
bribe-taking had been uncovered in 1988".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 35; p. 37,002).
In August 1993, an assessment published
by the Ministry of Labour:
"Projected that official unemployment
would rise to 4 million to 5 million by the end of the year, mainly because
of cuts in the workforce of state companies (which would continue at higher
levels in the coming decade). . . A Labour Ministry official projection
for the year 2000 suggested an unemployed total of 68 million in
the cities and 200 million in rural areas".
('Keesing 's Record of World
Events', Volume 40; p. 40,101).
CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE : THE
NEW COLONIAL-TYPE STATUS (summer 1980 - April 1996)
Introduction
AS HAS BEEN SAID, AFTER
THE SUMMER OF 1978 THE MAJORITY OF THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
CHINESE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE ABANDONED THE AIM OF SEEKING TO ESTABLISH
A NATIONALLY INDEPENDENT CAPITALISM, AND TRANSFORMED ThEMSELVES INTO POLITICAL
REPRESENTATIVES OF ThE COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE.
The Fostering of Colonial-Type
Dependence
With the adoption of the 'economic
reforms', the pattern of a colonial-type economy dependent upon foreign
imperialism was clearly evident in China. By 1980:
"The growth rate for light industry
was 18.8%, and that of heavy industry only 1.9%".
(Zhou Xiaoshuang (Chou Hsiao-chiang):
'Industry and the Urban Economy in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove
(Eds.): op. cit.; p. 148).
In May 1981, the chief economic
adviser to the State Planning Commission told Japanese economists that:
"In the past three years the
rate of growth of heavy industry had been slowed down. In 1979 growth
rate had been 7.7% for heavy industry, 9.6% for light industry
and 8.6% for agriculture, while in 1980 the rates had been 1.4% for
heavy industry, 18.4% for light industry and 2.7% for agriculture".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p. 31,322).
Premier Chao Tzu-yang admitted to
the National People's Congress in November 1981 that this meant that
priority would be:
"Given to the development of
consumer goods industries."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p. 31,325).
and in his report to the 12th National
Congress of the CPC in September 1982, General Secretary Hu Yao-pang
confirmed emphasis:
"On light industrial development".
(David W-w. Chang:
'China under Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping):
Political and Economic Reform';
Basingstoke; 1988; p. 81).
In other words, development patterns
shifted in 1979:
"To the use of foreign capital
and technology for development of light manufacturing and service industries.
The new policy recognised that light manufacturing and service industries
could make better use of China's abundance of cheap labour while producing
exportable goods capable of earning foreign currency".
(K. K. Seo:
'Economic Reform and Foreign Direct Investment in China
before and after the Tien An Men Square Tragedy', in: Lane Kelley
& Oded Shenkar (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 113).
In the 1990s, the government dismantled
much of the mechanism designed to protect Chinese industry from the competition
of more technologically advanced foreign industry.
For example, in 1992:
"The government abolished regulatory
tariffs and reduced tariffs on a total of 3,596 import categories for an
overall reduction in tariffs of 7.3%. The authorities have announced that
a further reduction of 8.8% on 2,900 items will go into effect in 1994".
('China Business:
The Portable Encyclopedia for doing Business with China';
op. cit.; p. 18).
In January 1994:
"China abolished quotas and
import licences on 283 products and reduced tariffs on a further 234. The
action was taken in accordance with the October 1992 market access agreement
between the USA and China under which China had agreed
to remove 75% of its non-tariff barriers within two years."
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 40; p. 39,816).
In November 1995, the Chinese government:
"Unveiled a package of .
. tariff reductions and the elimination of quotas which was interpreted
as an attempt to facilitate entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO)".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 42; p. R68).
Neutral Dependence upon Imperialism
HOWEVER, THE NEW POST-1980 DEPENDENCE
OF CHINA UPON IMPERIALISM WAS NO LONGER A DEPENDENCE UPON A PARTICULAR
IMPERIALIST POWER, BUT A NEUTRAL DEPENDENCE UPON IMPERIALISM IN GENERAL.
ITS FOREIGN POLICY
THEREFORE INVOLVED THE REPUDIATION OF THE PREVIOUS FOREIGN POLICY OF THE
PARTY GROUPING AROUND HUA KUO-FENG, WHICH HAD HELD THAT THAT SOVIET
IMPERIALISM WAS CHINA'S MAIN ENEMY.
In the early 1980s:
"The PRC moved to lessen its
extreme hostility toward the Soviet Union. Peking's verbal assaults
on Moscow were curtailed; political relations between the PRC and
the Soviet Union improved, and trade increased substantially".
('Encyclopedia Americana', Volume
6; Danbury (USA); 1992; p. 544d).
In March 1980:
"The first issue of a magazine
entitled 'Soviet Literature' was published in Peking".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p. 31,561).
In April 1980, Peking:
"Made it clear . . that
it had abandoned its charge of revisionism against the Soviet Party (CPSU)".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p. 31,559).
and the 'People's Daily':
"Condemned . . . a series of
nine articles attacking the Soviet Union which it had published between
Sept. 6 1963 and July 14 1964".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p. 31,561).
Also in April 1980:
"The street in Peking in which
the Soviet Embassy stood, which at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution
had been renamed 'Struggle against Revisionism Street', reverted
to its original non-political name."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p. 31,561).
During the first half of the 1980s,
Teng Hsiao-ping mapped out:
"A genuinely independent foreign
policy."
(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.;
p. 92).
and the period from April 1984,
in particular:
"Was a time when China enjoyed
good or steadily improving relations with both super-powers."
(Rosemary Foot: 'China's Foreign
Policy in the Post-1989 Era', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.):
op. cit.; p. 235).
On the other hand, the total value
of Sino-US trade:
"increased from $1,100 million
in 1978 to . . $5,500 million in 1981".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p. 31,623).
and a US State Department spokesman
said in June 1981:
"That the Administration had
decided to permit China to purchase additional US technology with potential
military uses".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p. 31,620).
In March 1982, Soviet President
Leonid BREZHNEV*:
"made an appeal for normalisation
of relations",
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p. 31,562).
with China. In 1982,
"Ambassadorial talks between
the two countries (China and the Soviet Union -- Ed.) resumed and
. . . trade began to increase from 1984".
(Paul Wingrove: 'China
and the Pacific Rim', in: Robert Benewick & Paul
Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p.
251).
In August 1982, a US communique
stated that it had been agreed:
"Gradually to reduce its sale
of arms to Taiwan."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 30; p. 32,736).
At the 12th National Congress of
the CPC in September 1982, Party Chairman Hu Yao-pang stated that China:
"Never attaches itself to any
big power or group of powers."
(Jonathan D. Pollack: 'The Opening
to America', in: Roderick MacFarquahar & John K. Fairbanks (Eds.) (1991):
op. cit.; p. 468).
and in October 1982, the 'New China
News Agency' declared that:
"China is independent of all
the superpowers".
(Harry Harding: 'China's Changing
Roles in the Contemporary World', in:
Harry Harding (Ed.):
'China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s'; New Haven (USA);
1984; p. 198).
Following a visit to China
in September 1983 by US Defence Secretary Caspar WEINBERGER*:
"Military cooperation between
China and the USA developed significantly".
('Keesing 's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 30; p. 33,033).
In December 1983, China:
"Joined the Multifibre Arrangement
(MFA -- an agreement on the international textile trade under the
auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade -- GATT".
('Keesing 's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 31; p. 33,923).
The value of Sino-US trade in 1984:
"Increased from $4,300 million
in 1983 to a combined total of $6,060 million".
('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 31; p. 33,923).
In January 1984, Hu Yao-pang,
General Secretary of the CPC, in a press interview:
"Made a renewed appeal for a
rapprochement with the Soviet Union".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 30; p. 33,034).
In April/May 1984, US President
Ronald REAGAN*:
"Visited China, . .
the first visit to China by a US president since the establishment of formal
diplomatic relations in 1979. During his visit four protocols were signed
. . . and a pact on nuclear cooperation was initialled".
('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 30; p. 33,031).
During his visit, Hu Yao-pang reiterated
to Reagan:
"China's commitment to an independent
foreign policy".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 30; p. 33,031).
In June 1984, Chinese Defence Minister
General CHANG Ai-ping* made a 15-day visit to the USA:
"The visit was given minimum
publicity at General Chang's request, signalling China's concern about
its image as a non-aligned power and its desire not to disturb relations
with the Soviet Union."
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 30; p. 33,033).
During his visit, the US Defence
Department:
"Announced that an 'agreement
in principle' had been reached for the sale of anti-tank and anti-aircraft
weapons to China."
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 30; p. 33,033).
In June 1985:
"China, in effect, accepted
the constraints on nuclear proliferation incorporated in the non-proliferation
treaty. The Chinese assurances . . . were sufficient to satisfy the
US Energy Department and State Department".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 31; p. 33,923).
An associated agreement provided:
"For the sale of US nuclear
reactors and related equipment to China".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 31; p. 33,923).
In July 1985:
"A nuclear cooperation agreement
. . . was . . . concluded during a visit to the USA by the
Chinese President Mr. LI Hsien-nien*".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 31; p. 33,922).
In April 1986, US President Ronald
Reagan notified Congress:
"That the sale of high-technology
electronic aviation equipment worth $550 million had been agreed with China."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 32; p. 34,674).
In October 1986, US Vice-President
George BUSH* paid a six-day visit to China, during which he announced:
"That the Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM -- a 15-nation organisation created
in 1950 to supervise the export of Western technology to communist nations)
had agreed to the easing of licensing controls on 27 categories of high-technology
equipment with a potential military application."
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 32; p. 34,674).
In November 1986, three ships of
the US navy visited China for:
"a friendly port call".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 34; p. 35,965).
By 1988:
"China had joined . . . thirty-seven
inter-governmental organisations,''.
(Rosemary Foot:
'China's Foreign Policy in the Post-1989 Era', in:
Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove
(Eds.): op. cit.; p. 236).
while:
"Its participation in non-governmental
organisations (NCOs) also rose dramatically • . . to 574 in 1988",
(Rosemary Foot: 'China's Foreign
Policy in the Post-1989 Era' in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.):
op. cit.; p. 236).
while:
"Peking also started to become
involved with the UN's peacekeeping operation, sending PLA officers
to join the UN's truce supervisory organisation and applying for membership
of the UN's 'Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations'".
(Rosemary Foot: 'China's Foreign
Policy in the Post-1989 Era', in: Robert
Benewick & Paul Wingrove
(Eds.): op. cit.; p. 236).
In February 1989:
"Edvard SHEVARDNADZE*,
the Soviet Foreign Minister, visited China . . . for talks.
. . . Agreement was reached on the holding of a Sino-Soviet summit,
the first since 1959".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 35; p. 36,465).
In May 1989:
"Mikhail GORBACHEV*, the
general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and
. . . Soviet head of state, arrived in Peking . .
at the start of an official four-day visit for summitlevel talks with senior
Chinese leaders.
His visit marked the formal
normalisation of state and Party relations between China and the Soviet
Union".
('Keesing' s Contemporary Archives',
Volume 35; p. 36,641).
In May 1991:
"CHIANG Che-min*, general secretary
of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), paid a historic visit to the Soviet
Union for talks with his Soviet counterpart, President Gorbachev".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 37; p. 38,189).
In the Gulf War of 1991, although:
"China's power is maximised
in the UN because of its veto."
(Rosemary Foot:
'China's Foreign Policy in the Post-1989 Era', in Robert Benewick
& Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 241).
China:
"Voted for all ten UN resolutions
that ordered military and economic sanctions against Iraq, and abstained
on resolution 678 that permitted the use of force to compel an Iraqi withdrawal
from Kuwait."
(Rosemary Foot: 'China's Foreign
Policy in the Post-1989 Era', in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.):
op. cit.; p. 240).215
In January 1992, China and the USA
signed an agreement:
"On the protection of intellectual
property rights (IPR).. . .
China agreed to provide protection
for US inventions and copyrighted works, including computer software, product
patents, sound recordings and trade secrets."
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 38; p. 38,722).
In November 1993, Russian
Defence Minister Pavel GRACHEV* visited China, becoming:
"The first Russian Defence Minister
to visit the country since the collapse of the Soviet Union".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 39; p. 39,735).
In January 1994, the USA and China
signed:
"A three-year textile
agreement which effectively reduced China's access to the US market by
some 13%.
The agreement followed months
of negotiation over the problem of Chinese textiles exceeding their allotted
quota of the US market by some $2,000 million per annum."
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 40; p. 39,816-17).
In May 1994, Russian Premier Viktor
CHERNOMYRDIN*:
"made an official visit to China..
. . A number of agreements were signed covering trade, scientific
technical and military cooperation, and border management. The two countries
expressed their common desire to 'expand and strengthen' cooperation in
all such areas
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 40; p. 40,007).
In May 1994, US President Bill CLINTON*
announced:
"His decision to renew the most-favoured-nation
(MFN) status applying to China's relations with the USA since 1980.
He also announced that he had abandoned his previous insistence on
linking the issues of trade and human rights".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 40; p. 40,007).
In September 1994, Chinese:
"President Chiang Tse-min
visited Russia for talks with President Boris YELTSIN*".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 40; p. 40,181).
In May 1995, Russian President Boris
Yeltsin said that the visit to Russia of Chinese President Chiang Tse-min:
"Signified that both countries
were ready to proceed to partnership"'.
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 41; p. 40,550).
In June 1995, Chinese Premier LI
Peng* visited Russia, delivering:
"An invitation to Russian President
Yeltsin to visit China."
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 41; p. 40,600).
In November 1995, at the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum conference, President Chiang Tse-min
announced:
"The largest single trade liberalisation
since the country began opening its markets in 1979. . . .
The effect of the measures was expected to lower average tariffs from the
current 35.9% to about 22%. . Analysts interpreted the package as
designed to accelerate the negotiations on China's application for
membership of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 41; p. 40,825).
In February 1996, the United States:
"Lifted sanctions blocking the
sale to China of telecommunications, satellites and subsequently approved
the sale of two non-military satellites".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 42; p. 40,952).
In February 1996, the Chinese government:
"Reached agreement to manufacture
Russian-designed jet fighter aircraft. .
Arms analysts described the
development as highly significant".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 42; p. 40,952).
In April 1996:
"During a visit to China . .
Russian President Boris Yeltsin celebrated with Chinese President
Chiang Tse-min what he called 'a new strategic partnership' between the
two countries, spanning economic and security ties and intended to last
into the 21st century. . .
Yeltsin offered unequivocal
support for China's claims on Taiwan and Tibet, while Chiang recognised
Russia's position over Chechnya and described as 'impermissible' the eastward
expansion of NATO". ('Keesing's Record of World Events', Volume 42; p.
41,048).
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES --14
BREZHNEV, Leonid
I., Soviet revisionist politician (1906-82); secretary,
Dnepropetrovsk District Committee,
CPSU (1939-41); major-general (1946);
1st Secretary, CP of Moldavia
(1950-53); secretary, CC, CPSU (1952-60);
deputy head, Chief
Political Administration of the Armed Forces (195355); 1st
Secretary, CP of Kazakhstan (1955-57); President, USSR (196064,
1977-82); 1st Secretary/General Secretary, CPSU (1964-82).
BUSH, George H.
W., American oil executive and politician (1924-
); US
Ambassador to UN (1971-73);
congressman (1967-71); chairman, Republican
National Committee (1973-74);
chief, US Liaison Office in Peking (197475); director,
CIA (1975-76); Chairman, First National Bank, Houston
(1976-79); Vice-President (1981-88); President (1989-93).
CHANG Ai-ping, Chinese
revisionist military officer (1910- ); chief
of staff, East China Military Region (1948-54); comnmander,
naval hq, 3rd Field Army (1949-51); commander, Chekiang
Military District (1952-53); member, National Defence Council (1954-67);
lieutenant-general (1955); Deputy Chief of General
Staff (1977-80); Deputy Premier (1980-82); Minister
of National Defence (1982-88); State Councillor
(1983-88); member, Central Military Commission (1983-88).
CHERNOMYRDIN, Viktor
S., Soviet/Russian revisionist engineer and politician (1938-
); director, oil processing plant, Orenburg (1973-78);
Deputy Minister of Gas Industry (1982-85); Minister of Gas
Industry (1985-89); chairman of board of directors, State Gas Consortium
(1989-92); Premier, Russian Federation (1992- ).
CHIANG Che-min,
Chinese revisionist politician (1926- );
commercial
counsellor, Moscow
(1950-55); assistant minister, Machine-building
Industry (1956-59); Deputy
Minister, State Administrative Commission for
Import and Export Affairs
(1980-82); general secretary, CPC (1980- );
Deputy Minister, State
Foreign Investment Commission (1981-82); Deputy
Minister, Electronics
Industry (1982-83); Minister, Electronics Industry
(1983-85); mayor,
Shanghai (1985-88); deputy secretary, CPC Shanghai
(1985-87); member, Politburo,
CC, CPC (1987- ); secretary, CPC Shanghai
(1987- );
member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1987- );
member, Standing
Committee, Politburo, CC. CPC
(1989- ).
CLINTON, William
J. ('Bill'), American lawyer and politician
(1946lawyer, 1973-76); attorney-general (1977-79); state governor
(1981-82); President (1993- ).
GORBACHEV, Mikhail S., Soviet
revisionist lawyer and politician (1931- ); 1st secretary,
CPSU, Stavropol (1970-78); member, Politburo, CC, CPSU (198091);
general secretary, CPSU (1985-91); President,
USSR (1990-91); awarded Nobel Peace Prize (1990).
GRACHEV, Pavel S.,
Soviet/Russian military officer (1948- ); major-general
(1986); commander,
Soviet airborne troops (1990-91); chairman, RSFSR
State Committee
of Defence (1990); Minister of Defence,
Russian
Federation (1992-
); general of the army (1992).
JIANG Zemin Pinyin
form of CHIANG Che-min.
LI Hsien-nien, Chinese
revisionist politician (1909- ); deputy commander,
2nd Field Army (1949); commander and political commissar, Hupei Military
District (1949-50); member, People's Revolutionary
Military Council (1949-54); secretary, Hupei Provincial
CPC (1949-54); member, National Defence Council (1954-67); member,
Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC (1977-87); Minister
of Finance (1954-75); Deputy Premier (1954-80);
member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1956-87); secretary, CPC (1958-69);
deputy chairman, State Planning Commission (1962-67);
deputy chairman, CPC (1977-82); Deputy Chairman,
State Financial and Economic Commission (1959-81); President
(1983-88).
LI Xiannian = Pinyin form of
LI Hsien-nien.
LI Peng, Chinese revisionist
politician (1928- ); director, North-east China
Electric Power Administration
(1960-64); director, Peking Electric Power
Administration (1966-80);
Deputy Minister of Power Industry (198~81);
Minister of Power Industry (1981-82);
Deputy Minister, Water Conservancy
and Power Industry (1982-83);
Deputy Premier (1983-87); Chairman, State
Environment Protection
Committee (1984-87); Minister, State Education
Commission (1985-88);
member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1985- ); secretary,
CC, CPC (1985-87); member,
Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC (1987); Acting Premier
(1987-88); Premier (1988- ); Minister, State
Commission for Restructuring
the Economy (1988- ).
REAGAN, Ronald W.,
American actor, sports commentator and politician (1911); film
actor (1937-64); president, Screen Actors' Guild (1947-52, 1959-60); state
governor (1967-74); President (1981-89).
SHEVARDNADZE, Edvard A.,
Soviet/Georgian politician (1928- ); 1st Deputy
Minister for the
Protection of the Public, Soviet Georgia (1964-65);
Minister for the Protection
of the Public, Soviet Georgia (1965- );
member, Politburo, CC,
CPSU (1985-90); Foreign Minister, USSR (1985-91);
Foreign Minister, Georgia (1991-
); President, Georgia (1991- ).
WEINBERGER, Caspar W,,
American lawyer, publisher and politician (1917- ); book reviewers,
'San Francisco Chronicle' (1959-68); chairman, Federal Trade
Commission (1970); Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget (1970-72);
Director, Office of Management and Budget (1972-73); Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare (1973-75); Secretary of Defence (198O-87).
YELTSIN, Boris N.,
Soviet revisionist/Russian politician (1931- );
1st secretary, Sverdlovsk CPSU (1976-85); 1st Secretary,
Moscow City CPSU (1985-87); member, Politburo, CC,
CPCU (1985-87); President, Russian Republic (1990- ).
ZHANG Aiping = Pinyin form of
CHANG Ai-ping.
CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE : ThE
NEW INNER-PARTY DIFFERENCES (spring 1980 - January 1996)
Introduction
AFTER THE OUSTING OF THE COMPRADOR
GROUPING HEADED BY HUA KUO-FENG IN 1981 -
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
MAJORITY OF THE REMNANTS OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE INTO A COMPRADOR BOURGEOISIE,
A NEW
POLITICAL DIFFERENCE EMERGED WITHIN
THE REVISIONIST COMMUNIST PARTY
-- ONE BETWEEN 'RADICAL
REFORMERS' WHO WISHED TO INTRODUCE
A FREE ENTERPRISE CAPITALIST SYSTEM IMMEDIATELY,
AND 'CONSERVATIVE
REFORMERS' WHO WISHED TO RETAIN THE PSEUDO-SOCIALIST
FACADE OF STATE CAPITALISM.
To the first of these new groupings,
(ie the 'Radical reformers'):
"Hu Yao-pang and Chao Tzu-yang
belonged",
(John Thoburn & Jude
Howell: 'Trade and Development: The Political Economy
of China's Open Policy", in: Robert Benewick & Paul
Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 171).
and had its principal strength in
the student democracy movement.
The second of these new groupings
(ie the Conservative Reformers') was headed by Teng Hsiao-ping who,
in a speech to the Central Advisory Commission of the CPC in October 1984:
"Attempted to assuage the concerns
of some 'old comrades' who 'fear that after they had fought all their lives
for socialism, for communism, suddenly capitalism is coming back'.
Their fears, he said, were unwarranted; and the basic means of production
would remain in the hands of the state".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 31; p. 33,722).
This grouping took their stand on:
"Ideological aspects such as
'spiritual pollution'. They .. . were behind both the Spiritual Pollution
Campaign of 1983 and the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalisation Campaign of 1987".
(John Thoburn & Jude Howell:
'Trade and Development: The Political Economy of China's Open Policy",
in: Robert Benewick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.; p.
171).
In the spring of 1980, 'conservative
reformers' in the military:
In August 1980, Chao Tzu-yang, one
of the leaders of the radical reformist' grouping of the Party,
At the 12th National Congress of
the CPC in September 1982, 'radical' reformers:
"Consolidated their hold on
political power."
(Jonathan D. Pollack:
'The Opening to America, in: Roderick MacFarquahar & John K. Fairbank
(Eds.) (1991): op. cit.; p. 461).
and Hu Yao-pang, one of the leaders
of the 'radical reform' grouping:
"Was elected as General Secretary".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 28; p. 31,819).
of the Party.
The Election of Li
Hsien-nien as State President (June 1983)
In June 1983, Li Hsien-nien:
In spite of the ascendancy of the
'radical reformist' grouping of the Party at the 12th National Congress
of the CPC in September 1983, the fight back of the 'conservative reformists'
was not without its successes.
In June 1983, the National People's
Congress:
"Elected Mr. Teng Hsiao-ping
chairman of the Central Military Commission".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives',
Volume 29; p. 32,503).
and in July 1983,
Nevertheless, as a result of advanced
age and failing health, Teng Hsiaoping:
"Retired from daily administration
in September 1985, from the CPC Political Bureau at the 13th Congress of
the CPC (in October 1987 -Ed.), and from his last formal (CPC --
Ed.) position as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in November
1989".
(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.;
p. 102).
Finally, at the National People's
Congress in March 1990, Teng Hsiao-ping:
At the end of 1986:
"student street demonstrations
for greater democracy erupted"
(David S. G. Goodman:
op. cit.; p. 106).
on the initiative of the 'radical
reformist' grouping of the Party, headed by Hu Yao-pang and Chao
Tzu-yang.
These demonstrations:
"Provided the opportunity and
the excuse";
(David S. G. Goodman: ibid.;
p. 106).
for the 'conservative reformers':
"To demand Hu Yao-pang's removal".
(David S. G. Goodman: ibid.;
p. 106).
In January 1987, therefore, Hu Yao-pang:
At the 13th National Congress of
the CPC in October 1987, Prime Minister Chao Tzu-yang openly raised the
question of 'radical reform 'of the one-party political system, declaring
that it was:
"High time to put political
structural reform on the agenda of
the whole Party".
(Chao Tzu-yang: Report of the
CC to the 13th National Congress of the CPC (October 1987),
in: 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 33; p.
35,577).
Nevertheless, the continuing influence
of the 'conservative reformers' was demonstrated by the fact that
the congress:
"Semi-formally recognised Teng
as the 'paramount' leader".
(David S. G. Goodman: op. cit.;
p. 107). and called for
"Struggle against bourgeois liberalism".
(Ruan Ming (Juan Ming): op.
cit.; p. 45).
The 1st Plenum of the
13th CC (November 1987)
At the 1st Plenum of the 13th CC
of the CPC in November 1987, Chao Tzu-yang:
"Was formally elected as general
secretary of the CPC",
('Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 33; p. 35,578).
and at a meeting of the Standing
Committee of the NPC later in the month, Chao announced:
The death of Hu Yao-pang in April
1989:
"Triggered weeks of massive
protests",
(Edwin P-w. Leung (Ed.): op.
cit.; p. 166).
On 4 May 1989:
"An estimated 50,000 students,
watched and supported by large numbers of workers, marched from their
campuses in Peking to Tien An Men Square, the city's centre."
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 35; p. 36,640).
The demonstrations started:
"Following the death of former
CPC general secretary Hu Yaopang, and were organised in support
of increased democracy and in opposition to corruption and nepotism".
('Keesing's Record of
World Events', Volume 35; p. 36,640).
The student demonstrations were
supported by the 'radical reformist' grouping, headed by Hu
Yao-pang and Chao Tzu-yang, but opposed by the 'conservative reformist'
grouping, headed by Teng Hsiao-ping and Li Peng.
The Party and government were:
"Divided into two sections:
one generally supportive of the students' demands (led by Chao Tzu-yang,
the CPC general secretary) and the other favouring a hard-line military
response to the unrest (led, ostensibly, by the Premier Li Peng, but ultimately
supported by the country's 'elder statesman' leader, Teng Hsiao-ping".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 35; p. 36,640).
For example, Chao, in an address
to the Asian Development Bank on 4 May demanded that:
"..'reasonable demands from
students . . . should be met'...".
(Chao Tzu-yang: Address
to the Asian Development Bank (May 1989), in:
'Keesing 's Record of World
Events', Volume 35; p. 36,640).
while, in contrast, the 'People's
Daily':
"Described the student
demonstrations as 'a planned conspiracy"'.
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 35; p. 36,640).
On 13 May 1989:
"students occupying Tien An
Men Square began a hunger strike to dramatise their call for 'genuine dialogue'
with the Chinese leadership. . . . .
By May 14 at least 100,000 people,
including a large number of teachers, had gathered in Tien An Men Square
in support of the fasting students".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 35; p. 36,640).
On 17 May 1989, Chao Tzu-yang:
On 17 May 1989, the Politburo of
the CC of the CPC:
"Voted to relieve Chao of his
duties as CPC general secretary, appointing Li Peng in his place in an
acting capacity. . . . The meeting also approved a decision taken
by Teng to begin the movement of military units from the provinces to Peking.
Teng's sole remaining official position was as Chairman of the powerful
Central Military Commission."
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 35; p. 36,641).
In addition, the grouping around
Li and Teng placed Chao:
"Under virtual house arrest."
(Lowell Dittmer: 'The
Tien An Men Square Massacre', in: 'Problems of Communism',
Volume 38, No. 5 (September/October 1989); (hereafter listed as 'Lowell
Dittmer (1989)'); p. 11).
On 20 May 1989,
"Over 1 million people, including
large organised groups of workers and government officials, demonstrated".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 35; p. 36,641).
And:
"Substantial numbers
of Army units were deployed around Peking".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 35; p. 36,640).
At midnight:
"Li Peng declared martial law
in a nationally televised speech. . . Chao's conspicuous absence from the
group of five on the stage. . . made the split in the leadership public".
(Lowell Dittmer (1989): op.
cit.; p. 11).
After the news of the imposition
of martial law had been broadcast:
"Large numbers of Peking residents
converged on six or more points around the capital, successfully halting
the progress of the troop convoy towards Tien An Men Square. . Citizens'
barricades against the troops were quickly erected".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 35; p. 36,641).
On the night of 3-4 June 1989, the
PLA used:
"Ooverwhelming firepower to
clear the streets, killing at least several hundred civilians in and around
Tien An Men. . . . The number of officially
reported arrests as of early July 1989 exceeded 2,500; unofficial
estimates put the figure at more than 10,000".
(Lowell Dittmer (1989): op.
cit.; p. 12).
The second Tien An Men Square Incident
of June 1989 was the reason given for action:
"To remove Chao Tzu-yang from
his post as General Secretary".
(Tony Saich: 'The Rise
and Fall of the Beijing (Peking) People's Movement', in: Jonathan
Unger (Ed.): 'The Pro-Democracy Protests in China: Reports from the
Provinces'; New York; 1991; p. 25).
and at the Standing Committee of
the NPC later in the month:
"Teng Hsiao-ping personally
moved to dismiss Chao Tzu-yang from his last remaining governmental position,
that of Vice-Chairman of the state Central Military Commission."
(Lowell Dittmer (1989): op.
cit.; p. 13).
July 1989 saw:
"Increasingly virulent attacks
on the disgraced former CPC general secretary Chao Tzu-yang and his
. . . supporters."
('Keesing '5 Record of World
Events', Volume 35; p. 36,815).
and in June 1991 it was officially
stated that Chao:
"had been held under house arrest
since his dismissal in June 1989".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 37; p. 38,290).
The 9th Plenum of the 13th CC in
October 1992 held that Chao Tzu-yang:
The 14th National Congress of the
CPC in October 1992 was:
"a triumph".
('Keesing's Record of
World Events', Volume 38; p. 39,126).
for the 'conservative reformers',
headed by Teng Hsiao-ping,
"Both in terms of policies adopted
and of personnel appointed".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 38; p. 39,126).
and the report to the congress of
CPC general secretary Chiang Tse-min was:
"a recapitulation and celebration
of Teng's economic reform line".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 38; p. 39,126).
Chiang Tse-min as Paramount
Leader (March 1993 - April 1995)
In October 1989, Chiang Tse-min,
a prominent leader of the 'conservaruve reformist' grouping of the Party,
"Took over Teng Hsiao-ping 's
chairmanship of the Communist Party's Military Commission; six months later
he inherited the same post in the parallel State Commission."
(Simon Long: 'Leadership Politics
since 1989', in: Robert Benedick & Paul Wingrove (Eds.): op. cit.;
p. 54).
In March 1993, Chiang Tse-min:
"Was elected as state President
by the NPC. . . Chiang's election as President appeared designed
to bolster his authority as the chosen successor of paramount leader
Teng Hsiao-ping".
('Keesing's Record of
World Events', Volume 39; p. 39,365-66).
The communique of the 4th
Plenum of the 14th CC of the CPC in September 1994:
"Emphasised the position of
President Chiang Tse-min, the CPC general secretary, as the 'core'
of China's third generation leadership".
('Keesing's Record of
World Events', Volume 40; p. 40,181).
Thus, by April 1995 Prime Minister
Li Peng could officially state that:
In an effort to maintain for as
long as possible the pseudo-socialist facade of state capitalism against
the efforts of the 'radical reformist' grouping of the Party to replace
it by multi-party free enterprise capitalism, in the 1990s the dominant
'conservative reformist' Party grouping instituted
a series of repressive measures.
In June 1992:
"The authorities published the
text of new regulations which tightened restrictions on demonstrations.
. In addition to making it more difficult to organise a legal protest,
the regulations gave the authorities the right to use 'all police
measures to suppress illegal demonstrations."
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 38; p. 38,960-61).
In October 1993, a new law:
"Placed tight restrictions on
the manufacture, import, sale and installation of satellite dishes, all
of which would be subject to strict licensing".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events'. Volume 39; p. 39,688).
In May 1994:
"The already extensive
powers of the police to detain and restrict dissidents were broadened".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events1. Volume 40; p. 40,007).
In December 1995, draft legislation
was submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress:
"Designed to give the government
the power to impose martial law."
('Keesing's Record of World
Events', Volume 41; p. 40,865).
In January 1996, the State Council:
"Invested the official news
agency 'Hsinhua' with exclusive authority to oversee the dissemination
of all business and economic information. The decision was interpreted
by Western business analysts as an effort by sections of the government
to exert greater control over proliferating electronic information
services, including the Internet".
('Keesing's Record of World
Events'. Volume 42; p. 40,903).
CONCLUSION
UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF MAO TSE-TUNG
AND HIS SUCCESSORS, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA PURSUED NOT MARXIST-LENINIST,
BUT REVISIONIST POLICIES WHICH SERVED THE INTERESTS OF SECTIONS OF THE
CHINESE BOURGEOISIE.
SUCH REVISIONIST POLICIES COULD
NOT BRING ABOUT A SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN CHINA, SO THAT THE 'SOCIALISM
WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS' WHICH CAME INTO EXISTENCE IN CHINA
WAS MERELY A VARIETY OF CAPITALISM CARRYING ALL THE SOCIAL EVILS
INEVITABLY ASSOCIATED WITH CAPITALISM.
THERE IS NO WAY
FORWARD FOR THE WORKING PEOPLE OF CHINA EXCEPT TO REPUDIATE
REVISIONISM AND TO RE-FORM A GENUINE MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY WHICH --
IN SOLIDARITY WITH
MARXIST-LENINIST PARTIES AND ORGANISATIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
-- CAN LEAD THEM TO GENUINE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION.
THERE IS NO WAY FORWARD
FOR THOSE WHO REGARD THEMSELVES AS MARXIST-LENINISTS EXCEPT TO UPHOLD
THE PRINCIPLE THAT POLITICAL POLICIES MUST BE BASED UPON FACTS, NOT UPON
WISHFUL THINKING.
FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT ON THE BASIS OF SCIENTIFIC MARXISM-LENINISM!
FOR THE EXPOSURE OF ALL BRANDS
OF REVISIONISM -- WHICH CAN ONLY DECEIVE AND MISLEAD WORKING PEOPLE AND
SERVE THE INTERESTS OF THEIR ENEMIES!
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