CHAPTER TWELVE : THE 'AGRICULTURE FIRST' POLICY
(Summer 1960 -  September 1962)

Introduction

COMPELLED  TO  BRING THE 'GREAT LEAP FORWARD' TO AN  END,  THE  COMPRADOR BOURGEOIS  GROUPING  OF  THE  PARTY  NEVERTHELESS  SUCCESSFULLY  UTILISED  THE AGRICULTURAL  CHAOS  CAUSED BY THE 'LEAP' TO IMPOSE ON THE PARTY FOR A TIME  -
A POLICY OF ACCORDING THE PRIORITY TO AGRICULTURE.

  The Peitaiho Central Work Conference (summer 1960)

 In  the  summer  of  1960,  a Central Work  Conference  was  convened  at Peitaiho,  attended by all provincial Party First Secretaries. The proceedings of the conference were not made public,  but subsequent events indicated  that it:

"Decided to change drastically the priorities  of  economic policy   -- above  all  by  mobilising  available  resources  to  support agriculture. . . .  After  the work conference,  the shift towards an  'agriculture-first' policy became clearly discernible".
(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 126).

 This  policy was confirmed at the 9th Plenum of the 8th  CC,  in  January 1961, which:

"Decided  to  reinforce the agricultural  front  by  making agriculture  the  foundation of the national economy and giving  industry second priority".
(Edward L. Wheelwright & Bruce McFarlane: op. cit.; p. 68).

"Since  there  had been tremendous development  in  heavy industry  in  the  last  three years  .  .  . the  scale  of  the  basic construction industries should therefore be appropriately reduced".
(Li  Choh-ming:  'China's  Industrial  Development:  1958-63'  (hereafter listed as 'Li Shoh-ming (1972)),  in: Roderick MacFarquahar (Ed.)  'China under  Mao:  Politics  takes Command:  A Selection of Articles from  "The China Quarterly"'; Cambridge (USA); 1972.; p. 182).

"All the Party and all people to agriculture and food grains."
(Resolution of 9th Plenum of 8th CC, in: Li Choh-ming (1972): ibid.; p. 182).

 In December 1961:

"The Party issued secretly to the cadres in the field a document known  as '70 Articles of Industrial Policy'.  In  essence,  it  directed that,  unless special authority was given,  all basic construction should be suspended,  all those enterprises that had been operating regularly at a  loss  be shut down, and the practice of recruiting labour from  rural areas be abandoned for at least three years."
(Li Shoh-ming (1972): ibid.; p. 182-83).

"As the immediate urgent task of the people, the development of agriculture,  itself the foundation of the national economy . . . must be given the topmost position".
(Resolution of 10th Plenum of 8th CC (September 1962),  in:  Li Shoh-ming (1972): ibid.; p. 183-84).

Introduction

 THE  'SOCIALIST  EDUCATION  MOVEMENT'  WAS A MOVEMENT  INITIATED  BY  THE
COMPRADOR  BOURGEOIS  GROUPING  WITHIN THE PARTY  LEADERSHIP  WHICH  AIMED  AT MOBILISING  THE  POOR  AND  LOWER-MIDDLE  PEASANTS  IN  COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE AGAINST THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE.

The 10th Plenum of the 8th CC (September 1962)

 By the time of the 10th Plenum of the 8th CC, in September 1962:

"China's internal political and economic situation was just beginning to improve following three years of severe crop failures and  a series  of  emergency administrative retrenchments made necessary by  the collapse of the Great Leap Forward".
(Richard  Baum:  'Prelude to Revolution:  Mao,  the Party and the Peasant Question:  1962-66' (hereafter listed as 'Richard Baum (1975);  New York; 1975; p. 11).

"Mao Tse-tung put forward the slogan 'Never forget the class struggle"'.
(John  Gittings (1968): op. cit.; p. 271).

The most important decision taken by the Plenum was to set up:

"A mass movement called the Socialist Education Movement. The aim  of  this  movement  was .  .  to counter  all  moves  towards  an individualistic  economy  .  .  .  and generally to raise the socialist consciousness  of the whole people by bringing about mass participation in the struggle and relating Mao Tse-tung's works to it."
(John & Elsie Collier: op. cit.; p. 58).

"The  Socialist  Education Movement of 1962-66 . .  .  was  not  just directed at 'capitalist' attitudes in the countryside. . . .  It was also concerned  with  institutional  arrangements which might contribute  to capitalist' relations".
(Dennis Woodward: "'Two Line Struggle" in Agriculture', in: Bill Brugger (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 153).

"To rectify the four 'uncleans' in rural administration (lack of political discipline,   ideological deviations, organisational deviations and the mismanagement of economic affairs) and  thus  became popularly known as the . . . 'Four Clean-ups Movement'".
(David & Nancy D. Milton: op. cit.; p. 71).

"In addition to stressing 'class struggle' was increasingly identified with the Thought of Mao Tse-tung".
(William F.  Dorrill:  'Power,  Policy and Ideology in the Making of the Chinese Cultural Revolution', in: Thomas W. Robinson (Ed.): 'The Cultural Revolution in China'; Berkeley (USA): 1971; p. 56).

"Rehearsal of the 'Cultural Revolution."
(Alam Chamsul:  'A Critique of China's Cultural Revolution (1966-76)'; Calcutta; 1980; p. 5).

"Was well under way in many provinces".
(Parris H. Chang: ibid.; p. 148).

  From the outset, however,

"Within the Socialist Education Movement there developed two opposed policies".
(John & Elsie Collier: op. cit.; p. 59).

"Great  struggle between the representatives  of  the  'two roads"'.
(David & Nancy D. Milton: op. cit.; p. 75).

"Continued to stress not politics but production,  . . .  not class struggle but technical reform",
(Richard Baum (1975): op. cit.; p. 20).

As a result of the opposition of the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie to Mao's 'class struggle' aims for the SEM,  up to February 1963:

"Party functionaries at the intermediate and  lower  levels dragged their feet in implementing the new campaign",
(Richard Baum (1975): ibid.; p. 19).

"The SEC was relatively lifeless".
(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 148).

 In a speech to a Central Work Conference in February 1963, in an effort to put the SEC on what he regarded as:

". . the correct course, Mao intervened",
(Parris H. Chang: ibid.; p. 149).

"Revealed the extraordinary political significance he attached to the new movement:
'How can we achieve socialist construction when there is peaceful coexistence in politics?   .  .  . Once we grasp class struggle, miracles are possible'".
(Richard Baum (1975): op. cit.; p. 17).

 In  May  1963,  Mao issued 'Note on Seven Well-written Documents  of  the Chekiang  Provincial  Committee  concerning Cadre  Participation  in  Physical Labour', in which he warned that, without class struggle:

"The day would not be far off .  .  . before  a  counter revolutionary  restoration on a nation-wide scale would inevitably occur.
The whole of China would then change colour.  .  . . Isn't that a most dangerous prospect?"
(Mao  Tse-tung:  'Note  on Seven Well-written Documents of  the  Chekiang Provincial  Committee concerning Cadre Participation in Physical  Labour'; (May 1963), in: Richard Baum (1975): ibid.; p. 22).

In May 1963:

"The  Chairman's growing displeasure  .  .  .  was  clearly manifested .  . . when the Central Committee, acting under Mao's personal supervision,  promulgated a 'Draft Directive on Some Problems in  Current Rural  Work'.  Known in Maoist parlance as the 'First Ten  Points',  this directive  served notice to Party officials throughout the  country  that their superficial,  perfunctory and lackadaisical attitudes towards class struggle would no longer be tolerated".
(Richard Baum (1975): ibid.; p. 21).

"The first major policy directive concerning the SEC and was clearly intended by Mao to guide the campaign  along the course he desired".
(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 149).

"Those cadres who had failed to emphasise the class struggle or had paid insufficient attention to the class struggle phenomena were criticised".
(Parris H. Chang: ibid.; p. 149).

"Not  all of our comrades have paid attention to the various phenomena of class struggle.  . . Many have failed to observe these phenomena and have not given them the serious thought required.  Instead they adopt  an attitude of indifference, thereby letting the phenomena  continue to develop".
('Draft Directive on Some Problems in Current Rural Work' (May 1963), in: Richard Baum (1975): op. cit.; p. 21).

"Held that cadre corruption . . . was the most prevalent cause of peasant dissatifaction with the existing rural leadership".
(Richard Baum (1975): ibid.; p. 24).

In other words, the 'First Ten Points':

"Called for the revitalisation of long-dormant poor and lower middle  peasants'  organisations in the countryside,  The poor and  lower-middle  peasants,  who reportedly constituted some 65% to 70% of  China's total rural population,  . . . were now instructed to form a 'class army' to do battle against the forces of corruption and reaction in the countryside".
(Richard Baum (1975):  ibid.; p. 24).

"During the course of the movement,  the masses must be given every opportunity to fully  air their views, make criticism of errors and shortcomings, and expose evil people and evil deeds".
('Draft Directive on Some Problems in Current Rural Work' (May 1963), in: Richard Baum (1975): ibid.; p. 24).

"Officially adopted by the Central Committee at its 11th Plenum in August 1966,  when the Cultural Revolution was in full blood.  It took 38  months for these ideas to be accepted by the majority of the  Party's highest body".
(Jean Esmein: 'The Chinese Cultural Revolution'; London; 1975; p. 44).

 In  September  1963,  four  months after the issuing of  the  'First  Ten Points',  the  leaders  of  the national bourgeois  grouping  within  the Party succeeded in getting the  Central Committee to issue:

"Another  directive on the SEC,  'Some Concrete Policy Formulations of the CC of the CPC in the Rural Socialist Education Movement' (also known as the 'Second Ten Points')". (Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 150).

"Were drafted on the basis of a report . . . by Peking Party boss, Peng Chen".
(Richard Baum (1975): op. cit.; p. 43).

"If not to Liu Shao-chi personally, at least to Liu's thought".
(David & Mancy D. Milton: op. cit.; p. 71).

"The 'Second Ten Points' substantially modified the spirit and softened the impact of the SEC as set forth in its predecessor."
(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 150).

"Reliance  in the movement should be placed, the revised 'Ten Points' stated, not on the  poor and lower-middle peasants, but on the Party leadership".
(David & Nancy D. Milton: ibid.; p. 71).

"The net effect of both the 'Second Ten Points' and the ensuing propaganda  campaign in the mass media was to ensure that  the  Socialist Education Movement would be a relativly low-key affair."
(Richard Baum (1975): op. cit.; p. 63).

  In December 1964, the comprador bourgeois grouping within the Party struck back with the issue of:

"A new directive 'Some Problems currently arising in the Course of  the Rural Socialist Education Movement' (also known as  the'  TwentyThree  Points',  which was said to have been drafted under Mao's personal guidance)".
(Parris H. Chang: op. cit.; p. 156).

"The  Socialist Education Movement as a movement meant to confront the 'contradiction between socialism and capitalism in China's countryside'.  In  order to accomplish this,  it called once again on the peasant masses to supervise the Party cadres by their criticism and,  for the first time, there appeared the formulation that was to be the central political focus of the Cultural Revolution  -- to direct the  'spearhead of criticism against 'those people in authority within the Party who take the capitalist road"'.
(David & Nancy D. Milton: op. cit.; p. 71-72).

"If  the present document should contradict previous Central Committee documents concerning the Socialist Education Movement, then this document shall uniformly be regarded as the standard".
(CC,  CPC:  'Some  Problems currently arising in the Course of the  Rural Socialist Education Movement' (January 1965),  in:  Richard Baum  (1975): op. cit.; p. 127).

"Lin Piao rose to ideological prominence";
(Roxane Witke: op. cit.; p. 375).

"Chiang Ching,   . . . after two decades of isolation, . began her return."
(Roxane Witke: ibid.; p. 306).

In April 1966:

"Mao  study was incorporated into the  Socialist  Education Movement on a regular and nation-wide basis".
(Richard Baum:  'The Cultural Revolution in the Countryside: Anatomy of a Limited Rebellion'(hereafter listed as 'Richard Baum (1971)',  in: Thomas W. Robinson (Ed.):  'The Cultural Revolution in China';  Berkeley (USA);  1971; p. 376).

"The initiation of the Cultural Revolution".
(Richard Baum (1971): ibid.; p. 376).

"Overlapped the Cultural Revolution and virtually merged with it in the autumn of 1966". (John & Elsie Collier: op. cit.; p. 62).

"Mao-study was the common element of both the (urban) Cultural Revolution and the (rural) Socialist Education Movement."
(Richard Baum (1971): op. cit.;  p. 376).

"Mao's test run"
(David & Nancy D. Milton: op. cit.; p. 127).

CHAPTER FOURTEEN : PRELUDE TO THE 'CULTURAL REVOLUTION' (September 1962 - April 1966)

The 10th Plenum of the 8th CC (September/October 1962)

 The  10th  Plenum of  the 8th CC was  held  in  September/October  1962. Although:

"Mao presided over this meeting";
(Kenneth  Lieberthal:  'The Great Leap Forward and the Split  in  the Yenan Leadership' (hereafter listed as 'Kenneth Lieberthal (1987)'),  in: Roderick MacFarquahar & John K.  Fairbank (Eds.): 'The Cambridge History of China',  Volume 14:   'The People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China'; Cambridge; 1987; p. 334).

"put forward the slogan 'Never forget the class struggle!".
(Mao  Tse-tung:  Speech  at 10th Plenum of 8th  CC  (September/October 1962), in: John Gittings (1968): op. cit.; p. 271).

"In the months that followed, precious time slipped by while the Secretariat of the Central Committee appeared to do nothing".
(Jean Esmein: op. cit.; p. 44).

In December 1963,

"Mao issued a general call for people to 'learn from the PLA', a startling slogan".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): op. cit.; p. 338).

"The  PLA generated several models of political rectitude including a selfless soldier (LEI Feng*)".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): op. cit.; p. 338).

"Was a peasant soldier from Hunan province who was held up by Mao Tse-tung to be youthful paragon of Maoist  virtues.   .  .  .   These virtues  included  courage,  humility,  sacrifice .  .  .  and above  all unquestioned loyalty".
(Edwin P-w. Leung: op. cit.; p. 205).

"Died in an accident",
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): op. cit.; p. 338).

"crushed by a fallen telegraph pole".
(Edwin P-w. Leung: op. cit.; p. 205).

By 1962, Chiang Ching had convinced Mao:

"That the cultural sphere needed attention".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): op. cit.; p. 343).

"Her plans to revolutionise Peking Opera and other aspects of Chinese culture."
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 343).

"the Ministries of Culture and Education and the Propaganda Department of the CPC . . . paid her no heed and scoffed at her efforts."
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 345-46).

"Heavily and personally involved himself in Chiang Ching 's efforts to revolutionise Peking Opera",
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 345).

"Who was in the cultural apparatus in Shanghai",
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 345).

"a Shanghai critic".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 345). ;

 In June/July 1964,

  " . . clashes occurred at . . . the  . . . Festival of Peking Opera on Contemporary Themes";  (Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 346).

".  . Lin Piao and Chiang Ching were clearly linked up when Lin invited Chiang to stage a 'Forum on Literature and Art for Troops' and made her the official cultural adviser to the military. This for the first time gave Chiang an official position that she could use as a  base for pursuing her political goals".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 342).

"Directly challenged the policies of Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi and others".
(Frederick   C.   Teiwes  &  Warren  Sun:   'The  Tragedy of  Lin   Piao: Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution: 1966-1971'; London; 1996; p. 57).

In June 1964,

"the Party Secretariat formed a Five-Man Group to coordinate efforts  toward  Cultural Reform.  Peng Chen .  .  .  took charge of  the group".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 346).

In May 1965:

"The  army  .  .  compiled the little red book of Mao quotations";
(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.):  'People's China: Social  Experimentation,  Politics,  Entry  onto the  World  Scene:  1966 through 1972'; New York; 1974; p. 225).

 LO Jui-ching*  had  been appointed Chief-of-Staff of the PLA in April 1959, at the time of the ousting of Peng Teh-huai, and:

"Over the course of time,  Lo came to adopt views similar  to those of Peng".
(Lois  D.Tretiak:  'Revolt of the Generals',  in:  'The Case of Peng  Tehhuai'; op. cit.; p. 339-40).

"General Lo .  . was a recent convert to the modernisers".
(Gerard H.  Corr:  'The Chinese Red Army: Campaigns and Politics since 1949'; Reading; 1974; p. 149).

"A romantic day-dream inspired by nostalgia for the caves of Yenan,  holding China back from building the modern armed forces that she needs"
(Joan Robinson:  'The Cultural Revolution in China'; Harmondsworth; 1969; p. 32).

"Our troops  . . must absorb the highly advanced military science of the Soviet Union".  (Chu Teh:  Broadcast of August 1951,  in:  Gerard H.  Corr:  op. cit.; p. 143).

Lin Piao, the new Minister of National Defence:

"Was given the job of remoulding a new PLA, one more to Mao's liking and one which in the future could be used as a military-political instrument'".
(Gerard H. Carr: op. cit.; p. 147).

" . . had overtly dropped the interest he had once shown in what Mao called 'positional warfare' and,  unhesitatingly,  accepted   .  .  the Chairman's concept of a people's war with all the supporting ideology".
(Clare Hollingworth:  'Mao and the Men against  him';  London;  1985;  p.
104).

"The role of the militia and of unconventional forces rather than of the regular army".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): op. cit.; p. 340).

"Began his reform of the PLA by bringing back into prominence the Military Affairs Commission (MAC) of the Party'".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): ibid.; p. 336).

"Giving greater power to the Army's Political Department,"
(Gerard H. Carr: op. cit.; p. 148).

"The  command vehicle through which the Party exercises control over the professional military.   .  . . Day-to-day leadership of this body generally resided in the Minister of Defence."
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): op. cit.; p. 336).

"To stress the use of Mao Tse-tung Thought in the military".
(Kenneth Lieberthal (1987): op. cit.; p. 337).

"Opposing the thorough establishment by our army of the absolute authority of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung".
(Yang Cheng-wu: 'Thoroughly establish the Absolute Authority of the Great
Supreme Commander Chairman Mao and of his Great Thought',  in: 'Peking
Review', Volume 10, No. 46 (10 November 1967); p. 19).

Lin Piao's 'Long Live the Victory of People's War!' (September 1965)

"Lin  Piao's famous programmatic document,  'Long live  the Victory of People's War!', was published".
(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 226).

"The countryside alone can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory.  . . .   Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of establishing revolutionary base areas in the rural districts and encircling the cities from the countryside  is attracting more and more attention among the people in these regions (Asia, Africa and Latin America -- Ed.)".
(Lin Piao:  'Long live the Victory of People's War!';  Peking;  1965;  p. 48).

The Central Work Conference (September/October 1965)

"A veiled political attack on Mao's 1959 dismissal of Peng Teh-huai."
(Hong Y.  Lee:  'The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study'; Berkeley (USA); 1978; p. 11).

"The Group of Five in charge of revolutionising literature and art".
(Hong Y. Lee: ibid.; p. 11).

"a very stormy meeting".
(Jean Esmein: op. cit.; p. 56).

"regarding the criticism of Wu Han".
('Circular  of  the CC of the CPC' (May 1966),  'CCP Documents of  the Great  Proletarian Cultural Revolution:  1966-1967' (hereafter listed  as 'CCP Documents (1968)'; Hong Kong; 1968; p. 20).

"Mao was in a minority".
(Shamsul Alam: op. cit.; p. 15).

"Mao withdrew to Shanghai".
(Jean Esmein: op. cit.; p. 56).

"In  September and October 1965,  the central committee surrendered to
revisionism, and I thought that I could not put my ideas into practice in
Peking".
(Mao Tse-tung:  'Statement of January 1967',  in: 'Keesing's Contemporary
Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,985).

"Therefore left the capital,  where the Party  machine  was controlled by his opponents, and settled in Shanghai".
('Keesing's Contemorary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,985).

"In singling out Wu Han, Mao was actually focussing his fire against Peng Chen and the Peking Party apparatus,  for Wu Han was one of Peng's proteges".
(Stanley Karnow:  'Mao and China: From Revolution to Revolution'; London;
1973; p. 159).

  Yao Wen-Yuan's Critique (November 1965)

"Had to go to Shanghai to find his man who might expose the socalled bourgeois outlook in culture and ideology. It was Yao Wen-yuan who drafted the critique of 'Hai Jui' and Wu Han".
(Alam Shamsul: op. cit.; p. 8).

".  .  commissioned  by Mao,  was turned down by  every  official publication in Peking."
(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann: op. cit.; p. 225).

Yao's critique was, in fact:

"The first bullet of the Cultural Revolution".
(Alam Shamsul: op. cit.;p. 8).

  The 'February Thesis' (February 1966)

"The appraisal of historical figures,  and the viewpoint and method of historical research".
('Outline Report concerning the Current Academic Discussion of the  Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution' (February 1966),  in:  'CCP Documents (1968)'; op. cit.; p. 7).

"the report discarded any connection between the play of Wu Han and Peng Teh-huai's dismissal".
(Shamsun Alam: op. cit.; p. 9).

"As regards people like Wu Han, who treats history with the bourgeois world outlook and committed political mistakes, the discussion in the press should not be confined to political questions, but should go fully into the various academic and theoretical questions involved".. ('Outline Report concerning the Current Academic Discussion of the Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution' (February 1966),  in:  'CCP Documents (1968)': op. cit.; p. 10).

"The policy of 'opening wide' propounded by Comrade Mao Tse-tung . . calls for a full expression of all kinds of opinion  (including anti-Marxist things)".
('Outline Report concerning the Current Academic Discussion of the Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution' (February 1966),  in:  'CCP Documents (1968)'; ibid.; p. 9).

The CC Circular (May 1966)

"An outline report by Peng Chen alone",
 ('Circular  of  CC of CPC' (May 1966),  in:  'CCP  Documents  (1968)':
ibid.; p. 21).

"Violates the basic Marxist thesis that all class struggles are political struggles".
('Circular of CC of CPC' (May 1966),  in:  'CCP Documents (1968)'; ibid.;
p. 22).

"The  Central Committee has decided to revoke the 'Outline  Report  on the  Current  Academic Discussion made by the Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution . . ., to dissolve  the 'Group of Five in charge of the Cultural Revolution' and its offices."
('Circular of CC of CPC' (May 1966), in: 'CCP Documents (1968); ibid.; p. 20).

"While feigning compliance,  .  .  .  actually opposes  and stubbornly  resists  the  great cultural  revolution  initiated  and  led personally by Comrade Mao Tse-tung,  as well as the instruction regarding the  criticism of Wu Han which he gave .  .  .  in September and  October 1965.  .
It obscures the sharp class struggle that is taking place on the cultural and ideological front."
('Circular of CC of CPC' (May 1966),  in:  CCP Documents (1968);  of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: 1966-1967'; ibid.; p. 20).

"To set up a new Cultural Revolution Group directly under the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau".
('Circular of CC of CPC' (May 1966),  in:  'CCP Documents (1968)'; ibid.; p. 20).

 The new 'Cultural Revolution Group' was known as the:

"'Cultural Revolution Small Group'''.
(Hong Y. Lee: op. cit.; p. 16).

"under the leadership of Chiang Ching, who took control of the Party propaganda machine".
(Hong Y. Lee: ibid.; p. 16).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES -- 8
CHANG Chun-chiao, revisionist journalist and politician (1917-90);
Director,  East  China Branch,  New China News Agency  (1950);  managing director,  'Liberation  Army Daily' (1954);  Deputy  President,  Shanghai Branch,  All-China Journalists'  Association  (1955);  member,  Shanghai Municipal  Committee,  CPC (1958);  secretary,  Shanghai Municipality CPC (1958-71);    director,   propaganda   department,   Shanghai   Municipal Committee,  CPC (1963);  secretary, East China Bureau, CC, CPC (1966-67); 1st  Secretary and Director,  Shanghai Municipal People's Commune (1967); deputy  head,   Cultural  Revolution  Small  Group,  CC,  CPC  (1967-69); director,  Shanghai Garrison,  PLA (1967-76);  member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1969-76);  member,  Standing Committee,  Politburo,  CC,  CPC (1971-76); director,  General Political Department (1975-76);  Deputy Premier (197576); dismissed from all posts and arrested (1976); tried and found guilty of   counter-revolutionary  crimes  and  sentenced  to  death  (1980-81); sentence commuted to life imprisonment (1983); died in prison (1990).

KANG Sheng,  Chinese revisionist politician (1903-75);  member, Politburo, CC,
CPC (1934-56,  1966-75);  secretary,  CC, CPC (1937-56, 1962-67); member,
Central  People's Government Council (1949-54);  1st Secretary,  Shantung
Province CPC (1949-55);  Governor,  Shantung Province (1949-55);  member,
East China Military and Administrative Council  (1950-62);  member,  East
China  Administrative  Committee  (1952-55);  political  commissar,  PLA,
Shantung Military District (1953);  adviser, Cultural Revolutionary Small
Group,  CC, CPC (1967-69); member, Standing Committee, Politburo, CC, CPC
(1969-75); Deputy Chairman, CC, CPC (1973-75); expelled posthumously from
CPC (1980).

LEI Feng, Chinese revisionist soldier (1940-62); held up as paragon of virtues by Chinese revisionists; killed in accident (1962).

LO Jui-ching, Chinese revisionist military officer (1906-  );  member, Supreme People's  Procuratorate  (1949-54);   member,   Goverment  Administrative Council)  (1949-54);  Minister of Public Security  (1949-59);   Director, Public Security Bureau,  Peking (1949);  Commander,  PLA Public  Security Forces (1950-59);  political commissar, Public Security Forces (1953-59); member, National Defence Council (1954-65); Chief of General Staff (195965); Deputy Premier (1959-66); Deputy Minister of National Defence (1959-
66);   secretary-general,  Military  Affairs  Committee,  CPC  (1961-65); general (1955);  secretary,  CC, CPC (1962-66); Deputy Chairman, National Defence Council (1965-66).

LUO Ruiching = Pinyin form of LO Jui-ching.

WANG Hongwen = Pinyin form of WANG Hung-wen.

WANG  Hung-wen,  Chinese revisionist politician  (1935-92);  member,  Shanghai Municipal  Revolutionary  Committee  (1967);  Deputy  Chairman,  Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary  Committee (1967-73); secretary, Shanghai Municipality,  CPC  (1971-72);  member,  Politburo,  CC,  CPC  (1973-76); member,   Standing  Committee,   Politburo,  CC,  CPC  (1973-76);  Deputy Chairman, CC, CPC (1973-76); expelled from CPC and arrested (1976); tried and sentenced for counter-revolutionary crimes (1980-81);  died in prison (1992).

WU Han,  Chinese revisionist historian,  journalist and politician (1909-   ); Dean, College  of Arts, and head,  Department  of  History,  Tsinghua University (1949-50); member, Standing Committee, University Administration Committee, Tsinghua  University (1949-52); member,
Standing Committee,  All-China Federation of Democratic Youth  (1949-66);
Deputy Mayor, Peking (1949-66); Deputy Chairman, University Administrative Centre,  Tsinghua University (1951-52);  member, editorial board,  'New Observer' (1959-66);  President, Peking TV University (196466).

YANG  Cheng-wu,   Chinese  revisionist military  officer  (1914-  );   deputy commander,  Peking-Tientsin Garrison,  PLA (1950);  member,  North China Administrative Council (1951-54);  deputy commander, North China Military Region  (1952-54);   member,   North China  Defence  Council  (1954-68); commander,   Peking-Tientsin Garrison,  PLA  (1954-56);  colonel-general (1955);  commander, Air Defence Command, PLA (1956-58); commander, Peking Military Region (1957-59);  Deputy Chief of Staff,  PLA (1959-66); Acting Chief of Staff, PLA (1966-68); deputy head, PLA Cultural Revolution Group (1967-68);  deputy  chairman,  Military Commission,  CC,  CPC  (1967-68); removed from all posts,  tried and sentenced to imprisonment for counterrevolutionary crimes (1968); rehabilitated by revisionists (1974).

YANG Chengwu = Pinyin form of YANG Cheng-wu.

YAO Wen-yuan, revisionist journalist  and  politician  (1931-  );  member, Cultural  Revolution Small Group (1966-69);  member,  Shanghai  Municipal Revolutionary Committee (1967-69); deputy chairman, Municipal Revolutionary  Committee,  Shanghai (1967-76);  chief  editor,  'People's Daily' (1967);  member,  Politburo, CC, CPC (1969-76); dismissed from all posts and arrested (1976);  tried,  found guilty of counter-revolutionary crimes and sentenced to imprisonment; released from prison (1996).

YAO Wenyuan = Pinyin form of YAO Wen-yuan.

ZHANG Chunqiao = Pinyin form of CHANG Chun-chiao.


---


CHAPTER FIFTEEN : THE 'CULTURAL REVOLUTION'
(April 1966 - April 1969)

INTRODUCTION

TO DESTROY THE POLITICAL POWER OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE,  HEADED BY LIU SHAO-CHI,

FIRSTLY, THE YOUTH;  WHEN THAT FAILED,
SECONDLY, THE WORKERS; AND WHEN THAT IN TURN FAILED,
THIRDLY, THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY.

The Initiation of the 'Cultural Revolution' (April 1966)

"Called  for a fierce and protracted struggle to  wipe  out 'bourgeois  ideology'  in  the  academic,  educational  and journalistic fields, in art, literature and all other fields of culture".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,577).

"There  exists in our literary and art circles  an  anti-Party,  antisocialist black line running counter to Mao Tse-tung's thinking.   .
We must .  .  .  take an active part in the great socialist revolution on the cultural front, thorougly eradicate this black line.  . We must not mind being blamed for 'brandishing the stick"'.
('Hold  High  the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thinking:  Actively participate  in the Great Socialist  Cultural  Revolution',  in:  'Peking Review', Volume 9, No. 18 (29 April 1966); p. 6, 9).

"'Liberation Army Daily' published a violent attack . . . on three  journals published by the Peking Party -- the 'Peking Daily'.  the 'Peking Evening News' and the fortnightly 'Front Line
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,577).

". . instruments for opposing the Party and socialism".
  (Yao Wen-yuan:  'On Three-Family Village' (May  1966),  in:  'Peking Review', Volume 9. No. 22 (27 May 1966); p. 5).

"Peking University . . is a key point of the 'Three-Family Village' sinister  gang,  a stubborn bastion used by them to oppose the Party and socialism.
The  people of the whole country will rise up, oppose and knock down all those who oppose Chairman Mao.   .  .  .  The whole nation will smash their sinister gang, sinister organisation and sinister discipline  to pieces."
('Hail  the Big Character Poster at Peking University' (June  1966),  in:
'Peking Review', Volume 9, No. 37 (9 September 1966); p. 21, 22).

"That the Central Committee of the CPC had decided to reorganise the Peking Party Committee."
('Keesing' s Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,577).

"The Party Committee of Peking University".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,577).

The announcement was:

"Immediately followed by demonstrations outside the Peking Party headquarters and at the university which continued for several days. Thousands of people marched through the streets carrying portraits of Mao Tse-tung, beating drums and cymbals, exploding fire-crackers and acclaiming the purge as a victory for Chairman Mao's thought."
(Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,578).

  The 'Red Guards' (May 1966 - January 1967)

"Was led by the students".
 (David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): 'People's China: Social  Experimentation,  Politics,  Entry  onto the World  Scene: 1966 through 1972'; New York; 1974; op. cit.; p. 230).

"The  PLA and People's Militia trained groups of teenagers in  schools and universities to form Red Guard units which were designed .  .  .   to promote the teachings of the Chairman".
(Clare Hollingworth: op. cit.; p. 136).

  "The Red Guards are the shock force of the great proletarian  cultural revolution
('In  Praise of the Red Guards' (September 1966),  in:  'Peking  Review Volume 9, No. 39 (23 September 1966); p. 15).

 "The Red Guards say, and say it well:
'Chairman Mao is our  red commander and we are the young, red soldiers of Chairnan Mao .   .''
They carry with them copies of 'Quotations from Chairman Mao"'.
('In  Praise of the Red Guards' (September 1966),  in:  'Peking  Review
Volume 9, No. 39 (23 September 1966); p. 15).

"The attitude towards Mao Tse-tung's Thought,  whether to accept it or reject it, to support it or oppose it, to love it warmly or be hostile to it, this is the touchstone to test and the  watershed between true revolution and sham revolution, between revolution  and  counterrevolution."
('Mao Tse-tung's Thought  is the Telescope and Microscope of our Revolutionary Cause' (June 1966),  in:  'Peking Review', Volume 9, No. 24 (10 June 1966); p. 7).

"Universities and schools were closed indefinitely to enable them (the students - Ed.) to participate in the Cultural Revolution".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,986).

"Great prominence was given in the Chinese Press .  . . to a report  that  Mr.  Mao  had swum nine miles in the Yangtze  River  in  65 minutes,  apparently  in  order  to dispel rumours that he  was  in  poor health".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,579).

"Signified his approval of the movement by donning the  red armband which they wore."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,986).

"eight such giant rallies of a million or more Red Guards were held in the great Tien An Men Square in Peking".
(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.;p. 268).

"that the entire printing industry would be mobilised to print 35 million copies of the 'Selected Works' of Mao Tse-tung by the end of 1967".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,579).

In December 1966:

"Peng Chen was dragged from his bed and arrested by Red Guards and was displayed before a rally of 100,000 Red Guards in a Peking stadium."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p  21,987).

"Lo Jui-ching" .
 ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,987).

"Opposing the thorough establishment by our army of the absolute
authority of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung".
(Yang Cheng-wu: 'Thoroughly establish the Absolute Authority of the Great
Supreme  Commander  Chairman Mao and of  his  Great  Thought'  (November
1967), in: 'Peking Review', Volume 19. No. 46 (10 November 1967); p. 19).

"Lu Ting-yi"
 ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,987).

". . head of the propaganda department and Minister of Culture"'.
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,578).

". . removed from both posts."
 ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 15; p. 21,578).

  The 11th Plenum of the 8th CC (August 1966)

". . guarded by the troops of Lin Piao",
(Alam Shamsul: op. cit.; p. 17).

"Mao resorted to the extraordinary measures of packing  the galleries with .  .  .  youthful supporters and convoking only about half the total CC membership".
(Lowell Dittmer:  'Liu Shao-chi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution:  The Politics of Mass Criticism'; Berkeley (USA); 1974; p. 95).

" . . presided over by Comrade Mao Tse-tung",
 ('Communique  of 11th Plenum of CC of CPC'  (August  1966),  in:  'CCP
Documents': op. cit.; p. 62). p. 1).

"Were confronted with a big-character poster written by Mao himself",
(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.):  op. cit.; p. 267-
68).

"Bombard the Headquarters!"
(Mao Tse-tung:  Big-Character Poster (August 1966),  in: David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): ibid.; p. 268).

"Was immediately understood by all the delegates as an attack on  Liu  Shao-chi,  Teng Hsiao-ping,  and other prominent leaders of  the powerful Party apparatus."
(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 268).

"Demoted Liu Shao-chi . . . and elevated Lin Piao, the Minister of  Defence, to the post of Deputy Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party.  Lin was officially proclaimed as 'Chairman Mao's closest comrade-in-arms and successor'."
(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 268).

"That the series of directives by Comrade Mao Tse-tung concerning the great proletarian cultural revolution are the guide to action in the present cultural revolution of our country ('Communique  of  11th Plenum of CC of  CPC'  (August  1966),  in:  'CCP
Documents': op. cit.; p. 65).

"Our objective is to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road".
('Decision of the CC of the CPC concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' (August 1966), in: 1CCP Documentst: op. cit.; p. 42).

"Trust the masses,  rely on them,  and respect their initiative.  Cast out fear. Don't be afraid of disorder".
(tDecision of the CC of the CPC concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' CPC' (August 1966), in: 'CCP Documents': op. cit.; p. 45).

"That the intensive study of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's works by the whole Party and the whole nation is an important event of historic significance. Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our era. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has . . . developed  Marxism-Leninism with genius .  .  .  and has raised Marxism-Leninism to a new stage. Mao Tse-tung's thought is Marxism-Leninism of the era in which imperialism is heading for total  collapse and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory. It is the guiding principle for all the work of our Party and country".               
('Communique of 11th Plenum of 8th CC of CPC ,  in:  'CCP Documents : op. cit.; p. 69).

  The 'Revolutionary Rebels' (November-December 1966)

"Organised a large number of work teams -- perhaps four hundred teams  with more than ten thousand members in all -- and dispatched  them to universities and high schools and to bureaucratic agencies  .  .  . to re-establish Party leadership over the student movement .  .
 The  work  teams were able to restore a modicum of normality  to  many universities"
(Harry Harding (1991): op. cit.; p. 136).

"In the long run,  the student movement became  unmanageable because of factional quarrels".
(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 229).

"Able to repulse the first attack by Red Guards in August and September (1966 - Ed.) by mobilising workers . . . in their defence".
(Philip Bridgham:  'Maoist Cultural Revolution in 1967', (hereafter listed as 'Philip  Bridgham (1971)'); in: Richard Baum  (Ed.):  'China  in Ferment: Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution'; Englewood Cliffs (USA); 1971; p. 122).

"That free transport, food and accommodation would no longer be provided for Red Guards coming to Peking".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,986).

"that Red Guards from the provinces must leave the city within three  days".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 22,986).

"The  campaign began .  .  .  with the formation of new 'revolutionary rebel' organisations in industrial and mining establishments."
(Philip Bridgham (1971): op. cit.; p. 122).

". . consisting of adult workers, replaced the Red Guards from this time on as the main agents of the Cultural Revolution."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives?, Volume 15; p. 21,988).

"The Revolutionary Rebels . . . did not form a single movement organised  on  a  national  scale.   .     .  Scores  of  militant Maoist organisations  bearing  a wide variety of names sprang up throughout  the country,  often operating independently and even in rivalry. In Shanghai, for  example,  there were at least 31 Revolutionary Rebel and  Red  Guard organisations.   .  .  .  In  many cities and provinces the Revolutionary Rebels were opposed by equally militant anti-Maoist organisations."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,988-89).

"Armed  organisations  were  formed  to  resist  them  (the 'Revolutionary Rebels' - Ed.)".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,985).

"higher wages, lower working hours, better housing, improved medical care and other benefits."
(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.;p. 265).

"Widespread strikes in support of demands for wage increases began in Shanghai at the end of December  (1966  -- Ed.).   .  .  .  The  port was brought to a standstill".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,989).

"Revolutionaries', fearful  of  being  branded  as  'revisionist  counterpromised to satisfy every demand".
(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 265).

"They  were then told that they had  been  hoodwinked  into following the 'evil road of economism"'.
(Philip Bridgham (1971): op. cit.; p. 123).

"Raged even more fiercely through December (1966 - Ed.)".
(Joan Robinson: op. cit.; p. 57).

The 'Revolutionary Committees' (January 1967 - September 1968)

". . remained neutral in the struggle".
  ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,989).

"Anarchy".
 (Philip Bridgham (1971): op. cit.; p. 125).

". . only one institution had the capacity to fill the power vacuum the Army".
(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 275).

"to involving the Army in the Cultural Revolution .  . . was apparently led by officers like Marshal HO Lung*".
(Stanley Karnow: ibid.; p. 279).

"Before a kangaroo court and  . . he disappeared from public view".
(Stanley Karnow: ibid.; 282).

"In  the light of the general stalemate that had occurred throughout the fall, and the collapse of authority that had begun to appear around the turn of the year."
(Harry Harding: 'The Chinese State in Crisis' (hereafter listed as 'Harry Harding (1991)',  in: Roderick MacFarlane & John K. Fairbank (Eds.): 'The Cambridge History of China1  Volume 15:  The People's Republic,  Part  2:  'Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution;  1966-1992';  Cambridge; 1991; op. cit.; p. 161).

"All  past  directives concerning the army's  non-involvement  in  the great cultural revolution . . . are null and void. Active  support must be rendered to the broad masses of  revolutionary Leftists in their struggle to seize power.  .
Counter-revolutionaries  and  counter-revolutionary organisations who oppose   the  proletarian  revolutionary  Leftists  must  be   resolutely suppressed".
('Decision   .  .  .  concerning the Resolute Support of the PLA for  the Revolutionary Masses of the Left' (January 1967), in 'CCP Documents': op. cit.; p. 196).

"That the former provincial and municipal administrations must be replaced by Revolutionary Committees,  based on a 'triple alliance' of Revolutionary Rebels, Army representatives."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,992).

"Old Party cadres who had passed the test of  the  Cultural Revolution".
(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 354).

"Were set up between November 1967 and May 1968 in 16 provinces
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 22,945).

"Revolutionary Committees were established .  .  . in the five remaining provinces"
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 22,945).

"The  triple alliance policy in practice gave the Army control of  the 'revolutionary committees"'.
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 21,993).

"playing only a subsidiary role".
  ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 22,945).

"the chairman of the committee was the local political commissar or military commander".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 22,949).

"The public sale of Red Guard literature was forbidden . . . on the ground that certain of them fomented 'sectarianism'".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 22,949).

"The last campaign of the historic Peking Red Guards. Massive worker and army teams were sent in to direct and lead the  universities. The mass movement was over."
(David Milton, Nancy Milton & Franz Schurmann (Eds.): op. cit.; p. 354).

 "repudiated the Red Guards".
  (Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 441).

"all schools and universities . . . should reopen immediately".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 16; p. 22,949).

During this time, the Communist Party had "disintegrated":

"Except in the Army, (the CPC-Editor) had virtually disintegrated during the Cultural Revolution". ('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 24,698).

"Reorganisation of the Communist Party . . began in September 1968, local branches being established first."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 24,698).

". . pattern of military predominance was dutifully applied to the Party Committees germinating in the provinces."
(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 462).

"At the provincial level, . . . Party authority gradually slipped into the hands of the local PLA leaders".
(Liao Kuang-sheng: 'Factional Politics after the Cultural Revolution: The Gang of Four and "Old Revolutionaries"' (hereafter listed as 'Liao Kuangsheng (1977)'),  in:  Steve S.K.Chin (Ed.):  'The Gang of Four: First Essays after the Fall'; Hong Kong; 1977; p. 124).

"The Red Guards ended up with derisory treatment."
(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 458).

"The post of First Party Secretary was assumed by the Chairman of the provincial Revolutionary Committee, who in most cases was an army officer or political commissar,  whilst the majority of the assistant secretaries were also officers or political commissars".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 24,698).

"were finally established in late August 1971".
(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 463).

 The  12th Plenum of the 8th CC of the CPC was held in October 1968.  Like the 11th Plenum in August 1966, it:

"Was a rump session.  . . . Only 54 full members of the Central Committee attended  the  meeting,  representing  a bare quorum of the surviving members of the body. Furthermore, like its predecessor the 12th Plenum was packed with people who were not Central   Committee members.   .   .  The  extra participants were members of the Cultural Revolution  Group, representatives of the provincial revolutionary committees, and 'principal responsible comrades of the Chinese People's Liberation Army"'.
(Harry Harding (1991): op. cit.; p. 193-94).

"announced that Liu Shao-chi was being dismissed from all his government  and Party positions,  and was being expelled from  the  Party 'once and for all'".
(Harry Harding (1991): ibid.; p. 194).

"'renegade, traitor and scab hiding in the Party', as 'a lackey of imperialism and modern revisionism, and Kuomintang reactionaries."
('Resolution  of 12th Plenum of 8th CC,  CPC' (October 1968),  in:  Harry Harding (1991): ibid.; p. 194-95).

"The Cultural Revolution Group's proposal that Teng Hsiao-ping . . . be expelled from the Party altogether, along with Liu Shaochi, was rejected".
(Harry Harding (1991): ibid.; p. 195).

The 9th National Congress of the CPC was held in April 1969:

"The first such conference to be held in more than a decade".
(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.;p. 454).

"held in conditions of strict secrecy, no journalists or foreign observers being admitted".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 17; p. 23,377).

"No foreign parties were invited to send delegations."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 17; p. 23,379).

" appointed by the central authorities after 'negotiation' with the provinces."
(Harry Harding (1991): op. cit.; p. 193).

". . great victory",
Lin Piao: Report on the Cultural Revolution, 9th National Congress CPC (April 1969), in: Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 405).

"We cannot speak of final victory."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 17; p. 23,377).

"Emerged as the single most powerful institution in China at the 9th Congress."
(Frederick C. Teiwes & Warren Sun:  op. cit.; p. 127).

"The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought as the theoretical basis guiding its thinking. Mao Tse-tung's thought is Marxism-Leninism of the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and Socialism is advancing to  world-wide victory".
('Constitution of CPC adopted at 9th National Congress' (April 1969), in:  'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 17; p. 23,378).

"Comrade Lin Piao is Comrade Mao Tse-tung's close comrade-inarms and successor." ('Constitution of CPC adopted at 9th National Congress' (April 1969), in: 'Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 17; p. 23,378).

"Only  54  out of the 167 members of the  previous  Central Committee were re-elected". (Harry Harding (1991): op. cit.; p. 197).

"Was overwhelmingly weighted in favour of Army officers and Party cadres who had survived the Cultural Revolution."
(Stanley Karnow: op. cit.; p. 458).

while new members of the Politburo:

"Included YEH Chun* (Lin Piao's wife -- Ed.), Chiang Ching, Chu Teh, Chiang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-Yuan".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 17; p. 23,378).

WITH  THE 9th CONGRESS OF THE CPC IN APRIL 1969,  THE "GREAT  PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION" EFFECTIVELY -- ALTHOUGH NOT OFFICIALLY -- CAME TO AN END.

 The 'Cultural Revolution':

"Whilst virtually destroying the Communist Party organisation, greatly strengthened the political role of the Army, which largely controlled  the provincial Revolutionary Committees and many Ministries and economic enterprises."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,437).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES --9

HE Long  = Pinyin form of HO Lung.

HO  Lung,  Chinese  revisionist military officer  (1896-  );  member,  Central
 People's Government Council (1949-54);  commander, South-Western Military
 Region (1950-54);  secretary,  South-Western Bureau,  CC,  CPC (1952-54);
 secretary,  CPC,  South-western Military Region (1953);  Deputy Chairman,
 South-Western Administrative Council (1953-56); Deputy Chairman, People's
 Revolutionary Military Council (1954);  Deputy Chairman, National Defence
 Council  (1954-67);  Deputy Premier (1954-67);  marshal  (1955);  member,
 Politburo,  CC,  CPC (1956-66); Deputy Chairman, Military Commission, CC,
 CPC (1961-67).

YE Qun = Pinyin form of YEH Chun.

YEH Chun, Chinese revisionist journalist and politician, wife of Lin Piao (? 1971);  member,  PLA Cultural Revolution Group (1967); member, Politburo, CC, CPC (1969-71); killed in air crash fleeing to Soviet Union (1971).

CHAPTER SIXTEEN : THE 'LIN PIAO AFFAIR';
(September 1971 - August 1973)

Introduction

 As we have seen, the 'Cultural Revolution' was basically a struggle for power between the political representatives of the  comprador bourgeoisie and those of the national bourgeoisie of China.

 But as the Cultural Revolution drew to a close,
A LATENT CONFLICT  OF INTEREST  WAS  BECOMING MANIFEST WITHIN THE CHINESE COMPRADOR  BOURGEOISIE  --
BETWEEN  THAT  SECTION  LINKED TO UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM AND  THAT  SECTION LINKED TO SOVIET IMPERIALISM.

This  contradiction was reflected in:
CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN THE  COMMUNIST PARTY  OF CHINA BETWEEN THE GROUPING REPRESENTING THE POLITICAL  INTERESTS  OF
THE PRO-US COMPRADORS,  HEADED BY MAO TSE-TUNG,
AND THE GROUPING REPRESENTING THE POLITICAL INTERESTS OF THE PRO-SOVIET COMPRADORS, HEADED BY LIN PIAO.

 According to the biographer of Mao's wife, Chiang Ching,

"Even before the lines of Cultural Revolution began to be drawn in 1965, the Chairman was a foe of Lin Piao.  Contradictions between them were already evident".
(Roxane Witke: op. cit.; p. 311).

"During the Cultural Revolution, the 'Lin Piao clique' . commissioned  two groups of people to search for materials that could  be used against her (in the power struggle)".
(Roxane Witke: ibid.; p. 59).

"During the Cultural Revolution, the power of the Army grew to unprecedented proportions as the PLA was called on  . . . to intervene to impose military control.   .  .  .  Later, in the  reorganised Party committees, the military continued to play the dominant organisational role".
(Kau Ying-mao & Pierre M.  Perrolle: 'The Politics of Lin Piao's Abortive Military Coup',  in:  'Asian Survey',  Volume 14,  No.  6 (June 1974); p. 560).

The contradiction between the two comprador bourgeois groupings within the Party showed itself particularly in:

"Disagreements  inside  the Party leadership  over  foreign policy".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,437).

"A massive programme for the mechanisation of agriculture",
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,437).

"By reducing expenditure on the armed forces".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,437).

"A detente with the United States".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,437).

"opposed the policy of detente with the United States."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,437).

"The revival of the provincial Party committees",
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,437).

"Opposed by Marshal Lin and a section of the Army leadership".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,437).

". . threatened the Army's political ascendancy."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,437).

".  .  broke ranks with the leadership on a number of domestic and foreign issues, including  the decision to seek a normalisation of relations with the United States."
('New York Times', 28 July 1972; p. 2),

"Another policy opposed by Mr. Lin was the move to rebuild the Communist Party  apparatus, which  had been shattered by the Cultural Revolution".
('New York Times', 28 July 1972; p. 2).

"A certain ambiguity became apparent .  .  .  in the Chinese attitude towards the United States. While violent opposition to American intervention in Asia continued to be voiced,  Edgar SNOW* and several other Western  mediators were sounding out Washington's  readiness to establish a dialogue".
(Jaap van Ginneken: op. cit.; p. 244).

".  . was supported by Chou En-lai, though Lin Piao remained opposed to it."
(Jaap van Ginneken: ibid.; p. 244).

"The more radical faction in China, led by Lin Piao, vigorously opposed the prospect of detente".
(Michael Schaller:  'The United States and China in the Twentieth Century'; Oxford; 1990; p. 185).

"'ultra-leftism'".
(Dennis Woodward:  'Political Power and Gun Barrels: The Role of the PLA', in: Bill Brugger (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 88).

At the 2nd Plenum of the 9th Central Committee, held at Lushan in August/September 970,  the  struggle between the two main current groupings within the Party  -- between that representing the interests of the pro-American compradors and that representing the interests of the pro-Soviet compradors -- emerged into the open.

The Plenum:

 ". . was a particularly lengthy one".
(Jaap van Ginneken: op. cit.; p. 206).

"Were reported to have been responsible for having the original agenda  of the session amended in such a way that Chen Po-ta could  place the question of the Presidency on the new agenda".
(Jaap van Ginneken: ibid.; p. 217).

"Remained vacant . .  since Liu Shao-chi was removed from it during the Cultural Revolution."
(Dennis Woodward: op. cit.; p. 80).

"A movement developed .  .  .   to solve the problem of  the Presidency immediately,  by pressing Mao to accept.   .  .  .  Chen Po-ta delivered a seemingly unprepared speech on the subject of the Presidency. . . . He then proposed spontaneously to nominate Mao as President".
(Jaap van Ginneken: op. cit.; p. 215).

"The 'surprise attack' contained in speeches by Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta and other top military leaders was directed at those (Chou En-lai  in particular) who, in drawing up the new State Constitution, had deleted the  post of Chairman and a provision extolling the 'genius' of Mao Tse-tung".
(Philip Bridgham:  'The Fall of Lin Piao' (hereafter listed as 'Philip Bridgham (1973)'),  in:  'China Quarterly', No. 55 (July/September 1973); p. 434-35).

"Backfired when Mao rejected both the proposal for a State Chairman . . . and the view of 'genius' which Lin and Chen had propounded in their speeches".
(Philip Bridgham (1973): ibid.; p. 435).

"I  don't  want  to  be state chairman.  I have said this six times already".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks with Responsible Comrades at  Various  Places during his Provincial Tour' (August/September  1971), in: Stuart Schram (Ed.) (1975):  op. cit.; p. 294-95).

"Lin, through his supporters, attempted to reappoint Mao to the position of Chairman (President -- Ed.) of the People's Republic.   . Lin 's supporters, led by Chen Po-ta,  knowing that Mao would decline the position, hoped that by this tactic, Lin would be appointed  to  the revived post".
(Dennis Woodward: op. cit.; p. 80).

"Would also have become Party Chairman in the event of Mao's death, while still remaining commander-in-chief of the army."
(Jaap van Ginneken: op. cit.: p. 215-16).

"At the 1970 Lushan Conference they made a surprise attack and carried out underground activity.   . . . They caused trouble . . . for . . . two days and a half.  .  . .  This kind of behaviour shows that they had some aim in mind.  . .  Their  programme was to appoint a  state  chairman, and to extol 'genius'. . . A certain person was anxious to become state chairman, to split the Party and to seize power.   .  .  . I am no genius.  . . . I wrote 'Some Opinions' which specially criticises the genius theory.   .  We should not appoint a state chairman.    . . . Chen Po-ta . . . gave the appearance of meaning to establish my prestige.  But when you get to the bottom of it, he really meant himself".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks with Responsible Comrades at  Various  Places during his Provincial Tour' (August/September  1971), in: Stuart Schram (Ed.) (1975): Op. cit.; p. 292, 293, 294-95).

"Lin Piao .  .  . went further to start a .   . coup d'etat, which was aborted, at the 2nd.  Plenary Session of the 9th Central Committee in August 1970".
(Chou  En-lai:  'Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC' (August 1973),  in:  'The 10th National Congress of the CPC (Documents)'; Peking; 1973; p. 5-6).

"Chen  Po-ta had to face a full-scale attack.   His whole political career was closely examined,  bringing reproaches of ultra-Left deviationism.   . . . He was finally deposed . . . from his position as a member of the Standing Committee and,  obviously,   from the position  of propaganda chief".
(Jaap van Ginneken: op. cit.; p. 216).

"who resisted Chen's dismissal longest".
(Jaap van Ginneken: ibid.; p. 217).

With  the conclusion of the 2nd Plenum,  the pro-US comprador grouping of the Party:

"Was determined to undermine Lin' s power base so as to stall off an attempt to seize power".
(Wu Tien-wei:  'Lin Piao and the Gang of Four:  Contra-Confucianism in Historical and Intellectual Perspective'; Carbondale (USA); 1983; p. 17).

"was taken into custody in September 1970".
(Wu Tien-wei: ibid.; p. 17).

". a campaign to criticise Chen Po-ta and to oppose 'idealism and metaphysics' followed immediately after the end of the plenum."
(Dennis Woodward: op. cit.; p. 80).

"Mao was compelled .  .  .  to resort to indirect tactics to undermine Lin's base of power in the Army".
(Philip Bridgham (1973): op. cit.; p. 435).

"We have shielded Vice-Chairman Lin and have not drawn conclusions concerning an individual.   . . . We still want to protect Lin. No matter who it is who has made mistakes, it is not a good thing to forget unity".
(Mao Tse-tung: 'Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks with Responsible Comrades at  Various  Places during his Provincial Tour' (August/September  1972), in: Stuart Schram (Ed.) (1975): p. 294).

"In the months following the plenum moves were taken  to undermine Lin Piao's  base  of  support as a prelude to his eventual demotion or dismissal.  These moves .  .  .  embraced the launching of a campaign to criticise Chen Po-ta and to oppose arrogance and conceit within the PLA.. . . In January 1971, the Peking Military Region was thoroughly reorganised". (Dennis Woodward: op. cit.; p. 80).

"Lin's closest supporters . . . who had championed his cause at the 2nd Plenum, were criticised".
(Dennis Woodward: op. cit.; p. 80).

Following  their setback at the 2nd Plenum in August/September  1970,  in March 1971, according to Chou En-lai's report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC in August 1973,  Lin Piao -- together with his wife Yeh Chun and his son Lin Ki-kuo, who was Deputy Director of Operations of the Air Force:

"drew up the plan for an armed .  .  .  coup d'etat entitled 'Outline of Project 571"'.
(Chou  En-lai:  'Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC' (August 1973), in: 'The 10th National Congress of the CPC (Documents)'; op. cit.; p. 6).

"Envisaged a military coup based on Air Force and Army support; Soviet pressure on the frontier;  the arrest of Chairman Mao;   . . . and the murder of the conspirators' other opponents in the Party leadership".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,635).

"That Marshal Lin had offered to cede large areas of Chinese territory to the Soviet Union in return for its support".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,635).

"that Mr. Lin had plotted to assassinate him as part of  a conspiracy aimed at replacing the civilian leadership of China with a military dictatorship".
(Mao Tse-tung:  Statement of July 1972,  in:   'New York Times',  28 July 1972; p. 1)

"Lin had arranged to blow up the train somewhere north of Nanking".
(Wilfred Burchett: 'Lin Piao's Plot: The Full Story', in: 'Far Eastern Economic Review', Volume 81, No. 33 (20 August 1973); p. 23).

However, Lin Tou-tou:

"Daughter of Lin Piao,  .  . . reported the situation to the premier  (Chou  En-lai -- Ed.) in time, which led to the foiling of her father's monstrous conspiracy".
('Top Secret Communique of CC of CPC concerning Lin Piao's 1'September 12" Anti-Party Incident' (September 1971),  in: Michael Y. M. Kau (Ed.): 'The Lin Piao Affair:  Power Politics and Military Coup';  White Plains (USA); 1975; p. 70).

"All internal air flights were halted, . . . and   . . the Air Force remained almost completely grounded for some time".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,438),

"The preparations for the annual mass procession .  . . on 1 October were cancelled".
(Jaap van Ginneken: ibid.; p. 20).

"During the following months . . . the number of arrests began to run into hundreds".
(Jaap van Ginneken: op. cit.; p. 283).

"During the night of Sept. 13 a jet aircraft belonging to the Chinese People's Republic  violated the air space of the Mongolian People's Republic .  .  and .  . . crashed.  . . . The semi-carbonised bodies of nine persons,  a firearm,  documents and equipment proving that the aircraft belonged to the Chinese Air Force were found on the scene of the catastrophe". ('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,438).

"in the innuendo of .  .  .  'Liu Shao-chi and his kind of swindler'".
(Wu Tien-wei: op. cit.; p. 20).

"That Mr.  Lin had plotted to assassinate him as part of  a conspiracy aimed  at replacing the civilian leadership of China with a military dictatorship. . . . When the plot failed, he (Lin -- Ed.) and certain of his followers commandeered a plane and 'tried to escape' to the Soviet Union; the plane crashed and they were killed".
('New York Times', 28 July 1972; p.1; 2).

"Officially confirmed that Mr. Lin had died in a plane crash in Mongolia . . . while fleeing to the Soviet Union".
('New York Times', 29 July 1972; p. 7).

"To conduct the investigation into the Lin Piao-Chen  Po-ta anti-Party clique".
('Resolution of CC of the CDC concerning the Lin-Chen Anti-Party Clique', (1971), in: Michael Y. M. Kau (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 74).

After the setback received by the political representatives of the pro-Soviet compradors, headed   by Lin Piao, at the Lushan Plenum in August/September 1979, and particularly after the frustration of Lin Piao's attempted coup in September 1971, moves towards a Sino-US  rapprochement developed quickly.   In November 1970, American proposals for improving relations between the USA and China were:

"conveyed to Mr. Chou En-lai . . . by the Romanian government."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,437).

"Chairman Mao told the American journalist Mr. Edgar Snow that he would like to meet President NIXON*,  and that it would  be made clear in  the  coming months that it was not the Army which wielded  power  in China."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 25,437).

"after a six-year absence from international competitions, the People's Republic of China  competed in the world table tennis championships."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 24,645).

"When the American table-tennis players arrived in Peking, the group received VIP treatment.  . . . They were received personally by  Chou En-lai".
(Jaap van Ginneken: op. cit.; p. 244).

 "Your visit to China on invitation has opened the door to friendly contacts between the people of the two countries."
(Chou  En-lai:  Statement to Visiting US Table-Tennis Team (April  1971), in: Jaap van Ginneken: ibid.; p. 244).

 "Knowing  of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the  People's Republic of China,  Premier Chou En-lai .  . . has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China". (Jaap  van Ginneken:  ibid.;  p.  250,  citing 'People's Daily' (15  July 1971).

"The United States would support the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 18; p. 24,765).

"Let us start a Long March together".
(Richard Nixon:  Speech at Peking Dinner (February 1972), in: Jaap van Ginneken : op. cit.; p. 295).

"The 22-year-old restrictions on travel to China by US ships and aircraft were lifted".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 19; p. 25,684).

"the two countries . . . agreed . . . to establish a liaison office in each other's capitals". ('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 19; p. 25,837).

"a five-day visit to Peking."
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 20; p. 26,316).

"Chairman Mao Tse-tung had invited him (Nixon -- Ed.) to visit China."
('New York Times', 14 August 1975; p. 19).

Sino-US Rapprochement in World Affairs (1971-76)

 The  rapprochement between the US and the PRC was reflected in the latter throwing off its false 'anti-imperialist' mask in international affairs.

 This was seen in Chinese support for the strengthening of NATO:

"The Communist Chinese leadership .  . . promoted the strengthening of the NATO alliance";
(A. James Gregor:  'The China Connection: US Policy and the People's Republic of China'; Stanford (USA); 1986; p. 90).

 "China is the world's most consistent advocate of German reunification and West European integration";
('Economist', Volume 257, No. 6,898 (8 November 1975); p. 59).

"Peking ceased its criticism of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.  The Communist Chinese leadership .  .  . actively encouraged the security relationship between Tokyo and Washington";
(A. James Gregor: op. cit.; p. 90).

"With the termination of the war in Vietnam, Communist Chinese support for insurrectionary movements in South-East Asia rapidly declined";
(A. James Gregor: ibid.; p. 90).

"Become a champion of stability in the Persian Gulf region. It had  .  .  .  gradually disassociated itself from the national liberation movements in the region".
(A. James Gregor: ibid.; p. 91).

"The Government of People's Republic of China firmly supports the Imperial Government of Iran in its just struggle to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty".  ('Peking Review', Volume 14, No. 34 (20 August 1971); p. 4).

"After the proclamation of Bangla Desh as an independent nation, China refused to recognise it as it had affected the integrity of Pakistan. China opposed the consideration of Bangla Desh's application for UN membership. China offered so much aid to Pakistan that the latter occupied the first place on the list of recipients of Chinese economic aid. From 1965 to 1973 Pakistan received from China $445.7 million of economic aid".
(R. S. Chavan:  'Chinese Foreign Policy: The Chou En-lai Era'; New Delhi; 1979; p. 85-86).

  "The  Chinese government supports the just positions of the Government of Zaire", ('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 19; p. 25,751).

"offered Zaire a big loan of $115 millions".
(R. S. Chavan: op. cit.; p. 198).

"that she no longer recognised him as Santiago's representative, in a move viewed in diplomatic circles as de facto recognition of the new Chilean military junta".
('New York Times', 12 October 1973; p. 3),

"Unremitting efforts to safeguard national independence and defend state sovereignty".
('Keesing's Contemorary Archives', Volume 21; p. 27,334).

"The natural leader of the Third World".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 27,334).

In the 1970s,  the 'New York Times' reported that the US-backed 'National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola' (UNITA), led by Jonas SAVIMBI*,:

"is supported by China and Zaire."
('New York Times', 12 July 1975; p. 3).

"had acquired Mirage jets -- a French-made aircraft  -- and Chinese pilots to fly the planes".
('New York Times', 24 August 1975; p. 2).

 In  his report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC, held in August 1973, Chou En-lai declared that:

"The  shattering of the Lin Piao anti-Party clique is our Party's greatest victory since the 9th Congress.   .  .  .  A movement to criticise Lin Piao and rectify style of work has been launched throughout the country."
(Chou En-lai:  'Report to the 10th National Congress of the CPC', (August 1973), in: 'The 10th National Congress of the CPC (Documents)'; op. cit.; p. 6-7).

"The congress indignantly denounced the Lin Piao anti-Party clique for its crimes. All the delegates firmly supported this resolution: . . .
Expel Lin Piao, the bourgeois careerist, conspirator, counterrevolutionary double-dealer,  renegade and traitor, from the Party once and for all;
expel Chen Po-ta, principal member of the Lin Piao anti-Party clique, anti-Communist Kuomintang element,  Trotskyite,  renegade, enemy agent and revisionist, from the Party once and for all, and dismiss him from all posts".
(Press Communique of the 10th National Congress of the CPC (August 1973), in: 'The 10th National Congress of the CPC (Documents)'; ibid.; p. 92).

"did not vary greatly from the statutes adopted at the previous congress";
(Jaap van Ginneken: op. cit.; p. 304).

"The paragraph concerning Lin Piao .  .  .  was completely deleted".
(Wang  Hung-wen:  'Report on the Revision of the Party Constitution' (August 1973),  in:  'The 10th National Congress of the CPC (Documents)'; op. cit.; p. 43).

"Mirrored the decline in 'military' representation in the Chinese leadership towards pre-Cultural Revolution levels".
(Dennis Woodward: 'Political Power and Gun Barrels: The Role of the PLA', in: Bill Brugger (Ed.): op. cit.; p. 92).

 The 4th National People's Congress met in January 1975, for the first time in ten years:

"The failure to reconvene it being generally attributed to the political upheaval caused by the Cultural Revolution".
('Keesing 's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,965).

"Took place in complete secrecy".
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,965).

"the post of Chairman (President) of the Republic was abolished",
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,966).

 The Army was not strongly represented in the new government,  there being only one military officer among the twelve Deputy Premiers.
('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 21; p. 26,969).

ANDERSON,  Jack N.,  American journalist and missionary (1922-   );  reporter, 'Salt   Lake  City  Tribune'  (1941-44);   Mormon missionary  (1941-44); reporter,  'Washington Merry-go-Round' (1947-  ); editor, 'Parade' (195468).

BANDARANAIKE,  Sirimavo R.  D.,  Sri Lankan politician (1916-  );  married Sri
Lankan  politician Solomon Bandaranaike (1940);  president of Sri  Lankan Freedom Party  after assassination of  husband  (1959);  Prime Minister (1960-65,  1970-71);  stripped  of political rights by parliament (1980); pardoned (1986).

FORD,  Gerald  R.,  American lawyer and politician  (1913-  );  Vice-President (1973-74); President (1974-77).

KISSINGER,Henry A.,  German-born American academic and diplomat (1923-  );  to USA (1938);  Assistant Professor of Government, Harvard University (195962);  Professor of  Government, Harvard University (1962-69); Presidential Assistant  for  National  Security  Affairs  (1969-73);   head,  National Security Council (1969-75);  Nobel Peace Prize (1973); Secretary of State (1973-77); Professor of Diplomacy, Georgetown University (1977-  ).

MARCOS,  Ferdinand,  Hawaiian-born  Filipino lawyer and politician  (1917-89); Senator  (1959-66);  President of Senate (1963-65);  President (1966-86); fled to USA (1986).

MOBUTU,  Sese Seko. Zairean journalist, military officer and politician (1930);  Army  Chief  of  Staff  (1960-65);  led  military  coup  (1965); President (1965-97); field marshal (1982); fled abroad (1997).

NIXON, Richard M, American  lawyer  and  politician (1913-94); Vice-President (1953-61); President (1969-74); resigned (1974).

ROGERS,  William P.,  American lawyer and diplomat (1913-  ); Deputy AttorneyGeneral (1953-57);  Attorney-General (1957-61);  US representative to  UN General Assembly (1965); Secretary of State (1969-73).

SAVIMBI,  Jonas  M.,  Angolan politician (1934-  );  formed US/South  Africanbacked National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) (1966);

SCHUMANN,  Maurice,  French journalist and politician (1911-  );  Minister for Foreign  Affairs  (1951-54,   1959,  1969-73);  Minister  for  Scientific Research (1967-68);  Senator (1974-  );  Vice-President of Senate  (197783).

SNOW,  Edgar  P., American journalist and author (1905-72);  to China  (1928); assistant  editor,   'China  Weekly  Review'  (1929-30);   correspondent, 'Chicago  Tribune'  (1929-30);  correspondent,'Daily  Herald'  (1932-39); returned to USA (1941); war correspondent (1942-43), assistant editor, 'Saturday  Evening  Post'  (1943-51);   special  consultant,   Harvard University (1956-57);  correspondent, 'Look' (1960-61); correspondent, 'Le Nouveau Candide' (1964-65); died in Switzerland (1972).
 

NOTES ON STALIN & THE COLONIAL QUESTION IN CHINA By Alliance
Stalin and China

UPON THE CURRENT SITUATION: OPEN LETTER TO LUDO MARTENS;
Part 1:
Part 2:
Part 3: